Us-Sino Joint Education Ventures in China: a Stakeholder Analysis Of

Home , Charlie Soong, Duke Kunshan University, Gaokao, Graduate Medical Program, Kunshan

Lucas Olson

2016

US-SINO JOINT EDUCATION VENTURES IN CHINA: A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF

HOPKINS-NANJING CENTER, DUKE KUNSHAN UNIVERSITY,

AND SCHWARZMAN SCHOLARS

Lucas Olson

ABSTRACT

Elite US-Sino joint education ventures in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have brought together diverse stakeholders to create a learning environment that supports innovation in the context of China’s transformation to a service-based economy. These diverse stakeholders include: university administration, faculty, and students; government agencies; and industry.

Theories of strategical alliances are useful in understanding how these stakeholders interact and influence these institutions during their establishment. Important insights can be learned about how to build successful cross-border education partnerships in a complex social environment.

Three descriptive case studies were conducted through in-depth interviews, site visits, and official documentation. The first case is the Hopkins-Nanjing Center at Nanjing Universi- ty—the first US-Sino venture established in 1986. The second case is Duke Kunshan University, and the third case is the Schwarzman Scholars Program at Tsinghua University, heralded as the

Rhodes Scholarship of China. !iii

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank first and foremost my committee members who accompanied me through the painstaking process of seeing this project to completion. A deep level of thanks is due to Dr. Louis Goodman of the School of International Service at American University for his constant encouragement and push to see me succeed. His focus on inductive research and always pushing me to get into the field has been a source of great learning and balance for my deductive tendencies. Thank you also to Dr. Amanda Taylor of the School of International Service at Amer- ican University for encouraging me to be rigorous in my methodology, critical in my thinking, and for always helping to keep me grounded.

Thank you to the School of International Service for the grant that allowed for the field research in China. Also, a sincere thank you to all who allowed me to interview them and gain a window into the incredibly fascinating and important work that they do. I would also like to thank Karen Ives for editing my early drafts and for her support throughout the research and writing process. Finally, thank you to the Carter Center and Global Times for the opportunity to present the results. The writing of this thesis has been an amazing learning process about the in- tricacies of international and transnational higher education, and I am profoundly grateful for the experience. !iv

Table of Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………..ii

Acknowledgements………………………………..…………………………………………….iii

List of Tables……………..……………………………………………………………………..vi

List of Illustrations……………………………………………………………………………..vii

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………1

Outline……………………………………………………………………………….…….………4

Research Significance……………………………………………………………..…………..…6

Background……………………………………………………………………………..………..8

Research Problem……………………………………………………………….….…………..15

Research Question……………………………………………………………….….………….18

Theoretical Framework…………………………………………………….…………………..19

Literature Review……………………………………………………….……………..……….23

Methodology…………………………………………………….………..……………………..29

Case (Site) Selection………………………………………………….………..….……………..30

Hopkins Nanjing Center………………………………………………….……………………32

Stage 1: Envisioning HNC………………………………………………….……..…..…………32

Stage 2: Negotiations………………………………………………….………..…..……………34

Stage 3: Implementation………………………………………………….………..…….………37

Stage 4: Evaluation and Evolution………………………………………………..…………..…40

30th Anniversary Celebration: Reflecting Back…………………………………………………49 !v

Duke Kunshan University………………………………………..…….………………………55

Stage 1: Envisioning Duke Kunshan University…………………………..…….………………55

Stage 2: Negotiations………………………………………………….……..…..………………56

Stage 3: Implementation………………………………………………….….……..……………63

Schwarzman Scholars………………………..…………………………………………………73

Stage 1: Envisioning Schwarzman Scholars…………………………………….…………….…73

Stage 2: Negotiations………………………………………………….…………………………74

Stage 3: Implementation………………………………………………….…..…………………78

Discussion……………………………………………….………………………………………89

Strategic Alliances………………………………………………….………..……..……………91

Stakeholder Analysis………………………………………………….……….…………………95

Hybrid Model of World-Class Chinese University………………………………..……………100

Rival Theories………………………………………………….………..………..……………105

Recommendations for Practice……………………………………………….………………110

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..………………113

List of Interviews.…………………………………..…………………………………………115

References…………………………………………..…………………………………………116 !vi

List of Tables

Table 1: Program Details………………………………………………………………………90

Table 2: Outcomes…………………………………………………………………………….102 vii!

List of Illustrations

Diagram 1: Stakeholders in Higher Education……………………………………………….22 !1

Introduction

US-China relations have repeatedly been described as the most important bilateral relationship in the world for the 21st century (e.g. Kissinger 2014; Christensen 2015), and, in the sto- ry of this relationship, international higher education has played a key role. According to the In- stitute for International Education (2014), China is the origin of nearly one-third of all international students who study in the US higher education system, which in 2013-14 hosted nearly twice as many international students as any other country (Altbach and Knight 2007). This trend is not a recent development, as the history of education exchange between the US and Chi- na extends back over a century (Li 2007). Yet throughout this history, collaboration in this area has been subject to the vagaries in US-Sino government relations. During the period 1949-79, educational exchanges ceased to exist as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US did not have formal diplomatic relations. Following the establishment of formal relations in 1979, international education grew rapidly to their currently levels. This thesis explores some of the most high-profile education institutions established in this period that are helping to further define the relationship between the United States and China.

International education between the US and China has taken on new dimensions since

China joined to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. WTO membership required China to open its education market to foreign providers, and in 2003 China’s Ministry of Education released regulations to manage foreign providers that required all foreign universities to have a

Chinese partner. This opening of China’s education market has since created a large growth of joint-venture partnerships, and, by 2013 there were 1,780 such jointly-run institutions and pro- !2 grams with overseas partners (Jingjing 2013). Branch campuses, the most ambitious ventures that foreign universities can undertake, have also grown, and currently 27 branch campuses have been set up in China, according to Cross-Border Education Research Team (C-BERT) at the

State University of New York at Albany. Eleven branch campuses have been set up in China by

US institutions, more than any other country (C-BERT 2016). The presence of this large number of US education providers in China has had important implication for US-China relations, and this thesis presents, in the form of three separate case studies, an analysis of the stakeholders involved in the establishment of three key US-Sino joint-venture educational institutions in China.

China’s two most recent national Five-Year Plans (FYPs) (2011-15 and 2016-20) have established an economic transition from manufacturing to services at the forefront of the national agenda, and this transition has created important context for US higher education providers that are currently operating in China or are seeking to do so. The role of higher education has been highlighted as necessary to create the human capital and innovation required for this economic transition. However, there is a wide perception that quality in China’s higher education is falling short of employer expectations. In the late 1990s and 2000s, major government initiatives, such as the 98/5 initiate and 2/11 initiative, pumped billions of Yuan into leading Chinese universities.

However, in 2014, the unemployment rate of college graduates six months after leaving university was still between 15-30% (Sharma 2014). Multinational corporations, a key employer of high- skilled human capital and provider of services in China, have been warning for nearly a decade about the problem of Chinese graduates being unfit for the service export sector. In 2005, a report by McKinsey titled China’s Looming Talent Shortage predicted a shortage in the labor market based on the inability of higher education institutions to effectively train students for the job !3 market and suggested that multinational corporations (MNCs) in China would need to internally train employees for the foreseeable future (Farrell and Grant 2005). It is within this context of

China’s increasing demand for high-quality higher education programs to aid in the economic transition that joint-venture institutions find themselves. However, the context in the US also plays an important role for US universities that are partners in a Chinese joint-venture.

The necessity of supporting the Chinese government’s agenda has challenged US universities to reflect on their core mission as educational institutions as well as their responsibilities as institutions based in the US. The political stability of the country under one party rule is implicit in the government’s economic agenda, as the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is contingent on a successful economic transition. Consequently, under the leadership of Presi- dent Xi Jinping since 2012, the Communist Party of China has cracked down on academic freedom in order to ensure that Chinese universities are supporting the national agenda. In 2014, Xi

Jinping encouraged universities to “enhance guidance over thinking and keep a tight grip on leading ideological work in higher education,” and he admonished them to “[n]ever allow singing to a tune contrary to the party center. Never allow eating the Communist Party’s food and then smashing the Communist Party’s cooking pots” (Buckley and Jacobs 2015). These statements have been further enforced by official CPC policy documents such as Document 9 and

Document 30 that list precisely which ideas from the West are not allowed in universities. This crackdown has not gone unnoticed in the US government. In 2015, the US Congress held hearings with the leaders of US universities operating in China to ensure that academic freedom was not being limited (Feuerberg 2015). As a result, the complexities for US universities to operate in

China has increased, as have the stakes for all those involved in these education programs. !4

Outline

The next section of the thesis explains why the research in this thesis is significant to those involved in joint-venture education institutions, those interested in China’s overall economic development and the development of world-class Chinese universities, and those concerned about US-China relations. The following section provides relevant background on China’s economic transition and the role of China’s higher education system for those non-Chinese readers unfamiliar with the topic. Afterwards, the core research problem is defined that limits the scope of study for this thesis. Subsequently, the driving research question and several sub-questions are laid out. The following section provides a theoretical framework from theories on strategic alliances and a stakeholder approach to international higher education programs. This framework provides an initial structure through which to interpret the data that has been gathered for this study. Following the theoretical framework is a detailed description of the methodology of the study and the logic behind the selection of the three case studies included in this thesis. Follow- ing the methodology are the results from the three cases: the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Duke

Kunshan University, and the Schwarzman Scholars Program.

The discussion section then analyzes the cases in four subsections. The first looks beyond the establishment of these joint-venture institutions to explore how they might evolve over time, especially through the use of evaluation mechanisms. The second provides a more in-depth analysis on how China’s economic transition is influencing its higher education system (and vice-versa) as well as a discussion on how US-Sino joint-venture institutions are influencing the evolution of a uniquely Chinese model of world-class universities. The third highlights the influ- !5 ence of US-China relations on the different stakeholders in the establishment of each institution included in the case studies. Last, the discussion section looks at rival theories that help further elucidate the phenomenon of these institutions as well as explain and interpret evidence gathered in the research for this thesis, in particular theories of global inequality, elitism, and gender studies. The conclusion of the thesis integrates the argument, suggests areas for further research, and points to several key takeaways for those that might be interested in starting a US-Sino joint-venture education institution in China. !6

Research Significance

This paper covers issues that are of direct relevance to those who are interesting in partnering to establish US-Sino joint educational ventures in China. This thesis is based on three case studies of leading US education ventures in China that are setting the standard for other US and international universities that would like to operate in China. Many popular news sources have covered the rise of these institutions, but few formal studies have explored these institutions in- depth in order to provide a complete picture of the phenomenon. Information about the motivations of the different stakeholders involved is obviously needed as examples abound where key stakeholders have been ignored resulting in either the delay or complete failure of the endeavor.

New York University (NYU) President Sexton’s vote of no confidence in 2013, shortly after the opening of the NYU Shanghai campus, is an example of the consequences that can occur when these initiatives are not fully thought through (Kaminer 2013).

This paper is also significant because of the role that US education providers play in introducing innovative university models into China’s higher education system from which other

Chinese universities can learn. These new models are significant as China attempts to drive their economic transition from manufacturing to services by investing in their higher education system to provide the necessary supply of high-skilled human capital. In particular, this paper sheds light on an evolving Chinese model of world-class university. These case studies demonstrate how

China is importing key aspects of Western education to promote critical thinking in its citizens that will lead to economic innovation (Stanfield and Wang 2015). However, it also constantly attempting to do so without leading to political instability. It is a delicate balance that is constant- !7 ly being tested both implicitly and explicitly as these institutions are established and consequently evolve.

Last, this paper also provides insight on the evolving diplomatic ties between the US and

China. Because the cases selected are on the forefront of the expanding education market in

China, they are closely connected with diplomatic relations between the countries in terms of the establishment of the institutions, the content of their curriculum, and the industries in which graduates eventually work. Consequently, it is possible to use these institutions as an indicator of the current state of US-China relations and also as a predictor of the direction of future political and economic relations between the two countries. For example, the Hopkins-Nanjing Center was one of the only remaining ties between the US and China during the 1989 Democracy

Movement in China. The Schwarzman Scholars Program has as an ambition to help train the the future Presidents of both the US and China. For those that want to get an advance look at where

US-China relations are going in the future, there is much to learn by studying the academic and professional programs that are producing many of the future leaders in this field. !8

Background

This section provides a brief overview of China’s current national agenda, specifically its economic transition from manufacturing to services, and the unique role that China’s higher education system is playing in this process. This context is crucial for foreign education providers operating in China, and therefore this background is provided for non-Chinese readers unfamiliar with the topic. First, this section covers the rise of Xi Jinping to power as the leader of China.

Second, it describes the role of national development plans in settling China’s government priori- ties. Then it describes the two major parts of China’s economic transition: the move to a domestic consumer-based economy and the supply of services to match this increased consumption, driven by high-skilled human capital trained in China’s expanded higher education system.

In 2012, Xi Jinping occupied the positions of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People's Republic of China, and the Chairman of China's Central

Military Commission, making him China’s supreme leader. Unlike his two predecessors, Hu Jin- tao and Jiang Zemin, he was not hand-selected by Deng Xiaoping. Consequently, his rise to power prompted a great deal of domestic and international interest with regard to his direction for the country during what has become the customary ten-year term for Chinese leadership. In this context, he announced his “Chinese Dream” in 2012. The Chinese Dream focuses on development goals for two impending centennial anniversaries: the centennial anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party is in 2022, by which time President Xi hopes to make

China into “a moderately well-off society”; the centennial anniversary of the PRC is in 2049, by which time President Xi hopes that China will become “a fully developed nation” (Kuhn 2013). !9

With a current population of over 1.3 billion people, nearly 1/5th of the global population, such an achievement would have a tremendous impact on the world as a whole. As Kuhn, a modern

Chinese business expert describes, “Indeed, the Chinese Dream ultimately aims at vaulting the country to the center stage of international affairs and back to its rightful place in the global order” (2013, 4). This economic transition has been put at the forefront of China’s national agenda.

The details of how these goals will be achieved has been described in China’s most recent

Five-Year Plans (FYPs). China’s official FYPs have provided a roadmap for China to achieve its goals, and key to this process is the transition from an economy based on manufacturing to one based on services. China’s FYPs are a legacy of its socialist history and are generated by the

CPC and the PRC’s National People’s Congress after an extensive process of research and debate with the different interest groups in Chinese society. The 11th FYP was ratified in 2010 for the period of 2011-2015, and the current 12th FYP spans from 2016-2020. These in turn have generated a number of reports by international observers analyzing their implications, especially for business (e.g. APCO Worldwide 2016; Reeves and He 2015).

These plans are best understood as aspirations for the country and do not specify the necessary steps to achieve each goal, which is instead delegated to the lower levels of Chinese government for implementation. Nevertheless, they are extremely important to understanding the direction of the country and how resources will be prioritized in the future. In particular, the 12th

FYP highlights what President Xi calls the “New Normal” annual GDP growth rate of no less than 6.5%, a lower growth rate than China has become accustomed to, associated with a move to a service-driven economy. It also highlights five main tenets of innovation, openness, environ- !10 mentalism, coordination, and inclusion. These tenets are designed to address the major challenges that China faces in the process of this economic transition.

China faces two major hurdles in its transition from manufacturing to service. The first major hurdles is the creation of a consumer-driven economy. Currently, China has one of the highest saving rates in the world that is primarily driven by Chinese households unwilling to spend their hard-earned savings. An official report by the Australian government explains this change well:

“Since the 1980s, saving as a share of GDP has risen from less than 40 per cent to about 50 per cent in 2011, outsizing investment for the past 18 years. The rise in saving has been driven by all three sectors of the economy — corporate, household and government. The household sector is China's largest source of saving, accounting for on average almost half of China's national savings since 1992” (Kong, McKissack and Zhang 2012, 9- 10).

One of the largest hurdles that China will need to overcome is convincing famously thrifty Chi- nese consumers to purchase the services being produced by firms. In an extensive report, the

Demand Institute analyzed data on consumption patterns for 167 economies between 1950-2011 and compared China to economies with similar attributes. Based on this research, it estimates that, “[i]f consumption’s share of real GDP rose from 28% to 46% of GDP in China in the course of a decade—an optimistic but not impossible scenario, given our research—it would generate an incremental 90 trillion yuan between 2015 and 2025 ($15 trillion at current exchange rates)” (Keely and Anderson 2011). However, the research also suggests two other important conclusions. The first is that China is unique compared with other countries in that “[c]onsump- tion’s share of real GDP has been falling for six decades, from 76% in 1952 to 28% in

2011” (Keely and Anderson 2011, 6). While not abnormal for a country’s economic develop- 11! ment, China is unique in that “[t]his decline has been due to a fall in both of the components that underlie consumption: household income’s share of GDP and consumption’s share of household income” (Keely and Anderson 2011, 7). Its second conclusion is that, “[w]ithout a substantial intervention…we believe consumption’s share of China’s economy is unlikely to rise substantially before 2025” (Keely and Anderson 2011, 6).

Fortunately, the CPC is well-aware of this challenge and the 12th FYP aims to address this challenge by rapidly expanding the social safety net for Chinese citizens. The logic is that

Chinese citizens are unwilling to spend their savings if they do not have a guarantee that in an emergency the government will support them. The 12th FYP also rescinded the One-Child Policy in order to address the impending issue of a safety net for an aging population, and it has hinted at reforming the hukou system, which helps manages internal Chinese migration by providing regulations on government benefits: under the current system, any extant welfare benefits do not easily transfer if an individual migrates to another location within the country; under the re- formed system, people would be able to retain their welfare benefits if they move to another location within the country (Roach 2015). However, addressing the issue of consumption is only one side of the coin, and the issue of who will supply these services also needs to be addressed.

The second major hurdle China faces in its economic transition is the need to expand the services offered in its economy at the same rate at which consumption is increased. Service ventures have made tremendous strides in China: the size of the service sector has expanded to being nearly absent in the 1980s to, in 2015, the largest sector of the Chinese economy at 51.6% GDP

(Roach 2015). However, this statistic may mislead one into thinking that China is in the midst of a successful economic transition from manufacturing to service. The diminishing economic !12 growth in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) prompted the government to provide a massive stimulus program. In order to avoid economic stagnation, China ballooned its debt between 2007 to 2015 from 172% of GDP to more than 250% (Bin 2016), in relative terms larger than the debt of both the US and Germany (Anderlini 2015, 3). However, most of this support has gone to the manufacturing sector where there are already highly diminished returns on investment. Rather than stimulate the economy through investment in the nascent service sector, it has been argued that the massive government expenditure has gone to State-Owned Enterprises

(SOEs) and the senescent manufacturing sector, where the political economic ties are strongest.

The influence that vested interests within the manufacturing sector have in policy-making add to the difficulties already inherent in economic transition to services. The transition to services, if successful, will inevitably result in a large number of economic losers within the manufacturing sector by cutting government funding and severing age-old political ties. While deregulating the economy to create new opportunities and growth within the service sector is a goal of the 12th

FYP, the presence of vested interests will continue to make these and similar initiatives difficult to implement.

