The Red River Campaign, Part 2: Retreat from Mansfield and the Camden Expedition
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A BGES Civil War Field University Program: The Red River Campaign, Part 2: Retreat from Mansfield and the Camden Expedition The Prussian general, Carl von Clausewitz announced in his 1832 classic, On War, that, “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. The political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object.” Over 140 years later in 1975, Clive Borrell and Brian Cashinella succinctly stated in their book, Crime in Great Britain Today, that an investigator should, “Always follow the money. Inevitably it will lead to an oak- paneled door and behind it will be Mr. Big.” At first glance these works on war and crime seem to be disassociated, that is, until one studies the Red River Campaign of 1864. More than any other Civil War military operation, the Red River Campaign exemplifies the relationship between war and commerce. In early 1864 it was difficult to justify a military incursion deep into Louisiana and Arkansas, especially with both Grant and Banks recommending a move to Mobile. Even General Steele in Little Rock was much opposed to the Red River plan. Yet General-in-Chief , Henry Wager Halleck insisted on the campaign, and in his typical avoidance of responsibility, continued to prod Banks with suggestions rather than orders. At the same time Halleck advised Grant that the Red River movement was a matter of “State policy” ordered by the President “for reasons satisfactory to himself and his cabinet.” Grant finally understood the double-talk and pocketed his objections, but only after he was promoted to lieutenant general and superseded Halleck as general-in-chief on 12 March. So, the Red River Campaign, initiated two days earlier, went forward. In the end, the Red River Campaign proved to be a military failure, both tactically and operationally. The disaster seemed to be so complete that it prompted General William T. Sherman to state that the Red River Campaign was “one damned blunder from beginning to end.” But, as usual, Sherman missed the bigger picture. Strategically, it seems that the Red River Campaign was “mission accomplished” in both political and financial commerce. Politically, after the dust and smoke had settled, Major General Nathaniel Banks, a former governor of Massachusetts and a prime contender for the upcoming presidential election, was no longer a viable opponent. Financially, tons of cotton had been successfully seized and transferred from the scorched plantations of Louisiana to the hungry fabric mills of New England. Under the Naval Prize Act, Admiral Porter’s personal share of the 2,129 bales that he reported seized equaled just under $340,000 in today’s dollars. So, despite the Northern military failure, one can only imagine the winks, nods, and sighs of relief that occurred behind the oak-paneled doors of Washington in late May 1864. BGES’s Red River Campaign first iteration (February 2014) followed Banks’ columns and Porter’s fleet in Louisiana from Brashear City and Simmesport to the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, where Richard Taylor, as Sherman wryly stated, administered a “whaling” to Banks. Part 2 (February 2015) will be based in Shreveport and will cover the campaign in Arkansas, then pick up the retreat in Louisiana, culminating in the remarkable engineering achievement of Bailey’s Dam in Alexandria. Tuesday, February 17, 2015 6:00 p.m. Registration at Courtyard by Marriott on Financial Plaza. At 6:30 p.m. we will open with introductions by Executive Director, Len Riedel. General Hills will follow with one of his popular and unique PowerPoint presentations. This will recap the campaign and surrounding politics to date and will set the stage for the trip to follow. Dinner is on your own. Wednesday, February 18, 2015 Load them up by 8:00 a.m. We will depart for historic Washington, the capital of Confederate Arkansas. General Fred Steele had been ordered by Grant to cooperate with General Banks by marching his troops from Little Rock to Shreveport, the Confederate capital of Louisiana at that time, while Banks moved north through Louisiana to Shreveport. Neither Steele nor Banks would reach their destination. Steele also ordered General John Thayer to march his troops southward from Fort Smith in order to join Steele’s column at Arkadelphia. From there they were to march to Washington. Steele arrived in Arkadelphia on 29 March, but Thayer was nowhere to be found. An exasperated Steele waited for three days, all the while watching his rations dwindle, then marched toward Washington on 1 April without Thayer. Meanwhile, the Confederates in Arkansas (primarily five brigades of seasoned cavalry) were commanded by General