The 1975-76 Federal Deficits and the Credit Market
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The 1975-76 Federal Defleits and the Credit Market RICHARD W. LANG rfp I HE possible effects on credit markets of the fiscal 1975 and 1976 U.S. Government deficits were of con- Table I siderable concern in late 1974 and early 1975. Projec- Fiscal Year Surplus or Deficit tions of these deficits ran from $50 to $80 billion Fsscel Surplus ( )orDeficit or more. A number of analysts outlined certain condi- Year (In 8,llson of Dolla tions under \vhich the financing of such large deficits 1965 1.6 by Treasury borrowing would have adverse effects on 1966 38 credit markets, pushing short-term interest rates into 1967 87 the double-digit range again and crowding out private 1968 252 borrowing for capital formation. If these conditions 1969 32 developed, it was suggested that the Federal Reserve 197 2.8 might attempt to keep interest rates from rising by 1971 230 increasing its rate of purchase of Government securi- 192 232 ties. As a result, there would be a large increase in 973 43 the growth of the money stock, which eventually 1974 35 would lead to a new inflationary spiral that would 1975 436 push interest rates higher due to increased inflationary 976 65.6 expectations.’ e Thi 1? Es I r ipso ‘F The concern for credit markets was based on the lice I assumption that the increased Government demand for credit would overwhelm any decrease in the tan rdsthedfi’it 975and /6wr i ed private demand for credit as well as any increase in lamg~ aisu ~isThg t the’ gen oi I oc . i d the supply of credit. Other aralysts maintained that 1 ets’in ifrst ‘ s( ig si? although Government borrowing would increase, pri- vate borrowing would decrease substantially during the recession. This decrease in the private demand for funds was expected to largely offset the increased Government demand, with the result that the larger r i k co t’ ~ ‘ e rms deficits would have little effect on either interest 1 s Udidf k rates or the total quantity of credit.’ m ‘U e ‘t ‘i tog the C tity d t ‘ e ni it The deficits in fiscal 1975 and 1976 were $43.6 t billion and $65.6 billion, respectively, while the largest a ) c e’nii ‘ jjUo an d- deficit in the previous ten fiscal years was $25.2 billion ad r i. ‘oc m’~ ‘oc d 1~ 0 ‘1 (see Table I) .~ Thus, relative to recent historical lu oxrm et n, ‘This possibility was expressed in tins Review in a number of mm ci m e ‘U fi iii’ different articles. See, for example, Darryl H. Francis. “How yi re nra ~t oros’i ‘e..l i in- and Why Fiscal Actions Matter to a Monetarist,” this Review ee s ts am, cit (May 1974), p. 7; W. Philip Cranim, “Inflation: Its Cause and Cure,” this Review (h”ebruaiy 1975), pp. 5-6; or Susan ,n n ‘ e ii - o 1 de ,n rdi H. Roesch, “The Monetary-Fiscal Mix Through Mid-1976,” I I C t c this Review (August 1975). pp. 2-7. 0 1 - o’ro ig. exe t ‘This point of view ‘vax clearlr’ expressed by James L. Pierce, “Interest Rates and Their Prospect in the Recovery,” Brook- fi. i ems h to’a ing.r Papers on Economic Activity (1:1975), pp. 89-112. ‘Using the unified budget data as reported in the Federal ‘ihedics Us ‘phi r ,m ‘, rm of h aom Resen-e Bulletirs. mi I 4 ~ n’” ft rdnos’,Irte,of’n rst. Page 9 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1977 demand for credit depends in large part on whether finance the large projected deficits, with other factors the deficit is predominantly due to “active” or “pas- unchanged, market interest rates would rise. Further- 5 sive” elements in the budget. Discretionary changes more, it was claimed that if the Federal Reserve pur- in Federal expenditures and taxes which result from chased a large proportion of the increased debt in an Congressional or Executive actions are “active” ele- attempt to prevent this increase in interest rates, ments in the budget. Nondiseretionary, or automatic, higher expected rates of inflation would result, This, changes in Federal expenditures or taxes which result in turn, would lead to higher interest rates. The above from changes in the level of economic activity are analysis also implied that the nominal quantity of “passive” elements in the budget. A Federal deficit credit outstanding would increase. which is primarily the result of active elements in the The above outlook for the credit market depended budget will tend to produce a larger increase in the heavily on the assumption that there would not he a total demand for credit than if the deficit were pri- substantial decrease in the private demand for credit. marily due to passive elements. This