“#Itsmydam”: An analysis of Ethiopian and Egyptian discourses surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
ELOISE FREIIN VON GIENANTH
Image source: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190803-egypt-hands-ethiopia-its-vision-of-renaissance-dam/
Eloise von Gienanth
August 2020
MSc International Development Studies
Student number: 12768766
University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Tefera Negash Gebregziabher
Second reader: Dr. Yves van Leynseele
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 8
1.1 BACKGROUND ...... 8
1.2 RELEVANCE AND OBJECTIVES ...... 9
1.3 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS...... 11
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE ...... 12
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 12
2.1 HEGEMONY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY ...... 13
2.2 HYDRO-POLITICS ...... 14
2.3 HYDRO-HEGEMONY ...... 16
2.4 A DAM AT THE EPICENTER OF COUNTER-(HYDRO-)HEGEMONY? ...... 20
2.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNTER-HYDRO-HEGEMONY ...... 21
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ...... 23
3.1 UNITS OF ANALYSIS ...... 23
3.2 RESEARCH LOCATION...... 24
3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS ...... 25
3.3.1 Semi-structured in-depth interviews ...... 25
3.3.2 Focus group ...... 26
3.4 SAMPLING...... 26
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS ...... 27
3.6 RESEARCH ETHICS AND POSITIONALITY ...... 28
3.7 QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH ...... 28
Trustworthiness ...... 29
Authenticity ...... 30
3.8 OTHER LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH ...... 31
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALIZING THE NILE DISPUTE ...... 32
4.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NILE ...... 32 2 4.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORKS...... 34
4.3 THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM ...... 36
CHAPTER 5: THE GERD IN EGYPT ...... 38
5.1 COERCIVE COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS ...... 40
5.2 NORMATIVE COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS ...... 40
5.3 HEGEMONIC COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS ...... 41
a) Securitization ...... 41
b) Knowledge construction ...... 43
c) Sanctioned discourse ...... 43
CHAPTER 6: THE GERD IN ETHIOPIA ...... 45
6. 1 DECONSTRUCTION ...... 45
6.2 CONSTRUCTION ...... 47
6.2.1 Socio-economic development ...... 48
6.2.3 International support ...... 51
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS ...... 52
7.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...... 52
7.2 THEORETICAL REFLECTION ...... 55
7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ...... 56
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 56
3 Abstract
Despite the popularity of the hydro-hegemony framework in transboundary water-conflict analysis, counter-hegemonic strategies in river basin contexts have not yet been sufficiently explored. This study aims to address these gaps by exploring the counter-hegemonic discourses that Ethiopia has employed against Egypt alongside its construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The study thereby makes use of a critical hydro-politics lens under consideration of Gramsci’s work on counter-hegemony. Using content analysis of Ethiopian, Egyptian and international media items and semi-structured interviews with governmental actors and citizens, this study examines how these discourses impact Ethio-Egyptian relations. Results show which narratives Egypt has circulated to maintain its presumed hegemony over the Nile, namely securitization, referring to its ‘historical’ legal rights, and framing Ethiopia as deliberately taking unilateral measures to threaten its water supply. Ethiopia contests these claims and constructs own narratives to gather support for the GERD by framing it as central to the country’s socio-economic development, linking national pride to the Dam and creating positive sum-outcomes for other riparians. Results moreover show that these discourses are informed by each respective countries’ geopolitical interests, such as creating national unity amidst domestic struggles. Both countries further use notions of ‘cooperation’ to pursue their goal of maintaining or gaining power over the waters of the Nile. Lastly, some of the weaknesses of the hydro-hegemony framework are shown.
Keywords: Ethiopia, Egypt, hydro-politics, hydro-hegemony, water governance, transboundary water conflict
4
Acknowledgements
This year certainly presented challenges to us that went far beyond of what we had anticipated. Fortunately, I have been able to count on numerous people that supported me during this time. First, I want to thank Dr. Tefera Negash Gebregziabher for his continued guidance, understanding and valuable feedback throughout the process of writing this thesis. I can sincerely say that I have learnt a lot from these insights. I would like to thank Dr. Yves van Leynseele for acting as my second reader. Furthermore, I want to sincerely thank all the kind people in Addis Ababa, and especially at Addis Ababa University, without whom this thesis would not have been possible. Both those who directly participated in this study and those who brought me in touch with relevant individuals were of tremendous help during my stay in Addis.
I would like to thank my parents, to whom I owe my deepest gratitude for their support during my studies. To Carlo and his family, as well as to Sofia and Chiara: Thank you all, not only for providing me with space during the writing process, but for making me feel at home (and for all the fun self-isolation nights!).
5 List of abbreviations
DoP – Declaration of Principles
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GERD – Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HAD – High Aswan Dam
IPoE – International Panel of Experts
METEC – Metals & Engineering Cooperation of Ethiopia
NBI – Nile Basin Initiative
SGCC – State Grid of China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Co.
USBR – United States Bureau of Reclamation
6 List of figures
Figure 1: Forms of Interaction over Transboundary Water Resources
Figure 2: Water resource control strategies and tactics
Figure 3: The ‘pillars’ of hydro-hegemony
Figure 4: The ‘circle of hydro-hegemony’
Figure 5: Conceptual scheme of counter-hydro-hegemony
7 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The Nile river has been an essential component in the political, economic and cultural shaping of all its eleven riparian nations. With increasing population growth and climate-change related risks such as desertification, deforestation and soil loss, these nations’ dependence on its waters have rapidly increased. Riparian relations have moreover been strained since the announcement of the unilateral construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in 2011 (Gebreluel, 2014, 25). The $4.7 billion hydro-electric power dam has caused considerable controversy and tensions, possibly permanently altering relations in the Horn of Africa.
For Ethiopia, from where 86% of the Blue Nile originates, the project promises socio- economic development and has become a symbol of national prestige. Although the country has shown comparatively high GDP growth rates since the beginning of the millennium, approximately 70% of its population still do not have access to electricity (Worldbank, 2018). The GERD, whose supposed projected capacity is 6,000 megawatts, could double national electricity production and promises to solidify Ethiopia’s role as the biggest power exporter of the African continent upon its completion (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 17; Gebreluel, 2014, 25). As Ethiopia’s population has just reached 110 million, the GERD is hoped to ensure increased energy production, agricultural irrigation and economic growth (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 15). Increased energy production would both provide electricity to the millions of households currently living in the dark and enable Ethiopia to sell power to neighboring countries similarly struggling with power shortages. The Dam has furthermore become a symbol of national pride amongst Ethiopians, who contributed to its financing by buying bonds through a lottery (Tesfaye, 2016).
Down-stream riparian Egypt has been the most vigorous opponent to the Dam. As it relies on the Nile for approximately 90% of its water supply, Egyptian leaders have claimed the project might drastically reduce the Nile’s flow, potentially leading to water shortages down- stream. Egypt, which has been considered the more powerful riparian for centuries, and whose population has just reached 100 million (World Bank, 2020), is projected to face increasing water scarcity in coming years (World Economic Forum, 2019). Egyptian politicians such as its Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation have claimed that Egypt could lose up to one million jobs and billions in economic production annually in the case of drought (BBC, 2018).
8 Since the establishment of the GERD project, its construction has therefore been vehemently contested by Egypt. Studies on the Dam’s impact have shown that, depending on the speed with which the Dam is filled, it can likely be operated without significantly harming Egypt’s water supply (German Bundestag, 2020). The contentions thus do not merely represent a fight over natural resources, but the culmination of competing geopolitical interests.
The Dam has been considered a game-changer for the region not only because of its projected electricity production, but because it is believed to, as argued by some scholars, challenge Egypt’s hegemony over the waters of the Nile (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 444; Cascão, 2009, 248; Tawfik Amer, 2015, 6; Gebreluel, 2014, 32). This hegemony has been maintained through various factors, such as Egypt’s relative political and economic power, as well as its proclaimed “historical rights”; these are based on the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters. The Agreement bestowed Egypt and the Sudan, but no other riparian state, with legal rights over water allocation of the River Basin while prohibiting upstream countries from developing infrastructure on the Nile (Turton, 2000; Cascão, 2009; Tawfik Amer, 2015). Up until the construction of the GERD, this supposed hegemony was hardly challenged. It has thus been argued that Ethiopia has moved from ‘veiled’ to ‘overt’ contest of Egypt’s hegemony over the Nile by constructing the GERD (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 12).
The two countries’ relations have been moving along the lines of conflict and cooperation for over a decade. Both Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Egyptian counterpart President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have alternated between war-mongering and seemingly peaceful rhetoric. The topic has evoked strong reactions in both countries, with large- scale online campaigns either supporting or contesting the Dam’s construction. In this context, it is important to examine the narratives Ethiopia has created to contest Egypt’s presumed hegemony over the waters of the Nile, and how it has attempted to increase its own influence in this dynamic.
1.2 RELEVANCE AND OBJECTIVES
This research makes use of a critical hydro-politics lens to examine the discourses that have been circulated both within Ethiopia and Egypt and to assess how the narratives affect Ethio-Egyptian relations. Critically examining these narratives is important in several respects:
9 The Nile basin countries have a combined population of close to 500 million people who are dependent on its waters (Nile Basin Water Resources Atlas, 2017). Tensions between its most populous and powerful states, Ethiopia and Egypt, can permanently alter political configurations in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the GERD is a central component of Ethiopia’s national development plan, which is hoped to lift its population out of poverty. As both countries are struggling with domestic turmoil, achieving socio-economic development or, as Egypt claims, losing sufficient water supply, could become a decisive factor for the future of the two states. Public mass media further has incomparable impact on the perception of these hydro-political dynamics, both among citizens and international actors. Examining the narratives that have been created within mass media is important to understand the GERD’s impact on Ethio-Egyptian relations. Furthermore, as this topic is so timely, not much literature has been published on the media depiction of the GERD in both countries and in international media. The societal relevance of this study is therefore undeniable.
To analyze Ethiopian and Egyptian discourses, this research will moreover make use of the framework of hydro-hegemony. This framework has attained considerable popularity among scholars of transboundary water conflict. The hydro-hegemony framework posits that states rarely resort to ‘water wars’, not because they prefer cooperation, but because of power imbalances between riparian states; non-hegemonic states are therein assumed to comply with hegemonic orders as they are discouraged by the hydro-hegemon’s superior power position. Ethiopia has been claimed to challenge Egypt’s hydro-hegemony by constructing the GERD. Counter-hegemonic strategies in river basin contexts have so far been under-researched (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 454). This study will thus contribute to the academic literature by critically examining Ethiopia’s assumed counter-hegemonic strategies in the Nile Basin. Application of the frameworks in addition makes evident some of the strengths and weaknesses of the hydro-hegemony framework.
Due to the plethora of aspects that play into the hydro-political dynamics in the Nile Basin, an important step to take is to precisely define the scope of this study. The impact of the GERD on Ethio-Egyptian relations occurs at different levels: political, economic and social. Actors involved range from governments, non-governmental actors to media and citizen-level. Ethio-Egyptian relations are furthermore informed by the two state’s relations with other riparians, such as Sudan. Both states each enjoy support from external actors, such as the Arab League (in the case of Egypt), China and a number of different donors around the globe. In addition, there have been several factors that have impacted negotiations between Ethiopia,
10 Egypt and the Sudan on the filling of the GERD. An example of this are the talks between the three nations hosted by the United States and the World Bank in Washington D.C. from 2019 to 2020. Analyzing all these complexities would by far exceed the scope of this study. Therefore, this research uses the hydro-hegemony and counter-hydro-hegemony frameworks as a lens to analyze popular narratives within Egyptian, Ethiopian and international media items in the English language published between February 2018 and April 2020.
1.3 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS
The research will answer the following research question and sub-questions:
How do the narratives that Ethiopia and Egypt have created in relation to the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam affect existing relations between Ethiopia and Egypt?1
SQ 1. What narratives in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are Ethiopia and Egypt using to increase their power and influence over the waters of the Nile?
SQ 2. What are the points of contention and cooperation between Ethiopia and Egypt?
SQ 3. How is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam framed within Ethiopia’s political economy, who creates these narratives and how is it perceived by Ethiopians?
1 The research question and sub-question 1 were changed due to the challenges presented by the Sars- CoV-2 outbreak. Initially, the research question was ‘How do Ethiopia’s strategies of water governance in relation to the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam affect existing relations between Ethiopia and Egypt?’. As not enough interviews could be conducted due to the pandemic, the methodological focus shifted towards content analysis of media items (see Chapter 3: Methodology). Therefore, the research question was changed to focus on popular narratives circulated within media of both countries.
11 1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework derived from literature relevant to this study and provides the conceptual framework through which the case study will be analyzed. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used for this study, such as the data collection and analysis methods. Chapter 4 will then provide important contextual information on the historical formation of riparian relations on the Nile, the legal frameworks that have shaped riparian relations on the Nile, and a brief timeline of the GERD’s construction. The following chapters 5 and 6 will present the findings of this research. Chapter 6 first apply the hydro-hegemony framework on Egypt. Then, the narratives on the GERD that have been circulated by Egyptian media will therein be critically analyzed followed by an application of the counter-hydro- hegemony framework on Ethiopia’s case. Chapter 7 entails conclusions and theoretical reflections and answers the main research question, as well as providing suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter investigates the theoretical literature by focusing on the conceptualizations on hegemony and hydro-politics. The chapter mainly draws on Gramsci’s work on counter- hegemony and the literature on hydro-hegemony, from which a framework of counter-hydro- hegemony is developed as a conceptual apparatus to guide the research process. As counter- hegemony could be exercised on many different levels and spheres, this study focusses on the aspects of ideational power as mentioned in the hydro-hegemony framework. At the same time, it incorporates Gramsci’s idea of a ‘war of position’, therein assuming a ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’, as discussed below. Counter-hegemonic strategies in river basin contexts have so far been under-researched and “explicit consideration of the non- hegemonic actor(s) offers valuable insights into the process and outcome of transboundary water interaction” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010, 28). By combining Gramsci’s work with the hydro-hegemony framework, this study uniquely presents a framework through which to study transboundary water conflict.
The chapter is structured as follows: The first section discusses Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony and counter-hegemony. The second section examines the understanding of the concepts of water governance and hydro-politics that provide the basis of
12 the framework. The last section connects the concepts by presenting the counter-hydro- hegemony framework, as well as discussing the research gaps that this study addresses.
