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Caitsith a New Type of Rule Based In-Kernel Access Control

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Caitsith a New Type of Rule Based In-Kernel Access Control LinuxCon North America 2012 (San Diego) CaitSith a new type of rule based in-kernel access control Tetsuo Handa, NTT (C) 2012 NTT Open Source Software Center 2012/8/29-2012/8/31 Who am I? A retired employed programmer My involvement with Linux 2001.10-2003.3 Developing user space applications that run on Linux systems. 2003.4-2012.3 Developing kernel mechanisms for improving security of Linux systems. 2012.4- Providing user support service for troubleshooting Linux systems. 1 What do I speak today? Security, especially access control in kernel space. May I? Yes. May I? No. User space Kernel space Subject(processes), Action, Object(resources) That's all. However, it is extremely difficult to develop rules that match user's needs. Subject Action Object 2 Players? Security mechanisms which come on my talk. SELinux SubDomain SAKURA TOMOYO CERBERUS SYAORAN YUE TOMOYO 1.x TOMOYO 2.x RWXfilter AppArmor AKARI code inheritance CaitSith idea feedback 3 TOMOYO is a registered trademark of NTT DATA CORPORATION in Japan. Structure of this presentation? Chapter 1 --- Introduction: Summarized description of what has happened before CaitSith For users who are interested in in-kernel access control. Chapter 2 --- Things I experienced with continuing enhancement of access control functionality For developers who are developing access control modules. Chapter 3 --- Things I experienced with continuing enhancement of ease of use For users who are seeking for simpler in-kernel access control modules. Chapter 4 --- CaitSith For users who are interested in my proposal. 4 Chapter 1 Introduction: Summarized description of what has happened before CaitSith 5 Everyone's security varies? What people associate with the word "security" depends on their skill levels and beliefs. Give people choices, rather than forcing the only one. My belief is that visualization is important. Many of today's security issues come from invisibleness. Traceability leads to satisfaction. 6 Attempts for doing access control in the kernel space Threats are in the behavior of the user space. But, doing access control in the user space is problematic. It can be bypassed when deprived of control. Its level and granularity varies. Let's do access control in the kernel space, in addition to access control in the user space. Although what in-kernel access control can do is limited, in- kernel access control can provide a baseline restriction and will be useful. 7 Mandatory Access Control(MAC) Implementation that does access control in the kernel space. It cannot be bypassed because it is done in the kernel space. Currently, SELinux, SMACK, TOMOYO and AppArmor are in the Linux mainline kernel. They are all **whitelisting** approach which uses Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface. They do access control from the point of view of **subjects**. can only on 8 Distributor's kernels enable some of them, but... Many people are still disabling SELinux. 9 Distributor's kernels enable some of them, but... Even AppArmor which was claimed to be easier than SELinux is disabled. 10 Distributor's kernels enable some of them, but... What about SMACK? Not disabled yet, for SMACK is not enabled without user's explicit configuration. 11 Distributor's kernels enable some of them, but... What about TOMOYO? Not disabled yet, for TOMOYO is not enabled without user's explicit configuration. 12 Distributor's kernels enable some of them, but... Reasons to disable them? Fears to use without understanding their configuration. Fears to miss permissions in the whitelisting approach. There are a lot of documentation. Too long, didn't read. They are for developers, not for users. 13 "all or nothing" problem Ideally, access control is enforced on all subjects and all objects. In reality, it is considered as "Well done" if access control is enforced on some specific subjects. When troubles occur, they will have no choice but to **disable entirely** unless they know how to configure policy and current policy configurations. 14 Reasons why TOMOYO insisted on manageability for users? No resource to distribute ready-made policy. TOMOYO has no background distributors compared to SELinux(RedHat) and AppArmor(SUSE/Ubuntu). Unable to troubleshoot if ready-made policy is used. TOMOYO would follow the same way where SELinux and AppArmor stray into. What people want to allow/deny varies. It is impossible to develop ready-made policy that can cover everybody's needs. Have to disable upon troubles if there is only one switch. "all or nothing" problem 15 Problems with developing policy configuration An "access control" restricts access requests based on rules defined beforehand. It is an implicit requirement that users can define rules beforehand. However, to define rules beforehand, users have to be familiar with internal structure of Linux systems. Not many users are familiar with Linux internal because it is a world where they usually don't care. However, paying attention for burden of defining rules has generally been viewed as unimportant. TOMOYO had been paying attention for this burden. 