DOCSLIB.ORG

A Geriatric Peace? Mark L. Haas the Future of U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Geriatric Peace? Mark L. Haas the Future of U.S A Geriatric Peace? A Geriatric Peace? Mark L. Haas The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations In coming decades, the most powerful states in the international system will face a challenge unlike any other experienced in the history of great power politics: signiªcant aging of their populations. Due to steep declines in birthrates over the last century and substantial increases in life expectancies, all of the current great powers are growing older—in most cases at a substantial rate and extent.1 By 2050 at least 15 percent of the citizens in these states will be over 65.2 In Japan more than one out of every three people will be over this age. China alone in 2050 will have more than 329 million people over 65, which is equal to the entire current populations of France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom com- bined.3 As social aging progresses over the next half century, the populations in Germany, Japan, and Russia are expected to shrink signiªcantly. Russia’s population is already decreasing by nearly 700,000 people per year, and Japan, too, is currently experiencing absolute population decline.4 Russia’s aging problem is so severe that President Vladimir Putin asserted in 2006 that de- mography is “Russia’s most acute problem today.”5 Global aging has key ramiªcations for the future of international relations. This article concentrates on the effects of this variable for the future of U.S. security. Global population aging will inºuence U.S. foreign policies in ªve major Mark L. Haas is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University. For their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article, the author thanks Clifford Bob, Ste- phen Brooks, Jacques Hymans, Paul Staniland, William Wohlforth, and International Security’s anonymous reviewers. The author is also grateful for a Presidential Fellowship from Duquesne University, which aided in the completion of this article. 1. The eight states I consider to be great powers, based on a combination of current and potential military and economic power, are China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United King- dom, and the United States. 2. United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database (New York: United Nations, 2006), http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel?2, select variant: medium. Throughout the article, I use the medium variant of UN population projections to avoid what some might consider overly optimistic or pessimistic assumptions. Even the medium variant, however, anticipates a signiªcant increase in fertility rates in states that currently have very low numbers in this area. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.; and Norimitsu Onishi, “Japan’s Population Fell This Year, Sooner Than Expected,” New York Times, December 24, 2005. 5. Quoted in C.J. Chivers, “Putin Urges Plan to Reverse Slide in the Birthrate,” New York Times, May 11, 2006. International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 112–147 © 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 112 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.112 by guest on 27 September 2021 A Geriatric Peace? 113 ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states’ economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere ªscal environment that the other great powers will lack the re- sources necessary to overtake the United States’ huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difªculties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and ªscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be signiªcantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much re- cent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely.6 Second, global aging increases the likelihood of continued peaceful relations between the United States and the other great powers. Studies have shown that the probability of international conºict grows when either the dominant country anticipates a power transition in favor of a rising state or states, or when such a transition actually takes place.7 By adding substantial support to the continuation of U.S. hegemony, global aging works against either outcome from transpiring. An aging world therefore decreases the probability that ei- ther hot or cold wars will develop between the United States and the other great powers. 6. On this debate, see Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). I am referring to traditional “hard” balancing, which involves di- rect military power and threats, not “soft” balancing, which includes such actions as withholding cooperation from the hegemon, attempting to restrict the hegemon’s freedom of action through entangling diplomacy in prominent international organizations, and economically aiding the hegemon’s potential enemies. On this debate, see Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7–45. 7. Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.112 by guest on 27 September 2021 International Security 32:1 114 Third, the effects of global aging will likely increase the United States’ uni- lateral foreign policy tendencies. The aging problem in the other great powers is so severe that these states will have tremendous difªculty maintaining the extent of their international commitments. Consequently, when the United States engages in major international undertakings in the future, the other ma- jor actors in the system will be able to offer less help than they can today. Fourth, although the United States is in better demographic shape than the other great powers, it, too, will confront massive new costs created by its own aging population. As a result, it will most likely be unable to maintain its cur- rent international position. Thus while the United States will be even more se- cure from great power rivalry than it