UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
Date:______
I, ______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of: in:
It is entitled:
This work and its defense approved by:
Chair: ______
NATO’s Transformation in an Imbalanced International System
A Dissertation Submitted to The Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
in the Department of Political Science in the McMicken College of Arts and Science
2008
By
Ivan Dinev Ivanov
B.A. University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria 2000 M.A. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary 2001 Master of Advanced International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, Austria 2002
Committee Chair: Dr. Richard Harknett
Abstract
The dissertation studies the functioning and management of NATO in the post-Cold
War distribution of power. The core purpose is the articulation of a framework that enables coherent explanation of NATO’s transformation while at the same time binding together the invitation to new allies, the expansion of allied missions, and advancement of new capabilities. I explain these three aspects of NATO’s transformation through club goods theory and the concept of complementarities.
The club goods framework originates from collective goods literature and is consistent with the theory of intergovernmental bargaining in integration studies. It suggests that NATO has features similar to heterogeneous clubs: voluntarism, sharing, cost-benefit analysis and exclusion mechanisms. Based on club good theory, I conceptualize complementarities as a relationship between military resources and transformational allied capabilities. The military resources considered include military personnel, army, navy, air force and defense spending. The alliance missions in terms of peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation are key intervening variables in my model that shape the development of allied capabilities. Combined Joint Task
Forces, NATO Response Force and different non-proliferation teams illustrate the advancement of new capabilities. This framework distinguishes between three groups of nations: the core NATO allies, the new members and the non-NATO nations that are members of the European Union (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden).
The study indicated that a strong relationship between resources and allied capabilities for the old NATO members, while for the new NATO allies this relationship is much less powerful and none of the observed variables is significant in the case of the
ii non-NATO nations. Based on these findings the dissertation makes the argument that the
United States as a hegemon has a key role in managing allied relations, while at same time influencing the decision to invite new allies and pushing forward NATO’s transformational agenda.
The theoretical contributions of this research are twofold: First, it rests on a novel
approach to study imbalance in international affairs from the perspective of military
power. Second, it expands club goods theory as an analytical framework of studying
contemporary alliance politics through the development of the concept of
complementarities.
iii
Copyright @ 2008 Ivan Dinev Ivanov
iv
Acknowledgements
This project would never have been completed without the advising, encouragement
and support of several key persons and institutions. First of all, I am particularly grateful
to Professor Richard J. Harknett who was not only the “driving force” behind my arrival
to Cincinnati to pursue doctoral studies, but also advised me academically and supervised
my research throughout last five years. I owe him a lifetime of gratitude for guiding my
intellectual and professional development, for his dedication to this project and for
fuelling me with stimulating ideas, thoughtful feedback and encouraging criticism. I
need to emphasize the institutional support that I received from the Charles Phelps Taft
Research Center which included Advanced Graduate Fellowship and various travel and
research awards that made it possible for me to conduct interviews in Brussels, Belgium
and Washington, DC and present different stages of my research at major professional
meetings in the United States and Europe. Professors Dinshaw Mistry, Joel Wolfe and
Steve Mockabee provided a great deal of feedback on the content and research methods
that was instrumental for the completion of the project. Also, I would like to express my
gratitude to the Department of Political Science and the University of Cincinnati for
providing me various forms of intellectual and financial assistance in order to complete
my dissertation, especially the support that I enjoyed from the graduate program directors
Dr. Michael Margolis and Dr. Barbara Bardes, as well as the department’s Senior
Business Assistant Joe Waddle.
Writing a dissertation is a lonely struggle, and yet the input of colleagues and friends is a vital part of the process. I have benefited immeasurably from my colleagues
Tolga Turker, Jim Masterson, Christiane Haberl and Lisa Stinnett. I am similarly grateful
v to my Bulgarian professors and colleagues at the University of National and World
Economy in Sofia, Bulgaria who in one form or another provided their feedback and take and on this research -- Atanas Gotchev, Georgi Genov, Dinko Dinkov, Elena Simeonova and Evgenia Vassileva. Others like Jeremy Shapiro, Samuel Wells, Dieter Dettke, Emily
Goldman, Velizar Shalamanov and Todor Tagarev that I had an opportunity to meet and interview helped me with suggestions and ideas to improve and refine the argument. I am also thankful to Walter Huber and Brian King, who hired me at the position of
Visiting Assistant Professor in International and Comparative Politics at Muskingum
College. Lastly, would like to thank my parents Margarita and Dinio Dinevi, as well as my girlfriend Kris for their endless support and belief in my success.
For those that I have missed in my acknowledgements, I sincerely apologize.
Needless to emphasize that I, alone, am responsible for any shortcomings or errors in this work.
vi List of Most Frequent Abbreviations
ACUS -- The Atlantic Council of the United States BALTBAT – Baltic Battalion; also see BALTNET and BALTRON CBRN -- Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear threats/ weapons CEE – Central and Eastern Europe CFSP –Common Foreign and Security Policy CI – Complex Interdependence CJTFs –Combined Joint Task Forces CPI -- Counter Proliferation Initiative DCI –Defense Capabilities Initiative DGP – NATO’s Senior Defense Group on Proliferation DPC – NATO’s Defense Planning Committee DPT –Democratic Peace Theory EAPC -- Еuro-Atlantic Partnership Council EGF -- European Gendarmerie Force ESDP -- European Security and Defense Policy EU – European Union HR for CFSP -- High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy IFOR -- Implementation Force for Bosnia and Herzegovina ISAF -- International Stabilization and Assistance Force MAP -- Membership Action Plan MNB RC South -- Multinational Brigade - Regional Command South NPT -- Nuclear non-proliferation treaty NRF –NATO Response Force OOTW -- Operations other than war OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PARP -- PfP Planning and Review Process PCC - Prague Capabilities Commitment PfP – Partnership for Peace SACEUR –Supreme Allied Commander -- Europe
vii SEE – Southeastern Europe SEE BRIG – Southeast European Brigade SGP – NATO’s Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation TA diplomacy/ relations – transatlantic diplomacy/ relations UNPROFOR –United Nations Protection Force WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
viii Contents
Introduction...... 4 Theory...... 9 Method and Scope...... 13 Structure of the Dissertation ...... 14 Chapter 1. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Studying Alliance Politics ...... 18 Conceptual Definitions ...... 22 ALLIANCES ...... 22 HEGEMONY AND EMPIRE...... 23 A Look at Alliance Literature...... 26 ALLIANCE FORMATION...... 26 ALLIANCE FUNCTIONING AND MANAGEMENT ...... 29 Major Theoretical Traditions Studying Alliance Politics...... 31 REALISM ...... 32 REALISM AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER...... 35 NEOLIBERAL APPROACHES...... 42 LIBERALISM AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER...... 47 SECURITY COMMUNITIES APPROACH...... 51 Major Frameworks Explaining Political Transformation...... 55 FUNCTIONALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM...... 55 LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM...... 58 Methods...... 61 SINGLE CASE STUDY APPROACH...... 61 HYPOTHESES...... 66 RESEARCH PROCEDURE ...... 69 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ...... 70 METHOD OF INQUIRY...... 73 THE ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY ...... 77 Chapter 2. Conceptual Framework: Club Goods Theory ...... 84 Conceptual Definitions ...... 85 BURDEN SHARING AND COST SHARING ...... 86 COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY ...... 87 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODS ...... 91 CONCEPTUALIZING EQUILIBRIA, OPTIMALITY AND EXTERNALITIES ...... 95 The Collective Goods Model...... 100 THE APPLICATION OF OLSON AND ZECKHAUSER’S MODEL TO THE CASE OF NATO 101 MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE MODEL...... 109 WEAKNESSES OF THE MODEL ...... 111 ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC MODELS ON NATO’S COST SHARING AND BURDEN SHARING ...... 113 Measuring National Contributions and Burden Sharing among NATO Allies...... 116 The Club Goods Model...... 125 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CLUBS ...... 125 MEMBERSHIP SIZE AND TYPES OF CLUBS...... 128 HETEROGENEOUS CLUBS ...... 131 CROWDING AND DEPRECIATION OF CLUBS ...... 134 CLUB MEMBERS’ PAYOFFS...... 138 HETEROGENEOUS CLUBS AND THE NON-COMPETITIVE (UNIPOLAR) ENVIRONMENT140 TRANSACTION COSTS ...... 142 THE CLUB VERSUS THE TEAM CONCEPT...... 143 Chapter 3. Military Transformation and the Concept of Complementarities...... 148 The Relevance of Military Transformation to International Security ...... 149 The Effect of the Distribution of Power in the North Atlantic Area ...... 155 The Complementarities Approach ...... 158 Approaches to Defining Resources and Transformational Capabilities...... 162 MEASURING RESOURCES...... 165 MEASURING ALLIED CAPABILITIES...... 168 Assessing the Effect of Complementarities ...... 179 DATA DESCRIPTION...... 180 STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS...... 185 THE MODEL OF THE FIFTEEN OLD NATO ALLIES ...... 187 THE MODEL OF THE TEN NEW NATO ALLIES ...... 189 THE MODEL OF THE FOUR NON-NATO EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES ...... 195 Major Findings and Conclusions ...... 197 Chapter 4. Case Study on the Evolution of NATO’s Missions and Capabilities ... 200 NATO’s Transformation after the End of the Cold War ...... 203 Peacekeeping Missions and Capabilities ...... 206 MISSION ...... 206 COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES...... 212 Crisis Management Missions and Capabilities...... 219 MISSION ...... 219 NATO’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES ...... 224 Non-Proliferation Missions and Capabilities...... 230 MISSION ...... 230 NATO’S NON-PROLIFERATION CAPABILITIES ...... 238 Interoperability and Allied Capabilities...... 246 INTEROPERABILITY AS A CONCEPT...... 246 NATO’S PROBLEMS WITH INTEROPERABILITY...... 249 ENHANCEMENT OF ALLIED INTEROPERABILITY: SEE BRIG AND BALTBAT...... 252 The Distribution of Power and the Enhancement of Capabilities...... 257 The Processes of Transformation and Expansion...... 261 Chapter 5. Case Study on the Evolution of NATO Expansion...... 266 Tracing the Process of NATO Expansion...... 267 FROM PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) TO MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP) ...... 268 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND NATO EXPANSION ...... 278 THE VILNIUS GROUP AND THE “BIG BANG” EXPANSION...... 282 PREPARING THE NEXT ROUND: THE ADRIATIC CHARTER...... 287 EVALUATION OF THE EXPANSION PROCESS THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF COMPLEMENTARITIES...... 291 PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER EXPANSION ...... 299 Complementarities and Alliance Politics outside the Club...... 308 FOUR CASES OF NEUTRALITY: AUSTRIA, FINLAND, IRELAND AND SWEDEN ...... 308 FINNISH NEUTRALITY AND ALLIANCE POLITICS...... 315 NATO’s Heterogeneity and Anticipated Outcomes ...... 322 Chapter 6. European Union and NATO Capabilities: Implications for Transatlantic Security ...... 333 The EU Efforts to Develop Security and Defense Policy...... 338 HELSINKI HEADLINE GOALS AND BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENT...... 342 ESDP CAPABILITIES: RAPID REACTION FORCES AND BATTLEGROUPS...... 344 ESDP CAPABILITIES: EUROCORPS AND EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE ...... 350 Theoretical Conceptualization of European Defense ...... 353
2 The EU Politics of Sub-Clubs: Implications for Transatlantic Security...... 360 EUROPE’S ‘ATLANTICIST’ AND ‘EUROPEANIST’ APPROACHES...... 360 EASTERN EUROPE’S ATLANTICISM...... 364 THE EUROPEANIST APPROACH: THE CASE OF THE TEUVEREN DECLARATION (2003)367 Conclusion ...... 373 Major Findings of the Dissertation ...... 373 Theoretical and Policy Contributions of the Research ...... 381 Implications for Future Research...... 393 Bibliography...... 396 Documents and Other Primary Sources:...... 407
3
Introduction
In 1993, assessing the consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of
communism, the University of California, Berkeley Professor Kenneth Waltz, a leading neo-
realist scholar of international relations, expected that the end of the Cold War would gradually
result in a new multipolar distribution of power based on the emergence of new great powers
such as Germany, Japan and Russia. Waltz anticipated that this emergence of new powers and
demise of old threats would lead to America’s withdrawal from Europe, which, in turn, would
lead to NATO’s decline. He concluded that “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are ...
Once the new Germany finds its feet, it will no more want to be constrained by the United States
acting through NATO than by any other state.” 1
Fifteen years later, nonetheless, the world seems different from Waltz’s expectations. As a major international alliance and security organization on the European continent, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appears enhanced in terms of membership, mission and capabilities. Throughout the past decade, it has expanded its membership from sixteen to twenty-six, thus incorporating most of the countries in Eastern Europe that were considered adversaries prior to 1990. 2 And the expansion is an ongoing process since new countries were invited in April 2008 to join the organization. 3 In terms of mission, rather than disintegrate into irrelevancy, NATO has been transformed into an alliance that reaches beyond the borders of its
1 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security , Vol. 18, No 2 (Fall 1993), p. 76. 2 NATO’s eastward expansion took place in two rounds. In 1999 the three Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) joined NATO and in 2004 seven other Central and East European countries became members -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 3 There were Albania and Croatia. Macedonia was not invited at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 due to its unresolved dispute with another NATO and EU member - Greece.
4 allies into the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. 4 NATO’s new missions and the
responsibilities associated with them necessitated the advancement of new capabilities that will
enable the Alliance to accomplish its tasks of international security. 5
These three clearly identifiable aspects of NATO’s transformation correspond to the goals
of the organization embedded in Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely “to contribute
toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening
their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which
these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.” 6 At the
same time, these aspects of NATO’s post-Cold War transformation depart from the expectations
neo-realist logic, which in the past fifteen years has not been able to provide us with persuasive
explanation why NATO did not disappear, why did it transform itself and how it moved from a
Cold War alliance to an institution involved with the peace and security in the Balkans, the
Middle East, the Mediterranean and other remote corners of the world.
Neo-liberal and constructivist approaches argue that while structural theories pay too much
attention to the distribution of power across the international system and undervalue other major
variables such as the role and significance of international institutions to provide a set of assets
that ultimately influence the outcome of international affairs, including alliance politics. 7 Other
4 Since mid-1990s NATO has been involved in numerous out-of-area operations, such as the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), in the Mediterranean and currently in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Iraq. 5 In order to meet the new mission requirements for these out-of-the-area operations, the Alliance had to develop new capabilities, which included various Combined Joint Task Forces, NATO Response Force and various multilateral teams that deal with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) non-proliferation capabilities. In addition, the allies agreed to enhance their interoperability as a part of NATO’s efforts to operate effectively as a single entity. 6 See the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington D.C., April, 4 1949, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm , 05/18/2008. 7 Neoliberal institutionalism argues that international institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs […] facilitate the operation of reciprocity.” In this framework, NATO is analyzed as a regional security regime establishing stable norms and rules that lead to “stability in levels of conventional forces within the regime that cannot be explained by structural theories.” See Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security , Vol. 20, No.1 (Summer 1995).
5 scholars attribute NATO’s sustainability to its particular feature of being an alliance of democratic nations, where “liberal states do exercise peaceful restraints and a separate peace exists among them,” where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is only one such tool to ensure the perpetual peace among liberal democracies. 8 In the same token, international
relations theorists have argued that NATO is an integral cog of the post-Cold War order
established by the United States rests on the open and pluralistic way in which the U.S. foreign
policy is conducted and the “web of multilateral institutions that allow others to participate in
decisions and act as a sort of world constitution to limit the capriciousness of American power.” 9
Lastly, NATO has been approached as an institutional framework that helps establishing security communities, as “social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance,” where “the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” 10
Does the inability of structural theories to explain NATO’s transformation mean that the traditional power politics has become obsolete in the post-Cold War world? Has NATO been able to depart away from the traditional domain of a military alliance that deals with collective defense and has its transformation led to the creation of an institutional and community structure that perpetuates peace? Is the distribution of power today much less important than it was half a century ago?
Certainly NATO is one of the most extensively researched alliances in international politics and at least four separate debates regarding its functioning and management can be tracked over
8 Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review , Vol. 80, No. 4, December 1986, p. 1156. 9 Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Superpower Can’t Go It Alone , Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 17. 10 Karl Deutsch, et al, “Political Community in the North Atlantic Area,” in Brent Nelsen and Alexander Stubb, Readings on the Theory and Practice of the European Integration, Boulder, London 1994, p. 118.
6 time. The oldest of them dates back to the first years after NATO was established and deals with evaluating the actual and expected contributions of the individual allies. Some scholars argued that each ally should contribute proportionally to its size, while others made the case it is quite natural that the bigger allied will bear a disproportionately higher share and, therefore, allies should be evaluated based on their strategic value.11 The second debate started in the early mid-
1990s with the applications of the Visegrad countries for full membership. It is associated
primarily with the question whether it makes sense to invite new members to join NATO, which
specific nations should be invited, and whether this will lead to strengthening of the Alliance.
While some scholars made the case that extending invitations to the aspirant nations in Eastern
Europe will strengthen democracy there, others argued that such a decision is ‘premature,’
‘counterproductive’ and ‘irrelevant’ from a strategic perspective. 12 This debate can also be
contextualized within a broader discussion of NATO’s new roles in international security after
the Rome and Brussels declarations of 1990 and 1994 that launched the third major debate in the
literature. 13 This third debate is much more theoretical and focused on the relevancy of collective defense and collective security in post-Cold War alliance politics and specifically whether NATO is moving from an alliance of collective defense to an institution of collective security. A growing number of scholars have been making the case that NATO’s expanded membership and new missions have transformed the alliance into a very different security
11 For details about this debate see Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, Rand Corporation (1966); Galvin Kennedy, Burden-Sharing in NATO, New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers (1979); Casper Weinberger, “A Report to the U.S. Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense ,” (1984); James Golden, The Dynamics of Change in NATO, New York: Praeger (1983); Charles Cooper and Benjamin Zycher, “Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing,” RAND Publication Series (1986) and Peter Forster and Stephen Cimbala, The US, NATO, and Military Burden-Sharing , Frank Cass, New York (2005). 12 See Michael Mandelbaum, “Preserving the New Peace: the case against NATO expansion,” Foreign Affairs , Vol. 74, September 1995, p. 9. 13 For details see Zoltan Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion, Cambridge University Press (2003); Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: the transatlantic bargain reconsidered, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York (2003); Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: the battle for consensus, Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries (1997) and Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, Cato Institute, Washington DC, 1998.
7 institution from its original design in 1949. 14 Lastly, the decisions of the Washington and Prague
Summits in 1999 and 2002 initiated a fourth debate about NATO’s ability to build rapidly deployable multinational structures able to respond quickly and efficiently to various international crises, such as those in the former Yugoslavia. 15 While some researchers raise the question about NATO’s ability to meet the new demands for peacekeeping and crisis management out of the territorial domain of its member states, others make the case that “only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day.” 16
There are at least several major conclusions that could be drawn from the arguments presented in these ongoing debates. First, certainly NATO is transforming itself into a different organization from its original 1949 design; i.e. there is a general agreement that it is moving away from the deterrence into a new type of institution. Second, on its path of transformation, the NATO faces new problems that, in one way or another, resemble some of its old dilemmas.
Third, the admission of new allies, the expansion of its missions and the development of new capabilities has been followed by a vocal opposition among some of the decision-makers, analysts and IR scholars on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Fourth, some project that the path of NATO’s transformation will upgrade the alliance from a regional organization into one with a truly global outreach.
This dissertation touches upon all these major debates in the literature. However, its core purpose is to bring to the literature of international relations the articulation of a framework that
14 See Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities , Cambridge University Press (1998) and David Yost, NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC (1998). 15 For details see Jeffrey A. Larsen, “NATO Counterproliferation Policy: A Case Study In Alliance Politics,” Occasional Paper #17 , Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies (1997); Eric Herring (ed.), Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction , Frank Cass, London (2000); Thomas Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping, Rand Publication Series (2001) and Geoffrey Williams and Barkley Jones, NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the XXI Century, The Institute for Economic and political Studies (2001). 16 See Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006.
8 enables coherent explanation of NATO’s transformation while at the same time binding together the interaction of expansion (the invitation to new allies), missions (the use of force beyond the borders of the member states), and allied capabilities (the capacity of the organization to respond timely and effectively to the challenges for international security). Eighteen years after the
Rome declaration of 1991, which declared that NATO’s transformation will “open a new chapter in the history of our Alliance”, international relations literature still lacks a comprehensive theory of how NATO functions in the post-Cold War world. This dissertation sets out to contribute to such a theory.
Theory
The core research question of this dissertation is: how NATO functions in the in contemporary international system, where one of the great powers is much more powerful than the others? 17 Is there a causal link between the incorporation of new allies, the expansion of
NATO’s missions and the advancement of new allied capabilities? In other words, how is power being managed in contemporary transforming NATO and what does this case of alliance transformation exemplify for contemporary transatlantic and international relations?
I make the case throughout the dissertation that all three aspects of NATO’s transformation are interrelated and in order to understand NATO’s complexity we need a comprehensive framework that encompasses these aspects in their entirety. Therefore, the goal is to develop what Kalevi Holsti calls a “middle-range” alliance theory that explores “selected aspects of
17 If we take the global military spending for an indicator of the distribution of power across the international system, the data for 2007 indicate that the United States represents 43 per cent of total global military spending and is responsible for about 80 per cent of the increase in the last several years, where the U.S. spending has almost doubled since 2001. In 2007 the United States has spent almost six times as much as China, ten times as much as Russia and about 2.5 times as much as the rest of Europe, where most of the countries are U.S. allies. For further details see Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI)’s 2007 Yearbook and Global Issues Online, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp , 03/13/2008.
9 international politics” and at the same times addresses all dimensions of NATO’s transformation. 18 I suggest a theoretical study of NATO’s post Cold War transformation that
rests on two pillars: the concept of complementarities and club goods framework. In this way,
based on the deductive logic, the research generates conclusions that have relevancy for the
overall functioning and management of alliances.
The concept of complementarities originates in the economic literature where two goods
are considered to be complementary if “the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns
from (or efficiency) of the other.” 19 Complements are those items that are normally consumed along with the product in question. Therefore, the complementing goods assume that if the demand for one of the products increases, then the demand for the complementary good increases as the consumption of non-alcoholic beverages (such as Coke, Pepsi, etc) and pizza, where the drop in the pizza price results in an increased demand for non-alcoholic beverages. As a result, the demand for a good varies inversely with the price of the complements. 20 Also, from
multigood monopoly theory we know if two goods are complementary then lowering the price of
one good stimulates the demand for the other. 21 Political scientists apply complementarities
primarily to the institutions of political economy and the operations of firms in microeconomic
theory. The dissertation uses this concept to explain the interaction among states in realm of
international security, specifically among current and potential allies. Translated to an alliance
dynamic, the concept is linked to the management of relations within alliances, the distributions
of various military resources and sharing of specific capabilities that the allies have been able to
18 Kalevi Holsti, International Politics: A Framework of Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Inc, NJ, Second Edition (1967), p. 10. 19 Peter Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism” in Hall and Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage , Oxford University Press (2001), p. 17. 20 Arop K. Mahanty, Intermediate Macroeconomics, Academic Press, New York, 1980, pp. 93-4. 21 David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory , Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 305.
10 develop. The military resources have been operationalized in terms of military personnel, army, navy, air force and defense spending. The specific allied capabilities include Combined Joint
Task Forces, NATO Response Force and different non-proliferation teams. The broader overall framework of complementarities assumes that the increase of military resources decreases the price of collective defense and, therefore, enhances the various allied capabilities of each state and the alliance as a whole. Thus, complementarities can help us understand not only why new states join alliances, but also how these states undergo transformation, adapt their military structures to the new security environment and share the burden and the cost of alliance commitments.
The second theoretical pillar of the dissertation is club goods framework. It provides a
loose and yet manageable analytical framework for explaining NATO’s transformation. Club
goods theory builds upon the economic theories of alliances, more precisely the collective goods
approach. It assumes that alliances function similar to clubs and provide their members with
impure public goods such as collective defense. Unlike homogeneous clubs, where all the
members have relatively similar structure and income of the individual members, NATO is a
heterogeneous club and its allies vary in terms of size, wealth, defense expenditure and overall
defense capabilities. Such a framework allows us to group the allies into several similar and,
therefore, relatively homogeneous groups or sub-clubs and explore how the various sub-clubs of
allies contribute to the advancement of NATO’s new capabilities. The logic of club goods is
consistent with the general intergovernmental bargaining theory, which explains path of
European integration. Intergovernmental bargaining theory rests on three core assumptions,
which are also consistent with the logic of club dynamics: (a) negotiations take place within a
noncoercive system of unanimous voting; (b) transaction costs of bargaining and, therefore,
11 generating information and ideas, are lower compared to the benefits of interstate cooperation and; (c) the distribution of benefits reflects the relative bargaining power of the participating nations. 22
Based on the proposed theoretical framework, the dissertation will explore four specific hypotheses. The first one studies whether there is a relationship between military resources and specific allied capabilities as far as NATO is concerned. If confirmed, it will present evidence for the concept of complementarities. The second hypothesis builds on the findings of the first one and explores whether NATO membership in the case of NATO makes a difference in developing such allied capabilities. The purpose is to study the extent to which the relationship between resources and capabilities can be observed within and outside of the alliance framework and whether the observed relationship has relevancy only to the NATO allies or to the other nations as well. The third hypothesis focuses on one of the admission of new members and tests whether the prospect for membership has stimulated a more efficient use of the available resources and development of new capabilities for the countries that have recently joined NATO as opposed to those that are not NATO members and do not plan to join the alliance in the near future. Lastly, the fourth hypothesis explores the significance of the distribution of power in transforming international alliances, specifically whether the presence of a hegemon makes difference by promoting a more efficient use of the available military resources by the allies in developing allied capabilities.
Complementarities can be interpreted as an independent concept within alliance theory or as an integral part of club goods framework, where its incorporation into the literature on alliances has important contributions for broader international relations literature and foreign policy analysis. On a theoretical level, it contributes toward expanding the debate on the role
22 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998, p. 60-1.
12 and significance of international institutions and offers a new perspective of approaching the different aspects of power, collective defense, allied capabilities and the overall dynamic of alliance politics. On a foreign policy level, the proposed framework has direct implications for analyzing the foreign policy and behavior of the hegemon, its old and new allies, as well as the countries that aspire to join the alliance structures that are led and managed by the hegemon.
Method and Scope
The dissertation takes a positivist approach of inquiry to NATO’s transformation. The core focus is on military power as defined and approached by traditional structural and realist theories. Thus, the outcomes of alliance politics depend heavily on the amount of various military resources and advancement of specific allied capabilities, not so much on variables such as domestic political regimes, or the formation of pacific security communities.
The focus of NATO’s transformation poses, without any doubt, considerable challenges and constraints. First, unlike historic cases, in a contemporary case most of the events occur in the present, where their outcome often unknown and difficult to predict. The negotiations between Greece and FYR of Macedonia over the name of this former Yugoslav Republic are only one such example that may ultimately determine the decision which countries will be invited to join NATO at the upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Second, the choice of NATO or by the same token, the European Union allows for a single case study, where political scientists cannot take advantage of the comparative method of several cases since EU and NATO are sui generis cases of economic integration and military transformation. That is why the single case study remains the only feasible strategy for unique cases. NATO is the biggest, the oldest, and the most advanced of all contemporary alliance structures and there are
13 no other analogous historic or contemporary cases of alliance politics that have similar characteristics in order to conduct a methodologically consistent comparative study.
Based on the research question, theoretical framework and methodological approach, the dissertation grapples exclusively with NATO’s functioning and management and excludes other aspects such as the issues dealing directly with the origin, formation, sustainability and decline of alliances. Although some of the findings inevitably link the management of alliance with their origins and formation, no such specific hypotheses will be generated and explored. While it addresses various aspects dealing with the expansion of NATO, the dissertation does not set itself the goal to explore the individual motivations of the new NATO members. In the same token, the research specifies the scope of analysis to institutionalized alliance structures, thus excluding other forms of international security cooperation, such as various alignments and political coalitions. Lastly, the dissertation does not aim at expanding the existent literature of international cooperation or contributing to the broader debate on the role and significance of international security institutions. Although some implications are directly linked to the larger debate on the role and function of international institutions, the theoretical contributions are primarily targeted toward expanding the existent theoretical literature on NATO.
Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation contains introduction, six chapters and conclusion. Chapter one offers an overview of the core concepts and existing theoretical literature of international alliances. Based on the existent alliance literature, it discusses the differences between research that deals with the origins of alliances and research that studies the functioning and management of alliances.
14 Furthermore, the chapter offers a survey of the three distinct theoretical approaches for alliance politics -- realism, neoliberalism and security communities, as well the methodological approach that involves a single case study.
Chapter two presents the foundations of the existent economic literature on alliances that
conceptualizes different types of international goods and grapples with the meaning and
relevance of collective and club goods. Chapter three develops the second theoretical pillar of
the dissertation – the concept of complementarities. This concept is operationalized as a link
between military resources (such as army, navy, air force, military personnel and defense
spending) and specific allied capabilities needed to conduct successful peacekeeping, crisis
management and non-proliferation missions that extend far from the territories of the member-
states. Alliance missions are intervening variables in the model that shape the allied capabilities.
The validity of the model is tested the against three sets of countries – the old NATO allies, the
new NATO allies and the four EU nations that are a part of the EU, but not a part of NATO such
as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Thus, from the perspective of the economic literature
of alliances, complementarities provide an insightful feedback on the broader debate about
measuring national contributions and the distribution of burden sharing across allies. While club
goods theory emphasizes primarily the heterogeneous nature of NATO, the concept of
complementarities focuses exclusively on the question how the individual allies transform their
resources in order to develop new capabilities for the alliance missions overseas.
The last three chapters study the implications of club goods theory and the concept of
complementarities for the case of NATO’s contemporary politics. Chapter four is a qualitative
study that traces the processes of the advancement of NATO’s new capabilities. In addition to
peacekeeping, the chapter discusses the definitional and case study implications of the crisis
15 management, non-proliferation and the advancement of interoperability among the allies. The presentation rests on the logic that that the demand for a new mission determines the development of new capabilities, which means that the missions of peacekeeping, crisis- management and non-proliferation determine the development of specific alliance capabilities to support these new missions. The chapter is organized around theory-oriented process tracing and develops the argument that the advancement of NATO’s capabilities may be vertical and horizontal. The vertical evolution shows how the demand for new missions leads to development of new types of capabilities. This trend is illustrated with the evolution from peacekeeping missions backed up by CJTF capabilities to more thorough crisis management missions for the purpose of which NATO needed rapid reaction capabilities and, therefore,
NATO Response Force was introduced. Alternatively, the horizontal evolution indicates how the mission evolves over time based on the new strategic environment that leads to the development of additional and enhanced capabilities. An example in this respect is NATO’s non-proliferation mission and the inception of the Prague Capabilities Commitment in 2002, which led to the advancement of various Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear teams based on the concentration of allied resources within and across the various sub-clubs of allies.
The last section of Chapter Four addresses the issue of interoperability, where the progress of the new and potential allies is illustrated through various multinational efforts, such as the Southeast
European Brigade (SEE BRIG) and the Baltic battalion (BALTBAT).
Chapter Five applies the theoretical framework to the most visible part of NATO’s
transformation – the admission and incorporation in the past decade of ten new allies and
explains why the effect of complementarities is less observable in the case of the new allies
compared to the “core” NATO nations. In the same token, it surveys the cases of Austria,
16 Finland, Ireland and Sweden and explores why there is no sufficient evidence for relationship between military resources and transformational capabilities in their cases.
Chapter Six discusses NATO’s transformation in the context of its cooperation with other regional institutions of international security, such as the European Union and its Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP). The comparison between the EU and NATO capabilities is designed to answer two major questions: (a) how and to what extent the concept of complementarities applies on transatlantic level to the burden-sharing the European Union and NATO and; (b) how the distribution of power affects the advancement of EU and NATO capabilities, as well as the overall management of the transatlantic relations.
The concluding chapter checks the argument developed throughout the study with focus on the relevance of complementarities for the three groups of countries -- the old, the new allies and the non-NATO European Union nations. While looking into the sources of progress and impediments in the development specific capabilities, it also discusses the applicability of the proposed framework to the specific dynamics of the ISAF mission as a venue for future research.
Thus, the dissertation has relevancy to the growing academic literature on the transformation of
NATO and alliance politics. It also suggests important implications for students researching the issues of alliance politics, European and transatlantic security, post-communist and military transformation and broader international relations theory.
17 Chapter 1. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Studying Alliance Politics
Much of the literature on international alliances rests on either the explicit or implicit assumption that state behavior related to the formation and functioning of international alliances is in response to systemic distributions of power. This structural theory argumentation is based on the empirical evidence from historical cases of multipolar and bipolar distributions. 23 In the
1990s and early 2000s, the distribution of power deviated significantly from these historical precedents. While there is ongoing theoretical and policy debate over whether a unipolar distribution of power is structurally transitory, 24 the fact remains that NATO, the most significant military alliance of contemporary world politics, not only expanded but also underwent major transformation from its original design in a strategic environment that differs importantly from the assumption of much of existing alliance literature. In examining how and why this major alliance expanded and transformed, this dissertation provides an analysis of alliance behavior in a strategic environment of imbalanced power. In the last two decades we have had an
23 For detailed research on the origins and management of alliances in a multipolar system see: George Liska, Nations in Alliance, Johns Hopkins University Press (1968); Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London (1997); Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security , Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer, (1994). Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond are among the champions of researches dealing with the alliances in a bipolar distribution of power. For further detail see Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics (1979); “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security , Vol. 18, No 2 (Fall 1993); Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances , Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1987); Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond, A Mulipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century , St. Martin Press, New York (1989). 24 The core of the debate on American hegemony is between the realist and liberal perspectives. For further details about realist perspective see TV Paul, James Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21 Century, Stanford University Press (2004); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Cornell University Press (2006) and William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security , Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 5-41, Summer 1999. The liberal view is represented by J John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye. For further detail see G John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Cornell University Press (2002) and Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: American Power and International Order, Polity Press (2005); and Joseph Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, Oxford University Press, (2002).
18 unprecedented expansion of a major alliance at time when the distribution of power can hardly be defined as bi- or multipolar and when the threat environment was perceived as lessening, rather than growing. Why this occurred is important on two fronts: (a) it will reveal some core dynamics that may tell us something about NATO’s future and; (b) it will develop a generalizable analysis to the broader alliance theory literature from a distinct case.
To address this core research agenda, the dissertation will focus attention on how NATO
functions as an international military and political alliance after its most recent two rounds of
expansion to twenty-six members. In particular this study will explore on how the old and new
allies have developed specific capabilities required for various missions. From the perspective of
the bigger picture in international relations theories, the dissertation approaches the major
theoretical question why was the realist logic wrong in predicting the decline of unipolar
alliances, such as NATO? In other words, why was neo-realism unable to foresee the vast
transformation that NATO underwent since 1991? Does Kenneth Waltz’s structural imperative
have embedded insurmountable empirical anomalies? Do we need to focus our inquiry on the
impact of “ideas, domestic institutions, economic interdependence, and international institutions”
that actually reflect the “exogenous distribution and manipulation of interstate power
capabilities” in order to understand NATO’s transformation? 25
The major problem with leading scholars on international alliances is that they lack a comprehensive framework that explains the logic of transformation and expansion and, most importantly, addresses the issue how alliances function in the unipolar distribution of power?
That is why explaining the nature of NATO’s overall transformation in which the expansion is an integral part, is important to international relations for several reasons. First, it is necessary to
25 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist,” International Security , Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 6.
19 reevaluate the explanatory power of the existent literature on alliance formation and management in the new imbalanced structural dynamic of international politics. Second, we need to research the link between the incorporation of new members and the overall transformation that NATO has been undergoing since the early 1990s. Third, in evaluating alliance behavior during the period of an imbalanced distribution of power, we need to study whether there are linkages between alliance behavior and the persistence of imbalance. This is to say, as imbalanced distribution of power might shape distinctive alliance dynamics, those distinctive alliance dynamics might affect the persistence of imbalance. Political scientists like Andrew Moravcsik would probably label this approach an attempt to “to redress empirical anomalies, particularly in
Waltz’s neorealism, by subsuming [...] traditional counterarguments.” 26
Nonetheless, the need to reconsider contemporary alliance theory in the case of NATO is determined, in part because we cannot make accurate foreign policy predictions without specifying the purposes of power.” Randall Schweller correctly notes that the conceptualization of power is important for IR theory because it “can be used to threaten others, attack them, take things from them, and prevent them from doing things they would otherwise do,” while at the same time “power can be used to make others more secure and to enable them to reach goals that they otherwise could not achieve.” 27
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to offer an overview of the core concepts and
existing theoretical literature on international alliances, as well as introduce a distinctive
methodological framework that will enhance our understanding of the complexity of alliance
dynamics. The chapter is organized around several core sections. In the first part I introduce
core definitions of alliances and hegemony that will be discussed throughout the whole
26 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999), p. 6. 27 Randall L. Schweller et al, “Correspondence: Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),” International Security , Vol. 25, No. 1. (Summer, 2000), p. 177.