Further complicating the transition to services is that Chinese firms will have to compete with well-established international firms. As a member of WTO, China has committed itself to international competition throughout the economy. China has managed to increase its exports of services from barely $30 billion when it entered WTO in 2001 to over $200 billion USD in 2013

(Ministry of Commerce 2016). However, total US exports in services were nearly $700 billion in

2015 (Amadeo 2016). Furthermore, the trade surplus between the US and China in services has steadily widened since 2001 raising questions of how much expanding demand for services in !13

China will be supplied by US or Chinese firms (Serletis 2013). Consequently, China has a long way to go in completing an economic transition that allows it to compete internationally in services.

It is in this area that the principle of innovation, one of the five main tenets of the 12th

FYP, applies directly to higher education. The Chinese higher education system is essential to the

Chinese government’s plan to drive innovation in the service sector. Without graduates that have the skills and creativity to not only work in the knowledge economy but to start new ventures that can compete with established international firms, China’s economic transition will be difficult. However, China’s universities still seem to be lagging. As stated earlier in this thesis, the unemployment rate is extremely high for college graduates, and multinational corporations are explicitly relying on their own internal training of new Chinese hires that consequently disincen- tivizes them from hiring Chinese citizens. Furthermore, the flow of Chinese students to the US has risen steadily since the 1980s as students simply vote with their feet (Li 2010).

China’s MOE has increasingly relied on evaluations as an official accountability mecha- nism to increase academic quality. The MOE’s increased reliance on evaluations has come from not only the massive growth in China’s higher education system but a decrease in the total staff at the MOE. Liu (2010) has begun to track these attempts at accountability in graduate education such as the MOE’s creation in 2000 of the China Academic Degrees & Graduate Education De- velopment Centre (CADGEDC) to accredit post-graduate degree-granting units and to evaluate masters and doctoral dissertations. This step has contributed greatly to the enforcement of common standards in graduate education throughout China. However, the goals of this framework are not necessarily the same as those of US universities. !14

US higher education has a reputation of being able to enhance innovation through critical thinking, and, in China’s drive to transform its economy, US universities offer the opportunity to promote innovative models in China’s higher education system. A recent Stanford study demonstrates that critical thinking skills are not being developed in Chinese universities (Hernandez

2016). However, a key component of critical thinking in the US tradition of higher education is the ability to criticize the status quo and question traditional ways of thinking (Auger and Overby

2005). Consequently, an implication of importing US higher education into China is that it would promote critical thinking towards China’s one-party rule. Bin (2016) highlights this issue by stat- ing that China’s government will continue to struggle providing basic services effectively because of a lack of “public participation in decision-making” (Bin 2016, 11). In this sense, one area where US universities can help China’s economic transition is by promoting critical analysis of government service delivery in the education of Chinese citizenry. However, understanding how these two conflicting approaches of US higher education and the Chinese government is key to understanding the challenges in establishing these joint-venture institutions and how they evolve. !15

Research Problem

This thesis focuses on understanding the phenomenon of how US-Sino joint-venture education institutions are established. Its focus is on institutions that are either a comprehensive university or a college within a Chinese university, each having at least one academic program with dedicated faculty, staff, and facilities. These larger institutions are complicated to establish, re- quiring millions of dollars in upfront costs and years before revenues from enrollments are large enough to cover operating costs (Dessoff 2011). Because of the significant commitment required for these institutions, there are significantly less of them in operation as compared to joint degree programs that are much more common (Jingjing 2013). However, the large-scale investments required mean that these institutions are closely tied to wealthy and powerful members of society and that these institutions themselves are designed to be highly influential in society.

This thesis is also focused in particular on the establishment of these institutions. Form- ing a successful partnership can be quite difficult, as the number of failed ventures attests. For- eign universities often rush into establishing an international partnership in China because they they are trying to keep up with other universities who are expanding into China or because they think it will be an easy way to generate revenue (Wilkins and Huisman 2012). Between 2006 and

2009, the Chinese government stopped approving joint education program because of a large number of issues in their management (Jingjing 2013). The strict regulations in China, including working closely with a local partner university, require a nuanced understanding of Chinese culture and Chinese higher education. A general distrust of foreign influence in China and a lack of !16 academic freedom create a particularly difficult environment for US universities that hold academic freedom as a core value.

Furthermore, most of these institutions in China are relatively new, so a mature body of literature has not yet evolved. This process has been slow in particular because these institutions are often private and, given the sensitive environment in which they operate, are not necessarily incentivized to make their data public for research. However, as they have become established and more common, this information has increasingly become available. Given the increased number of US higher education providers operating in China and their complexities, there is a need to understand these institutions in a systematized manner. Consequently, this paper seeks to understand the complexities of establishing these ventures in China, particularly by using a framework of strategic alliances and stakeholder management, in order to help facilitate these ventures going forward.

There are several terms that are used in this paper that are necessary to define because of their potential ambiguity in meaning. The definition of “institution,” drawn from sociology, is used to mean established “patterns of behaviour” (Scott and Marshall 2009) and is distinct from that of a branch campus. “Branch campus” is used to mean “an entity that is owned, at least in part, by a foreign education provider; operated in the name of the foreign education provider; engages in at least some face-to-face teaching; and provides access to an entire academic program that leads to a credential awarded by the foreign education provider” (C-Bert 2016). How- ever, as this research illuminated, not all organizations that fit this definition of branch campus use the term, and theories from branch campuses are more broadly applicable to organizations that, for example, lack foreign accreditation. Hence the distinction between institutions and !17 branch campuses in this thesis. A broad definition of “transnational education” (TNE) is used in this thesis from Knight (2007) to mean any of the following "cross-border education," "offshore education," and "borderless education.” Last but not least, education “quality” is a term that this thesis intentionally does not define because, as will become clear, different stakeholders have very different ideas of what this term means, and this ambiguity has large implications for these joint-ventures. !18

Research Questions

Given the growing prevalence of these institutions and their potentially significant impact on Chinese society and US-China relations, this thesis is driven by the following research questions: In what ways do key stakeholders influence the establishment of joint-education ventures in China?

Sub questions:

• How was the initial idea for this institution conceived? (Who is its parent?)

• How was the creation of this institution negotiated?

• What is the governance structure of the institution?

• How have duties and responsibilities been shared between US and Chinese partners?

• What has the role of faculty and staff been in the creation of each graduate program?

• How have graduate programs evolved over time (or are anticipated to evolve) in terms of con-

tent, size, and other factors?

• From where have students been recruited and what have been (is anticipated to be) their career

outcomes? !19

Theoretical Framework

This paper applies theoretical frameworks from organizational theory on the formation of strategic alliances as well as stakeholder theory as adapted to higher education. Organizational theory offers both a definition of strategic alliances as well as a framework for understanding the process of how these alliances evolve. Wohlstetter et al. (2005) define “strategic alliances” as

“groups of organizations ... voluntarily working together to solve problems that are too large for any one organization to solve on its own” and in education specifically offering “otherwise un- available assets including additional human and financial resources, new knowledge, increased flexibility and productivity, and enhanced legitimacy" (Wohlstetter et al. 2005, 419). In a survey of non-profit literature on strategic alliances, the Jossey-Bass Handbook of Non-Profit Leader- ship and Management (2010) found four common stages of strategic alliance development. The first stage involves “one or more individuals conceiving of the possibility of partnering” (Herman

2010, 385) and conducting “due diligence” on potential partners to determine a good fit. The second stage is the process of is when the partners “formalize their relationship. A negotiation process… culminates in an agreement” (Herman 2010, 386). The third process is the “implementation” or “operation” of the agreement that is followed by the fourth process of

“evaluation” (Herman 2010, 387). This thesis attempts to apply this four-stage process of strategic alliance development to joint-venture education programs in China.

Stakeholder theory also offers a useful framework for understanding the operations of higher education institutions and the establishment of these joint-ventures. Stakeholder theory was originally synthesized by R. Edward Freeman in his 1984 book Strategic Management: A !20

Stakeholder Approach. Freeman defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who is effected by or can effect the achievement of an organization’s goals” (Freeman 1984, 46). Stakeholder theory was originally developed for corporations and presented models for understanding and managing the different groups that have an interest in the operations of a corporation. It has been widely used in the field of business ethics and in models of corporate social responsibility. How- ever, it has also been adapted to fit the context of higher education.

Stakeholder theory has been increasingly applied to higher education (Amaral and Maga- lhaes 2002; Jongbled et al. 2008). The stakeholders, as in traditional corporate stakeholder models, are divided between internal and external stakeholders. For universities, internal stakeholders are traditionally defined as the faculty, students, and administration. External stakeholders are any groups in the broader society with a stake in what happens in the university. These external stakeholders can include the local neighborhood, employers, different levels of government, accreditation agencies, media, alumni, and families of students. Bolton and Nie (2010) provide an example of relevant stakeholders in a TNE through a jointly-run education program between an

Australian and Chinese university that includes the internal stakeholders at the partnering universities (primarily administration and faculty); government agencies; industry; and prospective students and their families. These higher education stakeholders are described in Diagram 1.

These stakeholders can be ranked by importance in order to explain both their involvement in governance structures and why managers prioritize relationships with particular stakeholder groups in decision-making. Such a model has been developed by Mitchel, et al. (1997) and Loggerman (2013) in the corporate world. This model for ranking stakeholders identifies three different criteria: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Power is defined as “the extent that it can !21 gain access to coercive, utilitarian or normative means” (Mitchel et al. 1997, 865). Legitimacy is

“socially accepted and expected behaviour” (Mitchel et al. 1997, 866). Urgency is “the degree to which a stakeholder claims call for immediate attention” (Mitchel et al. 1997, 867). According to a combination of these three attributes, stakeholders can be latent stakeholders, expectant stakeholders, or definitive stakeholders. These concepts have been subsequently adopted in higher education by Ehater Eggins in her book Drivers and Barriers to Achieving Quality in Higher Edu- cation (2014). She provides examples of power as voting on key committees with decision-making abilities; she describes legitimacy as a “widely-shared expectations to be represented in various governance bodies;” and she describes urgency as their engagement in meetings in such ways as comments, proposals, and action items, especially those involving quality assurance

(Eggins 2014, 84). This framework provides a useful way to analyze the relative importance of different stakeholders in the process of establishing these joint-venture programs. !22

!23

Literature Review

Educational exchange between the US and China goes back more than a century, and the literature on the subject is consequently vast and spans numerous disciplines. This literature review will cover recent literature across three fields of study in particular. International higher education, in particular the sub-field of transnational education, speaks directly to the phenomenon of joint-venture education institutions in China. Additionally, literature on economic development in China, especially on the massive growth in the higher education system since the late

1990s, provides important context to the role of these joint-ventures in China. Additionally, foreign policy literature on US-China relations, in particular public diplomacy and the role of soft power, helps frame the actions of two major stakeholders—the Chinese and US government.

Literature on international education between the US and China has grown rapidly since diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1979. The majority of this literature has focused on

Chinese studying in the US, especially for graduate programs (Sidel 1983; Li 2010) and also on issues of brain drain as many Chinese students opt to stay in the US after completing their degree

(Lien 2008). More recently, scholars have begun to analyze the reversal of brain drain as long- time Chinese expatriates opt to return home, especially in response to targeted government policies (Nawab and Shafi 2011). The conversation took on new dimensions when higher education began to be included in major trade deals such as GATS and WTO (Knight 2002; Ercheng 2001).

As China’s higher education system has evolved, flows of international students to China have increased (Hu, Wotipka, and Wen 2015), and the pattern of student mobility has increasingly taken on market characteristics as Chinese universities compete through program offerings and at- !24 tempt to respond to international student demand (Li and Bray 2007; Kuroda 2014; Pan 2013).

As China’s leading universities have begun eyeing world-class status, research has also focused on factors that attract international faculty (Kim 2015).

Research on transnational education in China has grown significantly since China opened its education market to foreign providers after joining WTO in 2001. Chinese regulations require foreign higher education providers to partner with a local Chinese university, and consequently joint-ventures have become an area of focus (Huang 2003). Branch campuses, in particular, have become a large area of research as more branch campuses have been founded in China than any other country besides the United Arab Emirates (Becker 2015). Numerous authors have focused on models for understanding the expansion of branch campuses around the world (Lien 2008;

Stanfield 2014; Wilkins and Huisman 2012; Lane, Kinser, and Knox 2013; Croom 2010). In- creasingly, a body of literature is growing that focuses explicitly on branch campuses in China.

Many of the earliest entrants to China were British universities, and the largest subset of articles focuses on these institutions (Stanfield & Wang 2015; Tang & Nollent 2007; Onsman 2013)1.

Hayhoe and Pan (2015) compare differences between British branch campuses. Osman Özturgut is one of the few authors who has published on specifically US-China joint educational ventures and ends his research imploring for more case study research in this area to help understand these institutions better (Özturgut 2007; Ozturgut 2008).

Literature on China’s economic development is also relevant to this thesis. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China’s two most recent Five Year Plans (FYPs) for national develop-

1 British universities have also led Europe in the creation of branch campuses abroad, though they still fall short compared to the number of US branch campuses abroad. !25 ment have focused on an economic transition from manufacturing to services in order to achieve the “Chinese Dream” of being a “moderately well-off society” by 2022 (the centennial of the

CPC’s founding) and a “fully developed nation” by 2049 (the centennial of the PRC’s founding)

(Kuhn 2013). In the past, cheap manufacturing has required a relatively low-skilled labor force, but the service sector will require a large increase in high-skilled labor. To address this challenge, the Chinese government announced its National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Re- form and Development for 2010–2020. This plan builds on the massive expansion in both size and quality of the Chinese higher education system that began in the 1990s in order to create a

Chinese labor force fit for a knowledge economy.

China has invested massively since the late 1990s to increase the size and quality of Chi- nese universities. Liu (2007) and Ma (2007) provide overviews of the evolution of China’s higher education system and the connection between China’s universities and its economic transition to services. In 1994, the adoption from the US of a tuition-driven financial model and loan programs from commercial banks led to a dramatic growth in access to higher education2. Further- more, quality of higher education was simultaneously increased at China’s leading universities through the Ministry of Education’s widely-known 211 and 985 initiatives. In 1995, China’s

Ministry of Education (MOE) launched Project 21/1 to create 100 leading Chinese research universities for the 21st century. Nearly US $6 billion was spent through 2010 on this initiative. In

May 1998, China’s MOE launched Project 98/5 on the centennial of Peking University’s founding. This initiative targeted about 40 top Chinese universities for grants worth hundreds of mil-

2 China surpassed the US in 2005 to have the largest higher education system in the world in terms of enrollments (Mahbubani, 2014). !26 lions of US dollars to create world-class Chinese universities. As the Chinese higher education system has grown, the Ministry of Education has allowed universities to become increasingly autonomous and has relied on accountability and evaluation mechanisms to shape the industry

(Liu 2010).

As China’s higher education system has developed, researchers have increasingly begun discussing the evolution of a Chinese model of higher education capable of creating world-class universities. Kirby (2014) explicitly challenges China to create such a model as a symbol of global leadership. Commentators have argued that China’s higher education is primarily a blend of components imported from the West (Hayhoe 1989; Mohrman 2008) as well as deeply influenced by Chinese history and culture (Li 2012; Yang 2015). Stanfield and Wang (2015) explore whether joint-venture branch campuses in China will be able to create this uniquely Chinese model of university that achieves world-class status.

Academic freedom is one area in which Chinese universities are developing their own unique approach. Li (2012) argues that Chinese universities are characterized by self-mastery and intellectual freedom, two parallel concepts to Western ideas of autonomy and academic freedom. Self-mastery refers to Chinese university’s subservience but not dependence on the Chinese government. Intellectual freedom refers to a belief that the highest purpose of knowledge is to be applied towards the social good. In doing so, Li creates a framework that explains how Chinese academics have traditionally been able to critique and change government policy by referring to the national agenda. However, recent government policies in China raise questions about whether any such freedoms exist, such as Document 9 and Document 30 that explicitly limit discussion in universities on topics deemed to be subversive to the government (Zhao 2016). !27

Another relevant aspect of Chinese higher education for this thesis is the state of public administration graduate programs in China. In the last several decades, China has increasingly turned to a professional civil service to manage its government bureaucracy (Burns 1989; Tong,

Straussman, and Broadnax 1999). This process has had important implications for the teaching of public administration at Chinese universities. For example, Wu and He (2009) demonstrate how differences in curriculums of public administration programs in the US and China can be explained through the lack of a non-profit sector in China. Infeld and Wenzhao (2009) provide descriptive examples of differences in pedagogy between public administration programs in Chi- na and the US.

Foreign policy literature on US-China relations also adds to the conversation about joint- venture education institutions, particularly research on public diplomacy and the role of soft power. Joseph Nye first presented the idea of soft power in his 2004 book Soft power: The means to success in world politics. The idea has since been applied to how international education has influenced US-China relations (Altbach and Peterson 2008; Scott-Smith 2008). Many authors have focused on the effects of future Chinese leaders studying in the US and how the experience has shaped their perceptions of the US and international affairs (Han and Zweig 2010; Han,

Chen, and Fang 2013). Li (2005) offers a comprehensive view of how education exchange between the US and China has shaped the relationship between the two countries. Increasingly, research is becoming focused on how China is using higher education as its own form of soft power (Metzgar 2016).

This thesis sets out to use case study methodology to examine three flagship US-Sino joint venture education institutions at the forefront of Chinese higher education through the lens !28 of these three bodies of literature. It will use a theoretical framework of strategic alliances and stakeholders to illuminate how these three bodies of literature integrate with each other and help understand the process of establishing these institutions. Because these partnerships are considered flagship ventures, that is to say that they each have pushed in significant ways the bound- aries of what has previously been thought possible in Chinese higher education, they add considerably to each previously mentioned body of literature. In particular, it will set these institutions within the context of US-China relations, as each case study has its own unique focus on policy- making, and each institution plays a unique role in the diplomatic relations of the US and China.

!29

Methodology

This paper includes a collection of three descriptive case studies of US-Sino joint venture graduate programs. Each case study is unique in a number of ways and could arguably be the focus of its own stand-alone case study. They are included together to provide a more complete picture of the cutting edge of China’s higher education system. Additionally, other researchers can begin to pull together information for a more comprehensive study of the influence of US higher education programs on China’s economy and higher education system. Multiple case studies are a unique form of qualitative analysis that allows for deep analysis of a phenomenon across key differences that can illuminate explanatory factors in their evolution over time (Yin

2013). This thesis aims to be of use in developing a rigorous, as well as practical, theoretical model for describing the phenomenon of US-Sino joint venture education programs. Therefore, careful attention is placed to the choice and application of the case study methodology.

