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LIMEN Journal of the Hungarian Migration Research Institute 1 (2020/1) LIMEN Journal of the Hungarian Migration Research Institute 1 (2020/1) Limen Limen is a semiannual International Journal published by the Hungarian Migration Research Institute Articles published in the journal reflect the views of their authors and do not represent the official positions of the Migration Research Institute. Editorial Board: Abdessamad Belhaj, Tamás Dezső, Szabolcs Janik, Viktor Marsai, Balázs Orbán, Bianka Speidl, Norbert Tóth, Márk Vargha Editor-in-Chief: Viktor Marsai (Research Director, Migration Research Institute) Publisher: Tamás Dezső (Director, Migration Research Institute) P. O. Box 155, H-1518 Budapest, Hungary [email protected] ©Migration Research Institute Frontispiece: A girl from the minority Yazidi sect, fleeing the violence of the ISIS in the Iraqi town of Sinjar, rests at the Iraqi-Syrian border in Fishkhabour, Dohuk province August 13, 2014. REUTERS/Youssef Boudlal/File Photo – stock.adobe.com ISSN: 2732-0200 Founders: Table of Contents Foreword 4 Tamás Dezső Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Islamic State 5 Abdessamad Belhaj Burden Bearing, Burden Exporting: The Global Compact for Migration as Seen from the Arab World 85 Szabolcs Janik The Economic Impacts of the Migration Wave in Europe 98 Viktor Marsai Climate Change, Africa and Migration 113 Hanga Horváth-Sántha – Bianka Speidl “Stuck in One Place” 124 László Bernát Veszprémy Immigration and Antisemitic Incidents: An Overview from West and North Europe 134 Márk Vargha Closing the Doors – Paradigm Shift in the Danish Migration Policy 153 Hanga Horváth-Sántha – Bianka Speidl The Political Expansion of Islam 169 László Bernát Veszprémy A Peculiar Alliance: Progressive Parties and Muslim Voters in Certain Western European Countries 181 Márk Vargha A Snapshot of the Migration Situation in Finland 196 About the authors 211 Foreword With utmost delight, we announce the publication of Limen, a journal of migration studies published by the Migration Research Institute in Budapest. Within the spectrum of current journals of migration (some thirty journals published in various languages), there is a tendency to be disciplinary-focused (could be sociology, economy, political science or law oriented, depending on the editor) and/ or humanitarian-focused (embracing the narrative of migrants as victims). Limen follows a critical, realist and complex approach to migration. On the one hand, we endorse critical distance and views of migration insofar as migration flows express rational choices, motivated by social, political and economic interests. In line with this critical stance, our editorial line is focusing on the realities, the push and pull factors as well as the processes of migration. On the other hand, this journal is intended to be complex in terms of its scope, endeavouring an intersection of multiple research venues on migration in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, we encourage interdisciplinary insights grounded in field work; immediate sociology and history of migratory flows; the economic dimension of migration; the security challenges related to migration such as radicalisation, organised crime and anti-Semitism; the ways religious and political cultures shape migration, especially in the Middle East and Africa; challenges migration poses to national, European and international laws; and alternative narratives on climate migration. 4 Limen 1 (2020/1) Tamás Dezső Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Islamic State (Research Outline) Tamás Dezső Abstract The European (and western non-European) secret services seriously struggle – and surely will in the long run as well – with identifying the foreign fighters from their countries who either died or disappeared on the side of the Islamic State. Their unresolved cases will continue to be a great concern to the analysts and the heads of services. This study attempts to explore the magnitude of this problem. The jihadists who died in battles on the side of the Islamic State – were they western or local fighters – are admired as the first martyrs of a new heroic ethos in a significant part of the Sunni Islamic world. These “heroes” and returning “veterans” will give the new example to be followed by the new generations of jihadists. A great number of foreign terrorist fighters had already fought in various radical, jihadist Muslim organisations well before the proclamation of the Islamic State of 29 June 2014 in Mosul. It is enough to think of Afghanistan (the mujahideen already fighting against the Soviet troops, then the jihadists fighting on the side of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban), or the thousands of volunteers fighting on the side of the Iraqi troops in the second Gulf War. News reports had already presented such cases before, but they became a mass security policy problem only after the appearance and expansion of the Islamic State, and its fall in its territorial