20 dissertation. Based on the current alliance literature, I distinguish between research that deals with the origins of alliances and research that studies the functioning and management of alliances. Then, I survey three distinct theoretical approaches for alliance politics: realism, neoliberalism and security communities. Lastly, in the methodological section I will discuss the case study approach and the methods that the dissertation employs with an emphasis on the various aspects of the assumption of rationality and how it is tied to the broader theoretical argument presented in the next chapters.
While I will offer a brief examination of the concepts of emerging hegemony, the dissertation is not distinctly concerned with grappling with that concept. My research accepts the assumption in the majority of the alliance literature that the distribution of power affects the flow of international relations, including the politics of management and functioning of alliances.
The focus of the research question, however, deals with the driving forces behind the management and functioning of alliances in the specific structural conditions of imbalanced distribution of power. I believe that in order to answer correctly the question why NATO expands, we need to address the problems dealing with the management of military resources and the development of much needed capabilities by each of the allies. Based on the proposed research framework, I will subsequently answer the question how NATO functions in the post-
Cold War world. For this purpose, I introduce club goods theory and the concept of complementarities in Chapter Three that will provide insight on the relationship between military resources and modes of alliance capabilities between the NATO allies. Through the concept of complementarities, I will be able to suggest a holistic framework that addresses simultaneously the issues of NATO’s transformation and expansion as mutually related processes that flow from the same structural imperative of imbalance.
21 Conceptual Definitions
Before introducing the various theoretical approaches, it is necessary to discuss how international relations literature defines international alliances. Also, we need to distinguish between notions of hegemony and empire and how they are related to conceptualizing allies and alliances.
ALLIANCES There is a general agreement among IR theorists that “it is impossible to speak of
international relations without referring to alliances. 28 In his seminal work Alliance Politics,
Glenn Snyder defines alliance as a “formal association of states for the use (or nonuse) of military forces, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.” 29
There are several important features of this definition. First, it is an association with a military or security purpose. Second, it involves at least several separate state units. Third, the level of commitment is a formal agreement, which differs from alignment based solely on common interests and informal commitment. Fourth, the definition also assumes that alliances are formed in reaction to or against other states outside their own membership. Stephen Walt expands the definitional framework to security cooperation that includes “formal and informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” 30 Although Snyder’s approach is
more comprehensive that Walt’s, they both emphasize several key elements of alliances that will
be employed throughout the dissertation. First, alliances deal with sovereign states as units of
analysis. Second, address the issues of international security, and exclude any other subfield of
28 George Liska, Nations in Alliance, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968, p. 3. 29 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1997, p. 4. 30 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987, p. 12.
22 international interaction. Third, they are relatively narrowly and explicitly defined forms of cooperation among nations.
HEGEMONY AND EMPIRE Hegemony is another concept that necessitates definition. For John Mearsheimer the
hegemon is “a state that is so powerful that it dominates all other states in the system.” 31 In other
words, power is concentrated in a single state or pole in the international system. Therefore,
hegemony “means domination in the system which is usually interpreted to mean the entire
world.” 32 The fundamental distinction between a hegemon and a great power is the amount of
power concentrated in the state relative to the other states in the international system. Therefore,
hegemony implies the same meaning as significant imbalance in the international system. If a
great power can accumulate power that none of the other states can match, then this state can be
considered a hegemon.
Literature on international relations discusses various types of hegemons based on different criteria, such as (a) geographic scope of imbalance and; (b) the level of power consolidation over time and exercise of influence over the other players in the international system. Geographically,
Mearsheimer distinguishes between global hegemons , which dominate the world, and regional hegemons, which dominate only distinct geographical areas. He concludes that “it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve hegemony,” where the principle impediment for great power to achieve extraterritorial hegemony is determined by “the difficulty of projecting power across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power.” 33 Furthermore, he argues that although the United States is the most powerful state on the planet today and a hegemon in the
American continent, it does not dominate Europe and Northeast Asia today “and it has no
31 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics, WW Norton, New York, 2001, p. 40. 32 Ibid, p. 40. 33 Ibid, p. 41.
23 intention of trying to conquer and control those distant regions mainly because of the stopping power of water.” 34 Therefore, in Mearsheimer’s world, geography is the key criterion for determining the success of power projection capabilities, whereas the stopping power of water determines the constraints for a regional hegemon to attain global outreach.
Depending on the current as opposed to future distribution of capabilities, Mearsheimer distinguishes between actual and potential hegemons, where “the potential hegemons […] have an appreciable power advantage over the other great powers, which means they have good prospects of winning wars against their weaker rivals. 35 He elaborates:
Potential hegemons also invite war by increasing the level of fear among great powers […] A potential hegemon does not have to do much to generate fear among other states in the system. Its formidable capabilities alone are likely to scare neighboring great powers and push at least some of them to create a balancing coalition against their dangerous opponent. 36
Christopher Layne follows the same logic and elaborates on the distinction between extant and rising hegemons. He argues about the current distribution of power that “for the first time, the international system is dominated by an extant hegemon.” 37 The extant or actual hegemon
reflects already established or sustaining, but not necessarily sustainable unipolar international
system, while the rising or would-be hegemon is the one that aspires to revise the status quo and become the dominant great power in the international system.
While John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne have made significant contributions in defining hegemony and distinguishing between various types of hegemons, Michael Doyle’s seminal work Empires elaborates on the analytical distinction between hegemony and empire.
The central difference is in the way the distribution of power affects the interaction of state- and
34 Ibid. 35 Ibid, p. 344. 36 Ibid, p. 345. 37 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Cornell University Press, p. 143.
24 system-level variables. In the case of empire, the dominant metropole “exerts political control over the internal and external policy – the effective sovereignty – of the other, the subordinate periphery.” 38 An imbalanced distribution of power assumes a hegemonic power, which controls
“much or all of the external, but little or none of the internal, policy of other states” and “a
dependent state, as opposed to an imperialized periphery, is a state subject to limited constraints
on its economic, social and (indirectly) political autonomy.” 39 Therefore, the analysis of the
hegemonic distribution of power focuses on system-level variables but accepts the core
assumption that states, not metropoles, colonies or other forms of imperial or tributary units are
the principle actors of world politics.
The definition of hegemon and the analytical distinction between hegemony and other
similar concepts is important in testing and defining the relationship between alliances and
polarity. The majority of the theoretical literature agrees that “alliances cannot be understood
apart from their context in the international system” and that the distribution of power provides
“much of a motive for allying, and the nature of alliances varies with the characteristics of the
system.” Furthermore, Glenn Snyder agues that “the systemic context of alliances may be
described in terms of four analytical entities: structure, relationships, interaction and units.” 40
While there is almost no literature theorizing alliance politics that excludes the effect of the distribution of power, the vast majority of foundational research on alliances done by Liska,
Snyder, Walt, Raymond and Kegley published between 1960s and 1990s automatically assumes defensive alliances formed in a multipolar or bipolar distribution of power as the norm. This research also accepts the assumption that the distribution of power shapes the alliance formation and, therefore, the changes in the dynamics of alliance formation should be able to reflect the
38 Michael Doyle, Empires, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, (1986), p. 12. 39 Ibid, pp. 12-3. 40 Glenn Snyder (1997), p. 4.
25 transformation of the structural components of polarity. My research focus, however, is on a different distribution of power – unipolarity or hegemony and how it might change the alliance dynamic, which includes the way alliances are formed and managed, as well as the rules by which they function.
A Look at Alliance Literature
By and large, current research on international alliances focuses on two core questions: (a)
what drives the formation of international alliances and; (b) what are the rules and propelling
principles by which alliances perform their duties in international system, i.e. literature that deals with the functioning and management of alliances.
ALLIANCE FORMATION The majority of IR literature on alliances studies the origins of alliances. 41 Hans
Morgenthau introduces the argument that “the aspiration of power on the part of several nations
each trying to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to configuration that is
called the balance of power and to policies that aim to preserving it.” 42 Kenneth Waltz further expands the balance-of-power argument and argues that “whether political actors balance each other or climb on the bandwagon depends on the system’s structure.” 43 He recognizes that balancing and bandwagoning are in sharp contrast and that balancing behavior is induced by the system because “the first concern of the states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.” 44
41 Most notably, these are the works of George Liska (1962), Kenneth Waltz (1979, 1994), Stephen Walt (1994), Randall Schweller (1994) and Glenn Snyder (1997). 42 Hans Morgenthau (1948), p. 167. 43 Waltz (1979), p. 125. 44 Ibid, p. 126.
26 In the Origins of Alliances Stephen Walt studies how statesmen choose among potential threats when seeking external support and how great powers and weaker states choose their allies. Walt develops the balance-of-threat theory, where he argues that “the forces that bring states together and drive them apart will affect the security of individual states by determining both how large a threat they face and how much help they can expect.” 45 Walt departs from the
Waltzian interpretation that states balance against power and argues that they respond to threats.
This analysis indicates that they can either balance a threatening power or bandwagon with the most threatening state. In the balance-of-threat theory balancing is defined as alignment against the source of threat while bandwagoning is alignment with the source of insecurity. Walt concludes that “balancing is far more common than bandwagoning” and states may balance by
“allying with other stronger state if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons.” 46
Also, the distribution of power across the international system plays a key role in determining the foreign policy behavior since “weaker states are more likely to bandwagon, rather than balance” because they can do little to affect the outcome. Alternatively, “strong states can turn the losing coalition into a winning one because their capabilities may play a key difference in the outcome of a conflict.” 47 However, in the case when no allies are available, states may ally with the most threatening state in order to survive. 48
Randall Schweller challenges the Waltian interpretation that balancing and bandwagoning are opposite behaviors motivated by the same goal to achieve greater security. Instead, he presents the balance of interest theory, which argues that states have very different reasons to balance or bandwagon. While the aim of balancing is self-preservation and, therefore, is driven
45 Stephen Walt (1987), p. 1. 46 Ibid, p. 17-18. 47 Ibid, p. 29-30. 48 Ibid, p. 32.
27 by the desire to avoid losses, bandwagoning is usually driven by the opportunity for gain. 49
Therefore, in his analysis alliances are approached as a response both to threats and opportunities. In addition to balancing and bandwagoning, Schweller identifies distancing, buckpassing and engagement as reactions to threats. At the same time he identifies five bandwagoning reactions to opportunities – jackal, piling on, wave of the future, domino, and holding the balance. 50
Stephen David brings internal variables into the analysis of alliance formation and argues that the formation of alliances should be seen as reaction to internal and external threats. 51
Richard Harknett and Jeffrey VanDenBerg expand David’s argument and explain that under certain conditions the formation of alliances must be understood as “a reaction not to the presence of an external threat, nor by domestic political compromise, but by the presence of both external and internal security challenges that reinforce each other.” 52 Furthermore, Harknett and
VanDenBerg argue that the behavior of states is often determined by the “the presence of
internal or interrelated threats which makes the explanation of alignments more complex and
difficult.” 53 Such may be the case when a state aligns with an external power that poses a long
term security challenge in order to balance against an immediate internal threat, which
conventional alliance theory will interpret as bandwagoing while in fact it is balancing against an
impending domestic threat.
49 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security , Vol. 19, No. 1. (Summer, 1994), p. 74. 50 Randall Schweller (1994), pp. 93-9; also Amy Hood, Havel’s Hope: An Analysis of the Motivation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic’s Desire for NATO Membership, MA Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, 1998, pp. 21-2. 51 Stephen David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, no 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-57; and Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, also quoted in Harknett and VanDenBerg (1997), p. 117. 52 Richard Harknett and Jeffrey VanDenBerg, “Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats,” Security Studies , Vol. 6 no. 3 (Spring 1997), p. 115. 53 Harknett and VanDenBerg (1997), p. 114.
28 Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond discuss several additional hypotheses why the formation of alliances is beneficial. In addition to quest for power maximization, balancing and bandwagoning, alliances sometimes serve as mechanisms “to reduce costs by spreading them among several partners and they provide benefits that that cannot be obtained unilaterally. 54
Kegley and Raymond posit that “aside from common benefit of security which accrues as a
“public good” to all members, alliances can also bestow a “private” benefit by increasing the military capability of certain states. 55 Nonetheless, they explicitly emphasize that alliance
politics is driven by rational behavior and a careful cost-benefit analysis of the participating
states. In addition, they also explore the hypothesis that “alliances furnish a medium for exerting
leverage over partners,” where great powers may gain increased influence over other countries’
foreign policy decisions. Nonetheless, this influence does not flow uni-directionally from the
alliance leader to the smaller partners; it may also flow from the smaller allies to the bigger ones.
Therefore, international alliances imply a dynamic with specific rules that require a conceptual
research framework. Lastly, alliances may also furnish the leader with the opportunity to
consolidate support at home by gaining political recognition, economic support or legitimizing
ideology. 56 Kegley and Raymond’s first three hypotheses link alliance behavior implicitly or explicitly to the structural conditions in the international system. They assume that rationality is the driving force behind formation, functioning and management of alliances.
ALLIANCE FUNCTIONING AND MANAGEMENT Glenn Snyder’s seminal work Alliance Politics expands the research question from alliance formation to alliance management, where management refers to “the joint and unilateral
54 Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond, A Mulipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century, St. Martin Press, New York, 1994, p. 95. 55 Ibid, p. 95. 56 Ibid.
29 processes by which alliance members try to keep the alliance alive and advance their own interests within it.” 57 Snyder argues that the dominant theoretical theme in alliance management
is bargaining among allies over common and competitive interests, which can be either tacit or
explicit. The primary common interest is the preservation of alliance and the allies have a stake
in “keeping those benefits flowing,” whereas “the primary competitive interest is to control or
influence the ally in order to minimize one’s own costs and risks.” 58 As a result, Snyder
operationalizes the bargaining power of the allies through four variables – dependence,
commitment and interests, as well as time preferences and attitude risk. Dependence measures
the net benefits that each state receives from an alliance, compared to the benefits available from
other alternative sources. The commitment, on the other hand, is an “arrangement that disposes
one to act in a certain way” while interests determine the behavior of the parties in a specific
issue about which they are bargaining. 59 As a result, the bargaining may occur in a broad range
of options that define the bargaining range. Lastly, Glenn Snyder argues that states in an alliance
face a security dilemma of two opposing fears: the fear of abandonment and the fear of
entrapment. 60 Again, Snyder’s findings rest on the assumption for multipolar distribution of power, similar to the earlier studies by Waltz, Walt and Schweller, where the analysis deals only with “alliances among great powers in such system and predominantly defensive alliances.” 61
William Riker, Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser employ rational choice methods to develop frameworks that explain alliance functioning. Riker’s study on political coalitions
(1962) examines the optimal size of n-person alliances to find out that in social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side-payments, the participants “create coalitions just as large
57 Glenn Snyder (1997), p. 3. 58 Ibid, p. 165. 59 Ibid, pp. 166-70. 60 Ibid, p. 307. 61 Ibid, p. 5.
30 as they believe will ensure winning and no larger.” Therefore, these coalitions including international alliances seek to “minimize, that is, to maintain themselves at the size (as subjectively estimated) of a minimum winning coalitions.” Such a coalition is called minimum winning coalition, i.e. “one which is rendered blocking or losing by subtraction of any member.” 62 The extension of Riker’s logic indicates that his theory of international coalitions can also be applied to international alliances as a more rigid form of such coalitions.
Mancur Olson introduced the theory of collective goods in the 1960s that eventually was applied to explain why the United States carried a larger share in the military expenditure and overall alliance burden than its European allies did during the Cold War. These two approaches are important not only because they develop interdisciplinary research by employing economic concepts into alliance politics, but also because they suggest novel explanations that expand the existent literature in several directions. First, Olson and Zeckhauser’s approach employs the economic logic to rational cost-benefit of alliance politics. Second, they links collective defense as a good provided by international alliances to the economic concept of collective goods. Third, they address theoretical and policy-oriented aspects of alliance management in terms of the distribution of burdens and costs among allies. Further details and implications of these approaches will be discussed in Chapter Two of the dissertation. 63
Major Theoretical Traditions Studying Alliance Politics
While alliance theory tends to be treated as an autonomous theoretical branch within international relations literature, the essence of the various research arguments follows the logic
62 William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, 1962, p. 40. 63 Mancur Olson developed the theory of collective goods in his seminal work The logic of collective action; public goods and the theory of groups (1965) and in 1996 Olson and Zeckhauser applied the theoretical findings to the case of Cold War NATO in An Economic Theory of Alliances (1966) .
31 of mainstream theoretical traditions in studying of international relations. The brief overview that I will present in this chapter will focus on the three major theoretical traditions – realist, neo-
liberal and security communities’ approaches that have been associated to the study of alliance
politics. The first two approaches share a common assumption that much of international
relations is driven as a response to the structure of international system, specifically the
distribution of power. In other words, alliances are likely to vary according to the number of
great powers in the international system. The following section will examine the base theoretical
roots of alliance studies and their link to the various forms of the distribution of power.
REALISM Currently, realist literature distinguishes between defensive and offensive realist assumptions. 64 When applied to the study of alliances these distinctive sets of assumptions shape different expectations about state behavior. Defensive realists posit that states seek to balance the power of threatening states; and for this purpose they may engage in various unilateral efforts or military cooperation including, but not limited to, forming military alliances. They expect a multipolar world after the end of the Cold War in which “the United States as the strongest power will find other states edging away from it; Germany moving towards Eastern Europe and
Russia, and Russia moving towards Germany and Japan.” 65 As a result, “the presence of
American forces at higher than token levels will become an irritant to European states, whose
security is not threatened.” 66 Since NATO was created to balance against the Soviet Union and
the latter is already gone, Kenneth Waltz expected that the U.S. would withdraw from Europe
and NATO would become obsolete. He concluded in 1993:
64 For further details on the distinction between defensive and offensive realists see Christopher Layne (2006) and John J Mearsheimer (2001). 65 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security , Vol. 18, No 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 75. 66 Ibid, p. 75.
32
NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are. Some hope that NATO will serve as an instrument for constraining a new Germany. But once the new Germany finds its feet, it will no more want to be constrained by the United States acting through NATO than by any other state.” 67
From a defensive realist perspective NATO was created to balance against the communist bloc and when the latter ceased to exist, Waltz expected the demise of the alliance. This, in essence, is predetermined by the structure of the international system. Within this framework of the analysis, NATO can only sustain if the structure of international politics entails the presence of a threat that “can provide sufficient glue to hold the alliance together,” such as the Soviet threat during the Cold War. 68
Unlike defensive realism, offensive realists emphasize the distinction between great powers and the other actors in an anarchical international system. The criteria for defining great powers
“are determined largely on the basis of their relative military capability,” such as sufficient military assets to fight successfully against the most powerful state in the world. 69 Power is the
key independent variable that has to be analyzed. It is composed of two components-- latent and
military power. Whereas the former is based on “the size of its population and the level of its
wealth,” the latter “is embedded in its army and the air and naval forces that directly support
it.” 70 Essentially, the argument of offensive realism rests on two separate pillars. The first one is built on the assumption about the ever present potential for offensive power coupled with uncertainly, where as “the international system forces great powers to maximize their relative power because that is the optimal way to maximize their security.” 71 For Mearsheimer, survival mandates aggressive behavior and “great powers behave aggressively not because they want or
67 Ibid, p. 76. 68 John S. Duffield, “Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future,” International Studies Perspective , (2001) Vol. 2, p. 97. 69 John Mearsheimer (2001), p. 30. 70 Ibid, p. 43. 71 Ibid, p. 21.
33 because they posses some inner drive to dominate but because they have to seek more power if they want to maximize their odds of survival.” 72 Thus, the major contribution of offensive
realism is the presentation of an argument that overcomes the status quo bias of defensive
realism. The second pillar rests on the logic of the stopping power of water because large bodies
of water sharply curtail the power projection capabilities of armies and thus shift the balance of
land power in important ways.” 73 That is why land power is the core variable determining power
since “armies are the central ingredient of military power, because they are the principal
instrument for conquering and controlling territory.” 74 Since the assumption of uncertainty is coupled with the primacy of land power, “the United States has historically behaved as an offshore balancer in Europe and Northeast Asia.” 75 Furthermore, the United States continues to
“dominate NATO decision making, much the way during the Cold War […] making it difficult for many of those states (especially Germany) to cause trouble with Russia.” 76
Scholars on American hegemony such as Christopher Layne and Richard Harknett disagree on the logical consistency of these two arguments. In fact, Layne argues that The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics is based on two separate theoretical arguments because the logic of offensive realism itself suggests that great powers will seek global hegemony, but there are insuperable geographic obstacles to obtaining it. Because the offshore balancers become in essence status quo powers, he labels the stopping power of water “an essentially defensive realist concept.” 77 As a result, if we disregard the primacy of land power, by extension, the logic of
72 Ibid. 73 Ibid, p. 85. 74 Ibid, p. 43. 75 Ibid, p. 386. 76 Ibid, p. 382. 77 For further detail on the stopping-power-of-water argument see Christopher Layne (2006), pp. 19-20; also “The Debate Continues: American Hegemony in Theoretical and Historical Perspective: Christopher Layne's The Peace of Illusions,” 47 th International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, California, March 22-25, 2006.
34 offensive realism expects that NATO is approached by Washington as an asset to maximize power. Therefore, the United States would not be willing to give up power and could play on the uncertainty of the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to encourage new allies to join NATO.
While I will not take part in the debate on the relevancy of the stopping power of water to overall offensive realist theory, I accept several key assumptions. First, since NATO is a regional organization as defined in the Washington Treaty, it seems that the United States is a part of this region and we need to study power realities in the North Atlantic Area as a whole.
Second, there is very little doubt that, given its size, spending on defense, overall military resources and actual capabilities, the United States is much more powerful than any other state in the North Atlantic Area. Third, in my dissertation, I will build on the premise that NATO in the post-Cold War world serves as a tool for managing power relations between the different allies, where one of the allies is much more powerful than the others. Fourth, Mearsheimer’s straightforward approach to defining military and latent power is particularly valuable which is why I use it for the operationalization of the independent variables in my research.
REALISM AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER Realism has made a significant contribution toward defining and conceptualizing key terms
in international relations theory such as distribution of power and capabilities, polarity and
hegemony. Furthermore, the different traditions in the realist literature of international relations
seem to agree that significant imbalance of power is an aberrant condition rather than a stable
distribution of power. For Hans Morgenthau “international peace and order are a function of the
balance of power – that is, of an approximately equal distribution of power among several
nations or a combination of nations, preventing anyone of them from gaining the upper hand
In part, the weakness of the stopping power of water was discussed at Richard Harknett’s the Graduate Seminar on International Relations, University of Cincinnati, Spring 2004.
35 over the others.” 78 For Kenneth Waltz “power has to be defined in terms of the distribution of
capabilities; the extent of one’s power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not
get.” 79 Furthermore, he elaborates:
To use power is to apply one’s capabilities in an attempt to change someone else’s behavior in certain ways. Whether A in applying its capabilities, gains the wanted compliance of B depends on A’s capabilities and strategy, on B’s capabilities and counterstrategy, and on all those factors as they are affected by the situation at hand. Power is one cause among others, from which it cannot be isolated. 80
Essentially Waltz equates the concepts of power and capabilities thus implying the same
meaning behind the distribution of power and the distribution of capabilities. For him the
distribution of capabilities is a key causal variable driving international relations; it is the third ordering principle of the international system, where “the power of the strong may deter the weak from asserting their claims […] Conversely, the weak may enjoy considerable freedom of action if they are so far removed in the capabilities from the strong that the latter are not much bothered by their actions or much concerned by marginal increases in their capabilities.” 81 Waltz
posits that “to promote a change in the system, whether by building world hegemony or by
promoting an area to great power status by helping it to find political unity, is one of history’s
grandiose projects. We should be neither surprised nor sad that it failed.” 82
Referring to realist thinking, John Mearsheimer notes that “the structure of international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies.”83 Therefore, the distribution of power reflects the relative ordering of the individual capabilities of the players in international relations to which they must adjust their foreign policy. The notion of an international system implies the presence of an ordered structure (or structures) that entails
78 Hans J. Morgenthau (with Kenneth W. Thompson), Politics among Nations: the struggle for power and peace, Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1948 [Fifth edition, 1985], p. 388. 79 Kenneth Waltz (1979), p. 192. 80 Ibid, 191. 81 Ibid, p. 113. 82 Ibid, p. 201. 83 John Mearsheimer (2001), p. 17.
36 interaction between specified units. At the same time the distribution of power puts emphasis on the different, mostly unequal distribution of material resources that in the Dahlian definition are able to “get people do what one wants them to do when otherwise they would not do it.” 84 While
it seems that the term “distribution of power” implies a broader meaning than “international
system,” both of them capture similar effects and can be applied interchangeably in this analysis.
Christopher Layne correctly points out that in the Waltzian world there is sufficient
security in the international system because the security dilemma is managed by structural
factors and, therefore, would-be hegemons are always defeated in the end by the
counterbalancing actions of other great powers. Alternatively, in the world of offensive realism,
security in the international political system is scarce and, in order to gain security, great powers
need to pursue expansionist strategies in order to maximize their power. 85 In the Peace of
Illusions (2006) , Layne observes that on the issue of hegemony offensive realism does not differ significantly from defensive realism. While Mearsheimer acknowledges that “European great powers that have tried to obtain regional hegemony failed to do so because they were defeated by the counterbalancing efforts of others,” at the same time he admits that it is not invariably out of question to aspire for a regional hegemony – “although it is difficult to achieve,” the “pursuit of regional hegemony is not a quixotic ambition.” 86 Layne correctly noted that “offshore balancing is a lot like football: if you want to pass the buck (or the football) there has to be someone to catch it” and therefore offshore balancing is a buck-passing strategy viable only in a multipolar international system. 87 Currently there is no existent entity – individual state or supranational
structure (such as the European Union) in Europe that has the characteristics of a single unitary
84 See Robert Dahl, quoted by Kenneth Waltz (1979), p. 191. 85 Mearsheimer (2001), p. 35 and Christopher Layne (2006), p. 17. 86 Christopher Layne (2006), p. 21 and Mearsheimer (2001), p. 212-13. 87 Christopher Layne (2006), p. 25.
37 actor that is able to match the power capabilities of the United States in order to catch the buck
(or the football).
For the purpose of my analysis on NATO the Mearsheimerian logic can be amended in two different directions. If the regional hegemony argument is correct, then Europe and North
America can be approached as a single region which, however, is not impeded by the stopping power of the Atlantic Ocean. Alternatively, the validity of the entire argument that extraregional hegemony is unattainable can be dismissed and we can essentially accept Laynian argument that
“the United States consistently has sought to expand its power and attain a position of hegemony in international system – not only after 1989 but from the early 1940s and throughout the Cold
War as well. 88 As a result, for first time international system is dominated by what Layne calls
“extant hegemon.” 89 The extant or actual hegemon reflects already established or sustaining (but
not necessarily sustainable) unipolar international system. Unlike the cases of rising hegemons
in Europe such as the Habsburg Empire under Charles V, the Spanish Empire under Philip II,
France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, as well as Nazi Germany under Hitler, there are virtually
no cases of actual (or extant) hegemony in the last 1,500 years that can present empirical
evidence of the specificity of balancing dynamics. 90 Certainly, from structuralist perspective the extant hegemon dynamic has been under-researched in part because there has always been a predominant assumption that unipolar world cannot sustain much longer.
So far, we have been able to track the theoretical debate on hegemony and its relevancy to contemporary distribution of power in the North Atlantic Area. It seems that the majority of literature converges on the view that the United States has unmatched power capabilities in the
North Atlantic area and can be approached either as a regional hegemon that has surpassed the
88 Ibid, p. 25. 89 Ibid, p. 143. 90 Ibid, p 21 and 143.
38 constraints of the stopping power of water and has extended its influence in the North Atlantic
Area or as an extraterritorial hegemon that has been able to project its power in the different parts of the Old Continent from late 1940s onwards.
However, the realist tradition is divided on the ability of the U.S. hegemony to sustain.
The unipolar optimists argue that American hegemony will last for long time and is beneficial for the United States and for the international system as a whole. 91 Authors like TV Paul, James
Wirtz and Michel Fortmann present two different levels of arguments in favor of lasting
hegemony. First, they depart from the classical interpretation that balancing occurs only “when
(i) states face an intense military challenge to their security, (ii) states face extinction due to
increasing power of a rising state, and (iii) states are engaged in intense enduring rivalries.” 92
Instead, they suggest a revision that extends the analysis beyond the balancing and bandwagoning hypotheses. Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann propose soft balancing that in their opinion seems better suited to “describe the behavior of many states today because it involves a mixture of cooperative and balancing behavior.” 93 Furthermore, they reject polarity as a discrete concept that determines the distribution of power in terms of only one, two or three clearly distinguishable great powers in the international system and argue that balancing exists under
“near-unipolarity” and is “a more complex undertaking that […] bipolarity or multi-polarity.” 94
Fortmann, Paul and Wirtz’s second argument is that the sustainability of hegemony varies and the history has shown cases of the Roman Empire, where the imbalance lasted for well over 300 years, or the British Empire that “survived over 200 years with its hegemony waxing and waning
91 Ibid, p. 134. 92 TV Paul, James Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, “Balance of Power at the Turn of the New Century” in TV Paul, James Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21 Century, Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 366. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid, p. 365.
39 over time.” 95 To sum up, the unipolar optimists vary from traditional balance of power analysts on the questions of how long should the imbalanced distribution of power sustain and whether there should always be intensive balancing against the existing hegemons. The traditional neo- realist theorists like Waltz make the case that imbalance cannot sustain longer and it always results in intensive balancing against the emerging hegemons. Alternatively, the optimists argue that, under certain conditions, the imbalance can sustain much longer and, therefore, does not necessarily result in intensive balancing against the emerging hegemon.
Scholars like Christopher Layne share the skepticism about the sustainability of the U.S. hegemony, arguing that at best it will only last for another decade or two. They believe that the
U.S. hegemony will trigger a counter hegemonic backlash against the United States and, therefore, the costs of preserving America’s preponderance will outweigh the benefits. 96
Furthermore, Layne argues that the structural imbalance as a result of the emergence of an actual hegemon has not eliminated the balancing dynamic, although there is limited evidence for response to preponderance. More specifically he distinguishes between several different types of balancing – terrorism, “soft” and “semi-hard” balancing. 97 He admits that terror attacks, such as
those mounted by Al Qaeda are not balancing because in realist international relations theory
balancing is a form of behavior that pertains to states. However, in the case of Osama Bin Laden
and Al Qaeda terrorism is “an asymmetric strategy pursued by groups that are not states but
would like to control one” such as the case of Saudi Arabia. The core concept of balancing is
that of “a counterweight, specifically the idea to generate sufficient capabilities to match -- or
offset – those of would-be, or actual hegemon.” 98 Although non-state organizations such as Al
95 Ibid, p. 364. 96 Christopher Layne (2006), p. 134. 97 Ibid, p. 143. 98 Ibid, p. 144.
40 Qaeda lack the material capabilities to engage in this kind of counterbalancing, their behavior reflects some key attributes of balancing. It seems that the biggest problem in Layne’s argument is that he is trying to equate the evidence for sufficient capabilities to offset a major power in international politics and capabilities to simply inflict material harm. Certainly one can inflict serious harm by targeting a major event (football or soccer games), airport or major facilities with a significant concentration of people. The question, however, is how much this act of terror can actually offset a major power (not necessarily a hegemon). Applied to the security environment after September 11, 2001, the question would be how much did 9/11 change or reverse the distribution of power in the international system? In part, the problem of this framework of state power and struggle is its inability to address the novel sources of threats originating from terrorism that do not change the overall distribution of power. Layne’s attempt to link terrorism to a form of balancing behavior is far from persuasive in this respect.
Unlike balancing through terrorism, soft balancing relies primarily on diplomacy. This form of balancing is conducted through ad hoc coalitions or through international institutions.
Instead of directly challenging the U.S. hegemony, it seeks to constrain the United States and limit Washington’s ability to impose its policy preferences on others. The underlying concept of soft balancing is that “by coordinating their diplomacy and lending one another mutual support, soft balancers can gain outcomes vis-à-vis the United States that they could not obtain by acting separately.” 99 Furthermore, Layne distinguishes between two strategies of soft balancing. First, the second tier powers (i.e. major powers) cooperate among themselves formally in organizational structures or informally in order to curb the hegemon’s power. Second, the second-tier major powers also engage in “binding” strategies that seek to involve the hegemon in international institutions and, thus, ensure its restraint by international law and norms of
99 Ibid, p. 144.
41 permissive great power behavior. 100 The underlying strategy of semi-hard balancers has several objectives: (a) to constrain the hegemon (i.e. the United States); (b) to gain bargaining leverage that the hegemon will respect their interests abroad rather than running roughshod over them and; (c) to ensure they can take care of themselves if the United States withdraws its security umbrella. 101
In conclusion, realism, which has dominated IR theory for quite some time is not able to offer a comprehensive explanation as to why NATO continues to exist and why it undergoes major transformation. Scholars like Waltz, Mearsheimer, Layne and Wohlforth disagree on whether and under what conditions the current distribution of power would sustain and, therefore, they offer little theoretical insight why NATO stays in business. Furthermore realism does not provide much insight on why NATO undergoes major transformation that includes the incorporation of new allies, the expansion of its out-of-the-area missions and the advancement of allied capabilities.
NEOLIBERAL APPROACHES Neoliberal tradition in international relations literature offers a very different interpretation and analysis of alliances and hegemony including NATO politics. In general, neoliberal approaches assume about international politics that states are rational actors that operate in a world of anarchy and that cooperation is possible if states have significant common interests.
Unlike realism, however, rationality is not determined by the sheer survival of the states but by the utility maximization of international interaction where actors have “consistent, ordered
100 Ibid, p 144-5. 101 Ibid, p. 146.
42 preferences, and they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of those preferences.” 102
The theories of complex interdependence and globalization represent a neoliberal view of international politics. In Interdependence in World Politics, Robert Keohane argues that
“contemporary world politics is not a seamless web; it is a tapestry of diverse relationships.” 103
More specifically, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations by
“creating or accepting procedures, rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity,” which
Keohane calls international regimes. 104 Furthermore, Keohane defines interdependence (or mutual dependence) in terms of “situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.” 105 He argues that interdependence is not a mere interaction or exchange, but a sustained relationship; “a condition in which transactions among actors have reciprocal costly effects.” Interdependence is measured through the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability . Sensitivity indicates “how quickly changes in one country bring costly changes in another and how costly these effects are,” where the focus is not on the amount of trade, but on the correlation between economic transactions to economic development. 106
Alternatively, vulnerability “can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time.” 107 The major difference between
sensitivity and vulnerability is that sensitivity interdependence is “created within a framework of
policies and assumes that it remains unchanged,” while vulnerability can be manipulated through
102 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy , Princeton University Press, 1984 (reprinted in 2005), p. 27. 103 Robert Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1977, p. 4. 104 Ibid, p. 5. 105 Ibid, p. 8. 106 Ibid, pp. 12-3. 107 Ibid, p. 13.
43 various policy adjustments. 108 The significance of these two concepts is that they provide an explanation of how “power resources” translate into “power outcomes” throughout the bargaining process among different states. The primary goal of interdependence theory is international economic cooperation, specifically Canadian-American and Australian-American relations between 1920s and 1970s. In Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World,
Keohane and Wallander link the interdependence argument to international security and argue that “security coalitions may be distinguished by their purposes, as well as by the degree of their institutionalization.” 109 For this purpose, they introduce analytical distinction between alliances and alignments on the one hand and security management institutions on the other. Alliances and alignments are designed to cope with threats and essentially approach international politics from a realist perspective. That is why they “need to effectively aggregate the military capabilities of their members in order to pose credible deterrence threats or efficient instruments of defense.” Alternatively, security management institutions such as NATO after the end of the
Cold War “do not need to mount credible deterrents and effective defenses against adversaries.