These case studies are descriptive rather than explanatory in that they do not attempt to test a hypothesis related to joint-venture programs but rather create detailed narratives in order to develop a proposed causal theory that could be tested in more comprehensive future studies. In order to have explanatory power in these studies, it would be necessary to have multiple examples of branch campuses, or “replications,” (Yin 2013) within each model of joint venture that exists between US and Chinese education partners. If each replication conformed to the predic- tions of the proposed causal theory, that theory would then gain a higher level of predictive cer- tainty and power. However, because of the unique nature of each education joint venture in Chi- na (and therefore each case study included in this thesis), as well as the limited total number of !30 such ventures in China, this paper takes the approach that a worthy goal is simply to detail a handful of the most successful, high-profile examples in order to provide a snapshot into an otherwise opaque venture. Such case analyses will hopefully allow others who are interested in more comprehensive studies to note incipient patterns as a fuller picture begins to emerge of how these types of graduate programs are evolving in China. By understanding the process of forming these partnerships, others who are interested in doing such a thing, whether governments, diplomats, educators, or those in private institutions, will be better able to do so in a successful manner. The results of this study would also be of use to those interested in setting up a program evaluation by identifying key criteria to be tested.

Site (or Case) Selection

Each case study was selected because it represented a different type of US-Sino joint- venture institution and because they are considered to be leading models for other programs. The first case study is the Hopkins-Nanjing Center (HNC). HNC was the first US-Sino joint venture in China after diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries and is consequently also currently the oldest operating such institution in the country. It is well known as a model for other foreign universities interested in operating in China, and it has maintained its role as the preeminent training ground for US and Chinese citizens interested in foreign relations between the two countries. The second case study is Duke Kunshan University (DKU). DKU was selected because it is a leading example of a fully comprehensive university developed explicitly to merge elements of a US liberal arts university and Chinese higher education into a new model !31 for a Chinese university that will obtain world-class status, something other Chinese universities have yet to do. The third case study is the Schwarzman Scholars Program. It was selected because it is an example of a Chinese university partnering with a leading US corporation rather than a US university. Schwarzman Scholars has also explicitly used the Rhodes scholarship as a model and has received more publicity than almost any other joint-venture program in China.

Each institution selected in this thesis is also at a different stage of evolution. HNC was established 30 years ago and provides an example not just of establishing a joint-venture institution but also of how such an institution evolves over time. DKU has been operating degree programs for almost three years now, though it is still in an early phase of implementation and is not currently offering all of its anticipated degree programs. Schwarzman Scholars has not yet opened but is welcoming its first cohort at the end of 2016. Comparing these institutions in there different stages of development will allow for additional insights into predictable stages of joint- venture education institutions.

The primary unit of analysis has been drawn at the organizational level that encompasses the joint-venture with which the US partners are involved. For HNC and Schwarzman Scholars, this distinction means that Nanjing University and Tsinghua University are not the primary units of analysis, even though they are the physical location of the joint-ventures facilities. The sub- units of analysis are the various aspects of the joint-venture that are determined through the process of establishing the institutions. These sub-units include such aspects as the degree programs, the pedagogy, the faculty and student mixes, and the research activity. The next section begins the first case study of the thesis: the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. !32

Hopkins-Nanjing Center

The Hopkins-Nanjing Center (HNC) is the first US-Sino joint-venture education institution founded in China. It was founded in 1986 as the brainchild of the two university presidents of Nanjing University (Nanda) and John Hopkins University (JHU), respectively Kuang Yaming and Steven Muller. They met shortly after the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations between the US and China in 1978 via an official Chinese education delegation sent to the US to learn more about US higher education. Despite the fact that neither president spoke the other’s language, they laid out a vision for the program to train the leaders of US-China relations that has continued to guide the Center until this day throughout a number of challenges and changes.

These challenges include the ups and downs of US-China relations such as student protests of

1989 and the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as well as the challenges of day- to-day operations at HNC that have included spy scandals, financial crises, and pressures for academic freedom. Major changes include the introduction in 2006 of a two-year MA degree as well as a major expansion to the facilities. In 2016, HNC celebrated its 30th anniversary at which the institution took stock of its long journey as the preeminent international joint-venture education institution in China.

Stage 1: Envisioning HNC

Between the founding of the PRC in 1949 and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978, formal diplomatic ties did not exist between the US and China, and therefore there was no oppor- !33 tunity for US institutions to operate in China, let alone partner with Chinese institutions. After- wards in 1979, an official Chinese delegation was sent to the US to learn about US education. In

1979, Nanjing University President Kuang Yeming was appointed by the Ministry of Education to lead a delegation of Chinese academics to the US during which he met with Chih-Yung Chien, a faculty member at John Hopkins University, friend of JHU President Muller, and advocate for international education exchange between the US and China. Chien hosted the delegation at his home where Kuang invited Chien back to China to research “potential bilateral projects” (Wheeler 2010, 63). Without this introduction facilitated by formal diplomatic ties,

HNC would never have come to exist. The partnership between these two leaders underlies the key role of strong university leadership in creating the space for a unique institution like HNC to establish itself and grow throughout the years. It also highlights the role of diplomatic relations in providing the necessary context for this institutions.

John Hopkins University (JHU) has a long history of leadership in graduate higher education since its founding in 1876. When Stephen Muller became president of JHU in 1972, he came to his position with a desire to increase its international profile. Before 1972, he was provost of

JHU where he advocated to his predecessor as president that the university should keep open its

Bologna campus that at the time was facing financial difficulties. He argued that the campus was useful for creating better foreign relations due to the relationships forged between alumni. The

Bologna campus was kept open and by the late 1970s, Muller was looking to create another campus in east Asia. In particular, he had his sights set on China with whom the US had officially normalized relations in 1979. When Chien returned to China to research potential sites, Muller !34 and his family joined him, and together they spent seven weeks traveling through China (Wheel- er 2010, 61-62).

After seven weeks of searching, Nanjing University, under the leadership of Kuang Yem- ing, proved to be the best partner for John Hopkins University. Because of Nanjing University and Yeming’s international history, it had the necessary perspective to support a joint-venture of the kind President Muller was imagining. In 1963, Kuang Yeming became president of Nanjing

University, a university that already had a long history of ties with the West. Nanjing University was created in 1952 through the merger of several smaller colleges and universities such as

Nanking University and Huiwen Academy, both founded previously by Christian missionaries.

Shortly after coming to the position, he came under attack during the Cultural Revolution and was sent to labor camps, only to be restored to the presidency in 1978. Consequently, he helped restore a number of academic leaders and became an ardent supporter of Deng Xiaoping’s open door policies. Nanjing University was also chosen strategically as the location because of its dis- tance from both the political and economic centers of China (Beijing and Shanghai) in order to allow it independence from forces that would unduly influence its evolution (Wheeler 2010, 59).

Having decided that Nanjing University would be the ideal partner for JHU, the leaders of the two institutions now needed to negotiate a formal agreement.

Stage 2: Negotiations

On September 28, 1981 an agreement was signed between NU and JHU to establish the

HNC. The goal was to create an institution that would promote cultural understanding between !35

China and the Western world, especially the US, now that China was reopening to the rest of the world. The institution would train the future leaders of US-China relations, and it was the hope of HNC’s founders that one day both the US Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister would both be HNC alumni. The initial program was a one-year certificate program that was meant to have 100 students made of 50% Chinese students and 50% international students. The international students would study in Mandarin, and the Chinese students would study in Eng- lish. In principle, the costs would be equally shared between the two partners. However, the physical facilities were primarily funded by Nanjing University, and the Center was to be owned by Nanjing University. Additionally, students would live in on-site residence halls with each

Chinese student paired up with an international student. The HNC library and governance structure were also key dimensions of the initial agreement.

From the beginning of HNC, the library has played a unique and symbolic role for the institution. In negotiations between Muller and Kuang, Muller pressed that there would need to be a library with access comparable to those students in the US would have. When the Chinese partners said they would need to review all the books placed in the library, Muller threatened to call off the whole endeavor, and the Chinese capitulated on the condition that access was restricted to current staff, faculty, and students (Wheeler 2010). In order to enforce this provision, security guards are placed at both entrances of the HNC. “We started with about 200 journals, 200 on each side, if I remember correctly, half Chinese and half English. And even through the great difficulties in 1989, the journals were permitted to keep coming in” (He and Kubler 2016, 220). The library has continued be an uncensored collection that symbolizes free expression and freedom of inquiry at the HNC. This library’s importance to HNC and to US-China relations is also re- !36 flected in its status as a funding priority. While at its inception, USAID provided funds to broadly support the operations of HNC, USAID’s support has now dwindled to just a couple hundred thousand dollars per year; these funds are directed almost exclusively to the library.

Governance and administration of HNC has been a closely monitored aspect of the institution. Equal control of HNC by the NU and JHU is a key element to the partnership since its inception. HNC would be co-managed by the two partners in the form of a co-director that each university would provide. All decision-making is the responsibility of the two co-directors who need to come to an agreement in order for any action to be taken. “…[W]e have to agree, we have to persuade each other what course to pursue. And if we can’t agree, then we don’t pro- ceed” (He and Kubler 2016, 263). Consequently, a tradition of careful compromise has developed between the two co-directors that has allowed progress to occur while also balancing the needs of both sides to be able to justify their decisions to their respective US and Chinese stakeholders. Nowhere is this likely better exemplified in the name of the Center itself. In English, it is referred to as the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. Yet, in Mandarin, the direct translation is the Nan- jing-Hopkins Center. From these initially negotiated conditions, a vibrant tradition has been created that is now celebrating its 30th anniversary. However, the partnership between the leadership of Nanjing University and JHU was not enough to create HNC. The implementation of

HNC also highlights the need for pragmatic compromise in order to bring a diverse set of stakeholders together for a shared purpose. !37

Stage 3: Implementation

The period between 1981 and the first cohort in 1986 was full of activity. As the first

HNC US co-director recalls, “We had to create the program, we had to create the curriculum, we needed to participate in the final design of the physical plant, recruiting students, recruiting

American faculty to go to the center. And there also was the need to locate considerable outside funding. It was a very, very busy time” (He and Kubler 2016, 218). Putting these various components in place took the combined effort of the administration, faculty, and government officials.

Construction of the facilities proved to be an especially complicated issue require the direct intervention of the local government.

The involvement of local government in China is evident in the development of the HNC facilities after the agreement between JHU and Nanjing University was established. Much of the five years between the formal agreement and the first cohort was due to construction complications. For example, deciding whether or not to have air conditioning (which did not exist on Nan- jing at the time) took nearly six months, during which designing the architectural design could not begin. After the decision was made to include air conditioning, it was realized that it would require as much electricity as the entire Nanjing University campus, and HNC had to seek out agreements with two additional power stations (Wheeler 2010, 66). Securing the land for for the building was even more complicated.

Securing the 6,000 square meters of land at the designated corner of campus required the relocation of hundreds of residents. Chien, who was helping with the early implementation of

HNC, nearly gave up on success. In order to gain the necessary approvals, Chien had to organize !38 an unofficial lunch to wine and dine the Provincial Secretary General, Nanjing’s Mayor, and several local political actors. In a closed-door meeting after the lunch, in which Chien was not included, they sorted out the necessary arrangements to relocate the residents. These types of complicated details existed in all aspects of HNC’s founding, often due to the complexities of international and cross-cultural communications.

Communications has always been a key focus of HNC because of the vision of its founders, but it has also been a very difficult issue to manage. Early HNC administrators remember the difficult and time consuming process of communicating between Nanjing University and

JHU because the only way to relay messages was through telex, since the technology and infrastructure for telephones and faxes was not in place (He and Kubler 2016, 224). Furthermore, all HNC communications need to assiduously reflect a balanced relationship between the US and

China. Many of these issues were first confronted and standards set during the tenure of the first two co-directors: Wang Zhigang, a linguist, and Leon Slawenski, a retired foreign service officer.

These issues spanned the gamut. In 1986, China Daily wrote an article referring to Wang as the

Center’s only director. In response, Wang and Slawesnki jointly wrote a letter to the paper asking for a correction3. These two co-directors also needed to decide who would take the first office,

A101, in the Center. In the end, they flipped a coin (Wang won). These types of issues under- score the importance of small details that go into successfully running a joint-venture educational center and how much time it takes that is not initially anticipated.

Operational finances for HNC also had to be sorted out. The basic principle was that finances for HNC would be evenly split. However, that principal was much more complicated to

3 China Daily never responded to their letter. !39 operationalize than expected. Nanjing University ended up spending more to build the initial facilities as it was agreed that they would in principal own the building. However, HNC was to be primarily reliant on tuition for revenues, and Chinese students could not afford the same tuition rates that Western students could afford. Consequently, each institution wanted the ability to set their own respective tuition, and Chinese students have consistently paid a much lower tuition to attend the HNC with subsidies from various Chinese sources. International student recruitment has also been a difficult issue for HNC to manage since, according to the initial partnership agreement, student recruiting is the responsibility of SAIS. In order to enroll in the initial one- year certificate program at HNC, a high level of Chinese language experience is necessary as the classes will be taught by Chinese faculty. However, Chinese language ability is not something in which there is a high supply internationally. Consequently, HNC has consistently struggled to recruit international students. Expenses also differ greatly on both sides of the partnership. In- ternational faculty are much more expensive to retain than Chinese faculty, and by necessity they live at HNC. Chinese faculty do not live at HNC as they maintain the same living situation as other NU faculty. The end result of all these financial complexities has been less than perfect, as

HNC has consistently run an annual deficit of $1-2 million.

Recruiting faculty for HNC has also required the careful attention of both the US and

Chinese co-directors. Due to the even split of students and the consequent language requirements, classes have always been taught equally between Chinese and international faculty. How- ever, the number of Chinese and international faculty has varied. The HNC has insisted on associate or full professors teaching at the Center, and consequently international faculty were largely professors who would teach at HNC during their sabbaticals. However, the Chinese fac- !40 ulty, who come from Nanjing University, do not have the same constraints as international faculty. Since teaching at the HNC is generally considered a prestigious post, there has been a high demand for the teaching positions. Chinese faculty at HNC have rotated frequently and teach part-time, each one only teaching a few courses. Currently, there are five full-time and 33 part- time Chinese faculty. Full-time faculty teach 1 course per semester and 1 course per year for part-time.

Stage 4: Evaluation and Evolution

Evaluating HNC and making the consequent adjustments has been an important part of

HNC’s institution development. In the first few years after the initial cohort in 1986, several significant changes were made to HNC after taking stock of the initial implementation. Additional- ly, Nanjing University and JHU have committed to a reevaluation of their partnership through

HNC every five years. Through these official evaluations, the institution has slowly evolved, and in 2006 expanded to include a two-year MA program. However, this expansion was not at all clear in the first years of the program when it was questioned whether HNC would even continue to operate at all.

It became clear in the very first cohort that studying content full-time in a foreign language was a very difficult thing for the students. According to the initial agreement, international students would study in Mandarin, and the Chinese students would study in English. However, the language difference proved to be a huge barrier to learning content that the administration decided to address. “That’s why the second year we brought an English teaching professor !41 in” (He and Kubler 2016, 224). However, controversy soon developed around whether this was a language or a content program, and, in response, English language courses, which were initially offered to support students, were removed. Shortly afterward, Chinese language courses were also removed from the curriculum. These changes helped mitigate resistance from SAIS faculty about the curriculum of HNC.

Even after making these adjustments, a number of crises erupted in the years just after

HNC’s founding. After just two years of being the US co-director Leon Slawecki stepped down to be replaced by Richard Gaulton, starting a trend of US co-directors continually serving short tenures due to the difficulties of living in China for extended periods. As he later reflected about the coming years:

“1988-89, I’m sure, was the most difficult year the Center has had. There were conflicts between Chinese and Americans, protests, we had a spy scandal, there were race riots in Nanjing over Christmas time, a lot of unhappy faculty….And in the aftermath, there was a real question as to whether the Center would reopen again in the fall” (He and Kubler 2016, 230).

Each of the incidents serves as an example of how complicated the management of a joint-venture education institution in China can be and how critical a role it can play in US-China relations. “In December of 1989, we actually held a conference on democracy with scholars from quite a few places in China” (He and Kubler 2016, 230). Despite these challenges, HNC did continue due to the commitment of Nanjing University and JHU. While JHU felt it was contributing to China’s overall development, Nanjing had a different agenda in mind.

Nanjing University has been advocating for adding a Master’s degree and additional research to HNU since nearly its inception because such a change would dramatically increase the prestige of Nanjing University within China. However, SAIS has continually resisted this expan- !42 sion due to the difficulties of recruiting students for the current 1-year certificate (He and Kubler

2016, 231). In 1999, HNC attempted to create a research institute called the Institute for In- ternational Research as a stepping stone to a MA program. As Elizabeth Knup, the US co-director at the time, remembers:

“The idea behind this center was to bring scholars from both the United States and China to study and live within the center and to collaborate on research and to contribute their ideas to the life of the center. It really set the stage, because the scholars were selected jointly and there was a committee that oversaw this joint research. This was sort of the beginning of the idea for how we would jointly run a master’s degree program” (He and Kubler 2016, 275).

While the research institute did not last, it provided a stepping stone to experiment with what it would be like to co-manage an academic program.

In 2006, the MA program was finally introduced after several years of planning, including a large addition to the HNC facilities. The total additional cost was $25 million dollars. Two- thirds of the funds were provided by Nanjing University. $21 million went to state-of-the-art conference facilities, classrooms, and two additional floors to house the library collection. The atrium of this library is named after Stephen Muller in honor of his work in its initial establishment. This MA program had a number of implications for HNC.

The MA program had large implications for faculty at HNC. In order to conduct a high- quality MA program, it requires faculty to be present for a longer period of time in order to maintain relationships with the students throughout the full two years. This requirement has created the need for longer contracts between international faculty and the HNC faculty. The international faculty is now made up of nine full-time faculty on renewable contracts for 2-3 years.

Because the HNC aims to only have associate or full professors teaching at HNC, international !43 faculty are de-facto required to give up their tenure in the US in order to teach at the HNC. Con- sequently, most faculty, though not all, are those that are nearing retirement. Their subjects are 3 political science, 2 international economics, 2 international law, 1 American history, 1 environmental science.

The Center does not provide extensive support for faculty research as do many top US academic institutions. Rather, it emphasizes that the priority of the institution is teaching, a decision that is reflected in multiple areas. While each faculty is currently required to teach four classes per year, in 2017 they will be required to teach five per year. This change is because

SAIS is making a change to have a clear split between teaching and research faculty. Teaching faculty will be required to teach six classes per year, and HNC split the difference between four and six. Currently, the administration claims that faculty split their time between 50% teaching, research 35%, and 15% service. While each faculty is provided $5,000 per year to support their research, most faculty are now nearing retirement where research is not nearly as large a professional priority as it is for younger faculty.