2.1 HEGEMONY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY
Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony is concerned with explaining the survival of capitalist class rule. He observed that the ruling classes’ power is maintained either through domination or hegemony, the former is coercive, the latter is consensual. Concluding that the bourgeoisie maintains its power by organizing consent rather than force, he raised the question of what the most appropriate strategy for a proletarian revolution would be under these conditions (Im, 1991, 124-24). Gramsci’s examination of how the bourgeoisie maintains their power through political, economic and ideological organization has led to two common interpretations. Some literature suggests that this occurs on an ideological level, such as via mass indoctrination. Others in turn have emphasized the material basis of hegemony, referring to the necessity of certain economic conditions for the creation of hegemony (Hall, 1991, 6; Im, 1991, 124). These interpretations have been expanded by explanations on the inter-relatedness of these different spheres, specifically on how economic leadership within society leads to ideological and political leadership - to organize consent among the subordinate class, its member have to validate bourgeois ideology in their everyday lives (Hall et al., 1977, 53). This requires the formation of ideological unity, which can only be achieved when the ruling class represents the universal interests of the entire society and realizes them on a material level (Przworski, 1980, 24; Im, 1991, 126, 132-33). The economic base must therein be structured in the following way: to maintain the proletariat’s consent and the necessary investment to reproduce the capitalist mode of reproduction, the ruling class has to make some sacrifices as to realize the subordinate classes’ interests (Jones, 2006, 47-48; Przeworski, 1980, 30; Im, 1991, 130). This compromise can on the other hand not touch the nucleus of the bourgeoisie’s economic activity, so that the capitalist mode of production can continuously be reproduced (Jones, 2006, 47-49; Im, 1991, 128-29). Thus, the ideological superstructure has to be compatible with the economic structure. A hegemonic phase then occurs at the passage from (economic) structure to (ideational) superstructure (Im, 1991, 130). The hegemonic system is to be understood as a historical bloc comprised of political, ideological and economic spheres, as a “complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble” (Gramsci, 1977, as quoted in Im, 1991, 136; Hall, 1991, 7). Gramsci then sees the state as pivotal in this relation, as its role is to
13 maintain favorable conditions for the previously described compromise between dominant and subordinate classes (Hall, 1991, 6; Im, 1991, 134-35).
Gramsci considered hegemony to be always constructed and contested by alternative hegemony (Hall, 1991, 5; Hall et al., 1977; Im, 1991, 142). As he himself has not explicitly written on counter-hegemony due to prison censorship, the concept has been interpreted in different ways. Some scholars under previously explained materialist interpretations have emphasized the difficulties of establishing counter-hegemony within the existing capitalist system. Others have argued that counter-hegemony can be established through the ideological or cultural rise of anti-capitalist forces (Im, 1991, 126). Gramsci asserted the “need to construct a new intellectual and moral order, that is, a new type of society and hence the need to develop more universal concepts and more refined and decisive ideological weapons” (Gramsci, 1977, 388). This order, constructed by the counter-hegemonic bloc led by the proletariat, needs to be established before winning governmental power. Counter-hegemony is thus seen not as another hegemonic order, but as ideological, political and economic preparations for overthrowing capitalism or bourgeois hegemony (Hall, 1991, 7; Im, 1991, 142). These preparations must firstly include the dismantling of the bourgeois historical bloc, which is comprised of its economic base and the ideological superstructure. At the same time, a new alternative bloc that allows for the abolishment of the capitalist mode of production must be established (Hall, 1991, 7; Im, 1991, 142). The emphasis here lay in the latter’s construction, not the mere destruction of capitalism. Such destruction alone, which Gramsci referred to as a ‘war of movement’, might not be fruitful under the constraints of bourgeois rule. Therefore, he considered a ‘war of position’, a “dialectic of destruction and construction”, the most appropriate strategy (Im, 1991, 143; Hall, 1991, 7). The proletariat must thus destruct the bourgeoisie’s economic and political base by constructing its own economic and political base, and its historical bloc has to be disarticulated through the articulation of a proletarian historical bloc (Hall, 1991, 3; Im, 1991, 143-44). This notion of a ‘war of position’ will provide the lens through which this study examines Ethiopia’s tactics in contesting Egypt’s presumed hegemonic position on the Nile.
2.2 HYDRO-POLITICS
This study was conducted with an understanding of water not merely as a natural resource, but also highly political and social. Much of the scientific literature on the topic has historically been dominated by a narrow field of disciplines, such as economics, international 14 law or engineering (Blatter, Ingram and Doughman, 2000, 32; Sneddon and Fox, 2006, 182). This has led to a tendency to analyze hydro-politics on the level of inter-state relations. One of the first definitions of hydro-politics was for example “a systematic study of the nature and conduct of conflict and cooperation between states over transboundary water resources” (Elhance, 2000, 202). Hydro-politics in the Nile Basin in particular have been noted to “very clearly highlight the complex historical interplay of colonial legacies, superpower rivalry in the Cold War era, interstate relations, and domestic politics in shaping and circumscribing inter- state conflict and cooperation over transboundary water resources” (Elhance, 1999, 54). Other literature places water within the context of environmental issues, with resource scarcity potentially triggering conflict (Turton, 2000, 14; Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Postel, 2000; Homer- Dixon, 1994). Water has been noted to have characteristics that make it particularly prone to conflict - it is scarce, it’s unevenly distributed, it is of primary importance and it is being shared (Frey, 1993). Water has also been embedded in the field of cultural studies literature, and notably within the field of security studies (Turton, 2002, 15; Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1998).
Although this study does focus on inter-state conflict, it recognizes the multi-scalar character of hydro-political dynamics, such as non-state actors. Further, it will enrich the current canon of hydro-political literature through application of Gramsci’s conceptualization of counter-hegemony. There are a number of points that should be taken into consideration by students of hydro-politics. As transboundary rivers by their nature do not respect national boundaries, they create complex webs of hydro-political, economic and security interdependencies, confronting states with a number of dilemmas (Elhance, 2000, 203). These interdependencies can hinder state’s ability to unilaterally pursue its interests, be it national security or sovereignty, territorial integrity, domestic stability or economic growth (Elhance, 2000, 206). Such complexities can be amplified in river basins, as they can be seen as crucial for competing interests such as environmental conservation, livelihood resources and economic development (Sneddon and Fox, 2006, 182). As water is vital for a plethora of aspects, be it the maintenance of ecosystems, food production or national security, it is difficult to measure what constitutes ‘legitimate’ demands. As Waterbury puts it, “riparian claims typically combine incommensurables: human survival, economic growth and national security” (Waterbury, 1997, 281). Questions on the distribution of water can be considered practical as well as political, as “the (historical) accumulation of water shapes both access and authority, with differences in access to water in turn co-shaping social identities and forms of citizenship” (Zwarteveen et al., 2017, 4-6). Studying water distribution must therefore not only focus on the biophysical distribution of water, but can also involve the distribution of voice and authority on water 15 resources. It thus requires not only an examination of quantities of water, but also of the laws and norms that have shaped water access; as well as the distribution of water-related risks, such as pollution, contamination and water pressure (Zwarteveen et al., 2017, 7; Dinar, 2000, 380). Further, it requires consideration of the norms through which different actors are able to exercise agency and justify their actions, as unequal water distributions are part of broader structures of social, economic and political dominance unique to each basin (Zwarteveen et al., 2017, 7; Elhance, 2000, 202).
2.3 HYDRO-HEGEMONY
Previously described literature often stems from an understanding of water as a source of conflict or cooperation and has consequently predicted ‘water wars’. Research in recent years has shown that despite such predictions, states rarely resort to going to war over water resources (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 446; Wolf, 2004). The hydro-hegemony framework posits that states do not refrain from ‘water wars’ because they cooperate but because of power imbalances between riparian states. Tawfik Amer thus considers its key contribution “not the explanation of transboundary hydro-political interactions by reference to power, but it is the illustration of how this power is exercised” (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 4). The absence of ‘water wars’ is explained through non-hegemonic states’ compliance with hegemonic orders as they are discouraged by the hegemon’s superior power position. Further, Zeitoun and Warner emphasize that “the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict”, as silent water conflicts often underlie apparent ‘cooperation’ (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 436). In the hydro-politics of the Nile, the concept of hydro-hegemony has previously been explored by authors such as Williams (2002:1192), who posits that “downstream Egypt's interest in cultivating a hydrological hegemony to coerce upstream-state co-operation in preserving its extant water uses stems precisely from fear of being unable to free-ride on future upstream storage”. The first systematic analysis of the theory was then established by Zeitoun and Warner (2006).
16 To establish the hydro-hegemony framework, Zeitoun and Warner have combined Frey’s (1993) and Yoffe et al.’s (2001) work into one coherent framework. Frey has explored the political context of conflict and cooperation in river basin contexts by establishing a model of conflict-potential. It is therein assumed that three elements are decisive for the eruption of a ‘water war’. These are the water’s or hydro-project’s importance to the nation, its relative military power and its riparian position (Frey, 1993, 66-67). Conflict is defined here as “when an actor attempts to exert power over another actor to overcome that actor’s perceived blockage of the first actor’s goals and faces significant resistance” (Frey, 1993, 66). The framework leads the author to conclude that the most stable riparian relations will be achieved when the upstream nation is the most powerful and has little interest in utilizing the water. Conflict might arise when both up- and downstream nations are interested in the water while the downstream nation is the most powerful (Frey, 1993, 66-67). Yoffe et al. have brought an alternative contribution to the field with the identification of historical indicators of freshwater conflict and cooperation (Yoffe et al., 2001). The authors established variables within a database of historical water- related events, such as government type, basin water stress, climate or spatial proximity. The results have shown that no single indicator could accurately explain water conflict by itself. The most relevant indicators for water conflict were rapid changes in institutional or physical changes such as internationalization or large dams (Yoffe et al., 2001).
Figure 1: Forms of Interaction over Transboundary Water Resources, adopted from Zeitoun and Warner (2006).
Applying the concept of hegemony in river basin contexts, Zeitoun and Warner distinguish between three possible situations that arise from different riparian relations (see Figure 1). When some sort of cooperation exists, control can be shared. Alternatively, it can be consolidated (in the hegemon’s favor), or contested, when riparian states compete over the water resources. A ‘positive hydro-hegemony’ emerges when riparian states share the water, which leads to the most stable situation. Situations of contested control, ‘negative hydro- hegemony’, would lead to instability among riparian nations (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 444).
17 The following stylized figure adopted from Zeitoun and Warner (2006) summarizes the strategies and tactics used by hydro-hegemons to achieve consolidated control, which are explained in the following section.
Consolidated Goal control
(A)Resource capture Strategies (B)Containment (C)Integration (1)Military Force (2)Covert Actions
(3)Coercion-pressure Tactics (4)Active Stalling (5)Incentives (6)Treaties (7)Securitization (8)Knowledge construction (9)Sanctioning the discourse
Coercive Resources International Support - Financial mobilization - riparian position
Figure 2: Water resource control strategies and tactics, adopted from Zeitoun and Warner (2006).
Drawing on the work of Lustick (2002), the authors distinguish between three different tactics states use to achieve their desired outcomes in transboundary river basins. They may resort to ‘resource capture’(A) in the form of land annexation, land acquisition or the construction of large hydraulic plants. Alternatively, they may make use of ‘containment strategies’(B) by integrating its competitors or contain them through utilitarian, normative, coercive or hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms. Lastly, the integration strategy (C) entails seeking compliance from co-riparians by offering incentives, which then results in more equitable distribution of water resources and hence shared control (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 445-46). To carry out these strategies, the hegemon can rely on several tactics such as military force, which is not commonly used in conflict over water resources, or covert action such as political undercover operations. Alternatively, it may exercise pressure or coercion through political threats (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 446-47). A riparian state could also use ‘utilitarian compliance-producing mechanisms’ by offering incentives to its co-riparians. Another tactic the authors have distinguished is the hydro-hegemon’s ability to institutionalize their power position through the use of treaties that work in their favor (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 447). 18 Lastly, the hydro-hegemony framework entails ‘hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms’. Such mechanism could be used by the hegemon in the form of securitization of water issues, thus silencing counter-hegemonic voices by creating the belief that the issue is a matter of national security. Further, discourse may be sanctioned; knowledge can therein by constructed, deeming discourse in the hegemon’s favor politically acceptable and counter- hegemonic discourse unacceptable. Consequently, certain aspects of riparian relations can be emphasized, while other aspects are concealed (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 448-49).
A riparian state’s ability to use these tactics and strategies is determined by its relative power. Such power can be its geographical position and its material power. The latter includes international support, and its ability to mobilize financing (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 449- 450). Apart from these, a state can “level the rules of the game” through its bargaining and ideational power (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010, 31-32). Bargaining power refers to the leverage power or ability to define political parameters of negotiations, and depends on relations between the concerned parties. Further, a riparian state can create narratives, storylines, or knowledge structures and impose sanctioned discourse to control perceptions on transboundary waters within its own country and across borders, which is referred to as ideational power. This power can for example be used for securitization of water conflict (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010, 32).
Bargaining Power • 1st dimension (military/ economic) Exploitation • 2nd dimension potential (active Ri parian position stalling/ • Infrastructure incentives) • Tech. capacity • 3rd dimension Material (incl. (securitization Ideational riparian /sanctioned position) discourse)
Figure 3: The ‘pillars’ of hydro-hegemony, adopted Figure 4: The ‘circle of hydro-hegemony’, from Zeitoun and Warner (2006). adopted from Menga (2016).
Zeitoun and Warner had presented the different forms of power in the form of ‘pillars’ (Figure 3). The different spheres in which hydro-hegemons are presumed to base their power
19 (material, bargaining and ideational) are shown as three separate pillars. Menga has since suggested a reconceptualization of this design (Figure 4). Instead of separate ‘pillars’, Menga’s circle of hydro-hegemony emphasizes the inter-relatedness of the different types of power in river basins (Menga, 2016, 410). This inter-relatedness is important to consider, as a riparian might for example only be able to make use of its riparian position when it possesses sufficient bargaining power. This contribution is thus valuable to the context of this study and has thus inspired the conceptual scheme (see conceptual scheme).
The next section puts the various but interrelated theoretical discussions on hegemony, counter- hegemony, and power relations in the context of transboundary rivers through what I termed a ‘counter-hydro-hegemony framework’. Such a framework is applied to investigate the hydro-politics of the Nile in the context of the GERD in Ethio-Egyptian relations.
