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Rational Foundationalism RATIONAL FOUNDATIONALISM A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Sage School of Philosophy of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Chad Alan McIntosh August 2020 © 2020 Chad Alan McIntosh ii RATIONAL FOUNDATIONALISM OR, HOW THE FUNDAMENTAL BEING WHICH EXPLAINS EVERYTHING ELSE ITSELF HAS AN EXPLANATION IN ITSELF, THAT IS, IN ITS PROPER PARTS, OF WHICH THERE ARE THREE THAT MUTUALLY EXPLAOIN EACH OTHER Chad Alan McIntosh, Ph.D Cornell University 2020 Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence. Philosophers have used this principle in arguments for the existence of something ontologically fundamental, an ultimate ground of being, such as God. But if everything has an explanation of its existence, so, too, does whatever is fundamental. I analyze what five prominent historical figures—Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz—have said about how a fundamental being, a being that exists a se, is explained. While none are satisfactory, several lessons are drawn from them to construct a novel proposal, which requires a new way of thinking about absolute and relative fundamentality. If what is fundamental is identified with God, certain Scholastic doctrines about the divine nature, such as absolute simplicity, will have to be abandoned—a consequence that I argue is a virtue rather than vice of the proposal. iii BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH C. A. McIntosh earned his B.A. in Philosophy at Calvin College, and M.A. in Philosophy at Cornell University iv For 魏詩潔 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Three is a magic number Yes, it is, it’s a magic number Somewhere in that ancient mystic Trinity You get three as a magic number The past and the present and the future The faith and hope and charity The heart and the brain and the body Give you three as a magic number A man and a woman had a little baby Yes, they did And they had three in the family That's a magic number There are many people I have to thank for their role, big or small, in helping me complete this dissertation. There are my Calvin College and Cornell University cohorts. Calvin: Prof. Stephen Wykstra, whose gifts as a teacher are unparalleled; Cameron Gibbs and Joshua Schendel, to whose friendship and wit I owe much. Cornell: David Kovacs, Philippe Lemoine, Fran Fairbairn, Brandon Conley, and Eric Epstein, among others, helped me through many conversations (and drinks). My advisers Derk Preboom, Karen Bennett, and Scott MacDonald. Karen, in particular, somehow always met my obstinacy and turtle-paced thinking with supernatural patience. What virtues I lack as a student she more than made up for as an advisor. Others who in some way helped me with the ideas herein include Ted Sider, Simon Evnine, Achille Varzi, Ben Arbour, Jannai Shiels, Tully Borland, and William Vallicella. Finally, and perhaps most of all, I am indebted to vi Cornell philosophy department secretary Pamela Hannah, who went far beyond her duties in helping me navigate the bureaucratic morass of graduate school. Thank you. And, of course, there are friends and family. My parents, including my in-laws, whose proud support I cherish (Scott McIntosh, Cindy and Kevin Kelly, Jim and Dominica Wei). My dear late Nanna, who always asked with genuine interest about my studies. My hometown friends, Shawn Isaacs, Todd Jefferson, and Ben Walker, who have never shied from philosophical conversation. The School House Rock lyrics are apropos for, appropriately enough, three reasons. First, their relevance to my main argument should be obvious. Second, I learned them from Blind Melon’s cover, a band I cannot hear without thinking of my dear friend Will Ard. Will taught me many things, such as what good music is, how to street race, how to look cool while smoking a cigarillo (it’s not easy!), how to be a pool shark, how to think about disability and the resurrection, and how to be a proper bum (also not easy!). Perhaps most importantly, he taught me how death can be at once an enemy and a friend. Will unexpectedly passed away just before my first semester of graduate school. I miss him more than words can express. It was my wife, Lizzy, who taught me how not to be a bum. Thus I come to the third and final reason for the lyrics: Lizzy agreed to patiently wait for me to finish this dissertation before having kids. Impatience overcame my procrastination, giving us Aletheia Zhen McIntosh on October 17th, 2018. There is indeed three in the family. It is to Lizzy this dissertation is dedicated. Ecclesiastes 4:9-12 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS RATIONAL FOUNDATIONALISM: ABSTRACT ........................................................ iii BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............................................................................................. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. vi LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. x INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: RATIONAL FOUNDATIONALISM: PRELIMINARIES .................. 4 1.1. Metaphysical Rationalism ......................................................................................... 4 1.1.1. The PSR .............................................................................................................. 6 1.1.2. The PSR and the Existence of a Fundamental Being ....................................... 10 1.2. Metaphysical Foundationalism ............................................................................... 15 1.2.1. Vicious Circularity ............................................................................................ 16 1.2.2. Vicious Regresses ............................................................................................. 18 1.3. Rational Foundationalism ....................................................................................... 28 1.4. Preview of Aims ...................................................................................................... 33 CHAPTER 2: PRECEDENTS ....................................................................................... 35 2.1. Anselm .................................................................................................................... 35 2.2. Aquinas ................................................................................................................... 42 2.3. Interlude .................................................................................................................. 51 2.4. Descartes ................................................................................................................. 53 2.5. Spinoza .................................................................................................................... 65 2.6. Leibniz ..................................................................................................................... 69 2.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 73 CHAPTER 3: LESSONS LEARNED ............................................................................ 76 3.1. Dependence ............................................................................................................. 76 3.2. Independence ........................................................................................................... 83 3.3. Mutual Dependence ................................................................................................ 84 3.3.1. Purported Examples of Mutual Dependence .................................................... 84 3.3.2. The Priority Problem ........................................................................................ 91 3.3.3. Non-Vicious Mutual Dependence .................................................................... 93 3.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 97 CHAPTER 4: HOW TO BE A RATIONAL FOUNDATIONALIST ........................ 99 4.1. Absolute Fundamentality ........................................................................................ 99 4.1.1. Building a Fundamental Being ....................................................................... 100 4.1.2. Interlude: A Mereological Proposal ................................................................ 101 4.1.3. Back to Building ............................................................................................. 104 4.2. Relative Fundamentality ....................................................................................... 108 4.2.1. The Proximity View ........................................................................................ 109 4.2.2. The Quantitative View .................................................................................... 111 4.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 118 CHAPTER 5: PUTTING EVERYTHING TOGETHER .......................................... 119 5.1. The Main Argument .............................................................................................. 119 5.2. A Humean Objection ............................................................................................. 122 5.3. Subatomic Particles ..............................................................................................
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