They need to provide for transparency, consultation, and incentives for cooperative strategies among members.” 110 Thus, interdependence creates hybrid institutions that are “more ‘portable’ than the rules and practices of single purpose alliances focused only on threat.” 111 Based on the proposed framework of analysis, Keohane and Wallander suggest that NATO is becoming a security management institution and that its “military functions will decline as threats diminish
108 Ibid, pp. 14-6. 109 Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane, “Risk, Threat and Security Institutions” in Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World , Routledge -- Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2002, p. 97. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid, p. 89.
44 and it should gradually expand to encompass all democratic European states that are committed to peaceful, friendly relations based on territorial status quo.” 112
The globalization and interdependence literature has several implications for my research.
First, the club goods theory that I will introduce in Chapter Two may be seen as an extension of
Keohane’s theory of interdependence in among states in international security. Second, the concept of complementarities that I will propose in Chapter Three as a relationship between military resources and allied capabilities may be seen as a cooperative strategy that interlock the alliance members into a security management institution, which is why the concept is not applicable to outside of the alliance framework. The implications of these approaches will be further discussed as the argument is presented in the next chapters.
In addition to interdependence, the conceptualization of international security institutions is
also linked to neoliberal institutionalism . This approach posits that “when states can jointly
benefit from cooperation … [we] expect governments to attempt to construct […] institutions.
Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible,
establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.” 113
Institutionalists challenge the realist assumption that relative gains dominate over absolute, and support the argument that the importance of institutions is “conditional on factors, such as the number of major actors in the system and whether military advantages favor offense or defense.”
In this framework, NATO is analyzed as a regional security regime that establishes stable norms and rules which lead to “stability in levels of conventional forces within the regime that cannot be explained by structural theories.” 114 Therefore, for neoliberal institutionalism international
112 Ibid, p. 108. 113 Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security , Vol. 20, No.1 (Summer 1995), p. 42. 114 Ibid, pp. 44-9.
45 structures like the United Nations or enlarged NATO are seen as instruments taking action against any aggressor on the part of the whole international community. In this respect, liberalism and Wilsonian idealism share similar expectations that transatlantic partners come together and cooperate in expanding NATO in order to guarantee collective security. Celeste
Wallander, for example, focuses on the case of post-Cold War NATO and comes to the conclusion that “the variation in institutional adaptation is explained by variation in relative costs
(such as provision of information), and by whether the rules, norms, and procedures of a given institution enable states to overcome obstacles to cooperation (such as provisions for sanctioning or bargaining).” 115
Democratic peace theory (DPT), on the other hand, focuses on how democratic governance
as an independent variable shapes international relations. Its foundation is based on the available
empirical data that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. For Michael Doyle
“even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states,
constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.” 116 It is not that such a war is impossible, but rather “preliminary evidence does appear to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states.” 117 Thus, realism,
which provides a plausible explanation of general insecurity of states, offers little guidance in
explaining the pacification of the liberal world. In order to explain this theorem, DPT focuses on
domestic variables such as constitutional law, republican representation and the separation of
powers. Therefore, the distribution of foreign policy decision-making authority among multiple
bodies and officials indicates that any step toward armed conflict among those countries would
115 Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization , Vol. 54 (2000), pp. 705. 116 Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” in Robert Art and Robert Jervis (eds.), International Politics and Contemporary Issues , Longman, 2003, p. 97. 117 Ibid, p. 97.
46 be much slower and cumbersome. As a result, “liberal states do exercise peaceful restraints and a separate peace exists among them. And this peace provides a solid foundation for the United
States’ crucial alliances with the liberal powers, e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization…” 118
Therefore, the functioning and management of NATO as international security alliance is seen through the framework of establishing a “pacific community” of nations in the North Atlantic area where democracy is the key independent variable shaping the expansion process.
LIBERALISM AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER Unlike realism, liberal and neo-liberal theories accept the possibility of sustained imbalance. However, they reject relative power as a key causal variable. Instead, they prefer to focus on the effect of international institutions, the uniqueness of the American political system or the pervasiveness of democracy after the end of the Cold War. Their empirical analysis links security to the increasing role of the United States in international institutions and the fact that democratic countries tend to avoid conflict with each other. That is why scholars like
Christopher Layne label the liberal approach to hegemony as “unipolar agnostics.” 119 Scholars like Joseph Nye and G. John Ikenberry argue that American hegemony might last for some time.
They search for the roots of a sustaining hegemonic order in various domestic sources and arrangements in the international system. Nonetheless, liberal IR theorists acknowledge the possibility that, under certain conditions, others could balance against the United States, without assuming the inevitability of such a counterbalancing behavior. Therefore, they accept that the duration of American preponderance can be extended somewhat if the United States follows wise policies that allay other fears of U.S. power.120
118 Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review , Vol. 80, No. 4, December 1986, p. 1156. 119 Layne (2006), p. 134. 120 Ibid, p. 134-5.
47 Robert Keohane defines hegemony as “preponderance of material resources” in which the hegemonic power “must have control over raw materials, control over resources of capital, control over markets and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.” 121
Furthermore, based on Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger’s research, Robert Keohane presented in 1980 the theory of hegemonic stability where he argued that “the Pax Britanica and
Pax Americana , like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of reliable peace and
security.” 122 The theory rests on two central propositions: (a) any particular order in world
politics is normally established by a single dominant great power or a hegemon; (b) the hegemon
acts as a stabilizer, i.e. provides for “mutual adjustment of state policies.” Finally in his 1984
book, Keohane argues that while hegemony can facilitate certain types of cooperation, there is
“little reason to believe that it is either necessary or sufficient condition for the emergence of
cooperative relationships” and post-hegemonic cooperation is also possible. 123
For Joseph Nye, for example, the success of Pax Americana is determined not only by the
“unmatched American hard power” but also by exercising “soft power” through engagement in a
strategic restraint that reassures partners and facilitates cooperation.” 124 Furthermore, Nye claims that the success of Pax Americana rests on the open and pluralistic way in which the U.S.
foreign policy is conducted and the “web of multilateral institutions that allow others to
participate in decisions and act as a sort of world constitution to limit the capriciousness of
American power.” 125
121 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, 1984 (2005 copy), p. 32. 122 Ibid, p. 31. 123 Ibid, p. 31-2. 124 Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 17. 125 Ibid, p. 17.
48 G. John Ikenberry argues along the line of Nye’s analysis that the core of today’s
international order is built on two grand bargains that the United States has made with other
countries around the world. The first one is based on the security protection and access to its
markets that the United States provides its European and Asian partners and, in return, these
countries agree to “provide diplomatic, economic and logistical support for the United States.”
Second, the Asian and European states agreed, “to accept American leadership and operate
within an agreed-upon political and economic system,” while the United States “opens itself up
and binds itself to its partners.” 126 For Ikenberry the stability and expansiveness of the post-Cold
War hegemonic order is based on America’s “unmatched economic and military power today.” 127 In addition, he emphasizes the unique capability of the United States to engage in
“strategic restraint, reassuring partners and facilitating cooperation.” In his view, the American hegemony is liberal, because it is built on the “constitution-like character of the institutions;” and institutions exhibit “increasing returns” character, which makes it extremely difficult for the contenders to “compete against and replace the existing order and leader. 128 Therefore,
American power is embedded in American particularism that has given international organizations and law a system-wide legitimacy and sustainability.
Thus, Joseph Nye and J John Ikenberry establish a direct causal link between the notion of pacific community and sustainability of imbalance. A pacific community, such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, is established and managed by the hegemon. The merge between the uniqueness of democracy and the American exceptionalism determines the success of the pacific community in Nye’s world; not simply the sheer distribution of power. In other words,
126 G. John Ikenberry, “Democracy, Institutions and American Restraint” in John Ikenberry (ed) America Unrivaled: the future of the balance of power , Cornell University Press (2002), p. 215. 127 G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order” in T.V. Paul and John Hall, International Order and the Future of World Politics , University of Cambridge Press (1999), p. 125. 128 Ibid, p. 125.
49 the amalgamation of power, democracy and particularism of a specific nation drives the overall course of contemporary international relations and the management of various alliance structures. Therefore, in this causal model the merge between hegemony and democracy results in peace, whereas alliances are simply tools to promote it. Thus, from the perspective of democratic peace theory, the research on hegemony combines systemic and domestic variables, which is often being criticized by structural theorists that instead of focusing on a coherent single-level explanatory model, they offer “mosaic” of explanations on different levels of analysis. 129
To sum up, neoliberal theories offer very diverse explanations about NATO’s sustainability and transformation. Some of them attribute NATO’s persistence to its general and specific assets as an institution of international security, while others link NATO’s transformation to the liberal and democratic order established by the United States after the end of the Cold War.
Specifically, the democratic peace explanation seeks to establish a causal link between the regime type of the individual states and their membership to NATO. Nonetheless, the main problem with all these explanations is that they underestimate the core function of military alliances, including NATO, namely that they are formal associations with a military or security purposes. Therefore, while neoliberal approaches provide us with abundant models why NATO stays in business and continues to expand, they fail to establish a causal link between the admission of new allies, the management of its out-of-the-area missions and advancement of allied capabilities.
129 J David Singer lists the following requirements of an analytical model: (a) accurate description; (b) capacity to explain; and (c) a promise of reliable prediction. Furthermore, he concludes that “for a staggering variety of reasons the scholar may be more interested at one level or another at any given time,” which is why “we may utilize one level here and another there, but we cannot afford to shift our orientation in the midst of a study.” See J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics , Vol. 14, No. 1 (Oct., 1961), pp. 90-1.
50 Lastly, authors like Karl Deutsch, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett suggest a very
different theoretical base for studying alliances -- as a process of establishing security
community over an extended period of time. The constructions and management of security
communities, nonetheless, differs significantly from the liberal ideas of “pacific communities.”
SECURITY COMMUNITIES APPROACH Karl Deutsch et.al., introduced the concept of security communities in 1957 as “social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance.” 130 His analysis noted that such communities possessed a
“capacity to act as a political unit – such as its size, power, economic strength, administrative
efficiency and the like,” and had “the ability of a unit to control its own behavior and to redirect
its own attention.” 131 He combines security and community and introduces the concept of
security community, where “the members of that community will not fight each other physically,
but will settle their disputes in some other way.” 132
Integration is a key criterion, and depending on how much they have been integrated, the
security communities can be either amalgamated or pluralistic ones. Amalgamation means “the
formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit.” 133 Deutsch uses the cases of the United States and Switzerland as examples of amalgamation where the community becomes a single governmental unit by the formal merger that leads to “one supreme decision-making center.” Although offering an insightful perspective on integration, the concept of amalgamated communities changes the unit of analysis by assuming a merger of independent
130 Karl Deutsch, et al, “Political Community in the North Atlantic Area” in Brent Nelsen and Alexander Stubb, Readings on the Theory and Practice of the European Integration, Boulder, London 1994, p. 117. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid, p. 118. 133 Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area , Princeton, New Jersey, 1957, p. 6.
51 states into a single bigger unit that interacts in the anarchic world. The core of amalgamation is the elimination of the state as unit of analysis and its transformation into a bigger political unit, either another superstate or at least a supranational entity.
Alternatively, the pluralistic security community “retains the legal independence of
separate governments” as autonomous units of analysis where “two separate governmental units
form a security community without being merged.” 134 The pluralistic community produces a
different systemic outcome but does not change the assumption of the anarchic structure of
international politics. Deutsch et al recognize that the “pluralistic security communities turned
out to be somewhat easier to attain [and] preserve than their amalgamated counterparts.” 135
Deutschian approach is important as a seminal work in defining and understanding the
North Atlantic Area as a community. Deutsch et al argue that “certainly there is a considerable
support for the tightening of the existing international organization – NATO – until it becomes a
pluralistic security community. Indeed the North Atlantic Area contains sub-areas of integration,
some of them already partly equipped with institutions that may or may not have the capacity to
develop.” 136 Furthermore, Deutsch discusses the three alternative approaches of geographically
defining the North Atlantic Area. The first alternative includes all countries that are
“geographically located on the North Atlantic Ocean or the North Sea or in the immediate
hinterland of that area.” The second alternative equates the area with “NATO membership” and
excludes Austria, Finland, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 137 The third alternative
confines the research to “democracies located in whatever we consider to be the North Atlantic
Area.” In this definitional framework democracy serves as a key causal variable, “a requirement
134 Ibid. 135 Ibid, p. 29. 136 Ibid, p. 9. 137 Spain joined NATO in 1982.
52 for integration.” 138 Deutsch et al favor the first option confining the definition of such a
community to an area where “geography is a positive test of inclusion; the negative test is a
membership in a power bloc ideologically politically incompatible with the West.” 139
The core conditions for the integrative process in the Deutschian model address issues such as compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making; the capacity of the participating political units to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without a resort to violence; as well as the mutual predictability of the behavior required for the members of the community in order for it to function. 140 Furthermore, his major contribution is that he distinguishes between the background (or “core”) conditions and the process of establishing such a community where time is a key intervening variable because “once integration has been reached, the length of time over which it persists may contribute to its consolidation. 141
There are two important implications of the classical Deutschian interpretation of security communities for this research. First, the formation of such political communities “has direct implications on the interest groups, political parties and governments” that act not only in an intergovernmental but also in a supranational setting. 142 Therefore, the key explanation here is how the integration as a process drives interest groups and political parties together “in their efforts at supranational organization [to] coalesce on the basis of a common ideology” that surpasses “those prominent at the national level.” 143 Second, the conceptualization of security communities is also important in researching how integration changes the course of international
138 Ibid, p. 10. 139 Ibid, p. 10. 140 Deutsch et al in Nelsen and Stubb (2003), pp. 140-1. 141 Ibid, p. 125. 142 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: political, social and economic forces 1950-1957, Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 9. 143 Ibid, p. 10.
53 politics by constructing novel types of relations among the different actors of international politics.
Adler and Barnett, for example reformulate the original Deutschian concept and present “a
framework for the study of the emergence of security communities that is analytically organized
around three tiers: (1) precipitating conditions; (2) process variables (transactions, organizations,
and social learning); and (3) mutual trust and collective identity.” 144 By focusing on mutual trust and collective identity, Adler and Barnett bring in the constructivist dimension of analysis. Their contribution is important in understanding the formation of these communities measured through integration. Most importantly, Adler and Barnett discuss two tiers conducive to the development of integration, namely (a) size, power, economic strength, administrative efficiency and; (b) the ability of the unit to control its own behavior and to redirect its own attention.
Applying constructivist framework to this research poses several inevitable challenges.
First, while constructivist scholars are “primarily concerned about the social dimension of
international relations, and have demonstrated the importance of norms, rules and language at
this level,” 145 this dissertation is primarily concerned with the various aspects of actual and potential military power and their implications for NATO’s management and functioning.
Second, it seems that most of constructivist debate is focused exclusively on the “methodological inconsistencies in the conventional constructivist and post-structuralist positions” and thus underestimates the issue-oriented research agenda. 146 Lastly, constructivism has a limited applicability given the fact that the question of this research necessitates a positivist approach
144 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities , Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 17. 145 Karin Fierke, “Constructivism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 168. 146 Karin Fierke and Knud Erik Joergensen, Constructing International Relations: the next generation, M. E. Sharpe, New York, (2001), p. 7.
54 that explores various aspects of military power as key explanatory variable for the formation and management of various military and political alliances, such as NATO.
Nonetheless, constructivist tradition is important in sharpening the debate with traditional
IR theories “that explain or understand change at the international level.” 147 For example, the novel thinking in defining security communities is the combination of integration and time. In other words, the construction of supranational political entities and forms of interaction is based on the presence of background or precipitating variables and process variables, the most important of which is time.
Major Frameworks Explaining Political Transformation
FUNCTIONALISM AND NEOFUNCTIONALISM The conceptualization of security communities is also important in developing various frameworks that explain different aspects of political transformation, including integration. Karl
Deutsch defined integration as a “condition under which ‘integrated’ states have forgone the use of violence as a means of settling their differences.” 148 Ernst Haas pinpoints one of the major weaknesses of the Deutschian definition since it does not isolate condition from process and, therefore, is not able to draw the difference between cause and effect. Instead, he argues:
If the present international scene is conceived of as a series of interacting and mingling national environments, and in terms of their participation in international organization, then integration would describe the process of increasing the interaction and the mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the system of international organizations and the environment provided by their nation-state members. Since such a process involves, obviously, the actions and perceptions of a variety of actors, and since these actions are described in a particularly striking way by the Functionalist approach, sociological functionalism retains its relevance for refining our understanding of integration. 149
147 Karin Fierke (2007), p. 168. 148 Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford University Press, 1964, p. 27. 149 Ibid, pp. 27-9.
55 Thus, Ernst Haas introduces functionalism as an alternative approach to studying
integration. Intellectually, the ideas developed by Haas rest on David Mitrany’s research on
functionalism in the 1950s. In A Working Political System Mitrany argues that “under certain
conditions the reverse has also occurred, powers and duties being handed over to regional and
other authorities for the better performance of certain communal needs.” 150 Furthermore, he
observes that “in national states and federations the functional development is going ahead
without much regard to, and sometimes in spite of, the old constitutional divisions. Mitrany
outlines the path of integration as a self-propelling process in which “every function was left to
generate others gradually, like the function sub-division of organic cells; and in every case an
appropriate authority was left to grow and develop out of actual performance.” 151 The
emergence of such functional authorities above the territorial states requires a wider
coordination, which “too, would in sense have to come about functionally” and take several
separate steps. 152 First, it includes technical and functional integration within the same group.
Second, the path of integration necessitates “coordination of several groups of functional
agencies.” 153 Third, the next stage mandates coordination between these functional agencies and other international planning agencies that results in the development of a single or multiple advisory organs above the territorial state which function as supranational authority, i.e. authority above the individual nation-states or by the same logic territorial states. Lastly,
Mitrany emphasizes that such an international action “must have some overall political authority
150 David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System,” in Brent Nelsen and Alexander Stubb, The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of the European Integration, Lynne Riener Publishers, 2 nd Edition, 1998, p. 99. 151 Ibid, pp. 100-1. 152 Ibid, pp. 107-8. 153 Ibid, p. 108.
56 above it,” which is “a practical possibility, it is the central view of the functional approach that such an authority is not essential for our greatest and real immediate needs.” 154
Ernst Haas expands Mitrany’s ideas in two major directions. First, he elaborates on the
argument that “organized economic interests pressure governments to manage economic
interdependence to their advantage by centralizing policies and institutions.” 155 Such
organizations, according to Haas “develop their own norms and their own accepted procedures
for dealing with conflict over these norms.” 156 By studying the process of learning through which national governments have been subjected, Haas argues that “through the process of learning, initially power-oriented governmental pursuits evolve into welfare-oriented action.” 157
Thus, he makes the case that neo-functionalism can offer a better explanation about change international politics compared to the dominant realist and idealist frameworks in the 1950s and
1960s.
Second, Haas elaborates on the process of integration and makes the case that initial decisions to integrate economically result in functional and political spillovers. In Beyond the
Nation State , he presents the argument that “integrative lessons learned in one functional context
will be applied in others, thus eventually supplanting international politics.” 158 In this context
functional spillover assumes that pressure for integration in certain sectors propels pressure for
further integration in others. Alternatively, political spillover occurs when “ongoing cooperation
154 Ibid, p. 109. 155 Andrew Moravcsik, “The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2005, p. 351. 156 Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford University Press, 1964, p. 47. 157 Ibid, pp. 47-8. 158 Ibid, p. 48.
57 in certain areas empowers supranational officials to act as informal political entrepreneurs in other areas.” 159
How does neofunctionalism apply to studying NATO’s transformation? Although it is
essentially a theory of European integration, some of its implications may be able to address the
advancement of specific allied capabilities among the old and the new NATO allies. Haas
himself admits that there is a distinction between high and low politics, where the economic
integration can be much more successful in advancing functional spillover in comparison to
military integration, where the coordination of efforts among the different governments is much
harder to achieve. In 1966 he admitted that certain issues such as “military and defense
questions have not displayed a close affinity to integration unless the issue involves a related
question of saving and allocating resources for welfare measures.” 160 Such instances can be observed mostly when the economic burdens for defense for small countries are considered incompatible with their welfare commitments. NATO’s experience in the financing of infrastructures programs, weapons research and integration of air warning systems can be good examples in this respect. The advancement of various combined joint task forces and multinational teams in the late 1990s and especially after the 2002 Prague Summit which usually include smaller allies may present evidence in support of neo-functionalist logic behind NATO’s post-Cold War transformation.
LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM Andrew Moravscik challenges the neofunctionalist logic and the ‘bicycle theory’ that it rests upon. The latter argues that “once an initial commitment was made, forward momentum of
159 Andrew Moravcsik, (2005), p. 352. 160 Ernst Haas, “International Integration: the European and the Universal Process” in International Political Communities: an Anthology, Anchor Book, New York, 1966, p. 103.
58 integration was inevitable,” which is analogous to riding a bike that moves Europe forward on the way to ‘an ever closer union.’ 161 Instead, he offers an alternative framework for explaining
European integration by making the case that specific elements of neofunctionalism “prove to be
exceptional rather than central to an empirical understanding of European integration” and
“remain peripheral to the overall dynamics of European integration.” 162 In The Choice for
Europe , he proposes neoliberal intergovernmentalism as an alternative approach to European integration, where “a tripartite explanation of integration – economic interest, relative power, credible commitments -- accounts for the form, substance and timing for major steps toward
European integration.” 163 Therefore, “the integration process did not supercede or circumvent the political will of national leaders; it reflected their will.” Thus, the outcomes of the interstate bargaining “are generally Pareto-efficient, but its distributive outcomes vary greatly.” This statement implies that different bargaining situations favor different countries. For example, bargains over institutions governing a single currency favored Germany, the Common
Agricultural Policy favored France, while the establishment of regional policy favored Britain.
Thus, Moravcsik presents a framework in which “interstate bargaining outcomes are decisively shaped by the relative power of nation-states,” where “choices to pool and delegate sovereignty to international institutions are best explained as efforts by governments to constrain and control one another – in game theoretic language, by their effort to enhance the credibility of commitments.” 164
On the one hand, liberal intergovernmentalism rejects the supremacy of supranational
bodies and agencies in explaining political integration and emphasizes the significance of
161 Andrew Moravcsik (2005), p. 350. 162 Ibid, p. 351-363. 163 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice of Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998, p. 4. 164 Ibid, pp. 7-9.
59 intergovernmental bargaining. On the other hand, however it departs from the traditional structural theories of international politics. Instead, the term “intergovernmental” is used in the
EC literature in order to draw “on general theories of bargaining and negotiation to argue that relative power among states is shaped above all by asymmetric interdependence, which dictated the relative value of agreement to different governments.” 165 As a result, the governments that
benefit most from the core agreement relative to their best unilateral and coalitional alternatives
to agreement tend to offer greater compromises in order to achieve it.” 166 Based on this logic,
Moravcsik concludes that “governments transfer sovereignty to international bodies where
potential joint gains are large, but efforts to secure compliance by foreign governments though
decentralized or domestic means are likely to be ineffective.” 167
How does the logic of liberal intergovernmentalism apply to the case of NATO’s post-Cold
War transformation? In general, the case of NATO tends to favor liberal intergovernmentalism
in its intellectual debate with neofunctionalism. There are several reasons why the logic of
neofunctionalism is much harder to apply in the case of NATO. First, as discussed earlier in this
sub-section, Haas himself openly admits that as a military and political institution dealing with
international security, NATO has always been intergovernmental in its nature and, therefore, the
spillover effect of military integration is much less observable. Second, the logic of the North
Atlantic Treaty mandates that major decisions for alliance transformation, such as the invitation
of new allies, the expansion of the alliance missions and the advancement of allied capabilities
are usually made at regular (usually bi-annual) summit meetings that involve bargaining at the
highest level among heads of state and government. Third, the theoretical framework developed
in the dissertation has relevance toward understanding the intergovernmental nature of NATO.
165 Ibid, p. 7. 166 Ibid, p. 8. 167 Ibid, p. 9.
60 Specifically, the club goods framework discussed in Chapter two and the concept of complementarities developed in Chapter three provide a detailed insight on the nature of bargaining among the allied governments with regard to the various aspects of alliance transformation. Lastly, the method of inquiry applied in this study and the underlying assumption of rationality are also congruent with Moravcsik’s approach used in The Choice for
Europe and will be discussed in the next sub-section of this chapter.
Methods
SINGLE CASE STUDY APPROACH Most political scientists share a growing concern that contemporary political science is becoming more and more driven by the method of inquiry rather than puzzle of the research question. 168 The selection of methods and research procedure in this study on NATO’s transformation is, nonetheless, determined by the research question how NATO functions and specifically how military power is being managed in the course of its transformation. Alexander
George, Harry Eckstein and Andrew Bennett present the most suitable case study approach for this study. In the case of NATO’s transformation, the selection of a single case is based on the search of a theory for which this case constitutes a good test. I believe that the specific question why NATO expands, undertakes new missions or develops new capabilities is a part of the broader question of how alliances function. In order to address these issues, I introduce club goods framework in Chapter Two and the concept of complementarities in Chapter Three to study the relationship between military resources and the transformation of alliances with focus on development of specific allied capabilities of the individual member states.
168 This concern was made explicit by John Mearsheimer, Robert Keohane and Thomas Risse at the roundtable discussion The Discipline of International Relations: Past, Present and Future, of the American Political Science Association 2007 Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, August 30 – September 2, 2007.
61 Theory building is one of the key goals of case study methodology. In Case Studies and
Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett list six different types of theory-building research objectives – atheorietical (descriptive) case, discipline-configurative case, heuristic case, theory testing and “building block.” 169 In addition,
they also stress the importance to identify which of these six types of theory building is being
undertaken. Therefore, this dissertation will examine the case of NATO’s post-Cold War
transformation to test the validity and the scope of the complementarities concept as it relates to
the military resources and allied capabilities of the individual nations. The dissertation also
contributes to identifying common patterns of alliance politics and suggests broader
generalizations often referred to as “building block studies.” Unlike King, Keohane and Verba’s
Designing Social Inquiry (1994) , Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue that single case
studies can be useful if they pose “tough tests for theories.” 170 Furthermore, George and Bennett recommend that “one must consider not only whether a case is most or least likely for a given theory but whether is also most or least likely for alternative theories.” 171 Focusing the research solely on NATO’s expansion makes it an easy case for the liberal approaches such as the institutionalism and democratic peace theory. The argument that NATO expands because the
United States wants to strengthen democracies in Eastern Europe and export the uniqueness of the American political system in this part of Europe seems to be quite persuasive. 172 In the same
way, it is not particularly challenging to find evidence in support of the argument that that
169 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005, pp. 75-6. 170 Ibid, p. 183. 171 Ibid, p. 121. 172 Here I refer mostly to Ikenberry’s study on the U.S. hegemony and Doyle’s democratic peace theory hypothesis. I found sufficient evidence for both arguments during my personal interviews in Brussels, Belgium and Washington, DC. For further reference see author’s personal interviews with Toomas Kukk, Deputy Head of the Estonian Mission to NATO, Juraj Podhorsky, Deputy Head of Slovak Mission to NATO, Geremy Shapiro from the Brookings Institution and Dieter Dettke from the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.
62 NATO persists because it was much more costly to create the alliance in 1949 than to maintain it now, therefore NATO may be useful as a tool in the war on terror despite the changed circumstances in international politics. 173
NATO’s case can also be tested against Allison’s organizational and bureaucratic theories.
Graham Allison (1971) challenges the rational actor model and argues that in addition to larger
national patterns and shared images, “the organizational routines that produce information,
alternatives and action,” matter in the same way as the bureaucratic politics and individual
leaders of government that make major governmental choices. 174 Other political scientists such
as Philip Selznik develop an argument that “the internal life of an organization tends to become
but never achieves a closed system. There are certain needs generated by the organization itself,
which command the attention and energies of leading participants.” 175 The core problems of each organization arise from “the need for continuity of policy and leadership.” These needs create an “intricate system of relationships and activities, formal and informal, which have primarily an internal relevance.” 176 Since no organization subsists in a vacuum, each one of
them should “pay some heed to the consequences of its own activities […] for other groups and
forces in the community.” 177 While Selznik and Allison offer persuasive explanations of organizational modification, they focus on the internal life of the organization as a key explanatory variable of its transformation. Instead, this study focuses on the management of military power as a key variable that explains various aspects of alliance transformation such as
173 Here I mostly refer to Celeste Wallander’s article “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War,” International Organization, Vol. 54 (4), Autumn 2000, pp. 705-6. 174 Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 258-9. 175 Philip Selznik, TVA and Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization, Harper Torchbooks, 1966, p. 10. 176 Ibid, p. 10. 177 Ibid, p. 10-11.
63 the incorporation of new allies, the initiation of new missions and the advancement of new capabilities.
The proposed framework of this research does not make the case that the liberal-
democratic, institutionalist and organizational perspectives are irrelevant. As a matter of fact, the
survey of the IR and alliance literature indicates that the democratic peace, the institutional and
organizational theories seem to be the “most likely choice” for explaining alliance dynamics.
The major problem is that none of them constitutes what George and Bennett call a “tough case.”
All of these approaches have tried to explain primarily cooperative outcomes. Yet, NATO
remains involved exclusively in the business of providing security and is active in the use of
military force in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq and in the Mediterranean, where the variables of
military and economic power remain highly salient. 178
A tough case for international military alliances would be to develop a model that studies
variables and causal mechanisms, such as the management of military resources and needed
allied capabilities as key ingredients of power politics in the new contextual environment of the
expanded and transforming North Atlantic Alliance. Is it logical to expect that any explanation
that focuses exclusively on military resources and capabilities as measure of state power and is
tied to the structure of the international system will lead to the Waltzian conclusion? Is it true
that “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are?” If this is the case, why are we not
being able to see new Germany that “finds its feet” and “will no more want to be constrained by
the United States acting through NATO than by any other state?” 179
Unlike Graham Allison, I do not challenge the rational actor assumption. While I depart from Selznik and Wallander in the assumption that organizations function similar to organisms
178 Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory” in David Baldwin (ed) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 228-9. 179 Kenneth Waltz (1993), p. 76.
64 that need continuity (in this particular case, of policy and leadership), my model assumes that the international system drives organizational behavior. Nonetheless, a simple test of the case of
NATO’s transformation against the models developed by Allision, Selznik or Wallander would not constitute a critical or “tough” case to be researched and will have very limited if any scholarly implications for theory development.
Upon identifying of the “tough case,” George and Bennett recommend two types of case studies: comparative and congruence methods. The comparative method is inapplicable for a single case study because it requires “at least two or more instances of well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but one.” 180 The alternative to that compensates for the limits of statistical and comparative case studies. These are the so-called within-case analyses that are more variable-oriented and “attempt to establish the causal power of a particular variable by comparing how it performs in different cases.” Also, the “within-case comparisons” are “critical to the viability of the small-n analysis.” 181
The congruence method offers an alternative approach to the comparative method and has
several key characteristics. First, the investigator introduces a theory and then “attempts to
assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case.” 182 My dissertation studies the concept of complementarities and assesses the case of NATO’s transformation through this analytical framework. Second, the congruence method offers adaptability and flexibility and contributes to theory development in several ways, including through the formulation of a crucial or tough case of an existing theory. Third, not surprisingly, an important
180 George and Bennett admit that such a control is very difficult to achieve and list various alternative methods such as Mill’s “method of agreement” and “method of difference,” Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis and King, Keohane and Verba’s “assumption of unit homogeneity.” For detailed information on these approaches see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005), pp. 153-71. 181 Ibid, p. 179. 182 Ibid, p. 181.
65 general standard for this type of case study is the criterion for congruity, which requires
“similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesized causes and observed effects.” 183 In order to address the cause-effect problem of congruency, I test the model as a quantitative study in Chapter Three and a qualitative study in Chapters Four and Five. At this point, I need to underline that the qualitative case study supplements the deficiencies and constraints of the quantitative model. Fourth, my research design employs “process-tracing” which “identifies a causal path (or causal chain) that depicts how the independent variable leads to the outcome of the dependent variable.” 184 In other words, the dissertation addresses the
causation behind the relationship between the independent variables that operationalize military
resources and the new alliance capabilities.
HYPOTHESES In my research, I hypothesize that in the post-Cold War distribution of power NATO
functions differently from its original Cold War design because through the 1990s the alliance
has been able to transform itself by using efficiently the available resources of its member states
in order to boost much needed allied capabilities. Specifically, from this proposition I have
generated four separate hypotheses that are going to be tested against several groups of countries.
These are summarized in the chart below:
Hypothesis Statement/ Proposition Groups of nations against which the hypothesis is tested Hypothesis There is a relationship between The 15 old NATO allies (Iceland One military resources and specific allied excluded) capabilities. The 10 new NATO allies The 4 non-NATO EU nations (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden) Hypothesis NATO membership makes a The 15 old NATO allies
183 Ibid, p. 183. 184 Ibid, p. 183.
66 Two difference in developing allied The 10 new NATO allies capabilities. The 4 non-NATO EU nations Hypothesis NATO expansion contributes to the The 10 new NATO allies Three development of allied capabilities. MAP and PfP nations that would like to join NATO The 4 non-NATO EU nations Hypothesis The presence of the hegemon The hegemon (United States) Four enhances the development of allied The 26 NATO allies capabilities by stimulating the The 27 EU member states efficient use of the available resources.
The first hypothesis explores whether there is a relationship between military resources and specific allied capabilities with regard to the old and the new NATO allies, as well as the four non-NATO European Union members (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden). This test is conducted primarily through analysis of quantitative data. If confirmed, it will present evidence for the concept of complementarities.
The second hypothesis studies whether NATO membership makes a difference in developing allied capabilities. In other words, I test whether the relationship between resources and capabilities in the first hypothesis can be observed within and outside of the alliance framework, i.e. whether and to what extent there is a difference between the three groups of nations discussed in the first hypothesis. If I am not able to find sufficient evidence for complementarities for countries that are not NATO members, it means that the concept of complementarities is specific for NATO as alliance of international security. This hypothesis will be examined through analysis of quantitative and qualitative data.
The third hypothesis is related to the second and explores whether the development of new allied capabilities can be linked to the process of NATO expansion. Specifically, I test whether the prospect for membership has stimulated a more efficient use of the available resources and development of new capabilities for the countries that have recently joined NATO as opposed to
67 those that are not NATO members, but are interested to join NATO, as well as those that are not members and do not plan to join the alliance in the near future. This hypothesis is tested thought quantitative data but also through a survey of the process of NATO expansion from mid-1990s to early 2000s.
The fourth hypothesis is also related to the second one and investigates whether the presence of a hegemon makes a difference by promoting a more efficient use of the available military resources by the allies in developing allied capabilities. The hypothesis is tested through a survey of the capabilities of the European Union (European Security and Defense Policy) as opposed to NATO capabilities. If I find sufficient evidence that NATO is more successful in developing allied capabilities compared to the EU, it means that, by the logic of extension, the presence of a hegemon in alliances can make a difference. This hypothesis explores whether, unlike in the EU where there is no hegemon, the United States exercises influence over its allies in NATO to manage their military resources more efficiently and develop new capabilities.
Thus, the four hypotheses trace the path by which the management of military power leads to the advancement of allied capabilities needed for the successful implementation of the new missions. They allow us to generate novel explanations that deal with the management of power within the transformed NATO. These hypotheses depart from the traditional realist and neo- liberal explanations, while preserving the focus on intergovernmental bargaining and the importance of size and relative power of the individual allies. Lastly, these four hypotheses also make it possible to test the relevance of club goods framework and the concept of complementarities, which are the two core theoretical pillars of this research.
