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Worldly Patterns Emergence, Functionalism and Pragmatic Reality in Wallacian Quantum Mechanics

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Worldly Patterns Emergence, Functionalism and Pragmatic Reality in Wallacian Quantum Mechanics History and Philosophy of Science; Foundations of Physics Utrecht University: Master thesis Worldly Patterns Emergence, Functionalism and Pragmatic Reality in Wallacian quantum mechanics \While the wave-function realist will deny that three-dimensional objects and spatial structures find a place in the fundamental ontology, this is not to say that the three-dimensional objects surrounding us, with which we constantly interact, and which we perceive, think and talk about, do not exist; that there are no truths about them; it is just to maintain that they are emergent objects, rather than fundamental ones. But an emergent object is no less real for being emergent." | David Wallace & Christopher Timpson Advisors: Author: Dr. Guido Bacciagaluppi Ruward Arthur Mulder Dr. Ronnie Hermens 15th August, 2018 But I love extravagance And wanting it has handed down The glitter and glamour of the sun As my inheritance |Sappho of Lesbos (630-570 BCE) Scientific summary David Wallace's The Emergent Multiverse is the most recent complete presentation of a version of Everett's theory of quantum mechanics that has attracted much scientific activity in the past decade. I present a brief sketch of Wallace's solution to the measure- ment problem, arguing that the many-worlds interpretation is not as far-fetched as it is often conceived to be. Taking the wavefunction as the fundamental ontology, it claims to solve the measurement problem by recognizing certain (quasi-classical) patterns of the wavefunction in 3N-dimensional configuration space that functionally behave like the (classical) configuration-space pattern of a N-particle system described by classical mechanics. In this sense, structures within the universal wavefunction are identified with classical `worlds' at the coarse-grained level. I highlight two elements of this work: the role of emergence and the functionalist framework that Wallace imports through what he calls `Dennett's criterion'. This criterion appeals to the virtue of usefulness (in the form of predictability and explanatory power) as a criterion for the reality of `patterns'. It is shown that, due to decoherence, quasi-classical worlds emerge weakly, similar to that of the emergence of thermodynamic temperature from statistical physics, in the sense that they are autonomous and unexpected with respect to the lower-level domain (as opposed to strong emergence of some insuper et supra high-level ontology). However, the use of Dennett's criterion obscures this result, laying bare some philosophical issues, which we address over three axes of distinctions: (i) the objective/subjective-axis, (ii) the quantitative/qualitative-axis within the framework of intertheoretic reduction and (iii) the ontological/epistemological-axis. First, Daniel Dennett's `real patterns' are compared to Wallace approach to pat- terns. Then, I point out (i) an analogy with Bas van Fraassen's idea of causal patterns that become salient due to pragmatic explanation, namely that in the context of a prag- matic goal the quasi-classical pattern is made salient over other objectively existing, non-classical, patterns. I conclude that in the absence of human goals there is no reason to regard the quasi-classical pattern as `more real' than other patterns. In analogy to Dennett's `intentional stance', Wallace is committed to a `classical stance', equivalent to breaking Hilbert space democracy of bases. Although Wallace's version is a weaker one, his (ii) relations between theories bare resemblance to the reductionist program, and I argue that, next to quantitative deduction, additional conceptual `bridge principles' `ala Ernest Nagel are needed. The appeal to usefulness as a criterion for reality (iii), I claim, is not necessary to solve the measurement problem itself, but has the further (unwarranted) goal of establishing `real' worlds. I spell out a solution to the measurement problem, the many-minds theory, which solves the problem along the same lines as The Emergent Multiverse, with the exception that the { although the quantum world itself is real { the classical worlds with definite properties are beliefs in the superposed brains of observers. Persoonlijk voor- en dankwoord Voor u ligt een scriptie waarmee ik na acht jaar mijn academische opleiding afrond. Na vele jaren te hebben gezworven tussen verschillende velden { natuur- en sterrenkunde, geschiedenis, filosofie, kunst- matige intelligentie en biologie { en het afronden van een opleiding theoretische fysica een jaar geleden, ben ik uiteindelijk trots om de spreekwoordelijke punt te zetten achter de master History and Philos- ophy of Science (HPS). Deze omzwervingen zijn