2.4 A DAM AT THE EPICENTER OF COUNTER-(HYDRO-)HEGEMONY?
This thesis investigates the politics of the Nile with specific reference to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the way Ethiopia portrays the Dam project and how this plays out among the riparian states. The hydro-hegemony framework is applied to examine the narratives being circulated by Egypt to maintain its presumed hegemonic position over the Nile. The counter-hegemonic conceptualization is then used to examine the presumed counter-hegemonic narratives that have been created by Ethiopia. Gramsci had in mind a counter-hegemonic strategy of ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’, which implies the necessity to articulate Egypt’s ‘historic bloc’ through the articulation of a new, Ethiopian bloc. Under this assumption, this thesis closely examines Ethiopia’s strategies of ‘construction’ and ‘deconstruction’. Inter-state relations and Ethiopia’s assumed counter-hegemonic strategies are complex and occur at various different levels. To facilitate the process, this study focuses on aspects of ideational power. This aspect in particular has to be explored since out of the different forms of power within the hydro-hegemony framework, ideational power relates most to what Gramsci had in mind in his work on hegemony. Deconstruction is thus assumed to entail the contestation of Egyptian narratives surrounding the Nile, while construction relates to the construction of Ethiopian counter-hegemonic narratives. Important contributions to this have been made for example by Cascão (2008), who have previously examined Ethiopia’s counter- hegemonic strategies on the Nile. This thesis will add to existing literature by closely examining
20 the narratives Ethiopia has created in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam under consideration of Gramsci’s work.
2.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNTER-HYDRO-HEGEMONY
The conceptual scheme of counter-hydro-hegemony combines the hydro-hegemony framework and Gramsci’s idea of a dialectic of construction and deconstruction into one coherent framework. The three spheres on which both the hydro-hegemon and counter- hegemon base their power (ideational power, bargaining power and material power) are shown as inter-related. This formation, inspired by Menga’s circle of hydro-hegemony, makes evident the way in which these three types of power mutually reinforce each other. The framework will be used in the following way: firstly, the hydro-hegemonic tactics presumed to be used by Egypt through its ideational power is analyzed. Second, the tactics that Ethiopia is presumed to be using with its ideational power, namely the ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’ is analyzed.
The conceptual framework developed here is relevant in the following respects. Firstly, the hydro-hegemony framework centers power imbalances at the center of transboundary water conflict. Gramsci’s work on counter-hegemony adds an interesting lens through which to study the narratives Ethiopia and Egypt have created to increase their power in the Nile Basin. Secondly, not only the academic literature but many interviewees during the fieldwork of this study as well as several media outlets have directly referred to Egypt as the ‘hegemon’ of the Nile waters. As this framing seemed prevalent among study participants, it makes sense to include it in the theoretical framework.
21 Figure 5: Conceptual scheme of counter-hydro-hegemony
22 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
This research relies on qualitative methods as it pays particular attention to the meanings that participants ascribe to their environment, such as the socio-cultural and historical significance of the Nile River Basin and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Qualitative research allows the researcher to “see through the eyes of the people being studied”, which allows for a deeper understanding of the socio-historical context in which the relevant events occur (Bryman, 2012, 399). Initially, the focus of the research methodology were in-depth interviews with governmental and non-governmental actors, researchers and citizens. Unfortunately, the data collection was hampered by a range of issues. Firstly, as the topic of this research is highly politically sensitive, finding suitable participants proved to be difficult. When reaching out to different organizations and international actors, several replied that they could not provide me with an interview opportunity due to the chosen topic. In personal conversations with Ethiopians, I was told that officials, as well as citizens in general, may not want to talk about the issues at hand due to its sensitivity, or be suspicious of me as a foreign researcher. I was therefore advised to build a network of respondents who would bring me in contact with further participants. Building a network of respondents took time and unfortunately, the outbreak of SARS-CoV-19 during our data collection phase forced me to leave the field several weeks earlier than planned. As I had several interviews with important actors, such as the Nile Basin Initiative planned, the amount of primary data collected is smaller than initially intended. Therefore, the focus of the research methodology shifted from in-depth interviews to the qualitative content analysis of Ethiopian, Egyptian and international media items. The primary data collected in interviews and focus groups will be supplemented and triangulated with content analysis of media items from Ethiopian, Egyptian and international news outlets.
3.1 UNITS OF ANALYSIS
While recognizing the multi-scalar character of hydro-politics, this study focusses on inter-state relations. The unit of analysis is therefore Ethio-Egyptian relations, and the political and power dynamics between the two states.
23 3.2 RESEARCH LOCATION
The data of this study was collected in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa2. Although I initially planned to visit the GERD itself, which is located close to the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, this idea soon proved unfeasible. This was due to the fact that special permissions are required to visit the Dam site, which are difficult to obtain. Therefore, all interviews were conducted in the capital, as most relevant organizations and actors reside there.
Ethiopia, located in the Horn of Africa, has a rapidly growing population of approximately 110 million, making it the second most populous country of the African continent (CIA, 2020). Moreover, it is considered the only country on the continent that has never been colonized by Europeans (Hart, 2016). Although Italy has attempted to invade the country in the 1890s and again in the 1930s, the Italians were ultimately defeated by Ethiopia. Ethiopia is now a federal parliamentary republic, and notably works under ethnic federalism. The population is comprised of over 80 ethnic groups, of which approximately 34% are of the Oromo group, 27% are of Amhara descent, 6% are Somali and 6% are Tigrayan (Council of Foreign Relations, 2018).
Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister since 2018, has undertaken numerous reforms since the start of his term in office. These reforms reached from a liberalization of the economy, ending a state of emergency, releasing political prisoners to ending its border-conflict with Eritrea (Deutsche Welle, 2020; The Economist, 2019). One of the fastest growing economies of the world and the fastest growing in the region, Ethiopia’s GDP is mainly accounted for by its industry, including construction and services (World Bank, 2019). The government aims to reach lower-middle- income status in 2025 through its Growth and Transformation Plan, which focusses mainly on expanding its manufacturing and agricultural sectors (National Planning Commission, 2016). As 70% of its population still lacks access to electricity (World Bank, 2018), the government moreover aims to provide hydro-power to its entire population by constructing the GERD. The Dam is at the same time hoped to solidify Ethiopia’s role as the biggest power exporter of the African continent (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 17; Gebreluel, 2014, 25).
Although his reforms have gained Abiy international praise and even a Nobel-peace prize, his popularity within the country has since been contested. Ethiopia not only struggles with a
2 For map of Ethiopia, see Appendix 4.
24 lack of jobs for its rapidly growing youth population, but particularly with conflict between ethnic groups. These conflicts, partly resulting in violent clashes, have also led a reduction of its economic growth rate (World Bank, 2019). The long-awaited elections in the country set for August 2020 were postponed due to the outbreak of Covid-19 (Reuters, 2020).
3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS
To further understand the narratives that have been created within Ethiopia and Egypt, this has made use of qualitative content analysis. In contrast to quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis enables more fine-grained analysis of and sensitivity to the content and context of themes (Bryman, 2012, 553). As Hsie and Shannon posit:
“qualitative content analysis goes beyond merely counting words to examining language intensely for the purpose of classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories that represent similar meanings […] qualitative content analysis is defined as a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsie and Shannon, 2015, 1278).
The purpose of the content analysis was therefore to capture prominent narratives surrounding the GERD, the Nile and Ethio-Egyptian relations within Ethiopian, Egyptian and international media. Following a large-scale review of publicly available news items, thirty articles most relevant to understanding how the GERD is framed in both Ethiopia, Egypt and international media in the time frame from February 2018 and April 2020 were selected (for list of these media items, see Appendix 2). Within each category of items (ten Ethiopian, ten Egyptian and ten international items), different popular news outlets provided insights into popular framings of the GERD and Ethio-Egyptian relations.
3.3.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS
Semi-structured in-depth interviews with relevant actors were moreover conducted to gain insights into inter-state relations and the significance of the GERD. Interviewees included
25 a foreign diplomat, a student from the University of Addis Ababa, two professors, as well as a PhD-Researcher from the same university and two foreign researchers who are experts on the topic. The purpose of the interviews was to gain an understanding of political processes that have led to the construction of the GERD, different aspects of Ethio-Egyptian relations both in the present and in the past, as well as other background information. These interviews were conducted individually and usually lasted for approximately one hour and a half.
3.3.2 FOCUS GROUP
To understand the impact of the GERD on Ethio-Egyptian relations, it makes not only sense to review government policies, but to also gain an understanding of the public’s perception of the project. Therefore, this research, particularly the third sub-question, are also concerned with Ethiopian’s perception of the GERD, as well as the socio-cultural significance of the Nile within Ethiopia and Ethiopian’s perception of Egypt. Focus groups allow the researcher to witness individuals’ interaction with each other, thus allowing for a deeper understanding of how they collectively make sense of issues around them (Bryman, 2012, 503). The focus group with four students was organized with the help of a professor from the University of Addis Ababa and lasted for approximately one and a half hours. During the discussion, a fellow student from the University of Amsterdam assisted and took notes to facilitate transcription. Of the four, all participants were Ethiopians, in their twenties and three were male. At the beginning of the focus group, the purpose of the research was explained, as well as how the data collected would be used within the research project. After the discussion, participants were invited to add any points of interest to them or ask questions.
3.4 SAMPLING
Key informants of this research were firstly found through purposive sampling, as participants with relevant knowledge were likely to provide insights on specificities of Ethio- Egyptian relations. During the first stage of the data collection phase, a network among researchers and professors at Addis Ababa University could be established. Apart from interviewing these individuals themselves, they provided other relevant contacts to governmental and non-governmental actors, thus this stage was followed by snowball sampling. Third, I had personal conversations and in-depth interviews with citizens from 26 different demographics to gain a better understanding of public perceptions of the GERD and its relevance for individuals in their specific contexts. Some of the students I had met on the campus of Addis Ababa University additionally agreed to a focus group discussion. These groups of students were chosen based on their interest and expertise in the topic, as they were all Master’s or PhD students in water-related fields at Addis Ababa University. As these students were from relatively similar demographics, additional focus groups with different or mixed demographics could have provided further opportunity for triangulation. As I unexpectedly had to leave the field earlier than planned, only one focus group discussion was conducted. It will thus rather serve the purpose of triangulation.
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS
Qualitative content analysis with the help of the atlas.ti software was used for transcription of the focus group, interviews and media items. Qualitative content analysis is useful for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns. Hsie and Shannon have distinguished three types of this type of qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed and summative content analysis. Conventional content analysis is considered appropriate when existing theory or literature is limited (Hsie and Shannon, 2015, 1279). Although the data analysis of this research is guided by the framework of ‘counter-hydro-hegemony’, it follows no further preconceived categories. Therefore, conventional content analysis allows for the development of concepts deriving from the data. In contrast to the grounded theory approach, which allows for the development of theories, content analysis tends to be restricted to the creation of concepts or models. This is due to the difficulties in inferring theoretical relationships between concepts from merely coding a limited amount of text data (Hsie and Shannon, 2015, 1281). The process follows inductive category development: firstly, the researcher reads all data repeatedly to obtain a sense of the whole, and highlights parts of the texts to derive codes. These codes form the basis of the coding scheme, and are then clustered into meaningful categories. The researcher then may identify relationships between categories, and infer conclusions on the data provided. The transcription of the focus group, interviews and media items have all undergone this process.
27 3.6 RESEARCH ETHICS AND POSITIONALITY
All research conducted under consideration of the ‘do no harm principle’ and the Safety Guidelines provided by the Graduate School of Social Sciences. I have sufficiently informed all participants of these ethical standards, including their right to anonymization, informed consent and the possibility to end the interview at any moment they wish. Although I have not interviewed individuals on possibly traumatic events or similar, the role of a researcher requires acknowledgement of individuals’ circumstances and the (political) sensitivity of the research topic, such as Ethio-Egyptian relations. To carefully develop an understanding of these contexts, I have appropriately discussed my research methods with my supervisor and others who are knowledgeable of the local context. My safety was ensured as appropriate by maintaining regular contact with my supervisor and the other students in this location, and by occasionally accompanying each other to interviews and short trips. The data has been anonymized and safely stored on different data storages throughout and after the entire research process.
Reflecting on my collection, analysis and interpretation of data is indispensable for the reliability of my results. As a researcher, I am therefore required to reflect on my own biases. My understandings of water resource distribution and hydro-politics may stem from a liberal perspective, and my knowledge of the Nile is only informed by the socio-historical particularities and contexts of Ethiopians lives to a certain extent. As I have only conducted research in Ethiopia and not in Egypt, I may have further developed biases in relation to the GERD’s impact on Ethiopians and Egyptians. I have thus attempted to bear these aspects and the general subjective component in concepts such as ‘hydro-hegemony’ in mind throughout the research process by carefully considering my own subjectivity.
3.7 QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH
The following sections will discuss the quality of the research under consideration of the quality criteria for research by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as adapted in Bryman (2012). These criteria, namely authenticity and trustworthiness, were adapted particularly to qualitative research. As Lincoln and Guba have suggested the possibility of multiple accounts of social phenomena, these are more suitable for quality assessment than original criteria of validity and reliability from quantitative research. Qualitative research is concerned rather with the 28 “contextual uniqueness and significance of the aspect of the social world” (Bryman, 2012, 392), and as the GERD itself is an unprecedented project, aspects such as replicability seem unsuitable for such a quality assessment.
TRUSTWORTHINESS
Trustworthiness is comprised of four criteria, namely credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Bryman, 2012, 390). If one assumes a multiplicity of social realities, research results will only be accepted by others if they are deemed credible. Apart from the data collection having been carried out with transparency and within ethical research standards, triangulation will be used to confirm the validity of results. This step is especially important as I was not able to conduct as many interviews as initially planned. Apart from using multiple methods of data collection such as discourse and content analysis of public speeches and media items, I also attempted to gain a better understanding of local contexts in the field. I did so by triangulating respondents’ answers with other interview partners, for example asking them if they agreed to a certain point previous interviewees had made. Another factor that may have affected credibility was the language barrier. Although all interviews were conducted in English, some interviewees’ accents or way of phrasing things may distort the initial statement they wanted to make. Although I always asked respondents if I had correctly interpreted their responses, some information might have been lost in translation. Another factor that may have impacted participants’ responses was their perception of me as an outsider researching this politically sensitive topic. When I for example asked interviewees about the possibility of negative consequences of the GERD on the lives of Egyptians, some appeared to suspect me of defending Egypt and explicitly assured me they do not hold harmful intentions for Egyptians. Reactivity during interviews may have therefore distorted outcomes to a certain extent. Further, credibility is also in issue with regard to the content analysis of media items. As noted by Bryman, even when credibility in mass media outputs is not high, it is often the uncovering of distortions that are of interest to content analysis (Bryman, 2012, 553). I consider making evident the particular and subjective, even distorted, narratives in mass media an important part of this study. In addition, I have aimed to increase the representativeness of the content analysis by choosing articles from each respective country’s most popular news outlets and triangulate them to gain a coherent sense of common perceptions on the topic. Another aspect to consider is that the media items collected were all published in the English language. This may on one
29 hand provide a limited or distorted view of discourses circulated within the two countries. On the other hand, it provides interesting insights into what images Ethiopian and Egyptian media outlets want to convey to the outside, which is of importance to the interpretation of the findings.