68 RESEARCH PROCEDURE As previously discussed, the research uses quantitative and qualitative data to study alliance transformation from the early 1990s onwards by tracing core developments of NATO politics from the Rome Summit (1991) to the Riga Summit (2006). The dissertation consists of two major components of inquiry: (a) a case study on NATO enlargement, which includes quantitative and qualitative components, as well as in-depth elite interviewing and; (b) development of a theoretical framework that rests on club goods theory and the concept of complementarities examined in a strategic environment of systemic imbalance. The rationale behind employing quantitative and qualitative data is that, in this way, I am able to test the validity of my theoretical argument from two different methodological perspectives. The small- n approach of the case study gives several advantages compared to large-n approach of the quantitative methods – conceptual validity, exploring causal mechanisms and deriving new hypotheses. 185 The case study also enables me to identify indicators that best represent
theoretical concepts intended to measure military power, peacekeeping and crisis management
and non-proliferation. 186 In addition, it is much more feasible within a single case to look at a larger number of intervening and causal variables driving NATO’s overall transformation. The case study is also valuable in identifying new variables and hypotheses, such as the relationship between military resources and allied capabilities. Lastly, the interviews which generated qualitative data, turned out to be extremely suitable in providing “a trade-off among the goals of attaining theoretical parsimony, establishing explanatory richness, and keeping the number of cases … manageable.” 187 The possibility to interview various representatives of the political
185 Ibid, pp. 19-22. 186 Ibid, p. 19. 187 Ibid, p. 31.
69 elites in Europe and the United States allowed me to test various rival explanatory models which will be discussed as the theory and the case are presented.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS In order to test the validity of the first and the second hypothesis, I have conducted a multivariate regression analysis (OLS model), in which I regressed six independent variables that measure military resources: (1) military personnel; (2) Army equipment; (3) Navy equipment;
(4) Air Force equipment; (5) defense spending and; (6) GDP per capita. I tested this hypothesis against three sets of countries: the “old” NATO allies, 188 the ten “new” NATO members 189 and the four non-aligned European Union members 190 as presented in the summary chart above. This
test is used to answer several key questions about the relationship between military resources and
troops abroad. Most of the data have been collected from the Military Balance Yearbook.
Sometimes due to the rotation of troops or shift of missions, the Military Balance (MB) database
tends to underestimate or overestimate the actual values of the data by recording the new and the
old troops or not recording any of them. In order to avoid data spuriousness, I have also checked
with the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database and where there has been major
discrepancy between the SIPRI and the Military Balance, I have averaged the data or looked for
national sources to confirm the actual number of forces.
In the qualitative part of my data collection, I survey primary sources, such as NATO
official documents, parliamentary minutes, military doctrines, government studies, leaders’
statements and decisions for and implementation of military reforms required under the
188 The fifteen old NATO allies are the founding members and those who joined the alliance prior to 1989 - Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Iceland was excluded from the model because it is the only nation among them that does not maintain armed forces. 189 These include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 190 These countries are Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Switzerland was excluded from the model because it is formally neutral and has no intention to join EU or NATO.
70 membership criteria. In addition, I also study secondary sources such as press releases and interviews with NATO and government officials and researchers.
The in-depth elite interviewing is the second research technique that strengthens the qualitative component of the research. Generally, interviews are a helpful method in studying international politics because they provide insights into events about which we know little: the activities that take place behind closed doors. Thus, I was able to learn more about the inner workings of the political process, the interactions between the different individual actors and how the sequence of events was viewed and responded within the broader framework.191 One of
the biggest advantages of in-depth interviewing is the semi-structured format with open-ended
questions. Another reason to use the open-ended approach is its flexibility and adaptability to
the style of elite thinking, opportunity of the respondents to organize their answers within their
own frameworks, as well as higher degree of receptivity of respondents such as the possibility to
articulate their positions and explain their views on the issues that have been researched. 192
Also, open-ended questions give freedom to probe and formulate follow-up questions.
For the purposes of my dissertation, I determined the interviewees based on two criteria: (a) they should be representatives of the national elites of NATO members, i.e. people in decision- making or leadership roles and (b) the respondents should be experts about the topic at hand. 193
There are two types of elites that meet these criteria: (a) representatives of the governments, such as national delegations and permanent representations in Brussels or the foreign and defense
191 Darren Lilleker, “Interviewing the Political Elite: Navigating a Potential Minefield,” Politics, 2003, Vol. 23(3), pp. 207-214. 192 On the advantage of the open-ended interview approach see Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews,” Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, December 2002, pp. 673-6; and Jeffrey Berry, “Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing,” Political Science and Politics , Vol. 35, December 2002, pp. 679-81. 193 I. E. Seidman Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and Social Sciences, Teachers College Press, New York (1991) and Beth L. Leech, “Asking Questions: Techniques for Semi-Structured Interviews, ” Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, December 2002.
71 ministries of these countries; and, (b) representatives from the non-governmental organizations and think tanks, such as the Brookings Institution, the Wilson Center and the George C. Marshall
Associations in Eastern Europe.
The sample includes elite representatives from the United States, Western and Eastern
Europe. I was able to conduct a total of fourteen interviews in Brussels, Belgium; Sofia,
Bulgaria and Washington, DC. The interviewees varied from professors and researchers at
universities, think tanks and non-profit organizations to high-ranking policy makers. During the
first stage of my research in Brussels, Belgium and Sofia, Bulgaria in January and February
2006, I managed to arrange and conduct ten interviews with representatives from political and
decision-making elites. The sample included representatives at the national delegations to the
NATO Headquarters from the core European nations in NATO, such as France and Germany, as
well as the new allies including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia. The elites
in the Western European countries were chosen to indicate the dynamics of alliance politics
among the old core European allies. Alternatively, the interviews with representatives from
Eastern Europe helped me to study underlying transformational processes and broader
perceptions of NATO politics in the new allies from Eastern Europe that joined between 1999
and 2004.
The elites in the United States reflect the decision-making and think tank representatives that study U.S. foreign policy making and influence the hegemon’s grand strategy how to manage foreign relations. They constitute surrogates for the high-ranking decision makers in
Washington, DC, which normally are very hard to access. I was able to arrange and conduct four interviews in Washington, DC in September and October 2006 with representatives from the
72 Wilson Center, the Brookings Institution and the Washington Program at the University of
California-Davis.
There is little doubt that the choice of NATO’s post-Cold War transformation and the selected methodological approach poses numerous challenges. However, the selection of a contemporary case imposes constraints on the perspective of ongoing processes. Unlike historical cases, contemporary IR dynamics changes quickly and so does NATO politics which sometimes is comparable to shooting at a moving target. There is no doubt that focusing solely on a single case limits the possibilities to make comparison and expand the theoretical findings.
Ideally, it would be much easier to select several similar cases to compare, but imbalance has been an aberrant fleeting condition in modern international politics and thus we are limited to the constraints of studying a single contemporary phenomenon.
The research question determines the criteria of selecting one or several cases and the methods to collect and analyze data in order to develop new theories. However, the research procedure and findings are also determined by the researcher’s personal view as a political scientist of how to study the issues of international affairs and alliance politics, which is linked to the broad scholarly debate on philosophy of science.
METHOD OF INQUIRY As previously indicated, the choice of the particular case and the focus on specific set of independent and dependent variables reflects a research strategy that presents evidence in support of a certain theory. Kenneth Waltz defines theory as “a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm of domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts.” 194 Furthermore, he elaborates that “a theory arranges phenomena so that they are seen as mutually dependent; it connects otherwise disparate facts; it
194 Kenneth Waltz (1979), p. 9.
73 shows how changes in some of the phenomena necessarily entail changes in others.” 195 This
Waltzian conceptualization on what constitutes a good theory rests on certain foundational
philosophical assumptions. They play an important role not only in determining the research
methods that fit best the characteristics of this inquiry, but also in defining the appropriate
theoretical and research question frameworks of this inquiry on international alliances. A careful
analysis of the evolution of the theoretical, methodological and research question frameworks
indicates that the origins of division in the discipline are embedded in the underlying approaches
to ontology and epistemology.
On deeper philosophical level, political scientists “deal with the very nature of ‘being’
literally” or developing an approach of ‘being,’ which is also know as ontology. 196 Furthermore,
they also differ depending on whether they agree that reality exists independently of the human
being or is constructed by them. While the former are called foundationalists (or essentialists),
the latter are anti-foundationalists. The epistemological position also reflects the view of the
researcher of “what we know about the world and how we know about it.” 197 With regard to
whether we can discover the world through direct observation or there are other relationships that
are not directly observable, political scientists belong either to the empiricist or the interpretist
tradition. There are three major schools that emerged on the grounds of these ontological and
epistemological approaches -- positivism (empiricism), interpretism and critical realism.
Positivist or empiricist approach is based on foundationalist ontology and believes that
natural science and social science are broadly analogous. Therefore, the major goal of this
195 Ibid, p. 10 196 David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 18. 197 Ibid, p. 18-9.
74 approach is to establish causal relationship between social phenomena and, in this way, to separate empirical from normative questions or to distinguish “is” from “ought.” 198
The interpretist tradition is often referred to as “the obvious ‘other’ of positivism.” 199
These researchers reject the notion that the world exists independently of the knowledge of it.
They argue that the social phenomena that we study do not dwell independently of our interpretations and understanding. Therefore, our interpretations play an instrumental role in determining political outcomes. March and Stoker clarify that “in ontological terms this position is anti-foundationalist.” 200 Currently, constructivism belongs to the IR approaches whose
tradition is closely linked to the interpretist approach to ontology and epistemology.
Philosophically, constructivism is rooted in the Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosphicus
(1961). The underlying logic of this intellectual movement was to reorient the philosophical
presuppositions underlying Western philosophy since Descartes thus “replacing the distinction
between subjective and objective realms of experience with the social nature of language.” 201
Alexander Wendt notes that “there are at least two empirical issues at stake in the debate between rationalists (or positivists) and constructivists.” 202 First, the intellectual debate is about
the extent to which the state identities and interests are determined by domestic as opposed to
systemic structures. If these sources are domestic, i.e. exogenous to the international system, the
positivist explanation rests on the liberal and neo-liberal domain of IR theorists and if the answer
is systemic then the explanatory power rests on structural realism or neoliberal institutionalism.
However, the positivist approaches are not “well equipped to analyze endogenous preference
198 Ibid, p. 22-3. 199 Ibid, p. 26. 200 Ibid. 201 Karin Fierke and Knud Erik Joergensen, Constructing International Relations: the next generation, M. E. Sharpe, New York, (2001), p. 4. 202 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 37.
75 formation and thus a constructivist approach would be called for.” 203 Constructivism literature has clustered around two camps. The first one is often referred to as “the bridge-building approach” around Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein. Their core argument is that the power politics imperative does not “follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world this is due to process, not structure. There is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process.” 204
The second group of constructivist scholars embraces the Wittgensteininan view that “language is a constructive of the world” and “a form of action in itself that is bound up with other practices.” 205
The philosophy of science literature interprets differently the relationship between the
structuralist and constructivist approaches. While authors like March and Stoker argue that these
two traditions are incompatible in their ontological and epistemological foundation, scholars like
David Dressler make the case that “the constructivist ontology entirely encompasses structuralist
ontologies because it takes into account social and material structures, as well the intended and
unintended consequences of social interaction.” 206 While I find it intellectually challenging and enriching to address NATO’s transformation from a constructivist approach such as the security communities’ perspectives, I believe that there are significant ontological and epistemological hurdles. From a methodological point of view my research remains overwhelmingly positivist because it studies the relationship between the actual amount of military resources and the
203 Alexander Wendt (1999), p. 38. 204 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make Out of It: the social construction of power politics,” International Organization , Vol. 46 (2), Spring 1992, pp. 394-5. 205 These are mostly scholars like Friedrich Kratowchil, Emmanuel Adler and Karin Fierke. For further details see Karin Fierke “Critical Methodology and Constructivism” in Fierke and Joergensen Constructing International Relations: the next generation, M. E. Sharpe, New York, (2001), p. 126. 206 David Dressler, “What is Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” International Organization , Vol. 43, No 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 441-474, quoted by George and Bennett (2005), p. 129.
76 alliance capabilities needed for various peacekeeping, crisis-management and non-proliferation missions. This dissertation does not set itself the goal to address issues such as the language of constructing security communities, or the social construction of democratization and westerninzation in Eastern Europe by its inclusion into NATO and the EU. These hurdles make it logically inconsistent, from a methodological perspective, to combine an agenda that researches military resources and capabilities with a framework that studies the formation and development of security communities, where the construction of these communities takes place over an extended period of time.
There are several practical reasons why this is the case in this particular research on
NATO’s post-Cold War transformation. First, from constructivist perspective it not ontologically and epistemologically challenging to grapple with the causal link between military resources and allied capabilities. Second, Karl Deutsch’s framework requires that in order to study security communities, we need to collect and analyze data over quite an extended period of time, say at least several decades. At the same time, this research focuses exclusively on the period between 1993 and 2005 and most of the qualitative and qualitative data have relevancy for this period only. Third, since the case of NATO’s transformation is a contemporary study, there are objective constraints to collect data over a much-extended period of time because
NATO’s transformation has been ongoing for slightly more than a decade and we can only speculate about how and when it is going to end.
THE ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY As discussed earlier, the core of the dissertation argument is organized around the evidence for a relationship between military resources and allied capabilities, which I refer to as the concept of complementarities. The underlying logic is that the distribution of power matters as
77 far as alliance functioning and management is concerned. The model also assumes that the members of the alliance are rational actors and alliance politics, as such, tends to produce optimal outcomes. As mentioned in the literature review section, the assumption of rationality is distinctive for most of the literature on alliances. In the same token, this study also accepts this assumption. Since, there have been various contending approaches to studying and defining rationality as such, in this last section I would like to briefly address its meaning and relevance to my research design.
The conceptualization of rationality begins with the rational choice tradition from the
1950s. Since then it has generated multiple theoretical models and theorems that tried to establish norms and rules on various political phenomena such as majority rule and political dynamics, democratic institutions and various governmental policies. 207 Rational choice
theorists agree on several core assumptions of their research. First, rational action involves
utility maximization , i.e. a situation when an individual is confronted with an array of options and
he or she picks up the one that best serves his or her objectives. Therefore, rational behavior is
normally identified as “maximization of some sort.”208 Second, similar to macroeconomic theory, rational choice theorists assume that individual’s available options can be rank-ordered , which sometimes is referred to in the literature as connectedness. This means that an individual may consider the two available options unequal or equal. If these options are unequal he or she prefers one to the other and if they are equal, it means that the individual is indifferent. 209 Third,
rational choice theorists assume that the preference orderings of the rational actors are transitive .
This means that if option A is preferred to option B and B is preferred to C, the consistency rule
207 Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice: a critique of applications in political science , Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 3-4. 208 See Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values , Yale University Press, 1951, quoted by Green and Shapiro (1994), p. 14. 209 Green and Shapiro (1994), p. 14.
78 requires that A is preferred to C. Fourth, this framework assumes that each individual maximizes the expected value of his or her payoffs measured on some sort of utility scale. 210
Fifth, rational choice theorists agree that the maximizing actions of the individual persons produce certain collective outcomes that can be explained with the help of the rational choice methods. By accepting to various degrees these five core assumptions, the research task of this methodological approach is to “explain collective outcomes by reference to the maximizing actions of individuals.” 211 While rational choice has grown tremendously in the last decades,
most of the current literature rests to one degree or another on one or several of the foundational
works in the field represented by Kenneth Arrow, Anthony Down and Mancur Olson. 212
Mancur Olson’s seminal work The Logic of Collective Action has the largest theoretical impact in conceptualizing alliance theory. Olson focuses on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation, where “one purpose that is, nonetheless, characteristic of most organizations, and surely of practically all organizations with an important economic aspect, is the furtherance of the interests of their members.”213 The Logic of Collective Action expands the
scope of the method of the research on groups and organizations by conceptualizing “public or
collective goods that states or other organizations provide.” 214 Also, Olson’s work elaborates on the free-rider problem, i.e. a situation where an economic, political or social group is provided
“regardless of whether one contributes to its provision” and where the rational individual will
210 See Duncan Luce and Howard Raffa, Games and Decisions, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957, p. 50, quoted by Green and Shapiro (1994), p. 15. 211 Green and Shapiro (1994), p. 16. 212 For further details see Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963; Anthony Down, Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper, 1957; and Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, 1965. 213 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Gods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, [c. 1977], p. 5. 214 Ibid, p. 15.
79 consume this good without contributing to its provision.” 215 Lastly, he concludes that the larger
the group, “the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good” and
the largest member who would “on his own provide the largest amount of collective good, bears
a disproportionate share of burden of providing a collective good.” 216
Nonetheless, the rational choice methodology is not unquestionably embraced in political
science. In Pathology of Rational Choice Donald Green and Ian Shapiro list several
methodological weaknesses. The first of them is that rational choice theorists primarily tend to
look at the empirical evidence and then come up with a model that fits the available empirical
data. Rather than formulating bold predictions that are falsifiable by the empirical data, they
develop “post-hoc theory” models where the research question follows the available empirical
data. Furthermore, when disconfirming data come in later, these researchers embark in “curve
fitting” that concocts a new version of the theory in order to “re-describe the anomaly as
rational.” 217 Second, those predictions that are not amended post-hoc undergo modification because they rest on inherent equilibria, which are “immeasurable and, therefore, unobservable” entities. As a result, it is much harder to detect whether the observed conditions existed as described in the model and whether they were antecedent or initial. 218 Green and Shapiro argue that rational choice theorists engage in “arbitrary domain restriction.” This means that there are domains such as voter turnout and collective action where the theory seems to work, while on other occasions, such as the wealth maximization hypothesis where rational choice is significantly constrained in its explanatory power.219 Often times a theory that is to be tested
215 Green and Shapiro (1994), p. 9. 216 Mancur Olson (1977), p. 35. 217 Jeffrey Friedman, “Economic Approaches to Politics” in Jeffrey Friedman (ed) The Rational Choice Controversy , Yale University Press, 1995, p. 5. 218 Ibid, p. 5. 219 Green and Shapiro (1994), p. 44.
80 needs to be defined by a specific reference whether it works in that domain or not, which makes the whole theory building enterprise problematic and even pointless. Fourth, since this research method is based on the assumption of equilibrium, most of the propositions entail certain predictions. Sometimes these predictions are a rate or propositions; sometimes they are particular outcomes. In any case, the perditions are vaguely operationalized and sometimes they are invariably incorrect to one degree or another. 220 Fifth, as a result of the equilibrium constraints, rather than seeking overwhelming evidence, rational choice theorists frequently attempt solely to attain a confirmation of the hypothesized statements. 221
Although the logic of this critique seems compelling, it does not elaborate much on
alternative and more reliable methods of inquiry. For example, Green and Shapiro mention that
the “the conjectures of rational choice theorists have not been tested empirically.” 222 Therefore,
they propose an employment of behavioral and psychological approaches, as well as critical
approaches such as institutionalism and constructivism. It seems that the psychological and
behavioral approaches are the only empiricist alternatives suggested, whereas constructivist and
to a certain degree the new institutionlist approaches seem to shift the ontological and
epistemological foundations of positivism. 223 Certainly Green and Shapiro’s concerns about the
methodological limitations and problems with post-hoc theory developments that also result in
the departure from the primacy of the research question are well grounded. It is true that the
method rather than the question is becoming the driving force of research, which ultimately
circumscribes the scope and the explanatory power of political science as a discipline. Precisely
because I believe that the question should drive the research, a study on the re-management of
220 Ibid, p. 41. 221 Jeffrey Friedman (1995), p. 6. 222 Green and Shapiro (1994), p. 6. 223 For further details about the various distinctions between the different institutionalist traditions, behavioral approaches and constructivism see March and Stoker (2002).
81 military resources and allied capabilities needs the assumption of rationality in order to be able to operationalize the concepts into variables and put them into plausible tests that present compelling evidence for my theory.
In conclusion, this chapter offers an overview of the different theoretical and methodological approaches for studying alliances within the broader context of international politics. Furthermore, we discussed the conceptual distinction between alliances and other similar concepts such as hegemony and empire; and surveyed the various theoretical frameworks dealing the origins, functioning and management of allinaces. From methodological perspective, the chapter addresses the assumption of rationality and some of the problems related with it. The model that will be developed in the next chapters accepts the assumption of rationality but does not rest on the rational choice methodology. Instead, it studies the evidence for a relationship between the independent and the dependent variables, which in this particular case are operationalized as military resources and peacekeeping.
The next chapter of the dissertation will discuss some classical economic models of alliances developed by Mancur Olson, Richard Zeckhauser and Todd Sandler. Based on the deductive logic of their research, I will introduce the concept of complementarities in Chapter
Three and incorporate this concept into the broader debate on alliance management. Collective and club goods frameworks offer a loose and yet manageable framework that allows the development of a logically consistent, parsimonious and operationalizable theory. This framework is also congruent with the assumption in the dissertation that the international system is the driving force for the flow of IR. Lastly, the goal of the study is to develop an explanatory model of alliance transformation which is linked to the systemic condition of imbalance.
Although from scientific perspective such a contribution is mostly theoretical, some of its
82 findings have also policy implications that will be discussed in the last chapters of the dissertation.
83 Chapter 2. Conceptual Framework: Club Goods Theory
Most of the current literature that examines forms of military security cooperation elaborates on the formation of alliances. There are relatively few studies that bring theoretical focus on their functioning and management. The goal of this study is to explain how NATO functions and why it transforms after the collapse of bipolarity in 1991. For this purpose, I suggest a framework for research that builds on club goods theory and the concept of complementarities, thus borrowing from economic literature and accepting the core assumptions associated with rational actor models.
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical foundations of club goods theory and its link to the existing economic literature on alliances. Specifically, I will provide an overview of the conceptualization of different types of goods and elaborate on the distinctions between collective goods and club goods frameworks. The utility of the proposed framework makes it possible to capture several important features of international alliances. On the one hand it captures the negotiation process among different member states on the various aspects of collective security. On the other hand, this framework depicts the rational bargaining among bigger and smaller states and the constraints that they face given their size and influence within the club. Therefore, the club goods framework modifies the logic of structuralism and structural realism while also suggesting heterogeneous clubs as an economic approach to alliance politics.
Lastly, the proposed framework of analysis offers a flexible and yet manageable explanation how international alliances are being managed, which borrows from economic theory but is also theoretically and methodologically congruent with other frameworks that explain political integration, such as liberal intergovernmentalism as discussed in Chapter one of the dissertation.
84 The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the meaning and significance of several key groups of concepts that are relevant to alliance theory, such as burden-sharing and cost sharing, collective defense and collective security, public and private goods, equilibria, optimality and externalities. Second, I present the theoretical foundations of collective goods theory presented by Olson and Zeckhauser in their classical piece entitled An Economic Theory of Alliances (1966). Third, I survey the reevaluation of the collective goods model and elaborate on the strengths of the club goods framework for studying alliances suggested by Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler. Fourth, I link club goods theory to other similar concepts, such the team concept suggested by Richard Harknett and Borek Lizec and explain the similarities and differences between them.
Conceptual Definitions
First, I would like to elaborate on several key definitions related to the presentation of the argument in this chapter. As discussed in the previous chapter, the assumption of rationality posits that actors’ available options may be rank-ordered and their preferences are transitive.
Also, their rational actions involve some sort of utility maximization that produces various equilibria. In this introductory section, I will discuss the specific meanings of several key pairs of concepts that are widely discussed in the economic theories of alliances. These are mostly similar or mutually related concepts such as burden sharing and cost sharing, collective security and collective defense, public and private goods, Nash equilibrium and externalities.
85 BURDEN SHARING AND COST SHARING From the 1960s onwards, alliance literature has studied carefully the issues of burden-
sharing and cost sharing among various allies, mostly in the context of NATO. 224 Peter Forster and Stephen Cimbala define burden sharing as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in a process of accomplishing a common goal.” 225 These risks may be economic, political, military or other. In military alliances like NATO, burdens have to be shared including the raising of costs. In this way, Forester and Cimbala implicitly emphasize that burden sharing incorporates a combination of willingness and commitment to share some sort of costs and risks associated with a particular good. These costs, however, are not only economic. They include “raising and supporting arms of service, deploying them overseas and using them in combat or peace operations.” 226 Therefore, burden sharing is the broader concept, which includes sharing of certain costs (political, economic, military) as well as other factors including but not limited to various risks, “additional strategic operational and tactical burdens”, as well as “domestic and international reactions to multilateral operations.” 227 Lastly, an
important component of burden-sharing is also “an increasing legitimacy that results from […]
international cooperation in response to the multiplicity of regional conflicts and civil wars that
violate the roles of humanity, spawn power vacuums, and destabilize regions. 228 Cost sharing,
on the other hand, refers first and foremost to sharing various types of costs in acquiring certain
resources (political, economic, military, etc). Translated to the security dynamic within NATO,
disputes over cost sharing can be defined as debates over “the allocation of NATO expenditures
224 These works include Olson and Zeckhauser’s classical research on the Economic Theory of Alliances (1966), Cooper and Zycher’s Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing (1989), James Golden’s The Dynamics of Change in NATO (1983) and Forster and Cimbala ‘s work on The U.S., NATO, and Military Burden-Sharing (2005). 225 Forster and Cimbala, The U.S., NATO, and Military Burden-Sharing, Frank Cass, New York, 2005, p. 1. 226 Ibid, p. 8. 227 Ibid, p. 9. 228 Ibid, p. 9.
86 and the relative contribution of real military resources.” 229 Similar to Forster and Cimbala,
Charles Cooper and Benjamin Zycher trace the historical debate between the United States and the European allies about burden sharing and conclude that most of the transatlantic debate has been focused on the force contribution and expenditures. However, they argue that the dynamics of alliance politics within NATO has indicated that “the burden-sharing issue in NATO is far more complex than a mere squabble over money.” 230
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY The concepts of burden-sharing and the cost-sharing imply a debate that on the one hand deals with the distribution of efforts among the allies to achieve security and, on the other hand, touches upon the bigger intellectual debate about the type of good that international security provides. In the lieu of the debate, the literature discusses two different notions of security that alliances provide to their members -- collective defense and collective security. Nonetheless, collective defense and collective security reflect two very different analytical and theoretical approaches to security. Collective defense is a much older concept in the realm of alliance politics that has dominated modern European and world politics throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The collective defense pact is “an instrument of states cooperating to seek security from the actual prospective threats posed by others, one of its chief preoccupations is achieving a favorable, or at least acceptable, balance of power as means of deterring war or hedging against its outbreak.” 231 Therefore, the concept of collective defense binds together an alliance of states to deter, and if necessary defend, against one or more external threats to the
229 Charles Cooper and Benjamin Zycher, Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1989, pp. 2-3. 230 Ibid, p. 6. 231 David Yost, NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p. 7.
87 agreed alliance domain. 232 Collective defense is directly linked to deterrence and balance of
power, as a means to combine power among several states in order to balance against
preponderance. Thus, the notion and goal of collective defense has dominated most of alliance
politics in the multipolar and bipolar distribution of power.
Alternatively, the idea of collective security emphasizes the establishment of “a self-
enforcing international mechanism or body that automatically reacts by rejecting and
immediately renouncing an aggression in the international system.” 233 In essence, it is a “pact against war,” where the threats emanate from an “aggression by a currently unidentified party to the pact, which should ideally include all states in the state system.” 234 Therefore, collective security “is directed towards no predetermined or clearly defined enemy, nor can it operate on the basis of predetermined coalition.” 235 Its universality is opposed to the traditional concept of the balance of power, where collective defense always played a crucial role in modern international politics through various alliances. But collective defense is “somewhat easier to achieve” since it necessitates coordination of efforts among allies. Because attempts to achieve collective security require everybody to join the institutional setup and, given the fact that these states have different interests, this can easily fragment an alliance. 236 In fact, the ideas of
collective security have been developed in the post-World War I context as an alternative to the
previously dominating balance-of-power mechanism to maintain international stability. While
alliance members are expected to “honor formal mutual defense pledges in the event of
aggression against an ally, they are not necessarily obliged to take action against acts of
232 Ibid, pp. 5-9. 233 Ibid. 234 See David Yost (1998). Also, the collective security concept is based on the ideas of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson and is discussed by authors like Martin Wright, Inis Claude, Jr., etc. Currently some of the liberal literature on international security embraces this concept in part or in full. 235 Geoffrey Williams and Barkley Jones, NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the XXI Century, The Institute of Economic and Political Studies, Cambridge, 2001, p. 88. 236 Ibid, p. 91.
88 aggression affecting non-allies.” Alternatively, in the Kantian or Wilsonian collective security system, “all states in the system would be united in a cooperative pact, and all the states would be obliged to act against any aggressor.” 237 In this case, the divergence of interests erodes the efficiency of the decision-making and implementation process, such as the case of the League of
Nations in the interwar period, which had quite a mixed record on enforcing collective security.
The League was successful in regulating international disputes such as the plebiscite in Upper
Silesia in 1921, the border dispute between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925 and the referendum in
Saarland (1935). At the same time, it failed to intervene and prevent aggression on other occasions, such as the Soviet aggression against Finland, where only 7 out of 15 members of the
Council voted for the expelling the Soviet Union, as well as in the case of Italy invasion in
Abyssinia during Mussolini’s rule in 1936. 238
Historically, the emergence of NATO in 1949 was a reflection of balance-of-power dynamics and, by extension, balance-of-threat politics, i.e. a response to the Soviet threat.
Therefore, collective defense was the core purpose at its inception. However, with the end of the
Cold War some political scientists and policy makers brought President Woodrow Wilson’s idea back to life arguing that post-Cold War NATO had at least “championed ideas from the collective security tradition” although not being able “to establish a full-fledged collective security system in the Wilsonian and Kantian type.”239 An indication of these efforts is the
global partnership initiative within NATO, where nations outside of the North Atlantic area, such
as South Korea, Japan and Australia, have come to the alliance and indicated that they “are not
really interested in becoming members”, but they would like to “work on this collective security
237 Yost (1996), p. 7. 238 The League of Nations: Statistical and Disarmament Documents, Research Guide to the League of Nations Documents and Publications, Northwestern University Library, 2007, http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govinfo/collections/league/background.html , 02/29/2008. 239 Yost (1996), p. 21.
89 business.” 240 Furthermore, NATO’s involvement out of the members’ territory in various
operations and missions in Bosnia, Kosovo (SFOR and IFOR) and currently in Afghanistan as
well as the evolution of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) present further evidence of this trend.
While NATO’s out-of-the-area involvement is an important part of its transformation, there are
at least two reasons why it would be inherently erroneous to link its transformation to collective
security. First, political scientists agree that collective security in action under the institutional
setup of the League of Nations and United Nations has had mixed records of success. Second,
even if we agree that international structures such as the League of Nations in the interwar period
or currently the United Nations have occasionally performed successfully as institutions of
collective security, it is conceptually wrong from a theoretical perspective to attribute in the
same way the notion of collective security to NATO. Even though in the 1990s NATO was
involved in military operations in Bosnia on the grounds of a sanction by the UN Security
Council, this does not automatically make it an institution of collective security. NATO remains
first and foremost a regional alliance that might occasionally be used by other international
institutions for various operations, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Article Six
of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly defines the territorial scope of the Alliance, namely:
• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, 241 on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. 242
240 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), “Reflections on NATO,” The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., Thursday, December 21, 2006, p. 6. 241 After Algeria became independent state in 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that in the case of the former Algerian Departments of France, the North Atlantic Treaty becomes inapplicable as from July 3, 1962. 242 The North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington D.C., April 4, 1949. For detailed information see the NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm , 02/29/2008.
90
Third, NATO’s global outreach measured through various partnerships with countries from
other parts of the world such as South Korea, Japan and Australia are at a very early stage to be
considered tools of collective security. Currently, NATO lacks political consensus in order to
expand its global outreach to a fully-fledged collective security commitment.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODS The core analytical distinction between collective security and collective defense is the type of good that international alliances provide to their members. Generally, the literature on international cooperation distinguishes between two major characteristics of international goods: non-rivalry and non-excludability. Goods are non-rival (also called indivisible) when their unit can be consumed by someone “without detracting, in the slightest from the consumption opportunities still available to others from the same unit.” 243 Examples for such goods are
sunsets as unobstructed views, as well as pollution-control devices and weather-monitoring
stations. Those goods whose benefits can be withheld costlessly by the owner or provider
display excludable benefits. Alternatively, benefits that are available to all once the good is
provided are termed non-excludable. Usually most of the goods are excludable, such as territory,
oil, clothes, food, etc; examples for non-excludable goods being firework displays, pollution-
control devices, street lighting or access to radio frequencies and orbital space. 244 In the case of the non-excludability characteristic, it does not matter whether the entire international community, an individual country or only a single person enjoys the good; this would not change the amount of good available, such as the examples of street lighting or the firework displays on
July 4. The analytical distinction between excludability and rivalry is important because it allows us to classify the goods into pure private, pure public and such with mixed characteristics.
243 Cornes and Sandler (1986), p. 6. 244 Ibid, p. 6.
91 Private goods are those that exhibit both rivalry and excludability, such as territory, natural
resources, etc. Alternatively, public goods exhibit neither rivalry, nor excludability, such as the
access to radio waves, oxygen, public parks, etc. 245 Nonetheless, there are goods with mixed
characteristics depending on whether they are excludable and whether they exhibit rivalry. 246
The impure public goods are between the two extremes of purely private and purely public goods with partially rival and/or partially excludable benefits. Such are the cases of coordination goods and common property resources discussed by Barry Hughes. Coordination goods exhibit non- rivalry and excludability such as the benefits provided by the international postal services.
While all the countries can benefit simultaneously, it would be possible to exclude a country from an established system, such as the case of Albania which was excluded from the already established system of universal postal service during the communist dictatorship of Enver
Hoxha. 247 Common property resources, on the other hand, are characterized by rivalry and non-
excludability, such as the cases of whales and tuna in the high seas. While rivalry is a fixed
feature, excludability is partly a legal concept. Geosynchronic orbital space and the spectrum of
radio frequencies exemplify common property resources. While there will always be rivalry
because only one satellite can efficiently use a given location, there should not always be
excludability because the international community can effectively allocate slots and convert
them into private property, thus allowing options for purchases and sales. 248 Sometimes the
245 Cornes and Sandler (1986), Sandler (1992) and Barry Hughes “The EC and the Evolution of Complex Governance” in The Future of Integration in Europe , Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pp. 49-52. 246 Barry Hughes calls the goods that exhibit excludability and non-rivalry “coordination goods,” while those goods that exhibit rivalry and non-excludability are referred to as “common property resources,” Barry Hughes (1993), p. 49. 247 Ibid, p. 50. 248 Ibid, p. 51.
92 impure public goods such as coordination goods and common property resources shown in the chart below are often referred to in the literature as club goods. 249
Rivalry Non-rivalry
Excludability Private goods Coordination goods
Non-excludability Common property resources Public goods
There is no uniform approach in the international relations literature about the kind of good that international security provides. Collective security is often associated with pure public goods due to the fact that, at least in theory, it includes virtually every nation in the international system. Collective defense, on the other hand, can hardly meet the non-rivalry and non- excludability criterion because it is limited only to the members of a certain international structure (organization, alliance, etc) and is associated with sharing of certain costs and burdens.
Although NATO transformed both its membership size and the types of its missions, there is very little evidence that it strives to perform functions similar to that of the United Nations or even replace them in security business. NATO remains first and foremost a regional organization that provides security for its members and, thus, it generates an excludable good.
Out-of-the-area involvement does not automatically signify provision of a non-excludable good, since there is no consensus within the organization whether and to what extent it should become involved in operations and partnerships in various parts of the world. Furthermore, the pursuit of out-of-the-area operations does not automatically assume involvement in any kind of peacekeeping operations anywhere in the world, where there is demand for international
249 See Cornes and Sandler (1986), as well as Sandler and Hartley (1999).
93 involvement. There have been voices among various think-tank representatives proposing the expansion of membership and partnerships with countries in Central and East Asia and the
Middle East to further transform NATO into an organization with global outreach. 250 At the same time, there is opposition to these ideas by some European member states who argue that
NATO is a Euro-Atlantic organization, and therefore, the expansion of membership and partnership should be limited only to European democracies. Otherwise, the alliance loses its regional focus and will face a major overstretch with insufficient funding, troops and other resources. 251
The issue of resource constraints is tied into the broader debate whether the Alliance should
remain a collective defense organization or it should also upgrade its role to an institution of
collective security. Therefore, these two questions cannot be analyzed completely separately
because several additional issues need to be taken into account. First, NATO is a regional
alliance whose territorial scope is clearly defined in Article Six of the North Atlantic Treaty and
in order for NATO to move to collective security, there must be consensus among its allies. The
contemporary state of the inter-allied relations does not indicate that such a consensus is feasible
any time soon. Second, in order for NATO to become an institution of collective security, the
allies need to provide a substantial resource base that will ensure that NATO’s commitments are
credible and can be fulfilled. The lack of resources is certainly one of the major concerns why
NATO will hardly be able to handle such a responsibility for international peace and security.
Third, although it is generally agreed that NATO proved to be “an efficient tool to manage the
250 Ronald D. Asmus, for example, argues that “the best way to provide Israel with that additional security [and thus balance against Iran] is to upgrade its relationship with the collective defense arm of the West: NATO; see Ronald D. Asmus, “Contain Iran: Admit Israel to NATO,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2006. A part of this debate is the advancement of global partnerships with South Korea, Japan and Australia that was actively advocated by the United States but did not appear in the final communiqué of the Summit in Riga in December 2006. See transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Thursday, December 21, 2006, p. 4. 251 Author’s personal interview with the deputy head of mission at the French delegation to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, January 19, 2006.