Sterling Price. Three of these brigades, under General John Marmaduke, rode to Elkin’s Ferry on the Little Missouri River to contest the crossing of Steele’s column as it headed southwest from Arkadelphia toward Washington. We will travel from Washington to Elkin’s Ferry where the fighting occurred on 3-4 April between Steele’s 6,800 men and Marmaduke’s 3,600 troopers. Steele was successful in crossing the Little Missouri, and Marmaduke fell back to Prairie d’Ane, where he constructed hasty earthworks along Steele’s route of march. We will travel to Prairie d’Ane, where Marmaduke was joined by General Richard Gano’s Confederate brigade of Texans, which rode hard from Fort Washita and Fort Towson. However, Steele was also being reinforced as Thayer’s men finally arrived at Elkin’s Ferry on 9 April (the same day of the Battle of Pleasant Hill in Louisiana). On 10 April, Steele and Thayer moved to contact with Marmaduke at Prairie d’Ane, and an artillery duel ensued. The next day, 11 April, there was little action, and that night General Price, who had arrived on the battlefield, inexplicably ordered his men to withdraw to Washington. Despite the unwise move that Price made from his fortified position, Steele, now severely strapped for rations and fodder, reversed his line of march and headed southeast on 12-13 April to Camden in search of supplies. His rear guard was harassed on 13 April by the remainder of the Confederate troops from the Indian Territory, Colonel Tandy Walker’s Second Indian Choctaw Brigade. These troops intensely disliked blue-coated soldiers due to the enforcement of the reservation policies of the U.S. government. But that will be a story for tomorrow, for after a full day of travel we will return to Shreveport. Lunch is included but dinner is on your own. Thursday, February 19, 2015 Let’s get it started again at 8:00 a.m. Today we will pick up the action in Arkansas by traveling to Camden and Poison Springs. We will be following General John Walker’s Texas Division, one of three divisions which Confederate General Kirby Smith took from General Richard Taylor to send to Price’s support in Arkansas. Taylor was naturally livid, as he needed these divisions to pursue Banks’ army, and just as importantly, Porter’s fleet while it literally backed down the narrow Red River. On 15 April Walker’s men marched eastward out of Shreveport to Minden, Louisiana, then northward toward Camden, Arkansas, where Steele’s and Thayer’s 11,000 hungry men and 9,000 starving equines had hunkered down. Desperate for supplies, Steele sent a foraging expedition of 198 wagons, two cannon, 500 blacks of the 1st Kansas Volunteer Infantry, and 200 white cavalry westward, primarily in search of corn. On 18 April the corn-loaded train started back toward Camden and was reinforced by 375 infantry, 90 cavalry, and two mountain howitzers, giving the train a total guard force of 1,000 men and four guns. Sterling Price sent General Sam Maxey with 3,100 Confederates to ambush this column at Poison Springs. The entire federal train and all four guns were lost, and only 300 survivors straggled back into Camden. The day before Kirby Smith had arrived at Calhoun, just east of Magnolia, with his three divisions and took field command. He ordered one division to interdict Steele’s line of communications between Camden and Little Rock, while the other two divisions would march to Camden to make Steele believe the main attack was on his fortified position. We will drive to Marks’ Mills, where on 25 April General James Fagan’s Confederate cavalry division attacked Steele’s supply train of 240 wagons, 1,200 infantry, and 240 cavalry, accompanied by cotton speculators, reporters, and 300 contrabands. The results were much the same as at Poison Springs, with 1,300 Federal casualties and the loss of the supply train. Upon learning of the disaster at Marks’ Mills, Steele decided to abort his mission and return to Little Rock. He abandoned Camden for Little Rock on the night of 26 April and crossed the Ouachita on pontoons. Kirby Smith was fooled and did not realize until 9 a.m. on 27 April that Steele had withdrawn, but the Confederate general had forgotten to bring his pontoons. For unexplained reasons, Smith sent Maxey’s Division back to the Indian Territory. While Marmaduke’s cavalry swam across the Ouachita, Smith’s infantry was delayed until they could build a bridge. We will follow Steele and the pursing Confederates to Jenkins’ Ferry on the Saline River, where the culminating fight took place on 30 April between Steele’s and Thayer’s men and two of Price’s divisions. Once the federals crossed the Saline, they destroyed their pontoon bridge. Price, with no bridging equipment, was forced to call off the pursuit, and Steele’s exhausted men finally reached Little Rock on 3 May.