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Kenya 2017 General and Presidential Elections Final Report

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Kenya 2017 General and Presidential Elections Final Report ELECTION REPORT ✩ Kenya 2017 General and Presidential Elections Final Report Kenya 2017 General and Presidential Elections Final Report One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5100 www.cartercenter.org © 2018 by The Carter Center. All rights reserved. Contents Executive Summary............................ 4 Campaign for Aug. 8 Elections ............... 39 Overview of Key Findings .................... 4 Campaign for Oct. 26 Election ............... 41 Additional Findings .......................... 7 Violence Against Women and Children ....... 42 The Carter Center’s Election Observation Summary .................................. 42 Mission in Kenya ............................ 9 Participation of Women, Youth, and Political Background .......................... 11 People With Disabilities ....................... 43 Electoral System and Legal Framework ........ 13 Women’s Participation ...................... 43 Kenya’s Legal Framework for Elections ........ 13 Participation by Youth and People With 2017 Election System ....................... 14 Disabilities ................................. 44 Late Changes to Legal Framework ............ 16 Summary .................................. 45 Summary .................................. 17 Electoral Dispute Resolution .................. 46 Election Administration ....................... 18 Election Dispute Resolution Framework and Processes .............................. 46 Election Administration Structures ............ 18 Primaries and the Political Parties Transparency in Election Information ......... 19 Dispute Tribunal Decision ................... 47 Electoral Preparations ....................... 20 The Independent Electoral and Boundaries The Kenya Integrated Election Commission and Candidate Nomination Management System ....................... 21 Decisions .................................. 48 Preparations for the Oct. 26 Election. .21 Electoral Code of Conduct Enforcement Summary .................................. 22 Committee ................................ 49 Election Day, Tabulation, and Results Summary .................................. 49 Transmission ................................. 24 Presidential Election Dispute Resolution . 50 Aug. 8 Election Day ......................... 25 Sept. 1 Ruling on Aug. 8 Presidential Election .. 50 Oct. 26 Election Day ........................ 27 Summary .................................. 53 Oct. 26 Election Results ..................... 28 Summary .................................. 28 Civil Society and Citizen Observation .......... 54 Kenya’s Civil Society Organizations Information and Communication Technologies . 29 and the 2017 Elections ...................... 54 Technology in the 2017 Elections ............ 29 Restrictive Environment for Summary .................................. 30 Nongovernmental Organizations ............. 55 Voter Education .............................. 31 Summary .................................. 56 The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Conclusion and Recommendations ............ 57 Commission and Voter Education ............ 31 To the Parliament/Government .............. 57 Civil Society Organizations’ Voter To the Independent Electoral and Education Efforts ........................... 32 Boundaries Commission .................... 58 Summary .................................. 32 To the Political Parties ...................... 59 Voter Registration ............................ 33 Appendices Kenya’s Voter Registration System ............ 33 A: Acknowledgments ....................... 60 Voter Registration 2017 ..................... 33 B: Terms and Abbreviations .................. 61 Voter Audit ................................ 34 C: Letter of Invitation ....................... 62 Summary .................................. 35 D: The Carter Center Delegation and Staff ..... 63 Candidate Nominations....................... 36 E: Deployment Plan ......................... 66 Kenyan Candidate Requirements ............. 36 F: Checklists ............................... 69 Political Party Primary Elections .............. 36 G: Information and Communication Candidate Integrity ......................... 37 Technologies .............................. 94 Summary .................................. 38 H: Women’s Political Participation ........... 112 Campaign Environment ....................... 39 I: Carter Center Public Statements Overall Environment ........................ 39 and Reports .............................. 130 The Carter Center at a Glance ................... 167 Executive Summary Kenya’s 2017 general electoral process was marred noted problems during the subsequent processes of by incidents of unrest and violence throughout electronically transmitting polling station results the extended electoral period and by harsh attacks and tabulation of results at county-level tallying by top political leaders on electoral and judicial centers. While these were designed to allow for authorities that seriously undermined the inde- thorough checks and verification of election pendence of the country’s democratic institutions results — and should have been possible to imple- and the rule of law. The confrontational tactics ment — the process of tallying and tabulating final and actions of Kenya’s political leaders polarized results suffered from delays and a lack of transpar- the country and exposed the deep tribal and ency. The situation was made worse by heightened ethnic rifts that have long characterized its poli- political tensions and confrontational statements tics. Regrettably, the elections represent a major by political leaders. setback in Kenya’s democratic development. By the morning of Aug. 9, the day after the elections, as the Independent Electoral and Overview of Key Findings Boundaries Commission (IEBC) began announcing provisional results showing President Uhuru Pre-election Period Kenyatta with a roughly 10 percent lead, opposi- The pre-election period included a reasonably tion presidential candidate Raila Odinga and his adequate but flawed voter registration process, National Super Alliance (NASA) claimed that which included an independent audit and correc- there had been massive fraud and that the results tive actions to address some of the many errors had been hacked. On the afternoon of Aug. 9, the in the list. While the voter list retained serious IEBC’s nearly complete provisional results showed problems, the introduction of the Kenya Integrated President Kenyatta with 54 percent of the vote, Election Management System (KIEMS) biometric leading by a margin of some 1.4 million voters voter identification system provided a strong safe- over Raila Odinga, with about 45 percent of the guard against multiple voting on election day. The vote. Although the IEBC noted that the process level of political competition in the various races of tallying and submitting official results forms to was high, and there was a significant increase in the national IEBC tally center was proceeding at the number of independent candidates. a slow pace, it did not highlight or clarify that the results broadcast on TV were unofficial provisional Aug. 8 Election results, received electronically directly from polling Carter Center observers found that the voting and stations. Unfortunately, for unexplained reasons, counting processes during the Aug. 8 election were the IEBC did not utilize the full seven-day period generally well-administered. However, observers 4 Nathan Siegel John Kerry, former secretary of state of the United States, and Aminata Touré, former prime minister of Senegal, co-led the Carter Center’s election mission in Kenya. provided by the law to consolidate and post all the tabulation that provided an independent verifica- official polling station results forms. tion of the official results. ELOG’s tabulation was Instead, the IEBC hastily declared the final based on results data gathered from a representa- presidential election results on Aug. 11, just three tive random sample collected by about 1,700 days after election day, based on the constituency- observers deployed around the country. The level results forms, and prior to the receipt of all parallel vote tabulation’s estimated results, released polling-station level results forms. Worse still, elec- on Aug. 11, were consistent with the IEBC’s offi- tion authorities failed to ensure that parties had cial results.1 timely access to official polling-station level results in the days following the announcement of official Supreme Court Decision results, which made it impossible for parties and After initially refusing to take these claims to court observers to fully verify and cross-check the results and saying his supporters had the right to protest against their internal data and reports in time to in the streets, Odinga and NASA decided to file a include any key evidence in court petitions. petition challenging the results shortly before the While the lack of IEBC polling-station data deadline. Several weeks later, in an unexpected hindered the parties’ ability to verify results, it is ruling announced on Sept. 1, the Supreme Court important to note that a Kenyan citizen election annulled the results of the presidential election, observation organization (Election Observation finding that the tabulation procedures failed to Group, or ELOG) conducted a parallel vote fulfill the constitutional requirement that all 1 http://elog.or.ke/index.php/resource-centre/item/20-verification- statement-of-the-official-2017-presidential-results
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