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Appendix KURT DANZIGER’S PUBLICATIONS BOOKS (1997). Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found its Language. London: Sage Publications. (1990). Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research. New York: Cam- bridge University Press. (Italian translation, 1995). (1976). Interpersonal Communication. New York: Pergamon Press, 1976. (Translations: Spanish, 1982; Italian, 1981). (1971). Socialization. London: Penguin Books. (Translations: Italian, 1972; German, 1974; Danish, 1974: Swedish, 1975). (1970). Readings in Child Socialization. London: Pergamon Press. CHAPTERS IN BOOKS (in press). Where theory, history and philosophy meet: The biography of psychological objects. In D. B. Hill & M. J. Kral (Eds.), About Psychology: Essays at the Crossroads of History, Theory and Philosophy. New York: SUNY Press. (2001). Sealing off the discipline: Wundt and the psychology of memory. In C. D. Green, M. Shore, & T. Teo (Eds.), Psychological Thought in the Nineteenth Century: The Transition from Philosophy to Science and the Challenges of Uncertainty. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. (2001). Wundt and the temptations of psychology. In R. W. Rieber & D. Robinson (Eds.), Wilhelm Wundt in History. New York: Plenum Press. (2001). The unknown Wundt: Drive, apperception and volition. In R. W. Rieber & D. Robinson (Eds.), Wilhelm Wundt in History. New York: Plenum Press. (1999). Natural kinds, human kinds, and historicity. In W. Maiers et al. (Eds.), Challenges to Theoretical Psychology. Toronto: Captus Press, 1999. (1997). The historical formation of selves. In R. D. Ashmore & L. Jussim (Eds.), Self and Identity: Fundamental Issues, The Rutgers Series on Self and Social Identity, vol. I. Oxford University Press. 233 234 KURT DANZIGER’S PUBLICATIONS (with P. Ballantyne) (1997). Psychological experiments. In W. G. Bringmann, H. M. L¨uck, R. Miller, & C. E. Early (Eds.), A Pictorial History of Psychology. Quintessence Publishing. (1996). The practice of psychological discourse. In K. J. Gergen & C. F. Graumann (Eds.), Historical Dimensions of Psychological Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (with P. Shermer) (1994). The varieties of replication: A historical introduction. In J. Valsiner, R. van der Veer & M. van Ijzendoorn (Eds.), Reconstructing the Mind: Replicability in Research on Human Development. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex. (1992). Reiz und Reaktion. Historisches Worterbuch¨ der Philosophie, vol. 8, 554–567. Basel: Schwabe. (1990). Wilhelm Wundt and the emergence of experimental psychology. In G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie, M. J. S. Hodge, & R. C. Olby (Eds.), Companion to the History of Modern Science. London: Routledge. (1990). Generative metaphor and the history of psychological discourse. In D. E. Leary (Ed.), Metaphors in the History of Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (1990). Die Rolle der psychologischen Forschungspraxis in der Geschichte: Eine kontextual- istische Perspektive. In A. Schorr & E. G. Wehner (Eds.), Psychologiegeschichte heute. G¨ottingen: Hogrefe. (1990). The social context of research practice and the history of psychology. In Wm. J. Baker, R. van Hezewijk, M. E. Hyland & S. Terwee (Eds.), Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology. Vol. 2. New York: Springer-Verlag. (1988). A question of identity: Who participated in psychology experiments? In J. Morawski (Ed.), The Rise of Experimentation in American Psychology. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. (1988). On theory and method in psychology. In W. Baker, L. Rappard & H. Stam (Eds.), Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology. New York: Springer-Verlag. (1987). Statistical method and the historical development of research practice in American Psy- chology. In L. Kruger, G. Gigerenzer, & M. Morgan (Eds.), The Probabilistic Revolution Vol. II: Ideas in the Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (1987). Apperception. In R. L. Gregory (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford Uni- versity Press. (1987). Herrmann Ebbinghaus and the psychological experiment. In W. Traxel (Ed.), Ebbinghaus—Studien 2. Passau: Passavia. (1987). Social context and investigative practice in early twentieth century psychology. In M. G. Ash & W. R. Woodward (Eds.), Psychology in Twentieth Century Thought and Society. New York: Cambridge University Press. (1985). Towards a conceptual framework for a critical history of psychology. In H. Carpintero & J. M. Peiro (Eds.), Psychology in its Historical context: Essays in Honour of J. Brozek. Valencia: Monograf´ıasde la Revista de Historia de la Psicolog´ıa. (1985). The problem of imitation and early explanatory models in developmental psychology. In G. Eckardt, W. G. Bringmann, & L. Sprung (Eds.), Contributions to a History of Developmental Psychology. The Hague and New York: Mouton. (1983). Wundt as methodologist. In G. Eckardt & L. Sprung (Eds.), Advances in Historiography of Psychology. