The Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
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Tizen IVI “From Scratch” Customizing, Building and Testing
Tizen IVI “from scratch” Customizing, building and testing Stéphane Desneux Senior Software Engineer Eurogiciel <[email protected]> Eurogiciel ● Open source development and integration: ● Maintainers in multiple domains on tizen.org ● Embedded systems for real-time multimedia: ▪ Widi/Miracast stack ▪ Wayland/Weston ▪ Webkit2 browser with HW acceleration ● Applications: HTML5/CSS3, jquery, jqmobi, Cordova ● Location : Vannes (Brittany), France 14 2 FOSDEM' Automotive devroom – Tizen “from scratch” : customize, build, test ! Agenda ● Tizen & Tizen:IVI : short introduction ● From source code to target devices ● Customize ● Build ● Flash, Run, Test ! 14 3 FOSDEM' Automotive devroom – Tizen “from scratch” : customize, build, test ! Tizen: a short introduction Definition ● Open source project ● Hosted at the Linux Foundation ● Innovative Web-based platform for multiple devices ● Sponsored by worldwide companies ● Samsung & Intel are two big contributors ● Built on industry standards: ● GNU/Linux kernel, GNU libc ● POSIX ● W3C ● Many upstream Open Source projects 14 5 FOSDEM' Automotive devroom – Tizen “from scratch” : customize, build, test ! Tizen Profiles ● Multiple vertical profiles (derived from Tizen:Generic) ● IVI ● Mobile ● Future: other devices (TV, ...) ● Each profile adds its own enhancements ● Tizen packaging format: RPM 14 6 FOSDEM' Automotive devroom – Tizen “from scratch” : customize, build, test ! From source code … … to target devices 1: Source code GIT Repositories Remote Local Clone source repo Developers -
Role Based Access Control on MLS Systems Without Kernel Changes
Role Based Access Control on For example, roles in a bank may include the role of teller or accountant. Each of these roles has a set of MLS Systems without Kernel privileges or transactions that they can p erform, includ- Changes ing some privileges that are available to b oth roles. Roles can b e hierarchical. For example, some roles in a hospital D. Richard Kuhn may b e health care provider, nurse, and do ctor. The do c- National Institute of Standards and Technology tor role may include all privileges available to the nurse Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899 role, which in turn includes all the privileges available to the health care provider role. Roles have b een used in a variety of forms for com- Abstract puter system security for at least 20 years, and several prop osals for incorp orating roles into existing access con- Role based access control (RBAC) is attracting increas- trol mechanisms have b een published [2], [3], [4]. More ing attention as a security mechanism for b oth commer- recently, formal defnitions for general-purp ose RBAC no- cial and many military systems. This pap er shows how tions have b een prop osed [5], [6], [7]. RBAC can b e implemented using the mechanisms avail- This pap er shows how RBAC can b e implemented able on traditional multi-level security systems that im- using the controls available on traditional lattice-based plement information fow p olicies. The construction from multi-level secure systems. This approach presents a MLS to RBAC systems is signifcant b ecause it shows that number of advantages: the enormous investment in MLS systems can b e lever- aged to pro duce RBAC systems. -
File Permissions Do Not Restrict Root
Filesystem Security 1 General Principles • Files and folders are managed • A file handle provides an by the operating system opaque identifier for a • Applications, including shells, file/folder access files through an API • File operations • Access control entry (ACE) – Open file: returns file handle – Allow/deny a certain type of – Read/write/execute file access to a file/folder by – Close file: invalidates file user/group handle • Access control list (ACL) • Hierarchical file organization – Collection of ACEs for a – Tree (Windows) file/folder – DAG (Linux) 2 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) • Users can protect what they own – The owner may grant access to others – The owner may define the type of access (read/write/execute) given to others • DAC is the standard model used in operating systems • Mandatory Access Control (MAC) – Alternative model not covered in this lecture – Multiple levels of security for users and documents – Read down and write up principles 3 Closed vs. Open Policy Closed policy Open Policy – Also called “default secure” • Deny Tom read access to “foo” • Give Tom read access to “foo” • Deny Bob r/w access to “bar” • Give Bob r/w access to “bar • Tom: I would like to read “foo” • Tom: I would like to read “foo” – Access denied – Access allowed • Tom: I would like to read “bar” • Tom: I would like to read “bar” – Access allowed – Access denied 4 Closed Policy with Negative Authorizations and Deny Priority • Give Tom r/w access to “bar” • Deny Tom write access to “bar” • Tom: I would like to read “bar” – Access -
Access Control and Operating System