The HNC MA degree became the only degree in China to be jointly accredited by the

Chinese MOE and a US accreditation body. This development is remarkable considering that international students are primarily taught by Chinese faculty, which raises concerns with the accreditation agency that they are not fully vetting their programs. Yet, in some areas the Chinese standards were more strict. For example, due to Chinese regulations, the MA requires a thesis option, as compared to the SAIS MA requirements in DC (that do not require a thesis), and this requirement was “one thing that Nanjing University insisted on from the first day” (He and

Kubler 2016, 312). Nonetheless, the academic quality of the HNC MA degree has been a con- !44 tentious topic. SAIS faculty were skeptical that Chinese faculty would teach in a manner they thought appropriate (Lampton interview, 2016). However, HNC was the first to admit that the academic quality would be different than both SAIS and Nanjing University because of the unique requirement and benefits of studying in a non-native language. According to Robert Daly, the US co-director from 2001-07 while the MA program was being created:

“No matter how good your Chinese or your English is, your target language is not your native language. Reading is tougher, writing is very much tougher, everything you do is more difficult And what it means is that the reading load and other aspects of some of the demands for the Hopkins-Nanjing Center Masters can’t be quite what they might be in Washington or what Nanjing university students would face at Nanjing University. So, to make this Master’s program be what it has to be for both universities, to be fully Hopkins SAIS quality as well as Nanjing University quality, I think you have to accept the propo- sition that there is an academic benefit to target language study” (He and Kubler 2016, 311).

Just as the academic quality at HNC was unique, the master’s degree provided three concentrations in which HNC would aim to excel: international and comparative law, international politics, and international economics, with a fourth concentration added later in energy, resources and environment.

The MA program has also added, in addition to the Certificate option, a third programmatic offering that was unexpected at the time. A five-semester option evolved naturally to complete the HNC Certificate program and then to study at SAIS in Washington, DC to complete an

MA program. This option became possible because the administrative infrastructure required for the Certificate and MA program was already in place. Because credits can be transferred to the

US, the MA degree can then be completed in DC an additional three semesters, for a total of five semesters to earn both the Certificate and MA degree. As transferring credits has become more common, students have recently been able to complete the MA degree in Washington, DC in !45 only two semesters. Issues remain with a lack of predictability around what SAIS faculty will accept as acceptable prerequisites due to some lack of confidence in quality of the courses taught by the Chinese faculty. When students are able to complete the Certificate and MA degree in just four semesters, on top of the international experience, the total cost of the MA degree is cheaper for students as compared to if they completed the entire degree in the US. Additionally, as compared to the MA degree at HNC or the Certificate program, students finish their program in

Washington, DC, a fact that offers considerable benefits for particular career trajectories. For these reasons, the Certificate/MA degree option has become an increasingly popular option

(Kubler interview 2016).

The MA program has also created large changes to HNC’s governance. Day-to-day governance at HNC has traditionally been the responsibility of the two co-directors. When the new

MA program was created in 2006, an Academic Advisory Committee was created to oversee the program. This committee is made up of 10 members, each serving a one-year term. The current membership includes the two co-directors, the Dean of the Environmental School at Nanjing

University, and seven other faculty members. This committee meets for one week each year in

Washington, DC for a total annual cost of roughly $100,000. In a contested decision, the mandate of this governing board was recently expanded to include the Certificate program, making it responsible for the oversight of the entire HNC. Consequently, the introduction of this MA program has resulted in a significant overhaul of the HNC’s total governance. The co-directors now have considerably less influence than previously, and there is a much larger number of individuals who have to agree to any changes to HNC. !46

Pedagogy has continued to provide for an interesting situation at the HNC, especially teaching. Chinese students and Western faculty have continually struggled with each other, and

Western students and Chinese faculty have also struggled with each other. Chinese students struggle to adapt to the interactive nature of Western teaching. While many do become more open to expressing their opinions openly by the end of the program, it can often be a painstaking process. Often, it is only after class that a Chinese student will approach a Western faculty member to ask a question or express an opinion. Alternately, Western students struggle with the primarily lecture based teaching of Chinese faculty. Questions are not encouraged, and grades are often based only on one large exam or paper at the end of the class. Western students do not always appreciate the risk that Chinese faculty members take on by discussing certain subjects not deemed appropriate by the Chinese government. Thirty years after its founding, HNC has nearly reached the point where it has encouraged all of its Chinese faculty to use power point technology in class and to include at least two points of feedback between professor and students in each course, such as through an assignment, test, or presentation (Kubler interview 2016). Since 2006, student-teacher evaluations have been introduced at HNC. However, Chinese faculty were originally reluctant to make the results available to students (Lampton interview 2016). Additionally, most Chinese faculty have adopted the use of powerpoint in class and include at least two points of feedback to students in each course, such as an assignment, test, or presentation.

In addition to pedagogy creating a unique environment for students at HNC, the student body is also extremely diverse. That an extremely diverse group of students are attracted to the

HNC creates a unique environment in which to study. In addition to the aim of having 50% of students from China and 50% from the US as well as elsewhere in the world, each program of- !47 fered (the Certificate, MA, and Certificate/MA) attracts a different type of student. The Certifi- cate is the cheapest option and also requires the least commitment, both in terms of language and time. The other two options attract those students who are highly committed to an in-depth study of Chinese language and society. The HNC MA degree is completed in China whereas the Cer- tificate/MA option is completed in Washington, DC. Consequently, students who tend to choose programs based on which continent they desire to work after graduation. While HNC has added additional students to HNC through the MA program, the Certificate program is still much larger.

This small size is largely due to the increased difficulty of international recruitment. Not only is the program longer and more expensive, it has a required thesis component at the end that necessarily mandates a higher language level for completion than the Certificate program.

Student life at HNC has evolved along with the student body. This mix of students creates an interesting residential life at HNC, where all students are required to live. Chinese and international students are paired up in rooms, which has mixed results in terms of compatibility.

Some roommates become best friends, others rarely communicate, and others simply do not get along. Chinese and international students also approach student life at HNC quite differently.

Even though everyone is required to live in the HNC, Chinese students often have pre-established networks and communities within Nanjing as opposed to international students who are not likely to know anyone outside of the Center. Nevertheless, a number of marriages have occurred between students who have met at HNC.

Recently, student co-curricular activities has required increased regulation. In 2009, an international HNC student decided to start an academic journal at HNC as an extracurricular activity. After soliciting articles from both Chinese and international faculty and staff, the first edi- !48 tion was on the verge of being printed. However, after a controversial article about the Chinese

Communist Party was placed on the public bulletin board, Chinese authors requested that their article be withdrawn from the journal. The journal was not, in the end, printed, and the HCN co- directors established a new policy that official extra-curricular activities would from thereon require the approval by the administration. Subsequently, an application to create the journal was submitted to the administration and was denied.

Another recent example of the role that students play in HNC’s management is a recent controversy over air quality in HNC. Air quality in Chinese cities, Nanjing included, is quite poor and care result in negative health outcomes. This air quality is also reflected inside HNC facilities much to the dislike of international students and faculty who are used to very different circumstances and worry about their health. Students have begun debating at HNC about whether to pay for installment of an air purification system for HNC facilities, especially student residences. Faculty in the MA degree environmental concentration have taken the role of mediators at the Center, using the situation as an opportunity to teach the role of good governance and data- driven policy making in decision-making (Lampton interview 2016).

As HNC has aged as an institution, students have played a role in management not just when they are enrolled in the institution but also as alumni. Since its founding, the alumni network of HNC has grown dramatically. While the initial class of HNC was only 60 students, there are currently over 2,600 HNC alumni throughout the world. The initial vision of the program’s founders was to have the US Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister both be HNC alumni. While this vision has not come to fruition, the alumni of the HNC have gone on to numerous influential positions in government, business, and civil society. These alumni form a !49 community that is and continues to be one of the most critical groups for a strong relationship between the US and China based on mutual respect and understanding. Well known US alumni include:

• Ambassador to Vietnam and Asst. Secretary of State David Shear

• Former Commerce Minister Chen Deming

• President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai Kenneth Jarrett

An HNC Alumni Club of Beijing has been established (He and Kubler 2016, 280). There is also an annual fall alumni gathering at HNC starting in 2010ish (He and Kubler 2016, 361).

30th Anniversary Celebration: Reflecting Back

In 2016, HNC celebrated its 30th anniversary by holding four days of activities that brought together the leadership of JHU and Nanjing University, alumni from around the world, and high-level government officials from a variety of countries. Starting as the only international joint-venture education institution in China to being the oldest in an education market that has in the last decade been dramatically opened to the outside world, HNC’s anniversary has provided an opportunity to reflect back at the unique evolution of the institution. This path has included navigating the largest diplomatic challenges between the US and China including Tiananmen

Square, the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the SARS crisis. It has also provided a space to discuss some important issues that have not arisen explicitly in other contexts, such as internet access and competition from other programs. !50

As one of the most important training schools for those individuals who are at the forefront of US-China relations, there have been a number of challenges in running the school that have arisen due to diplomatic tensions in the two countries’ relationship. However, HNC has been able to work through these issues by being sensitive to broader diplomatic context, and in some ways helping to indirectly shape them (e.g. through a trailblazing model in educational exchange and alumni network) (He and Kubler 2016, 246). Three of the biggest examples of the relationship between HNC and Us-China diplomatic relations are the protests of 1988-89, the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the SARS epidemic of 2003.

The race riots and student protests of the 1988-89 academic year were the first time HNC found itself entwined with US-China relations. When race riots towards African students erupted in Nanjing in late 1988, HNC became tense because of the presence there of two African Ameri- can students. The cohort was split in their judgement of the protests, and protesters threatened to target HNC. However, a series of well-timed class discussions on race in US-China relations helped ease tensions. Shortly afterwards, when student protests erupted nation-wide in spring

1989, HNC became one of the only remaining vehicles of exercising diplomatic ties between the

US and China. Ultimately, the student cohort was brought back together in support of the na- tionwide protests, and HNC became a symbol of good relations between the two countries

(Wheeler 2010).

The US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 was also a key point in

HNC’s history. HNC’s experience became a lesson for all those involved in how to manage diplomatic crises between the two countries. Elizabeth Knup, the US co-director at the time, recalls how the incident effected the Center: !51

“[T]he center almost immediately became polarized. All the Chinese students went on one side and all the American students went on the other side. They really just immediately divided along those lines of Chinese and American, about what happened and whose responsibility it was. It could have been a dangerous time for American students, so we asked all the American students to stay in the center and not go outside” (He and Kubler 2016, 271).

In response, the administration became the diplomats in trying to resolve the conflict:

“…Professor Chen and I, we talked about what had happened and my belief that it was an accident and his belief that it wasn’t an accident, we didn’t agree on that. But what we did agree on was that the Center came first and that our job was not to settle what was right and what was wrong, but our job was to make sure that the students and the faculty at the Center could get through that time without destroying all of their relationships and their good feelings towards each other” (He and Kubler 2016, 279).

In the end, students ended up coming together over their differences in what was a very emotional process for everyone involved. Elizabeth Knup, the US co-director at the time, believes that high level Chinese officials were instrumental in keeping HNC from being a focus of protests that broke out in Nanjing (Knup 1999). In coming full-circle, the US keynote speaker of the 30th anniversary was Madeline Albright, the Secretary of State who oversaw the bombing and discussed her experience publicly at the event. Consistently, HNC also shown the importance of flexible and creative administrators who were able to manage and mitigate crises.

SARS also became a critical point for HNC. In 2003, when SARS broke out in China, it created a lot of complications for HNC. JHU Medical School was consulted about the risks for people at the Center. When it was recommended the institution be evacuated, the problem existed of sunk costs and losing, students, faculty, and staff if HNC did not operate for a year. Eventual- ly, HNC was relocated to Hawaii for one year in order to make sure the institution was sustainable. Daniel Wright, the Executive Director of the HNC Office in Washington, DC, recalls: !52

“And, as you all know, it’s in the spring when students are deciding about their fall plans. SARS hit in the spring, so we had a double challenge. We had both the challenge of recruitment….At the same time, and it was actually more important, we had an entire community of both Chinese and international students and American faculty and their families, all in this community which we know and love as the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, and how were we prepared to address this issue? (He and Kubler 2016, 291).

While the SARS crisis could have been a major blow to the sustainability of the institution, it rather became an example of the flexibility and ingenuity of the institution to adapt to the reality of the situation and continue moving forward in its mission of creation improved cultural understanding between the two countries.

Other lessons can be drawn about HNC’s governance by looking back at its history.

Turnover with US co-directors has been a problem. Since 1986, there have been six Chinese co- directors but 14 US co-directors. While JHU aims to have a term of six years for US co-directors, this high turn-over reflects the difficulties of recruiting qualified individuals who are willing to live abroad for extended periods of time. Additional, co-directors rank their accomplishments on reflection somewhat differently than one might expect. The US co-director between 1995-96 remembers one of their key accomplishments in helping build up the local international school to encourage more international faculty to come here who have children (He and Kubler 2016,

256). Additionally, key players in international relations have been instrumental in HNC’s success. As the first US co-director Leon Slawecki recalls, George Bush Sr.’s involvement in the early 1980s was key to HNC’s founding. “Without his support, I think it would have been more difficult to set up the center” (He and Kubler 2016, 273). Institutions such as HNC require the !53 involvement of senior government officials in order to create the political space necessary for their success.

Unsurprisingly, internet access is also become an issue at HNC that did not exist when it was first founded. Internet access throughout China has been subject to the systematic censorship called colloquially “the Great Firewall of China.” However, through their student IDs all HNC students are given de-facto access to the Duke University VPN. This VPN allows students to access the internet as if they were located in the United States, and consequently allows them to bypass the censorship. While technically illegal, Chinese administration seems to turn a blind eye to the matter, and US administration does not encourage the issue to be discussed.

While HNC has grown immensely since its inception, it continues to face a number of challenges. Competition from other programs has increased in recent years. Anthony Kane, the only person to serve as both the US co-director and the Executive Director of the HNC office in

Washington, DC, offers the following perspective on HNC’s continued relevance:

“And now American students can directly enroll in Chinese universities, there is lots of, you know, scholarship money like the Schwarzman program….And its important for us to be able to maintain the idea of what makes us special, why they should come to the center, what we have to offer over other programs…. When you look at the NYU program or the Duke Program or the Schwarzman program, they are all kinds of American programs situated in China. But we are a joint venture that very much has, you know, worked together with our Chinese partners and I think that gives us unique strengths and opportunities for American students” (He and Kubler 2016, 252).

Despite rising competition from other joint-venture programs in China, HNC appears to be flexible enough to maintain its position as a niche leader in the field of US-China education relations.

Following the 30th anniversary, JHU and Nanjing University provided the money to cover !54

HNC’s deficit for a half decade while it figures out how to find a sustainable solution such as introducing a certificate option that would have a lower language requirement. !55

Duke Kunshan University

Duke Kunshan University (DKU) has been called, “without question the most ambitious international educational enterprise in China since the days of Yenching University (the present- day site of Peking University)” (Kirby 2014, 151). As a partnership between Duke University and Wuhan University, its goal by 2025 is to be a fully-operational, world-class, research-driven liberal arts university in China. The idea first began in 2007 with a different prospective partner,

Shanghai Jiao Tong University, but that partnership never materialized. Through many complicated steps began its first graduate classes in 2014 and the undergraduate program is scheduled to begin in 2018.

Stage 1: Envisioning Duke Kunshan University

Duke University has a long history of involvement in China. As a leading university of the Southern Methodists, in 1881 Trinity College4 took on the initial responsibility of providing

Charlie Soong with a Western education. As close friend, publisher, and eventual father-in-law of

Sun Yat-sen, Charlie Soong and his family played a key role in China’s history of Westernization

(Bradley 2015, 121-191). However, Duke’s more recent foray into international education in

Asia includes the successful introduction in 2005 of a graduate medical program in Singapore in partnership with the National University of Singapore. This successful initiative created an example for other Duke University efforts at internationalization to follow.

4 Trinity College was later named Duke University in 1924 after a large donation from the Duke family. !56

Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business has had a relatively short and highly successful past. Founded in 1969, Fuqua quickly established itself as a leading business school globally because of its innovative programs. In 1996, it launched the Global Executive program that trains executives located throughout the world in a mix of in-person and online education.

This program quickly became a model for other leading business schools (Burness 2007). In

2000, Fuqua created the Cross Continent MBA program with similar success and also launched in 2001 the Masters in Management Studies program. The MMS degree was created to target students with an undergraduate degree and without a background in business, structured as a one- year introduction to the technical skills necessary in the private sector. While popular in Europe,

Fuqua’s MMS was one of the first such programs in the US. On July 1, 2007, Blair Sheppard, who was instrumental in the creation of many of these programs, became Dean of Fuqua and was intent on building on these successes. His original goal was nothing short of opening five different Fuqua campuses around the world, one of which would be in Kunshan, China.

Stage 2: Negotiations

By the winter of 2009, the school had secured a partnership with Shanghai Jiao Tong

University. In early 2010, faculty approved first phase of development of the Duke Kunshan venture, though they had strong concerns about academic freedom and where the money for the venture would come from (Kiley 2011). In 2010, Duke University President Richard Brodhead signed an agreement with the municipal government of Kunshan to break ground on the new campus, which was scheduled to open by Fall 2011 (Rupp 2009). However, when Duke Univer- !57 sity and Shanghai Jiao Tong University could not agree on the details of the campus, the partnership fell through (Kiley 2011).

In February 2011, a new partner was found with Wuhan University, and President Brod- head presented the partnership as a campus-wide initiative in response to the global economic downturn (Carroll 2011). Its goal was to create a university to not just compete with other top

Chinese universities but that would be a uniquely world-class university through exploring a new model of liberal arts education. The proposed initiative of the university and business school leadership met initial resistance from the Duke community. Duke had cut $125 million from its budget after the economic downturn, and there were significant questions about how such a cost- ly endeavor would be funded. While the proposed initiative had the city of Kunshan providing all the funds for construction of the new campus, Duke still expected to subsidize the new campus between $3-8 million for the first six years as its enrollment grew. These funds were to come primarily from the business school and the university’s central strategic fund (Shulklapper 2014).

Wuhan University, as Duke’s new partner, supported the model that Duke was pursuing.

Located in the nearby province of Hubei, Wuhan has been consistently ranked among the top ten universities in China, and it has been a major recipient of government funding through both the

985 and 211 initiatives. As the official Chinese partner of the joint-venture, Wuhan had the knowledge and experience with the Chinese government to guide a new venture through the institutional environment in China. Furthermore, Liu Jingnan, the former president of Wuhan Uni- versity and a widely-respected academic in China, agreed to become the President of Duke Kun- shan University, which demonstrated the level of collaboration that Wuhan University was willing to put into this endeavor. !58

A preliminary agreement with Wuhan University was signed in 2010 (Bullock interview

2016), but the expanded vision for Duke’s presence in China created a number of hurdles for actually finalizing an agreement. Duke faculty and students were especially anxious about the implications of such a large initiative draining resources away from the main campus in Durham, and a number of further hurdles were created by negotiations occurring with both the local Kun- shan government and the Chinese Ministry of Education. Many of these issues had to do with finances, as became clear in a planning document released by Duke in March 2011.

The original financial commitment for which Duke leadership estimated they would be responsible steadily increased since the new vision for Duke Kunshan University was presented.