is today, it (and its allies) will be less able to realize other key international objectives, including preventing the prolifer- ation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), funding nation building, engag- ing in military humanitarian interventions, and mitigating the effects of local security problems. Global aging, in short, is likely to result in a great power “geriatric peace,” but this same phenomenon may threaten other important U.S. international interests, including by facilitating international conºict in non-great power relations. Fifth, as the costs created by the United States’ aging population grow, the saliency of neo-isolationist or “offshore balancing” grand strategies is likely to increase.8 In a time of ªscal austerity brought on by social aging, these strate- gies are likely to become more compelling because they mesh with the need to reduce spending. An aging world therefore increases the likelihood that the United States will withdraw from the international system even more than budget constraints dictate. Despite the great signiªcance of global aging for the future of international politics in general and U.S. security in particular, little systematic analysis in the international relations literature has been dedicated to this subject. Most prominent analyses of great power politics and the balancing debate with re- gard to U.S. power, for example, either do not mention this issue or do so only in passing.9 More generally, scholars have long recognized the importance of population to states’ economic and military power, but no study analyzes in a comprehensive manner the effects of social aging on these relationships (until recently, signiªcant population aging was not considered a likely outcome). 8. See Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 233–248. 9. For a partial exception, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the Twenty-ªrst Century (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), pp. 182–186. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.112 by guest on 27 September 2021 A Geriatric Peace? 115 There are a number of studies outside international relations scholarship that examine the scope and various effects of population aging; issues of interna- tional security, however, receive relatively little attention in these works. This article seeks to ªll these important gaps in the literature. My analysis is divided into ªve sections. The ªrst section provides background information on the causes of global aging. The second and third sections examine the eco- nomic and ªscal costs created by this phenomenon and various means of pay- ing these costs, respectively.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • ASD-Covert-Foreign-Money.Pdf
    overt C Foreign Covert Money Financial loopholes exploited by AUGUST 2020 authoritarians to fund political interference in democracies AUTHORS: Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley © 2020 The Alliance for Securing Democracy Please direct inquiries to The Alliance for Securing Democracy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1700 18th Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 E [email protected] This publication can be downloaded for free at https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/covert-foreign-money/. The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the authors alone. Cover and map design: Kenny Nguyen Formatting design: Rachael Worthington Alliance for Securing Democracy The Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD), a bipartisan initiative housed at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, develops comprehensive strategies to deter, defend against, and raise the costs on authoritarian efforts to undermine and interfere in democratic institutions. ASD brings together experts on disinformation, malign finance, emerging technologies, elections integrity, economic coercion, and cybersecurity, as well as regional experts, to collaborate across traditional stovepipes and develop cross-cutting frame- works. Authors Josh Rudolph Fellow for Malign Finance Thomas Morley Research Assistant Contents Executive Summary �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 Introduction and Methodology ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
    [Show full text]
  • April 2000 – February 2001)
    U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (click on heading to be linked directly to that section) Phase 1 (July 1998 - August 1999) Major Themes And Implications Supporting Research And Analysis Phase 2 (August 2000 – April 2000) Seeking A National Strategy: A Concert For Preserving Security And Promoting Freedom Phase 3 (April 2000 – February 2001) Roadmap For National Security: Imperative For Change 71730_DAPS.qx 10/12/99 5:06 PM Page #1 NEW WORLD COMING: AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY MAJOR THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century September 15, 1999 71730_DAPS.qx 10/12/99 5:06 PM Page #3 Preface In 1947, President Harry Truman signed into law the National Security Act, the landmark U.S. national security legislation of the latter half of the 20th century. The 1947 legislation has served us well. It has undergirded our diplomatic efforts, provided the basis to establish our military capa- bilities, and focused our intelligence assets. But the world has changed dramatically in the last fifty years, and particularly in the last decade. Institutions designed in another age may or may not be appropriate for the future. It is the mandate of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century to examine precise- ly that question. It has undertaken to do so in three phases: the first to describe the world emerging in the first quarter of the next century, the second to design a national security strategy appropri- ate to that world, and the third to propose necessary changes to the national security structure in order to implement that strategy effectively.
