Written Evidence Submitted by Tony Smith CBE (CHA0015)
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(CHA0015) Written evidence submitted by Tony Smith CBE (CHA0015) Summary This evidence is submitted on the basis of over 45 years’ experience in Immigration & Border Control at all levels from immigration officer through to interim Director General in the UK Home Office (1972 – 2013) and subsequent experience as a global border management consultant (2013 – present). It provides some corporate memory and context to the Committee which might not be readily available in archives or from current officials, in respect of previous asylum intake issues via irregular routes including from France. As the UK leaves the EU it is important to establish a new framework for asylum applicants and refugee resettlement in the UK. The Dublin Convention must be succeeded by a new international framework of “safe third country” agreements, where any applicant entering or seeking to enter the UK without prior permission to do so will be returned instantly to their point of disembarkation. There is scope in International Law to introduce joint patrols in the English Channel between UK and EU authorities which could facilitate (a) the safe rescue of persons found at sea and (b) their instant return to their last point of departure. (this rests upon a new bilateral agreement with France to complement previous bilateral agreements). Having secured the principle of safe third country returns the UK government should prepare new and specific criteria setting out the circumstances under which refugees might be admitted (a) under the existing UNHCR resettlement programme or (b) on humanitarian or compassionate grounds, if they are already residing in a safe third country (including an EU country). Any applications under (a) or (b) above must be made prior to arrival / entry in the UK. Background 1. I served in the UK Home Office between 1972 and 2013 at all grades ranging from Immigration Officer through to Interim Director General. My service was exclusively in the Immigration and Nationality Department; the UK Immigration Service; the Border and Immigration Agency; and the UK Border Agency. Save for a 3-year attachment to Citizenship & Immigration Canada between 2000 – 2003 as Director of Ports and Borders (spanning the 9/11 period). I was also Director of Ports of Entry in UKIS 2005 – 2007 (spanning the 7/7 period) and SRO / Gold Commander for the UKBA London 2012 Olympic Programme. 2. Since my retirement from public service in 2013 I have been an international border management consultant working in the private sector on current and future border management strategies. This evidence is submitted to support the Committee with some corporate memory of the challenges faced by previous administrations in managing irregular migration to the UK; and some broader context, which might be helpful. Historical Context 3. When I was an immigration officer in the 1970s and 1980s at Heathrow, the power to grant or refuse leave to enter was vested by law in the immigration officer at the port of entry. Those who (CHA0015) did not qualify to enter under the immigration rules were refused entry; and removal was directed on the first available flight or vessel whence the traveller had arrived. Those who were entering or seeking to enter without leave became illegal entrants and were liable to summary removal to their country of origin. Virtually nobody claimed asylum in those days, save for occasional defectors who were categorised as “unheralded arrivals” primarily from Eastern Europe, who were handed over to Special Branch and the Security Services. 4. In the 1990s asylum applications suddenly started to rise. Passengers were arriving at the UK Border without passports and visas and claiming asylum on arrival. Under International Law, immigration officers are not empowered to consider asylum claims. These have to be referred inland to a separate authority. Immigration Officers remained responsible for the “screening” process, which included questioning about the nationality, identity, point of provenance and travel journey; and for returns once cases reached Appeals Rights Exhaused (ARE) stage. Files were held locally at ports of entry; duplicate files were created at the Home Office to enable the asylum application to be processed. Applicants were dispersed across the UK pending the outcome of their applications, by way of temporary admission (TA). 5. I oversaw the Asylum Liaison Unit in Croydon at that time. We acted as the conduit between the ports and the new Asylum Directorate. As case numbers grew, this led to a huge mountain of duplication of papers between the Asylum Directorate and the ports; and increasing failures in bureaucracy. At the same time immigration offenders found in country also started to claim asylum in ever greater numbers. Asylum intake continued to rise. 6. Following the introduction of fingerprint checks on asylum seekers we started to identify many “duplicate” claims. I recall vividly cases where applicants were found to have claimed asylum in over 50 different identities, with networks of multiple claims for social security and housing. 