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The Greek Economic Crisis and Its Effects on Serbia

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The Greek Economic Crisis and Its Effects on Serbia Südosteuropa 58 (2010), H. 4, S. 612-619 eFFeKte Der GrIeChenlanD-KrISe aUF DIe naChbarlänDer GORAN CETINIć The Greek Economic Crisis and Its Effects on Serbia Abstract. Two crises of different nature have recently dominated the Serbian economy: the global economic recession of 2008-2009 and the Greek crisis of 2010. Both crises overshadowed, at least in the public discourse, the country’s own very serious long-term economic crisis. Serbia’s economy, along with the Ukrainian one, ranks as one of the worst in the ex-socialist countries of Europe. Whereas the world crisis seriously affected the already badly damaged Serbian economy and society, the Greek crisis produced more modest consequences. Goran Cetinić is an independent economic consultant and analyst for research agencies and international entities such as the World Bank, the UN Industrial Development Organization, and USAID. He is based in Belgrade. The Greek Economic Crisis – Basic Facts The strong economic growth performance of Greece (close to 4 % per year vs. 2 % annually in the Eurozone) in the last decade was based on unsustainable factors. The driving forces of this growth were: a domestic demand boom, in particular in consumption and residential investment; high real wage increases that consistently outpaced productivity gains; and rapid credit growth, sup- ported by a liberalization of the financial sector, low real interest rates, and a loose fiscal policy. At the same time, exports as a proportion of the gross do- mestic product (GDP) decreased from 25 to 19 percent between 2000 and 2009, weakening Greece’s international competitiveness. As a result, external imbal- ances quickly increased. Economic results routinely fell short of fiscal targets due to systematic overspending, habitual tax evasion, and overoptimistic tax projections. In April 2010, Greek authorities officially asked for financial assistance. On May 26, 2010, after a short but heated political debate, the European Union, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB), produced the “Economic Adjustment Program for Greece”. Greece agreed to implement budget cuts of 30 billion euros, at which point it Serbia 613 will receive a 120 billion euro, three-year bailout loan from the Eurozone and the IMF. In the longer run, Greece is expected to reduce its budget deficit to the EU target of 3 per cent by 2014.1 These austerity plans triggered expected protests, which were well-covered by the global media; nationwide, Greek workers expressed strong resistance, with strikes closing down airports, government offices, courts, and schools. The weight of the measures, critics say, falls on low-income earners, which is said to be the main reason why they provoked such massive protests. Serbia as a Specific Case – Basic Facts The Serbian economic and social crisis has little to do with the 2008-2009 global recessions, and even less to do with the 2010 Greek crisis. The Serbian economic crisis’ specific characteristic is its endurance: It started in 1990 with the wars and the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, but the driving force was applied in 1993, when Serbia experienced one of the worst periods of hyperinflation in history. Since then, the country has not managed to overcome its economic crisis, and along with Ukraine it is one of the rare ex-socialist European coun- tries that has yet not reached the level of development it enjoyed 20 years ago. In 2009, Serbia’s real GDP was about 30 % lower than in 1989. According to Eurostat and CIA World Factbook sources, its public debt in 2008 was 37 % of the GDP; the UNI Credit Group estimated its foreign debt at 65 % of its GDP in the same year. In the decade and a half between 1993 and 2008, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow into Serbia was only 13 billion euros, one third of that in Bulgaria and also less than in Croatia, where it was 21 billion. Per capita this amounts to 1,700 euros, as compared to 4,500 euros in Bulgaria and 4,700 in Croatia. In 2008, Serbia’s exports comprised only 17 % of its GDP and were thus the lowest of all European ex-socialist countries (Bulgaria 35 %, Slovakia 71 %). The unemployment rate jumped from an already high 24 % of the work force in 1995 to 31 % in 2008.2 The drama of the long-term Serbian crisis is illustrated by the following graph: 1 A monitoring mission of the EU, IMF and ECB visited Greece to evaluate the implementa- tion of these draconian measures and assessed the situation positively. Equally constructive is the Greek government’s requirement that the commercial banks boost lending to businesses and households in return for access to a new, 25-billion-euro liquidity package. Greece’s big- gest lenders agreed to participate. The Economic Adjustment Program For Greece, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Occasional Papers no. 61, 26 May 2010; cf. Completing Plan B for Greece Will Take a Few Glasses of Ouzo, Financial Times, 29 May, 2010; Greek Lenders Set for More Pain, ibid. 2 Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW), Database on Serbia, available at <http://publications.wiiw.ac.at/?action=publ&id=countries&value=47>; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Recovery and Reform. Transition Report. 