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Election Overview Governors: from Presidential ELECTION OVERVIEW GOVERNORS: FROM PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT TO POPULAR ELECTIONS Although their positions have existed for five years, the majority of Russia’s regional executives, or governors as they call themselves in the Russian pre-revolutionary style, will face the voters for the first time this fall. While the idea of electing the governors existed from the start, most of them were in fact appointed by President Boris Yeltsin. Between now and 1 January 1997, 50 regional executives will submit to the popular will, joining the 16 who have already stood for election. (The presidents of the Adygeya and Kabardino-Balkariya republics will stand for re-election in January, since their terms in office expire then). An August 1991 Russian Supreme Soviet decree created the post of governor in all of Russia’s six krais, 49 oblasts, 10 autonomous okrugs, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. (The mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg were initially elected in June 1991.) Governors were supposed to replace the former obkom Communist Party first secretaries who were the de facto regional leaders of their territories. The decree made governors accountable to the president and the regional legislatures. According to a law passed by the Supreme Soviet in October 1991, the governors were to be popularly elected by the end of that year. But a week later, the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies acceded to President Yeltsin’s request that the elections be postponed until December 1992. By early 1992, governors--or at least acting governors--were appointed to all krais, oblasts, and okrugs. The appointment of governors led to a conflict between the president and his appointees, on the one side, and regional legislatures, which had to approve the new regional executives, on the other. The soviets, which had been elected in 1990 and often had strong links with the local party organizations, did not want to allow Yeltsin’s reformers to take over regional management. However, in many cases, the new executives turned out to be recycled apparatchiks, often former secretaries of the regional Communist Party branches, and not particularly disposed toward reform. But even in these cases, in spite of the similar ideological attitudes shared by the legislatures’ members and the new governors, they continued fighting each other for supremacy in their regions. In December 1992, when the moratorium on gubernatorial elections expired, the Supreme Soviet again postponed elections for another two years. However, in some regions gubernatorial elections were permitted, especially where the regional legislature passed a vote of no confidence in the governor. As a result, elections were held during the spring of 1993 in eight regions (Amur, Bryansk, Chelyabinsk, Lipetsk, Orel, Penza, and Smolensk oblasts and Krasnoyarsk Krai). These elections confirmed Yeltsin’s fear that popular elections would return leaders who were more anti-reformist and independent than the bureaucrats he had appointed. Only in Krasnoyarsk did the incumbent win re-election. In all other regions, Yeltsin’s appointees were defeated by candidates backed by local Communist organizations (although many of them later became Yeltsin supporters and joined the pro-government Our Home Is Russia bloc in 1995). After some governors turned against Yeltsin during his October 1993 clash with the parliament, he issued a decree giving himself exclusive authority to appoint and dismiss regional executives. Recalcitrant governors, some of them elected, were soon replaced, including Aleksandr Surat of Amur Oblast and Yurii Lodkin of Bryansk Oblast. In December 1993, Yeltsin permitted all governors to stand for the parliamentary elections, and 34 of them were elected to the Federation Council, the parliament’s upper house. The incumbents’ success paradoxically gave Yeltsin an additional excuse to postpone gubernatorial elections once again (this time until 1996), since he could argue that his nominees had proved through electoral victories that they had popular support. The reaction from the regions to the constant postponement of gubernatorial elections was mixed. Regional legislative bodies, which themselves had been elected in late 1993 and early 1994, bombarded the president with requests to allow them to call gubernatorial elections. On the other hand, the Union of Russian Governors, which consisted of more than 40 regional administration heads, supported the postponement arguing that there was no appropriate federal and local electoral legislation. Meanwhile, some governors, who were confident of their re-election prospects and hoped to gain more independence from both the president and their regional legislature, sought permission to seek a popular mandate. Although Yeltsin did not order gubernatorial elections everywhere, he did make a few exceptions. Yurii Nozhikov won re-election in Irkutsk in March 1994. Under pressure from the regional legislature, Yeltsin agreed to a gubernatorial election in Sverdlovsk Oblast which was scheduled for August 1995. In that vote Eduard Rossel, the regional administration head in 1991-1993, defeated Our Home Is Russia candidate Aleksei Strakhov, a 1994 presidential appointee. Yeltsin had fired Rossel for declaring an independent Urals Republic on the oblast’s territory during the presidential clash with the Supreme Soviet in October 1993. In September 1995, Yeltsin issued a decree ordering gubernatorial elections to be held in December 1996 in all those regions where his appointees were still in charge. The timing ensured that his appointees would still be in place for the 1996 presidential election. However, to satisfy the demands of local legislative bodies, Yeltsin allowed gubernatorial elections in 12 regions (Moscow, Nizhnii Novgorod, Novgorod, Tomsk, Tver, Tambov, Omsk, Orenburg, Belgorod, Yaroslavl, and Novosibirsk oblasts and Primorskii Krai). This list included only regions where the governors were in strong positions and pro-Yeltsin. The results of the races, held in December 1995, generally confirmed Yeltsin’s expectations. The incumbents won in nine of the regions; in the other three, they were defeated by candidates supported by the Communist Party. After its defeat in the presidential elections, the communist and nationalist opposition are seeking revenge during the fall gubernatorial elections. If Yeltsin’s opponents succeed, they could change the balance within the Federation Council, which now is mainly composed of Yeltsin supporters, and more effectively block presidential policies in both houses of the parliament. On the other hand, the pro -government organizations have declared their intention to back a single candidate in each region, including many of the current incumbents who have vast resources to win over popular support. -- Anna Paretskaya CONFUSION REIGNS IN ELECTING REGIONAL LEGISLATURES The controversy and confusion surrounding the elections to the Russian regional legislatures was perhaps even greater than that around the gubernatorial elections. Although representative bodies had been elected in Russia during the entire Communist era, the new relatively independent and effective legislative bodies took their first halting steps only in 1990. After many regional and local soviets opposed President Yeltsin in his conflict with the federal parliament in October 1993, Yeltsin ordered them disbanded and called elections for new legislatures. These new bodies would have fewer members and work on a professional basis (i.e. with full-time deputies who did not simultaneously hold other posts). The president hoped that the new legislatures would be more productive and less politicized. Most of these elections were held in late 1993--early 1994. The new legislatures were elected for two-year terms, as stipulated by a November 1993 presidential decree. As the expiration of their terms drew near, Yeltsin issued another decree postponing elections until December 1997 and ordering the current legislatures to extend their terms in office. Some of the legislative assemblies obeyed the presidential decree immediately and prolonged their authority for another two years. However, the State Duma, several regional legislatures, and individual citizens challenged the decree, claiming that any postponement of regional legislative elections would be a violation of the voters’ constitutional rights. After some regional courts ruled that the decree postponing the elections was not legal, Yeltsin issued another decree in March 1996 allowing regional legislatures to set the dates for regional elections on their own. The Duma called on regional legislative bodies to hold elections on 16 June, the same date as the presidential poll, and asked those legislatures which had already extended their terms in office according to the September 1995 presidential decree to suspend this decision. However, the Central Electoral Commission declared that none of the regional or local polls, except for those specially permitted by the president, could be held on the same day as the presidential election. Finally, in July, the State Duma passed a bill regulating the elections to regional legislatures. According to the Duma plan, all regional legislatures whose term had expired by July would be forced to hold new elections within six months after the law comes into effect. The Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, has not yet considered the bill and may change it. The Federation Council has already proposed legalizing the decision of those regional legislative assemblies
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