BICOM Briefing Causes and consequences of the Six- Day War (1967) March 2017 PART 1: THE CAUSES OF THE WAR Armed Palestinian fighters (Fedayeen) frequently launched raids into Israel, especially from Jordan What was the background to the war? and Lebanon, with Syria a key supporter of the fighters. These raids became more regular and Israel’s War of Independence ended in early deadly during the immediate years prior to the war, 1949 with armistice agreements that left Israel and culminated in what is often referred to as the in a formal state of war with all its neighbours, precursor to the Six-Day War, the Samu Incident defending precarious borders and cut off from of 13 November 1966. Israel sent up to 3,000 Jewish places of religious, historic and national soldiers and tanks into the Jordanian-held village significance in Jerusalem and the West Bank. of Samu, in the West Bank, in an attempt to stop The War also created approximately 750,000 Fedayeen attacks and to force Arab states to more Palestinian refugees in Jordanian, Lebanese, aggressively prevent cross-border attacks under Egyptian and Syrian controlled territory. Israel’s their control. The Samu Incident did not produce territory was the size of Wales, and in 1967 its its intended outcome; in the first four months of population was less than three million. 1967 Israel recorded 270 border incidents along the West Bank and Syrian borders (a 100 per cent Surrounded by hostile neighbours on all increase from the last four months of 1966) which sides, Israel had extremely vulnerable borders triggered Israeli reprisal raids. and no strategic depth. The narrowest point between the West Bank and the Mediterranean Cold War military alliances: In the late 1950s was nine miles, and Jordanian and Egyptian and early 1960s Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel artillery weapons could hit most Israeli cities Nasser aligned with the Soviet Union, receiving and civilian infrastructure. The recent memory vast amounts of arms and financial support. In of the Holocaust heightened the Israeli sense of fact, from 1956 to 1967 the Soviet Union invested insecurity and fear of genocide. Israeli Foreign US$2bn in military aid alone in its Arab clients – Minister Abba Eban said of the pre-1967 borders 1,700 tanks, 2,400 artillery pieces, 500 jets, and that they are, “for us equivalent to insecurity and 1,400 advisers – of which 43 per cent went directly danger. I do not exaggerate when I say that it has to Egypt. Due to the Soviet Union clientelism, for us something of a memory of Auschwitz ”. Israel’s Arab neighbours were outspending Israel in defence expenditures by US$1,481m to US$628m. Israel’s diplomatic vulnerability: Israel’s strongest Western ally and arms provider was France. However, after Charles De Gaulle was elected in 1958, France shifted to align itself more with Arab interests, placing an embargo on offensive weapon sales to the Middle East, a move affecting only Israel. British leaders had sympathy for Israel but placed emphasis on its relations with oil rich Arab states, whilst the US- Israel strategic relationship was in its infancy. Tensions over the sources of the Jordan River and Israeli land cultivation on the border, led to clashes between Israel and Syria. Syria attempted to divert the sources of the river, to thwart the construction of Israel’s National Water Carrier, vital for Israel’s development. A major clash between Syria and Israel occurred on 7 April 1967, when Syrian artillery on the Golan Heights fired on an Israeli tractor farming in the demilitarised zone which subsequently escalated into an air battle in which Israel shot down six Syrian MiG 21 fighters. Egypt signed a mutual defence agreement with Syria in 1966, placing all army units under the command of the Egyptian military, in effect 1 limiting Israel’s ability to respond to specific of Tiran to Israeli shipping, a violation of attacks without potentially causing a massive international law and long regarded by Israel as retaliation. a casus belli. The closing of the Straits prevented vital goods from entering Israel’s Red Sea resort What led to the crisis in May-June 1967? of Eilat and the absence of an Israeli response was perceived as severely False intelligence from the Soviets who reported diminishing Israel’s “The time has deterrence, which to Egypt in mid-May 1967 that Israel was massing come to enter troops to attack Syria. No such preparation was was vital for its underway. national security. US into a battle of President Johnson annihilation.” Egypt sent four brigades into the Sinai on 14 said later: “If a single - Syrian Defence Min- May and ordered out the 3,400 UN peacekeepers act of folly was ister Hafez al-Assad stationed there as an integral part of the ceasefire more responsible for agreement hammered out after the 1956 Sinai- this explosion than Suez