94 operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan,” 252 this does not mean that the Alliance has political will and capacity to be an “on call” global crisis management institution.
CONCEPTUALIZING EQUILIBRIA, OPTIMALITY AND EXTERNALITIES An important aspect of the theoretical and research question oriented frameworks studying alliances, such as realist, liberal and economic approaches, is the embrace of the rationality assumption. The economic approach to alliances represented by Olson and Zeckhauser, Sandler and Hartley and Cornes and Sandler focuses on the definition and conceptualization of externalities, the presence of various equilibria, including Nash equilibrium, and the overall conditions for optimality.
There is a behavioral standard in social science whether a group has managed to do well by its members. In economics, this standard is called Pareto optimality. An allocation in assignment of resources is considered Pareto optimal when “it is not possible to improve the well-being of one individual without harming at least one other.” 253 When an alternative
allocation exists, so that it is possible to improve at least one person’s well being without
harming anyone else, then, the Pareto optimality requires that the actors choose the alternative.
If the allocations are not Pareto-optimal, then they are called Pareto-inferior or Pareto-dominated
and are by definition sub-optimal. Pareto optimality remains a normative standard in economics
and that is why it will be applied in this analysis as defined in the economics literature. 254
How does Pareto optimality differ from the commonly used term of positive sum game?
The positive sum game assumes that the payoffs of each actor are by definition positive with varying numeric values for the different boxes, often referred to as win-win scenarios.
252 Ibid. 253 Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992, pp. 13-4. 254 Ibid.
95 Alternatively, the zero-sum game assigns positive or negative options for the various actors whose sum ultimately is zero. In a matrix, however, all the assigned values may be either positive, negative or zero. There might well be a situation where all the assigned values for the actors are positive. All these options constitute a positive sum game, but not all of them are
Pareto-optimal. Arthur Stein, for example, distinguishes between the most preferred outcome, i.e. such which satisfies both parties, and other outcomes. 255 The most preferred outcome may have a positive or negative value for each of the actors. It is most preferred not because of its value (whether positive, negative or zero) but because it avoids mutually undesirable outcomes.
Therefore, this outcome is Pareto optimal, while all other outcomes are Pareto-suboptimal or
Pareto-dominated. In the case of NATO, the ISAF commander identified in early 2006 that there is a shortage of troops and requested from the allies additional contributions. Despite initial reluctance, the European allies agreed to send additional 1,500 to 2,000 troops only when this surge was matched with about 2,000 U.S. troops and, that is how the allies were able to meet about 90% of the troop demand from the ISAF command. Therefore, in order to meet the current operational capabilities of ISAF, the allies had to redistribute this troop surge between the United States, on the one hand and its European allies and Canada, on the other. 256 This particular arrangement was only one of several possible equilibria. Although this was not a perfectly equitable distribution of the burden among the allies, the arrangement seems to be very close to Pareto-optimality. Alternatively, if only several nations had contributed or if only the
Europeans or Americans had sent additional troops, this would mean that the burden has been distributed inequitably, which would automatically lead to sub-optimality.
255 Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in David Baldwin (ed), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, p. 32. 256 International Security Assistance Force Factsheet and transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Washington, D.C., Thursday, December 21, 2006, pp. 10-11.
96 The meaning of Pareto optimality is also linked to another commonly used term in
economic theories of alliances -- Nash equilibrium. Nash is a specific equilibrium situation,
where an agent chooses his or her best optimizing choice for one or more variables, given that
the other players make their choices for this variable (or these variables) at the same time.
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium has several important features. First, all actors optimize their
best responses; i.e. the equilibrium is a form of optimization. Second, all actors make their
decisions simultaneously and that is why time is not a factor in the decision making process.
Third, Nash equilibrium is its independent adjustment, i.e. actors adjust independent of one
another. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome assumes that all optimizing choices are “mutually
consistent, and no one would want to change his or her behavior alone.” 257
Todd Sandler distinguishes between two different situations of Nash equilibrium. He argues that the link between Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality depends on the type of goods that the particular actors provide. In a situation when we are dealing with a pure public goods model, then the Nash behavior leads to a Pareto sub-optimal outcome. 258 In the specific
case of alliance politics, if international alliances provide purely public goods that means that
Nash behavior leads to sub-optimality. Alternatively, in a standard competitive market
equilibrium, i.e. when we are dealing with impure public or private goods, the independent
adjustments lead to Pareto optimality. 259 Whether Nash equilibrium produces optimal or sub-
optimal outcome is directly linked to the type of goods that alliance in general and NATO in
particular provides.
This observation is especially relevant in the discussion whether NATO provides a pure
public good or some sort of impure good, i.e. such with mixed characteristics. If we assume that
257 Todd Sandler (1992), p. 16. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid.
97 NATO provides pure public goods, it means that collective defense is accessible to every nation in the international system. Therefore, if all the nations take their decisions simultaneously, it means that the equilibrium at which the allies come to an agreement is Pareto sub-optimal. In other words there other outcomes where a certain nation can be better off without making its allies worse off. Alternatively, if we assume that NATO provide collective defense that is limited only to its members or a certain group of nations, but excludes others, this means that the equilibria at which the decisions have been negotiated are Pareto optimal, i.e. there are no other situations where any of the allies can be better off without making its counterparts worse off.
Again, the causal link between Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality is first and foremost definitional because it deals with the conceptualization of collective defense as international good provided by NATO. That is why, in order to discuss the Nash equilibrium implications for this case study on NATO, it is necessary to discuss the two economic frameworks of alliances – the public goods and the club goods models. At this point, I would only like to indicate that, given the constraints of simultaneous decision making in the Nash situation, the practical implications for NATO are mostly related to the internal dynamic of the decision making at the various political and military committees within the alliance. In reality there are very few situations of NATO’s political and decision-making process where the participants make decisions without being informed about the positions of their allies. In many cases, however, the low-ranking diplomats have a relative freedom to present the positions of their country and even vote without consulting with their foreign ministries. The key decisions taken at high-ranking committees that deal with major issues of international security barely resemble Nash equilibrium situations. In theory, however, the optimality of the informed decisions that are
98 made by NATO official depends on the subject matter of discussion, which again is tied to the type of international good that NATO provides.
Lastly, another important concept is that of externalities or external economy. 260 This is an event that “confers an appreciable benefit (or inflicts and appreciable damage) on one or several persons who are not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly or indirectly to the events in question.” 261 Therefore, externality is first and foremost an unexpected event, even though the parties had made a rational decision based on the information available. Second, externalities may produce either a benefit or damage. Third, it is a product of the decision that the consenting parties have made. If one or both parties have not participated in the decision-making and, therefore, have not made this particular decision, externalities would not appear. In the case of NATO, the creation of NATO Response Force (NRF) as the alliance’s first combined arms capabilities which included army, navy, air force, marines and special forces was originally designed to serve primarily combat missions. However, NRF’s first two missions were the humanitarian disaster relief efforts in Pakistan and hurricane Katrina in the United
States. 262 Therefore, the NRF’s combat capabilities provided for NATO externalities in terms of
humanitarian disaster relief. While in this case positive, externalities may also be negative. For
example, some of the allies had to spend additional resources in order to meet the NRF goals.
Facing budget constraints, they felt that their additional involvement in peacekeeping and
stabilization efforts in Afghanistan would overstretch their resources. As a result, their initial
reaction to ISAF’s request for higher national contributions to the much-needed troop surge in
Afghanistan was met with reluctance in 2005 and early 2006.
260 Todd Sandler (1986, 1992) uses these terms interchangeably. 261 Cornes and Sandler (1986), pp. 6-9; and Meade (1973). 262 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), “Reflections on NATO,” The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., Thursday, December 21, 2006, p. 3.
99 The Collective Goods Model
In The Logic of Collective Action Mancur Olson argues that each group, no matter whether it is large or small, “works for some collective benefit that by its very nature will benefit all of the members of the group in question.” Although all of the members of a group or organization have a common interest in obtaining this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good.”263
In their 1966 book An Economic Theory of Alliances, Olson and Zeckhauser assumed that in the case of alliances characterized by deterrence, collective defense is a pure public good; that is, the access to this good is not only limited to the members of the alliance, but also includes practically all other states that participate in the international system. Also, their model assumes that any nation’s decision regarding the resources that it is willing to devote to military alliance, or any other international organization, is determined by what that nation’s government conceives to be its national interest. The collective goods model indicates that in alliance or other international organization composed of nations acting in their national interests, “there will be a general tendency for the larger nations to bear disproportionately large shares of the costs, and for the smaller nations to make little or no contribution to the common cause.” 264 It also implies that individual allies will usually “fail to provide the organization with as large an amount of resources as it would be in their common interest to provide.” Olson and Zeckhauser found out that “there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the size of
NATO nations as measured by their gross national product and the percentage of the resources
263 Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action; public goods and the theory of groups , Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965 [1977 edition], p. 21. 264 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances , Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1966, p. v.
100 that they devote to their common defense.” 265 They argue that states tend to prevent the effects of disproportionality and suboptimality through different institutional agreements that reflect greater unification, either of all alliance members, or even only the smaller alliance members, as well as arrangements for sharing costs of additional forces on a percentage basis. 266 Finally, the
collective goods model shows that in the absence of any institutional arrangements, the tendency
toward suboptimality and disproportionality is stronger. 267 However, even fairly considerable
divergences of purpose among alliance members do not necessarily destroy the alliance. As a
result, a limited disagreement among members may sometimes have negative impact on alliance
politics, but in other cases it can actually increase the effectiveness of an alliance. 268
THE APPLICATION OF OLSON AND ZECKHAUSER’S MODEL TO THE CASE OF NATO This section will present the details of Olson and Zeckhauser’s model from their work on
An Economic Theory of Alliances (1966). They determine that the contribution of each nation to the collective defense of the alliance is measured by the value that each nation places on the collective defense as a good illustrated graphically with a simple indifference curve. 269 Defense
capability is measured along the horizontal axis of the graph, while defense spending is
measured along the vertical axis. In Olson and Zeckhauser’s model, OB (point A) reflects a
status quo if the country was not a member of the alliance. Alternatively, if the country is a
member of the alliance, the cost curve moves down along the vertical axis beneath the origin. In
this way, Olson and Zeckhauser represent graphically the defense expenditure of allied nations as
265 Ibid, p. v. 266 Ibid, p. vi. 267 Ibid, p. vi. 268 Ibid, p. vii. 269 The indifference curve in broadly applied is microeconomic theory and is analogous to an elevation line on topographic map or an isobar on a weather map. The graph shows different bundles of goods, each measured as to quantity, to which a consumer is indifferent, which means that at each point on the curve, the consumer has no preference for one bundle over another. For further details see Allan Feldman, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory , Boston 1980, pp. 26-7.
101 distance between the origin and the juncture of the cost curve and the vertical axis (OH). OH represents how much defense the nation receives without cost. In addition, the amount the nation spends on defense will be affected by the amount its allies provide, i.e. the more defense the allies provide, the further the cost curve of this nation moves to the southeast and, therefore, the less it tends to spend on defense. In the same way, the amount that this nation contributes to the overall alliance capabilities will, in turn, influence the defense output of its allies whose reaction curves could be determined in the same way. 270
270 Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), p. 5.
102
Figure 1. An Indifference Map of the Relationship between Defense Expenditure and Defense Capabilities as Described by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966)
Olson and Zeckhauser elaborate a model with two players whose interaction can be graphically expressed as a reaction curve. 271 In this case, the intersection point of a two-country model indicates “how much of the alliance good each ally will supply in equilibrium.” 272
271 The reaction curve is another microeconomic term describing a situation of two players. It specifies for each output level for player two what is player one’s best response, i.e. what is player one’s most beneficial outcome level given that of player two. The microeconomic theory usually applies this concept to explain a situation between two competitive firms, but Olson and Zeckhauser use it to explain the behavior of two allies; http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gheal/B7006-001/strategy/tsld009.htm , 04/15/2007 and Allan Feldman, (1980). 272 Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), p. 7.
103 However, the economic theory does not assume that the two reaction curves should always intersect. For example, if one of the nations has a disproportionately higher demand for the alliance good than the other, its reaction point may lie well outside that of the other, and, therefore, it will provide all of the defense, while the other will not contribute at all. The equilibrium where the two curves intersect may be stable or unstable. Usually it is stable when there is only one equilibrium and there will be a tendency for the other nation or nations to provide all of the defense. In the case of NATO, Iceland is a perfect example of a stable equilibrium where the other nations provide all defense and it maintains only small police force and does not contribute to any of the peacekeeping efforts of alliance. Alternatively, if one of the countries provides part of the defense and the other country or countries, the remaining part, then the equilibrium is unstable if the two countries trade reaction curves.
104
Figure 2. The Relationship between Defense Expenditure and Defense Capabilities in a Two Country Model as Described by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966)
The collective goods model clearly identifies different outcomes for the smaller and bigger states. Olson and Zeckhauser argue that state behavior is determined by the size of the country and, therefore, implicitly by its role in the international system, where the bigger states will always pay disproportionately large share of the common burden in alliance structure. They illustrate this relationship graphically in a model of two states -- Big and Little Atlantis—in which the larger one (Big Atlantis) has a higher and a steeper evaluation curve (V B) compared to
the smaller one (Little Atlantis -- V L). The CC curve in the collective goods model shows the costs of providing defense capabilities for each of these two states, since by assumption they have the same costs. Outside of the alliance setting Big Atlantis would buy B 1 units of defense and Little Atlantis L 1. However, Olson and Zeckhauser’s model argues that if the two nations
105 continue to provide these outputs in alliance setting, they would provide (L 1 + B1) units of
defense. But each nation values marginal unit at less than its marginal cost. Big Atlantis would
stop providing the output of defense when the two nations supply together less than B 1 and Little
Atlantis would have no interest in providing any defense whatsoever. The two nations, therefore, are at equilibrium when Big Atlantis provides B 1 and Little Atlantis provides no defense. 273
Figure 3. The Exploitation of the Big by Small Hypothesis. The Relationship between Defense Expenditure and Defense Capabilities Given the Different Size of the Two Nations as Described by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966)
273 Ibid, pp. 9-11.
106 Olson and Zeckhauser’s model assumes that (a) the population and GNP of Big Atlantis
(BA) is twice as much as that of Little Atlantis (LA), otherwise these two nations are identical and; (b) there is a least-favorable rate at which an ally is willing to exchange units of one good or service for units of another, in this case trade financial contributions for units of collective defense. This rate is called Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS). 274 There is a link between the
MRS and the marginal cost (MC) to obtain a certain good. Marginal cost category is used in
economics and finance to measure the change in total cost that arises when the quantity produced
changes by one unit. 275 Therefore, in this model if Big Atlantis is providing twice as much defense as Little Atlantis, ceteris paribus then the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) in the equilibrium must equal the marginal cost for each of these two nations, i.e.:
MRS Big = MRS Little = Marginal cost
Since BA is twice as big as LA, therefore MRS Big = 2x(MRS Little ). As a result, BA will
want more defense or LA will want less defense and the common burden will come to be shared
in a disproportional way.
Therefore, under such circumstances there is a pretty strong incentive for smaller countries
like LA to contribute as little as possible to collective defense, which is also known in the
literature as “exploitation of the large by the small” and “free rider problem.” Specifically, a free rider is anyone who contributes less than the marginal value they derived from the consumption
274 The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) measures the value that each consumer (i.e. in our case each of the two allies -- Big Atlantis and Small Atlantis) places on one extra unit of a good or service, where the opportunity cost is quantified by amount of another sacrificed. For detailed information see Allan Feldman, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory , Boston 1980, p. 31-2. 275 Mathematically, the marginal cost function is expressed as the derivative of the total cost (TC) function divided by the quantity (Q). Also, the marginal cost may change with volume and, at each level of production, the MC value is the cost of the next unit produced; Allan Feldman (1980), p. 33.
107 of a non-excludable public good. 276 The collective goods model illustrates that the issue of free riding is embedded in the distribution of power and can only be fixed by seeking some sort of intergovernmental and/or institutional arrangement.
Collective goods theory also accepts the microeconomic classification of the goods according to their elasticity of expenditure into four categories -- inferior, inelastic, elastic and superior. Superior goods are such when the expenditure of the good increases by as much or more than the income. Inferior goods are such where the expenditure on the good decreases or is unchanged as income increases, i.e. income elasticity of expenditure (E) ≤ 0. A good is inelastic
when the expenditure on the good increases but by a smaller percentage than the income;
therefore, 0 < E < 1. Alternatively, when the expenditure on the good increases by a percentage that is as great as or greater than the percentage by which income increases but by a smaller absolute amount, then the good is elastic. It can be concluded that in the case of the elastic goods, the elasticity between 0 and S 0/Y 0 (0 ≤ E < S 0/Y 0), where S 0 is the expenditure of the
277 good when income is Y 0.
The theory argues that there is one particular situation in which there will be no tendency
toward disproportionality, namely when the indifference maps of the allies are such that any
perpendicular from the ordinate will intersect all indifference curves at points of equal slope. It
is only possible when defense is regarded as a “superior good,” i.e. a situation when all if any
increase in the national income is used to buy only this good or none of the increase in income
that the nation receives in the form of defense is spent on goods other than defense.
The logic of collective goods also posits that peaks of all-out war or exceptional insecurity create a situation where security is regarded as a superior good and, in this case, alliances will
276 Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), p. 11. 277 Ibid.
108 not have any tendency toward disproportional burden sharing. Such is the case of the U.S.-
British alliance during World War II where, as the United States mobilized, Britain proportionately maintained if not increased its military capability from 1941 to 1944, and, therefore, shared proportionally the burden. Despite this exception, the alliances generally share the burden disproportionately and provide suboptimal amounts of a given collective good.
MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE MODEL Generally, Olson and Zeckhauser’s model has three important contributions. First, they argue that the alliance output will always be suboptimal as far as its members place a positive value on additional units of defense. It is structurally determined that the individual members in an alliance will have an incentive to keep providing additional alliance forces until the optimal level is reached only if there is an arrangement by which the alliance members share marginal costs in the same proportions in which they share additional benefits. When such a marginal cost sharing arrangement is reached, there is no tendency toward disproportionality in sharing the burdens. A follow-up conclusion is that typically once an alliance treaty has been signed the allies are legally bound to remain members for the duration of the treaty. Usually such a treaty does not elaborate much on the procedure of how the burden should be shared within the alliance. This procedure works to the disadvantage of the larger countries. Often the smaller nations benefit from signing the treaty due to the asymmetric (or disproportional) distribution of the benefits and, once the treaty is signed, the larger powers are deprived of the bargaining power that they will punish the recalcitrant smaller powers. Historically, when the allied framework is negotiated, the exclusion may not be feasible because of various reasons. For example, many of
109 the alliances are implicit in already existing danger or some of the allies may have a goal common to some other states outside of the allied framework. 278
However, it should be taken into account that alliances are not burden free for small states.
Oftentimes, when the great powers act the small states have much less chance to defect. In fact,
there might be a potent incentive to cooperate in other areas that small states may not have
previously considered, for example, the new NATO allies sending troops to the war in Iraq. It is
incorrect to associate the various incentives of the small states to cooperate with great powers
only in order to appease the sources of threat or to take advantage of the opportunities to gain, as
the balance-of-threat and the balance-of-interests theories would predict. Therefore, the
relationship between the small and the big states is more complicated and cannot solely be
explained with the rationale of bandwagoning, i.e. behavior which according to logic of the
balance of threat theory expects that states “tend to ally with the strongest or most threatening
state.” 279 In the same token, the bandwagoning for profit explanation which approaches the behavior of small allies in terms of “self-extraction to obtain values coveted” does not unveil all aspects of the relations between the small and big allies. 280 That is why we need to focus on the
economic logic behind burden sharing in order to understand the multiple aspects of alliance
politics.
Second, a follow-up conclusion is that there are economies of scale for the production of
some special types of weapon systems and rising costs of larger proportions as a growing
number of nation’s citizens are called to arms. As a result, “a smaller country can perhaps get a
considerable amount of conventional capability with the first few percentiles of its national
278 Ibid, p. 20. 279 See Stephan Walt (1987); also Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization , Vol. 44 No.2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 137-68. 280 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security , Vol. 19, No 1 (Summer 1994), p. 74.
110 income,” which tends to keep the military expenditure of small nations in an alliance above the very low level applied by the constant cost assumption. 281
Third, the military forces in the alliance provide not only collective, but also purely national, non-collective benefits to the nations that maintain them. This situation creates a feeling of uncertainty among the other allies and makes them enlarge their military forces because of conceivable future conflicts. Such a situation results in greater ratio of private to collective benefits, decreases the degree of suboptimality and ultimately increases effectiveness of the alliance. 282
Fourth, in small groups of firms, as well as in alliances such as NATO, the free rider problem or “the exploitation of the big by the small” phenomenon explained by Olson and
Zeckhauser seems to be somewhat less important. There are at least two important reasons for that. First, alliances are involved in situations that contain a strong element of irreversibility.
For example, during the Cold War the United States could not cut defense spending because of the Soviet threat, and, therefore, there were limited possibilities to negotiate an optimal outcome with the European allies. Also, non-market groups and organizations, such as alliances, usually strive for a larger membership since they provide collective goods that should increase proportionately as membership increases. In other words, this logic expects that the scope of collective defense should increase with the admission of new allies because they will provide economies of scale and thus will reduce the marginal costs for collective defense.
WEAKNESSES OF THE MODEL Here Olson and Zeckhauser’s model raises several issues. While they assume that collective defense is pure public good, they also argue that alliances provide private benefits.
281 Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), p. 19. 282 Ibid.
111 This statement creates a problem with the operationalization of the theory – should we approach collective defense as pure public good or one with public and private characteristics?
Furthermore, there is also a problem in the argument that collective defense provides rival and excludable goods, i.e. those that have characteristics of private or at least impure public goods.
A possible interpretation is while collective defense provides private goods to the members of the alliance relative to the other nations, outside of the alliance system, it also provides public goods (or public and private goods) among the member states that are within this allied structure.
However, I am not convinced that this clarification reflects the reality of alliance dynamics and, therefore, we need to search for other alternative explanations within the existent studies on alliances.
While certainly collective goods theory has important contribution to understanding alliance dynamics, it also raises several theoretical and methodological concerns. The model has at least several weaknesses in addition to the assumption that alliances provide strictly or predominantly public goods. First, Olson and Zeckhauser introduced for the first time a quantitative model that studies the relationship between the defense expenditure and defense capability. Although an important one, defense expenditure is definitely not the only variable that influences the outcome of allied defense capabilities. In order to present a full picture that describes alliances’ functioning and management, it is necessary to focus on other components of power, namely manpower, army, navy and air force resources. Also, the collective goods model automatically assumes that defense capability is equivalent to deterrence. This is understandable given the fact that the theory was developed in the 1960s during the peak of the Cold War.
However, an up-to-date research on alliances needs to take into account multiple military and financial variables that reflect the resource base and influence the outcome of allied defense
112 capabilities of individual member states. Second, Olson and Zeckhauser’s model undervalues the private or impure public features of collective defense.
Based on the assumption that NATO provides exclusively pure public goods, the logic of collective goods model leads us to two major conclusions. The methodology applied in Olson and Zeckhauser’s research is congruent with the logic of rational choice and assumes that alliance politics results in a self-enforcing trend toward optimality. At the same time, the findings of their research indicate that whenever there is a difference in the size of the allies, such as Small and Big Atlantis, there is a natural, inherent tendency toward sub-optimality within alliances. Thus, this second finding, in fact, challenges the assumption for self-enforcing equilibria embedded in the rational choice approach. This inherent contradiction in the logic of collective goods theory indicates that we need a novel approach that provides a more powerful explanatory model that accounts for the distinct effects of public goods as opposed to private goods. Introduction of the logic and principles associated with club goods theory can offer such a novel approach. While I will discuss club goods model later in this chapter, first I would like to offer some background literature that expands the critique of collective goods literature in order to establish further context for my contribution.
ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC MODELS ON NATO’S COST SHARING AND BURDEN SHARING The distribution of cost-sharing within alliance structures such as NATO has also been studied by the British economist Galvin Kennedy. He criticizes the Olson’s model noting that it does not provide hard evidence of the assertion that a large country would value a defense more than a small country, i.e. that size defines defense spending. Only when the defense ratio between absolute defense expenditures and the size of GNP is studied, it is possible to find a highly significant positive relationship. Therefore, Kennedy’s argument is that no matter
113 whether a state participates in an alliance structure or not, the amount it spends on defense is related to a non-economic category, threat perception. Kennedy concludes that while Olson and
Zeckhauser’s model is useful in understanding alliance economics, their empirical predictions lead to spurious results because threat perception “is reflected in the size of the defense budget” and because it is a subjective category, it is hard to determine “how much is enough.” 283
Galvin Kennedy argues that any military alliance with partially integrated defense forces has two elements: (a) common costs that are “incurred by the alliance on behalf of the members”; and (b) “national costs that are incurred by the individual members primarily on their own account and only directly on behalf of the alliance.” 284 While the former costs are relatively small compared to the latter, the focus of his theoretical and/or analytical research is on the costs that the individual states incur. 285 Therefore, the major stumbling block to a burden sharing
agreement in any alliance is the “sheer magnitude of the sums involved and that there would be
no point in re-allocating the burden among members unless substantial changes were made.” 286
At the same time, Kennedy argues that it is not politically possible to make substantial changes in the arrangement of any alliance without threatening its cohesion.
Galvin Kennedy’s study has two major contributions in relation to the collective goods
model. First, it expands the scope of the threat perception variable from the literature on
formation of alliances to the literature that studies their functioning and management. Second,
he argues that the time series data for NATO members in the 1960s and 1970s suggest a steady
trend in the ratio of defense expenditures to GNP per capita (D/GNP ratios). For this purpose
Kennedy suggests the ability-to-pay criterion to decide on burden sharing in NATO – “a fairly
283 Galvin Kennedy, Burden-Sharing in NATO , New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1979, p. 42. 284 Ibid, p. 3. 285 Ibid, p. 4. 286 Ibid, p. 4.
114 simple method of calculating the cost-sharing based on Britain’s progressive taxation net of benefits schedule as the criterion for the members’ ability to pay.” 287 The member states are ranked by their per capita incomes around the NATO average, which is similar to the taxation policy where the states are ranked as a group of individuals with the same income and the contributions are determined as a ratio of the net tax rate divided by the D/GNP ratio. 288 That is
how Kennedy expects to fix the “free rider” problem and ameliorate the effect of the
“exploitation of the big by the small” phenomenon.
There are at least several weaknesses of the proposed approach. Even if the allies agree on
relatively precise cost sharing indicators for each nation, Kennedy assumes that sharing the costs
of collective defense automatically equals burden sharing. In reality, cost sharing focuses
explicitly on the allocation and use of the available resources, while burden sharing also reflects
willingness and ability of each member state to contribute to the goals of the alliance. As a
result, two identical countries with very similar defense spending can actually bring in quite
different contributions to the common burden. Therefore, the prescriptive character of the
ability-to-pay principle seems to depart from the foundations of the economic theories of
alliances.
In the 1984 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, Casper Weinberger
suggests than an index may be introduced which reflects both each country’s share in “the ability
to contribute” to the allied efforts and; “broader political aspects of [the] burdensharing” within
NATO. 289 This so-called “prosperity index” takes into account standard of living and economic development. Actual defense contributions are measured by variables such as total defense
287 Ibid, p. 60. 288 Ibid, p. 61. 289 Casper Weinberger, “Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,” A Report to the U.S. Congress, Washington, DC, 1984, p. 3.
115 spending, defense manpower, armored division equivalent, combat aircraft and naval combatant tonnages. 290 It is a much more sophisticated index that reflects both the wealth and ability to pay of the allies, as well as their share in the common defense of the alliance. Thus, the Report on
Allied Contributions makes at least an implicit analytical distinction between cost sharing and the burden sharing. Similar to Kennedy, Weinberger’s report is prescriptive in its nature.
However, it is important from a theory perspective because it distinguishes between the various components of the allied resource base and their capabilities.
Measuring National Contributions and Burden Sharing among NATO Allies
James Golden’s 1983 research on The Dynamics of Change in NATO builds on Olson and
Zeckhauser’s model and applies its theoretical implications to an empirical study on NATO.
Golden clearly distinguishes between public goods and private benefits and argues that “there is no unity of objectives between national defense contributions and alliance defense contributions.” 291 He recognizes that one of the biggest challenges among the alliance leadership
is to convince members to “place the common welfare above private interest” and at the same
time “using private interests to gain increased public commitments.” 292 However, in the absence for compelling mechanism that stimulates equal contribution, NATO leaders must search for bilateral political, economic and security agreements among the member nations. 293
Golden’s study on NATO focuses primarily on the evaluation of the allies’ burden-sharing.
He lists several methodological caveats and constraints of every analysis on NATO, namely how
290 Ibid, p. 11. 291 James Golden, The Dynamics of Change in NATO, New York: Praeger, 1983, p. 77. 292 Ibid, p. 77. 293 Ibid, p. 78.
116 to operationalize the composition of real defense outlays and eliminate the effect of the exchange rate fluctuations. In his model, the composition of defense spending among NATO allies includes “real inputs, manpower, and equipment, but they also reflect increases in prices.” 294 He lists that one of the biggest problems in measuring resource allocation is the distinction between real increases in resources allocated to defense and increases caused by inflation, particularly given the fact that the economies of the different allies might have a different inflation rate within the same year. While comparing the inflation rates during the 1990s is not as much challenging for the old NATO allies, it is a major issue for the new NATO members. Although the economies in the old allies (with exception of Turkey) have shown a steady economic growth and low inflation, that is not the case in Central and Eastern Europe, where the economies have indicated high levels of inflation and substantial exchange rate fluctuations, especially in the early and mid-1990s. As a result, there are significant fluctuations in the total defense expenditure, the national product and even the share of the national product spent on defense.
Also, the inflation effect is strengthened by the major economic and financial crises that some of the Eastern European countries experienced during their transition in the 1990s such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria.
Another methodological problem is what kind of forces from the allies should be counted as contributions to NATO’s collective defense. 295 Golden mentions the exchange rate fluctuations among the problems of evaluating allied contributions measured strictly in terms of defense spending. Similar to inflation, the exchange rate differences, particularly with unstable currencies, tend to overestimate or underestimate a nation’s resources. Sometimes the exchange rate differences simply indicate deviations from the overall trend of military transformation in
294 Although part of this problem has been solved by curbing the inflation in the Euro zone within certain limits, the inflation rates still vary substantially among the allies. 295 Golden (1983), p. 31.
117 the cases of the new allies. 296 Currently this issue is less of a concern given the fact that seven of
the European allies have introduced the Euro as the common European currency and the seven
others are expected to do that within the next four years. In order to do that, as a part of the
Maastricht criteria, the new NATO allies and EU members had to stabilize the exchange rates of
their respective currencies. 297
Nonetheless, Golden’s most important contribution is to evaluate allies’ national contributions in the context of alliance objectives and, therefore, implicitly to search for a relationship between the defense share and the available military resources. Furthermore, he introduces two models: (a) defense share in relations to capabilities and; (b) share of income allocated to defense with per capita income. Although very parsimonious, these models give us an insight about two very different but also mutually related processes. On the one hand they study the evaluation of the overall contribution of each of the allies, where the size factor included in the analysis of defense spending, wealth and capabilities. On the other hand, an alternative approach is used to eliminate the effect of the allies’ size. If we approach the contribution to a collective defense per a certain unit (say 1,000 people), this will eliminate the effect of the size. Even eliminating the size factor, the approach of calculating contributions based solely on the national product undertaken by James Golden is not the most precise determinant of defense shares, since it does not answer the question why the United Kingdom’s
296 Military transformation in the CEE does not follow a straight trend line, but rather a curvy trend that reflects major variation. This is in part due to the fact that political elites in Central and Eastern Europe face major domestic constraints to conduct military reforms and often times they try to reverse this process in order to decrease the social costs of transformation and thus, at least in part, meet the expectations of their voters. This tendency undercuts NATO’s efforts to promote military reforms and will be further discussed in chapters four and five of the dissertation. 297 The convergence criteria (also known as the Maastricht criteria) determine which European Union member states will adopt the Euro. There are four criteria for these countries to joint the Euro zone: (a) the inflation rate should not exceed with 1.5% percent the three best-performing member states of the EU; (b) the government deficit must not exceed 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of the preceding fiscal year and the ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year; (c) the member sates should not have devaluated their currency for two consecutive years and, finally (d) the long-term interest rate must not exceed with 2% the three best-performing member states in the Euro zone.
118 contribution is so much greater than that of France and France’s is much higher than that of the former West Germany.
Replicating the relationship of defense share to resource from The Dynamics of Change in
NATO for the expanded NATO has both theoretical and methodological implications. It gives a nice comparative picture of the current dynamic within NATO and enables further development of a causal model studying the relationship between the resources and capabilities. James
Golden takes year 1980 as a base year of the study and my test takes 2004 as a base year because it marked so far the largest expansion of the alliance with the inclusion simultaneously of seven new members. Although it is valuable to test the model against the year of expansion, it would also be very informative to compare the data with the averages for the period 1994-2004, a decade that includes the PFP program and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for the new members, as well as the transformation of the alliance with the Brussels declaration (1994). 298
Alternatively, the correlations have been reproduced with variables that measure the average value for the entire transformational period between 1994 and 2004. The two correlations do not differ substantially except that the one for 2004 indicates more clearly the undergoing trend throughout the entire decade.
The question of how defense expenditure varies with national incomes not only gives a very broad picture on the distribution of resources, but also a good starting point to collect empirical evidence about the undergoing trends. The United States clearly surpasses the rest of the allies in 1980 in terms of GDP and maintained among the highest percentage of defense expenditures, together with Greece, Turkey and the UK. Twenty-four years later there is no
298 The Brussels Summit Declaration will be further discussed later in this chapter. For further reference see Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (“The Brussels Summit Declaration”), Brussels, 11 January 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940111a.htm , 8/14/2006.
119 substantial difference in the expanded NATO -- Greece, Turkey and the UK are again the top spenders together with the U.S. The only other important trend now is that the gap between the
United States and the rest of the allies has almost tripled. If we compare the average values of the same variables for the period 1994-2004, it becomes clear that the gap has grown significantly during the last decade because the average value in 1994 is about 20-30% lower than in 2004. Therefore, this rough basis for comparison shows that the overall distribution of power has not only remained unaltered, but also has further strengthened the disparities within
NATO. The implications of this finding will be further discussed in Chapters Five and Six of the dissertation.
Figure 4. Relationship between Defense Expenditures and National Income (2004)
4.5 GR USA 4.0
3.5 TR 3.0 UK FR BG 2.5 PT RO PLNO IT 2.0 EEDKCZ SKLILA NL SI HU DE 1.5 BE CAES 1.0 LX
NATO membersNATO defense expenses as a % of GDP .5 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 1000 3000 5000 7000 9000 11000
GDP total, current prices (in bn USD)
120 Figure 5. Relationship between Defense Expenditures and National Income (average 1994- 2004) (94-04)
5 GRTR
4 USA
3 UKFR BGRO PT SKNO PL IT 2 CZ NL HUDK LI DE SIBE EE CAES LA 1LX
0 Average NATO members defense expenses as a % of GDP of % a as expenses defense members NATO Average 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Average GDP total, current prices (in bn USD) for 94-04
Golden’s model correlates the percentage of the defense expenditures to the GDP per capita. The analysis indicated that when we eliminate the size factor by dividing the income by the size of the population, in addition to the United States, there were four major groups of allies in 1980. The first group included allies with major strength: the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The second group comprised of the poorer countries in
Southern Europe with below average per capita incomes: Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey.
The last group included several relatively small but rich states in the north: Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. 299
An analysis of the relationship between defense spending and per capita income for 2004
(Figure 6B) indicates that the picture has not changed substantially for the old NATO members.
There are three relatively poor countries but high defense spenders in the south – Turkey, Greece
299 Golden (1983), p. 44-5.
121 and Portugal. The other two groups remained relatively unchanged. France, the United
Kingdom and Italy belong to the group of allies with significant military strength. Canada, The
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg and Spain form again a group of relatively rich countries with low defense spending. The only major difference from 1980s is that Germany has dropped from the group of allies with higher defense spending and maintains low levels of defense spending similar to the small and wealthy nations from Western Europe. Instead, Italy has joined the club of major allies with defense spending of two percent which is about average in NATO or even higher.
