The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Challenges of Establishing an Integrated Capability for Upholding Security
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2011-06 The Gulf Cooperation Council and the challenges of establishing an integrated capability for upholding security Almotairy, Sami F. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5677 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND THE CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN INTEGRATED CAPABILITY FOR UPHOLDING SECURITY by Sami F. Almotairy June 2011 Thesis Co-Advisors: James Russell Abbas Kadhim Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Reissued 25 May 2015 with correction to author’s surname THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Challenges of 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Establishing an Integrated Capability for Upholding Security 6. AUTHOR(S) Sami F. Almotairy 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ______NA__________. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The Gulf Cooperation Council’s abysmal performance during the last thirty years clearly demonstrates that the member-states of this alliance remain unprepared to seriously commit themselves to the establishment of a credible joint defense force able to facilitate the goal of collective security for which the GCC was established in the first place. This thesis seeks explanations as to why the GCC has made little progress in establishing mechanisms to provide collective security for its members through the lenses of neorealist theory and regime theory. Neorealist theory does explain the GCC’s stumble on the path to achieving collective security by expecting that the GCC would not succeed if there were other options for security, but it fails to explain the causes that led the GCC member-states to seek other security options. Applying regime theory in the case of the GCC will identify the GCC’s reasons for seeking other security options. This thesis hypothesizes that the GCC failed to guarantee security to its members due to its weakness as a regime, explained by regime theory, which led the GCC member-states to seek other security options provided by external power through bilateral security agreements, as predicted by neorealism. 14. SUBJECT TERMS GCC, Collective Security, Peninsula Shield, Gulf, Military, Politics, Saudi 15. NUMBER OF Arabia, and Decision-Making Process PAGES 81 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND THE CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN INTEGRATED CAPABILITY FOR UPHOLDING SECURITY Sami F. Almotairy Commander, Royal Saudi Naval Forces B.S., King Fahad Naval Academy, 1993 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (DEFENSE DECISION–MAKING AND PLANNING) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2011 Author: Sami F. Al-Motairy Approved by: James Russell Thesis Co-Advisor Abbas Kadhim Thesis Co-Advisor Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The Gulf Cooperation Council’s abysmal performance during the last thirty years clearly demonstrates that the member-states of this alliance remain unprepared to seriously commit themselves to the establishment of a credible joint defense force able to facilitate the goal of collective security for which the GCC was established in the first place. This thesis seeks explanations as to why the GCC has made little progress in establishing mechanisms to provide collective security for its members through the lenses of neorealist theory and regime theory. Neorealist theory does explain the GCC’s stumble on the path to achieving collective security by expecting that the GCC would not succeed if there were other options for security, but it fails to explain the causes that led the GCC member-states to seek other security options. Applying regime theory in the case of the GCC will identify the GCC’s reasons for seeking other security options. This thesis hypothesizes that the GCC failed to guarantee security to its members due to its weakness as a regime, explained by regime theory, which led the GCC member-states to seek other security options provided by external power through bilateral security agreements, as predicted by neorealism. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. ENVIRONMENT OF THREATS FOR THE GCC .....................................2 B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC) ..............................................................................................................10 D. NEOREALISM THEORY AND COOPERATION ...................................11 E. NEOREALISM AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY ...................................12 F. GCC AS A REGIME .....................................................................................13 G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................14 II. CASE STUDIES .........................................................................................................17 A. INVASION OF KUWAIT .............................................................................18 1. Official Emergence of the Crisis between Kuwait and Iraq ..........20 2. Kuwait Response to Iraqi Claims .....................................................21 3. Efforts to Settle the Dispute ..............................................................22 4. The GCC’s Role Prior to the Invasion .............................................22 5. Attempts to Solve the Crisis After July 17, 1990.............................23 6. The Jeddah Conference .....................................................................23 7. The Invasion .......................................................................................24 8. GCC’s Role After the Invasion .........................................................25 9. Saudi Arabia’s Role After the Invasion ...........................................25 10. Saudi Decision to Call on Foreign Forces ........................................26 11. GCC Role During the Military Build-Up ........................................27 12. GCC Role After the Liberation of Kuwait ......................................28 B. IRAN AS A THREAT ...................................................................................28 1. The Revolution of 1979 ......................................................................29 2. Iraq-Iran War ....................................................................................30 3. Hajj Demonstration in 1987 ..............................................................31 4. The Impact of the United States’ 2003 Invasion of Iraq ................32 5. Iran’s Rising Regional Ambitions ....................................................34 C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................35 III. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................37 A. FROM ESTABLISHMENT TO INVASION OF KUWAIT (1981- 1990) ................................................................................................................41 B. FROM THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED STATES’ 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ (1991–2003) ...................................45 C. FROM THE UNITED STATES’ 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ AND ONWARD (2003–PRESENT) .......................................................................49