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Managing Expectations from Iran's Upcoming Presidential Vote Managing Expectations from Iran’s Upcoming Presidential Vote © 2021 IAI by Sara Zanotta Iran will hold its thirteenth presidential Upon closer scrutiny, recent election on Friday, 18 June 2021. developments seem to indicate that ISSN 2532-6570 Much attention is devoted to this significant changes in Iranian policy event, due to the broad expectation should not be expected. This does not that Iran’s next president will herald detract from the importance of the from the conservative camp, replacing vote nor of the relevance of Iranian the current administration led by domestic politics more broadly. Rather, moderate-pragmatist President Hassan it underscores the need to appreciate Rouhani. how the past years have diminished differences between conservative and The election is taking place against moderate factions in Iran’s political the backdrop of ongoing international establishment. talks in Vienna on the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint This is particularly the case vis-à-vis Comprehensive Plan of Action the JCPOA and the US-backed sanction (JCPOA), and a severe economic crisis regime re-imposed on Iran and also within Iran, worsened by US sanctions extends to other important issues of and the covid-19 pandemic. Deeply Iranian policy. Having staked much of entrenched tensions with the US, as their political fortunes on the benefits well as Washington’s regional allies of engaging the US and Europe in in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United negotiations, the moderate camp has Arab Emirates, add to the importance of suffered significant setbacks. Many of this appointment, with many watching its leading figures, including President the vote in an effort to understand its Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad impact on Iranian domestic and foreign Zarif, have consequently hardened policies. their rhetoric as of late, understanding the fraying popularity of their efforts IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 30 - JUNE 2021 IAI COMMENTARIES Sara Zanotta is research intern within the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). 1 Managing Expectations from Iran’s Upcoming Presidential Vote to mend fences with the West in the Since President Trump’s unilateral face of US sanctions and Europe’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May inability to make true on its economic 2018, the Iranian economy has suffered commitments to Iran in the JCPOA. considerably. Iran’s GDP has contracted by 11 per cent and average living Beginning from the domestic level, standards declined by 13 per cent since two main issues are worth considering. 2018.3 First, due to the expected low turnout, © 2021 IAI the election will likely testify to a Sanctions have severely hampered growing disillusionment of a large Iranian trade and oil exports, reducing part of the population. Second, the foreign exchange reserves and leading results will be important to shed light to a 49 per cent depreciation of the on upcoming succession challenges, as Iranian currency against the US dollar Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in 2020.4 Inflation has continued is 82 years old and in relatively poor to increase, severely impacting the health. purchasing power of ordinary Iranians. According to the International ISSN 2532-6570 According to a recent poll, less than 42 Monetary Fund, inflation increased per cent of voters will likely take part by 36.5 per cent in 2020 and will grow in the election.1 If this were to happen, higher to 39 per cent this year.5 it will be the lowest turnout since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, While predominantly concerned with even lower than the 42.6 per cent the economy, the population is also turnout registered during Iran’s last sceptical that their vote will make any parliamentary elections in February difference.6 Indeed, the recent vetting 2020, which saw conservatives secure a of presidential candidates by the landslide victory.2 Iranian Guardian Council has added to popular frustration. On 25 May, the There is little doubt that low turnout Iranian Ministry of Interior announced would compromise the legitimacy of the vote. Many Iranians share growing 3 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Iran: The Double disillusionment and frustration, Jeopardy of Sanctions and COVID-19”, in largely connected to the economic Pandemic Discourses, 19 September 2020, impact of the US sanctions regime https://www.indiachinainstitute.org/?p=110043. and the covid-19 pandemic, as well as 4 Henry Rome, “Sanctions 3: Iran’s Economy in 2020”, in The Iran Primer, 16 December 2020, the mismanagement and corruption https://iranprimer.usip.org/node/8551. that remains pervasive in the Islamic 5 Davide Barbuscia, “IMF Sees Iran Economy Republic. Recovering this Year but Inflation Still on the Up”, in Reuters, 11 April 2021, http://reut. rs/2Rt5Cr1. 