Outline (may not finish in one lecture) Access Control and Operating Access Control Concepts Secure OS System Security • Matrix, ACL, Capabilities • Methods for resisting • Multi-level security (MLS) stronger attacks OS Mechanisms Assurance • Multics • Orange Book, TCSEC John Mitchell – Ring structure • Common Criteria • Amoeba • Windows 2000 – Distributed, capabilities certification • Unix Some Limitations – File system, Setuid • Information flow • Windows • Covert channels – File system, Tokens, EFS • SE Linux – Role-based, Domain type enforcement Access control Access control matrix [Lampson] Common Assumption Objects • System knows who the user is File 1 File 2 File 3 … File n – User has entered a name and password, or other info • Access requests pass through gatekeeper User 1 read write - - read – OS must be designed monitor cannot be bypassed User 2 write write write - - Reference Subjects monitor User 3 - - - read read User process ? Resource … User m read write read write read Decide whether user can apply operation to resource Two implementation concepts Capabilities Access control list (ACL) File 1 File 2 … Operating system concept • “… of the future and always will be …” • Store column of matrix User 1 read write - Examples with the resource User 2 write write - • Dennis and van Horn, MIT PDP-1 Timesharing Capability User 3 - - read • Hydra, StarOS, Intel iAPX 432, Eros, … • User holds a “ticket” for … • Amoeba: distributed, unforgeable tickets each resource User m read write write • Two variations References – store -
Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. 1201 for Software Freedom Conservancy Proposed Class: 20 – Smart T
Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under 17 U.S.C. 1201 For Software Freedom Conservancy Proposed Class: 20 – Smart TVs No multimedia evidence is being provided in connection with this comment Item 1. Commenter Information The Petition submitter is Software Freedom Conservancy (“Conservancy”), a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit organization that helps promote, improve, develop, and defend Free, Libre, and Open Source Software (“FLOSS”)—software developed by volunteer communities and licensed for the benefit of everyone. Conservancy is the nonprofit home for dozens of FLOSS projects representing well over a thousand volunteer contributors. Conservancy's communities maintain some of the most fundamental utilities in computing today, and introduce innovations that will shape how software will be created in the future. Among the projects for which Conservancy provides logistical, administrative, and legal support are BusyBox and Samba, both of which are commonly installed on “smart” or computer- embedded consumer electronics devices. BusyBox provides a number of key system utilities that enable such devices to run applications, interact with files, access network services, and more.1 It is also used by community projects focused on unlocking and improving Samsung-2 and LG- manufactured Smart TVs.3 Samba permits devices to interact with files stored on other networked devices.4 Conservancy also represents the interests of several contributors to the Linux kernel, the core component of the operating system of most Smart TVs. Conservancy may be contacted through its authorized representatives and pro bono counsel at Tor Ekeland, P.C., 195 Plymouth Street, Brooklyn, New York 11201: Aaron Williamson Frederic Jennings (718) 285-9349 (718) 514-2075 [email protected] [email protected] Item 2. -
Tizen Based Remote Controller CAR Using Raspberry Pi2
#ELC2016 Tizen based remote controller CAR using raspberry pi2 Pintu Kumar ([email protected], [email protected]) Samsung Research India – Bangalore : Tizen Kernel/BSP Team Embedded Linux Conference – 06th April/2016 1 CONTENT #ELC2016 • INTRODUCTION • RASPBERRY PI2 OVERVIEW • TIZEN OVERVIEW • HARDWARE & SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS • SOFTWARE CUSTOMIZATION • SOFTWARE SETUP & INTERFACING • HARDWARE INTERFACING & CONNECTIONS • ROBOT CONTROL MECHANISM • SOME RESULTS • CONCLUSION • REFERENCES Embedded Linux Conference – 06th April/2016 2 INTRODUCTION #ELC2016 • This talk is about designing a remote controller robot (toy car) using the raspberry pi2 hardware, pi2 Linux Kernel and Tizen OS as platform. • In this presentation, first we will see how to replace and boot Tizen OS on Raspberry Pi using the pre-built Tizen images. Then we will see how to setup Bluetooth, Wi-Fi on Tizen and finally see how to control a robot remotely using Tizen smart phone application. Embedded Linux Conference – 06th April/2016 3 RASPBERRY PI2 - OVERVIEW #ELC2016 1 GB RAM Embedded Linux Conference – 06th April/2016 4 Raspberry PI2 Features #ELC2016 • Broadcom BCM2836 900MHz Quad Core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU • 1GB RAM • 4 USB ports • 40 GPIO pins • Full HDMI port • Ethernet port • Combined 3.5mm audio jack and composite video • Camera interface (CSI) • Display interface (DSI) • Micro SD card slot • Video Core IV 3D graphics core Embedded Linux Conference – 06th April/2016 5 PI2 GPIO Pins #ELC2016 Embedded Linux Conference – 06th April/2016 6 TIZEN OVERVIEW #ELC2016 Embedded Linux Conference – 06th April/2016 7 TIZEN Profiles #ELC2016 Mobile Wearable IVI TV TIZEN Camera PC/Tablet Printer Common Next?? • TIZEN is the OS of everything. -
Making Linux Security Frameworks Available to Containers