7. With the creation of the EURODAC system under Dublin 1, we identified that many applicants were also claiming asylum in other EU countries. This became known as “asylum shopping”. In order to prevent this practice, we agreed with the EU that applicants should only be allowed to claim asylum once - and that would normally be in the country where the applicant first entered the EU, or where they first claimed asylum, or where they had been previously given a permit to enter or stay. 8. To combat ever increasing numbers of asylum applications, successive governments introduced measures which were effectively designed to keep applicants outside of the jurisdiction of the UK courts. This began with the introduction of the Carriers Liability Act, which placed a legal responsibility upon carriers to check that passengers boarding flights to the UK were properly documented. We created an “airline liaison officer” network which posted immigration officers around the world at source and transit countries to support and train airlines in this mission. 9. Thus, undocumented passengers shifted to alternative routes of entry, notably across the English Channel - either by ferries, or on trains via the new channel tunnel. Applicants arriving on those routes had clearly come from another EU country (mainly France or Belgium); but that was not enough to return them under the Dublin Convention. In most cases, it was impossible to show where the applicants had entered the EU. This was most likely through the Balkans or across the Mediterranean, but no records were kept. The onus under Dublin was upon us to show that an asylum application had been lodged in another EU country. That relied entirely upon a hit on the Eurodac system. 10. Even then, a lengthy negotiating process ensued before a third country return could be implemented. The power to direct removal to people arriving at the UK Border who were improperly (CHA0015) documented or entering without leave (as vested by law in immigration officers) was effectively lost. An asylum application trumped border control. And the longer people remained in the jurisdiction, the less likely removal became, as applicants put down roots in the UK. 11. The net effect of all this was a rise in asylum applications which overwhelmed both the Immigration Service and the Asylum Directorate. In 2002 0ver 80,000 asylum seekers arrived at the UK Border, mostly coming across in ferries. There was a public outcry. The government of the day introduced a new target known as “tipping the balance”. The ambition was to see more failed asylum applicants removed than new applicants arriving. There was a huge injection in resources into the Home Office to manage the “asylum backlog”. Many officials were called to give evidence to this Committee about asylum figures and delays in process. 12. To stem the flows, the UK and France agreed the “juxtaposed controls”. Passports were checked before boarding. Passengers without documents were refused entry on the French side. Asylum applicants were excluded because they were outside the jurisdiction. This became a top priority for that government, just as it is for this one. 13. Bilateral agreements subsequently extended our powers to British Control zones at Calais, Coquelles and Dunkirk which enabled us to supplement French lorry and vehicle searches with our own search teams; and to return any irregular migrants to the French authorities before they were able to board ferries and trains bound for the UK. By 2005 we had reduced asylum intake to 25,000. It went lower still before creeping up again in recent years, to around 35,000 last year. 14. The Department was nonetheless criticised year on year for “failing to get a grip” of the asylum backlog, despite a three-fold increase in resources and a massive spend on asylum accommodation and infrastructure across the country. Asylum applications are notoriously difficult to assess; the easy option is to grant asylum (or at least exceptional leave to remain). Even when refused, the route to removal is a tortuous one riddled with endless appeals, judicial interventions and – even then – non-compliance with the documentation and reporting processes. Irregular Migration by Sea 15. Irregular migration by sea is a relatively new phenomenon for the UK Border Force. This was not an issue at the UK Border during my service. Although it had become one in other parts of the world – notably in Australia and on the Mediterranean, where the volumes were far greater. We had previously considered maritime penetration to be a relatively small threat to the integrity of our borders, in comparison with undocumented arrivals and concealment in vehicles. 16. Those who said that these waters were too difficult to navigate in unseaworthy vessels have been proved wrong. We have seen arrivals in all forms of makeshift craft, even inflatables and canoes.