Secondly, due to the previously mentioned contextual uniqueness of the GERD, transferability of this research to other contexts may be low. Thick description, that is, rich accounts of the context, are nevertheless provided to allow the readers to determine the applicability to other contexts themselves.
Third, ensuring dependability of the research entails transparency about how properly the research procedures have been followed (Bryman, 2012, 392). To fulfil this criterion, records of the previous and adapted research questions, interview transcripts, respondent lists and fieldwork notes have been kept. This process was audited by my supervisor in order to keep track of the proper following of this procedure, as well as enabling him to assess the degree to which theoretical inferences I make can be justified.
Lastly, confirmability is concerned with the extent to which the researcher has attempted to work with objectivity, that is without letting his or her personal values impact the outcome of the study. I have made it a priority to critically analyze the data collected for this study from while bearing in mind my own biases. My position as an outsider has nevertheless likely impacted, as previously mentioned, interview responses. Further, as I have mainly spoken to Ethiopians and few Egyptians, this may have impacted my own perceptions of the situation. A point to consider in this regard is nevertheless that qualitative content analysis is concerned with the subjective interpretation of the content of text data. Ultimately, subjectivity can provide valuable insights during data analysis, while bearing in mind personal biases.
AUTHENTICITY
The criterion of authenticity is comprised of five sub-criteria, which are concerned with the degree of practical relevance for actors involved in the study, such as serving as an impetus to members to engage in action to change their circumstances (Bryman, 2012, 393). As decisions on the GERD are mainly made by policy-makers and heads of state, common citizens, at least as individuals, have arguably little space to change such dynamics. Nevertheless, the study is of practical relevance, thus hopefully policy-makers of different levels will take notice
30 of this study. Moreover, citizens may feel motivated to reflect on their perception of the GERD within Ethio-Egyptian relations.
Ontological authenticity refers to the degree to which the research helped members to arrive at a better understanding of their social milieu (Bryman, 2012, 393). This study aimed to explore narratives employed by media and political actors in shaping discourses around the Nile and the GERD, therefore hopefully it will enable some insights for individuals to reflect on these discourses and their impact on Ethio-Egyptian relations when shared with the public.
Educative authenticity is concerned with whether the research has helped members to appreciate better the perspectives of other members of their social setting (Bryman, 2012, 393). One aim of this study is the exploration of narratives and perspectives creating conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt. Hopefully, members of both countries will receive insights into each other’s perspectives and aspects that have led to the rise of such conflict. As such, educative authenticity will hopefully be increased by distributing the study’s results among different individuals of both countries. The final chapter of this thesis will provide points which should be considered by readers in order to contextualize some of the conclusions.
Lastly, ensuring fairness in qualitative research entails fairly representing different viewpoints among members of the social setting (Bryman, 2012, 393). As it would have exceeded the scope of this study to collect data from both Ethiopia and Egypt, the views presented by interviewees of this study are Ethiopian. Further, the SARS-Cov-19 outbreak and the political sensitivity of the topic hampered the data collection phase, therefore the number of interviews was not as high as intended and only represent the views of participants who were mostly male and educated. All these issues have affected the quality of this research and need to be taken into consideration both during data analysis and assessment of the study’s quality.
3.8 OTHER LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH
Methodologically, I consider the scope of this research could be its greatest limitation. An analysis of inter-state relations in addition to the application of the theoretical framework within the given parameters is an ambitious endeavor. An advantage of such a broad angle is that it creates an overview about popular narratives and how these are contested. On the other hand, there are various aspects to this topic that could not be explored in greater detail. The
31 topic of this research could for example be explored with a large-scale analysis of media items and a greater number of interviews in the two countries under study. Alternatively, a more in- depth analysis of singular narratives mentioned in this study, and interviews with Egyptians, likely would have provided valuable insights, though this would have exceeded the scope of this study.
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALIZING THE NILE DISPUTE
The following chapter provides the contextual information that is vital for understanding riparian relations on the Nile and the GERD’s impact on them. The first section gives a brief history of the Nile and riparian states, as an analysis of the GERD has to be situated in this context. The second section then explains the legal frameworks that have shaped hydro-politics in the Nile Basin. Knowledge of these frameworks is detrimental to understand Ethiopia’s and Egypt’s stances on the GERD. Lastly, an overview of the GERD’s construction and its bi- and trilateral negotiations is provided.
4.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NILE
The Nile is the longest river in the world, stretching almost 6700 kilometers into the Mediterranean Sea. Passing through arid lands, deserts, tropical forest and other landscapes, it has sustained diverse ecosystems and cultures for millennia (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 2). Its main tributaries are the White Nile, which begins in Central Africa, and the Blue Nile, Tekeze/Atbara and Baro-Akobo, which originate in Ethiopia and contribute approximately 86% of the Nile (Arsano, 2007; Abtew and Dessu, 2019). The tributaries merge in the Sudanese capital Khartoum. The eleven riparians sharing the Nile’s waters are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan, South Sudan,
Tanzania, and Uganda3. Because of the Nile’s unparalleled value for riparian nations, their wrangling for power over its water reaches back hundreds of years. This can firstly be seen in downstream riparian Egypt’s attempts of gaining power over the upstream territories. During the first half of the 19th century, Egypt began asserting autonomy from the Ottoman Empire and
3 For map of the Nile and GERD, see Appendix 1.
32 the nation’s leaders started their quest for Egyptian expansionism upstream of the Nile into Uganda, Ethiopia and the Sudan. According to Arsano,
“Egypt wanted to control Ethiopia primarily because Ethiopia controlled the headwaters of the Blue Nile, Atbara and Baro-Akobo, which together constitute 86 per cent of the annual flow of the Nile. This emanates from a perception that Egypt would not feel secure as long as another powerful country controlled the most important sources of the Nile waters, which happens to be the nation’s lifeline” (Arsano, 2007, 200).
Egypt’s concerns about Ethiopia’s control over its water supply, mentioned above, would become a common thread in hydro-political dynamics between the two countries. Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali would later state: "The national security of Egypt which is based on the waters of the Nile, is in the hands of other countries. ... The next war in the region will be over the waters of the Nile" (Hultin, 1995). The Egyptian invasion during its quest expansionism led to the battles of Gura and Gundet in 1875 and 1876, which were both won by Ethiopia (Arsano, 2007, 201). Losing the Ethiopian-Egyptian war did not mark the end of Egyptian attempts in gaining control over the river. As it had not been able to gain power over its territory, Egypt’s strategy shifted towards the technical utilization of the waters. Approximately one hundred years after the war, it announced the construction of the High Aswan Dam (HAD). The construction of the HAD has been cited as the beginning of the development of Egypt’s ‘hydraulic mission’ and as the decisive moment in solidifying its full technical control over the river (Cascão, 2009, 247). The hydro-politics of the Nile Basin signified at this point the competing interests between global powers, namely the USSR and the United States. Constructed between the 1960 and 1971, the HAD was financed with the help of Soviet funding. During the same period, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) undertook studies on potential hydropower sites on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia (Cascão, 2009, 254; Tawfik Amer, 2015, 12-13; Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 23). The fact that these studies were conducted with American assistance in response to the Soviet support of Egypt’s Dam has been cited as a reason for Egypt’s distrust of the Ethiopian dam plans (Tawfik Amer, 2015). Whereas Ethiopia was not yet able to pursue its ‘hydraulic mission’, Egypt’s construction of the HAD satisfied its industrial power demand, contributed to its agricultural expansion plans and helped control floods. The fact that Ethiopia was not able to realize the USBR’s plans until decades later can be explained by several factors. The USBR’s studies recommended the construction of several major dams on the Blue Nile (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 12-13). Despite its
33 advantageous position by contributing 86% of the Nile waters, Ethiopia lacked the financial resources to implement these plans. Weak institutions, internal conflict and a lack of prioritization of the water sector added to this inactivity (Cascão, 2009, 254; Waterbury, 2002, 68). Ethiopia only shifted towards a market-oriented economic model in the 1990s, which brought about economic growth and a stabilization of the economy (Cascão, 2009, 254). Meles Zenawi’s rule and improved donor relations finally paved the way for the realization of plans to construct large hydraulic projects on the Blue Nile. The GERD was a central component of Zenawi’s vision of a new Ethiopia, which has been considered “unparalleled in its ambitions in Africa” (Verhoeven, 2013, pp. 4-10). The GERD should thus be analyzed under consideration of these aspects: Egypt has historically been wrangling over power over the Nile. Previous Egyptian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the security paradigm over its waters. Ethiopia, which had previously been unable to utilize the resources due to financial, political and institutional reasons, may thus be able to permanently change power relations in the Basin through the GERD’s construction.
4.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Legal aspects of the distribution of the Nile waters have had particular impact on Ethio- Egyptian relations (Cascão, 2008, 26). The following section explains which legal frameworks shaped inter-state relations on the Nile. The first treaty to be discussed is the 1929 Nile Water Agreement. This treaty was signed between downstream Egypt and Great Britain on behalf of
Sudan and other British colonies in the basin. 48 billion m3 of water per year were therein allocated to Egypt and 4 billion m3 per year to Sudan (Cascão, 2009; Turton, 2000). No Nile water was allocated to upstream countries. The Agreement was not acknowledged by Ethiopia, which was excluded from the negotiations, and later contested by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda after their independence in the 1960s (Cascão, 2009; Arsano, 2007, 203). Thirty years later, these water allocations were renegotiated – the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilisation of the
Nile Waters granted Egypt 55.5 billion m3 and Sudan 18.5 billion m3 of water per year (Tawfik Amer, 2015). No water was therein, again, allocated to any upstream nation. The negotiations were held exclusively by the two downstream nations while benefitting Egypt’s plans to construct the High Aswan Dam (Cascao, 2009, 245). The 1959 Agreement further prevented Ethiopia from diverting the Nile’s flow or constructing hydraulic projects on the water. The upstream nations were, again, not considered in the Agreement, and have contested it ever 34 since. In 1958, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie protested against his country’s exclusion from the negotiations, arguing in support of Ethiopia’s right to make use of the waters of the Nile for the country’s economic development (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 12-13; Arsano, 2007, 100-101). In 1998, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister demanded a re-examination of the Agreement and announced intentions to construct several Dams within Ethiopian borders (Turton, 2002). The 1959 Agreement is thus an important component in the contentions surrounding the GERD, as Egypt wants to maintain it and Ethiopia argues for its abolishment.
There are two legal principles which form the basis of the two countries’ proclaimed water rights: the principle of ‘equitable utilization’ and the ‘historical and natural rights’ doctrine. Downstream Egypt and Sudan argue in support of their ‘historical rights’ as enshrined in the 1959 Agreement (Arsano, 2012, 30). This doctrine is linked to the concept of ‘appreciable harm’. If one riparian thereby establishes a senior claim over water resources, another riparian may not cause ‘appreciable harm’ to its flow (Waterbury, 2002). This has allowed the downstream nations Egypt and Sudan to prevent Ethiopia and other upstream nations to construct hydraulic infrastructure on the Nile tributaries.
Ethiopia, in contrast, bases its right to utilize the Nile waters on the principle of ‘equitable utilization’ (Cascão, 2009). Equitable use, as defined by the 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, implies that all those with access to a resource have some right to a share of it (Waterbury, 2002, 281-82). Ethiopia has attempted to make use of this principle when it joined the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). The NBI was born out of the contestation of historical agreements with the purpose of achieving sustainable and equitable utilization of the Nile by all riparian states (Nile Basin Initiative, 2020). In its attempt to contest the 1959 Agreement, Ethiopia joined the NBI under the condition that negotiations for a new multilateral and institutional framework were to be held (Cascão, 2009, 256). The resulting Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) endorses the principle of ‘equitable utilization’ while downplaying previous Nile water agreements (Cascão, 2009). The CFA was signed by all upstream countries, but was rejected by Egypt and Sudan, as it would replace their ‘historical rights’ over the Nile (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 17; Hammond, 2013; Chen and Swain, 2014, 12). Egypt’s rejection of the CFA has been cited as a reason for Ethiopia’s decision to start the construction of the GERD (Abtew and Dessu, 2019; Tawfik Amer, 2015 9).
35
4.3 THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM
On March 12th, 2011, the Ethiopian government surprised the world with the announcement of its plans to construct the ‘Millennium Dam’. The cornerstone of the Dam, whose plans had been kept secret and which would later be renamed into The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, was placed in the following month (Abtew and Dessu, 2019,, 73). The main contractor of the GERD is the Italian firm Salini Impregilo (. In 2012, Metals & Engineering Cooperation of Ethiopia (METEC), which oversees the electro-mechanical works, signed a US$ 250 million contract with French company Alstom to provide turbines and generators for the GERD (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 169). The GERD is located approximately 20 kilometers from Ethiopia’s border to Sudan and 500 kilometers from Addis Ababa (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 83). Upon its completion, the Dam will be 170 meters high, 1.8 kilometers long and have a reservoir of 74 billion cubic meters, making it the largest hydro-electric power plant on the African continent (Tawfik Amer, 2015). Initially planned to be completed in 2015, only half of the Dam had been completed by that time (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 25). The construction was hindered by several factors, most importantly, by financial issues.