conflict between Israel and Egypt. UN any other, it was the arbitrary and dangerous Secretary General U. Thant immediately agreed announced decision that the Straits of Tiran to withdraw the UN, which Abba Eban likened would be closed.” to “an umbrella which is taken away as soon as it begins to rain”. This doubled the number of At the end of May, Egypt signed military Egyptian soldiers compared with Israeli soldiers defence pacts with Jordan and Iraq, in theory in the area. Israel responded by mobilising its unifying their forces under Egypt, and increasing reserves, a considerable proportion of its male the Israeli sense of a noose being drawn around population. its neck. On 30 May 1967, King Hussein of Jordan said: “All of the Arab armies now surround Nasser, emboldened by the UN withdrawal, Israel. The UAR, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, announced on 22 May the closure of the Straits Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and Kuwait... there 2 is no difference between one Arab people and Israeli military doctrine, dictated by lack of another, no difference between one Arab army geographical depth, made it a strategic imperative and another.” to strike first.Facing potential war on three fronts, Israel’s planners believed a surprise first-strike International diplo- “Our basic was essential to take out one threat in order to macy failed to resolve objective will be withstand others if they materialised. Israel’s the crisis. A US initi- generals also argued that the longer Israel waited, ative to break Egypt’s the destruction the more costly would be the battle, and the lower blockade of the Straits of Israel” the chances of success, since Nasser was using with a multinational - President of Egypt time to entrench his forces. The mobilisation of so convoy to escort Israe- Gamal Abdel Nasser many of Israel’s male population away from their li ships (named Oper- work places was also crippling economically. ation Regatta), never materialised due to lack of international support and US resolve. This dilemma created a political crisis in Israel: The pressure of a potentially devastating war Why did Israel launch a pre-emptive strike? coupled with the absence of clear policy directives caused Israel’s Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin to Israeli Prime Minister suffer from mental and physical exhaustion, “Expecting which incapacitated him for 48 hours between Levi Eshkol resisted Israel to take intense pressure 22 and 24 May. Political and public pressure from his military to a possible ultimately forced Eshkol to hand over the defence launch a pre-emptive destructive portfolio (which he also held) to Moshe Dayan, a military hero. strike for two to three blow without weeks, and hoped in vain for a diplomatic responding Israel’s alarm grew as Arab leaders, media and solution. He wished to would be like publics united around the threat to destroy Israel avoid war if possible – accepting defeat and slaughter its people. Nasser declared: “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel,” certainly without overt before trying to US support – and whilst Syrian Defence Minister Hafez al-Assad feared the diplomatic protect yourself.” declared: “The time has come to enter into a battle consequences of being - Professor Michael of annihilation.” On 1 June, Ahmed Shukeiry, judged the aggressor. Walzer the Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), said: “We shall destroy Israel 3 and its inhabitants and as for the survivors – within minutes. Israel committed 95 per cent of its if there are any – the boats are ready to deport planes to this operation, which minimised Egypt’s them.” ability to launch a ground attack and freed the IAF to attack Jordanian and Syrian air forces on Ultimately, the filling of the Sinai with an the same day. The successful land battles on the Egyptian army capable of a devastating strike Sinai and Jordanian fronts were won in the first coupled with the closure of the Straits of Tiran 24 hours thanks to air superiority. This enabled and the failure of diplomacy made war inevitable. Israel to then divert forces to capturing the Golan As the expert in ‘just war’ theory Professor Heights from Syria. Michael Walzer said: “Expecting Israel to take a possible destructive blow without responding Although outnumbered, Israeli forces were far would be like accepting defeat before trying to better prepared while Arab forces were poorly led protect yourself.” and organised. Israel’s victory was a result of the military’s planning, intelligence and preparation. However, Israel sought to keep Jordan out of the Jordanian forces, which had been placed under hostilities sending an appeal to King Hussein on Egyptian command, were sent to southern areas the first day of the war via three channels – the US of the West Bank, exposing Jerusalem.