Originally, the commitment was $3-8 million for the first six years, but in March 2011 a planning document put the total estimated costs for this period at $37 million. Duke Provost Peter Lange explained that, “the university took on some additional costs in the design and development and agreed to handle some of the programmatic costs that were originally going to be covered by partners in Kunshan” (Kiley 2011). Consequently, Duke faculty concern began to grow, and by

April 2011 Duke faculty had created a special section on the website of the Duke Academic

Council to collect information on the Duke Kunshan venture (Kiley 2011). However, faculty at the Fuqua Business School took their skepticism of the venture to another level.

Fuqua faculty collaborated to deliver what would become a large blow to the final vision of the campus. After the announcement of the new agreement with Wuhan University in 2011,

Fuqua faculty pushed for the commission of a market study to gauge demand for the business programs proposed to be offered at Duke Kunshan University. What the study found became critical as it found that Chinese students were largely not willing to pay for the programs at the uni- !59 versity’s anticipated tuition level. This was because Chinese students and their families viewed a degree obtained in China as inherently inferior to studying in the US regardless of other assur- ances that the quality was equivalent. This lower price level meant that tuition revenues would be significantly lower that what Duke expected and consequently, Duke would be responsible for paying even more than what the recent planning document had estimated.

This study had significant impact on the Fuqua School of Business. In June 2011,

Fuqua’s faculty voted against offering an Executive MBA degree and the Masters in Manage- ment Study at DKU. Yet, they also requested more time to explore other options, in an attempt to try to find a compromise with the Duke administration (Kiley 2011). Shortly after on July 25, it was announced that Fuqua Dean Sheppard would be “declining reappointment,” ostensibly for “a new role in fund-raising and development for Duke Kunshan University” (Bradshaw 2011). Lat- er that year, the faculty was able to find an option that was more palatable, and in December

2011 the Fuqua faculty voted 44-8 with 4 abstentions for a scaled back version of the MMS to start in Fall 2012.

“The original plan called for 60 students in the program’s first year, growing to 170 within five years. Under the revised plan, the program will serve 30-40 students for the first three years in a pilot mode. Planners said they will not be sure of student demand until the program is in place, nor can they be sure what tuition price the Chinese Ministry of Education will be willing to approve” (Kiley 2011).

In this scaled back version, half of the program would be spent at Duke’s main campus in North

Carolina, and Fuqua faculty would fly to China to teach all of the courses held there. Of importance, the students would receive Duke University degrees and not Duke Kunshan University degrees. Ironically, while the original idea for Duke’s presence was a partnership between Fuqua

School of Business and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the idea had evolved to a partnership be- !60 tween Duke University and Wuhan University, with very little final involvement from Fuqua.

One of the only constants that remained was the agreement with the city of Kunshan that would be providing the land and the campus construction, largely free of charge.

Yet, construction of the DKU campus became even more of a challenge for the joint-venture than the involvement of Fuqua faculty. The initial plan for Duke Kunshan’s campus included six different buildings on 200 acres of land. The city of Kunshan provided the land and had arranged with a local contractor K-STEP to build the six buildings. The initial agreement with

Wuhan University had pushed the opening date from 2011 to Fall 2012. However, in September

2011 Duke Provost Peter Lange announced additional delays to construction due to poor weather, and the opening was pushed back to Spring 2013 (Carroll 2016). However, construction all but came to a complete stop in 2012 causing further delays in the opening date. “In Fall 2013, administrators maintained that five of the campus' six buildings would be completed by [summer

2014]—but construction will continue on all but one of the buildings throughout the Fall semester” (Shulklapper 2014). However, the conference center was the only building that was finished enough for faculty and students to hold classes, and the rest of the buildings were to be phased in later that year and the next (Zhu 2014). In total, there were nearly half a dozen significant delays in construction that reflected a number of behind the scenes negotiations with the local government and contractor K-STEP.

While Duke greatly underestimated the complexity of the construction process for the

Duke Kunshan campus, at the core of the delays was an insistence on the part of Duke University that the quality of all the facilities at DKU be at standards comparable to the United States. Con- trary to what was given as an explanation for the early delays, weather was not as much of a fac- !61 tor as the lack of high-skilled workers for K-STEP, the contractor that the city of Kunshan had selected for the work. After construction nearly halted in 2012, it became clear to Duke administrators that K-STEP did not have technical expertise with a project with the scope of the proposed campus. Much of the construction was being conducted by the workers in a learn-as-you- go fashion, creating frequent slow-downs and a lack of consistent quality. Furthermore, corners were being cut to save money, and less money overall was being spent that would be used for a similar project in the US. However, because of the cultural differences between Duke and the local government, Duke was not able to influence the project in the same way they could a project in the US (Carroll 2013).

Duke administration was not able to demand higher quality from the local government or demand a new contractor without damaging their partnership, and so they had to pursue a more culturally sensitive approach. After the halt to construction in 2012, in August Duke led a delegation of Chinese construction leaders and experts to Durham to learn about Duke’s quality control policies by touring the campus and meeting with facilities management administrators (Carroll

2013). Furthermore, Duke administrators began the delicate task of reaching out to the local CPC

Party officials. Eventually, Vice Mayor Jiang Hao was brought in to lead a Chinese government team to oversee K-STEP’s construction. Yet, it wasn’t until the 2015-16 academic year that the campus was finally finished, and this still did not include one of the original six buildings, the

Innovation Building that was the most complex to construct. However, the final product of campus was comparable quality to that in the United States. Simultaneous to the ongoing negotiations with the local government and contractors over construction was a process of agreeing on the initial government structure and program offerings for DKU. !62

There were several key points in establishing the governing system and approving the initial program offerings for DKU. The Ministry of Education required a number of key approvals before DKU could be officially operational. Preliminary approval was given by the MOE in 2012 that included the initial programs to be offered, the eventual size of the university, as well guarantees of academic freedom. This same agreement then had to be accepted by the Duke

University Board of Trustees. However, full approval was not granted by the MOE until Sep- tember 2013 before which in July 2013 a team of five administrators and five faculty members came from the MOE to inspect DKU in person (Bullock interview 2016). Only then was DKU allowed to be governed by its own independent board of trustees that consists of members of the leadership of Wuhan University, Duke University, and Kunshan’s business community. It held its inaugural meeting on November 11-12, 2013 at Wuhan University where it reviewed and approved DKU’s Articles of Association and Trustee Bylaws, as well as the operating budget for

2013-14 (DKU News 2013).

DKU also established an Advisory Board in 2014 that began as 19 members from international business, civic and education leadership and by 2016 has expanded to 25 members.

G. Richard Wagoner Jr., former chairman and chief executive officer of General Motors was appointed to be the Chair of the Board (DKU News 2014). The Advisory Board held its inaugural meeting in Beijing in April 2014 and focused on the role of DKU as a Sino-U.S. cooperative institution in US-Chinese relations. In remarks to the board, Cen Jianjun, Director of the Depart- ment of International Cooperation and Communication at China’s Ministry of Education, “noted the significance of DKU as an educational institution that is expected to offer U.S.-style education with Chinese characteristics. Cen also expressed his hope that DKU will play an important !63 role in China-U.S. cultural exchange by building strong relationships and understanding between young people from both countries” (DKU News 2014). With these two governance organs in place, the Board of Trustees and the Advisory Board, DKU was finally began operations.

Stage 3: Implementation

The implementation of the academic programs at DKU has been broken up into three overarching phases. This planning has been used by the DKU leadership to plan from

2013-2026. Phase 1 spans the period from 2013-2018 when DKU is planning to introduce in total between five and seven graduate programs and two or three research centers. Faculty and post-doctoral fellows will also be recruited from around the world, and initial planning will begin on the undergraduate program. Phase 2 (2019-22) is when DKU will begin offering a bachelor’s degree that includes the humanities, social and natural sciences, and the arts and will be taught only in China at the DKU campus. A second phase of campus construction will also occur in preparation for this stage to accommodate between 2,000 and 3,000 undergraduate students.

Doctoral programs may also be offered during this period. Phase three will span from 2023-2026 when DKU will focus on integrating its program to offer a world-class comprehensive research- led university with a focus on liberal arts education. Undergraduate programs will be added in this period to include Biomedical engineering, Civil and Environmental Engineering, Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Mechanical and Material Engineering. Graduate degree programs will also expand in this period to include Economics, Politics, Neuroscience, Environmen- tal Policy and Science, Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology, Biomedical Sciences and Medical !64

Physics (DKU News 2015). In this way, DKU will follow an orderly development that in a period of about a decade from its first cohort will allow it to be a fully operational, world-class university in China’s higher education system.

As the DKU Chancellor Liu Jingnan describes (DKU News 2015), in developing DKU to this point, a new model for a university has been developed. They have departed from traditionally organized faculties based on academic disciplines or different types of careers. Rather, DKU focuses on multi-disciplinary research institutes that are focused on “social issues, development issues, and issues relating to human cognition.” This approach has created a vertically integrated approach to talent cultivation from undergraduate students to doctoral education and faculty research. In this process, programs are developed in “small steps” that are both slow and deliber- ate. As described by DKU Chancellor Liu:

“‘Small steps”’ refers to a low priority given to quantity and speed when constructing and introducing degree programs. When selecting a new program, full consideration is being given to the geographical location of DKU, the talent needs of specific disciplines, and the question of what fields are significant to the development and global presence of China. Therefore, for each new program a SWOT analysis is conducted, followed by vetting and verification from over ten councils at both Duke University and DKU. Only then does DKU embark upon detailed planning and budgeting. After approval by the Board of Trustees, the programs will be implemented on a program-by-program basis. ‘Small steps; also suggests that DKU adopts a "quality foremost" strategy with no sacri- fice of quality for the sake of quantity when it comes to the adoption of individual programs” (DKU News 2015).

To date, this process has led to one research center and three initial graduate programs. The research center is in public health as is one of the MA degrees. The other two Masters degrees are in Medical Physics and Management Studies. Plans for a second center and additional masters program in Environmental Policy are in place for 2017. !65

As described earlier, the MMS degree was cut down dramatically from its initial vision.

The program is operating in a pilot version from its first cohort in 2014-2017 to make sure that there is demand in China for the program. Additionally, the program is taught fully by Duke

University Fuqua faculty, and half of the one year program takes place in Durham, North Caroli- na on Duke’s main campus. The program has managed to slowly increase enrollment in its first three years from 32 to 51 students, and it has also managed to have a roughly 90% employment rate for graduates within 6-months at reputable companies in both the US and China, a rate that is comparable to successful business programs in the US. While the MMS program is offered at

DKU because of it the Business School’s early involvement in DKU’s development, it is perhaps not surprising that the first research center has been in the field of public health.

Duke Kunshan has successfully established its Global Health Research Center as a leader in its field through being unanimously elected on August 21st, 2015 as the chair institution of

Chinese Consortium of Universities for Global Health (CCUGH) for a two year term. The

CCUGH “aims to build interdisciplinary collaborations and facilitate the sharing of knowledge among Chinese member universities to address global health challenges” (DKU News 2015). Its members include 12 leading Chinese universities. The Global Health Research Center has also attracted significant amounts of grant money, attracted leading scholars in China and from Duke

University, and hosted a number of successful conferences (Global Health Research Center

2016). Additionally, the MA in G Health is fully integrated into the Center’s operations. MA students conduct a capstone project in conjunction with faculty to help directly with applied research projects at the center. Public health is an area of great need in China as well as an area that !66

Duke University is well distinguished, ranking number one in US News rankings on a regular basis for several different health related fields

The MA in Medical Physics also began in 2014. While not directly integrated with the

Global Health Research Center in the way that the MA program in Global Health is, it has still greatly benefited from the strength of Duke’s medical program. Participants in this two-year MA program spend half their time in Kunshan, China and the other half of their time at Duke Univer- sity. The time at Duke University is critical because it is there that they gain access to the advanced technology of the Duke medical program and hospitals. In this way, Duke Kunshan has set its sights on training leaders in China’s growing field of health care who will have the skills and knowledge to be able to transfer advanced medical technology from the US to China.

The next major addition to DKU’s curriculum will be an MA in Environmental Policy that is integrated into an Environmental Policy research institute in the same manner as in public health. The Ministry of Education has already approved this expansion in Duke Kunshan’s original development plan. The first cohort will begin in Fall of 2017. The MA brings faculty from

Duke’s School of the Environment to teach the two year program. Like the other MA programs with the exception of the MA in Global Health, the option exists to study at Duke University in

North Carolina.

Both DKU research institutes in public health and environmental policy are designed to be closely regulated by the university leadership and the Chinese government. This oversight is provided by the Research Support Office (RSO) at DKU. According to its website, the RSO provides “cradle to grave” administrative support to all research projects “in order to ensure compliance with the Independent Non-profit Status Duke Kunshan University (DKU) has been granted” !67

(DKU 2016). In effect, no research can be conducted at DKU that is not approved by the RSO, and the RSO has a number mechanisms in order to manage this approval process. One of the most important mechanisms is the Research Policy Committee.

The Research Policy Committee (RPC) is made up of eight members who review policies developed by the RSO. It adapts these policies as necessary and adopts them as official DKU policy that governs research at the institution to “ensure the compliance from DKU community with the highest ethical and professional standards as well as with laws, policies and regulations imposed by the Government…” (DKU 2016). The membership of the committee is a balance of

Western and Chinese academics. The committee is headed by Dr. Haiyan Gao, a Chinese-Ameri- can nuclear physicist who is a member of Duke University’s faculty since 2002 and who was appointed the Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs at DKU since 2014. The committee also includes Dr. Xiaolin Chang, DKU Vice Chancellor for Government Relations. In this manner,

DKU is allowed to do cutting-edge and high impact research on Chinese government policy, but a close eye is maintained on exactly what impact DKU is aiming to have.

Along with the graduate programs, the undergraduate program has also begun development during Phase 1. DKU began a semester undergraduate program in Fall 2014 that has been used as a pilot program to experiment with innovation in undergraduate education. This program covers humanities, natural science, social science, linguistics and advanced writing, and graduate-oriented global health. This semester program enrolls undergraduate Chinese students in elite universities throughout China. “A formal agreement to establish the undergraduate program will be considered by Duke’s faculty and the Board of Trustees late in the fall semester” (DKU News !68

2016). Simultaneous to the operation of this semester program, DKU has begun the process of developing a comprehensive liberal arts curriculum for an undergraduate degree.

The development of the DKU undergraduate liberal arts curriculum has been a highly collaborative process. The goal has been to integrate Eastern and Western thinking and traditions in liberal arts education to create a final product that is unique and truly innovative. In 2016,

DKU held a conference of leading academic figures in China and from the US to help develop this unique model (DKU News 2016). The Trinity College of Arts and Sciences at Duke Univer- sity has established a Liberal Arts in China Committee that is dedicated to to designing the curriculum. It developed the original semester program at DKU and is collaborating closely with the

DKU Advisory Board which includes “professors specialized in undergraduate education from prestigious universities in the U.S. and China, to hold regular meetings on how DKU is to carry out undergraduate education that addresses China’s needs” (DKU News 2015). The Advisory

Board has been closely involved in this process.

The Advisory Board focused its 2016 annual meeting on April 22-23 at DKU’s campus on the undergraduate curriculum. The day before, Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong paid a visit to campus to praise the work being done by DKU (DKU News 2016). The Advisory Board sees the undergraduate curriculum as key to two concepts: “rooted globalism” and innovation in Chi- na. Rooted globalism is the idea of graduates obtaining a “high degree of global awareness and cross-cultural sensitivity while still maintaining deep connectivity to his or her own national and cultural origins.” The idea of innovation and China’s economic development is also clear. Liberal arts education at DKU is designed to create graduates who can hold the jobs of the future. “Ac- cording to former Banking Commissioner Liu Mingkang, ‘the graduates of Duke Kunshan Uni- !69 versity will be positioned to create the jobs of the future rather than simply accepting the jobs in the workplace as it is currently structured’” (DKU News 2016). Denis Simon, executive vice- chancellor of Duke Kunshan University, has made it clear: “Innovation and a liberal arts education go together” (Hongyi 2015). However, one complication for the program has been how to recruit students in China for such an innovative way of thinking.

In order to develop this type of liberal arts university, the admissions process has needed to be developed specifically to attract and accept particular types of students to DKU. Tradition- ally, admissions decisions in China are based solely off of the students score on the Gaokao test.

This test is well-known to measure a student’s ability to memorize facts but does not include creative thinking (Zhao 2014). Consequently, DKU’s admissions process is more balanced between a variety of different factors in a manner more similar to Western styles of admissions. “We will look at their GaoKao score, and we will look at other features: their academic background, and we will make a decision on admission based on a combination of factors” (CaiXin 2015). The cultural mix of students in the program is also essential. While DKU expects about two thirds of the early cohorts to be from China, the long-term goal is to have 50% Chinese students, 25% from the US, and 25% from the rest of the world (CaiXin 2015).

DKU has also developed important ties to industry for its students through other methods besides its innovative curriculum. DKU has developed its campus from the beginning to include state-of-the-art conference facilities. These facilities have been used extensively, even before the academic programs have fully developed, to cover a range of cutting-edge topics designed to establish DKU as a thought-leader throughout China. In May 2016, DKU hosted the multi-day

Duke International Forum on “China’s Role in the Global Innovation System.” In doing so, it !70 brought leaders from China and abroad together to discuss key strengths and weaknesses in innovation, a core element of China’s most recent five year national plan. Several barriers to innovation were highlighted, including further developing China’s talent pool, stronger intellectual property rights, and better policies to provide international standardization in technology innovation. Included in attendance were a number of representatives from foreign institutions in China, including the President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (an esteemed alum- nus of the HNC), leaders from University of Nottingham Ningbo, and representatives from several large MNCs with established presence in China.

DKU also sits in part of the Kunshan Yangcheng Lake Science Park. This industrial park is home to one of China’s leading light manufacturing centers. The presence of DKU in

Kunshan, along with the strategic placement of local Kunshan industry leaders within the governance structure of DKU, will eventually allow the local economy to evolve to a more knowledge based economy. In such ways, DKU is helping to change the Chinese economy to a more high- tech and knowledge based economy at the center of an historic hub of Chinese light manufacturing.

Despite the oversight provided by DKU’s Research Support Office, according to DKU

Chancellor Liu, administrative control over faculty at DKU is substantially less than at traditional Chinese universities (Caixin 2015). Full academic freedom has been further been emphasized by the US partners. According to Denis Simon, “We enjoy full academic freedom within the context of China’s laws and regulations. There is no evidence that anybody has tried to limit our academic freedom. We haven’t got any official document that says you can’t talk about anything, so I think the signal so far is all positive” (Caixin 2015). Additionally, all students at DKU are !71 able to access the internet using their student ID through a VPN that accesses the internet through Duke University in North Carolina. While academic freedom was included in the initial agreements with the Chinese MOE, there are other ways that the issue is more carefully managed such as the Research Support Office that controls the direction of research at the university and consequently steers the curriculum of the rest of the university. Another more subtle manner is the design of the campus. The campus’s distinct design of waterways also coincidently plays the role of discouraging large student gatherings on campus. It is hard to know how intentional such design implications were. However, to some international staff and faculty, it is reminiscent of college campus plans in the US during the Vietnam War era that attempted to control socially disruptive student protests (Moreton interview 2016).