Although Ethiopia initially asked Western and international donors such as the World Bank for funding, they did not agree to invest in the GERD. It has been claimed that Egypt has successfully convinced international actors not to finance the GERD (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 162; Tigrai Online, 2013). The costs of the GERD are projected to be as high as 7% of Ethiopia’s gross domestic product in 2016 (Abtew and Dessu, 2019). As the Ethiopian government could not attain enough external donor assistance for the project, it resorted to selling bonds to its citizens to finance the Dam. Individuals could purchase bonds by investing anything from $US 0.9 to $US 36,000 with an interest rate of 5.5% to 6% (Abtew and Dessu, 2019). Advertisements for the bonds were shown on billboards, musical performances and sports events. A lottery system through which one could win cars, houses and money was installed to collect funding (Abtew and Dessu, 2019). Furthermore, civil servants have been contributing parts of their salary to the GERD’s construction. Out of the first US$ 2.16 billion spent on the GERD, US$ 357 million were raised by the public (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 25;
Ethiopian Herald, 16th October 2015). The only other alternative funding source that Ethiopia attained is China’s State Grid of China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Co. (SGCC),
36 which is building transmission lines for the GERD at a cost of one billion US-dollars (Abtew and Dessu).
The construction of the GERD was, besides the financial obstacles, accompanied by a number of controversies and negotiations. The negotiation process has been ongoing since the beginning of the GERD’s construction, so far without results. After Ethiopia announced its construction, Egypt expressed worries about the size and impact of the Dam. To ease tensions between riparians, an International Panel of Experts (IPoE) was founded to assess the impact of the GERD one year after the beginning of its construction. Comprised of two experts each from Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan, in addition to four international experts, the IPoE published a review of the Dam’s environmental and hydrological impact in the three countries (IPoE, 2013). The report acknowledged the fait accompli status of the GERD, but stated that several documents and data had not been made available to them. Consequentially, the panel advised for further studies to be conducted (IPoE, 2013). In 2014, the Tripartite National Committee was established to conduct such studies, which were never completed (Crisisgroup, 2020). In March 2015, the three riparians signed the Declaration of Principles (DoPs), which endorsed cooperative mechanisms and principles of international law (Yihdego et al., 2018, 5; Crisisgroup, 2020). In May 2018, Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt established the National Independent Research Group to assess the dam’s filling and impact. The Research Group failed to produce an agreement for the three countries. The negotiations, which had been ongoing for 8 years at this point, moreover seemed to stagnate. One major issue of contention was the speed with which the GERD is to be filled. In July 2018, the GERD then gained further media attention when its projected manager, Simegnew Bekele, was found dead in his car in Addis Ababa. After controversies over his death sparked, indicating he was murdered, the Ethiopian
Federal Police Commission stated he had committed suicide (Reuters, September 7th, 2018; The
New York Times, September 7th, 2018). In the same month, Abiy Ahmed announced that the government had ended its contract with METEC. In November 2019, The United States and the World Bank hosted talks between the three countries in Washington, D.C. from November 2019 onwards. The two parties acting as mediators published a draft agreement on the GERD, which was refused by Ethiopia. Ethiopian politicians claimed the United States and World Bank were biased in favor of Cairo and overstepped their roles as mediators (Crisisgroup, 2020; The East African, 2020). In April 2020, the Ethiopian Prime Minister proposed a new agreement to cover the first two years of the GERD’s filling, which was in turn rejected by Egypt and Sudan (Crisisgroup, 2020).
37 At the time of writing, more than 70% of the GERD is completed. In a virtual meeting on July 21st, 2020, the leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan agreed on resuming negotiations on the GERD. One day after the meeting, Ethiopia started the first stage of the filling, which will run in parallel to its construction (The Brookings Institute, 2020; VOA News, 2020).
CHAPTER 5: THE GERD IN EGYPT
This chapter deals with the application of hydro-hegemony framework in the Egyptian context. It has been argued that Egypt has been able to maintain consolidated control over the Nile Basin until the construction of the GERD. Therefore, it is important to examine the strategies and tactics it has employed to do so. The chapter analyzes the media items collected for this study to show the popular narratives circulated in Egyptian mass media under consideration of the hydro-hegemony framework. Building from an understanding of these narratives, the following chapter provides analysis of how Ethiopia has contested these same narratives under consideration of the framework of counter-hydro-hegemony.
The hydro-hegemony framework posits that hydro-hegemons’ power is based on three different spheres: material power, bargaining and ideational power. The first section briefly explains Egypt’s material power and the resources it has relied on to maintain its presumed hegemony over the Nile. The following analysis contributes to an assessment of Egypt’s bargaining and ideational power, in other words, to its ability to define political parameters of negotiations and influence public discourse on the GERD. According to Tawfik Amer, the hydro-hegemony framework’s key contribution is “not the explanation of transboundary hydro- political interactions by reference to power, but it is the illustration of how this power is exercised” (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 4). The following sections thus explore how Egypt exercises its power through consideration of the coercive, normative and hegemonic compliance- producing mechanisms it is presumed to use.
As Waterbury noted in 2002 (167), “Egypt is by far the most powerful riparian. . . it still has formidable veto power. It has been successful in imposing the status quo for four decades and it will surely shape any change in the status quo. It cannot dictate terms, but no riparian, including Ethiopia, will seek, let alone welcome, confrontation with Egypt when its well-known national interests are at stake.”. Egypt’s powerful position among neighboring states on the Nile can be explained by several factors. Applying the hydro-hegemony 38 framework, Egypt is presumed to rely on coercive resources, namely international support and financial mobilization (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 449). Economically, Egypt is far more powerful than other riparian states, including Ethiopia. Its economic standing (with a GDP of 303 US$ billion in 2019 (World Bank, 2020a) versus 96 $US bio in Ethiopia (World Bank, 2020b), allows for financial mobilization. Such mobilization can strengthen both a state’s ability to gather external support and independence from donors, as well as its ability to take unilateral action. Egypt has furthermore been able to make use of its relations with both Middle Eastern states and other donors and actors in the past. There are numerous relations that can be considered beneficial to its standing in the region, a few examples of this being its favored position by Colonial Britain leading to the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement and the advantageous position of Egypt and Sudan in the 1959 Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters. Egypt moreover receives the second-largest amount of U.S. foreign assistance of all countries worldwide, with circa $US 1.4 billion expected for 2021 (foreignassistance.gov, 2020). Egyptian media examined in this study has repeatedly emphasized its relations with international actors:
“(…) members of the World Bank delegation stressed Egypt’s pivotal role in Africa and the Middle East region, and its success in overcoming the various challenges that the country faced during the past years” (“Nile waters are of vital independence to Egypt and its people: Sisi on GERD”, Egypt Independent,
January 18th, 2020)
Additionally, Egyptian leaders have emphasized their ties with the Arab League, who has been supportive of it, as described before. After Ethiopia rejected the Arab League’s resolution on the GERD, Egyptian foreign minister Sameh Shoukry expressed that:
“Ethiopia does not have the right to lecture the Arab League and its member states on the historical ties that bind Arab and African people […]. We call on the international community to join the Arab League in realizing the nature of Ethiopia’s policy of stubbornness and imposing of a situation which threatens regional stability and security,” the Egyptian Foreign Ministry said.” (“Egypt slams Ethiopian statement on Arab League support over GERD”, Egypt
Independent, March 8th, 2020)
39 5.1 COERCIVE COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS
In addition to above described resources on which hydro-hegemons are presumed to base their power, the hydro-hegemony framework entails several tactics that can be used to create or maintain hydro-hegemony. The following section examines some of the coercive compliance-producing mechanisms Egypt is presumed to employ in maintaining its hegemony. Coercive compliance-producing mechanisms can appear in the form of military force, covert action and coercion-pressure. Military force is, as mentioned before, rarely used in transboundary water conflict. At the time of writing, it has not been used as a tactic in relation to the GERD, though battles existed in recorded history. Covert action may refer to engaging in undercover operations aimed at weakening the opponent in some way. Egypt has for example been accused of supporting the Eritrean liberation front during its conflict with Ethiopia (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 8). Coercion-pressure may entail threats towards other riparian states. Examples of coercion-pressure can be seen in some Egyptian media expressing threats towards Ethiopia since the construction of the GERD, such as ”Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi stress[ing] that Egypt will take all necessary measures to protect its rights in the waters of the Nile, indicating that no scenario would be excluded” (“The Ethiopian Dam: a game bigger than generating electricity”, United World, 7th April 2020).
5.2 NORMATIVE COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS
An example of normative compliance producing-mechanisms that hydro-hegemons can use are treaties. Egypt bases its water rights on the ‘historical rights’ enshrined in the 1959 Agreement. Media items analyzed in this study have repeatedly emphasized the country’s ‘historical rights’ over the waters of the Nile (“Egypt slams Ethiopian statement on Arab
League support over GERD”, Egypt Independent, 22nd April 2020; “Will Egypt allow Ethiopia to equivocate until GERD becomes a fait accompli?”, Daily News Egypt, March 18th, 2020;
“Ethiopia: Dam dispute stokes anti-Egypt feelings”, Middle East Monitor, April 3rd, 2020).
40 5.3 HEGEMONIC COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS
Hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms enable the hydro-hegemon to make use of its ideational power to shape the discourse surrounding water issues in its favor. The hydro- hegemon can thereby make use of its ideational power for securitization, knowledge- construction and sanctioned discourse. The following sections will discuss to what extent and how Egypt has made use of these three tactics. Understanding Egypt’s presumed hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms is important to understood Ethiopia’s presumed counter- hegemonic discourses (discussed in Chapter 6).
a) SECURITIZATION
Securitization refers to the promotion of an issue to a national security concern, thereby legitimizing counter-measures and silencing counter-hegemonic voices. The Egyptian discourse observed in this study shows several narratives surrounding the Nile and the GERD. Firstly, the Nile is framed as detrimental to the survival of the country and its citizens. This narrative is supported by emphasis on Egypt’s dependency on the Nile, as well as the historical and cultural significance of the Nile within Egypt. The framing of the Nile as a ‘matter of life and death’ has been widely circulated in Egyptian media and influential political figures, such as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in his speech in front of the 74th United Nations General Assembly:
“The continued impasse in the negotiations on the [Grand Ethiopian Renaissance] dam will have negative repercussions on the stability, as well as on development in the region in general and in Egypt in particular. While we recognize Ethiopia’s right to development, for Egypt, the water of the Nile is a matter of life. It is an existential matter. And this places a great responsibility on the international community to play a constructive role in urging all parties to demonstrate flexibility in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement” (el-Sisi, 2019).
The securitization of the GERD is based upon several points: firstly, the GERD is claimed to cause water shortages in Egypt. These water shortages are claimed to affect a multitude of sectors in Egypt, such as its agricultural sector, which is stated to result both in
41 unemployment and difficulties in food production. These linkages are evident in statements such as the following:
“Egypt's minister of water resources and irrigation, Mohamed Abdel Aty, is extremely angry. "We are responsible for a nation of about 100 million", he says. "If the water that's coming to Egypt reduced by 2% we would lose about 200,000 acres of land. "One acre at least makes one family survive. A family in Egypt is average family size about five persons. So this means about one million will be jobless. "[The GERD] is an international security issue." (“The ‘water war’
brewing over the new River Nile dam”, BBC, 24th February 2018)
Another argument that has been brought forward against the GERD’s construction is that it is supposedly expected to decrease the water supply of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, which would in turn decrease Egypt’s electricity production capacity. The alleged negative consequences caused by the GERD have furthermore been linked to the displacement and migration of Egyptian migrants to neighboring regions. Outlets such as The Cairo Review of Global Affairs have made the following claim:
“the risk of water shortage caused by the GERD will directly affect food production and security in Egypt. Moreover, reducing the flow of water to Egypt will dramatically affect the resilience of the Egyptian Aswan High Dam, which stores water to be used by Egypt and Sudan during draughts. This in turn will also negatively affect the amount of electricity generated from the Egyptian [Aswan High] dam […] Moreover, 290,000 families will lose their income, which will increase the possibility of migration and displacement of people to neighboring countries, create more instability and potentially exacerbate the threat of terrorism, from which the region is already suffering.” (“Water Rivalry
on the Nile”, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 14th April 2020)
Linking the GERD’s supposed negative effects with the issue of terrorism and migration moreover elevates the securitization tactic from the national to the international. Such framing most likely appeals to international actors, particularly in Europe, where terms such as migration and terrorism have gained particular political weight.
42 b) KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION
A second tactic presumed to be employed by hydro-hegemons is ‘knowledge construction’, a variant of sanctioned discourse. It has been argued that Egypt has created different perspectives of its hydro-situation to international donors or its citizens (Cascão, 2005, 448). This tactic creates more space for the hydro-hegemon to support his position in times of external pressure. The GERD is for example framed as causing great environmental harm to Egypt by causing droughts, when the country is, as mentioned before, struggling with a number of climate-related issues, even without the GERD.
c) SANCTIONED DISCOURSE
Hydro-hegemons may, as the literature suggests, use the tactic of sanctioning discourse to gain support for their own discursive hegemony while silencing counter-hegemonic discourse. Used in combination with knowledge construction, the hydro-hegemon can veil certain aspects of riparian relations while emphasizing others to maintain its advantageous position in international relations. Assuming this tactic, it can be argued that Egyptian narratives emphasize certain aspects of riparian relations, such as notions of cooperation. Egyptian leaders have presented Egypt as cooperative in the GERD negotiations, particularly in international fora, such as previously mentioned speech by Egyptian President el-Sisi at the 74th United Nations General Assembly, which clearly pointed out:
“For decades, Egypt has sought to strengthen and deepen the bonds of cooperation with the brotherly Nile basin countries with whom it enjoys eternal relations. As a testament to its keenness to further the well-being of the peoples of the Nile Basin, Egypt expressed its understanding regarding Ethiopia's commencement to construct the Renaissance Dam, despite the fact that the latter did not conduct the necessary studies on the effects of this huge project to ensure no harm to the water interests of downstream countries, including Egypt. Notwithstanding, Egypt took the initiative to bring forth the agreement of the Declaration of Principles […] Unfortunately, these negotiations have not yielded the desired results. Nevertheless, Egypt still hopes for an agreement that will secure the common interests of the peoples of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt” (el-Sisi, 2019). 43 At the same time, other aspects of riparian relations are veiled. The fact that Egypt built the Aswan High Dam without consulting other riparian states, or that neither the 1929 and nor the 1959 Agreement bestowed any water rights to Ethiopia, or the fact that Egypt rejected the Cooperative Framework Agreement were not mentioned in any of the Egyptian media items analyzed in this study. Ethiopia has been portrayed in contrast as taking unilateral measures without considering possible negative consequences to Egypt. News outlets such as Daily News Egypt frame Ethiopia’s construction of the GERD as follows:
“Despite the intervention of many international actors, Ethiopia insists on prevarication, ignoring that the Nile River is the lifeline of Egypt and that any aggression on it or any attempt to stop its flow is an attack on Egypt’s life, development, and security. In this way, Ethiopia gives a message that its project is political, not economic, aimed at harming Egypt and threatening its security because if it was an economic development as Ethiopia claims, it would be easy to reach a satisfactory solution for all parties, especially since Egypt recognizes the right of Ethiopia and all countries to development.” (“Will Egypt allow Ethiopia to equivocate until GERD becomes a fait accompli?”, Daily News
Egypt, 18th March 2020).