16 TOMOYO had been struggled in order to keep TOMOYO enabled. Made possible to enable/disable on a per-action basis using profiles. This allows users to choose the action coverage based on their skills. Made possible to enable/disable on a per-domain basis using profiles. This allows users to choose the subjects coverage based on their skills. 17 TOMOYO had been struggled in order to keep TOMOYO enabled. Made possible to handle policy violations interactively. This allows users to judge unexpected access requests on a case-by-case basis. Made possible to understand all states using tree style domain transitions. This allows users to understand what's going on. 18 Meanwhile, I received unexpected requests from RHEL users... "I want to apply access control on specific resources (files), rather than applying on specific processes." TOMOYO was allowing users to enable/disable access control on a per-action basis and a per-domain basis, but was not allowing users to enable/disable access control on a per-file basis. 19 After all, did existing MAC implementations respond to user's needs? User's needs are not always whitelisting nor from the point of view of processes. Some wants to apply from the point of view of resources. Some are not interested in managing domains. These are limitations for TOMOYO. We might want to try a fundamental course-changing move. That's the trigger for developing CaitSith. 20 Chapter 2 Things I experienced with continuing enhancement of access control functionality 21 SAKURA (2003.4-) An attempt for protecting Linux systems without policy management. SELinux SubDomain SAKURA TOMOYO CERBERUS SYAORAN YUE TOMOYO 1.x TOMOYO 2.x RWXfilter AppArmor AKARI code inheritance CaitSith idea feedback 22 SAKURA I tried SELinux, but I soon gave up because SELinux was too difficult to use. Can't we omit policy management by specializing for protection from tampering? Code name: "Security Advancement Know-how Upon Read- only Approach for Linux" Topics on SAKURA Protection from tampering via read-only mounting System-wide access restriction Spontaneous permission abandonment via modification of user space programs 23 Protection from tampering via read-only mounting Mounting filesystems as read-only wherever possible in order to reduce the risk of tampering files. I modified the kernel to report pathnames which failed with - EROFS error in order to help separating read-only directories and writable directories. Mount all partitions except partitions which need to be writable (e.g. /var and /tmp) read-only, and store read-only partitions into read-only medium in order to protect from direct tampering attacks (e.g. writing to block device files which corresponds to read-only mounted partitions). 24 System-wide access restriction Mounting a writable filesystem over a read-only filesystem ruins tamper-proof protection. Restrict namespace related actions (e.g. mount, chroot, pivot_root) for system-wide. An example configuration looks like below. allow_mount devpts /dev/pts/ devpts 0x0 allow_mount any / --remount 0x0 allow_mount securityfs /sys/kernel/security/ securityfs 0x0 allow_mount none /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/ binfmt_misc 0x0 allow_chroot /etc/avahi/ Note that the name of allow_chroot /var/empty/sshd/ processes are not specified. 25 Spontaneous permission abandonment via modification of user space programs To make system-wide access restriction more efficient, I added spontaneous permission abandonment by appending a original field to task_struct of Linux 2.4 kernels. Allow user space programs to discard permissions to call execve(), chroot(), pivot_root(), mount() and a permission to regain effective UID = 0 on a per-task_struct basis. Temporal discard which the permissions will be regained after successful execve() request. Permanent discard which the permissions will not be regained after execve() request. We could not afford resource to modify user space programs and this feature was removed in TOMOYO 1.4. => But a more wider spontaneous permission abandonment feature was added to Linux 3.5 as "seccomp mode 2". 26 SYAORAN (2004.10-) Tamper-proof filesystem for /dev partition. SELinux SubDomain SAKURA TOMOYO CERBERUS SYAORAN YUE TOMOYO 1.x TOMOYO 2.x RWXfilter AppArmor AKARI code inheritance CaitSith idea feedback 27 SYAORAN SAKURA made it possible to mount / partition as read-only, but /dev cannot be mounted as read-only. Existing /dev filesystems (e.g. devfs and devtmpfs) allowed modification of directory entries via requests from user space. Tampering files in /dev partition is a severe problem. What happens if /dev/null has attributes of /dev/zero ? Code name: "Simple Yet All-important Object Realizing Abiding Nexus" Topics on SYAORAN Tamper-proof filesystem for /dev partition 28 Tamper-proof filesystem for /dev partition I developed a dedicated filesystem for /dev by adding attribute checking logic to tmpfs filesystem. By using this filesystem, we can enforce combination of filenames and their attributes. For example, /dev/null always has char-1-3 and /dev/zero always has char-1-5.
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