While there is no dispute that DKU is creating a new model of higher educator within

China, there are challenges that will certainly be faced along the way. DKU’s perspective is the long-term development of the Chinese higher education system and Chinese society. As Denis

Simon, DKU’s Executive Vice Chancellor, puts it:

“I have a hundred-year perspective. What we are doing now at Duke Kunshan is setting place, a foundation, to build a liberal arts university that will have a transformational impact on Chinese higher education. So the things that we set in place today will begin to shape the evolution of Chinese higher education. As Duke Kunshan grows and expands, its role in the education system will also grow and expand” (Caixin 2015).

However, as DKU President Liu admits (Caixin 2015), perhaps the largest issue facing DKU in the future is funding. DKU is following a model of private universities in the US that offers high- quality education at a high cost. Currently, the average tuition that a Chinese student is paying is only 40% of the cost of providing their degree. The remainder is covered by grants and scholarships from Duke University and the local government. As enrollment grows, DKU will have to !72 find new sources of funding. Liu aims to attract major alumni funding 15-20 years down the line, but in the meantime, the finances of DKU remain a very large question mark.

!73

Schwarzman Scholars

Schwarzman Scholars is a one-year MA program at Tsinghua University in Beijing that is modeled after the Rhodes scholarship. It provides future leaders from China, the US, and around the world the chance to network with each other as they learn about international affairs from an internationally-renowned faculty. It welcomes its first cohort of Chinese and US graduate students in 2016. The cohort is composed of just over 100 students who were selected by through an admissions process admissions process managed by the Institute of International Education (IIE) from more than 3,500 applicants. With a total endowment of nearly $450 million, tuition room, board, and all other expenses for each student are fully paid by the program, and eventually the program aims to expand to include 200 students per year.

Stage 1: Envisioning Schwarzman Scholars

Blackstone is a venture capital fund cofounded by Stephen Schwarzman in 1985. In 2007 just before the global financial crisis, Blackstone went public with an initial IPO where

Schwarzman sold about $700 million dollars worth of stock and retained nearly $9 billion dollars in company shares (Martin 2007). By 2008, Blackstone had lost nearly $1 billion of a $3 billion investment in IPO from the Chinese national savings. Shortly after that, Schwarzman was approached by members of the Advisory Board of Tsinghua Unviersity’s School of Economics and

Management (SEM), on which he sits, to talk about potential investment opportunities at Ts- inghua University. Stephen Schwarzman says he founded the program based on the motivation !74 that Americans “know next to nothing about China,” and that future political leaders in the West need to understand and have personal relationships with political leaders in China (Chen, 2013).

Others have speculated that the investment in Schwarzman Scholars is also a strategy for Black- stone to retain their access to the Chinese market (Metzgar 2016).

Tsinghua University has been referred to as the MIT of China due to its strong focus on engineering and sciences (Admin 2013), and it is one of China’s two most prestigious university

(the other being Peking University). In a country where engineering prowess is coveted, Ts- inghua boasts a large number of national leaders among its graduates including the former CPC

General Secretary Hu Jintao and current General Secretary Xi Jinping. It is a leading member of

China’s C-9 universities, the Chinese equivalent of the Ivy League, and it has been a major recipient of government financial support in China’s efforts to create several world-class universities.

Tsinghua a key recipient of funds from the government’s 211 project, equaled only in the amount it received by Peking University. Furthermore Tsinghua University received 1.8 billion Yuan from Project 985. Tsinghua’s global rankings have increased as a result. In 2015, US News and

World Report Best Global University Ranking listed Tsinghua at 59th in the world, and in 2016

Tsinghua was ranked 18th globally by Times Higher Education World Reputation Rankings (US

News 2016; World Reputation Rankings 2016).

Stage 2: Negotiations

The basic idea for Schwarzman Scholars was fairly straightforward and initially determined by Stephen Schwarzman and the President of Tsinghua University. Mr. Schwarzman de- !75 cided it would be a 1-year MA program designed to help cultivate young leaders from around the world. One year in length was chosen to attract to attract future political leaders in the US who would not necessarily be willing to forego more than a year of time to attend Tsinghua Universi- ty when they would likely also be considering degrees at other elite schools like Yale Law

School. Rather, it would help students network with each other and learn more about China as a rising power in the world. To facilitate this outcome, student allocations were fixed so that 45% of the participants would be from the US. Another 20% of the participants will be from China, and in order to achieve the goal of building a global network of future leaders, 35% of the students will come from other countries around the world (FAQ 2016).

The program was also designed especially so that students from the US would be comfortable in the academic environment. As Stephen Schwarzman described it, “What we’re trying to do is take the best parts of Western education and bring them over to China so that a Harvard student would feel totally comfortable with the teaching style and the content at one of the world’s best universities” (Media Coverage 2013). It was important that it be taught in English as the goal was not to attract students who have studied Mandarin for half a decade or more. It was to attract future leaders who may or may not have had extensive experience with China and to make sure going forward that they had a familiarity with and network in elite Chinese circles.

Additionally, the faculty would be split equally between Chinese faculty and internationally faculty, and it would have full academic freedom and a Western style of student-centered pedagogy.

Additionally, Schwarzman Scholars would be housed in Schwarzman College, the first residential college at Tsinghua University that would be modeled on the residence colleges of Harvard,

Oxford, and other elite Western universities. As one of the first residence colleges in China, and !76 because of the prestige it will bring to Tsinghua University, it would naturally serve as a model for Chinese higher education.

The rest of the programs details were left to be negotiated by a parallel governance structure between the China and US partners. Within Tsinghua University, Schwarzman Scholars had a unique relationship with the School of Management and Economics (SEM). It was only as a member of the School’s Advisory Board that Stephen Schwarzman was first approached by the

Tsinghua University President about the idea of him spearheading some type of philanthropic effort at the university. Consequently, both the position of Dean and Executive Dean of

Schwarzman Scholars were selected from longstanding SEM faculty. Furthermore, SEM would midwife the Schwarzman Scholars programs at Tsinghua, providing crucial administrative support at the university level in areas such as accounting, infrastructure, and human resources until

Schwarzman Scholars obtained its own in-house administration in October 2015.

By the time the program was announced in 2013, Stephen Schwarzman also created two international advisory boards to help establish Schwarzman Scholars. The first and most publicly visible was the 19-member Advisory Board made up of key world leaders; former senior members of the US foreign policy establishment; academic leaders; think tank leaders; a business executive; and one cultural figure. The world leaders include:

• Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair • Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy • Former Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd • Former Prime Minister of Canada Brian Mulroney !77

Together, these leaders represent the leadership of a large part of the nations that comprise the

West. While no former US President is a member of the Advisory Board, key former members of the US government include:

• Former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice • Former Secretary of State Colin Powell • Former Secretary of State Henry Kissenger • Former Secretary of the Treasurer Henry Paulson

Other world leaders are also represented including:

• Former President of the World Bank Group, Sir James Wolfensohn • Co-Chairman on the Council on Foreign Relation, Robert Rubin • Chairman of the Brookings Institution and Director of Global Leadership at Tsinghua Universi- ty (and former President of Goldman Sachs), John Thornton • President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass • Group Chief Executive of BP, Robert Dudley

Three members also represent important academic institutions including:

• President of Duke University, Richard Brodhead • Former President of Yale University, Richard Levin • Former Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford and former Warden of the Rhodes Trust, Sir Colin Lucas

The advisory board also included several prominent Chinese figures:

• Nobel Laureate and Honorary Director of the Institute of Advanced Study at Tsinghua Univer- sity, Chen Ning Yang • Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con- ference, Tung Chee Hwa • World-renowned Chinese-American Cellist, Yo-Yo Ma

These carefully selected Advisory Board members give an important window into the political, economic, and academic space that Schwarzman Scholars aims to fill.

Less visible but arguably more important for the actual operations of Schwarzman Schol- ars program is the Academic Advisory Council. This Council is constructed primarily of well- !78 accomplished US scholars and higher education administrators. They were to provided the academic know-how to run a successful elite program modeled after the Rhodes Scholarships. The

Chairman of the Council is William Kirby, Chairman of the Harvard China Fund and former

Dean of the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences who led the effort to select other members of the Council. This Council consisted of 18 members who are primarily leading administrators at elite US Universities, but also included additional representatives such as those from renowned universities internationally and a former Minister and Vice Minster from China’s Ministry of Ed- ucation. This Council met twice per year between 2012-2016 when the program began, and they divided their work into a number of committees that made recommendations about what decisions the Schwarzman Scholars administration should make. However, these recommendations were not binding, and the administration could decide which advice to accept and which to not accept.

Stage 3: Implementation

The administration of Schwarzman Scholars was split between Tsinghua University under the leadership of Dr. David Li who was selected to be the Dean of Schwarzman Scholars and a staff based in New York City where both Blackstone and the Stephen Schwarzman Education

Foundation are based. David Li is an influential figure in Chinese policy-making, being the

Mansfield Freeman Chair Professor of Economics at Tsinghua and also previously a member of

China’s Monetary Policy Committee. He runs an administrative unit of roughly 30 people that are scattered among three different office spaces on Tsinghua campus. These offices will eventu- !79 ally be joined within the Schwarzman College building when the building officially opens. In addition to Dean Li, Schwarzman Scholars has an Associate Dean in charge of the actual administrative units as well as an Executive Dean in charge of academics. There is also an Associate

Dean for Student Life position which has remained vacant until the time of this writing.

There are also currently nine Schwarzman Scholars employees in New York City that will eventually increase to twelve. The NYC office shares many of the administrative functions with the Beijing offices that are targeted for non-Chinese audiences. Admission for participants from mainland China including Hong Kong are managed in Beijing, and admission from the rest of the world are managed in NYC in collaboration with the Institute for International Education.

Additionally, public relations, fundraising, and career advising are similarly divided between the offices in Beijing and NYC. This division reflects the sensitivity necessary to the different target audiences for this program in China and throughout the rest of the world. For example, public relation for a Chinese audience and US audience are assumed to take a different perspective on similar issues. Additionally, career trajectories for Chinese and international students are likely to require a different kind of support.

However, the general structure of the program’s curriculum was developed by the Acad- emic Advisory Council that has met seven times since April 2013, the most recent being March

2016. In addition to each participant receiving a one-year MA in Global Affairs, they will also choose a concentration from three different tracks: Economics and Business, Public Policy, and

International Studies. Originally, a concentration existed in Engineering but after one year this track was removed. All participants complete a core curriculum that includes a mandatory course on leadership. Additionally, students take the core course corresponding to their concentration !80 and chose two of the three remaining courses (the two other core courses responding to the other concentrations as well as a course titled “Chinese Culture, History, and Values”). In addition to the core courses, each concentration requires 9 credits chosen from a selection of courses. In total, students take 21 credits between the core and concentration courses. Students are also required to complete eight more credits (for a total of 29 credits) to complete the program, many of them falling under co-curricular activities rather than core curriculum. Students are also required to take an additional leadership course their second semester called “Practices in Global Leader- ship” as well as to write a short thesis.

The faculty of Schwarzman Scholars were to develop the syllabi for all the courses, but difficulty in Chinese faculty recruitment created delays in the process. The faculty was supposed to consist of half Chinese faculty from Tsignhua University and half international faculty. How- ever, all courses are tied to an “anchor” faculty member who are required to be a Chinese faculty member at Tsinghua because of requirements at Tsinghua University for all university programs.

These anchor faculty members bear the primary responsibility for developing the course that is then supplemented by teaching from international faculty. While teaching at Schwarzman Schol- ars, they all retain their faculty positions at their home Tsinghua schools.

According to numerous sources familiar with the process, encouraging Chinese faculty to participate in the program has been difficult. Chinese faculty view the additional teaching as an extra burden to their workload. Additionally, without past years of operation to look back on,

Chinese faculty are uncertain what the expectations and repercussions of participating in the

Schwarzman Scholars program will be. However, the first round of faculty appointments occurred in December 2014 and more are expected in 2015. Additionally, several Chinese faculty !81 have agreed to live in the residence halls in Schwarzman College. Several Deans at Tsinghua have been brought into Advisory Board meetings and have helped with targeting and recruiting faculty such as the Dean of the School of Public Policy and Management, and the Dean of the

School of Social Sciences (Media Coverage 2015).

Consequently, the syllabi of these core and concentration courses were developed, in large part, on an ad hoc basis. Some courses, like the leadership course that is central to the idea of the program as a leadership program, was developed jointly by Vice President Yang Bin, Pro- fessor Wang Youqiang, and Professor Warren McFarlin of the Harvard Business School. As the

Schwarzman Scholars website states on the course description: “The aim of the course is to combine theory with practice, integrate Chinese and Western techniques, and offer diverse perspectives to help students learn and nurture the capabilities and qualities required for future leaders" (Media Coverage 2015). Other core courses were developed by the Chinese faculty or jointly with the international faculty. Some concentration courses were developed exclusively by international faculty, such as those by Dr. Nial Ferguson—an internationally renowned scholar and the first international faculty member to sign a teaching contract with Schwarzman Scholars.

Schwarzman Scholars Dean Dr. Li is teaching two of the program’s core courses: “Leading Is- sues in the Global Economy” and “Leading Issues in InternationalRelations. The other Chinese faculty were recruited from the Schools of Economics and Business, Political Science, In- ternational Relations, and Social Science (Media Coverage 2015).

International faculty were primarily suggested by members of the Academic Advisory

Committee, which is primarily made of US academics. Consequently, most international faculty are from the US, though there is a hope to further diversify the international faculty in the future. !82

Most international faculty will attend Schwarzman Scholars for a short period of 1-3 months in order to teach one course, and during this period they will live in the residence halls. While some faculty have been retained on multiple year contracts, the goal is to have all international faculty teaching on longer term contracts in order to create a constant faculty teaching from one year to the next. While all the faculty of Schwarzman Scholars are of top international repute, the program has also attracted a number of “all-star” faculty that has significantly added to its prestige.

These include Dr. Amitav Acharya, “the first non-Western scholar to be elected as the President of the International Studies Association (ISA), the largest and most well-known scholarly association in international studies worldwide” (American University 2016). Other international scholars include former US Treasury Secretary and former Harvard president Lawrence H. Summers and Dr. Joseph Nye, former Dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, who coined the influential concept of ‘soft power’ (Media Coverage 2016).

Western pedagogy is an important part of the curriculum. Stephen Schwarzman originally committed the program to a Western model of pedagogy in order to make US students feel more comfortable with the academic environment. This primarily meant less lecture and more interac- tion with students. Dean Li originally supported the idea, and on the Schwarzman Scholars website, under one of the core courses anchored by Dean Li, it states, “The course endeavors to provide multiple perspectives and to promote dialectical debates in every class. Proactive learning of the students is strongly encouraged. The instructors will rely primarily on directly engaging with the students, where they will be challenged and constantly brought into debates and discussions” (Overview 2016). Similar statements exist under each core course, each of which lists detailed information about how each course will be taught. However, as the program devel- !83 oped, it became clear that such a Western style of teaching would be unfamiliar and an adjust- ment to some Chinese faculty and students. Consequently, the Schwarzman Scholars program has committed to a blended form of pedagogy that allows more elements of Chinese pedagogy than originally planned.

Co-curricular activities are also an important part of this program. Early effort in the program’s development was put into creating the curriculum, but the program’s leadership soon realized that to create a successful program there would need to be an increased focus on student life because of the unique nature of the social environment the program seemed to create. As leading universities including Tsinghua have limited experience with residential colleges, the program ultimately hired a consultant through CET, a well-known study abroad provider from the US, to help develop the student life component of the program. The final co-curricular structure put into place creates a full-schedule for program participants that leaves little room for free-time. With the exception of Sundays, which are the students’ one free day each week, the rest of their schedule is filled with activities (Futrell interview 2016).

The co-curriculum includes a wide variety of activities. All students are required to complete a one credit orientation, as well as two credits of their non-native language (Chinese students study English and international students study Mandarin) their first semester. Students also have the option to take four credits of language their first semester and an additional language course their second semester. The language component was added to the program after 70% of accepted students ranked learning better language skills as very important or extremely important in an informal survey (Futrell interview 2016). Site visits in Beijing and across China are regularly scheduled in order to provide students with a broader experience of what China is like. !84

Each student completes a one-credit “Deep Dive” course midway through Fall semester that explores an issue in China in-depth that is completed at various locales outside Beijing. Additional- ly, each student is matched with a mentor for the program in their area of interest as well as a

Chinese student at Tsinghua that is not a part of the Schwarzman Scholars program.

Student life is concerned about a number of different issues arising for Schwarzman

Scholar participants. Because of the elite nature of the program, there is a concern that participants will never have been in a community where they do not greatly excel above everyone else.

Being “average” will likely be a new experience for many of them. Additionally, taking high- level courses in a non-native language will likely be a very big challenge for the Chinese students and will likely require additional support. Consequently, one of the program’s staff will be a counselor skilled in dealing with emotional and stress-related issues (Futrell interview 2016).

Student life is also highly influenced by the facilities that have been built to house the

Schwarzman Scholars Program. The 262,000 square-foot Schwarzman College was constructed to provide world-class facilities to the Schwarzman Scholars (Media Coverage 2013). The completion of the building on schedule with the opening of the program is considered no small feat.

The building was designed and built to last several hundred years and therefore required a construction quality that is difficult to obtain in China. The building was designed by Robert A.M

Stern, the former dean of the Yale School of Architecture, and is modeled after residential colleges at Oxford, Cambridge, and US Ivy League colleges. The style of the building symbolizes the purpose of the program by integrating both Western and Eastern design. It also is one of the first LEED certified buildings in China, symbolizing the increasing importance put on environmental issues in the top-tier of Chinese policy making circles. The building includes both student !85 and faculty residences, a small library, classroom space, and a courtyard. It was designed so that program students would spend a significant amount of their year in the building itself. The building’s forum is modeled on the Harvard Kennedy School’s John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum, and the housing system is based of the executive education residences of the Harvard Business

School. The building’s cost is estimated at roughly $100 million.

The application and recruitment process were developed and implemented by the Insti- tute for International Education (IIE) with whom a partnership was formed in 2014. IIE is the same organization that administers the Fulbright program as well as other prestigious international academic fellowships. In collaboration with IIE, an intensive campus recruitment and social media campaign began in Fall 2014 around the world. Unlike other international programs, Schwarzman Scholars does not need to worry about the same kind of market analysis that other international programs conduct to make sure there is sufficient demand for their program, as the initial program design includes zero tuition fees for those applicants who are accepted.