Furthermore, it has been claimed that Ethiopia has intentionally taken “advantage of the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt and the deteriorating political situation in the country” when it announced to construct the GERD in 2011 (“The Ethiopian Dam: a game bigger than generating electricity”, United World, 7th April 2020).
Assuming the hydro-hegemony framework, Egypt thus make use of its ideational and bargaining power by reinforcing these narratives in public spheres. Some of the international media outlets considered in this study have expressed statements that correlate with the Egyptian narratives of the country’s historical connection with and dependence on the Nile, as well as the securitization of the GERD, such as The Japan Times:
“No country is more reliant on the Nile than Egypt, whose teeming population has just passed 100 million people, over 90 percent of whom live along the river’s banks” (“Mighty Nile River threatened by waste, warming and a giant
Ethiopian Dam”, The Japan Times, 26th March 2020).
44 Arguably, the same argument could be made for all the other riparian states, as Ethiopia has a population of approximately 110 million (World Bank, 2019), of which approximately half live without access to electricity. Furthermore, the framing of Ethiopia as deliberately threatening Egypt’s water supply has been shown in news outlets such as Bloomberg:
“The fear in Cairo is that Ethiopia will see this as an opportunity to resume its strategy of creating facts on the ground, and eventually to impose its preferred outcome on the downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan. If Ethiopia no longer feels bound to resolve the dispute before filling the reservoir and operating the dam, Egypt will feel pressure to take action to defend what it sees as a threat to its vital interests.” (“Ethiopia and Egypt to resume their Nile rivalry”,
Bloomberg, 23rd March 2020).
The above quote shows a framing of Ethiopia as taking unilateral measures that may threaten Egypt’s water supply, while Egypt is presented as ‘feeling pressure’ to defend its interests.
CHAPTER 6: THE GERD IN ETHIOPIA
The following sections apply the counter-hydro-hegemony framework on Ethiopia. The counter-hydro-hegemony framework assumes that the counter-(hydro-)hegemon makes use of a ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’ to contest the hydro-hegemony. Ethiopia’s power is presumed to be based on, as in Egypt’s case, material, bargaining and ideational power. It is therein assumed that the counter-hegemon makes use of its ideational power by firstly, deconstructing the ‘hegemonic bloc’ and secondly, constructing its own ‘historical bloc’. The following sections discuss the assumed ‘deconstruction’ of the Egyptian ‘bloc’, which is understood as contestation of the Egyptian narratives discussed above. This will be followed by a discussion of the construction of own narratives that create public spheres of support for the GERD.
6. 1 DECONSTRUCTION
Narratives that are used by Egypt are, as described before, centered around the securitization of the GERD and Egypt’s ‘right to the Nile’ through the 1959 Agreement. These dominant narratives were widely contested both in Ethiopian media and by interviewees of this
45 study through several arguments. Firstly, the perceived injustice of the 1959 Agreement were emphasized in almost all media and by interviewees. It has been argued therein that Egypt has denied Ethiopia any right to make use of the waters of the Nile, even though 86% of its water originate in Ethiopia. Therefore, GERD is framed as a correction to ‘historical injustice’ by enabling Ethiopia to make use of its water resources. Moreover, it has been argued that Egypt criticizes Ethiopia for taking unilateral measures by building the GERD, even though Egypt had itself not consulted other riparian states when it built its High Aswan Dam. Ethiopia’s Minister of Water, Irrigation and Energy Seleshi Bekele, has for example written an article for Addis Standard stating:
“It is time for Ethiopia and the Nile basin countries to straighten the facts and unmask the flagrant injustice and correct the hegemonic Egyptian narrative. […] In Ethiopia, where about 86 percent of the Blue Nile water originates, it is a lifeline for more than 40 million people who eke out a living in the basin areas. […] Hence, no country should have an exclusive right to the Nile's water on the basis of obsolete colonial treaties. […] Egypt has twice ignored protests from upper riparian countries when it built the Aswan High Dam, and two other colossal projects […] Yet, Cairo seeks to dictate what other riparian states can and can't do with the Nile waters. Basin countries must now come together anew to challenge this hypocrisy and seek a judicious and equitable use of the Nile waters.” (“Ethiopia: Putting the Facts
Straight On the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam””, Addis Standard, 31st March 2020).
Furthermore, both Ethiopian media and interviewees have contested Egypt’s securitization of the GERD. A common claim was that Ethiopia solely constructs the GERD for its socio- economic development, and has no intention of harming Egypt. Claims that the GERD will not have any negative, or even positive effect on Egypt were widely made.
Egyptian media has, as described above, framed Ethiopia as uncooperative in negotiations while presenting itself as cooperative. Egypt has been framed in a similar matter in Ethiopian media, with news outlets stating that Egyptian intransigence has led to the cumbersome process of reaching an agreement on the GERD. In addition, several outlets not only considered Egypt uncooperative, but as deliberately trying to hinder Ethiopia’s socio-economic development, not only out of fear of water shortages, but out of own geopolitical interest. Ethiopian media has
46 moreover contested Egypt’s repeated requests of a longer filling period for the Dam. Ethiopian newspaper The Reporter states:
“It should be noted that when any entity, be it Egypt or otherwise, suggest obscenely grotesque “solutions” such as extended filling of the dam in 12-20 years instead of 4-7 years, which is already a big concession for Ethiopia which can fill the Dam in three years; […] not only are they trampling on Ethiopia`s sovereignty, dignity and citizens’ human right but they are in essence condemning Ethiopia to suffer for 20 more years. They are essentially saying halt all your development goals for the next 12- 20 years; suffer and perish so we can live instead of “live and let live”.” (“Hypocrisy or blind ignorance: the GERD, SDGs and current state of international actors”, The
Reporter, 28th March, 2020).
Some Ethiopian outlets further criticized the international media’s presentation of the country’s handling of the Dam matter. Specifically, they were accused of presenting Ethiopia as unilaterally constructing the GERD out of national pride and prestige, of creating facts on the ground and skipping the meetings in Washington deliberately. Moreover, it has been claimed that international media portrays Ethiopia “as plotting to become a hegemon in the Nile.” (“The international media’s misrepresentation of Ethiopia on the GERD”, Addis
Standard, April 14th, 2020). Another claim that has been made in Egyptian media is that, as mentioned before, Ethiopia deliberately announced the GERD’s construction during the Arab Spring revolutions to capitalize on Egypt’s domestic turmoil. Ethiopian media such as Addis Standard have contested this claim and in turn emphasized that it has deferred the Cooperative Framework Agreement’s ratification “at a time when Egypt was being rocked by internal political struggle” as a sign of political goodwill (“The International Media’s misrepresentation of Ethiopia on the GERD”, Addis Standard, 14th April 2020).
6.2 CONSTRUCTION
The section above analyzed how Ethiopian media contests Egyptian narratives, which is understood as the deconstruction of its ‘bloc’. Applying the counter-hydro-hegemony framework with Gramsci’s idea on a ‘war of position’, Ethiopia would in addition have to create a historic ‘bloc’ by creating its own political base. The following sections thus analyze through
47 which narratives Ethiopia has attempted to gain support for the GERD from both Ethiopian citizens and international actors. The first part discusses through which narratives public support has been built amongst Ethiopians, namely a framing of the GERD as a key component in providing socio-economic development and the emotional significance Ethiopians attribute to the Dam. This is followed by an analysis of the narratives that have been circulated on the GERD to gather international support.
Support for the Dam from citizens is not only vital for the government’s political interests, but for very practical reasons, such as the GERD’s financing through bonds, described before. One article emphasized:
“It is being built by the contributions made by all Ethiopians and as its very name underlines it is a national symbol of unity, justice and power, demonstrating Ethiopians welcome of the ‘return of their prodigal son’. The current diplomatic schism between Ethiopia and Egypt, caused by the failed negotiations, has reinvigorated the general public’s determination to support Ethiopia’s rightful claim over the Blue Nile in general and the unstoppability of the GERD project: ‘it is my Dam!’” (“Egypt’s Nile monopoly is over”,
Ethiopia Insight, April 9th 2020)
6.2.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
What narratives then motivate citizens to even invest their income into the Dam? The GERD is widely framed as central to Ethiopia’s socio-economic development, both by its leaders, the media and interviewees of this study. Many individuals interviewed for this study expressed great hopes for the GERD’s impact on the country. As one student told me:
“The future in Ethiopia, after the Renaissance Dam is built, is bright. As my friend said, 54% or 55% of the population does not have access to electricity. After the construction of the Dam, it will be a place where the future will be bright” (Student, Focus group discussion, 11th March, 2020).
48 Electricity production was considered central not only for providing light within households, but also for the improvement of health services, economic expansion that creates jobs, as well as for infrastructure and transport. An issue that was considered central to Ethiopia’s socio- economic development by participants, particularly by university students that were interviewed, were improvements in education. It has therein been argued that electricity production through the GERD is not only vital in and of itself, but also for the provision of quality education in Ethiopia, especially in rural areas. This aspect is notable considering only 24% of primary schools in the country have access to electricity (World Bank, 2018). Hydro- electric power production was moreover seen as central to the country’s plan in dealing with its projected population growth. In some instances, Ethiopian media framed the GERD as a ‘matter of survival’, similarly to Egyptian media. Ethiopian Ambassador to Kenya Meles Alem Tekea has stated in an interview:
“The Nile is a matter of survival for Ethiopia. […] The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is indispensable for Ethiopia as it is very critical in eradicating poverty from our country” (“US ‘overstepped’ mandate on Nile
water talks”, The East African, March 24th 2020).
6.2.2 National pride and unity
Apart from being framed as central to Ethiopia’s socio-economic development and poverty reduction, the GERD has become a symbol of national pride and unity among citizens. Firstly, many interviewees emphasized their state’s sovereignty, of which the GERD’s construction was seen as an expression. Egypt’s attempts to hinder the construction was therein seen as an attack on Ethiopia’s state sovereignty. A major component within the GERD’s effect on Ethiopians shown in the data was moreover a notion of national unity. Interviewees have told me that despite the complexities of conflict between different ethnic groups, the Dam is something that Ethiopians ‘stand behind in unity’. During interviews, I have been told that the GERD unites Ethiopians independent from ethnic group, religion or political views in other matters.
In contrast to Egypt’s ‘historical rights’ to the Nile based on (colonial) legal agreements, interviewees and media based Ethiopia’s ‘right to the Nile’ on the fact that it contributes most
49 of its water. When asked about their opinions on the government’s handling of the GERD negotiations and its possible conflict potential, interviewees emphasized the importance of cooperating with other riparians, particularly with Egypt. As one student told me:
“It is Ethiopia’s right to use the Dam because [the Nile] originates in Ethiopia. We are a sovereign state. But there must be agreement with Egypt. Cooperation is essential to prevent conflict” (Interview Student, Addis Ababa
University, 25th January, 2020).
It should nevertheless be kept in mind that reactivity might play a role in such framings, as many Ethiopians repeatedly wanted to ensure me that they had no bad intentions for Egypt. A motivation behind such framing might be to present Ethiopians as benevolent in front of outsiders as myself.
The Dam’s emotional significance as a symbol of national pride for Ethiopians can moreover be seen in the attention it has received online. Famous Ethiopian musician Teddy
Afro has released his first single in three years dedicated to the GERD (Addis Insight, June 29th, 2020). Online-forums, Facebook groups and petitions have been created in support of the GERD’s construction. Petitions such as the one shown below have been started to gather support for its construction:
Change.org petition “Ethiopia deserves its fair share of the Nile water to lift its people out of poverty” https://www.change.org/p/ethiopia-nile?redirect=false, last accessed August 12, 2020.
50 The hashtag #itsmydam has been trending on twitter, gaining thousands of retweets and promotional videos in support of the GERD.
6.2.3 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT
After analyzing what narratives attract support from Ethiopians within the country, the following sections analyze what narratives can be presumed to be circulated to gather support from external actors. In the construction of a ‘historical bloc’, outside support can be beneficial to increasing a state’s bargaining and ideational power. Firstly, Ethiopia has vehemently attempted to gain support from other riparians, such as the Sudan. Ethiopian media and interviewees claimed that Sudan, which plays another central role in the outcome of the situation, is supportive of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has pursued a strategy of creating positive sum-outcomes for other riparians, such as by emphasizing the GERD’s supposed benefits to them. An example that has been widely mentioned is its supposed reduction of flood risks in Sudan, which generally struggles with floods during the rainy seasons. The comparatively cheap electricity that Ethiopia plans to export to neighboring countries is another benefit that has been emphasized by Ethiopian politicians and media.
Furthermore, the GERD has been claimed to be vital for territorial integrity in the Horn of Africa. As one interviewee told me:
“The Nile is considered an important tool for African regional integration, rather than confrontation. That is why Ethiopia has never said it doesn’t want to be in dialogue. It’s very much interested in cooperation.” (Interview, PhD student, 23rd March, 2020).
Ethiopian media analyzed in this study emphasized that the GERD can be a tool for greater regional integration while contributing to the development of riparian nations through cheap electricity (Addis Standard, 31st March, 2020).
Another argument that has been brought forward in support of the GERD is the supposed sustainability of hydro-electric power production. As such, the Dam has been claimed to be central in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) in Ethiopia, such as SDG 1 (eradicating poverty), SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) and SDG 6 (provision of clean water and sanitation) (“Hypocrisy or blind ignorance: the GERD, SDGs and current stance of international
51 actors”, The Reporter, March 28th, 2020). Considering the popularity of the concept and the SDGs, this framing presumably sheds a positive light on the GERD within the international community and organizations such as the United Nations.
