I Ghosts II Persistence
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Notes I Ghosts 1. Famous mummies include those of the Egyptian pharaohs; those of people frozen in ice (such as Otzi the Iceman); and those of people buried in bogs (such as Lindow Man). The DNA in the mummy of Otzi has been sequenced (Keller et al., 2012). 2. One ancestor of digital ghosts is the Memex system (Bush, 1945). Another is the Teddy (Norman, 1992: ch. 6. The recorded personalities or constructs in William Gibson’s Neuromancer are also like digital ghosts (1984: 76–7). Ghosts play central roles in Gibson’s Mona Lisa Overdrive (1988). Nozick described intelligent programs that know your life history and that can simulate your personality (1989: 24–5). 3. Technologies for digital ghosts fall under the Capture, Archival and Retrieval of Personal Experiences (CARPE). One CARPE project is MyLifeBits (see Gemmell et al., 2002, 2003). For more on CARPE, see Steinhart (2007a). 4. As of June 2013, when Facebook is informed of your death, it changes the status of your account to memorial. Memorial timelines preserve most of their original content, but they are accessible only to friends and do not appear in searches. 5. Members of the Quantified Self movement digitally log many aspects of their daily lives, especially their physiological data (Swan, 2012). 6. Your second-generation ghost can include models of your personality based on your answers to long psychological exams (Bainbridge, 2003). It can include the ways you have tuned recommendation engines (Shafer et al., 2001). Those engines learn and store your preferences in books, music, art, movies, clothes, food, dating, and mating. 7. The classical digitalists argue that mentality is entirely computable (see Moravec, 1988, 2000 in their entirety). More specifically, see Moravec (2000: 72–88, 121–4) and Kurzweil (1999: ch. 3; replies in 2002; 2005: chs. 3 & 4). 8. An accurate digital ghost can pass a personalized Turing test. When your friends and family interact with your ghost (via some electronic interface), it can convince others into thinking that it is you. See Kurzweil (2005: 383). II Persistence 1. The concept of pipes as causal arrows is inspired by Salmon’s (1984) mark-transmission theory of causality and Dowe’s (1992) conserved quan- tity theory. Pipes transmit bits of information and they conserve program functionality. 2. The program shown in Figure 3 is Wolfram’s Rule 150 (it is 10010110). 217 218 Notes 3. Pipes are programs that transmit existence (they are if-then rules). Any pipe has this form: if there exists some previous object with its previous properties, then there exists some next object with its next properties. The programming of the pipe defines the relation between the previous properties and the next properties. 4. If some previous stage is linked by an updating pipe into its next stage, then the next stage is a successor of that previous stage. A stage y is a successor of stage x if and only if p is the program (I, S, O, F, G); x has the configuration (p, i, s, o); y has the configuration (p∗, i∗, s∗, o∗); p∗ is identical with p; the input i∗ comes from the environment; the state s∗ is F(i, s); and the output o∗ is G(i, s). All the stages in some process are linked by updating pipes if and only if each next stage is a successor of its previous stage. 5. The classical digitalists often write about the game of life. The classical digitalists include writers like Edward Fredkin, Hans Moravec, Ray Kurzweil, and perhaps Frank Tipler. See Moravec (1988: 151–8); Tipler (1995: 37–8); Kurzweil (2005: 520). 6. Digitalists affirm the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which states that for any things x and y,ifx is identical with y, then for every property p, x has p if and only if y has p. Having parts is like having properties. Hence this principle also implies that for any things x and y,ifx is identical with y, then for every thing z, z is a part of x if and only if z is a part of y. The Indiscernibility of Identicals is logically necessary. 7. Those who affirm identity through time are endurantists. They say that things endure. But many philosophers have denied that there is any iden- tity through time. They have attacked endurantism. Heraclitus was probably the first philosopher to attack endurantism: “You cannot step into the same river twice.” Since Heraclitus, many other philosophers have taken up the attack (see Quine, 1950; Browning, 1988; Heller, 1990: ch. 1). The arguments against endurantism are brilliantly developed by Sider (2001) and Hawley (2001). Like Heraclitus, digitalists argue against endurantism. 