Student recruitment was also helped by a strategic partnership with the Oxford Said School of

Business. In the only degree partnership to exist so far with Schwarzman Scholars, students can apply simultaneously but independently to both schools, and, if successful, would start an MBA program at Oxford after completion of the Schwarzman Scholars program. This dual-degree program helps with recruitment and career placement for students in the program. More than 3,500 people applied to this first cohort, and the initial applicants were, according to a Schwarzman

Scholars press release, “first reviewed by a distinguished team of readers from around the world, with 300 semi-finalists invited for in-person interviews in Beijing, Bangkok, London or New

York before international panels composed of CEOs, former heads of state, university presidents, !86 non-profit executives, journalists and other leaders” (News 2016). Ultimately, 111 students were accepted into the first cohort, resulting in an acceptance rate of 3.7%. These spots were roughly correlated with the official allocations, but acceptance was primarily determined by student qual- ifications (Thrift interview 2016). The goal of the program is to have 200 students in each cohort, and, in doing so, in 50 years the program will have an alumni network of 10,000 students.

The aim is that the program alumni reach the highest ranks of government in the US,

China, and elsewhere. The program explicitly aims to produce heads-of-state in all of the participant countries, especially the US and China. However, regardless of their particular title, these students are to be at the forefront of US-China relations. This goal was chosen to confront the fear of war between the US and China as China continues to rise as a challenge to the role of the

US as the undisputed global hegemony. There have also been a number of instruments built into the program to structure the career trajectories of its alumni.

One of the ways that the Schwarzman Scholar program has helped structure the career outcomes of participants is to provide benefits for donors. Donors often choose to sponsor the tuition of a certain number of students in the program for a set period of year (e.g. 10 years).

These students then become the fellows of the donor’s organization. Presumably, the students who receive these fellowships are those that have a perceived interest in the type of business that provided the donation and will then be more likely to pursue opportunities with these corporations in the future. Corporations can also support endowed chairs for the faculty. There are currently six endowed chairs, and by tying their donation to a particular chair, special attention would be paid to the donors (as is the case in many Western universities). Last, each student is also provided with a professional mentor outside of the program who is a leader in his/her field. !87

These mentors meet regularly with the student throughout the year and are hoped to become life- long relationships that will facilitate the students’ professional development.

Fundraising for the endowment has been an ongoing process during the implementation of Schwarzman Scholars that has effected how the program has evolved. The original fundraising goal announced by Stephen Schwarzman in 2013 was $300 million dollars. When he first announced the goal, Mr. Schwarzman committed $100 million of his own money to the cause and also announced an additional $100 million of pledged donations from primarily blue-chip international firms with strong ties in China. As fundraising the last $100 million has been accomplished rather quickly, the fundraising goal was increased first to $350 million, then to $400 million, and then $450 million. As fundraising slowly approached this final goal, a Director of

Development was hired in NYC to reach out to non-traditional audiences. Schwarzman Scholars currently stands as the largest fundraising effort in China to come from primarily international donors.

Funding has come from primarily international corporations and has been divided into multiple tiers: the Cornerstone donor, Founding donors, Partner donors, and Funding donors. The

Cornerstone Donor BP provided much of the initial funding that allowed it special privileges including filling a seat in the Advisory Board. “BP will assist in advising the School, support 14

BP Fellows each year as part of the program, and engage with successive cadres of

Scholars’” (News 2013). Other donors support a variety of different efforts. Delta Airlines has agreed to provide airline travel for all program officials and students for a period of 10 years.

Annual scholarships for students are a common destination of funding that also provides a clear career track for students into the upper-echelons of multinational corporate leadership. !88

Funding has also come from Chinese donors, but they have provided less funding than international donors. A notable number of these Chinese donors are Founding donors. These donors have provided the institutional legitimacy for Schwarzman Scholars within China, as these Chinese donors are some of the most influential organizations in Beijing. Some examples are the Dalio Foundation, Anbang Insurance Group, Chan Soon-Shiong Family Foundation,

Chanchai Ruayrungruang, Masa Son, Tsinghua Unigroup Co., Ltd., and Tingyi Holding Corp.

Presumably, these Chinese companies are hoping to use the students in the program to build ties for international trade with the rest of the world. !89

Discussion

In the context of the existing literature, these three cases reveal a number of interesting findings about the utility of a theoretical framework based on strategic alliances and stakeholders. In particular, the discussion’s first sub-section describes the utility of the four phases of strategic alliances to understand the process of establishing these institutions. This framework highlights the similarities between universities and non-profit firms operating in a market environment as well as the inability of universities to predict the final outcome of these partnership when they are first initiated. This work builds off Wilkins and Huisman (2012) in highlighting the motivations for universities to establish branch campuses and the important role of institutional environment in the host country. The next sub-section describes the utility of stakeholder theory to understanding the common players in negotiations about these joint-ventures as well as their outcomes. In particular, these cases highlight the importance of joint-venture institutions paying careful attention to the political, economic, and social context of US-China relations in order to successfully establish and operate. Building on the work of Bolton and Nie (2010), stakeholder theory also provides useful insights into common areas of controversy in these joint- ventures and the necessity of creating a stakeholder culture that recognizes the limits of institutional partners. The last sub-section of the discussion focuses on implications of this research for a growing conversation about a Chinese model of world-class university that includes hybrid aspects from the US higher education system. For an easy visual comparison between the different programs, the basic details of the programs in each case study are listed in Table 1. !90

Table 1: Program Details

Tuition: Int’l/ US First Primary Chinese Location Accredi Cohort Language (2015/16) tation

HNC

English for Chinese students; 1-year certiﬁ- 1986 $22,500.00 Nanjing, China Mandarin for No cate international faculty English for Chinese students; 2-year MA 2006 $39,964.00 Nanjing, China Mandarin for Yes international faculty

In China English for Chi- $22,500 (ﬁrst Nanjing (2 semester) nese students; 5-semester 2006 year); $39,964 and Washington, DC (3 Mandarin for in- Yes MA (remaining years) semester) ternational faculty In US English

DKU

Kunshan (1 semester) $49,900/$30,108. 1-year MMS 2014 and Durham, North English No 69 Carolina (1 semester)

2-year MS Kunshan (2 semesters) $49,500/ Medical 2014 and Durham, North English No $24,093.48 Physics Carolina (2 semesters) 2-year MS $49,500/ 2014 Kunshan, China English No Global Health $24,093.48

2-year MA Kunshan (3 semesters), Environmental 2017 not listed English No Durham (1 semester) Policy Undergradu- ate Global $15,000/$3,372.4 2014 Kunshan, China English No Learning Se- 3 (per semester) mester

MA Global 2016 None Beijing, China English No Affairs !91

Strategic Alliances

Partnerships are a necessary aspect for foreign education providers who want to operate in China’s higher education system, and it makes sense that foreign universities would strive to choose their partners carefully. The four-phase model used to describe the three cases in this study is helpful for understanding how these partnerships evolve. In these strategic alliances, each partner brings something to the agreement that the other lacks. In this cases, the Chinese university not only provides the legal requirement stipulated by the MOE, but it provides familiarity with the social, economic, and political context of China. US universities provide the brand and the high academic quality of their faculty. However, there are limits to the four-phases described in these case studies as there are often more than two partners involved in the joint-venture.

These cases demonstrated that the initial vision for these joint-ventures is developed primarily by the US partner, though this vision can evolve and the Chinese partner can contribute to the initial vision as well. In the case of HNC, JHU President Muller had a specific vision of a branch campus in China, and it was Nanjing University President Yaming who was open to the idea. Only after vetting a number of Chinese universities did Muller finally choose Nanjing Uni- versity and the idea was developed more comprehensively through negotiations. The case of

DKU demonstrates how the process of developing joint-ventures can be reset as factors change.

Fuqua’s initial idea for of the joint-venture was significantly different than the final outcome and the Chinese partner had changed completely, due seemingly to competing visions for the partnership within Duke University. In the case of Schwarzman Scholars, Stephen Schwarzman devel- !92 oped the initial idea but only after an invitation from Tsinghua’s President. Based on the available evidence, it does not seem like Stephen Schwarzman vetted any other Chinese universities.

The second phase of negotiations elucidates how the initial idea for the institution meets with the realities of China’s institutional environment and the competing demands of different stakeholders. While the role of different stakeholders will be analyzed further in the next sub- section, a few initial conclusions can be reached. In the case of both HNC and DKU, the local government plays a key role in the procurement of land and resources for construction of the facilities. This fact often requires separate negotiations from those with the Chinese university partner, and in the case of HNC and DKU these negotiations greatly stalled and almost ended the joint-venture. In the case of DKU, the partnership between Duke University and the city of Kun- shan actually proved to outlast the initial partnership with Shanghai Jiao Tong University, under- score the importance the local government can play. In the case of Schwarzman Scholars, the absent role of the local government likely has to do with Tsinghua Universities relationship with the federal government, though his research did not uncover any specific evidence to support this claim.

The role of economic forces, in particular the profit motive, also plays an interesting role in driving negotiations of these joint-ventures, but it is not the leading force under consideration.

In the case of HNC, the cultural and political role of HNC was much more important to negotiations, and HNC has notably lost money for many years of its operations. However, economic considerations did come into play in offering a two-year MA program, and they seem to be driving the institution to offer programs with less language requirements in order to tap into larger market demand. In the case of DKU, economic forces played a mixed role. The economic reces- !93 sion in the US played a driving role in Duke’s search for new market opportunities abroad. Mar- ket demand also played a key role in limiting the business programs to be offered and in setting the tuition of different programs. However, DKU is costing Duke University a tremendous amount of money and will not be generating profits for Duke University for at least several years. DKU’s President has even admitted that the institution still lacks a sustainable financial model. In the case of Schwarzman Scholars, all student tuition is paid for by the programs endowment, so there is no need to respond directly to market trends of international students. How- ever, the program has clearly been inspired by China’s growing economy and its consequent political influence. Between the three cases, it seems that while market demand for particular programs does influence the negotiations in terms of which programs will be offered and how large they will be, the establishment of the institutions themselves is only effected by macro-economic trends and their consequent political effects.

The third phase of implementation demonstrates how the vision for the institution and previous negotiations meet with the demands of marginal stakeholders and require the institution to adapt to unanticipated circumstances. In all three cases, these stakeholders include faculty who were not privy to the previous discussions and who are nonetheless essential to the institutions successful implementation. In the case DKU, they also included additional challenges to not just negotiate with the local government for land and funds for construction but also working with the local construction crew to ensure quality standards. These challenges resulted in multiple years of delays and millions of dollars in additional costs for Duke University. Students can also create challenges for implementations. In the case of HNC, student protests in 1988-89 in Nan- !94 jing and throughout the country nearly shut the Center down due to the level of controversy. The role of these stakeholders will be considered more in the next section.

Also evident in the implementation phase is the role of communication between similar institutions. Both DKU and Schwarzman Scholars sent small delegations to HNC to learn from their operations. Schwarzman Scholars also sent a delegation to DKU. Communication in this fashion appears to be the norm. When DKU officially opened its conference center, one of its earliest conferences allowed other Chinese universities the opportunity to visit DKU and learn about how they operated. Overlap in leadership teams is not uncommon. Both the President of

Duke University and the first Vice Chancellor of DKU serve as advisors respectfully on

Schwarzman' Scholars’ Advisory Council and Academic Advisory Committee.

The final phase of evaluation is not fully covered by all three cases because two are so recent, but this phase nonetheless plays an important role in these joint-ventures. In the case of

HNC, an evaluation occurs every five years that determines whether the Center will continue to stay open. These evaluations have often involved a renegotiation of terms and can result in large changes to the institution such as the introduction of new programs and changes in governance structure. In the case of DKU, evaluations are occurring for the pilot stages of each program that cover each programs implementation and are precursors to the program being fully scaled. In the case of Schwarzman Scholars, such an implementation evaluation will also likely be conducted, as the first year of the program is also a pilot version with just over 100 of the expected 200 students to be enrolled annually in the program. Based on the experiences of these case studies, suggestions for effective evaluations will be provided in the Recommendations section of this thesis. !95

Stakeholder Analysis

An analysis of the internal and external stakeholders involved in the establishment of these joint-venture institutions provides a nuanced understanding to the four phases of partnership detailed above. It explains some of the most common areas of contention in negotiations, and the influence of the different stakeholders help explain the different outcomes reached at each institution. While these stakeholders are not the exactly the same for each institution, these case studies provide a wealth of information about the ways in which similar actors influence these joint-ventures. These cases also demonstrate that similar stakeholders will behave differently given different context. This information is quite useful for understanding how these institutions are formed, and in each case study the outcomes of the negotiations between all the different stakeholders provide several new models for a developing hybrid model for a world-class

Chinese university.

The high-level administrators of US and Chinese partner institutions are the primary stakeholders in the establishment of these institutions. Without their active involvement throughout the different phases of these institution’s establishment, they would seize to exist. This does not always necessitate the active involvement of the university president or provost. In the case of HNC and DKU, the holders of these positions often create the vision for the program but del- egate some or all of the negotiations to other employees of the university. In the case of

Schwarzman Scholars, Stephen Schwarzman played the role of developing the initial vision and delegated much of the addition negotiations to members of his education foundation and to former administrators from Harvard as well as other US academic institutions. However, the vision !96 set by these institutional leaders is of critical importance in setting the course on which these institutions will evolve. In the case of HNC, DKU, and Schwarzman Scholars, institutional leaders set a vision that reflected the historical moment in a way that has guided them since. However, the US and Chinese university administrators are not sufficient to establish these joint-ventures on their own.

Building off the work of Lane, Kinser, and Knox (2013) on transnational regulation frameworks, national governments are also key stakeholders in the establishment of these joint- venture institutions. Because these institutions are based in China, the different parts of the Chi- nese government play a very influential role. The Chinese Ministry of Education keeps close control of what institutions need to do to get approved. This is clear in the multiple checkpoints that DKU needed to clear, and also in the close supervision that was provided for HNC both at its founding and at the introduction of the MA degree in 2006. The presence of high-level government officials, including Ministry of Education officials such as former Vice-Minister of Educa- tion Zhang Xinsheng, at Advisory Board meetings of Schwarzman Scholars speaks volumes about the degree to which the MOE attempts to monitor and influence outcomes. Whilethe level of regulation has changed over time, especially pre- and post-WTO, gaining the proper licensing is a cross-cutting theme in these cases that always instrumentally shapes these joint-ventures.

The CPC also closely regulates what happens at the university level for the Chinese partner institutions. The existence of a party committee that monitors each Chinese university clearly demonstrates the importance that the CPC gives to higher education. By affecting the involvement of Chinese administration and faculty in these joint-venture institutions, they are able to influence their establishment. As the case of HNC suggests, the CPC intelligence agents also !97 closely monitor the staff of these institutions. Chinese university presidents, whose position gives them the status of government civil service, provide a consistent political counterbalance to CPC university committees in the establishment of these institutions. Indeed, several interviewees commented on the inability of these institutions to be founded without strong and consistent support from a Chinese university president.

This research has also demonstrated how much local government in China can be a key stakeholder. Obtaining the land and construction of facilities is often a crucial step for these institutions that allows the local government and industry to exert strong influence. This is clear in both HNC and DKU. As the case of DKU clearly demonstrates, connections with local government officials can provide the initial impetus and partnership for these joint-venture institutions.

Municipal conferences, such as the fifth annual conference on Chinese-foreign Cooperation in

Running Schools, hosted by the city of Shenzhen in 2014, can provide crucial opportunities for the ideas for these institutions to be developed (Hayhoe and Pan 2015).

The US government also plays a role in establishing these joint-venture institutions, though much less actively than the various levels of the Chinese government. Since all of the US partners included in these case studies are private institutions, the US government seems to most- ly influence these institutions indirectly. In the case of HNC, an official delegation provided the impetus for JHU and Nanjing University to collaborate. The US government has further influenced the evolution of HNC through funding, especially for the library, and as a key employer of alumni. Schwarzman Scholars is also clearly supported by individuals who have been involved with the US government, and other Western governments, through the presence of former heads of state and high level officials on the Advisory Board. Other manners in which the US govern- !98 ment attempts to influence these institutions include the Congressional hearings that have occurred to determine whether academic freedom is being restricted for US universities. Also, while it seems to be standard practice of Chinese intelligence to monitor staff at and send agents to US-Sino joint-venture institutions, it is unclear how much the US responds in kind.

Given the role of the US and Chinese government as key stakeholders, the establishment of these institutions is clearly shaped by the context of US-China relations in the period they are founded. This is significant because higher education institutions are very slow to change after they are established (Krucken 2003), which helps explain why stakeholders are so considered with influencing these institutions during particular phases of their development. The HNC was founded in the context of reopening diplomatic relations between the US and China that is reflected in their programmatic emphasis on cultural understanding. This emphasis remains to this day, though it is beginning to evolve and has created a number of financial challenges that HNC is seeking to overcome. DKU was initially envisioned in a period of increasing globalization, though it has and continues to be shaped by the economic collapse that occurred in 2008. This collapse caused a dramatic shift in the final structure and programmatic offerings of the university. Schwarzman Scholars was founded in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis and clearly reflects the current geopolitical necessity of better understanding the rising global power of Chi- na. These contexts have clearly shaped the establishment of these institutions, though this finding does not eliminate the influence of additional stakeholders.

In addition to governments and university administrators, faculty arguably play an influential role. In all three cases, faculty have helped shape the establishment of the institutions in key ways. In the case of HNC, faculty have played an especially large role around the introduc- !99 tion of the MA degree. They have caused the institution’s governance to significantly change to include faculty. A large part of the expansion in facilities was to create accommodations for international faculty that would attract them to teach in China for an extended period of time. At

DKU, faculty voted to stop the introduction of certain programs and change others dramatically.

At Schwarzman Scholars, complications in recruiting Chinese faculty led to delays in developing the curriculum. While different stakeholders often change their behavior in different contexts, in these three cases it is a crosscutting theme that faculty are always concerned about these joint- ventures.

Students also play a limited role in the establishment of these institutions. The most visible role is through specific programmatic offerings that are based around what Chinese and international students are willing to pay for tuition. In the case of HNC, this is evident in the long delay of the introduction of the MA program because of a worry about enough students with sufficient language proficiency. In the case of DKU, it is clearly evident in the report commissioned by faculty about current market demand for Fuqua business programs. Students can also play a role in the implementation phase when student protests threaten to shut down the institutions because of heightened controversy. This is evident in the case of HNC in the 1988-89 student protests. It is also evident in the unique design of the DKU campus. While the aquatic quad is an aesthetically pleasing design aspect, one interviewer also noted its similarities to US campus built in the 1970s that were designed to discourage student protests.

Accreditation agencies do not seem to play a significant role as external stakeholders. In the case of HNC, accreditation was received by the Middle States Commission on Higher Educa- tion that accredits JHU. This accreditation was given despite the fact that half the teaching is !100 done by Chinese faculty not from JHU. In the case of DKU, students of DKU are still able to receive Duke University degrees despite the fact that the Southern Association of Colleges and

Schools which accredits Duke University has decided not to accredit DKU. In the case of

Schwarzman Scholars, there is no official US university partner, and therefore no relevant US accreditation agency. While US accreditations agencies are aware of the development of these institutions, they do not seem to play any influential role.