    [Show full text]
  • The Diaspora of Korean Children: a Cross-Cultural Study of the Educational Crisis in Contemporary South Korea
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2007 The Diaspora of Korean Children: A Cross-Cultural Study of the Educational Crisis in Contemporary South Korea Young-ee Cho The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Cho, Young-ee, "The Diaspora of Korean Children: A Cross-Cultural Study of the Educational Crisis in Contemporary South Korea" (2007). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 1244. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/1244 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE DIASPORA OF KOREAN CHILDREN: A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF THE EDUCATIONAL CRISIS IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH KOREA By Young-ee Cho B.A Economics / East Asian Languages and Cultures, Indiana University, 1986 M.B.A. International Marketing, Indiana University, 1988 Dissertation presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Montana Missoula, MT Summer 2007 Approved by: Dr. David A. Strobel, Dean Graduate School Dr. Roberta D. Evans, Chair School of Education Dr. C. LeRoy Anderson Dept of Sociology Dr. John C. Lundt Dept of Educational Leadership & Counseling Dr. William P. McCaw Dept of Educational Leadership & Counseling Dr. John C.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreignpolicyanalysis
    FOREIGNPOLICYANALYSIS Jakarta's Juggling Act: Balancing China and America in the Asia-Pacific Jessica Brown EXECUTIVE SUMMARY No. 5 • 3 February 2011 Indonesia, long thought of as a basket case, has emerged as one of the key players in the Asia-Pacific. Its democracy, while young and still consolidating, has proved to be remarkably resilient. While other countries are undergoing painful recessions, thanks to the global financial crisis, Indonesia is experiencing sustained economic growth. It has emerged as a key regional player on the diplomatic stage, forging strong bilateral relationships with its neighbours and joining the influential G20 group of major economies. The archipelagic nation is also strategically significant. Straddling the Indian and Pacific oceans, it abuts the busy Malacca Strait—through which half of the world’s commercial tonnage sails—and the contested South China Sea. Any serious assessment of Southeast Asia’s security outlook must now include Indonesia. Indonesia’s overriding security concern is the rise of China. Like most of its neighbours, Indonesia sees both opportunities and threats in this emerging giant. Indonesia, which is rich in natural resources and in desperate need of foreign investment to update its inadequate infrastructure, knows that its economic development is tied to China’s growth. But while Indonesia wants to piggyback on China’s economic ascent, it does not want China to dominate the region politically. Instead, Indonesia would prefer to preserve the status quo. Its colonial history has made it wary of being dominated by great powers. However, it believes that the existing US-led security order is the best way to ensure China does not become the predominant security actor in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Solving the COVID-19 Vaccine Product Liability Problem
    Solving the COVID-19 Vaccine Product Liability Problem Sam F. Halabi CSAS Working Paper 21-11 Public Health: Regulation, Innovation, and Preparation Solving the COVID-19 Vaccine Product Liability Problem SAM F. HALABI* ABSTRACT The global roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines is under way. Governments have invested billions of dollars in supporting research, development, logistics and supply chains, as well as networks of healthcare providers to deliver vaccines to recipients all over the world. The European Commission and several international organizations have established the COVAX Facility to pool resources in promising candidates and to subsidize their procurement by low- and middle-income countries. Yet up- front investment in vaccine development and delivery solves only half the problem with respect to vaccine access. Risks of legal liabilities, particularly product liability for severe side effects, will serve as an important, if not decisive, factor in how vaccine manufacturers participate in the response with emergency use authorized and recently licensed COVID-19 vaccines. If they do not receive sufficient assurance against legal liability, especially product liability, they will not ship vaccines. There is limited experience with developing coronavirus vaccines, and severe side effects following immunization are inevitable, as evidence from Phase III trials and early administration of EUA vaccines strongly suggests. Therefore, there is a critical need to balance the risk calculations of manufacturers with the justice for immunization
    [Show full text]
  • Japan's Pivot to Normalcy
    Japan’s Pivot to Normalcy: Interpreting Tokyo’s Security Policy Revolution Ilai Z. Saltzman Government Department Claremont McKenna College Prepared to be delivered at the FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference, Buenos Aires, July 23-25 2014. ‐ 1 ‐ JAPAN’S PIVOT TO NORMALCY: INTERPRETING TOKYO’S SECURITY POLICY REVOLUTION The issue of China’s rise has occupied considerable scholarly attention in since the early 1990s. Recent domestic political developments in Japan suggest, however, that we should also pay close attention to Tokyo’s changing foreign and security policy. Rather than continuing a ten-year cut in the budget, this year the decision was made to actually increase it. Furthermore, Shinzō Abe’s government approved a new interpretation of Article 9 that facilitates the shift from basic self- defense to collective self-defense. The objective of this paper is to identify the causes and features of this dramatic and significant security policy reorientation. INTRODUCTION It has become a cliché to argue that China is rising. There seems to be no scholar or practitioner who can deny the fact that, given this development, a tectonic geopolitical and geostrategic change is taking place in East Asia. The only open question revolves around China’s ultimate objectives.1 In a dramatic decision, the Japanese government approved on July 1, 2014, the country’s right for collective self-defense, a reinterpretation of the Constitution that would allow Japan’s armed forces to provide military assistance to allies under attack even if Japan is not under direct attack.2 Defined by The Japan Times as “a landmark shift in the postwar defense posture”, by the Yomiuri Shimbun as “an indispensible step” or by the Asahi Shimbun as a “controversial policy shift” and the Mainichi Simbun as “impermissible”, this revision, once approved in the Japanese parliament will revolutionize the way Tokyo conducts it foreign and security policy vis-à-vis its 1 The literature on China’s ris is truly vast and it will be impossible to mention all of these studies.