dimensions and state structure in late 2017. The West has been concerned with the following issues ever since: 1) what should be done with the re5turning fighters (whether to criminalise or attempt to reintegrate them into society as if nothing has happened); 2) what should be done with their families (in particular with their sons); how to investigate 3) who died and 4) who disappeared from among the returning fighters. The question arises whether the fighters from the West who had travelled to any of the frontlines of the Islamic State (primarily to Syria or Iraq) but failed to return to their countries of origin actually died, or still live their active or passive movement life as disappeared persons, ready for becoming active fighters of the ideology in a new war frontline or in the world of terrorism. 5 Tamás Dezső Limen 1 (2020/1) If they happen to “repent of their sins” and return to their countries of origin, can one believe that they will live a peaceful civil life, and that they will not organise any further acts under the ideology of the Islamic jihad? 1. Introduction A great number of foreign terrorist fighters1had already fought in various radical, jihadist Muslim organisations well before the proclamation of the Islamic State of 29 June 2014 in Mosul. It is enough to think of Afghanistan (the mujahideen already fighting against the Soviet troops, then the jihadists fighting on the side of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban), or the thousands of volunteers fighting on the side of the Iraqi troops in the second Gulf War.2 News reports had already presented such cases before, but they became a mass security policy problem only after the appearance and expansion of the Islamic State, and its fall in its territorial dimensions and state structure suffered with the recapture of Mosul on 9 July 2017 and of Raqqa on 17 October 2017, finally defeated in these terms on 23 March 2019 (losing the town of Baghouz). At the outset it is important to make it clear that the concept of foreign terrorist fighter is still transitional, and better understanding requires much more systematic researches and foundations. The concept itself and the phenomenon are still in the stage of “fundamental researches”, and as David Malet, a theorist of the field remarked, the phenomenon still lacks a widely used term in the literature on political theory,3 adding that the “foreign nature” of the foreign terrorist fighter is just a matter of perspective: we try to judge these fighters as “foreign” from our – call it European – point of view in their welcoming jihadist environment, which we hardly understand anyway. Their “foreign nature” in the jihadist environment where they fight proves to be only temporary. According to Hegghammer, a foreign terrorist fighter is someone who (1) has joined, and operates within the confines of an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organisation, and 1 This study uses the concept of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), widely used in the international literature. 2 A relatively high number of foreign terrorist fighters fought in the following conflicts: Afghanistan (1978–1992): 5,000–10,000; Bosnia (1992–1995): 1,000–3,000; Somalia (1993–2014): 250– 450; Chechnya (1994–2009): 200–700; Afghanistan (2001–2014): 1,000–1,500 (Schmid 2015b, 3; šikman 2016, 164, note 6). 3 For earlier studies of the issue, as a foundation see Malet 2010; Malet 2013; Hegghammer 2010; Glušac 2015, pp 33–48. 6 Limen 1 (2020/1) Tamás Dezső (4) is unpaid.”4 As it can be seen, this early definition seems to also be changing – at least with regard to point (3) and (4) –, since the forces of these fighters were regularised at the latest by the Islamic State, and they were also provided with various benefits. Therefore, this study rather serves as a research outline, and supplements the continuously evolving professional discourse with the problems occurring after the fall of the Islamic State which could not be reflected yet in the previous literature. As already presented above, the globalisation of jihad had commenced earlier; however,5 the Islamic State advanced it to the next level in terms of its volume and scope. The Islamic State opened a new era in the history of jihad, since it was predominantly able to unify Sunni jihadist groups – operating as isolated groups prior to the proclamation of the Islamic State and the caliphate – under the same flag. These groups had been involved in local battles in the past, and they had to fight to be recognised by the local society, so they could be considered as the prophets and real fighters of the jihad by the local communities. However, following the proclamation of the Islamic State and the caliphate, nearly all of these local jihadist organisations – except for certain troops of the Taliban, the Al- Qaeda/al-Nusra Front/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – pledged allegiance to the caliph, and lined up under the flag of the Islamic State.

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