tendency re- Some analysts, however, maintained that the recession flects the fact that credit finances economic activity. would induce much lower private investment because If the budget deficit is the result of passive elements, of higher excess capacity, and that the private de- the decline in economic activity which leads to the mand for credit would therefore decrease substantially increased deficit is also generally accompanied by a during fiscal 1975. Private borrowing would he lower decline in the private demand for credit. primarily as a result of a decline in the private de- Given an increase in the total demand for credit mand for credit and not as a result of a rise in market from an increased Government deficit, regardless of interest rates. This decrease in private demand, ac- whether the deficit is active or passive, the market cording to proponents of this view, was expected to interest rate increases as potential borrowers hid for offset, although not totally, the increase in the Govern- the available credit. As a result, the quantity of credit ment’s demand for funds.’ supplied increases as suppliers of credit are induced This point of view generally maintained that the to increase their lending by the rse in interest rates. credit market would be basically unaffected, in terms Since Federal Government borrowing is relatively in- of price and total quantity, by the large increase in sensitive to changes in the cost of borrowing, the Government borrowing, As a result of the changes in main effect of a rise in the market interest rate is on private and Government demands, the distribution of private sector borrowing. If other factors are un- total credit would change, but interest rates would changed, private horrowers will want to borrow a not be substantially increased and the quantity of smaller quantity of credit at this higher interest rate. credit outstanding would he increased only slightly. Since the total quantity of credit supplied is larger, Of course, in the absence of the Government’s in- this implies that the proportion of credit going to the creased borrowing, the expected decrease in private Government is larger. The resulting absolute decrease demand would have implied even lower interest rates in the amount of private sector credit is one illustra- in 1975-76, according to this view, tion of the argument that Government borrowing “crowds out” private borrowing.° This simplified analysis describes the underlying C~tj%:FI)N\iF:~N~~i~ rationale for some of the warnings expressed in 4 r 1974-75 about higher interest rates and private bor- Is ...‘.‘ if rowing. It was maintained that if the Government .‘s.t±y.sa.rv.il..i v.UIv..~ .itim’i ijii..hlasO In 1975 and 1976, short-term interest rates did not increased its debt by $50 to $100 billion in order to rise above their mid-1974 peaks, but instead tended to decline. Although short-term rates rose in mid-1975 rsFor a detailed discussion of “active” and “passive” budget deficits. see Keith NI. Carlson, “Large Federal Budget Defi- and again in mid-1976 (see Ghart I). these upward cits: Perspectives and Prospects,” this Review (October movements were not sustained and were not as severe 1976), pp. 2-7. 6 as some analysts had expected. In mid-1975, the up- For a detailed discussion of “crowding out”, see J. Kurt Dew, ward movement in short-term rates peaked at rates “The Capital Market Crowding Out Problem in Perspective,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review below 7 percent, and in mid-1976 they peaked at (December 1975), pp 36-42; Roger W. Spencer and William P. Yohe, “The ‘Crowding Out’ of Private Expendi- tures by Fiscal Policy ,kctions,” this Review (October 1970), ‘Pierce estimated that Covs’nmmnent borrowing in calendar year pp. 12-24; and Keith M. Carlson and Roger W. Spencer, 1975 would increase by 880 billion while borrowing liv other “Crowding Out and Its Critics,” this Review ( December nonfinancial sectors w’mdd decrease by’ 872 billion. See 1975), pp. 2-17. Pierce, “Interest Hates,” pp. 106-8. Page 10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1977 chart cha,,, It Short-Term Interest Rates Long-Term Interest Rates RaIls Scale Ratio Seal. of Yields M,,’hI, A,oo~ 0 skIt, hi,,,,, of Yield, Is 1968 1969 1970 1971 1Q72 1973 l974 1975 1976 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 do,,, do, plood: if P5* 30.y,,, ,,otg,a.,. O,,h,d Ik,,I ‘dl,’, d,~,,,’,,,,, 15,0’. P,,p,’~dhpP,d’,~~a,,,,,, Ll Mashi yP5,,,a,,.’t Th,’,dap ha,’,,,. 13 A,,,,a,, ‘5 ylald’ a, ‘.‘p..’ “as 5,, ,,SI,hl, 5,1,,~’,’, ,,oo,, ,,d’di,g I,,,,, p,I,II,a.,.