Security Namespace : Making Linux Security Frameworks Available to Containers Yuqiong Sun, David Safford, Mimi Zohar, Dimitrios Pendarakis, Zhongshu Gu and Trent Jaeger Container vs. Virtual Machines • Containers are operating system level virtualization environment for running multiple isolated Linux systems on a single Linux control host Image credit: Docker Inc. and RightScale Inc. Is Kernel Sharing All Good? • Container owners cannot leverage kernel security frameworks to protect their containers • I.e., cannot apply local security policies to govern integrity measurement, code execution, mandatory access control, etc. Integrity Attestation for Container • On a container cloud, can a container owner attest integrity of his/her containers to his/her customers? • Exactly what Linux Integrity subsystem (a.k.a. IMA) is designed for kernel mmap() extend Process Measure record Policy Measurements Integrity Attestation for Container (Cont.) • But… • Mixed measurements from different containers and host Process mmap() kernel extend Container1 Measure mmap() record Process Policy Measurements Container2 Integrity Attestation for Container (Cont.) • But… • Mixed measurements from different containers and host • Different versions of policies Process mmap() kernel extend Container1 Measure mmap() record Process Policy1 Policy2 Measurements Container2 Integrity Attestation for Container (Cont.) • But… • Mixed measurements from different containers and host • Different versions of policies • And policies do not always agree with each other Me: -
Operating Systems & Virtualisation Security Knowledge Area
Operating Systems & Virtualisation Security Knowledge Area Issue 1.0 Herbert Bos Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam EDITOR Andrew Martin Oxford University REVIEWERS Chris Dalton Hewlett Packard David Lie University of Toronto Gernot Heiser University of New South Wales Mathias Payer École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne The Cyber Security Body Of Knowledge www.cybok.org COPYRIGHT © Crown Copyright, The National Cyber Security Centre 2019. This information is licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. To view this licence, visit: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ When you use this information under the Open Government Licence, you should include the following attribution: CyBOK © Crown Copyright, The National Cyber Security Centre 2018, li- censed under the Open Government Licence: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open- government-licence/. The CyBOK project would like to understand how the CyBOK is being used and its uptake. The project would like organisations using, or intending to use, CyBOK for the purposes of education, training, course development, professional development etc. to contact it at con- [email protected] to let the project know how they are using CyBOK. Issue 1.0 is a stable public release of the Operating Systems & Virtualisation Security Knowl- edge Area. However, it should be noted that a fully-collated CyBOK document which includes all of the Knowledge Areas is anticipated to be released by the end of July 2019. This will likely include updated page layout and formatting of the individual Knowledge Areas KA Operating Systems & Virtualisation Security j October 2019 Page 1 The Cyber Security Body Of Knowledge www.cybok.org INTRODUCTION In this Knowledge Area, we introduce the principles, primitives and practices for ensuring se- curity at the operating system and hypervisor levels. -
Hardening Linux Processes Extending Grsecurity to Integrate System Call Filters and Namespaces
Universidad de Los Andes Tesis de Maestr´ıa Hardening Linux Processes Extending Grsecurity to Integrate System Call Filters and Namespaces David Derby Cardona Facultad de Ingenier´ıa Departamento de Ingenier´ıade Sistemas y Computaci´on June 2016 Universidad de Los Andes Tesis de Maestr´ıa Hardening Linux Processes Extending Grsecurity to Integrate System Call Filters and Namespaces David Derby Cardona Asesor: Sandra Rueda Rodr´ıguez Jurados: Rafael G´omezD´ıaz Fabian Molina Molina Facultad de Ingenier´ıa Departamento de Ingenier´ıade Sistemas y Computaci´on June 2016 Abstract The area of Linux sandboxing has seen various developments in recent years with the intro- duction of operating system containers and the ever present need to harden the security of applications. Two of the more prominent technologies that have been used when creating sandboxes are namespaces and system call filters. Whilst these technologies have been ef- fective for creating sandboxes, they are limited in that they require a developer to integrate them into their software. This work proposes to use these two technologies to enforce the Principle of Least Privilege on every process on a system. The solution extends a grsecurity hardened Linux kernel and allows the user to define security policies for each process which permit them to behave as intended. The presented results demonstrate the effectiveness of the extended Linux kernel and its impact on performance. The results provide a basis that may be built upon to deliver a comprehensive solution that would be appealing for use in real world environments. 1 Contents Abstract 1 Index of Figures 4 Index of Tables 5 1 Introduction 1 2 Context and Problem Description 3 2.1 Linux . -
Unbreakable Enterprise Kernel Release Notes for Unbreakable Enterprise Kernel Release 3
