Russia in 2045: a Scenario Analysis — Martin Kragh
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2/2020 Russia in 2045: A Scenario Analysis — Martin Kragh PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE Martin Kragh Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme, UI Project delivery ’RUSSIA’ within order FM2019-18671:1 for the Swedish Armed Forces © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash Photo: Karl-Josef Hildenbrand, TT Content Russia in 2045: Framing Different Scenarios ......................................................................... 3 The Political System ............................................................................................................ 5 Authoritarian model preserved ................................................................................................. 5 Restoration of the constitutional order .................................................................................... 6 Regime disruption ..................................................................................................................... 7 Economic Development ...................................................................................................... 8 No reforms, no change .............................................................................................................. 8 Economic reform ..................................................................................................................... 11 Economic disruption ................................................................................................................ 12 Foreign and Security Policy ................................................................................................12 Conflict .................................................................................................................................... 13 Cooperation ............................................................................................................................. 16 Disruption ................................................................................................................................ 17 Concluding Remarks and Implications ................................................................................18 © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 3 Russia in 2045: Framing Different Three different areas are considered in this study: the political system, economic Scenarios development, and foreign and security policy. In each area, different scenarios and This study outlines possible scenarios for their implications are discussed. The analysis Russia to 2045. What happens in Russia will covers conditions where Russia is either have far-reaching implications not only for “bad” (authoritarian, belligerent) or “good” Russia and its people, but also for Europe (democratic, cooperative), and where Russia and the international system. The future, is either “strong” (economic growth) or however, is uncertain, and it is often said “weak” (economic decline). The analysis also that this is particularly true in the case of discusses potential sources of surprise and Russia. In the 20th century, Russia (or the disruption, that will impact Russia’s Soviet Union) experienced two occurrences development and relations to the outside of regime change and state collapse: the fall world. The concluding section summarizes of the Russian Empire in 1917–18, and the the results and details the implications of collapse of the Soviet system in 1989–91. In different outcomes. the past 20 years, post-Soviet Russia has abandoned its previous pro-democratic At least one important topic will not be course and regressed to authoritarianism covered in this analysis: global warming. and a more assertive foreign policy Russia is one of the countries in the world reminiscent of the previous century. These most vulnerable to climate change. Large dramatic changes were difficult to areas in the arctic and of its infrastructure anticipate, and as a result the Western are built on permafrost. The Russian policy community was caught by surprise. authorities have identified various effects of rising temperatures. The most alarming are A challenge for any analysis is that the most threats to public health, endangered “unlikely” scenario will often be the most permafrost, and increased likelihood of pertinent for the policymaking community, infection and natural disasters such as and this report therefore avoids any drought, floods and wildfires. Other effects reference to a “baseline” scenario. Decision include shrinking extents of summer ice, makers and analysts, however, tend to have which will foster increased access to and a bias towards scenarios with few radical navigation of the Arctic Ocean. How the surprises. This bias can be relatively strong. Russian government will seek to manage the In the early 1980s, few observers risks posed by global warming remains to be anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union, seen. even though in retrospect many consider the outcome inevitable (although this may Although this report discusses different of course not be true). Before the scenarios, it does not attempt to assign annexation of Crimea and the war with quantitative probabilities to any specific Ukraine in 2014, there was little policy outcome due to the methodological discussion outside the circles of security and complexity and uncertainty inherent in any foreign policy experts about a potential such operation. Elements of scenarios can Russian threat, even though the country’s also appear in combinations. For example, a armed forces had occupied about 20 per regime can combine dictatorship with liberal cent of Georgian territory in 2008. In both economic policies and adherence to instances, the prevailing baseline scenarios international law. Alternatively, a regime turned out to be insufficient. can combine an open liberal political system with isolationist economic policies and an © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 4 inward orientation with limited interest in Authoritarian model preserved foreign affairs. Whatever our personal Whether Putin will attempt to remain in wishes regarding outcomes for Russia, the power post-2024, and how this transition outside world will need to manage whatever would be managed politically, remains an may appear. Under any conditions, the open question. One scenario is that Putin country’s future is in the hands of its leaders will continue to rule, either directly or and people. indirectly, and that the authoritarian model he has created is institutionalized by an The Political System eventual successor. Several constitutional changes to preserve the current political equilibrium can be imagined: the formation Russia’s historical tradition of political of a union between Russia and Belarus with centralization has been reinforced in the Putin as its leader, which has been discussed past 20 years, as President Vladimir Putin for 20 years; Putin being appointed head of has removed the independent governors of the State Council with significantly Russian regions, nationalized or assumed expanded authority; or a transformation of indirect control over large businesses, and Russia’s semi-presidential republic into a filled key positions in the country’s political pure parliamentary republic with Putin as hierarchy with his network from St prime minister.1 On 15 January 2020, Putin Petersburg and the security services announced his intention to change the (KGB/FSB). As a result, strategic decision constitution, possibly creating a new making in the Russian system is constitutional document. It remains to be concentrated at the pinnacle of the system seen what the outcome will be, and to what of power. extent the process will comply with the existing provisions of the Russian This section discusses three potential constitution. scenarios for Russia’s political development: (a) “authoritarian model preserved”; (b) An alternative to a de jure alteration of the “restoration of the constitutional order”; constitution is the informal model recently and (c) “regime disruption”. The first implemented in Kazakhstan. On 19 March scenario assumes that Putin remains in 2019, President Nursultan Nazarbayev power, in one manner or another, and that announced his resignation from the the authoritarian model he has created is presidency. He will, however, retain his also preserved by his successor. The second status as national leader, his chairmanship scenario, in contrast, entails a long-term of the ruling party and his lifetime tenure as restoration of Russia’s constitutional order head of the Security Council, through which and norms after the departure of Putin. The he will enjoy certain powers that are above third scenario discusses “black swan” events those of the president. Similarly, the Russian such as political turmoil, instability and presidency could be transferred to a loyal regime change. successor, while Putin secures the position as Secretary of the Security Council with significant (informal) decision-making 1 Notably, an alteration of the division of power is president the authority to appoint members of the possible even within the framework of the current Federation Council in 2014. In Azerbaijan and Belarus, constitution as the relevant provisions are contained term limits were removed by referendum in 2009 and in chapters four to seven of the Russian Constitution. 2004, respectively. This suggests that comparable These chapters have already been amended several changes could be introduced