614 Goran Cetinić 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Figure 1. Indexes of industrial production in Serbia 1990-2009. Source: Republički zavod za štatistiku, Indeksi industrijske proizvodnje [Indexes of industrial production], March 2010. 1990 = 100. All data show that the Serbian economy has been stagnating for almost 20 years, which makes it a unique case in Europe. The two decades have to be qualitatively distinguished, however. During the first period, Serbia waged several wars and suffered from hyperinflation, sanctions, and other non-regular economic events. After the shift to democracy in 2000, in spite of an influx of more than 70 billion U.S. dollars (USD) through net borrowing, net transfers, and FDI, the GDP grew only minimally. Today, the country, “junkie-like”, de- pends on foreign capital inflow to sustain the economy.3 In this manner, Serbia is comparable to the Greek case. Serbia possesses a similar potential for financial collapse, not because it has been adversely affected by either the Greek or world economic crises, but because both Serbia and Greece treated public spending as a limitless source for the fulfillment of unreasonable ambitions. Recent data corroborate such a prediction: Inflation is threatening to grow out of control, reaching 10 % in the first eleven months of 2010. By the end of 2010, Serbia, together with Ukraine, had the highest inflation rate in Europe. The current account deficit is projected at 2.5 billion euros, or around 8 % of the GDP, which is less than in the pre-crisis period, when it reached 18 % of the GDP. The dramatic diminution of capital inflow created huge problems regard- ing the financing of the deficit. As a consequence, foreign exchange reserves are falling rapidly, with the dinar exchange rate deteriorating. Unemployment is October 2010, available at <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/tr10.pdf>. All websites were accessed on 8 February, 2011. 3 Mlađen Kovačević, Srpska kriza nije ni grčka ni svetska, ona je samo naša, Novi Standard, 21 May 2010, available at <http://standard.rs/-cvijanovi-vam-preporuuje/4587-mlaen-kovaevi- srpska-kriza-nije-ni-grka-ni-svetska-ona-je-samo-naa.html>. Serbia 615 still growing, but since the second half of 2010 this growth has slowed its pace. The number of people living beneath the poverty line has risen from 6.1 % in 2008 to 8.8 % in 2010. As a positive trend in Serbia in 2010, exports grew by 8 % in the first eight months of 2010. Yet, it must be noted that in 2009 the export rate dropped around 20 %. By the end of October 2010, Serbia’s public debt was over 38 % of its GDP and indicates further large increase. This development has a strong impact on foreign debt, which equals approximately 80 % of the GDP. The rapid growth of public debt has had a negative influence on the country’s credit rating, ensuring rising interest rates on foreign loans. The Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) for Serbia is twice the average for European transitional countries.4 In November 2010, Transparency International noted that corruption is and will remain the greatest obstacle on the Serbian road to the European Union.5 Economic Interactions between the Two Countries Greece began to increase economic and political activities in the Western Balkans in the post-1989 era, when Greek investment began to enter the region. Greece’s big food producers, small food retailers, clothing and textile producers targeted Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania. Major investments in the construc- tion, telecommunications and energy sectors of Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania have followed. Over the last 15 years, Greek banks have become involved in the banking systems of the Balkan countries. By 2007, seven major Greek banks had established a network of roughly 20 sub- sidiaries in the region with around 1,900 branches, employing approximately 23,500 people. Greek money lending is concentrated mainly in Romania and Bulgaria, but as a major investor in the region since 1989 it is the second larg- est lender in Serbia as well. Greece is also a donor and host to several hundred thousand economic migrants from the region, particularly from Albania. After strengthening its economic ties with the Balkan countries in this way, Greece became an important foreign trade partner to several of them.
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