In summary, in contrast to Egypt, Ethiopia has the most advantageous riparian position as the Blue Nile originates within its borders, which allows it to divert the Nile’s flow and make use of its waters. At the same time, it has been less of a political heavyweight in the past. Although its economy has grown, which has, amongst other dynamics, benefitted its standing within the international community, it has struggled to gather external support for the GERD. This becomes evident for example in the government’s inability to attract enough foreign funding for the Dam. The funding of external actors has been claimed, as mentioned before, to have been hindered by Egypt. By having secured domestic funding for the Dam and enabling its construction, Ethiopia has nevertheless been able to increase its bargaining power. Assuming the hydro-hegemony framework, Ethiopia makes use of the resource capture strategy to gain control over the Nile’s waters. As the data analysis has shown, it has also made use of compliance producing mechanisms, such as securitization of the GERD issue by claiming it will eradicate poverty from the country. Therefore, one could argue that Ethiopia makes use of the containment strategy, similarly to Egypt.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
7.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The following sections will summarize the findings and provide conclusions of this study. The Nile river has been of considerable value for riparian nations for millennia. Egypt, who is in a vulnerable position due to its dependency on its waters while being a downstream nation, has historically attempted to gain control over its waters. It has firstly attempted to gain territorial power during the Ethiopian-Egyptian war, and later constructed the High Aswan Dam to utilize its waters. Through its influential political position in the past, it has further been able to prevent upstream nations from building hydraulic infrastructure. This is evident in the colonial-era treaties of 1929 and 1959. Ethiopia, who possesses the more advantageous riparian position by contributing the majority of the Nile’s waters, has not been able to utilize the river until the GERD’s construction. The GERD thus presents a game-changer in the hydro-political configurations in the Nile Basin, which has been vigorously contested by Egypt.
52 This study has examined the discourses circulated within both countries through a critical hydro-politics lens. The application of the hydro-hegemony framework on Egypt has shown the following results: firstly, assessing Egypt’s material power indicates low geographical power through its position as a down-stream nation. In comparison to other riparian states, it can nevertheless resort to both financial mobilization and international support. By making use of its influential role in regional politics, it is able to reinforce narratives that work in its favor. Egyptian media has predominantly framed the GERD as a threat to its security. This argument is based on claims that it will reduce the electricity production of the Egyptian High Aswan Dam, as well as reducing the Nile’s flow in Egypt, which in turn is claimed will have negative effects on different economic sectors, employment and citizens’ access to water. These narratives are corroborated by reference to Egypt’s dependence on the Nile, as well as the historical significance of the Nile for Egyptians. In addition, Egypt’s ‘water rights’ are claimed to be based on the 1929 Agreement and especially the 1959 Agreement. Furthermore, the media items analyzed in this study frame Ethiopia as deliberately taking unilateral measures while risking the safety and water security of Egyptians. At the same time, Egypt is presented as cooperative in negotiations surrounding the GERD.
Studies have shown that, depending on the speed with which the GERD if filled, it can be constructed and filled without significantly harming Egypt’s water supply. The contentions on the Dam thus not merely represent a fight over natural resources, but are informed by geopolitical interests. There are several points that could explain Egypt’s motivation for contesting the GERD’s construction: As the Nile has provided life to Egyptian lives and civilization for millennia, the river holds great social and cultural significance for Egyptians. Egypt has moreover been struggling domestically over the last decade: both its economic and political situation have evoked criticism and protests against the government. Creating a ‘common enemy’ such as the GERD may create a sense of unity among Egyptians. The politicization of the issue can furthermore be intended to distract from domestic struggles and criticism towards the government. If water shortages become apparent as projected by some estimates, using the GERD as a scapegoat for causing water shortages could further be of interest to the Egyptian government in coming years. Moreover, Egypt may fear for its superior role in regional politics. The GERD’s construction may send a message that upstream nations openly contest the colonial-era agreements, which can lead to additional hydraulic projects in the Great Lakes Region.
53 The application of the framework of counter-hydro-hegemony has shown how many of the Egyptian narratives are contested within Ethiopia. Firstly, whereas Egypt bases its water rights on the 1959 Agreement, Ethiopia has argued in support of the ‘equitable and reasonable use’ principle as enshrined in the Cooperative Framework Agreement while contesting the previous treaties. To gather support for the GERD, it has framed the project as central to Ethiopia’s socio-economic development. Moreover, Ethiopians attribute sentiments of national pride and unity to the GERD. To gain support from international actors, benefits to other riparians, as well as the supposed sustainability of hydro-electric power production, have been emphasized. It is notable that a country places the majority of its development endeavors on one project. As achieving socio-economic development contains inherent complexities, presenting one giant Dam project as a solution creates hopes amongst citizens. Public spheres of support are not only beneficial to the GERD’s domestic financing, but in several respects: similarly to Egypt, Ethiopia has faced domestic struggles. Conflict between Ethiopia’s different ethnic groups have been escalating in recent years. The GERD has been able to, as shown during interviews, become a symbol for national unity. The government’s emphasis on its vital importance may thus reflect its attempts to create national unity through the project. The GERD thus emphasizes how “the (historical) accumulation of water shapes both access and authority, with differences in access to water in turn co-shaping social identities and forms of citizenship” (Zwarteveen et al., 2017, 4-6).
Both countries moreover emphasize the importance of cooperation for utilization of the Nile’s waters. Egyptian media frames Ethiopia as uncooperative while Ethiopian media frames Egypt as uncooperative. Considering negotiations have been held for over a decade, and considering the occasional threats between politicians in both countries, one may question the motivation behind such claims. As Sneddon and Fox (2006) note: “Cooperation in and of itself is not the desired end for third-world riparian governments who create transboundary governance institutions; rather, cooperation is perceived as the basis for proceeding with the development of water resources encompassed by basins. This has typically implied significant interventions in the form of hydroelectric dams, large-scale irrigation works, and other infrastructure projects”. It should therefore be considered that Ethiopia may claim it cooperates to pursue its goal of the GERD’s construction, while Egypt does the same to contest the Dam.
54 7.2 THEORETICAL REFLECTION
The counter-hydro-hegemony framework has provided an interesting lens through which to study Ethio-Egyptian relations in the context of the GERD project. The conceptual scheme of counter-hydro-hegemony shows the spheres in which hegemons may base their power (material, ideational and bargaining), but does not yet include the tactics that are precisely used by the presumed counter-hegemon. The application of the counter-hydro-hegemony framework on the Ethiopian case has shown that in fact, Ethiopia has made use of similar tactics as Egypt in increasing its power over the Nile. Besides making use of the resource capture strategy as established in the hydro-hegemony framework, it also makes use of hegemonic compliance- producing mechanisms, such as securitization of the GERD. Therefore, one could argue that it also makes use of the containment strategy, as Egypt is presumed to do. As it unilaterally constructed and started filling the GERD, it has further been able to drastically increase its bargaining power and utilize the waters of the Nile. Ethiopia’s role of changing the facts on the ground by damming the waters of the Nile seems to shift the country’s standing towards hegemony. Due to these points, it becomes increasingly difficult to say who the hegemon in this dynamic is.
Gramsci had in mind a ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’ to contest hegemony. Counter-hegemony as he conceptualized it is not to understood as simply another hegemony. Instead, Ethiopia’s actions would have to be understood as its political, economic and ideational preparation for overthrowing Egypt’s hegemony. Although this notion shifts an interesting angle on Ethio-Egyptian relations, naming Egypt the hegemon and Ethiopia the counter-hegemon with such definiteness can, for reasons discussed above, be problematic. A point that is most important to be considered by readers of this study is moreover the effect of using a concept such as hydro-hegemony in transboundary conflict. If one aims to ease tensions between two nations, accusing one of exercising ‘hegemony’ will most likely not reduce tensions, but might evoke even more negative sentiments.
Cascão and Zeitoun have noted that “explicit consideration of the non-hegemonic actor(s) offers valuable insights into the process and outcome of transboundary water interaction” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010, 28). Nevertheless, such assumptions have also been criticized by scholars like Tawfik Amer, who notes that “by seeing counter-hegemonic tools as legitimate means to create social and political change, hydro-hegemonic scholars have uncritically
55 endorsed these tools, even if implicitly” (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 6). Readers should therefore bear in mind both of these aspects when assessing the GERD’s impact on Ethio-Egyptian relations.
7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This research has explored narratives on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that have been circulated within both Ethiopia and Egypt. The application of the hydro-hegemony and counter-hydro-hegemony frameworks has provided an overview of dominant discourses within both countries. The scope of this research is nevertheless quite broad, therefore various points could not be explored in further depth. Firstly, a large-scale collection of interviews among Egyptians could provide valuable insights on how previously discussed narratives on the GERD are perceived among citizens. Future research could moreover be concerned with exploring some of the following questions: how and to what extent have international media outlets circulated Egyptian or Ethiopian narratives depicted in this study (e.g. the securitization of the Nile)? Do media outlets from certain countries (e.g. from the MENA region) frame the GERD differently than others (e.g. North-American)? What aspects is the securitization of the Nile precisely linked to in Egypt (e.g. agricultural issues) and how are these narratives constructed? How does the GERD shape Ethiopians’ (national) identities and forms of citizenship? Are there any differences in how the GERD is perceived among different ethnic groups in Ethiopia? There are also a number of questions that can only be answered when the GERD has been finalized, such as its impact on different spheres of Ethiopia’s socio-economic development (e.g. its energy sector, national education, the rural/urban divide, etc.).
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has shown some of the complexities inherent in riparian relations on the Nile. If one aims to ease tensions between riparian nations, especially between Ethiopia and Egypt, several measures could be taken. Necessarily, some sort of negotiations would have to take place to allow for multilateral agreement. An important component of this would be an agreement on a filling schedule that would balance Ethiopia’s pursuits to utilize the Nile while not significantly reducing Egypt’s water supply, though the negotiations have proven this difficult. Furthermore, measures to allocate specific amounts of water to Egypt in the case of
56 drought have been proposed, but have so far not been implemented. Another concern are the legal aspects, which have been shown to have great influence over hydro-politics in the Nile basin. As Egypt rejects the Cooperative Framework Agreement and Ethiopia does not recognize the colonial-era treaties, riparian nations could jointly debate alternative prospects in legal matters in the basin. To ease tensions between the two nations, negotiations could furthermore be held in a cooperative spirit. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed could for example invite el-Sisi to the GERD site to create mutual trust and send a message of their cooperative efforts to the public. Moreover, educational material and independent studies that explain the technicalities of the GERD could be distributed among citizens.
As the study has shown, both countries’ positions nevertheless can be traced back to own geopolitical interests. Realistically seen, their willingness to even ease tensions may be questioned, thus it is uncertain to what extent such recommendations would be implemented. One aim of this study is nevertheless to create awareness of the different narratives that have been circulated in both countries, and what the motivations behind such narratives could be. Hopefully, this study enables readers to critically reflect on their perception of the GERD and Ethio-Egyptian relations.
57 References
Abtew, W. and Dessu, S.B. 2019. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Switzerland: Springer Geography. Arsano, Y. 2007. Ethiopia and the Nile. Dilemmas of National and Regional Hydropolitics. PhD Dissertation. Zurich: Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.
BBC. 2018. “The ‘water war’ brewing over the new River Nile dam”, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43170408
Blatter, J., Ingram, H. and P.M. Doughman. 2000. “Emerging Approaches to Comprehend Changing Global Contexts”, in M.E. Kraft and S. Kamieniecki (Eds.), Reflections on Water: New Approaches to Transboundary Conflicts and Cooperation.
Bryman. 2012. Social Research Methods. 4th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cascão, A.E. 2008. “Ethiopia – Challenges to Egyptian hegemony in the Nile Basin”, Water Policy, Vol. 10 (2), 13-28.
Cascão, A.E. 2009. “Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: Unilateralism vs. Cooperation?”, Water Alternatives, Vol. 2(2), 245-268.
Cascão, A.E. and Zeitoun, M. 2010. “Power, Hegemony and Critical Hydropolitics”, Analytical Approaches to Transboundary Water Management, Vol. 14 (7), 27-42.
Chen, H. and Swain, A. 2014. “The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Evaluating Its Sustainability Standard and Geopolitical Significance”, Energy Development Frontier, Vol. 3(1), 11-19.
CIA. 2020. Ethiopia: Fact Sheet. Central Intelligence Agency. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_et.html
Council of Foreign Relations. 2018. “Ethiopia: East Africa’s Emerging Giant”, available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ethiopia-east-africas-emerging-giant
Crisisgroup. 2020.”The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A Timeline”, available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam- timeline
Deutsche Welle. 2020. „Credit crunch pushing sweeping changes in Ethiopia“, available at: https://www.dw.com/en/credit-crunch-pushing-sweeping-changes-in-ethiopia/a-44278475
Dinar, S. 2000.“Negotiations and International Relations: A Framework for Hydropolitics“, in International Negotiation, Vol. 5, 375-407.
58 el-Sisi, Abdel Fattah. “Egypt – President Addresses General Debate, 74th Session”. Speech, New York City, September 24th, 2019. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bj935lPz0AY&t=801s
Elhance, A. P. 1999. Hydropolitics in the third world. Conflict and co-operation in international river basins. Washington DC: United States of America Institute of Peace Press.
Elhance, A.P. 2000. “Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope”, International Negotiation, Vol. 5, 201-222.
Falkenmark, M. and Lundqvist, J. 1998. “Towards water security: Political determination and human adaptation crucial”, Natural Resources Forum Vol. 21 (1), 37-51.
Foreignassistance.gov. 2020. Available at: https://www.foreignassistance.gov/
Frey, F.W. 1993. “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins”, Water International, Vol. 18 (1), 54-68.
Gebreluel, G.. 2014.”Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37 (2), 25-37.
German Bundestag. 2020. “Sachstand: Der Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – Wasserpolitik der Anrainerstaaten des Nils”, Wissenschaftliche Dienste. WD 2 – 3000 – 015/20, available at: https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/691208/4055cb090414c5f997e66fff804b 8b42/WD-2-015-20-pdf-data.pdf
Gleick, P. 1995. “Freshwater resources and international security”, In Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, Lynn-Jones S.M. and Miller S.E. (eds), MIT Press: Cambridge, USA.
Hall, S., Lumley, R. and G. McLennan. 2007. “Politics and Ideology: Gramsci“, In A. G., J. C., M. Erickson, S. H., & H. W. (Eds.), CCCS Selected Working Papers (Vol. 1). Routledge.
Hammond, M. 2013. “The Grand Renaissance Dam and the Blue Nile: implications for transboundary water governance”, Global Water Forum, Canberra, Australia.