Corporations play a much larger role in the establishment of these institutions. In the case of HNC, this is apparent especially for those that employ alumni. These organizations make donations to HNC, help organize site visits for classes, and have developed other institutional ties that allow them to benefit from the Center. It is especially evident in the case of DKU, where corporate leaders form the majority of the university’s advisory board and corporations take ad- vantage of the extensive DKU conference facilities. It is also evident in the case of Schwarzman

Scholars, where corporations have donated hundreds of millions of dollars to the endowment, presumably for access to the institution that will increase their business opportunities, such as the ability to employ students.

Hybrid Model of World-Class Chinese University

The case studies covered in this thesis add several models to a growing conversation about a Chinese model of world-class university that is a hybrid model between traditional Chi- nese elements of higher education and elements imported from different higher education sys- !101 tems around the world, including Japan, Europe, the US, and the Soviet Union (Hayhoe 1996).

This hybrid model has been described by Li (2012) as the “chiniversity” that…

“include[s] a tendency towards ethics-centered exploration of knowledge and normative application, secular and societal missions of higher education, acceptance of the domi- nant and directive role of government, a vision of teachers and students as scholar- offi- cials or officials in waiting, a hierarchical and meritocratic system, and institutional and disciplinary diversity” (Li 2012, 12).

As these case studies cover three leading US-Sino joint-ventures in China, this thesis helps add to this conversation by discussing the role of the US-Sino joint-venture education institutions in shaping this hybrid model. As these cases cover leading US universities that are consistently the highest ranked universities in the world, and these cases arguably have a lot to offer. In the establishment of these institutions, there are ongoing negotiations about the best policies for developing a hybrid model of university in China too reach a world-class status. The outcomes (see Ta- ble 2) of these negotiations have created such hybrid models that are adding to this conversation.

The degree of academic freedom at these joint-ventures is one of their key characteristics.

However, Chinese higher education is well known for its limitation on academic freedom and its strict pedagogy. Recent official government policies in China such as Document 9 and Document

30 have heightened this conservative approach by banning particular ideas from the West from being discussed at universities. Persecution of Chinese faculty has also increased greatly in recent years (Zhao 2016). Additionally, the 2015 law that will regulate the activities of foreign non-profits in China, while not directly targeting universities, could likely have adverse effects on their ability to freely operate (Redden 2016). However, Li (2012) has argued that rather than having an approach that limits academic freedom, Chinese universities have an an approach that encourages intellectual freedom defined as an ethics-based exploration of knowledge with prac- !102 tical implications. This approach is implicitly and explicitly negotiated with US approaches to academic freedom and pedagogy in the establishment of these institutions, and it varies widely between each institution.

Table 2: Outcomes

HNC DKU SS

College at Chinese Comprehensive College at Chinese Institutional context university university university Low, $5,000/year to each faculty for High, two major Research activity Low independent research institutes research

Teaching focused ✔ ✔

50% Chinese/50% 50% Chinese/50% Faculty Int’l Int’l Int’l 50% Chinese/50% 50% Chinese/50% 20% Chinese/45% Students Int’l Int’l US/35% Int’l

Pedagogy Blended US Blended

Graduate programs ✔ ✔ ✔

Undergraduate program ✔

Tuition-driven; Tuition-driven; subsidized by Primary funding Corporate subsidized by university partners source donations university partners and local government

Conference facilities ✔ ✔

VPN access via US university ✔ ✔ !103

DKU arguably challenges the status-quo the most in regards to what can be researched and published by faculty. Duke University required stipulations about academic freedom in the initial negotiations with the MOE that allow all faculty to research what ever they please while at

DKU. However, other limitations have been put into place by focusing the majority of research at DKU through its research centers. These research centers are carefully monitored as all major research projects must approved through a central regulatory office. Additionally, the research components of all the graduate degree programs at DKU are built into the research institutes.

Consequently, while faculty and students are in theory free to research whatever areas they want, in practice there are administrative checks in place that limit this ability. The pedagogy of

DKU also significantly pushes the limits of the status-quo in China. Much of this fact is due to the faculty being primarily from Duke University or recruited internationally. These faculty naturally teach in a manner that is more student focused than traditional Chinese faculty. However, there are certain limits imposed to the curriculums of the academic programs at DKU. Almost all the curriculums, including the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum, are designed around the research institutes. As a consequence, while there is a significant difference between pedagogy at

DKU and most Chinese universities, it is still a uniquely hybrid model within Chinese higher education.

HNC also plays a role in creating a hybrid model of academic freedom in Chinese higher education, but on a much smaller scale. As a relatively small college at Nanjing University, HNC has a limited influence on the overall university policy. However, HNC does have an elite status at the university and throughout China that magnifies its influence. Academic freedom in terms of faculty research has played less of a role at HNC as it is primarily a teaching institute. How- !104 ever, the library at HNC has nevertheless been a symbol of academic freedom since the institution’s founding and has been funded regularly by USAID. Furthermore, international faculty are given $5,000 each year to research whatever they like. Also, since the expansion of facilities in

2006, HNC has added conferences facilities that it has used to increase its profile in response to recent crackdowns on academic freedom in China. However, HNC has played a key role in shaping pedagogy at its institution as a model for Chinese higher education. In particular, it has con- vinced both US and Chinese faculty members to adopt a blended pedagogical style that includes regular student-professor feedback throughout the course as well as experiential learning components such as site visits.

Schwarzman Scholars also plays a role in creating a hybrid pedagogical model of Chi- nese higher education. Similar to HNC and Nanjing University, Schwarzman Scholars is a college at Tsinghua University and has a limited ability to influence university policy. However, it does play a crucial role as a model for other colleges at both Tsinghua university and throughout the Chinese higher education system. Similar to HNC, Schwarzman Scholars is primarily a teaching institute. In the area of pedagogy, it is unique by having classes be co-taught by US and

Chinese faculty. In this manner, Schwarzman Scholars also seems to be adopting a blended pedagogical style that includes regular student-professor feedback.

Another key aspect of the hybrid model is the mix of Chinese and international faculty.

At HNC, the faculty are 50% Chinese and 50% international. The faculty has also changed dramatically in 2006 on the introduction of the MA program. Now, faculty are required to stay for much longer periods of time that has created a much more cohesive core faculty. At DKU, the faculty are primarily on rotation from Duke University, and increasingly they aim to recruit in- !105 ternational faculty for permanent positions. At Schwarzman Scholars, faculty are 50% Chinese and 50% international. This mix of faculty is also reflected in the percentages of students at these institutions.

In all three case studies, this hybrid model also includes a mix of Chinese and international students. In the case of HNC and DKU, 50% of the students are Chinese and the other

50% are international students, primarily from the US. In the case of Schwarzman Scholars, only

20% of the students are Chinese, 45% are from the US, and 35% are from the rest of the world.

In all three cases, this high percentage of international students mixed with Chinese students creates a unique student life experience that contributes greatly to a unique model of education.

While DKU and Schwarzman Scholars are primarily English institutes, HNC is unique in having the Chinese students study in English and the international students study in Mandarin, further creating a unique environment for which they have become well known.

Rival Theories

The theoretical framework used in this thesis provides a useful analysis of these higher education institutions and how they are established, but it does not explain everything about these institutions. The four phases of establishing a joint-venture explains well the process of senior administrators from two universities partnering with each other, but it fails to explain the often times messy process of partnering between the multitude stakeholders that exist both within and outside these universities. Stakeholder theory, especially the ranking of influence of different stakeholders, does help explain much of this messiness by showing how universities prior- !106 itize relationships with particular stakeholders. However, there are significant limits to this perspective. The most difficult to reconcile is that the general public, who ultimately these institutions are designed to serve, is a largely excluded from any participation in the formation of these institutions, as they are largely formed by private US institutions and official Chinese institutions that do not incorporate public participation in decision-making. The closest representative in these institutions of the public are the students and their families, but as this research has demonstrated, they only have marginal influence in as much as they are willing (and able) to pay. Con- sequently, the theoretical framework used in this paper fails to accurate capture such incidents as

China's Democracy Protests in 1989 that threatened to permanently shut down HNC shorty after its establishment. Alternatively, two rival theories better capture this occurrence and significant other pieces of evidence gathered in this research. In particular, strong evidence exists that lend credibility to critical theories of global inequality and sexism.

Theories of how small cadres of global elites reinforce global inequality through their careful control of powerful institutions provide a particularly strong lens through which to understand these case studies. Each of these institutions is dominated by members of a social and economic elite. This is evident in the tuition necessary to attend them. For example, in the case of

DKU, tuition is roughly US $50,000 for international students that is comparable to the most expensive universities in the US. For Chinese students, the tuition is roughly half that for international students but still many times the annual income of a Chinese citizen. Elitism is also evident in the education backgrounds of the faculty, staff, and students who attend. Most are from top institutions in either the US or China. Furthermore, ties to elite governments and major multinational corporations are quite common. For example, the Dean of Schwarzman Scholar is !107 a former advisor to the Chinese government’s committee on financial policy, a highly elite economic policy position. Questions of favoritism in admissions are also raised by the inclusion in the first cohort of Schwarzman Scholars of the son of Advisory Board member John Thornton

(and former President of Goldman Sachs) who also is the Director of the Global Leadership Pro- gram at Tsinghua University. Furthermore, the distribution of international students in the program is extremely uneven. In the first cohort, for example, only four participants are from Africa

(Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya and Zimbabwe) out of nearly 40 applicants meant to represent every- where outside of the US and China..

A large amount of literature exists on how education reproduces social privilege while only allowing social mobility for a small number of select students (e.g. Morley and Aynsley

2007; Brennan and Naidoo 2008). This literature helps understand the ways in which definitions of quality at these joint-venture institutions and official institutions policies can exclude some groups of people from enjoying their benefits while fast-tracking other groups who already enjoy certain social privileges. Additionally, Kenway and Fahey (2014) look at how elite schools around the world have adapted to the forces of globalization in order maintain their privileged position. These joint-venture institutions are understandable as ways that elite institutions have attempted to remain relevant in the contemporary world. DKU fits this pattern as it was the brainchild of Duke University during an economic recession and budget crisis. Schwarzman

Scholars also fits this pattern as it allowed Blackstone to maintain access to the Chinese economy (Metzgar 2016). Moutsios (2014) has analyzed the processes by which international organizations have produced education policies around transnational education like that in China and concluded that market-based ideologies are the primary driving force in this process. Given the !108 massive increase in foreign education providers in China due to WTO regulations, including the case of DKU in this thesis, this perspective is relevant to this paper’s analysis.

A gendered lens also helps add a full understanding of the workings of these institutions.

Stromquist (1995) provide a feminist perspective of gender and power in education that looks at the key role of the state in shaping different opportunities for men and women. This perspective fits the evidence of the case studies in this thesis. Both Chinese and US faculty, staff, and students are predominately men. While there are particular examples of woman in positions of power in these institutions, they always report directly to positions occupied by men, and the statistics are decidedly one-sided. For example, the head of the Schwarzman Educational Founda- tion is a woman, as is the Chinese Vice Minister for Education who oversees higher education as well as the first Executive Vice Chancellor of DKU. However, Stephen Schwarzman (the name- sake of the Schwarzman Education Foundation), the Chinese Minister for Education, and the

Chancellor of DKU are all men. In HNC’s 30 year history, only one US co-director has ever been a woman (Kubler interview 2016). Only one Advisory Board member of Schwarzman Scholars is a woman, and only six of 18 members of the Academic Advisory Council are women. Addi- tionally, sixty-five percent of the first cohort of Schwarzman Scholars are men.

Feminist theory helps explain much of this inequality. Clear disparities exist for women as student, faculty, and staff in Chinese higher education (Guo, Tsang, and Ding 2010; Gaskell,

Eichler, Pan, Xu, and Zhang 2004; Cheung and Halpern 2010). Women are also marginalized in the ranks of US higher education. Despite large gains, women tend to be found predominately in middle management positions and not in top leadership positions (Cheung and Halpern 2010).

Additionally, research on the marginalized role of women in China’s economic transformation !109

(e.g. Cook and Dong 2011; West, Zhao, Chang, and Cheng 2016) could be adapted to shed light on the experience of cleaning and cooking staff at joint-venture institutions who tend to be predominately local women. While these conditions clearly reflect social injustice, they are not black and white. For example, after HNC’s 2006 expansion to its facilities, many of the previous cooking staff filled the ranks of the library staff (Kubler interview 2016). Consequently, HNC has provided an important source of job security for many local women who have been em- ployed for a decade or more, even if it has been it the institution’s bottom ranks.

The ability of these alternative theories to explain key characteristics of these institutions gives them credibility in explaining how these institutions fit within society more broadly. This credibility raises questions as to whether these joint-ventures are truly serving to better society or are reinforcing pressing social problems while simultaneously serving the interests of the small cadre of elites who have helped establish them. Rather than take the point of view that these institutions should not be established, this thesis provides a handful of practical recommendations to help these institutions work more effectively and incorporate the interests of otherwise marginalized stakeholders. 110!

Recommendations for Practice

There are four key takeaways from this research:

1) Conduct careful and extensive research before staring a joint venture institution. Research all

of the relevant stakeholders, not just the university partner. As all the cases in this study high-

light, unknowns can create significant delays and changes to the final outcome. Furthermore,

joint-ventures take years to establish and cost many millions of dollars before any revenues

are ever collected. Consequently, it is important to understand the situation as fully as possi-

ble before committing the time and resources into such an endeavor.

2) Develop a stakeholder culture where different actors recognize the limits of other partners

Bolton and Nie (2010). While this inevitably requires more time and can limit the results that

a particular stakeholder would like to achieve, it is essential to creating a successful partner-

ship. HNC is a testament to this approach. All decision-making is done through consensus,

and because of the differences in culture and institutional environment, building consensus is

often a painstakingly slow process. However, HNC has just celebrated its 30th anniversary

making it the oldest joint-venture education institution in China.

3) Effective evaluations are essential to the growth and healthy evolution of these institutions,

but evaluations can be extremely complicated and political to implement. Effective program

evaluations rely on an agreed upon definition of education quality, and different stakeholders

will have highly divergent views on what it means. An inability to conduct rigorous evalua-

tions can lead to nothing more than a self-congratulating effort without addressing real insti- !111

tutional issues or program evaluations simply not be implemented to avoid having to make

tough decisions. However, this paper offers a few recommendations to help in this area:

A. Start all programs off with a pilot program for a year or more, and conduct an im-

plementation evaluation after the end of this period. This process is evident in all

three cases covered in this thesis. Such a process will allow the institution to work

out the kinks in the program before scaling it to its full size.

B. Obtain buy-in from the leadership of the joint-venture before conducting an evalua-

tion. Within buy-in from them to do a thorough evaluation and follow the evidence

where it leads, program evaluations will ultimately be ineffective as they find resis-

tance from other stakeholders. Create a team of current joint-venture staff as well

as outside specialists to evaluate the program to eliminate bias.

C. Conduct regular student-teacher evaluations and make the results public. In the

case of HNC, they were implemented despite initial resistance from Chinese facul-

ty in making the results public to students (Lampton interview 2016). Student cri-

tiques of faculty are traditionally not acceptable in Chinese culture and are there-

fore difficult to implement. However, despite a number of remaining challenges,

student teacher evaluations are increasingly being accepted in Chinese higher edu-

cation (Dunrong and Fan 2009). Including this information is necessary for stu-

dents views to be included in decision-making in order to increase student satisfac-

tion.

4) Implement specific policies to create equal opportunity for marginalized segments of society

within these joint-ventures. Employ education professionals to improve equality in outcomes 112! in admissions, and enact specific policies to increase diversity in the leadership of these institutions. 113!

Conclusion

The largest fear in US-China relations comes from the historic fact that when a global hegemon is overtaken by another power, it generally leads to war. US-China relations, and especially international education between the two countries, is dominated by the idea of preventing war between these two countries. International education plays a key role in public diplomacy that is aimed at changing public opinion, and consequently policy, in US-China relations (Metz- gar 2016). While Chinese nationalists would like China to rise back to its historic place as the world’s leading civilization, the US does not want to lose its position as the most powerful nation in the world. These joint-venture institutions offer an opportunity to collaborate on a project together and to train others who will be able to collaborate in other areas in the future. Statements between these two nation’s leaders reflect this hopeful future, such as President Xi’s desire for building a “harmonious world” (Poole 2014) and President Obama’s insistence that “the United

States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China” (Tiezzi 2016).

However, in the process of establishing these joint-venture institutions, both countries still have agendas in mind as do the other stakeholders involved. China would like to transition economically to a knowledge economy while the US would like to see China become a responsible actor on the world stage. Chinese universities would like to increase their status within the country as well as globally. US universities are looking for new market opportunities in an attempt to stay relevant in a globalized 21st century world. Careful negotiations are required in order to meet the needs of all those involved in the process, and question are raised about wether the mission of these institutions to better society are necessarily compromised in the process. The 114! cases covered in this thesis provide several detailed examples of what this process is like in reality.

This thesis calls for research in several additional areas. One is the process and degree to which identify formation in these institutions effects nationalism. Students are likely to identify further with their country of origin but to what degree do these institutions encourage to also identify as part of a larger community? Additionally, to what degree do the different models of pedagogy found in these joint-ventures effect a students employability and their conception of citizenship? How do these elite joint-venture programs change traditional notions of leadership selection in China through their admissions criteria? Another area for further research is on how program evaluations for these institutions can be effectively implemented. Program evaluations must have all the stakeholders agree on the metrics for them to be effective, but how can consensus be built in a way that program evaluations do not simply become self-congratulatory reports and uncritical in areas that deservedly require changes? 115!

List of Interviews

Bullock, Mary. Former Executive Vice Chancellor, Duke Kunshan University. Member of Acad- emic Advisory Committee, Schwarzman Scholars. Interview by Lucas Olson. Phone interview, April 7, 2016.

Futrell, Chad. Executive Director of Student Life, Schwarzman Scholars. Interview by Lucas Ol- son. Personal interview. Beijing, China, June 15, 2016.

Gaulton, Richard. Former Co-Director, Hopkins-Nanjing Center. Interview by Lucas Olson. Per- sonal interview. Nanjing, China, June 18, 2016.

Goodman, Louis. Member of Academic Advisory Committee, Schwarzman Scholars. Interview by Lucas Olson. Personal interviews. Washington, DC. January-June, 2016.

Greeno, Paula. Associate Dean, Duke University Fuqua School of Business. Interview by Lucas Olson. Phone Interview, July 14, 2016.

Kubler, Cornelius. Co-Director, Hopkins Nanjing Center. Interview by Lucas Olson. Personal interviews. Nanjing, China, June 6-8, 2016.

Lampton, David. Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Ad- vanced International Studies. Interview by Lucas Olson. Personal interview. Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.

Moreton, Patrick. Associate Dean, Duke Kunshan University. Interview by Lucas Olson. Person- al interview. Kunshan, China. June 6, 2016.

Raufer, Roger. Professor, Hopkins Nanjing Center. Interview by Lucas Olson. Personal Inter- view. Nanjing, China. June 7, 2016.

Thrift, Nigel. Executive Director, Schwarzman Scholars Program. Interview by Lucas Olson. Personal Interview, Beijing, China, June 14, 2016. 116!

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