8. For a good collection of readings on persistence, see Haslanger & Kurtz (2006). For discussions of persistence in the game of life, see Steinhart (2012a). 9. For arguments that our universe is a cellular automaton, see Fredkin, Landauer, & Toffoli (1982); Fredkin (1991); Zeilinger (1999); Fredkin (2003). Still, it does not seem likely that our universe is a cellular automaton. For other ways to think of our universe as a network of computers, see Wolfram (2002); Kurzweil (2005: 85–94; 518–22). 10. Aristotelian physics involves only 3D substances interacting in a single universal present. For conflicts between special relativity and Aristotelian endurantism, see Balashov (2000a, 2000b), Hales & Johnson (2003), Sider (2001: ch. 4.4). 11. A discrete process is a function f from some ordinal K to some set of stages such that (1) f (m) is earlier than f (n) if and only if m is less than n; and (2) for every successor ordinal n + 1 in K, the stage f (n) persists into its successor stage f (n + 1); and (3) for every limit ordinal h in K, the series f (i)|i < h persists into its limit stage f (h). 12. On the one hand, the classical digitalists have many discussions of persis- tence (Moravec, 1988: 116–20; Tipler, 1995: 227–40; Kurzweil, 2005: 383–6). On the other hand, exdurantism is not developed until Sider (1996, 2001) Notes 219 and Hawley (2001). So Moravec and Tipler cannot have heard about it. And it does not seem fair to expect Kurzweil to have studied Sider and Hawley. Still, exdurantism is the theory of persistence most compatible with Kurzweil (2005: 383–6). 13. Kurzweil identifies himself with his body-pattern (2005: 385–6). He argues that the constant replacement of his parts “means the end of me even if my pattern is preserved” (385). This leads him to wonder “So am I constantly being replaced by someone else who just seems a lot like the me of a few moments earlier?” (385). On the basis of his own reasoning, his answer must be yes. Sadly, he then indicates that he will ignore his reasoning (386). He should have stuck with his reasoning – it was correct. 14. One pipeline may fission into many. Fission typically preserves programs. If the process Original fissions into the processes Left and Right, then one program runs through Original plus Left and also through Original plus Right. Hence Original plus Left and Original plus Right are two overlapping processes. Many pipelines may fuse into one pipeline. Fusion typically fails to preserve program functionality – the fused programs blend into one new program. If Right and Left fuse into Later, then Right and Left each end with the fusion, and Later is an entirely new process. 15. Fission (that is, twinning) negates identity through time. No thing can retain its identity through fission. Suppose A divides into B and C; the symmetry of the division and the preservation of form entail that A persists into B and A persists into C; but if this persistence is identity, then A is B and A is C; and, since identity is transitive, B is C; but that is wrong: B is not C. Hence fission shows that there is no identity through time. But fission does not negate persistence or continuity through time. 16. Cells divide naturally. But philosophers and digitalists have discussed artifi- cial body-fission (Parfit, 1985: 199–201; Moravec, 1988: 116–20; Kurzweil, 2005: 383–5). The best way to make sense out of body-fission is via exdurantism. 17. Someone may wish to argue that an organism must be biologically autonomous; yet no embryo has such autonomy; hence no embryo is an organism; on the contrary, it is merely an organ in the maternal body. On that view, early embryonic stages lack the values and rights of organ- isms. Nevertheless, on that view, later embryonic stages gain the values and rights of organisms as they gain biological autonomy. 18. The classical digitalists use the term pattern to refer to the program being run by a body (Moravec, 1988: 116–20; Tipler, 1995: 227–40; Kurzweil, 2005: 383–6). At times they seem to say that persons or bodies are identical with their patterns. But that is absurd: bodies and persons are concrete particular things; they are not abstract patterns. 19. Counterpart theory has its roots in the logic of possibility. It has its roots in the theory that there are other possible universes populated by other possible people – other possible versions of yourself. The logic of possi- bility is modal logic. Counterpart theory is used in modal logic to solve problems involving trans-world identity (Lewis, 1968, 1986). Counterpart theory is used in temporal logic to solve problems involving trans-time identity (Lewis, 1973: sec. 5.2; Sider, 1996, 2001). Digitalism uses counter- part theory to solve problems involving trans-death identity (see Steinhart, 2008).