het resultaat geweest van een gevoel van onbehagen, dat groeide naarmate mijn beeld van de wetenschap afbrokkelde. Steeds meer leek de praktijk niet te bevestigen wat wetenschap mij in eerste instantie toescheen: een manier om onomstotelijke en objec- tieve feiten te verwerven; om uit te leggen hoe de natuur daadwerkelijk werkt; om menselijke factoren, en vooral politiek en maatschappij, weg te filteren; om universele kennis cumulatief te verwerven vanaf de Griekse Oudheid tot de dag van vandaag. Dat onbehagen is eigenlijk al een one-way-ticket naar HPS. Vanuit daar kon ik laten zien wat de wetenschap allemaal n´ı´etis; en dat heb ik dan ook met veel overtuiging proberen te doen. Maar het bleek dat ook daar na¨ıviteitloerde en dat ik met enkel kritiek ook niet uit de voeten kon. Ik voelde een behoefte aan een retour-ticket, om dat onwaarschijnlijke idee `wetenschap' weer te gaan verdedigen. Na deze jaren denk ik dat het einde van die tocht voor mij persoonlijk in zicht is; al die dingen die wetenschap niet is { universeel, objectief, cumulatief { maken het voor mij nu juist geloofwaardig en overtuigend. We kunnen feiten w´elaannemen van `autoritaire' wetenschappers, niet omdat zij de waarheid voor eens en altijd in pacht hebben maar omdat zij een leven lang werken om feiten robuust te krijgen. Wetenschap is een culturele onderneming welke wat mij betreft het `gezonde verstand' idoliseert. Waar het dat voorheen niet deed, lijkt mijn beeld nu veel meer aan te sluiten bij de realiteit. Kortom, ik heb de mogelijkheid gekregen om mijn persoonlijk wereldbeeld te vernietigen en het weer op te bouwen en dat is precies wat we van de universiteiten moeten verwachten|en wat ze nooit als taak mogen vergeten. Uiteindelijk resulteert bovenstaand proces in twee overtuigingen. Ten eerste dat ik al die tijd (tegen alle initi¨elepogingen in) t´och aan een maatschappelijk project heb zitten werken; dat is tevens een realisatie die ik met beide handen heb aangegrepen door ook buiten de Ivoren Toren zo veel mo- gelijk verantwoordelijkheid op me te nemen. En ten tweede is het juist dankzij die herwaardering voor wetenschap dat ik de natuurkunde niet heb losgelaten en alsnog een these heb geschreven over een thema in de grondslagen van de natuurkunde, want naar mijn mening zijn conceptuele analyses van gangbare wetenschappelijk theorie¨ennoodzakelijk. Filosofische kritiek zal altijd nodig zijn, ook voor de komende generaties, zowel binnen de wetenschap als daarbuiten. Het levert handvatten voor beter begrip, leidt soms zelfs tot nieuwe theorie¨enen houdt bovenal de { altijd verleidelijke { dogmatische interpretaties op afstand. Deze these, om maar eens op de inhoud over te gaan, is zo'n natuurkundige/filosofische hybride. Voor al die vrienden en familieleden die mij meerdere malen hebben gevraagd wat ik nu eigenlijk al die tijd aan het doen ben, zal ik hier een poging wagen die vragen te beantwoorden. Als uitgangspunt neemt dit werk enkele kernproblemen in onze meest succesvolle theorie van de natuur, de kwantummechanica. Deze problematiek wordt vaak afgekort als `het meetprobleem' en ligt ten grondslag aan de (letterlijk!) eeuwige anarchie van verschillende theorie¨en(vaak onterecht verschillende `interpretaties' genoemd), waarvan hun aanhangers beweren dat ze de problemen oplossen zonder in te leveren op de empirische adequaatheid (de aansluiting met de waarneming). Dit werk is aanvankelijk dan ook een verkenning van ´e´envan de mogelijke oplossingen van die problematiek: de relatieve-toestandstheorie van Hugh Everett III, in de volksmond (het volk bestaat uit een aantal verdwaalde natuurkundestudenten) ook wel de `veelwerelden-interpretatie' genoemd. Everett schreef aan de universiteit van Princeton aan het einde van de jaren vijftig zijn visie op in zijn proefschrift onder John Archibald Wheeler. Zijn werk was gedetailleerd, radicaal vernieuwend op vele vlakken (zoals men dan zegt was hij `zijn tijd vooruit') en formuleerde buitengewoon scherp de tekortkomingen van de gangbare theorie: Kopen- hagen. Everett zelf vervolgde zijn academische carri`ereniet, misschien mede door de overmatige (en achteraf onterechte) kritiek van leidende natuurkundigen als Niels Bohr en L´eonRosenfeld. Everetts idee¨en,echter, aangevuld en aangejuicht door bekende namen (denk onder andere aan Bryce DeWitt, Murray Gell-Mann, John Wheeler zelf), zijn sindsdien eigenlijk voortdurend onderhevig geweest aan een populariteitsconjunctuur; en juist die lijkt in de afgelopen jaren weer te pieken. Het idee van de veelwerelden-theorie is dat de eigenaardige superposities van de kwantum- fysica { superposities zijn een wiskundige beschrijving waarbij het lijkt alsof objecten tegenstrijdige eigenschappen tegelijkertijd kunnen bezitten (zoals een op hetzelfde moment linksdraaiend ´enrechts- draaiend voorwerp) { verschillende `parallelle werelden' beschrijven, waardoor de inwoners van ´e´enzo'n
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