6 Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “Economic Distress 1 Andrew Hanna, “Poll on 2021 Presidential and Voter Turnout in the Iranian Elections”, in Election”, in The Iran Primer, 9 June 2021, FES Blog on the Iranian Presidential Elections https://iranprimer.usip.org/node/9211. of 2021, 26 May 2021, https://www.fes.de/en/ 2 Garrett Nada, “2020 Parliamentary Election referat-naher-mittlerer-osten-und-nordafrika/ Result”, in The Iran Primer, 24 February 2020, iran-elections/artikelseite-iranelections/ https://iranprimer.usip.org/node/7211. wirtschaftskrise-und-wahlbeteiligung-in-iran. IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 30 - JUNE 2021 IAI COMMENTARIES 2 Managing Expectations from Iran’s Upcoming Presidential Vote the names of seven candidates, mostly Raisi, aged 60, ran as a conservative hard-liners, approved by the Council candidate in the 2017 presidential out of 592 personalities that had election when he was defeated by registered to run.7 Rouhani. He was then appointed by Khamenei as head of the judiciary. This is not new in Iranian presidential Previously known for his leading role in races. However, the vetting procedure the mass execution of political prisoners this year was based on more restrictive in 1988, as head of the judiciary Raisi 8 © 2021 IAI criteria – also criticised by Rouhani sought to present himself as a judicial –, that excluded most reformist and reformer and promoter of good moderate politicians, leading to governance.12 He also launched a so- accusations that the regime was fixing called “war on corruption”,13 supported the election.9 by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with whom he maintains Only two of the vetted candidates close ties. belong to the moderate camp, while the expected winner is hard-liner Ebrahim These factors contribute to make Raisi ISSN 2532-6570 Raisi, the only prominent figure allowed the favourite to win the election. A to run after the exclusion of his main recent poll conducted by the Iranian rivals, particularly former speaker of Student Polling Agency, gave Raisi 48.6 parliament Ali Larijani.10 Significantly, per cent of the votes, while support for Larjani, by no means a traditional each of the other candidates did not moderate, had tentatively emerged exceed 3 per cent.14 Meanwhile, 41 per as a sort of consensus candidate, also cent of voters stated that they had yet to benefitting from some support from decide who they would vote for. Iranian moderates before he was disqualified.11 Turning to Iran’s succession challenges, it is worth reflecting on the possibility that Khamenei’s decision to disqualify so many other candidates may in fact 7 “Iran’s Electoral Body Announces Approved be driven by his efforts to tap Raisi as a Nominees”, in IRNA, 25 May 2021, https:// en.irna.ir/news/84342800. potential successor. 8 Patrick Wintour, “Iran President Criticises New Rules for Candidates As Election Begins”, The next Supreme Leader will be in The Guardian, 11 May 2021, https://www. formally chosen by the Assembly of theguardian.com/p/hck2g. 9 Patrick Wintour, “Iran’s Leadership Accused of Experts, an 88-member body elected Fixing Presidential Election”, in The Guardian, by the Iranian population after the 25 May 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/p/ hh8hd. 12 10 Ali Reza Eshraghi, “Council of Despair: Sanam Vakil, “Ebrahim Raisi: Will He Stay or Iran’s Uncompetitive Presidential Election”, in Will He Go”, in IranSource, 6 April 2021, https:// ECFR Commentaries, 3 June 2021, https://ecfr. www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=373793. eu/?p=73205. 13 “Who is Ebrahim Raisi, the Front-Runner in 11 Ehsan Mehrabi, “Chasing the Centrist Dream: Iran’s Presidential Race?”, in Al-Monitor, 11 June Ali Larijani Registers for Presidential Race”, in 2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/node/43137. IranWire, 16 May 2021, https://iranwire.com/en/ 14 Andrew Hanna, “Poll on 2021 Presidential features/9547. Election”, cit. IAI COMMENTARIES 21 | 30 - JUNE 2021 IAI COMMENTARIES 3 Managing Expectations from Iran’s Upcoming Presidential Vote vetting of candidates by the Guardian extraterritorial sanctions. Raisi has Council. Khamenei obviously has himself stated that he aims to fix the much influence over this body and an economy and push for a lifting of US electoral victory by Raisi would further sanctions, and as presidential candidate boost his credentials as a possible in 2017 he had specifically claimed that successor.15 any incoming Iranian administration should be committed to the JCPOA.17 Yet, should voter turnout be below © 2021 IAI expectations, the exclusion of Raisi’s Other issues affect relations with main rivals may turn out to be a Western and regional countries, such double-edged sword, harming both as Iranian support to regional proxies the legitimacy of the election and and its ballistic missile programme.18 Khamenei’s efforts to prepare the On such matters Iran’s stance does ground for a possible Raisi succession. not reflect the political orientation Voter turnout therefore represents one of the presidency, be it conservative important variable to assess as Iran or moderate, but the assessment of approaches its presidential vote.
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