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. (1982). Mid-nineteenth century British psycho-physiology: A neglected chapter in the history of Psychology. In M. Ash & R. W. Woodward (Eds.), Psychology in nineteenth century thought: International cross-disciplinary perspectives. New York: Praeger. (1980). Wundt and the two traditions of psychology. In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), Wilhelm Wundt and the making of a scientific psychology. New York: Plenum. (1980). On the threshold of the New Psychology: Situating Wundt and James. In W. G. Bringmann & R. D. Tweney (Eds.), Wundt Studies/Wundt Studien. G¨ottingen: C. J. Hogrefe. KURT DANZIGER’S PUBLICATIONS 235 (1980). Wundt’s theory of behavior and volition. In R. W. Rieber (Ed.), Wilhelm Wundt and the Making of a Scientific Psychology. New York: Plenum. (1979). The social origins of modern psychology: Positivist sociology and the sociology of knowl- edge. In A. R. Buss (Ed.), The social context of psychological theory: Towards a sociology of psycho- logical knowledge. New York: Irvington. (1979). Attitudes to parental control and adolescents’ aspirations: A comparison of immigrants and non-immigrants. In K. Ishwaran (Ed.), Childhood and adolescence in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. (1975). Differences in acculturation and patterns of socialization among Italian immigrant fami- lies. In E. Zureik & M. Pike (Eds.), Socialization and Values in Canadian Society, vol. I: Political Socialization. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. (1971). Modernization and the legitimation of social power. In H. Adam (Ed.), South Africa. Sociological perspectives. London: Oxford University Press. ARTICLES IN JOURNALS (2002). How old is psychology, particularly concepts of memory? History & Philosophy of Psy- chology, 4, 1–12. (2001). Making social psychology experimental: A conceptual history, 1920–1970. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 36, 329–347. (with J. Louw) (2000). Psychological practices and ideology: The South African case. Psychologie & Maatschappij, 50, 50–61. (1998). On historical scholarship: A reply to Dehue. Theory & Psychology, 8, 669–671. (1997). The future of psychology is not its past: A reply to Rappard. Theory & Psychology, 7, 107–112. (1997). The varieties of social construction: A review. Theory & Psychology, 7, 399–416. (with K. Dzinas) (1997). How psychology got its variables. Canadian Psychology, 38, 43–48. (1995). Neither science nor history? Psychological Inquiry, 6, 115–117. (1994). Does the history of psychology have a future? Theory & Psychology, 4, 467–484. (1993). The social context of research practice and the priority of history. Psychologie und Geschichte, 4, 178–186. (1993). Psychological objects, practice, and history. Annals of Theoretical Psychology, 8, 15–47. (1993). History, practice and psychological objects. Reply to commentators. Annals of Theoretical Psychology, 8, 71–84. (1992). Ideas and constructions: Reply to commentators. Theory and Psychology, 2, 255–256. (1992). The project of an experimental social psychology: Historical perspectives. Science in Context, 5, 309–328. (1991). Guest editor’s introduction. History of the Human Sciences, 4, 327–333. (Special issue on historiography of psychology). (1990). Malthus for Psychology? Canadian Psychology, 31, 276–278. (1989). Psychological experimentation as social practice: Historical considerations. (In Dutch). Kennis en Methode, 13, 146–158. (1987). New paradigm or metaphysics of consensus? New Ideas In Psychology, 5, 13–17. (1985). Origins of the psychological experiment as a social institution. American Psychologist, 40, 133–140. (1985). The methodological imperative in psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 15, 1–13. 236 KURT DANZIGER’S PUBLICATIONS (1983). Origins of the schema of stimulated motion: Towards a pre-history of modern psychology. History of Science, 21, 183–210. (1983). Origins and basic principles of Wundt’s V¨olkerpsychologie. British Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 303–313. (1980). Wundt’s psychological experiment in the light of his philosophy of science. Psychological Research, 42, 109–122. (1980). The history of introspection reconsidered. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sci- ences, 16, 240–262. (1979). The positivist repudiation of Wundt. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 15, 205–230. (1977). Images from the past: The dialectics of control. Ontario Psychologist, 9, 6–15. (1977). Hostility management and ego involvement in discussion groups. Journal of Social Psy- chology, 102, 143–148. (1974). The acculturation of Italian immigrant girls in Canada. International Journal of Psychol- ogy, 9, 129–137. (with H. Morsbach) (1967).
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