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____________________________________________________________________________________________________ Subject PSYCHOLOGY Paper No and Title Paper No 3: Qualitative Methods Module No and Title Module No 2: Logical Positivism Module Tag PSY_P3_M2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Learning Outcomes 2. Introduction 2.1 Historical Background 3. The Vienna Circle 3.1 Themes of Logical Positivism 4. The Main Philosophical Tenets of Logical Positivism 4.1 The Verifiability Principle 4.2 Sources of Knowledge 4.3 Reductionism and the Unity of Science 5. Limitations/Criticisms 5.1 Internal Weakness 5.2 External Criticisms 6. Logical positivism and Psychology 7. Summary PSYCHOLOGY PAPER No. 3: Qualitative Methods MODULE No. 2: Logical Positivism ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Learning Outcomes After studying this module, you shall be able to Understand how philosophical debates guide and govern research and knowledge production. Learn about the historical emergence of the logical positivist movement. Identify the influence of logical positivism in psychological research. Evaluate the major philosophical tenets of logical positivism. Analyze the weaknesses inherent in the principles of logical positivism. 2. Introduction One of the most influential schools of philosophy of science in the twentieth century was logical positivism. This school of philosophy developed in Austria and Germany in the 1920s and was also known as logical empiricism. The development of logical positivism was influenced by the rapid changes taking place in physical science and mathematics. Thus, this view upheld the notion that scientific knowledge was the most important kind of factual information that was available, and all metaphysical doctrines were to be rejected as meaningless. Since, science was believed to be the model for intellectual and social progress, logical positivists resorted to analyzing the structure of scientific knowledge and reasoning. The practice of logical positivism, believes in two major sources of knowledge, one being logical reasoning while the other being empirical experience. The proponents of logical positivism included Moritz Schlick, founder of the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, founder of the Berlin Circle, Alfred Jules Ayer, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Kurt Grelling, Hans Hahn, Carl Gustav Hempel, Victor Kraft, Otto Neurath, and Friedrich Waismann. Despite being influential, the movement was short lived. Many philosophers and scientists today believe that logical positivism has left an indelible mark on the philosophy of science. This influence of logical positivism is particularly noticeable in the attention philosophers give to the analysis of scientific thought and to the integration of results from technical research on formal logic and the theory of probability. To better understand these developments lets revisit the movement. 2.1 Historical Background The philosophy of logical positivism did not emerge in isolation. The questions and issues which had been raised by this circle of philosophers were no different from those raised previously at different times. This section focuses on the forces that influenced the development of logical positivism to a great extent. PSYCHOLOGY PAPER No. 3: Qualitative Methods MODULE No. 2: Logical Positivism ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2.1.1 Classical Empiricism: Logical positivism borrowed itself from 18th century classical empiricism, which postulated that all knowledge can be gained only through the senses. This position was opposite of the rationalist position, which stated that knowledge can be gained through the use of reason. One of the key figures of classical empiricism was John Locke (1632-1704). Locke proposed that everything is learnt and nothing is innate. It is through experiencing and learning that the mind is furbished. The mind of a new born child is, according to Locke, a tabula rasa or an empty slate and it is by experiencing the world through his/her senses that he/she develops ideas which become the source of all knowledge. Hence, the empiricist philosophers therefore strongly upheld that only sensory data could be treated as evidence which is verifiable in nature, instead of the metaphysical propositions favored by the rationalists. Other empiricists like David Hume (1711–1776), Thomas Hobbes (1588– 1679) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626) also emphasized on observable consequences of actions. Additionally, few American pragmatists like C. S. Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1962), also served as inspirational influence for the logical positivists. 2.1.2 Positivism: Logical positivism combined developments in empiricism and pragmatism with the existing positivist tradition, whose primary propagator was the French philosopher Auguste Comte. Comte’s ideas influenced both sciences- Natural and Social. The positivist approach believed that, the society functions in similar manner as the physical world, since the basic principles and general laws are applicable in both. In physics, the French mathematician as well as a philosopher-Jules Henri Poincare(1854- 1912) applied the positivist ideas, so as to construct a mechanism for comprehending and measuring human sensations and perceptions in terms of basic physical concepts. Ernst Mach (1838–1916), an Austrian physicist took a similar view. He proposed that the laws of physics were synonymous to the laws of all other sciences (including natural sciences), and were just like a shorthand summary of the numerous relationships which exist between the experiences of different observers. Fig 1: Auguste Comte Fig 2: Ernst Mach 2.1.3 Russell’s Mathematical Logic: Bertrand Russell’s mathematical logic exerted a great influence on logical positivism. Much of Russell’s work was concerned with the desires for perfect clarity and absolute certainty resting on the belief that analysis can be pursued down to certain indivisible elements, which are in some way incorrigible, and hence justify the intellectual edifice constructed from them. For this purpose he distinguished knowledge by acquaintance, which is indubitable, from knowledge by description, which PSYCHOLOGY PAPER No. 3: Qualitative Methods MODULE No. 2: Logical Positivism ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ may be in error. Examples of knowledge by acquaintance are sense data and the contents of our own memory. Borrowing from Russell, logical positivists not only adopted the thesis that all knowledge must be based on sense experience but were driven by the same motive of certainty and perfect clarity. 2.1.4 Wittgenstein's Tractatus was a text proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was of great importance for the positivists. This school of thought believed that the basic building blocks of reality are objects (simple and unanalyzable piece of information) which combine together to exist in a context forming the state of affairs. It has further focused on linguistic reforms by using modern logic and has also drawn attention to deducing a theoretically principled distinction between intelligible and nonsensical discourse. Wittgenstein's influence is further evident in certain formulations of the verification principle. Wittgenstein also influenced interpretation of probability by the logical positivists’. 3. The Vienna Circle The Vienna Circle was a group of scientifically trained philosophers and philosophically interested scientists, lead by Moritz Schlick. These professionals often met on Thursday evenings, every week, for discussing the problems regarding the philosophical dimension of scientific disciplines. The meetings began during the academic term, in the year 1924 and continued till 1936. These thinkers were greatly influenced by recent developments in science particularly Einstein’s physics, mathematical logic and philosophy of language and sought to synthesize these new ideas to institute a new philosophy. These groups of philosophers were against “German idealism” in particular, Hegel and Heidegger, who derived much of their ideas from German Idealism. They found their philosophies too abstruse and unclear. The Vienna Circle placed a high premium on reason, clarity and precision of language. They wanted to dispel mysticism, romanticism and nationalism. They also rejected the need for interpretation. Fig 3: Rudolf Carnap Schlick, who was the leader of the distinguished group, had been appointed to Mach's old chair in Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences at the University of Vienna in 1922. Apart from him, the group also involved participation of Hans Hahn (the mathematician), the social scientist Otto PSYCHOLOGY PAPER No. 3: Qualitative Methods MODULE No. 2: Logical Positivism ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ Neurath, and his wife, Olga Hahn-Neurath, who was a mathematician. In addition the philosopher Viktor Kraft was also a member of the group, along-with Theodor Radacovic and Gustav Bergmann (both of whom were mathematicians) and, lastly, Rudolf Carnap, a philosopher as well as a logician, who joined the circle only in 1926. After its formative phase, the Circle went public in 1928 and 1929. It is then that the Vienna Circle became popular amongst the population of intellects and began to play a prominent role in the academic as well as the public sphere.
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