More interestingly, a whole new group of very similar nations has emerged after the 1999 and 2004 rounds of expansion. The ten new allies have very low income, comparable only to that of Greece and Turkey and percentagewise spend slightly below and around the average of the alliance. Certainly there are some variations within the group of the new members – some of them are as small as 1.3 - 2 million people (Estonia, Slovenia and Latvia), while others like
Romania and Poland have a population of about 22.2 and 38.5 million respectively. The median size of the ten new allies is 10 million people, where Hungary and the Czech Republic are closest to this size. 300 At the same time, the structure of the armed forces and the pace of military reforms indicate a major degree of uniformity among those countries, which is also captured in the relationship between income allocated to defense and national income per capita. Based on these criteria, the new countries from Central and Eastern Europe emerged as the most coherent group of countries within NATO. 301
300 On the population size of the new NATO allies see The Europa World Year Book , Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, Vol. 34 through 45 (1993-2004). 301 Slovenia is the only country with a substantially higher national income (about the same as Portugal) but still significantly lower than NATO’s average. Also, most of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe spend below or around 2% on defense, Bulgaria and Romania being the only exception with about 2.5%.
122 Figure 6A. Relationship between Share of Income Allocated to Defense and Per Capita Income (2004)
4.5 GR USA 4.0
3.5 TR 3.0 UK FR BG 2.5 PT RO PL IT NO 2.0 EECZ DK SKLILA NL SI HU DE 1.5 BE ES CA 1.0 LX
.5 NATO members defense expenses as a as % of NATOGDP expenses members defense 0 10 20 30 40 50
GDP per capita (constant, 2000 USD)
123
Figure 6B. Relationship between Share of Income Allocated to Defense and Per Capita Income (average 1994-2004)
The collective goods model and its improvements suggested by Galvin Kennedy, Casper
Weinberger and James Golden are helpful in understanding various aspects of alliance management and functioning. This approach also depicts many aspects of NATO politics, such as the distribution of burden and costs among the different allies. Olson and Zeckhauser’s main contribution is to develop a model in which they explain the asymmetry in the distribution of burden sharing among two allies such as Little Atlantis and Big Atlantis based on the size of the countries. The logic of the collective goods model explains why it is optimal to have the burden between the big and the small states distributed disproportionately based on the size of the allies.
However, the policy implications of Olson and Zeckhauser’s research indicate that while it is optimal to have the burden of collective defense distributed disproportionately, it would not make much sense for NATO to expand with ten small and relatively poor countries. From the rationality perspective, such a decision would strengthen the group of the small and poor
124 countries, but would further pass the burden of collective defense on to the United States as the hegemon within NATO. Therefore, from the perspective of power politics, collective goods model implies that it is economically irrational for the leading states of NATO, particularly the
United States to support the expansion process. Given the fact that threat perception declined in the same period of expansion, these preceding theories do not adequately explain why NATO should incorporate new allies.
The Club Goods Model
Club goods theory offers a different interpretation of collective defense as international good and suggests an explanation that links the functioning of alliances to the concepts of clubs.
For this purpose, in the next section I will introduce the club goods theory as a novel theoretical perspective to studying NATO politics. First of all, we need to define clubs. For Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler a club is “a voluntary group deriving mutual benefit from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members’ characteristics or a good characterized by excludable benefits.” 302 Although the main focus is on the “excludability” feature, in addition to
excludability, there are several different aspects of club goods that need to be taken into account
– voluntarism, sharing a certain type of good and discrimination between members and non-
members.
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CLUBS Clubs must be voluntary, i.e. members choose to join and, since they are rational actors, they anticipate a benefit from this particular membership. Thus, the utility jointly derived from membership and the consumption of other goods for each of the members must exceed the utility
302 Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods , Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 159.
125 associated with non-membership status. 303 In other words, in the case of NATO the members
(both old and new) expect to have benefits of membership that outweigh the costs associated
with it. However, that does not mean that all the states have the same utility functions.
Clubs incorporate the idea of sharing. They may share the use of impure public goods or
the enjoyment of the desirable attributes of the members. Whether sharing a golf course and
access to the club house or collective defense, club members inevitably need to share some sort
of club facilities or goods. As a result, sharing often leads to a partial rivalry between members
involving club benefits, thus, causing detraction in the quality of the services already received. 304
Consider for example bringing a friend or family member on a nice weekend to play golf on a private course where you are a member. In this case you and your friend or family member need to share it with the other players who enjoy the benefit of membership. In the same way, they have to share the course not only with you but also with your friend or family member at the same time. Thus, the idea of sharing resources and access to goods inevitably leads to competition over the access to these goods. Since in most of the occasions these resources are limited, the competition leads to rivalry among the participants, which in our case are the states in the international system. Classical examples of such rivalry among nations are about the control of certain piece territory, especially if it has valuable natural resources or fishing a herd of whales in the open seas. Alliances, nonetheless, illustrate a specific form of rivalry, where we can observe quite the opposite dynamic, namely states complete over sharing as little burden as possible, as indicated in Olson and Zeckhauser’s seminal work.
Furthermore, club goods framework holds that as membership expands, both costs and benefits arise. Costs involve increased congestion due to a higher number of members, while
303 Ibid, p. 159. 304 Ibid.
126 benefits result from cost reductions due to economies of scale that reduce the expenses associated with the club good. By adding a cost offset to the benefits derived from expanding the club size, crowding ultimately leads to finite memberships. In other words, every club has a certain capacity until it becomes congested. Congestion is a situation where the costs surpass the benefits. This is particularly relevant in the case of NATO, where the ten new members add marginal contribution to the overall alliance resources. Therefore, club goods framework raises several logical questions: (a) how many members constitute the optimal size of the club; (b) is
NATO already congested and if not, than what is the congestion point; (c) what is the current ratio between the costs and the benefits of adding new members (specifically these particular to the member states) and what is the most optimal equilibrium? Unlike the collective goods model, the club goods approach offers a much more thorough theoretical perspective and a more powerful explanatory model. Usually club members share partially rival public goods that are also excludable such as recreational facilities, tennis clubs, swimming pools, and highways (in contrast to what Mancur Olson calls inclusive groups). International security is a good example of an excludable good characterized with rivalry. As John Mearsheimer indicated, “the sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business […] The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states.” 305
Club goods have an exclusion mechanism whereby users’ rates of utilization can be
monitored and nonmembers and/or non-payers can be barred. Without such an exclusion
mechanism there would be no incentives for members to join and pay dues. The operation of an
exclusion mechanism must be at a reasonable cost, in a way that the costs should be lower than
305 John Mearsheimer (2001), p. 2.
127 the benefits gained from allocating the shared goods. 306 At this point of analysis, it is necessary
to distinguish between two different types of costs and benefits: (a) costs and benefits related to
the individual members and; (b) costs and benefits related to the club as a whole.
When analyzing the clubs, it is necessary to distinguish between members with user privileges and non-members. In the case of NATO, after the alliance launched its Partnership for
Peace program (PfP) in 1994, most of the countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union joined the program but did not enjoy the privilege of common defense under Article Five or participation in any substantial decision making process. Moreover, the provision of the amount of the shared good must be determined, i.e. common defense. In this case, the territorial outreach of the collective defense provided by the alliance is limited within the “territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America” as defined in Article Six of the North Atlantic treaty.
Also, the operational limits of the collective defense have been elaborated on in Article Five “if an attack occurs, each of [the allies] … will assist the Party or Parties [with]… such action as it deems necessary.” 307
MEMBERSHIP SIZE AND TYPES OF CLUBS One of the major problems researched by club theory is the optimal number of clubs and their members when the club supplies the same type of goods, i.e. in the case of NATO collective defense. However, the optimality of the membership size is a function of the type of clubs. Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler discuss two types of clubs – homogenous and heterogeneous. A homogenous club includes members whose tastes and endowments are
306 Ibid, p. 160. 307 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm , accessed on 08/09/2005.
128 identical. If either tastes or endowments differ, then the club is called heterogeneous or mixed. 308 The bulk of clubs in the literature are labeled homogenous.
The optimal membership size of the homogenous clubs can be defined as the “core.” The core implies that no individual or set of individuals can improve their situation by forming a different partition. Since no individual’s welfare can be improved without making the other players worse off, then the core is always Pareto-optimal. If a core solution is obtained for a collection of m clubs (S 1 ... S m), then this is a stable collection since no member or set of members will have an incentive to transfer among clubs or to drop out and form new clubs. 309
The major issue is how to define the core. The literature on club goods distinguishes
between two different approaches – clubs with homogenous and clubs with heterogeneous
population. M. V. Pauly (1967) demonstrated for homogenous clubs that the core would consist
of a partition of the population among a collection of clubs, each of which maximizes average
net benefits. 310 In Pauly’s model the optimum club size s* is the one for which average net
benefits are maximized, i.e. v(S*)/s* is a maximum overall s. The relationship between the net
benefits and the club size can be summarized in the following table: 311
Net benefits and club size:
Club size (s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total Net benefits v/(S) .4 1.5 9 16 17.5 18 14 8 0 0
Average net benefits v(S)/s .4 .75 3 4 3.5 3 2 1 0 0
308 Cornes and Sandler (1986), p. 161. 309 Ibid, p. 199. 310 M. V. Pauly “Club Commonality and the Core: An Integration of Game Theory and the Theory of Public Goods,” Economica 34, pp. 314-24, also quoted by Cornes and Sandler (1992), pp. 199-200. 311 Cornes and Sandler (1992), p 201.
129 Cornes and Sandler found out that when the optimum club size is less than the actual members, there are strong incentives for club members outside of the core to switch to other undersized clubs, and thus, there is a natural tendency for clubs to equalize their size toward the most optimal number of members. Equal sharing of payoffs occurs only in the core because any club that practices discrimination will find either that the members being discriminated will abandon the club or the members in the discriminated group are replaced by members of other clubs. As a result, a multi-club world provides safeguards against discrimination, since discriminated individuals have the option of transferring between clubs. However, if only one club exists, discrimination is easier to practice. Thus, the ability to distinguish among different classes of members depends on: (a) the similarity of members and; (b) the presence of substitute clubs. The existence of a multi-club world provides safeguards against discrimination, since the discriminated individuals who do not belong to the core have options to transfer between clubs. 312
How does this hypothesis about homogenous clubs apply to international politics? First, it is necessary to take into account that there is an assumption of homogeneity among the members of a club -- they are relatively similar in terms of size or income levels, a feature that does not pertain in the international system because states have different capabilities. Kenneth Waltz indicated that “international structures vary only through a change of organizing principle or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units,” namely states. 313
Second, even if we assume for the purposes of this theoretical framework that states do not vary significantly in their capabilities and that international system is homogenous, then Cornes and Sandler’s conclusion is consistent with the Waltzian interpretation of international system –
312 Ibid, pp. 200-1. 313 Kenneth Waltz (1979), p. 93.
130 the presence of multiple clubs or poles in the international system guarantees stability since some of the players can switch allies. Although true for 18 th and 19 th century Europe, it is not true for the Cold War, where stability of the system was achieved without switching allies. Does that mean that the two clubs had been at optimal size for such a long time? The evidence from James
Golden’s analysis indicates that there was a significant difference of capabilities in NATO between the different allies and, although empirical evidence has not been provided for the other major club – the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the same could be assumed, too. 314 Since this
trend continues in the post-Cold War NATO, it is also necessary to study the theoretical
implication of heterogeneous clubs.
HETEROGENEOUS CLUBS Cornes and Sandler recognize the challenges in studying heterogeneous clubs since “the optimum number of clubs is considerably more elusive.” 315 The easiest approach is to partition the heterogeneous population into homogenous groups, i.e. an analytical framework similar to
James Golden’s model. Pauly suggested partitioning the heterogeneous population into similar groups and each of these homogenous groups should be divided into multiple groups in which the average net benefits are maximized. Hence, the optimum club size for a given class of identical individuals must divide evenly into the total number of individuals of that class. The main conclusion in Pauly’s model is that “a core exits if the club consists of identical members with equal payoffs and that clubs with higher average payoffs have fewer members than those with lower payoffs. 316 Basically, this model suggests breaking up the heterogeneous population
into several homogenous groups and comparing them across clubs with similar homogenous
members. Certainly it would be useful in the case of NATO to focus separately on each of the
314 James Golden (1983), p. 43-5. 315 Cornes and Sandler (1992), p. 201. 316 Ibid.
131 relatively homogenous groups within NATO. However, as indicated in Chapter One, there is not much space to compare with other similar clubs, because post-Cold War world politics lacks another major international alliance of the size and scope of NATO. The only possibility is to compare the current members with relatively homogenous groups of states that are a not a part of the alliance, such as the non-NATO members (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden), as well as the MAP countries that are awaiting invitation to join the alliance (Albania, Croatia and
Macedonia) or other Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.
Sorenson, Tschirhart, and Whinston (1978a) examined heterogeneous clubs in which the only impetus for club formulation is the decreasing production costs. 317 They concluded that, unlike the homogenous clubs, the total net benefits to the club do not depend simply on the number of members but rather on the number and identity of the members. Consequently, maximizing average net benefits is not a useful determinant of optimal club size. Sorenson,
Tschirhart, and Whinston distinguished two classes of members -- an entrepreneur and a set of consumers. In the case of homogeneity, members can evaluate their own payoffs by comparing to the average benefit, since their contribution to the club is the same as everyone else’s. On the other hand, in the case of heterogeneity the same evaluation is meaningless since a member may contribute more or less than the others. 318 When a club consists of the entire population, a core
can exist for a membership greater than corresponding to the maximized average benefit for the
entire population. Depending on the members’ demands, core existence is also possible beyond
minimum average cost, but there is the possibility that the average cost in a single club for any
output beyond the minimum may not be optimal. Again, looking into the case of NATO, it is
necessary to define the core of the alliance and to evaluate its optimality. However, if currently
317 J. R. Sorenson, J. Tschirhart and A. B. Winston, “A Theory of Pricing under Decreasing Costs,” American Economic Review , Vol. 68, 1978, pp. 614-24. 318 Cornes and Sandler (1992), p. 202.
132 such a distribution is not optimal, is it possible that the optimality function may change over time; a sub-optimal outcome today may actually be optimal tomorrow, i.e. is there a possibility to move from a sub-optimal toward an optimal outcome over time? A theoretical explanation on the change of optimality over time has been offered in the concept of intergenerational clubs.
Intergenerational clubs are clubs in which multiple overlapping generations of members share the same club good. The life span of the shared good in these clubs exceeds the membership span of the founding members, so that the good is shared between generations until the time span of the good is exhausted. The most mundane examples of such entities are universities, fraternities, professional organizations, religious groups, etc. In order to examine intergenerational clubs, it is necessary to develop a temporal model that takes into account the depreciation due to utilization over time and this depreciation should be detracted from the good’s remaining benefits. 319 The differences between homogenous, heterogeneous and inter- generational or inter-temporal clubs can be summarized in the chart below:
Type of Club Membership Example Relevance to Alliance Theory Homogeneous Members with Golf Clubs, the 1. The benefits depend on the clubs identical Paris Club of public number of the members. tastes and lenders 2. Multi-club world of provides endowment safeguards against discrimination. Heterogeneous Members with NATO; the Axis 1. The benefits depend on the clubs different powers; the number and identity of the tastes and Western allies members (club’s core). endowment during World War 2. Sub-clubs provide near II substitute and reduce the monopoly effect. Inter- Overlapping Universities, 1. The benefits depend on the generational generations of fraternities, utilization over time. or inter- members professional 2. Depreciation detracts from temporal organizations good’s remaining benefits. clubs
319 Ibid, p. 228.
133
CROWDING AND DEPRECIATION OF CLUBS For example, let us suppose that a national park is heavily utilized during a holiday weekend by people and vehicles that crowd the parking areas. Depreciation due to utilization takes place whenever the “carrying capacity” of the park is exceeded so that the car emissions and human transits deteriorate the surrounding environment. Such kind of depreciation may only affect the current members and the adverse consequence of the congestion might be restored in the future because the surrounding nature and air can recuperate from the crowding effect observed during this particular holiday weekend. However, the consequences of the congestion might be inter-temporal, particularly when it takes some time to recover from the damages caused by the congestion and this can affect the current, as well as the future members. An example of inter-temporal consequences might be the pollution of the pond in the part that kills the fish or damaging of the park property (benches, shelters, etc) that can be fixed only when the funding is available, which sometimes make take years.
Therefore, an inter-temporal model requires several additional details to be taken into
account. First, the crowding and depreciation considerations must be separated. In the case of
NATO that means that the question of admitting new members has to be distinguished from the
transformational dimension, although both processes are linked. A precise analysis necessitates
approaching separately the capabilities of the individual members and the doctrine-related
transformational issues, such as missions for peacekeeping, crisis management and non-
proliferation. 320 Second, an additional index is needed to distinguish between different time periods.
320 Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 67.
134 NATO clearly has features of an inter-generational club, not only because it outlived the structural environment that instigated its inception, but also because it expanded five times so far in its history from twelve founding members to twenty six nations. There is little doubt that the meaning of voluntarism differs substantially before and after 1989, which can also be attributed, at least in part, to variation in the presence and intensity of balancing blocs. Although the structure of international relations indicates a substantial decrease in the degree of voluntarism, the anarchic feature of IR, nonetheless, confirms the absence of an overarching authority that forces the states to pick certain alliance structures.
The five different waves of expansion also reflect two very different strategic environments, where definition of threats to international security and their sources have changed substantially from 1949 to 2004. The first two waves in 1952 and 1955 incorporated
Turkey, Greece and Germany, thus strengthening the alliance in Central Europe and the
Mediterranean. These two early waves and the incorporation of Spain in 1982 were a direct reaction to the Soviet threat during the Cold War. Alternatively, the last two rounds in 1999 and
2004 with a total of ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe took place in a strategic environment that lacked the Soviet threat, but an international environment that is much concerned about terrorism and a successful conduct of the global war against terrorism. That is why the post-Cold War NATO had to undergo major transformation that also involved several different time lines. The first one deals with the early stages of transformation from the inception of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Brussels declaration in early and mid-1990s to late 1990s. The second one begins with the first post-Cold War or fourth wave of expansion
(1997-1999) and ends with the events of 9/11 and the second post-Cold War or fifth wave of
135 expansion (2002-2004). Lastly, the third stage reflects NATO’s functioning and management in a new environment with twenty-six members.
Furthermore, the transformational constraint must encompass resource allocation over different periods of time or stages of transformation, which is also known in the economic literature as inter-temporal resource allocation. In other words, the case study should focus on the change in resource allocation over clearly defined time lines. For the purposes of the quantitative analysis, it is appropriate to analyze the entire period from 1994 until 2004 and generate sufficient number of cases for each of the countries, so that the conclusions are significant. However, when focusing on the separate variables of the qualitative evaluation, it is necessary to distinguish between the different stages of NATO’s transformation and to study how the resource allocation changes from T 1 to T 2 to T 3 and how this affects the capabilities of these states. Lastly, Cornes and Sandler suggest a multi-period utility function for each individual. This function depends on the utility received in each period of a person’s lifetime. 321
The novel feature in the inter-temporal model is the depreciation function. Depreciation is the inter-temporal analogue of crowding of homogenous clubs. It can be described as the wearing down of a certain good that is provided by heterogeneous clubs. In this situation the deterioration of the good’s quality is due to extensive utilization over a certain period of time.
Therefore, depreciation at a given period depends on the average utilization rate in that period and in all other previous periods, since it is viewed as a cumulative phenomenon over the entire period of time. 322
Nonetheless, we need to distinguish between crowding and deprecation as far as contemporary NATO is concerned. Crowding produces negative consequences as a result of the
321 Cornes and Sandler (1992), pp. 234-6. 322 Ibid, p. 227.
136 expanded membership. In the case of NATO, crowding impacts the process of making decisions at various organizational levels in NATO and affects the possibilities of the allied forces to work together and broadly conduct common missions, which is broadly defined as allied interoperability. While certainly the consensus rule embedded in the Washington treaty had certain meaning in 1949 with twelve allies, today’s NATO of twenty-six members operates differently under the same rule. Some political scientists and policy makers argue that this rule needs to be amended in order to facilitate the decision-making process and improve the overall efficiency of the alliance. 323 At the same time there is an alternative view that the consensus rule legitimizes NATO’s decision-making process and improves the efficiency of the missions for which the alliance was able to come to an agreement. 324 These various effects on NATO’s
decision-making process will be discussed in detail in the last chapters of the dissertation.
As indicated earlier depreciation differs from crowding also because it does not have any
positive impact. In the case of NATO, political influence over military decisions is a good
example of depreciation. Since its inception, NATO has established parallel political and
military structures that have separate domain of activities. By differentiating between these two
types of decision-making, the goal was to streamline the effectiveness of the alliance, where the
political decisions are made by the North Atlantic Council and military decisions are made by
the Military Committee. A the same time many NATO decision makers, among which former
SACEUR General James Jones indicated that “the Military Committee of NATO, which is
supposed to give the military advice, is in danger of becoming overrun by the early input of
323 See transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Washington, D.C., Thursday, December 21, 2006; also Rob de Wijk (1997) and Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro (2007). 324 Author’s personal interview with the deputy head of mission at the French delegation to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, January 19, 2006.
137 political influence before the military advice is developed.” 325 The incorporation of political rationale in the military decision-making does not reflect the spirit of the Washington Treaty that defined NATO as a political and military alliance. Thus, the political rationale behind military decisions tends to congest the work of the Military Committee, because it departs from the military rationale. While the military decisions are based primarily on the expertise evaluation, the political decisions take into account other factors such domestic politics, diplomacy, etc. As a result, the values of the committee decisions depreciates, which tremendously undercuts its overall effectiveness.
Lastly, Cornes and Sandler underline that the logic of expanding the membership of an inter-temporal heterogeneous club requires that the net membership criteria for an entrant exceed or equal the associated costs resulting from his or her entire utilization of the club during the membership. 326 Thus, they direct the debate to the cost-benefit analysis of alliance membership, which is a guiding principle in the economic theories of alliances. In order to reveal the dynamic of such heterogeneous clubs, I suggest a novel approach that expands the cost-benefit analysis by exploring the causal link between the available military resources and the advancement of needed allied capabilities. The theoretical and policy implications of this framework for this dissertation will be discussed in detail in the next chapters.
CLUB MEMBERS’ PAYOFFS From the club goods perspective, this dissertation also addresses NATO’s functioning and management in terms of the payoffs for the various members. Club goods theory assumes that the heterogeneous nature of NATO supposes a situation in which payoffs may differ between members. Authority structure is another important variable linked to noncompetitive and
325 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Washington, D.C., Thursday, December 21, 2006, p. 6. 326 Cornes and Sandler (1992), p. 236.
138 government provisions. The asymmetry in authority may result in membership discrimination based on founding members and other members, especially when founding members reap greater benefits. 327 In the same way, the club asymmetry, which in our case is the asymmetry within
NATO, may reflect the variation in the systemic distribution of power. As the collective goods model indicated, the asymmetry in the distribution of power across the international system results in different burden-sharing among the allies. Therefore, power inequalities within the alliance lead to formation of various sub-clubs which shape the overall club dynamic.
The case of NATO also raises the issues whether and how the payoffs in the heterogeneous club change over time and how this affects the current dynamic. In other words, it is necessary to address the payoff structure for the various members and the club as a whole and how these payoffs change over time. For this purpose I focus on how the expanded membership affects the decision-making outcomes and who wins and who loses from the current operation of the consensus rule with twenty-six member nations. Second, the expanded membership raises also multiple political and mostly military issues of coordinating allied efforts, i.e. problems of interoperability and deployability. These issues have been on the top of NATO’s agenda at the summits in Washington (1999), Prague (2002), Istanbul (2004) and Riga (2006). At this point of analysis, two competing hypotheses can be distinguished. The first one argues that the expanded
NATO is much slower and more difficult to coordinate among the positions of its twenty-six members. The alternative hypothesis states that the expanded membership makes the alliance more efficient because it stimulates specialization and division of labor, while the decision- making process remains essentially unaffected. Chapter Four will address in detail NATO’s efforts to improve allied capabilities in terms of peacekeeping, crisis management and non- proliferation missions, while Chapter Five will study the functioning of the expanded alliance,
327 Ibid, p. 193.
139 including the problems of crowding and depreciation and their implications for transatlantic diplomacy.
HETEROGENEOUS CLUBS AND THE NON-COMPETITIVE (UNIPOLAR) ENVIRONMENT From the analysis of heterogeneous public goods it seems that if a club has monopoly over a certain good, it always leads to a sub-optimal outcome. As a matter of fact, it is possible that only one club may be optimal, provided “monopoly power is present in the form of a low elasticity for demand for the club good.” 328 By the logic of extension, NATO may be an optimal heterogeneous club only if the collective defense that it provides as a club is regarded by some or all its members as inferior or inelastic, good, i.e. such a good that the expenditure on it decreases or remains unchanged as income increases or at least the expenditure on the good increases by a smaller percentage than the income. This is known in the literature as a noncompetitive provision, where the club members form only one club that establishes monopoly and is optimal.
However, it should also be taken into account that the mere presence of a single club does not necessarily imply monopoly, since other clubs or sub-clubs might exist that provide near substitute, thus reducing monopoly effect. 329 In order to study this implication of club goods theory to NATO’s transformation, we need to address the problem about the extent to which the
European Union more specifically the European Security and Defense Policy provides such near substitute features that reduces NATO’s effect as a heterogeneous club. This effect will also be further elaborated in Chapter Six of the dissertation.
However, Cornes and Sandler depart from the traditional condition for competitiveness in
economic literature and argue that monopoly or oligopoly does not necessarily imply large club
inefficiencies especially in the case of the member-owned clubs that might limit the amount of
328 Ibid, p. 190. 329 Ibid, p. 161.
140 rent that the monopoly or oligopoly can capture. 330 Hence, understanding an optimal
monopolistic or oligopolistic club like NATO requires a theoretical model that somehow
corresponds to a member-owned and operated club solution. Although in international security it
is hard to assume that any state is able to establish monopoly over a certain club, the disparities
in the distribution of power actually create an intra-alliance dynamic that may, under certain
conditions, be approached as a member-owned monopoly (or oligopoly) by the state that has
unmatched resource base and capabilities. For this purpose, the structural inequalities within
NATO and the role and performance of the United States as a hegemon will be addressed in
Chapters Five and Six.
The question about the external environment at which the club operates is directly linked to
the distribution of power across the international system. Specifically, the lack of alternative or
competing clubs highlights the problem of unipolarity, which also has direct implications about
the foreign policy of the hegemon. Thus, the framework raises the big question how to manage
such heterogeneous clubs in the presence of a non-competitive condition. As indicated earlier in
this chapter, this issue also touches the problems of transatlantic diplomacy and efforts to
coordinate various intra-club outcomes, which may or may not result in strengthening the
alliance but often times “makes the life of the U.S. diplomats absolutely miserable” in
coordinating efforts to bring together the different positions of the various allies. 331 The non-
competitive environment determines a special role and foreign policy behavior of the United
States. Structurally, the United States as a hegemon has special responsibilities in managing the
diplomatic relations in the absence of naturally competing alternative clubs, i.e. in making the
monopolistic or oligopolistic environment of international security work by the rules of pure
330 Ibid. 331 Author’s personal interview with Dr. Jeremy Shapiro, Director of Research at the Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, September 29, 2006.
141 market competition. On many occasions, the United States reacts actively in order to restore the equilibrium such as the case of Afghanistan when the U.S. contribution made a huge difference for the success of the ISAF troop surge. 332 In other cases, however, the United States chooses different unilateral approach, which may occasionally result in transatlantic tensions or “storms.”
Again, these occasions will be surveyed in details in Chapters Five and Six of the dissertation.
TRANSACTION COSTS Just like any other organization or entity, NATO membership involves a second category
of costs known as transaction costs. The narrow meaning of this term addresses the operation of
the club, such as billing, administration and meetings. There are clearly two types of transaction
costs: (a) such that are independent of the level of use and provision and; (b) those that are
related to the membership size and provision. Although Cornes and Sandler do not clearly
distinguish between transaction costs and maintenance costs, it seems that the term “transaction
costs” is broader and includes the concept of maintenance costs that club members, i.e. the allies,
are willing to pay. 333
Some of the organizational costs are fixed, while others vary with the membership size. 334
As a matter of fact, if transaction costs are growing faster than the membership size, this is a clear case of congestion in the club. Alternatively, if costs increase more slowly than the membership size, there are economies of scale. Finally, if the increase of the costs is the same as the increase in membership size, then there is a proportional distribution of the costs between the new and the old members. The transaction costs include not only the membership fees that each
332 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., Thursday, December 21, 2006, p. 11. 333 Cornes and Sandler (1992), p. 192. 334 Ibid.
142 nation pays, but also costs that the individual members are willing to share in order to develop capabilities consistent with the goals of the club.
Although distribution of costs among the allies is an important indicator, analyzing exclusively the transaction costs and defense spending would obscure crucial details of alliance politics. That is why I suggest a model that explains alliance formation based on the club goods concept and the concept of complementarities.
THE CLUB VERSUS THE TEAM CONCEPT In the last subsection of this chapter, I would like to discuss the differences in
conceptualizing club theory as opposed to other relatively similar analytical concepts that explain
the dynamics of transatlantic security and diplomacy such as teams. The notion of a team
suggests “not only a common value set, but also a common goal.” 335 The underlying assumption
in the team approach is that “teams have players with different roles and skills,” whereas “the
very best teams typically have a superstar around which the team is built. Those teams succeed
because they incorporate the superstar around the basic overall goal of winning the competition.
The superstar has more influence and you must put up with his or her ego, but the roles are
defined (and differentiated) and everyone plays to their strengths.” 336
Thus, the team vision is based on two pillars: specialization and interdependence. 337
Specialization is the organizing principle of a team. The underlying logic is that players specialize to various degrees depending on the overall capability of the team. If we assume that a “defender spends the same amount of effort on practicing offense as well as defense,” he or she
335 Richard Harknett, “A World Challenged: Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Material Capability to Harm,” Fulbright Public Lecture delivered on March 19, 2002, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, Austria. 336 Richard Harknett, Fulbright Public Lecture delivered on March 19, 2002, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, Austria. 337 Borek Lizec, Transatlantic Team Vision Founded on Interlocking Security Specialization: An Attractive Alternative to the Transatlantic Partnership, Doctoral Dissertation, the Economic University of Prague, Czech Republic, September 2005, p. 77.
143 does not use the time available for training as a primary efficiently and his or her “contribution to the overall strength of the team could be greater.”338 Interdependence, on the other hand is the modus operandi of the team. Interdependence makes independent action of the community members difficult. Alternatively, a lack of interdependence, “allows for unilateral actions when a ‘community’ action is not optimal.” 339 Therefore, both the specialization and interdependence
components assume an outcome that corresponds to the analysis offered by J. John Ikenberry,
Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Arthur Stein. Furthermore, the interdependence leads to “team
entrapment” resulting from “interlocking specialization” between the United States and the
European countries. The team model assumes that this framework would appear attractive on
both sides of the Atlantic.
Alternatively, the club goods model assumes a framework similar to what Richard Harknett and Borek Lizec call “partnership,” where the organizing principle is enhanced capabilities. The team vision, similar to the club goods framework, assumes that states are rational actors and that
“specialization is a way of using scarce resources more efficiently also in the area of security.” 340
Therefore, resources allocated to security and defense can be used in a considerably more cost- efficient way if countries form a team and specialize. The logic of the team rests on the
“comparative advantage theory.” 341 The core of the argument is that specialization of trade is attractive even for a country that is “absolutely more or as well effective in production of all goods.” 342
338 Ibid, p. 76-7. 339 Ibid, p. 79. 340 Ibid, p. 83. 341 The team concept borrows from comparative advantage theory, which assumes a model of two countries (or actors) that are trading a particular good – in our case security operationalized in terms of capabilities. 342 Borek Lizec (2005), p. 87.
144 Although the club and team frameworks share similar assumptions about rationality and the existence of multiple equilibria, the club goods model suggests a broader framework and greater flexibility of the tested hypotheses. As a result, I focus on six independent variables measuring resources, three types of transformational capabilities, where alliance missions in terms of peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation are intervening variables in the model.
Furthermore, the complementarities approach does not merely assume relationship but tests one in a model with multiple (not just two) actors. Alternatively, the team embraces neo-liberal concepts such as specialization and interdependence and discounts the effect of other variables such as power in terms of military resources. It seems that the team vision offers a somewhat narrow definition of specialization. The club, on the other hand, suggests that the alliance outcome may or may not result in specialization, which depends on the specific circumstances.
The club dynamic results in a more comprehensive outcome, i.e. the relationship between resources and specific military capabilities know as the concept of complementarities. The specialization is only a part of this relationship. Lastly, the team theory narrows down the framework to two independent actors (Europe and the United States) and excludes the effect of the distribution of power. By studying the various equilibria outcomes, the club allows us to bring in the distribution of power dimension back into focus.
That being said, I do not dismiss the relevance of the team concept introduced by Harknett
and Lizec. While the team vision does not give us much insight on the big picture of NATO’s
heterogeneous nature, it does provide us with valuable suggestions on how to manage the
relations within smaller, relatively homogeneous units such as NATO’s various sub-clubs.
Teams are particularly relevant in the advancement of niche capabilities, such as the Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear non-proliferation capabilities and their relevance will be
145 discussed in the next chapters in the context of some issue-specific or regional forms of cooperation. The only concern about this concept is that while it shows us interesting pieces of the boarder picture, teams cannot depict the transformational dynamic in its entirety and do not pay enough attention to the distribution of power across the North Atlantic Area.
In conclusion, the adjustment of the club goods model to the case of NATO requires parsimony and precision of the applied theoretical model. The advantages of parsimony are more than obvious – it enables us to analyze thoroughly and make clear logical conclusions that contribute to understanding international relations in general and alliance theory in particular.
Although the proposed framework does not explore political–evaluative or moral aspects of alliance politics, it allows us to focus on the various constraints and opportunities that different allies experience due to NATO’s intergovernmental nature.
Furthermore, the case study on NATO uses heterogeneous and inter-temporal club models to explain the process of rational bargaining. Finally, precision requires looking into specific variables and causal relationships that can explain the optimal or sub-optimal outcomes of the club expansion and transformation. Although the numerous theoretical models of the club goods theory provide a significant insight into analyzing alliances, the least common denominator that holds these models together and makes short, precise and thorough analysis with significant theoretical contribution, is in fact missing in the general club goods theory. That is why in the next section, I will elaborate on the concept of complementarities. This concept explains the relationship between the military resources and the development of specific allied capabilities, which in the case of NATO I refer to as Transformational Modes of Alliance Capabilities
(TMAC) or simply allied capabilities. The concept of complementarities fills in a theoretical gap
146 in alliance literature by explaining how allies shift and re-allocate resources and specific allied capabilities depending on the particular alliance dynamics.
147 Chapter 3. Military Transformation and the Concept of Complementarities
The previous chapter introduced collective goods and club goods theories as a framework for studying the politics of NATO. While the collective goods approach suggested by Mancur
Olson and Richard Zeckhauser has inherent weaknesses in conceptualizing collective defense, club goods theory suggested by Todd Sandler seems to be an important and useful tool for explaining how heterogeneous structures such as NATO function in an enlarging format of nineteen or twenty-six members. Nonetheless, the biggest problem of club goods theory is that it does not provide much insight about the internal dynamics of the various sub-club units. For this purpose, I introduce the concept of complementarities, which eliminates the difference in the size of the individual alliance members and shows how they use their available resources to enhance specific allied capabilities. Thus, the concept of complementarities becomes one of the two foundational pillars in the analysis of alliance politics in this dissertation.