Unbreakable Enterprise Kernel Release Notes for Unbreakable Enterprise Kernel Release 3 E48380-10 June 2020 Oracle Legal Notices Copyright © 2013, 2020, Oracle and/or its affiliates. This software and related documentation are provided under a license agreement containing restrictions on use and disclosure and are protected by intellectual property laws. Except as expressly permitted in your license agreement or allowed by law, you may not use, copy, reproduce, translate, broadcast, modify, license, transmit, distribute, exhibit, perform, publish, or display any part, in any form, or by any means. Reverse engineering, disassembly, or decompilation of this software, unless required by law for interoperability, is prohibited. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice and is not warranted to be error-free. If you find any errors, please report them to us in writing. If this is software or related documentation that is delivered to the U.S. Government or anyone licensing it on behalf of the U.S. Government, then the following notice is applicable: U.S. GOVERNMENT END USERS: Oracle programs (including any operating system, integrated software, any programs embedded, installed or activated on delivered hardware, and modifications of such programs) and Oracle computer documentation or other Oracle data delivered to or accessed by U.S. Government end users are "commercial computer software" or "commercial computer software documentation" pursuant to the applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation and agency-specific supplemental regulations. As such, the use, reproduction, duplication, release, display, disclosure, modification, preparation of derivative works, and/or adaptation of i) Oracle programs (including any operating system, integrated software, any programs embedded, installed or activated on delivered hardware, and modifications of such programs), ii) Oracle computer documentation and/or iii) other Oracle data, is subject to the rights and limitations specified in the license contained in the applicable contract. -
About Security Solutions in Fog Computing
“Ovidius” University Annals, Economic Sciences Series Volume XVI, Issue 1/2016 About Security Solutions in Fog Computing Eugen Petac Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science “Ovidius” University of Constanța, Romania [email protected] Andreea-Oana Petac Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science “Ovidius” University of Constanța, Romania [email protected] Abstract The key for improving a system's performance, its security and reliability is to have the data processed locally in remote data centers. Fog computing extends cloud computing through its services to devices and users at the edge of the network. Through this paper it is explored the fog computing environment. Security issues in this area are also described. Fog computing provides the improved quality of services to the user by complementing shortages of cloud in IoT (Internet of Things) environment. Our proposal, named Adaptive Fog Computing Node Security Profile (AFCNSP), which is based security Linux solutions, will get an improved security of fog node with rich feature sets. Key words: Fog Computing, IoT, Fog Computing Security J.E.L. classification: L8, M1, M3 1. Introduction Fog computing is a modern computing paradigm, representing distributed computing services, applications, access to pieces of information and various storage data, the user not needing to know the physical configurations for the systems that provide these services. This new technology is based on the tendency of cutting out the costs of the delivery services and increasing the dexterity of the deployment of the services. Utilizing this distributed computing concept, the services can be hosted at end devices (e.g. access points), creating an automated response that drives the value. -
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
CS 5323 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair Lecture 7 [email protected] www.profsandhu.com © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 1 Authentication, Authorization, Audit AAA Authentication Authorization Audit Who are You? What are You What Did You Do? Allowed to Do? siloed integrated © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 2 Access Control Fixed policy Discretionary Access Control Mandatory Access Control (DAC), 1970 (MAC), 1970 Role Based Access Control (RBAC), 1995 Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC), ???? Flexible policy © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 3 Access Matrix Model © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 4 Access Matrix Model Objects (and Subjects) F G S U r w r u own b j r w e V c own t s rights © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 5 Access Matrix Model Basic Abstractions Subjects Objects Rights The rights in a cell specify the access of the subject (row) to the object (column) © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 6 Users and Subjects A subject is a program (application) executing on behalf of a user A user may at any time be idle, or have one or more subjects executing on its behalf User-subject distinction is important if subject’s rights are different from a user’s rights Usually a subset In many systems a subject has all the rights of a user A human user may manifest as multiple users (accounts, principals) in the system © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 7 Users and Subjects JOE.TOP-SECRET JOE.SECRET JOE JOE.CONFIDENTIAL JOE.UNCLASSIFIED USER SUBJECTS © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research with Real-World Impact! 8 Users and Subjects JANE.CHAIRPERSON JANE.FACULTY JANE JANE.