    [Show full text]
  • Crossroads in Sino-Japanese Relations Exploring the Impact of Anti-Japanese Sentiment on Japanese Firms’ Business Relations in China
    CROSSROADS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT ON JAPANESE FIRMS’ BUSINESS RELATIONS IN CHINA Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis Submitted by Jane W. Wang 2005 © 2005 Jane W. Wang http://fletcher.tufts.edu CROSSROADS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT ON JAPANESE FIRMS’ BUSINESS RELATIONS IN CHINA by Jane W. Wang A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MALD The Fletcher School, Tufts University 2005 Approved by ___________________________________________________ Thesis Advisor __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ __________________________________________________ Program Authorized to Offer Degree _________________________________________________ Date __________________________________________________________ THE FLETCHER SCHOOL ABSTRACT CROSSROADS IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT ON JAPANESE FIRMS’ BUSINESS RELATIONS IN CHINA by Jane W. Wang Thesis Advisor: Professor Alan Wachman Do unresolved historical tensions negatively affect current business relations between countries? This paper explores the question of whether popular anti- Japanese sentiment in China impacts Japanese firms’ business relations in China. Drawing on relevant history, current trends, and key conceptual frameworks, the paper seeks to interpret the discrepant evidence from cases, media accounts, research studies, quantitative data
    [Show full text]
  • Toward an Interest Group Theory of Foreign Anti-Corruption Laws
    LEE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2019 1:39 PM TOWARD AN INTEREST GROUP THEORY OF FOREIGN ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS Sean J. Griffith* Thomas H. Lee** Foreign anti-corruption laws—laws that prohibit businesses from paying bribes abroad— present a puzzle. Why would the government of one country care to prevent corruption in other countries, especially when such laws harm domestic businesses? Unregulated foreign competitors can con- tinue to pay bribes and win contracts while domestic companies suffer. Yet foreign anti-corruption laws now span the globe. We offer an interest-group account of the spread of foreign anti-cor- ruption laws. Our account is bottom-up and focused on private interest groups, rather than top-down and focused on state institutions. We look at domestic political interests in the United States and abroad to explain both the enactment and the enforcement of foreign anti-corruption laws. Our principal focus is on each country’s business lobby. Our account explains observed patterns of enactment and enforce- ment of foreign anti-corruption laws and generates predictions concerning the efficacy of such laws based on the extraterritorial operations of multi- national businesses. It also suggests a limitation on the spread of such laws into countries with few or no multinational corporations and, therefore, no realistic extraterritorial enforcement risk. The essential features of our ac- count are: (1) after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) was en- acted in 1977, U.S. businesses pressured the government to urge foreign governments to ratify multilateral anti-corruption treaties to bind foreign companies to similar anti-bribery restrictions; (2) these treaties required all signatory nations to enact foreign anti-corruption laws, which, in the United States, led to statutory amendments to the FCPA that enabled gov- ernment agencies to apply the FCPA to foreign companies doing business in the United States; (3) as foreign companies operating in the United * T.
