RESEARCH COMMUNICATIONS

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Toward an Understanding of Opium Poppy Production in *

WILLIAM H. BRUNDAGE and WILLIAM A. MITCHELL

United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, U.S.A.

In the history of mankind, probably no plant has been more associated with conflict and tension than "Papaver Somniferum" or Opium Poppy. The poppy plant's uniqueness is that it is both a boon, which has done much to alleviate the suffering of mankind, and an insidious destroyer, credited with thousands of lives each year. It is this inherent dichotomy which makes the growing of the opium poppy such a controversial subject. On June 30, 1971, the Turkish government announced it would no longer allow Turkish farmers to cultivate opium poppy (Middle East Journal Autumn 1971: 520). Just over three years later, on February 14, 1974, Turkey informed the United States that Turkish farmers would be allowed to cultivate opium poppy again (Middle East journal Spring 1974: 170). This move was quickly publicized as detrimental to the worldwide anti-narcotics effort. However, the adoption of the poppy straw harvesting technique, wise use of economic in- centives, and greatly increased surveillance activities by the Turkish govern- ment largely prevented the Turkish farmers from returning to the illicit market. Despite the improved situation, the question, "Why did Turkey return to opium cultivation?" remains. The purpose of this article is to answer this question. For many centuries the farmers of western Anatolia have eked out an exist- ence by growing wheat, barley, vegetables, and opium. In the provinces of Afyon, Burdur, , , , Kutahya, and Usak, the heart of the opium growing area, poppy has been an important crop for centuries (U.S. Congress 1971: 112). In 1960 there were 103,782 acres devoted to the produc- tion of this crop (Holahan and Henningsen 1972: 265). Opium poppy produc- tion in Turkey was an important portion of the agricultural economy. In the 1960s world pressure on opium growers began to mount. This pres- sure was due to the misuse of morphine and heroin, which led to addiction reaching epidemic proportions in some countries, especially in the United * The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force or the United States Government. 260

States. Although internationally there was a legitimate and important raw opium market for medicinal purposes, the worldwide acreage cultivated at that time was producing more than necessary for the legitimate demand. The realization of this fact resulted in the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs which authorized Turkey and six other countries to legally produce and export opium poppy for medical derivatives such as morphine (Cooley 1974: 1-2). This convention set up a United Nations Narcotics Board which each year sets the worldwide quotas for the legal trade. This was an attempt to insure only opium needed for medicinal uses was produced. Un- fortunately it was not very effective and many countries, particularly the United States, continued to be flooded with illicit opiates, primarily heroin. Realizing that illegal Turkish opium comes principally from larger than declared yields on legal acreage, the United States government pushed for a reduction in Turkish acreage. This resulted in only 29,600 acres of opium poppy production in the early seventies (Holahan and Henningsen 1972: 265) .The number of opium producing provinces in Turkey was also lowered to four ( Time 1971: 29). Nevertheless this action did not halt the flow of illicit drugs. Hence, the United States continued efforts for the total cessation of opium cultivation in Turkey (Christian Science Monitor 1971: 3; and Spain 1975: 297-298). In order to make this action feasible for Turkey, the United States assisted in a plan involving economic support and eventual creation of alternate income for those farmers who would lose money because of the halt in opium production. Es- sentially the United States would make a donation of 35.7 million dollars to be given to Turkish farmers as compensation for not cultivating the opium poppy (Strategy Council on Drug Abuse 1975: 24). The money was to be used so that the farmers could develop income from alternate crops and, at the same time the United States agreed to help the Turks develop such alternate crops as wheat, sugar beets, and sunflowers. Assistance on improving livestock and poultry production was also assured (Cohen 1972: 1-2). The main objective behind the effort would be to improve Turkish wheat yields so that the land released from wheat production could be used for other cash crops (West 1972: 2). Hopefully this development would make it possible for the Turkish farmer to make more money growing crops other than opium poppy. If this were successful, the Turkish farmer would theoretically cease producing opium in any large quantity. Later events proved the plans for cessation of opium poppy production to be unsuccessful. Essentially, five miscalculations contributed to this failure. These were: 1) underestimating the magnitude of the problem; 2) implement- ing change too rapidly; 3) not including all opium poppy growers under the original program; 4) incomplete knowledge of Turkish culture as relates to opium poppy production at the village level; and 5) overestimating the capabil- ities of the Turkish government.

Magnitude of the Problem

It seems the American Congress and public underestimated the magnitude of the task which it had set out to accomplish. This is apparent by their desire to halt all opium production in one year. The true magnitude of the project