At this point several important features of the proposed theoretical framework need to be taken into account. First, club goods framework and the concept of complementarities should be approached in their entirety as two sides of the same coin. Second, these two theoretical pillars are interdisciplinary in their character; they originate in the economic literature and reflect the assumptions of the rational decision-making model. Third, the logic of complementarities and club goods is congruent with intergovernmental bargaining theory and rests on the assumptions that: (a) negotiations on collective security take place within a noncoercive system of unanimous
148 voting; (b) transaction costs of generating information are generally low relative to the benefits of interstate cooperation and; (c) the distribution of benefits reflects relative bargaining power. 343
The chapter is organized around several core sections. First, the concept of complementarities is directly linked to the overall process of military transformation and the evolution of warfare. Second, from the perspective of the economic literature of alliances, complementarities provides an insightful feedback on the broader debate about measuring national contributions and the distribution of allied burden sharing across allies. Third, while club goods theory emphasizes primarily the heterogeneous nature of NATO, the concept of complementarities focuses exclusively on the question of how the individual allies transform their resources in order to develop new capabilities for the alliance missions overseas. Thus, by bringing the relevance of the distribution of power into the analysis, the model suggests a novel interpretation of the existent literature on the functioning and management of alliances. In the last section of the chapter, the validity of the model is tested against three sets of countries – the old NATO allies, the new NATO allies and the four EU nations that are a part of the EU, but not a part of NATO. However, before discussing the details of complementarities, it is necessary to introduce and briefly discuss the different stages of the military transformation.
The Relevance of Military Transformation to International Security
In the Political Economy of NATO (1999) Todd Sandler discusses several different aspects of alliance transformation – peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation.
Furthermore, Sandler and Hartley introduce a fourth aspect -- interoperability. 344 The process of
NATO’s transformation reflects the general trends of military transformation. The majority of
343 For details about the core assumptions of intergovernmental bargaining theory see Andrew Moravcsik (1998), pp. 60-2. 344 Sandler and Hartley (1999), p. 67.
149 literature agrees that military transformation has evolved through several key stages. The first stage of transformation in modern history is associated with the French and the Prussian militaries, which organized warfare by “fielding a mass national army organized into corps and divisions and trained in a flexible tactical system.” 345 As a result, warfare of this era was determined by the need to maintain coordinated order on the battlefield of mass armies, which resulted in marching columns of men linking up and shooting one another with rifles and cannons in a regimented manner. 346 The second stage in the advancement of modern warfare
came around the time of the World War I and was associated with the French military that
introduced the dictum that the artillery is the first to conquer and is followed by the Army, which
occupies afterwards. The third stage of modern military transformation was introduced by the
Germans in the early campaigns of the World War II. The German army combined tanks with
innovative operations concepts, which ultimately played a decisive role in the defeat of France
and the Low Countries in the May-June 1940. 347 More specifically, the German blitzkrieg or
“lightening war” combined maneuverability across the breadth and length of the battlefield with
speed that progressively replaced firepower. If the second stage focused on attrition, the third
one reflected the destruction of enemy’s strategic rear, i.e. their industrial capacity and supply
network. 348 However, these different stages should not be interpreted in a linear manner, i.e. that
each one of them follows immediately the others; there might be cases of overlapping, when
various components of previous stages occur during later period of warfare. Thomas Barnett, for
example, indicates that operation Desert Storm in 1991 followed a pattern, where four
345 Geoffrey Herrera and Thomas Mahnken, “Military Diffusion in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Napoleonic and Prussian Military Systems” in Emily Goldman (ed.), The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, Stanford University Press (2003), p. 206. 346 Thomas Barnett, Blueprint for Action: a future worth creating , G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 2005, p. 19. 347 Geoffrey Herrera and Thomas Mahnken (2003), p. 244. 348 Thomas Barnett, (2005), pp. 19-20.
150 consecutive days of bombing preceded the land intervention, which is similar to the second rather than third stage in the advancement of modern warfare.
The military transformation of the late 20 th and early 21 st century has focused on what the
U.S. military refers to as a “Revolution in Military Affairs” or RMA. RMA reflects “an
emerging consensus on what constitutes a modern military: small highly skilled, rapidly
deployable forces using advanced IT that are more flexible and putatively much more lethal.” 349
Furthermore, Chris Demchak argues that, as a result of this evolution, the force in this stage of transformation “is defined by five characteristics: doctrinal flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and international connectivity, and versatility to function in a war and operations other than war (OOTW). 350 Barnett adds to the discussion, what he refers to as the fourth generation warfare and argues that it “may seem quite orthogonal, i.e. going off its own tangent,” which “is in large part due to the fact that it has a back-to-the-future sensibility regarding tools of trade.” 351 He argues that the fourth generation of warfare differs from the previous ones because it is essentially guerilla or insurgency based warfare that seeks to defeat the enemy politically, rather than militarily and not only on one battle-field, but over years and even decades of what is generally referred to in the literature as “low intensity conflict.” 352
Furthermore, he links these characteristics of the latest stage in military transformation to what is known in the literature as asymmetrical warfare and military operations other than war. In
Blueprint for Action (2005) Barnett argues that the asymmetrical warfare is a product of the post-
349 Chris Demchak, “Creating the Enemy: Global Diffusion of the Information Technology-Based Military Model” in Emily Goldman, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas , (2003), p. 307. 350 Ibid, p. 307. 351 Thomas Barnett (2005), p. 19. 352 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff defines low intensity conflict as “political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.” It usually involves a conflict that ranges from “subversion to the use of the armed forces” and is often localized but “contains regional and global security implications.” It is waged by a combination of means that involve political, economic, informational, and military instruments.
151 Cold War distribution of power and reflects “a conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight which meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weakness, by being “clever” and “dirty” in combat.” 353 The revolution in military affairs has resulted in two types of forces: (a) those who successfully wage war and; (b) a “blended” force that wages the peace afterwards which Barnett refers to as “System Administrators” or “SysAdmin.” Among other tasks, he argues that the system administrators of international security are optimized for a broad set of operations, such as stability and support operations, stabilization and reconstruction operations, military operations other than war, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and low-intensity conflict and counterinsurgency operations. 354
Barnett and Demchak discuss different stages in the advancement of military warfare.
Interestingly, a chronological survey indicates that three out of four stages took place during the
European multipolar distribution of power in the 19th and the first half of the 20 th century. The last one, however, began during the Cold War but became much more explicit in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union with the conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, former Yugoslavia and, most importantly, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. While in my dissertation I do not intend to study the broader topic of military transformation, I will briefly address this concept within the conceptual framework that I introduced in the previous chapter and also as a tool to explain the concept of complementarities that will be presented in this chapter.
Barnett properly defines the scope of military transformation, but he argues that contemporary military operations seek to “defeat the enemy politically, rather than militarily.”
353 Thomas Barnett (2005), p xv. 354 Ibid, p xix.
152 The major problem comes from the fact that normally defeat in a classical Westphalian understanding of military conflict between two or more states needs to be recognized by the legitimate government or political leadership of the state as a unit of analysis. What about the cases where there is no state or legitimate government, for example in the case of the so-called
“rogue” or “failed” states? 355 This observation raises the broader question how to deal with anonymity or actors (players) where we cannot identify a state conceptualized in terms of territory and population and with a government that is in effective control of both. 356 The
anonymous sources of threats and the phenomenon of the growing non-state actors definitely
poses a novel puzzle for contemporary military – it limits the scope and size of traditional
military involvement, but that does not mean that it switches the understanding of security from
military to a purely political dimension. Ultimately, all those efforts involved in the support,
stabilization and reconstruction efforts broadly described as “military operations other than war”
require the involvement of organizations that have certain military resources available.
Moreover, the reaction to these types of threats relies again on traditional armed forces of the
individual states, not on some sort of para- or post-military mechanisms emanating from various
355 The terms “rogue” states and “failed” states are discussed in the various U.S. national security strategies. The 1999 National Security Strategy refers to these states as “failed states” that “are unable to provide basic governance, safety and security […] potentially generating internal conflict mass migration, famine…” For further reference see “A National Security Strategy For a New Century,” The White House, December 1999, http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf , 04/28/2007. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States talks about rogue states which “brutalize their own people and,” “display no regard for international law,” sponsor terrorism and reject basic human values. For further reference see “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf , 04/28/2007. 356 The essence of modern international system is the territorially defined, mutually exclusive and fixed nation-state. The territoriality of contemporary states is understood primarily as defensability (broadly defined) against hostile outside forces. John Herz, E. Gulick and Hans Morgenthau attribute the stability of the states to factors such as internal and external stability and relations with other states, but the fundamental rationale “for organizing within the territorial state unit is its potential ability to protect a specific population.” Furthermore, W. H. McNeill found out that “most studies of the development of modern state have emphasized the linkage between military advancements and state consolidation.” See Richard Harknett, “The Soft Shell of Territoriality in the Nuclear Era” in Eleonore Kaufman and Gillian Youngs, Globalisation: Theory and Practice revised 2 nd ed., London: Continuum (2003), p. 295; and "Nuclear Weapons and Territorial Integrity in the Post-Cold War World," in Ken Dark, ed., New Studies in Post-Cold War Security, United Kingdom: Dartmouth (1996), pp. 34-5.
153 units of analysis, such as supranational organizations or entities. In other words, contemporary states have to react to different, evolving sources of threats relying on traditional mechanisms to exercise power that states normally have available (such as intelligence gathering, armed forces, police force, etc). Needless to emphasize that the humanitarian interventions in former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq are conducted by the same military, not by some extraordinary soft-power, diplomatic or non-state institutions.
The post-Cold War cases of military intervention have clearly indicated that states continue to rely on allies and multinational coalitions in the same way as they did during the 19 th century
European mulipolar world (concert) or during the costly global conflicts of the 20 th century.
Furthermore, to deal with these issues of contemporary international security, states have
militaries that need to work together under various formal and informal arrangements including
alliances. Thus, military transformation becomes directly linked to alliance transformation and
the demand of new militaries to serve specific alliance missions for operations that deal with
anonymous actors and rogue or failed states such as the case of NATO’s involvement in
Afghanistan. Thus, the use of traditional military resources provided by the army, air force and
navy is organized within the alliance context to serve the development of various capabilities that
are needed by the alliance for its specific missions, including the various out-of-the-area
operations undertaken by NATO.
As a matter of fact, if we carefully count the military involvement of NATO troops after
the end of the Cold War, the alliance participation in actual combat operations is much more
frequent and intense in the 1990s and early 2000s than during the entire period of the Cold War.
In 1995 NATO used its airpower to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 1999 it did the same
in the Serbian province of Kosovo in order to put an end to ethnic violence in these parts of
154 former Yugoslavia. On September 12, 2001, a day after the terrorist attacks in the United States, the North Atlantic Council approached these attacks on New York City and Washington, DC as an attack on all alliance members and invoked Article Five. As a result, in October 2003, NATO took over the command and coordination of the International Stabilization and Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan. 357
The question is whether unipolarity has affected the increasing involvement of NATO in various military operations? The club goods model presented in Chapter two offers a flexible framework of analysis, where the path of alliance transformation could also be attributed to and explained by the current distribution of power.
The Effect of the Distribution of Power in the North Atlantic Area
The review of the literature on international relations showed that IR scholars do not agree on how to measure the distribution of power across the international system. For Kenneth Waltz, for example, the distribution of power is the same as the distribution of capabilities. John
Mearsheimer suggests that the distribution of power implies primarily variables that are linked to offensive military resources. 358 It seems that Mearsheimer’s definition is more widely accepted
by the mainstream literature on international politics and that is why my operationalization of
military resources is very similar to his approach. Furthermore, in order to study the effect of
military transformation, I introduce the term transformational capabilities as a dependent
variable that explains the effect of complementarities. Therefore, the distribution of capabilities
in my analysis assumes a slightly different meaning from what Waltz implied in his work,
357 Frank Schimmelfennig, “Multilateralism in Post-Cold War NATO: Functional Form, Identity-Driven Cooperation,” paper presented at AUEB International Conference on Assessing Multilateralism in the Security Domain, June 3-5, 2005, Delphi, Greece, http://www.ekem.gr/pdf/Schimmelfennig.pdf , 04/29/2007. 358 The various theoretical frameworks and their approaches to alliances and the distribution of power have been discussed in detail in Chapter one of the dissertation.
155 namely – the development of specific capabilities for various alliance missions such as peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation that allows states to successfully conduct a broad range of military operations. These operations include but are not limited to conventional war, peacekeeping, and any military activities that fall in the category of “global war on terror” or “global fight against terrorism” as labeled by the Americans and Europeans respectively. Also, unlike Waltz and Mearsheimer, the variables operationalized in this study are restricted to a certain geographic area and time line. The geographic area is limited to the North
Atlantic region and the time line focuses on the period between 1994 and 2004. Again, the conceptualization of resources refers to military and latent (economic) resources, while the distribution of capabilities implies various transformational capabilities for each of the allies that reflect military troops able to contribute to the NATO’s post-Cold War missions.
Furthermore, the intellectual debate on the distributions of power and hegemony reflects two very different views that shape the core debate between two fundamentally different mindsets of approaching international politics – realism and neoliberalism. In my analysis I do not argue in favor or against the relevance of each or any of these theoretical approaches or whether and under what conditions uniploarity in general and American hegemony in particular can or will sustain. However, I also do not premise this analysis on the assumption that America is an “exceptional,” “privileged,” “nice” “enabling” or “good” hegemon in international politics, nor do I intend to join this debate. 359 The only parallel assumption that I do incorporate is that a
great power may become a hegemon by acting smart, i.e. in a rational, efficient, cost-minimizing
and utility-maximizing manner. While we cannot argue that a hegemon may be able to sustain
359 This intellectual debate on hegemony is represented primarily by John Mearsheimer, Christopher Layne, James Wirtz, G. John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye. Also, the issue has been researched by Professor Richard J. Harknett and graduate students at the Research Seminar in International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, Spring 2004.
156 the imbalance over a noticeably long period of time, it is for sure correct that if a hegemon acts irrationally or simply manages power inefficiently, there is a very little chance that it will be able to preserve the imbalance, as the numerous cases of modern post-1500 world history have indicated. However, this research accepts two bedrock assumptions: (a) the imbalanced distribution of power creates a very unique structural environment that produces specific outcomes and; (b) unipolarity itself also affects the way alliances function as clubs that provide security in an environment where one of the club members has unmatched military power. In particular, the focus is on how the complementarities function in this structural environment.
In his 2006 book Christopher Layne offers so far the most comprehensive analysis of U.S. hegemony and argues that it will only last for another decade or so because the U.S. hegemony will trigger a counter hegemonic backlash. Layne’s empirical observations have several key implications for this research. Although balancing and hegemony are not the primary focus of my dissertation, I would like to briefly discuss the implications of this argument for alliance theory. Layne’s approach to terrorism as a form of balancing has a direct link to the transformational dimension of alliances. In my analysis, I approach NATO’s transformational dimension as a set of dependent variables that determine the transformational capabilities of the allies or what Thomas Barnett refers to as “SysAdmin.” However, these transformational capabilities are a direct reaction to the growing threat of terrorism and may also be approached as efforts to counter these threats.
Interestingly, terrorism is an issue where Layne and Barnett have common ground with regard to its scope and size as an emerging threat in the international system, as well as the need of the territorial states and alliances to address it. But how can these two scholars with such different perspectives on international politics and security have a common point, given the fact
157 that Layne and Barnett share very different understandings about the way the international system functions? While Layne attempts to revise the premises of realism without changing its logic, Barnett presents a different, idealistic argument arguing that “eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well a supreme moral cause in the case of those who suffer it against their will.” 360 Both of them correctly identify terrorism as major factor in
contemporary international politics, but their interpretations are applied to different explanatory
networks. Layne uses terrorism to explain one of the variations of the contemporary balancing
dynamic, while Barnett uses it as independent variables that define the sources of
disconnectedness. Also, the implications of what Layne refers to as “soft” and “semi-hard”
balancing has direct relevance to the case of NATO in the sense of reassessing club goods
theory. It seems that in both frameworks of analysis the alliance strategies to deal with the
threats of terrorism are linked to the efficient use of the available resources by the individual
states in order to develop various needed skills and capabilities to successfully combat these new
threats. States can mobilize resources separately or use various forms of cooperation that
enhance their capabilities to address these new threats. Alliances like NATO are only one such
form of cooperation where states may be able to pull together their resources to advance their
capabilities is a certain way, which I refer to as the concept of complementarities.
The Complementarities Approach
The concept of complementarities is developed in the economic literature where two goods are considered to be complementary if “the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency) of the other.” 361 Complements are those items that are normally consumed
along with the product in question. If the demand for the product rises, then the demand for the
360 Thomas Barnett (2005), p. xvi. 361 Hall and Soskice (2001), p. 17.
158 complementary good rises, too. Thus, if we assume that people consume non-alcoholic beverages (such as coke, Pepsi, etc) with pizza, then when the price of pizza falls, the demand for non-alcoholic beverages increases. As a result, the demand for a good varies inversely with the price of the complements. 362 Also, from multigood monopoly theory we know if two goods
are complementary then lowering the price of one good stimulates the demand for the other. 363
Furthermore, the relationship between two goods such as pizza and non-alcoholic
beverages depends also on the elasticity of the goods, which is also known in the literatures as
sensitivity of demand to income or income-elasticity of demand. 364
362 Arop K. Mahanty, Intermediate Macroeconomics , Academic Press, New York, 1980, pp. 93-4. 363 David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory , Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 305. 364 In economics, the income elasticity of demand measures the responsiveness of the quantity demanded for a good to the change the income of the people demanding the good. It is measured as the percentage change in demand that occurs in response to a percentage change in income. People will consume various goods depending on their income and the elasticity of the various goods. For example, if their income increases, the demand for inferior goods will decrease because people will consume more luxury (or superior) goods. Alternatively people will consume higher qualities of normal goods, and there will also be a high positive demand associated with superior (or luxury) goods.
159
Figure 7. Relationship between the Amount of Resources (X) and the Price of Collective Defense (Y)
Political scientists apply complementarities to the institutions of the political economy in order to reinforce the differences between the liberal and coordinated market economies.
However, complementarities may also exist among the operations of a firm; an example of which will be the marketing arrangements that offer customized products and may offer higher returns when coupled with the use of flexible machine tools on the shop floor. 365 While the firms
are the core unit of analysis in microeconomic theory, the vast majority of security studies
researchers agree on the state being the major unit of analysis in international politics.
Although firms and companies are essentially concerned with different issues – while companies’ primarily goal is to increase productivity and therefore maximize profits, states are concerned about their survival, the preservation of sovereignty and furtherance of national power. The rational actor model, however, no matter whether it is applied to the firms or the
365 Hall and Soskice (1990), as well as Milgrom and Roberts (1995).
160 states assumes efficient reallocation of resources that leads to some sort of utility maximization.
In this framework of analysis, the concept of complementarities assumes that, under certain conditions, in alliance structures such as NATO states act similar to the firms in the market.
Thus, the logic of complementarities will be applied to the states with the same way as it is applied to firms in microeconomics.
Translated to an alliance dynamic, the concept of complementarities has direct implications
in analyzing the management of relations within alliances, the distributions of various military
resources and sharing of specific capabilities that the allies have been able to develop.
Furthermore, complementarities can help us understand not only why new states join alliances,
but also how these states undergo transformation, adapt their military structures to the new
security environment and share the burden and the cost of alliance commitments.
The assumption that collective defense is a club good, necessitates an approach that addresses the mechanisms through which this club operates and the outcomes that it produces.
Despite the fact that NATO is seen as a heterogeneous club, there are commonalities among the different allies that tie them together as a club in the same way as there are differences among the old clubs members, the new members and the non-members. Complementarities is a concept that can explain how allies manage resources within the club in a way that is consistent with the club’s strategy, what holds the alliance together and what keeps it an efficient component of international security. The function of this concept is twofold. On the one hand, it offers a novel insight into the functioning of alliances as clubs in the realm of international security. At the same time, the complementarities concept fills in an analytical gap by offering a novel insight into major issues such as cost-sharing and burden-sharing, which are not thoroughly addressed in the literature.
161 The remaining part of this chapter will seek evidence for the concept of complementarities by exploring the relationship between military resources and peacekeeping of the current NATO members (old and new), and the countries in the North Atlantic Area that are not a part of the alliance. In this particular study, the peacekeeping operations variable illustrates a certain mode of alliance capabilities among different types of allied nations.
The overall framework of complementarities assumes that the increase of military resources decreases the price of collective defense and, therefore, enhances the various allied capabilities of each state and the alliance as a whole. The conventional logic suggests that the relationship between military resources and peacekeeping operations should be positive, i.e. that the increase of resources affects directly the capabilities that allies develop. However, a careful analysis of the new allies supposes a different outcome. Most of the former communist countries that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004 had an outdated and inefficient system of resource management. As a result, their resource base that had to be reduced or re-allocated in order for them to manage the scarce defense resources in a more efficient use and optimal manner.
Although the model assumes that there is a relationship between military resources and peacekeeping operations, the direction and scope of the relationship may vary among the different groups of allies due to the gap in their military resources.
Approaches to Defining Resources and Transformational Capabilities
Power calculus measured in terms of actual military power and spending on defense is a key assumption in this model. However, the operationalization of military power seems to be the biggest challenge. There are two alternative approaches: (a) analyzing the military power of
162 each NATO member state relative to all others allies and; (b) measuring power as a category in which the variables are presented as coefficients adjusted to the population size and, therefore, reflect the values of resource base per population unit.
Given the multi-layered dynamic of alliances, each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. An analysis of collective defense approached solely by dividing the entire resource base and allied capabilities by the population size is not particularly helpful because it would mean that each member contributes to and benefits from this club exactly at a proportion to its population size, which has never been the case in the history of alliances. Furthermore,
NATO is a “voluntary alliance of sovereign states with partly divergent national military purposes” in which the alliance partners may sometimes have differing views on how best to achieve military purposes upon which common agreement is reached.” 366 Operationalizing
resources and capabilities also raises methodological concerns that reflect a long-standing debate
between two different approaches in the literature. The first one is concerned with the issue of
“fair shares” and the importance of equality in the financial sacrifice and effort. 367 It starts with the notion that all the allies should spend “proportionately as much on their defense as the
Americans do” and if the Europeans are not willing to do so, the United States should reduce the expenditure for the defense of Europe.” 368 The second approach is driven by the practical problem of eliciting effective military contributions and maintaining alliance unity. 369 It does not focus on the numerical expenditure goals and as it does on the variability in the qualitative difference of each country’s defense spending. It also encourages specialization (including joint procurement) since the emphasis is on the provision of military inputs rather than equalization of
366 Charles Cooper and Benjamin Zycher, Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing , Rand Publication Series, June 1986, p. 13. 367 Cooper and Zycher call it a “ fundamentalist approach.” 368 Ibid, p. 7. 369 Cooper and Zycher refer to this approach as “ Atlanticist.”
163 costs. While the former approach advocates NATO’s unity and cohesion in the alliance’s functioning, the latter assumes differences of opinion within and among the different allies as sovereign states. 370
Each of these approaches has its strengths and both of them seem to obliviate some important details of the relationship. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the operationalization of these variables will be consistent with the second approach discussed by
Charles Cooper and Benjamin Zycher. 371 More specifically, the resource and peacekeeping variables will be quantified as indicators divided by the size of the population of each of the alliance members. Thus, I will be able to discuss the variation in the available resources of each member across the international system separately in the dissertation. The distribution of power as a separate variable shaping alliance dynamics will be held constant in the model of complementarities. The purpose is to simplify the model to an extent that it is analyzable and generalizeable.
As previously discussed, the analysis of complementarities assumes that the states as club members are the sole units of analysis and that NATO will be approached as a heterogeneous club. It is also necessary to distinguish between two different levels of heterogeneity – (a) one that is based on the difference of available resources and allied capabilities within each of the states and; (b) one that is based on the difference in their size, mostly in terms of population. In the case of Hungary and Greece, for example, they are relatively homogenous in terms of their size, each of which has population of about 10-11 million people. However, in terms of defense spending and overall military power they are quite different. Alternatively, if we look at the cases of Poland and Slovakia they have quite a different size – Poland with its 37 million people
370 Ibid, p. 9. 371 Ibid, p. 10.
164 is about seven times bigger than Slovakia. However, in terms of defense spending, structure of armed forces and types of military reforms in both countries, Poland and Slovakia are quite similar.
Also, studying complementarities while holding constant the size of the club members is important from the perspective of parsimony of the model. First, it is unreasonable to expect that each member will contribute the same amount to the alliance goals even if the members are of similar size because there are other factors that affect optimality, such as geography and specialization. Geography might influence optimality in terms of strategic position that might increase the value of a particular ally. Geography may also be directly linked to the specialization variable since land-locked countries like Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovakia do not have the resource base to develop navy and need to specialize in other power resources. Second, unlike the collective goods model, the logic of club goods theory does not focus on the size factor and does not assume the “exploitation of the big by the small” explanation. The operationalization of the variables based on an approach that eliminates the size factor is congruent with the core premises of the club goods theory.
MEASURING RESOURCES As previously discussed, Cooper and Zycher argue that the debate of the 1970s and 1980s over the allocation of NATO expenditures is “too narrow” because “it is resources, rather than expenditures that are more central and more closely associated with the ultimate goal of deterrence and security.” 372 Reliance solely on spending shares as a measure can be misleading due to “the complex and variable relationships among expenditures, costs, defense inputs and the value of defense spending.” 373 Furthermore, their analysis indicated that there was “a disparity
372 Ibid, p. 11. 373 Ibid.
165 in inferences to be drawn from comparisons of burdens measured in terms of spending and as military resource terms” due to the fact that the European shares of collective burden rise significantly when shifting the analysis from spending to resource contribution. 374
The Perceptions of Burden-Sharing suggests that if alliance contributions should be measured in terms of resources as opposed to pure military spending, the conclusions would be quite different. The U.S. contribution, although seemingly disproportionate in terms of spending, does not seem to be so much disproportionate relative to European contributions when measured in resource terms. Also, Cooper and Zycher observe a significant variation in the contributions among the individual European nations, i.e. some European nations contribute more than others. This argument can be linked the explanation that NATO is a heterogeneous club. Lastly, they argue that by the real output measures, the European allies contribute very substantially to the provision of final military services in Europe. 375
The research of the political and military dimension of security supposes operationalization
of the resources in terms of “two kinds of power: latent power and military power” as suggested
by John Mearsheimer. 376 Although closely related, these two forms of power “are derived from
different kinds of assets. Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into
building military power, it is largely based on state’s wealth and the overall size of its
population.” 377 While potential or economic power is based on the “the size of its population
and the level of its wealth,” Mearsheimer defines military power as “embedded in its army and
the air and naval forces that directly support it.”378 However, Mearsheimer does not give the same weight to each of these ingredients when measuring power and argues that “land power
374 Ibid, p. 37. 375 Ibid, pp. 30-35. 376 John Mearsheimer (2001), p. 55. 377 Ibid. 378 Ibid, p. 43.
166 dominates independent sea power and strategic airpower.” 379 Although I assume his broader
definition of power, there are two important points of departure.
First, he argues that “power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses,” and does not elaborate on the distinction between the resource base and the actual capabilities operationalized through tactics and strategies. In part it is understandable because
Mearsheimer’s work does not focus on the functioning of alliances and, therefore, he does not study in detail the relationship between resources and capabilities. In my model I introduce alliances as a specific relationship that makes this analytical distinction possible. Also, I assume that the operationalization of the concept of power refers to military resources, not to capabilities.
Mearsheimer’s definition does not elaborate on the optimal number of variables that present a thorough picture of the available resources. The model that I introduce seeks to present a picture that finds the balance between a detailed analysis of the maximum number of variables and a parsimonious approach that allows clear analytical conclusions. I break up the resources into three major categories measured per capita. These include (a) military equipment; (b) military personnel, which includes army, navy, air force and conscripts but excludes reserves and paramilitary and; (c) actual spending on defense in US dollars. The military equipment is measured as three separate variables -- land, navy and air force equipment. 380 There are several different ways to quantify defense spending – as a percentage of GDP, in terms of actual spending and as a difference in the spending from the previous year. While the percentage of
GDP gives a clear picture of the share of the domestic product that a certain country is ready to
379 Ibid, p. 85. 380 The army equipment is quantified as the average value of the MBTs, AIFVs, APCs and artillery. The navy variable includes principal surface combatants, frigates, submarines, patrol and coastal equipment, and mine countermeasures and warfare. Finally, the air forces variable is measured in terms of combatant aircraft.
167 allocate for defense, it does not give a thorough picture on the dynamics of defense spending.
For example, a country may increase its percentage of defense spending, but if its economy does not perform well and has very low or even negative growth then the increased share of the GDP presents a skewed picture about the available resources. Despite the fact that none of the indicators suggests a comprehensive index, the defense spending per capita measured in purchasing power parities seems to capture relatively precisely the ongoing dynamic for each of the allies and will be used in this model. Similarly, the wealth of each of the allies is operationalized and measured in terms of GDP per capita in dollars measured in terms of purchasing power parities.
MEASURING ALLIED CAPABILITIES While resources comprise one side of the equation in this model, capabilities comprise the other one. The definitions and operationalization of the concept varies significantly. For example, during the Cold War the understanding of capabilities was focused on the deployment of military equipment and intellectual efforts were primarily concentrated in assessing variables such as the division-equivalent firepower provided by a unit, a group of units, or all units in a nation’s force structure. 381 There is no doubt that studying capabilities from the perspective of
the post-Cold War world is much different. The confusion also comes from the lack of
universally agreed definition and a large variety of meanings that the allied documents embed in
this concept.
Certainly, the meaning of capabilities in international security conveys an estimation of the
allied ability and willingness to adapt to the new strategic environment. Secondly, the meaning
of capabilities also implies actions necessary to respond to the transformation of the alliance by
contributing to its goals and missions. Sometimes allies are barely able to agree on common
381 For further information see Cooper and Zycher, pp. 20-31.
168 objectives, such as the case of the Baghdad Pact, and as a result, their fate is to fall apart. 382 In other cases, the allies agree on common objectives that sustain a substantial period of time, such as the case of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. NATO’s strategy of deterrence was quite similar to the strategy of its major opposing allies and differed significantly from its own strategy and after 1991.
As Todd Sandler indicated in the Political Economy of NATO since the 1994 Brussels summit, the transforming NATO has focused on “the appropriate strategic environment to compute costs of membership includes peacekeeping, crisis management and non- proliferation.” 383 More specifically, as the Brussels summit declaration indicated, the alliance
“increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and
fundamental task of collective defense of its members.” 384 The alliance set itself the goal to adapt its political and military structures “to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defense Identity,” to endorse the concept of
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and to intensify efforts “against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” 385 Under the current strategic
doctrine, force mobility and interoperability are essential factors if the new allies are to
contribute to NATO defense burdens. 386
On a theoretical level, international relations literature lacks a universally agreed and generalizable definition of capabilities that is applicable to alliance theory. In order to distinguish among the different meanings of capabilities, I will refer to the dependent variables
382 Stephen Walt (1990), p. 58. 383 Sandler and Hartley (1999), p. 67. 384 “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council” (“The Brussels Summit Declaration''), Brussels, 11 January 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940111a.htm , 08/14/2006. 385 Ibid. 386 Sandler and Hartley (1999), p. 67.
169 in my model as transformational modes of alliance capabilities (TMAC) or simply allied capabilities. TMAC implies capabilities of the allies applied to the specificity of NATO’s contemporary strategic environment; it is a framework that supposes the exercise of military power through various alliance activities. In other words, the Brussels Declaration of 1994 lays out several different modes of activities that involve: (a) decision-making process linked to organizational presence (i.e. alliance or club); (b) development of a certain set of capabilities based on an agreed alliance military doctrine and; (c) clearly definable missions. Furthermore, the concept of transformation implies modes of alliance activities that are aimed at changing and adjusting the existent capabilities, as well as building new ones. The meaning of transformation also implies that this is not a one-shot activity, but rather a continuous and cumulative process that involves various stages of transformation. Lastly, for the purpose of this study, I will apply the meaning of TMAC and transformational capabilities as mutually interchangeable.
The development of allied capabilities serves also as a benchmark condition for the
admission of new members to the alliance. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley identified what I
define as the transformational capabilities required for membership as examples of entry costs,
i.e. costs associated with development of interoperability, such as transponders that identify
tanks as friendly, training new commanders and troops in English and French, or the capacity to
commit troops to out-of-the-area missions in Bosnia or Afghanistan.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 or the bombings in London and Madrid later
did not result in any change in the alliance’s goals and the types of capabilities that it needs to
develop. In fact, they strengthened the demand for “balanced and effective capabilities within
the Alliance so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond
collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation
170 of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.” 387 Therefore, under NATO’s post
Cold War strategic doctrine the concept of complementarities can be expressed through the relationship between the resource base variables and the transformational capabilities variables as presented in the chart below:
The transformational capabilities of the individual states should be analyzed from NATO’s
perspective to coordinate efforts, as well as to increase the deployability and usability of its
forces. The aim is to ensure that the alliance can fulfill its present and future operational
commitments and fight new threats such as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs). 388
387 “Prague Summit Declaration,” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, November 21, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm , 08/14/2006. 388 For further information see the NATO Handbook: http://www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/index.html , 03/12/2006.
171 The details of the relationship between the four different variables that describe the transformational modes of alliance capabilities will be discussed in the next chapter of the dissertation. As indicated in the chart, I need to emphasize that the four variables affect the mode of alliance capabilities differently. For example, crisis management and peacekeeping are virtually inseparable, because they require essentially the same types of capabilities on decision- making and implementation levels. Interoperability, on the other hand is a separate variable but it does not exist independently of crisis management and peacekeeping, or non-proliferation. It is, however, a core component that affects the performance of the peacekeeping and crisis management, as well as nonproliferation.
In the model presented in this chapter, I will focus solely on peacekeeping as one of the key variables measuring allied capabilities. The implications of crisis management, to the extent that they differ from peacekeeping, non-proliferation and interoperability, will be discussed in a
Chapter Four of the dissertation primarily because it very difficult to quantify and measure them in a single quantitative model.
During the 1990s, NATO initiated the combined joint task forces (CJTF) and in 2002 the alliance reviewed its defense and operations planning process and launched a package of projects aimed at improving the response to international crises, nonproliferation and interoperability among the allies known as the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). In order to streamline its command structure, the alliance created the NATO Response Force (NRF), and currently is working on an Alliance Ground Surveillance system consisting of defense against WMDs and theater missile defense. These capabilities are particularly important for the new NATO missions such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. The new missions require forces that “reach further, faster, can stay in the field longer but can still undertake the most demanding
172 operations.” 389 Therefore, in this model I operationalize the peacekeeping variable in terms of forces abroad focusing primarily on UN and peacekeeping forces, but also forces that have participated in various operations in Iraq during 2003 and 2004.
This variable captures several different tiers of indicators. First, the number of troops that participate in peacekeeping operations reflects an actual capacity to send a certain number of trained troops for missions overseas. Second, it also reflects the willingness of the political elites in each of the countries to contribute to the alliance efforts. Therefore, the model assumes that they contribute up to their actual capacity to do so. Even if they would like to participate with a higher number of troops, for various reasons, they are not able to do it due to the limited military resources that they have available. For example Canada, Norway or Denmark may be willing to contribute more to NATO or UN-led peacekeeping missions but due to budget constraints they obviously cannot surpass their resource base cap. Alternatively, other countries like Germany,
Spain or Portugal may be reluctant to send troops although they have the capacity to do so. If that is a general trend within the alliance, the statistical model should be able to reject the hypothesis that there is a relationship between resources and capabilities. The model captures a general trend and an outcome as a result of a certain alliance dynamic, not a country specific variation or an explanation for the behavior of each of NATO members. Again, the variations among different allies that, among other factors, result from the current distribution of power or their different roles in international system will be considered in a Chapter four.
Even at this stage, however, it should be noted that there is one exception to the model –
Iceland. Due to its specific geographic location, Iceland does not maintain armed forces, and therefore, has a minimal contribution toward alliance capabilities in terms of peacekeeping, crisis
389 NATO’s Handbook (2001), http://www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/index.html , 08/28/2006.
173 management, non-proliferation and development of interoperability. However, the country contributes to the collective defense of the alliance with its important geographic position in the
Atlantic Ocean. As a specific country-case, Iceland will be excluded from the analytical framework of this model.
Considering the peacekeeping variable as the only measure of TMAC is not a comprehensive and precise approach and does not reflect the definition of capabilities in their completeness. However, it gives sufficient insight into the level of reforms, willingness of these states to undertake commitment to peacekeeping operations and, most importantly, reflects the overall dynamics of transformation in the new NATO. The complete theoretical model that presents the relationship between all the variables will be presented in Chapter Four of the dissertation.
In the mid- and late 1990s, a large part of the research on post-Cold War NATO expansion focused on costs and commitments and indicated skepticism about inviting new allies due to an expectation that “the enlargement process is certain to be expensive.” 390 Other researchers focused on capabilities to contribute to common defense and expressed skepticism that the new allies are able to undertake major security commitments concluding that the alliance “could discover by extending its realm eastward it had accepted security obligations that its members could not or would not honor, much as France and Britain when faced in 1938 with possibly having to honor their pledges to Czechoslovakia.” 391
In 2001, Thomas Szayna from the Rand Corporation conducted probably the most comprehensive research to date on the dynamics of NATO enlargement and evaluated the
390 Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, Cato Institute, Washington DC, 1998. 391 Steven Rearden, “NATO’s Strategy: Past, Present, and Future,” in S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future? St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995.