Hart, M. 2016. “Why was Ethiopia not colonized during the nineteenth-century ‘Scramble for Africa’?” in A History of the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Homer-Dixon, T.F. 1994. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases”, International Security, Vol. 19 (1), 5-40.
Hsie, H.F. and Shannon, S.E. 2005. “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis”, Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 15 (1277).
Hultin, J. 1995. “The Nile: Source of Life, Source of Conflict”. In Ohlsson, L. (Ed.): Hydropolitics: Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint. London: Zed Books.
59
Im, H.B. 1991. “Hegemony and counter-hegemony in Gramsci”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 15 (1) (Spring-Summer), 123-156.
IPoE. 2013. “Agreement on Declaration of Principles between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on the GERDP”, available at: https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/121609/Agreement-on-Declaration- of-Principles-between-Egypt%2C-Ethiopia-and--Sudan-on-the-GERDP?lang=en-us
Jones, S. 2006. Antonio Gramsci. London and New York: Routledge.
Lincoln, Y. S., and Guba, E. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Lustick, I. S. (2002). “Hegemony and the riddle of nationalism: the dialectics of nationalism and religion in the Middle East”, Logos, Vol. 1 (3) (Summer), 18–44.
Menga. 2016. “Reconceptualizing hegemony: the circle of hydrohegemony“, in Water Policy, Vol. 18 (2), 401•418.
National Planning Commission. 2016. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II), Vol. I. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Nile Basin Initiative. 2020. “Who we are”, available at: https://nilebasin.org/nbi/who-we-are
Nile Basin Resources Atlas. 2020. “Demography: Estimated and projected total population of Nile Basin Countries”, available at: http://atlas.nilebasin.org/treatise/estimated-and-projected- total-population-in-nile-basin-countries/
Postel, S.L. 2000. “Entering an Era of Water Scarcity: The Challenges Ahead”, Ecological Applications, Vol. 10 (4), 941-948.
Przeworski, A. 1980. "Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System", in Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 1.
Reuters. 2018. „Manager of Ethiopia’s $4 billion Nile dam project committed suicide: police”, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-dam/manager-of-ethiopias- 4-billion-nile-dam-project-committed-suicide-police-idUSKCN1LN1LL Reuters. 2020. “Ethiopia postpones August election due to coronavirus”, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-election/ethiopia-postpones-august-election-due- to-coronavirus-idUSKBN21I2QU
Sneddon, C. and Fox, C. 2006. “Rethinking transboundary waters: A critical hydropolitics of the Mekong Basin”, Political Geography, Vol. 25, 181-202.
Tesfaye, M. 2016. “The Imperative of Stepping-up Ethiopian Diaspora’s Contribution to Hedase Dam (GERD), available at: http://aigaforum.com/article2016/GERD-and-Diaspora- 041516.pdf
60 The Brookings Institute. 2020. “The controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/the- controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.
The East African. 2020. “MELES: US ‘overstepped’ mandate on Nile waters talks”, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Ethiopia-US-overstepped-mandate-on-Nile-waters- talks/4552908-5499770-sr97p5/index.html.
The Economist. 2019. “Ethnic violence threatens to tear Ethiopia apart”, available at: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/11/02/ethnic-violence-threatens-to- tear-ethiopia-apart.
The New York Times. 2018. “Death That Spurred Ethiopian Conspiracy Theories Is Ruled a Suicide”, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/world/africa/ethiopia-dam- engineer-suicide.html.
The World Bank. 2018. “Ethiopia’s Transformational Approach to Universal Electrification”, available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/08/ethiopias- transformational-approach-to-universal-electrification.
The World Bank. 2020. “The World Bank in Ethiopia”, available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview.
Tigrai Online. 2013. „Egyptian politicians caught plotting how to attack Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”, available at:http://www.tigraionline.com/articles/egypt-plan-attack- gerd.html.
Turton, A.R. 2000. “A Cryptic Hydropolitical History of the Nile Basin for Students of Hydropolitics”. Pretoria: Study Guide for Pretoria University.
Turton, A.R. 2002. “Hydropolitics: The concept and its limitations”, in Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective”, Turton A. and Henwood, R. (eds), African Water Issues Research Unit: University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.
Verhoeven, H. 2013. The politics of African energy development: Ethiopia’s hydro- agricultural state building strategy and clashing paradigms of water security. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.
VOA News. 2020.”Massive Nile Dam Hits First Filling Target, Says Ethiopia’s Prime Minister”, available at: https://www.voanews.com/africa/massive-nile-dam-hits-first-filling- target-says-ethiopias-prime-minister
Waterbury, J. 1997. “Between Unilateralism and Comprehensive Accords: Modest Steps toward Cooperation in International River Basins”, International Journal of Water Resources Development, Vol. 13(3), 279-290.
Wayne, M. 2019. Stuart Hall, Gramsci and Us. doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.17430.40007. Williams, P. 2002. “Nile Cooperation through hydro-realpolitik? (Review of Taffesse 2001
61 and Waterbury 2001)”. Third-World Quarterly, Vol. 6 (3), 1189–1196.
World Economic Forum. 2019.”This is the water crisis that Egypt is facing”, available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/11/water-crisis-builds-in-egypt-as-dam-talks-falter- temperatures-rise/.
Yihdego, Z., Rieu-Clarke, A. and A. E. Cascao. 2018. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Implications for Transboundary Water Cooperation. London and New York: Routledge.
Yoffe, S. B., Wolf, A. T. and Giordano, M. 2001. “Conflict and Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators and Findings of the Basins at Risk”, Journal of American Water Resources Association, Vol. 39 (5), 1109–1126.
Zeitoun, M. and Warner, J. 2006. “Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans- boundary water conflict”, Water Policy, Vol. 8, 435-460.
Zwarteveen et al. 2017. “Engaging with the politics of water governance“, WIREs Water, Vol. 4 (01245).
62 Appendix I: Map of the Nile and Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53573154 63 Appendix 2: List of media items analyzed
2. 1 Ethiopian media items analyzed: “Egypt is sailing against the wind, squandering its opportunity,” Diplomat Zerihun Abebe”, Ethiopian Press Agency: https://www.press.et/english/?p=20054#
“MELES: US ‘overstepped’ mandate on Nile waters talks”, The East African, March 21st, 2020: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Ethiopia-US-overstepped-mandate-on-Nile- waters-talks/4552908-5499770-view-asAMP- 1295rdhz/index.html?__twitter_impression=true
“GERD: issue of survival, sovereignty” Ethiopian Press Agency, October 17th, 2019: https://www.press.et/english/?p=14200#
“Egypt’s Nile monopoly is over”, Ethiopia Insight, April 9th, 2020: https://www.ethiopia- insight.com/2020/04/09/egypts-nile-monopoly-is- over/?fbclid=IwAR0zm33WS_iOY4xdOsRlIa0bCHFEhtg4SmYBG8qVLWfHIOtc9hylbWu9 SBc “Ethiopia does not need Egypt’s permission to start filling GERD”, Ethiopia Insight, March 30th, 2020: https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/03/30/ethiopia-does-not-need-egypts- permission-to-start-filling-gerd/ “Hypocrisy or blind ignorance: the GERD, SDGs and current stance of international actors” The Reporter Ethiopia, 28th March, 2020: https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/hypocrisy-or-blind-ignorance-gerd-sdgs-and- current-stance-international-actors
“For sake of justice, U.S. must reset its navigation of Nile file”, Ethiopia Insight, March 23rd, 2020: https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/03/23/for-sake-of-justice-u-s-must-reset-its- navigation-of-nile-file/ “Ethiopia: Putting the Facts Straight On The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”, AllAfrica, 31st March, 2020: https://allafrica.com/stories/202004010250.html
“The International Media’s misrepresentation of Ethiopia on the GERD”, Addis Standard, April 14th, 2020: https://addisstandard.com/opinion-the-international-medias- misrepresentation-of-ethiopia-on-the-gerd/ “How Ethiopia’s history of resistance shaped the ongoing battle for the Nile”, Addis Standard, March 2nd, 2020: http://addisstandard.com/opinion-how-ethiopias-history-of- resistance-shaped-the-ongoing-battle-on-the-nile/
2.2 Egyptian media items analyzed:
Address of al-Sisi at 74th UN General Assembly (from 13:15 minute): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bj935lPz0AY
64 “Nile waters are of vital importance to Egypt and its people: Sisi on GERD”, Egypt Independent, January 18th, 2020: https://egyptindependent.com/nile-waters-are-of-vital- importance-to-egypt-and-its-people-sisi-on-gerd/ “Egypt slams Ethiopian statement on Arab League support over GERD”, Egypt Independent, March 8th, 2020: https://egyptindependent.com/egypt-slams-ethiopian-statement-on-arab- league-support-over-gerd/ “Owning GERD does not give Ethiopia right to control the Nile”, Daily News Egypt: https://cdn1.dailynewsegypt.com/2020/03/04/owning-gerd-does-not-give-ethiopia-right-to- control-nile-shoukry/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=379bdf8ff6383188a8dbbe5ed375c42726304b6f- 1586943847-0- AWGhIuscNi8KtIVJdnubBxfIpLvShhKt4z0cfSAfU2s5J2UtE_7RBT52hiVJ7nPMLr0QAgV g- XQ8WU1ZJ2LVxy8TOKRAsKjfgD7KS3FX89IJQhzMFRJZatItPW6YykyqGzC2JCV89DV eXTgi9MvrDypJ41aBfW4lb4hsnc3zdKFN2PE2gaxQzStG0lAxPGmq6NWyh2lbdovqyWX0 oFnChxXG1oX- HTOLM1h87HTc_ALKLn4SFXlldNPPfCgi4RVcIVnjbukGKz_Qr8mG_tN2qqVdyx5B7sJR Z_83EEMBp1fnJpP0aeZOzVGdTEeYyqxfULx16FJeB5Otm9zFj2fuIDHTp- CGGn5ePLMuwNo-s3L-Prlo51zTrDKFckUMb_AFEg “Tensions rise again between Egypt, Ethiopia over GERD after U.S.-sponsored negotiations”, Daily News Egypt: https://cdn1.dailynewsegypt.com/2020/03/03/tensions-rise-again- between-egypt-ethiopia-over-gerd-after-us-sponsored-negotiations/
“Egyptians can never give up on their Nile water rights”, Daily News Egypt, March 11th, 2020: https://wwww.dailynewssegypt.com/2020/03/11/egyptians-can-never-give-up-on-their- nile-water-rights-irrigation-minister/ “Will Egypt allow Ethiopia to equivocate until GERD becomes a fait accompli?”, Egypt Independent, March 18th, 2020: https://wwww.dailynewssegypt.com/2020/03/18/will-egypt- allow-ethiopia-to-equivocate-until-gerd-becomes-a-fait-accompli/
“Water Rivalry on the Nile”, The Cairo Review, April 14th, 2020: https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/water-rivalry-on-the-nile/
“The Ethiopian Dam: a game bigger than generating electricity”, United World, April 7th, 2020: https://uwidata.com/9688-the-ethiopian-dam-a-game-bigger-than-generating-electricity/ “Ethiopia not seeking a deal on Nile dam and not offering an alternative: Egyptian minister”, ahram online, March 10th, 2020: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/365042/Egypt/Politics-/Ethiopia-not-seeking- a-deal-on-Nile-dam-and-not-of.aspx
2.3 International media items analyzed:
“Ethiopia won’t be forced by US on dam, foreign minister says”, AP News, March 13th, 2020: https://apnews.com/39183ccfeed1c0796ad38796d459ff3b
65 “Egypt and Ethiopia resume their Nile rivalry”, Bloomberg, March 23rd, 2020: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-23/egypt-and-ethiopia-resumetheir- nile-rivalry
“The ‘water war’ brewing over the new River Nile dam”, BBC, February 24th, 2018: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43170408
“Ethiopia: Dam dispute stoked anti-Egypt feelings”, Middle East Monitor, April 3rd, 2020: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200403-ethiopia-dam-dispute-stokes-anti-egypt- feelings/ “Ethiopia on Renaissance Dam: ‘We will not suffer for the sake of Egypt’s prosperity’”, Middle East Monitor, April 4th, 2020: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200404- ethiopia-on-renaissance-dam-we-will-not-suffer-for-the-sake-of-egypts-prosperity/ “Mighty Nile River threatened by waste, warming and a giant Ethiopian dam”, The Japantimes, March 26th, 2020: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/26/world/nile- river-ethiopia-dam/
“Nile dam still raging, despite global pause for COVID-19”, The Africa Report, April 8th, 2020: https://www.theafricareport.com/25874/nile-dam-still-raging-despite-global-pause-for- covid-19/ “”Technische Gespräche” über Nilstaudamm vereinbart”, Deutsche Welle, October 24th, 2019: https://www.dw.com/de/technische-gespr%C3%A4che-%C3%BCber-nilstaudamm- vereinbart/a-50977956 “For Thousands of Years, Egypt Controlled the Nile. A New Dam Threatens That”, February 9th, 2020: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/09/world/africa/nile-river-dam.html
66 Appendix 3: Map of Ethiopia
Source: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ethiopia-east-africas-emerging-giant
67 Appendix 4: Operationalization
Concept Dimensions Variables Indicators
What forms of international support does the hydro-hegemon International support enjoy, and by whom?
Is the hydro-hegemon able to rely on financial resources to Coercive resources Financial mobilization maintain its hegemonic position?
Is the hydro-hegemons geographic position of particular Riparian position advantage in maintaining its hegemony?
Through what form of (military) force, if any, does the hydro- Military force hegemon maintain its hegemonic position? Hydro-hegemony What forms of covert action, if any, has the hydro-hegemon Covert actions used to maintain its hegemony?
What forms of coercion-pressure, if any, has the hydro- Hydro-hegemonic tactics Coercion-pressure hegemon used to maintain its hegemony?
Through what treaties is hydro-hegemony maintained or Treaties justified?
Has the hydro-hegemon used securitization to maintain its Securitization hegemony, and if so, how? Has the hydro-hegemon used knowledge construction to Knowledge construction maintain its hegemony, and if so, how?
Has the hydro-hegemon used sanctioned discourse to maintain Sanctioned discourse its hegemony, and if so, how?
What Egyptian narratives/discourses have been circulated Deconstruction within Ethiopia to contest the GERD (if any), and how?
Counter-hydro- What narratives have been circulated within Ethiopia to attract National support hegemony national support for the GERD? Construction What narratives/discourses have been circulated to attract International support international support for the GERD?
69