    [Show full text]
  • The Perils of Proximity
    The Perils of Proximity 00-0474-4 fm.indd 1 9/2/10 11:59 AM 00-0474-4 fm.indd 2 9/2/10 11:59 AM The Perils of Proximity China-Japan Security Relations Richard C. Bush Brookings Institution Press Washington, D.C. 00-0474-4 fm.indd 3 9/2/10 11:59 AM Copyright © 2010 the brookings institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20036 www.brookings.edu All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Brookings Institution Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data Bush, Richard C., 1947– The perils of proximity : China-Japan security relations / Richard C. Bush. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Summary: “Explores the factors underlying the security dilemma confronting Japan and China despite their positive economic interaction, including China’s growing military capability, the Japan-U.S. security alliance, and issues such as Japan’s occupation of China in the mid-twentieth century and rights in the East China Sea”—Provided by publisher. ISBN 978-0-8157-0474-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Japan—Military relations—China. 2. China—Military relations—Japan. 3. National security—Japan. 4. National security—China. I. Brookings Institution. II. Title. UA845.B88 2010 355'.03109510952—dc22 2010029382 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed on acid-free paper Typeset in Minion Composition by Cynthia Stock Silver Spring, Maryland Printed by R. R. Donnelley Harrisonburg, Virginia 00-0474-4 fm.indd 4 9/2/10 11:59 AM For
    [Show full text]
  • Democracy and Futures
    Democracy and Futures Eds. Mika Mannermaa Jim Dator Paula Tiihonen Kuva: Wäinö Aaltonen, The Future, 1932/1969 Bronze. Parliament of Finland, Assembly Chamber Committee for the Future Parliament of Finland tel. +358 9 4321 fax +358 9 432 2140 tuv@parliament.fi www.parliament.fi /TuV Democracy and Futures Eds. Mika Mannermaa Jim Dator Paula Tiihonen . ISBN 951-53-2885-3 (nid.) ISBN 951-53-2886-1 (PDF) Foreword This year the Parliament of Finland celebrated, in a great variety of ways, its 100-year history as an institution founded on equal and universal suffrage. The Committee for the Future decided that its own contribution to this celebration of democracy would be, in a spirit of futures work, to produce this book on the future of democracy. It is, naturally, difficult or nearly impossible to predict what democracy will look like in several decades’ time, but nonetheless collectively pondering what lies ahead is important also in politics. Because the Committee has felt from the beginning that a global examination is a valuable aspect of its work, we decided to ask international authors to contribute to this sounding of the future of democracy. Our most sincere thanks to all of the authors, and especially Professor Jim Dator and Dr. Mika Mannermaa for their expert guidance. Thanks are due also to the members of the Steering Group, Representatives Kyösti Karjula, Päivi Räsänen, Esko-Juhani Tennilä, Anne Huotari and Jyrki Kasvi, whose advice and evaluations contributed to the work in many ways. A warm thanks to Doctors Paula Tiihonen and Osmo Kuusi and Researcher Ulrica Gabrielsson from the Secretariat.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dragon's Shadow: the Rise of China and Japan's New Nationalism, Which I Hope Will Make an Important Contribution to Our Understanding of This Strategic Issue
    THE DRAGON’S SHADOW: THE RISE OF CHINA AND JAPAN’S NEW NATIONALISM Benjamin L. Self with an Afterword by Dr. Richard P. Cronin November 2006 ii | THE DRAGON’S SHADOW: THE RISE OF CHINA AND JAPAN’S NEW NATIONALISM Copyright ©2006 The Henry L. Stimson Center ISBN: 0-9770023-3-0 Photos by US Navy, Ben Lauray (Creative Commons Legal Code-Attribution 2.0), Anonymous (Creative Commons Legal Code-Attribution 2.0). Cover design by Rock Creek Creative. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Henry L. Stimson Center. The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone: 202-223-5956 fax: 202-238-9604 www.stimson.org TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents................................................................................................iii Preface ................................................................................................................ iv Chapter 1: Introduction and Conceptual Framework ......................................... 1 Chapter 2: Structures, Processes, and Agents in Japanese Policy-making.................................................................................................... 13 Chapter 3: Legacies of the Past in Japan-China Relations ............................... 27 Chapter 4: The Resurgence of Japanese Nationalism....................................... 51 Chapter 5: Reluctant Realism..........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Earthquakes, Nature, Planning, and the (Re)Construction of Japan, 1923-1995
    Bracing Japan: Earthquakes, Nature, Planning, and the (Re)Construction of Japan, 1923-1995 THESIS Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Keegan Cothern Graduate Program in East Asian Studies The Ohio State University 2016 Master's Examination Committee: Philip Brown, Advisor; Ying Zhang; Nicholas Breyfogle Copyright by Keegan Cothern 2016 Abstract Japan has been called, both internally and externally, an earthquake country. 10- 20% of the world's major earthquakes (magnitude 6 or greater) afflict a nation that comprises less than a single percent of the world's overall area. Such earthquakes have claimed the lives of around 165,000 Japanese in the past century, while the largest four events alone devastated some $450 billion worth of property. Yet, the Japan of today is hailed by international media to be a particularly earthquake-resilient nation with many advanced mitigating technologies and frameworks for planning and countermeasures to help lessen the impact of future seismic events. An examination of Japan's longer history, however, reveals an uneven implementation of lessons from previous disasters, be they in the form of city planning, the use of technology, or the management of environmental risk. Additionally, the same day-to-day technologies, buildings in which humans live and work, however have themselves long posed the greatest risk to lives during seismic events. Built urban environments in which humans and buildings are clustered are by definition the most dangerous during a disaster. Japan especially also has space limitations within urban environments due to the nature of its islands.
    [Show full text]