174 potential new members according to “political, strategic, and military (particularly airpower) criteria to determine where they stand in relation to NATO's established pre-conditions for membership consideration and NATO's strategic rationale for issuing invitations to join.” 392
Szayna’s work focused on the conditions for the enlargement indicating that the applicant countries needed to resolve the disputes with neighboring countries and actively commit to a peaceful settlement of international disputes. This was probably the first comprehensive post-
Cold War study of NATO which developed a model based on power calculus as a key causal variable. Although he did not distinguish analytically between military resources and capabilities, implicitly Szayna concluded that the new allies needed to contribute militarily to the alliance and be willing to take steps to achieve interoperability with other alliance members and contribution to the new missions. More specifically such a contribution includes “conflict prevention and conflict management throughout Europe (including beyond its treaty area).” 393
Szayna’s major contribution is the analysis of key power variables such as defense
expenditures, military personnel, analysis of the structure of the three types of armed forces
(army, navy and air force) and strategic location. However, Szayna’s work is primarily policy-
oriented and answers a research question that assesses the prospective candidacy for the NATO
membership. My research, on the other hand uses a much bigger sample of states (the old
NATO members, the new NATO members, as well as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden), as
well as a timeline of ten full years – from 1993 to 2004. Most importantly, the research question
has a different theoretical focus and, therefore, suggests an emphasis on theory development.
This model and the model presented in NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and
Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping, have in common a major disadvantage– they
392 Thomas Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping, RAND Publication 2001, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1243/, pp. 135-36. 393 Ibid, pp. 74-75.
175 both are essentially static. An alternative strategy would be a model that introduces time as a control variable and search for variations within the different time periods. For example T 1 would the first post-Cold War period from the inception of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Brussels declaration of 1994 to the admission of the first three NATO allies from Central and
Eastern Europe, T2 would include the period from the Madrid Summit of 1999 to September 12,
2001 when Article Five was invoked and T 3 would analyze NATO in the post-9/11 security environment. However, for methodological purposes (such as the number of cases observed) and in order to keep the analysis parsimonious, I chose to complete the quantitative part of the model as a static one and research the temporal implications of the transformational dimension within the qualitative in-depth analysis of the case.
Since NATO is approached as a heterogeneous club, it is necessary to study the separate homogenous sub-clubs. Again, in order to simplify both the assumptions and the findings of the concept, the model will focus explicitly on the various groups of countries -- the fifteen “old”
NATO members (with the exception of Iceland), the ten “new” allies and the four non-allied
Western European nations. I realize that the assumption for homogeneity within a relatively large group with significant differences such as the fifteen “old” NATO nations tends to obliviate important details. However, it also allows us to check for commonalities in the distribution of resources and development of capabilities within the alliance’s older members. Nonetheless, I need to stress that additional fragmentation of this group into four (or five) sub-groups, as suggested by James Golden, contains inherent methodological constraints because of the insufficient number of cases. 394 Lastly, the effect of the homogeneity assumption within a
heterogeneous group and the static nature of the model will be compensated during the in-depth
case study.
394 For detail see James Golden, The Dynamics of Change in NATO , New York: Praeger, 1983, p. 77.
176 The data have been collected for each of the countries from 1993 to 2004. This extended
period allows capturing undergoing trends throughout the entire decade. In the case of the “old”
NATO members, the design enables us to study the nature of relationship between the resource
base and the capabilities acquired by the allies. Although the group of the old allies is quite
diverse in terms of their contributions to collective defense, I expect to capture commonality in
the trend. In all three models, I focus on several separate resource variables measuring the
resource base per capita – military personnel, army equipment, navy equipment and air force
equipment, defense spending per capita in U.S. dollars and GDP per capita measured in
purchasing power parities. Defense spending and GDP per capita can be measured either in
absolute values of a major currency (say U.S. dollars or Euro) or terms of purchasing power
parities. The research indicates that both approaches lead to the same results and that the
difference is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the purchasing power parities indicator is
slightly more precise because it captures the differences in the cost of labor and military
equipment among the different NATO members.
The dependent variable in the model discussed in this chapter is contribution to various international and alliances efforts overseas, which include but are not limited to peacekeeping operations. The variable has been operationalized in terms of forces abroad focusing primarily on UN and other peacekeeping forces, but also forces that have participated in 2003 and 2004 in the operation in Iraq. Furthermore, in order to match the military resources available and the development of peacekeeping capabilities as a result of these resources, the peacekeeping variable has been lagged with one year. In this way, the accumulation of the resource base in a certain year affects peacekeeping the year after. Although in reality it has effect over a longer
177 period of time, for the purposes of this model, I assume that twelve months is sufficient time to capture this trend.
The complementarities approach gives insight into the question of how rather than whether
the allies become incorporated into the alliance structure and suggests a framework to study the
overall functioning and dynamic of alliances as clubs providing security. Since its primary
purpose is to capture the outcomes that a certain alliance dynamic produces, the model does not
rule out the possibility that one or several of the club members could divert from the overall
trend of the model. In the same way, the model recognizes that there are differences in the size
and resource base among the different groups of allies that reflect variations in their capabilities.
Again, the contribution of the model is primarily theoretical in the sense that it reevaluates club
goods theory as a framework for studying alliances by introducing the concept of
complementarities. Also besides its theoretical contribution, this model has policy-oriented
contributions which will be addressed separately in Chapters Five and Six.
As previously discussed, the quantitative model presented in this chapter explores two core
hypotheses. The first one studies whether there is a relationship between the military resources
and specific allied capabilities as far as NATO is concerned. It is tested through an OLS
regression model separately for the three sets of countries – the old NATO allies, the new allies
and the four EU non-NATO countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden). If confirmed, it
will present evidence for the link between the available military resources and specific allied
capabilities.
The second hypothesis follows from the first one. If there is sufficient evidence for the link
between resources and capabilities, it is necessary to study whether NATO membership makes a
difference in developing the allied capabilities. In other words, by comparing the results from
178 the three sets of countries (the old allies, the new allies and the non-NATO European Union countries), this hypothesis will investigate whether the relationship between resources and capabilities studied in the first hypothesis can be observed within and outside of the alliance framework. The null hypothesis states that the relationship between military resources and allied capabilities (or TMAC) can be observed for all the three sets of countries and, therefore, alliance membership does not make any difference. The alternative hypothesis assumes different significance in the relationship between resources and capabilities as far as the three sets of countries are concerned. If I am not able to find sufficient evidence for the relationship between military resources and allied capabilities (captured through the concept of complementarities) for countries that are not NATO members, it means that the effect of complementarities is specific for NATO as alliance of international security.
Assessing the Effect of Complementarities
As previously discussed, there are significant variations among the “old” fifteen NATO
members, yet there are important similarities among them, too. First, they are either founding
members or have joined the alliance during the Cold War period and have been able to achieve
higher interoperability with the other allies over time. Second, they share similar political and
economic systems and most of them, with the exception of Turkey, belong to the group of
wealthy western democracies. Third, most of the European allies are also members of the EU
with the exception of Iceland, Norway and Turkey. Therefore, despite some noticeable
differences, I tested the relevance of complementarities by focusing on the fifteen allies as a
coherent group. As previously indicated, Iceland does not maintain armed forces, and, therefore,
was excluded from the model.
179 DATA DESCRIPTION The regression analysis for the three sets of countries includes six independent variables and one dependent variable. The independent variables are: military personnel, army, navy, air force and defense spending per capita and GDP per capita. Both defense spending and GDP per capita are measured in terms of purchasing power parities. The dependent variable is forces abroad. All variables are yearly data collected for the old and the new NATO allies, as well as
Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden from 1993 to 2003.
The six independent variables measure directly and indirectly the military resources of each member state. The manpower variable is a coefficient that aggregates ground, navy and air forces measured in thousand people divided by the population of each country (in millions). In the case of the United States it includes the Marine Corps. The Army equipment variable is a coefficient that averages three land power indicators -- battle tanks, AIFV and APC, and artillery. 395 In the same token, I operationalized the navy equipment variable as a coefficient of five indicators -- Principal Surface Combatants (PSC) including frigates, submarines, patrol and coastal vessels, mine countermeasures and warfare vessels, and other miscellaneous vessels, including amphibious, but excluding craft vessels. Each of these indicators has been divided by the population size (in millions) for the respective year of each country in the dataset. Finally, I composed navy equipment coefficient in which each of the five indicators has the same weight
(.20). The air power coefficient is based on a single indicator -- the combatant aircraft, divided by the population size of each nation (in millions of people).
The data on the Manpower, Army, Navy and Air Force coefficients are collected from the
Military Balance Yearbook, issued the London-based International Institute for Strategic
395 First, each of the three indicators (battle tanks, AIFV and APC, and artillery) are divided by the size of the population of each country (in millions). Then, a coefficient is created that gives the three indicators the same weight (.34).
180 Studies. 396 The data on the population dynamic of each of the countries has been collected from
The Europa World Year Book. The population data available from Europa World Year Book have been compared with the Military Balance, where Europa Year Book contained data with less fluctuations. 397 In cases of big discrepancies between the two sources (e.g. more than
100,000 people), the data included in the dataset have been averaged based on the general trend during the observed period (1993-2003). 398
One of the biggest concerns from methodological perspective is the operationalization of the Army and Navy equipment variables. Both of these variables are coefficients that aggregate three and five indicators respectively. In reality, the importance of battle tanks, AIFV and APC, or artillery may not always be the same, where certain types of equipment may be more important than others. Nonetheless, there is no sufficient literature arguing that certain indicators measuring military resources are more important and should be given a higher weight.
Therefore, for the purpose of this model, I assume that both Army and Navy equipment are compound variables whose indicators of military resources have the same weight in the overall coefficient. Thus, the regression analysis presents the big picture on the distribution of military resources across the North Atlantic Area and their relation to specific allied capabilities measured in terms of troops abroad.
The data on military expenditure have been collected from the database of the Stockholm
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) available online. 399 Similar to Manpower, Army, Navy and Air
Force equipment, Military Expenditure variables is a coefficient that measures defense expenses
396 See The Military Balance , London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992/93 through 2004/05. 397 The Europa World Year Book , Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, Vol. 34 through 45 (1993- 2004). 398 Such is the case of Turkey’s population for 2001, 2002 and 2003. 399 For further details see the SIPRI Database, http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step3&compact=true#24 , 06/28/2006.
181 is millions U.S. dollars for each country divided by the size of the population. The variable indicates the actual military expenses per capita in U.S. dollars and provides an easily identifiable measure of the scale of resources absorbed by military activities. Military expenditure is an input measure and is not “directly related to the output of military activities, such as military capability.” 400
The dependent variable in the model has been operationalized in terms of forces abroad. It
is an aggregate indicator for all the personnel sent abroad for various operations and includes
actual troops, observers, peacekeeping missions and coalitions. These are primarily
contributions to peacekeeping operations under NATO and UN auspices, but also and other
forces that have participated in 2003 and 2004 operations in Iraq. The data have been collected
from the Military Balance Yearbook. 401 The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable measured per capita indicates that there is a trend for convergence of the contributions of each of the old and new NATO allies in terms of troops sent for missions overseas. In the case of the fifteen old allies this trend leads to convergence of the national contributions around 100 troops per million people for each of the allies, which in some cases may even result in actual decrease of the overall contribution made by the nations that contribute the most. Alternatively, the trend for the new NATO allies indicates that after 1998-1999 these figures tend to increase on average and cluster around 60-80 troops per million people.
400 For further details see the detailed description on SIPRI’s military expenditures data, http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2 , 06/28/2006. 401 Sometimes due to the rotation of the troops or shift of the missions, the Military Balance (MB) database tends to underestimate or overestimate the actual forces abroad by recoding the new and the old troops or not recording any of them. In order to avoid data spuriousness, the data from the SIPRI database have been compared with the data from the Military Balance and where there has been major discrepancy between the two sources, the indicators have been averaged or I looked for alternative national sources to confirm the actual number of forces number. Such were the cases of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s contributions to the operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2004.
182
Figure 8. Troops Abroad per Capita for the Fifteen Old NATO Members (1993-2004)
Troops Abroad per Capita for the 15 Old NATO Allies
500.00 Belguim 450.00 Canada 400.00 Denmark 350.00 France Germany 300.00 Greece 250.00 Italy 200.00 Luxemburg The Netherlands 150.00 Norway 100.00 Portugal 50.00 Spain Number Troops Abroad per Million People NumberTroopsAbroadMillion per 0.00 Turkey 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 United Kingdom United States Year
Figure 9. Troops Abroad per Capita for the Fifteen New NATO Members (1993-2004)
Troops Abroad per Capita for the 10 New NATO Allies
180.00 160.00 140.00 Bulgaria 120.00 Czech Republic Estonia 100.00 Hungary
People 80.00 Latvia 60.00 Lithuania 40.00 Poland 20.00 Romania Number of Troops Abroad per ofNumber MillionAbroad Troops 0.00 Slovakia 4 5 6 0 1 2 4 98 Slovenia 99 99 99 9 00 00 00 1993 1 1 1 1997 1 1999 2 200 2 2003 2 Year
183 Alternatively, such a trend is hardly observable for the 4 non-NATO members of the
European Union, where Finland remains the top contributor followed by Ireland and Sweden and
Austria have about the same contribution per capita, where the national contributions, however vary between 100 and 250 troops per million.
Figure 10. Troops Abroad per Capita for the Four non-NATO Members (1993-2004)
Troops Abroad Per Capita for the 4 non-NATO Nations
400.00 350.00 300.00 Austria 250.00 Finland 200.00 Ireland 150.00 Sweden
Million People Million 100.00 50.00 0.00 Number of Troops Abroad per NumberTroops of
3 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 994 000 19 1 19 19 19 19 19 2 20 20 20 20 Year
The dependent variable has been lagged one year. The rationale behind is that the development of specific allied capabilities requires at least one year after the resources available have been used or transformed. Thus, the modification of military resources in 2003, for example, results in development of specific allied capabilities in 2004. I recognize that in reality the effect of the resources on the allied capabilities takes place over a longer period of time.
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this test I assume that twelve months is sufficient time to
184 capture this trend. The qualitative study in the next chapters takes into account a longer transformational timeline.
Since all the variables need to be comparable, the size of the different countries has been
eliminated by dividing the indicators by the population size of each country for each respective
year. Thus, all the data in the three datasets reflect per capita indicators. Also, a time lag has
been included between the independent and dependent variables. This time lag has been applied
to all the three datasets. 402 Lastly, the model does not take into account, inflation, the variation of the exchange rates, as well as the value and the depreciation of the military (i.e. Army, Navy and Air Force) equipment over time.
STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS There are several important sets of assumptions that need to be checked. The first assumption is about the structure and holds that all the independent variables are continuous.
This is the case of my datasets as all variables are scale variables, i.e. they all have positive values and vary from 0 to infinity. The second assumption is that there is linearity between the dependent variable and the independent variables, which means that the regression is a linear model. 403
Before introducing the actual model it is necessary to check the assumptions about the
parameters. The conducted tests indicated that the assumptions seem to be realistic. First, due to
its nature, the Navy equipment necessitates higher number of military personnel to maintain,
including forces abroad, while in the cases of the Army and the Air Force variables, the increase
402 The independent variables measuring the various military resources were lagged one year before the dependent variable (i.e. troops abroad), which means that the data on troops abroad include 1994 through 2005 while the data on the independent variables include 1993 though 2004. In cases where there were no data available for the independent variable for 2005, they were coded as missing. 403 The correlation matrix indicates that some of the variables in the three groups of countries do NOT meet the linearity assumptions because the correlation is not significant. In the case of the old fifteen NATO nations, the Military Personnel and Army Equipment variables are not significant.
185 is much smaller. In the same token, in order to increase the troops overseas with one soldier, there should be an increase of 30 thousand dollars defense expenditures for the new allies and about 40 thousand dollars for the old allies. This estimation also seems quite realistic, especially, given the fact that the new allies have slightly lower costs to maintain troops abroad due to the cheaper cost of labor there. It seems that in the case of the four non-NATO nations, this relationship is not significant and, therefore, the unstandardized coefficient (-.26) does not help us understand the ongoing dynamics. 404
There are three assumptions about the residuals. First, the independent variables are
supposed to be independent. This means that, from the viewpoint of my theory, the number of
troops abroad is not closely related to the Military Personnel, Army, Navy and Air Force
equipment and defense expenditure. Second, the independent variables have to be normally
distributed. Third, there must be homoscedascity. This can be assessed by looking at the
scatterplots of the standardized predicted value and standardized residuals. The three models
indicate that albeit not severely, this assumption is violated because the scatterplot is not
normally distributed long the fit line. In this case there are two options for the analysis. In cases
like this Barbara Tabachnick recommends that “violations of homogeneity usually can be
corrected by transformation of the [dependent variable] scores.” Nonetheless, the biggest
problem of this transformation is the interpretation of the scores. Alternatively, the
untransformed variables may be used with “a more stringent α level […] .01 with severe violation.” 405 Such an analysis would not demand data transformation but use of more stringent levels of significance.
404 This can be attributed to the fact that the analysis of these four countries did not find evidence for relationship between military resources and troops overseas. 405 See Barbara Tabachnick and Linda S Fidell, Using Multivariate Statistics , Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001, p. 82.
186 Finally, the descriptive statistic indicates that the six independent variables explain 63.1%
of the variance in the number of troops for the NATO 15 countries, 25.5% of the variance in the
number of troops abroad for the NATO 10 nations and 36.4% of the variance in the number of
troops abroad for the non-NATO 4 nations. The next sections in this chapter will discuss the
findings for the three sets of countries.
THE MODEL OF THE FIFTEEN OLD NATO ALLIES The model indicated that for the first hypothesis tested in this dissertation, namely that
there is a relationship between military resources and allied capabilities of the NATO nations,
five out of six variables were significant. GDP per capita is the only variable that is not
significant in the model of the fifteen “old” members. The army equipment indicates the highest
level of significance (.001), while air force and military personnel record moderate level of
significance (.05). The Navy variable is also significant at .05 but it also has a high standard
error (7.47). This can be explained with the specificity of the navy power, which includes fewer
mostly large units of equipment such as frigates, submarines, patrol and costal vessels and
amphibious vessels. If only several of these units of this equipment are being repaired, replaced,
or decommissioned during the observed period, this process results in significant fluctuations
and skews the overall picture of navy power. Furthermore, this effect is strengthened with the
fact that, due to their geographic constraints, some countries such as Luxembourg do not have a
navy.
The variable “defense spending per capita” indicated significance at .05 which means that alliance structures such as NATO have stimulated a positive relationship between resource base in terms of defense spending and peacekeeping efforts of the individual allies. In other words, the more military resources the “old” fifteen NATO allies allocate for defense, the more
187 successful they are in advancing the allied transformational capabilities. Alternatively, the variable “wealth” operationalized as GDP per capita is not significant, which means that it is not important how rich or poor the allies are, since their contribution toward alliance capabilities does not depend on their national wealth. For example, some less wealthy allies such as
Portugal, Greece or Turkey have, in fact, been able to contribute much more to the peacekeeping efforts than other wealthier states. If this finding is true, it also means that the argument against inviting poorer nations to join the alliance because of their marginal contribution to allied capabilities is inconsistent. In order to verify the validity of this assumption, it is necessary to test the relationship between military resources and specific transformational allied capabilities for the ten “new” NATO members.
Table 1. Influence on Capabilities per capita Operationalized as “Forces Abroad” for the Fifteen Old NATO Members (1993-2004)
Dependent Variable: Forces Abroad per capita
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-value Sig
Army Equipment per -.988 .275 -3.58 .00** capita
Navy per capita 84.16 7.47 11.26 .00**
Air Forces per capita 4.22 1.51 2.78 .01*
Military Personnel per -7.44 3.54 -2.1 .037* capita Defense Spending (in US -0.04 .023 1.1 .03* Dollars) per capita GDP per capita (in US -.41 .7 -.58 .56 Dollars) per capita Constant 26.05 18.15 3.59 .00*
Adjusted R-squared .616
188 F-statistic 41.99** on 6 and 147 degrees of freedom * Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.
Sources: The Military Balance (1993-2004), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html, 12/11/2005.
The data are available in SPSS format and can be accessed online, http://homepages.uc.edu/~ivanovid/data/NATO15.sav
THE MODEL OF THE TEN NEW NATO ALLIES The second model compares the ten allies that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004. Thus, it
explores whether the observed relationship between resources and capabilities studied in the first
hypothesis extends to other groups of nations, such as the new allies. This group of countries
also meets the basic criteria for homogeneity – they all share common past and similar features
due to the nature of their political and economic transition after 1989. Furthermore, they are
relatively small states whose population varies from 1.3 to 38 million people and have limited
resources with regard to population, GDP, defense spending and size of armed forces.
Table 2. Population, GDP, Defense Spending and Size of Armed Forces for the Ten New NATO Members (2004)
Country Population GDP per capita in Defense Defense Size of (millions) US Dollars Spending Spending (% of Armed (purchasing (million US GDP) forces power parities) Dollars) (thousands)
Bulgaria 7.45 9,000 516 1.9 42.5 Czech 10.24 18,000 1,741 1.8 43.3 Republic Estonia 1.33 16,400 181 1.9 5
189 Hungary 10.00 15,900 1,485 1.8 31.5
Latvia 2.29 12,800 205 1.7 4.9
Lithuania 3.59 13,700 1,042 1.6 13.5
Poland 38.63 12,700 4,149 2.0 133.3
Romania 22.33 8,300 1,399 2.4 87.2
Slovakia 5.43 15,700 585 1.9 18
Slovenia 2.01 20,900 465 1.5 7.1
Sources: The Military Balance (2004-05) and CIA Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ , 03/11/2006.
The commonality between the new allies is further strengthened by the nature of their transformation throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. By early 1997 all the countries from
Central and Eastern Europe had already expressed their desire to join the alliance. Also, the
North Atlantic Alliance enhanced the cooperation level with partner countries in 1997 by moving beyond the achievements of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council that was established in 1991 and creating the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This new format proposed a new cooperative relationship with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the ten then prospective members from Central and Eastern Europe. Third, the process of NATO expansion was initiated at the Madrid Summit of 1997 with the invitation to the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland to join the alliance. In addition, in April 1999 the alliance launched the
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for all other prospective members to assist those countries that wanted to join the Alliance in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership.
190
Figure 11. Defense Spending as a Percent of GDP for the Ten New NATO Members (1995- 2003)
Defense Spending of the New NATO
Members
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1 GDP/GNP of % 0.5
0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia
Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia
Average
Testing the concept of complementarities for the new allies from Central and Eastern
Europe is important mostly from a theoretical perspective. If the logic of complementarities is correct, then we should be able to find at least some evidence for the relationship between military resources and peacekeeping. The new NATO allies have been advised to transform their military and adjust them to the new strategic environment in the spirit of the Brussels
Declaration (1994). Furthermore, NATO established a Planning and Review Process (PARP) under PfP and MAP and developed individual Membership Action Plans for the applicant countries in order to have them prepared for full membership. If the advice from Brussels and the efforts on the part of the applicants have been successful, this means that the new allies have
191 been able to accomplish at least in part the assignment to optimize their militaries and enhance capabilities to prepare and send troops for operations overseas. This should, in part, be illustrated with the increasing contribution for troops overseas after 1998-1999 as illustrated in
Figure 9. In this case, the logic of complementarities implies that the optimality of expanding alliances can be attributed to the fact that the new members allocate resources efficiently and, with the gradual recovery of their economies, they would be able to contribute more significantly and proportionately to the alliance’s strategic goals by developing new capabilities that are important for the alliance.
Similar to the model with the fifteen “old” NATO members, the model with the new allies indicated, albeit moderately, that military personnel and army are significant variables (.05). The navy variable also indicated in this case high values of standard error that can again be attributed to the specificity of the countries. Due to their specific geography, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia do not have any navy resources at all. Thus, a model based only on six out of ten new allies could not lead to sound conclusions. Again, the wealth of the states did not indicate to be a deciding factor in determining the resource base, since GDP per capita turned out to be insignificant.
However, there are two major differences between the new NATO-10 and the old NATO-
15 models. Unlike in the case of the old allies, defense spending and navy variables turned out to be statistically insignificant. There are two alternative explanations for these differences.
First, although homogenous from outside, the new allies actually include two different groups of allies as far as background and basic characteristics of their military reforms and transformation are concerned. The first group consists of the six Eastern European countries that had heavy
Cold War armies and were once members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) –
192 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 406 The second group includes countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia that had no experience with independent statehood prior to 1990. Therefore, these two groups of countries differed in the nature of their transformation. While for the six countries that inherited heavy military structures the transformation comprised mostly of reduction of the existent resources and their more effective re-allocation, for the four countries that began their state building in the early 1990s the transformation was first and foremost a process of institution-building. As a result, we could hypothesize two different types of relationships between the military resources and TMAC of these two groups of countries. In the case of the former Warsaw Pact countries there is an inverse relationship between land power and forces abroad, as well as military personnel and forces abroad, while in the case of the newly emerging states this relationship is positive. These findings are important because they refer directly to the second hypothesis researched in the dissertation, namely whether and how NATO membership makes a difference for these groups of nations.
Second, it is necessary to keep in mind that the period between 1993 and 2004 actually captures an extended time line. The data focuses on a period that begins much before these nations intensified their military transformation and even before they were given a clear timeline for the upcoming membership. While it is helpful to study this relationship in the case of the
“old” NATO-15, it is much harder to capture the same dynamic for the new allies because they started intensive reforms of their armed forces only after they expressed the desire to join the
406 Although Czech Republic and Slovakia are new states that emerged with the spit of Czechoslovakia in 1993, they not only shared common statehood for about seventy-five years but also unlike the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia the Czechs and the Slovaks split the resources of Czechoslovakia, including the military ones, in a ratio that corresponded to the contribution of each of the two nations, usually in a ratio of two to one. This information was also confirmed with the representatives from the Czech and Slovak missions at NATO Headquarters during my interviews with them in January 2006.
193 alliance, and, more importantly, after the introduction of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the late 1990s. In other words, a model that focuses on a period which begins in the mid- and late 1990s might be able to present better evidence for the undergoing dynamic. I will use the case study to present additional arguments in support of the theory.
Table 3. Influence on Capabilities per capita Operationalized as Forces Abroad for the Ten New NATO Members (1993-2004)
Dependent Variable: Forces Abroad per capita
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-value Sig
Army Equipment per .374 .115 3.27 .002* capita
Navy per capita -25.91 8.7 -2.98 .004*
Air Forces per capita -.881 .97 -,91 .37 Military Personnel per -6.03 2.87 -2.1 .039* capita Defense Spending (in US 0.07 .087 .771 .442 Dollars) per capita GDP per capita (in US -2.22 2.5 -.89 .378 Dollars) per capita Constant 72.69 17.6 4.14 .000**
Adjusted R-squared .207
F-statistic 5.16** on 6 and 89 degrees of freedom * Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.
Sources: The Military Balance (1993-2004) and SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html, 12/11/2005.
The data are available in SPSS format and can be accessed online, http://homepages.uc.edu/~ivanovid/data/NATO10.sav
194 A logical question that follows from the “new” NATO-10 model is whether the complementarities in the case of the new allies should be understood only in terms of army and military personnel per capita. However, at this stage of the research I cannot argue that this is a persuasive conclusion. Instead, I attribute this finding to the available data and would prefer to approach the empirical model as a whole rather than focus on the separate components of military power.
THE MODEL OF THE FOUR NON-NATO EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES Finally, the third model focuses on the four non-NATO European countries: Austria,
Finland, Ireland and Sweden. The purpose of testing the model of complementarities against the four non-NATO European states that are also members of the European Union is to study whether the relationship between military resources and TMAC expands outside of the Alliance.
In this way, I explore the second hypothesis of the dissertation, i.e. whether evidence for complementarities exists outside of NATO. If there is a link between resources and capabilities in the case of the non-NATO nations, then it reiterates the persuasiveness of other explanatory frameworks outside of alliance structures and power calculus, such as the integration process within the European Union. Alternatively, a hypothesis that rejects the relevance of complementarities for these four non-aligned countries would confirm the original hypothesis that the linkage between resources and allied capabilities is relevant only within the specific
NATO setting and applies solely to current and prospective members. The conventional logic expects that the direction of causation is positive for all three groups of countries, i.e. the increase in the resources leads to the advancement of capabilities. However, there are instances when NATO allies need to restructure and reduce some of the available resources in order to redirect them toward other areas, where the advancement of capabilities is much needed. This is
195 particularly relevant for the smaller countries that possess or have access to limited resources but are expected to enhance their capabilities accordingly.
It is necessary to make several important points of analytical distinction with regard to the model of the four non-NATO allies. First, it is not designed to assess the contribution of these four countries to the international peacekeeping efforts. There is no doubt that they are among the major contributors in this respect. However, the purpose of this research is to test the alternative explanation about the relationship between military resources and peacekeeping as a measure for transformational capabilities outside the alliance framework.
Although there are only 43 cases observed, the model clearly indicates that none of the variables included is significant. I can argue with confidence that I did not find any evidence in support of the relationship between resources and capabilities in the North Atlantic Area outside of the NATO framework. These findings confirmed the original expectations for the second hypothesis, namely that it not possible to apply the concept of complementarities to international security without taking into accounts the effect of alliances.
Table 4. Influence on Capabilities per capita Operationalized as Forces Abroad for the Four Non-NATO States – Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden (1993-2004)
Dependent Variable: Forces Abroad per capita Variable Coefficient Standard error t-value Sig
Army Equipment per -.93 1.00 -.927 .36 capita Navy per capita 57.56 15.99 3.6 .001
Air Force per capita -3.37 1.79 -1.89 .067 Military Personnel per -6.52 7.82 -.833 .41 capita Defense Spending (in US -.146 .13 -1.1 .281 Dollars) per capita
196 GDP per capita (in US -5.74 2.26 -2.54 .016 Dollars) per capita Constant 436.22 133.9 3.26 .002
Adjusted R-squared .37
F-statistic 5.21** on 6 and 37 degrees of freedom * Significant at the .05 level. ** Significant at the .001 level.
Sources: The Military Balance (1993-2004) and SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html, 12/11/2005.
The data are available in SPSS format and can be accessed online, http://homepages.uc.edu/~ivanovid/data/NATO4.sav
Major Findings and Conclusions
This chapter focuses on the functioning and management of alliances and, by linking club
goods theory and the theory complementarities, suggests novel interpretation of NATO’s
dynamic after the end of the Cold War. More specifically, the model confirmed the first
hypothesis of the research, namely that there is a relationship between military resources and
specific allied capabilities (a.k.a. TMAC), which I refer to as the concept of complementarities.
This relationship is observable for the “old” and to a certain degree the “new” NATO members,
while inapplicable for the countries in the region that are outside of the alliance. Therefore, the
study confirmed the second hypothesis that alliance membership makes a difference in the
advancement of allied capabilities. Furthermore, the causal link between military resources and
allied capabilities described as the concept of complementarities reflects the dynamic of alliance
management as clubs of international security.
Lastly, by determining how the club operates and reaches an optimal outcome,
complementarities and club theory explain the logic of transforming and expanding the alliance.
197 Despite the fact that different members contribute differently according to their ability and willingness, alliances produce optimal outcomes when there is a significant relationship between their military resource base and the specific allied capabilities that these countries have been able to develop.
The concept of complementarities clearly distinguishes between “old” and “new” allies.
The next two chapters will discuss the relevance of complementarities by surveying notions of
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the evolution to the
Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). Subsequently, the concept introduced in this chapter is also relevant for the advancement of the European Union capabilities, where further aspects regarding these issues will be addressed in Chapter Six of the dissertation.
Currently NATO is directly involved in international security, including the war against
terrorism by securing military presence in Afghanistan, the Balkans (KFOR), Iraq and the
Mediterranean. 407 These out-of-the-area peacekeeping and crisis management operations are
combined with efforts to protect its populations and territory against terrorist attacks. 408 The
logic of the complementarities is consistent with the argument in support of out-of-the area
peacekeeping operations but that does not automatically imply support for the admission of new
members, especially nations that do not belong geographically to the North Atlantic area. A
number of policymaking and think-tank proposals have recently suggested new relations with
different countries that vary from an upgraded relationship with the alliance to their full
407 Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean was launched as an immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September, 11 2001. The operation is a part of the Alliance’s strategy in the fight against terrorism by helping to detect and deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index.html , 05/14/2008. 408 See NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism, http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html , 09/14/2006.
198 membership. 409 The model of complementarities explains outcomes rather than the relevance of certain policy-oriented or decision-making steps. However, it implies that even before considering such steps, it is necessary to make a careful cost-benefit analysis of whether the state in question brings additional needed allied capabilities at low cost and, most importantly, what would be the overall implications for NATO as a club.
409 Ronald Asmus argues that “the best way to provide Israel with that additional security is to upgrade its relationship with the collective defense arm of the West: NATO.” See: Ronald D. Asmus, “Contain Iran: Admit Israel to NATO,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2006.
199 Chapter 4. Case Study on the Evolution of NATO’s Missions and Capabilities
The previous two chapters of the dissertation discussed the two theoretical pillars of the dissertation -- club goods framework and the concept of complementarities. Their purpose was to address the question why NATO transforms in the post-Cold War world. The analysis of the dissertation focuses on military power as a key explanatory variable for alliance transformation that includes the incorporation of new allies, the development of new missions and the advancement of allied capabilities. While club goods theory suggests a broader framework of intergovernmental bargaining among the various sub-clubs within NATO, the concept of complementarities focuses on specific mode by which allied power has been managed. It reveals a relationship between military resources in terms of personnel, army, navy, air force equipment and defense spending on the one hand, and specific allied capabilities operationalized through the number of troops that each of the NATO members send overseas, on the other. The utility of the represented model meets the expectations of Kenneth Waltz – “in one sense a model represents a theory. In another sense a model pictures reality while simplifying it, say, through omission or through reduction of scale.” 410 Waltz correctly underlines that the parsimony of the model should not depart too far from reality or, otherwise, it will become useless.
In this chapter I link the club dynamics of transformation and expansion to the distribution of power in the international system. In the model presented in Chapter three, I intentionally set aside the effect of the distribution of power. For the purpose of manageability, the previous chapter focused on peacekeeping measured in terms of troops abroad as the only dependent variable. However, as indicated in the Brussels Declaration, NATO’s transformation is a much
410 Kenneth Waltz (1979), p. 7.
200 more comprehensive phenomenon and it would be analytically incorrect to limit the scope of research solely to peacekeeping efforts in terms of number of troops aboard.
This chapter is organized around several arguments. First, it presents the model of complementarities in its entirety as defined in the Brussels Declaration. In addition to peacekeeping, I also focus on NATO’s crisis management and non-proliferation missions. Thus, the chapter suggests a qualitative study that explains the roots of the link between military resources and allied capabilities embedded in the first hypothesis. Second, I distinguish between the alliance missions, which are the intervening variables in the model and actual allied capabilities measured in terms of Combined Joint Task Forces, NATO Response Forces and various Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) niche capabilities. Third, the logic of the presentation holds that the demand for a new mission determines the development of new capabilities, which means that the missions of peacekeeping, crisis-management and non- proliferation determine the development of specific alliance capabilities to support these new missions. Fourth, the observed relationship is studies in the context of NATO’s transformation, which enables us to test the second hypothesis that alliance membership makes a difference in the advancement of capabilities.
The logic of the presentation is organized around theory-oriented process tracing that studies multiple interaction effects and explains the effect that the new missions have for the development of allied capabilities. The missions include a decision-making process and a clearly defined and evolving conceptual framework. Specifically, the study traces the evolutionary development of NATO’s new missions, which may be vertical and horizontal. The vertical evolution of capabilities shows how the demand for new missions leads to development of new types of capabilities. The capabilities, on the other hand, are tied to the respective mission; they
201 follow similar evolutionary pattern and are linked to the distribution of power, where the hegemon uses different tools to stimulate their advancement. This trend is illustrated with the evolution from peacekeeping, backed up by CJTF capabilities to a more thorough crisis management for the purpose of which NATO needed rapid reaction capabilities and, therefore,
NATO Response Force was introduced.
Alternatively, the horizontal evolution indicates how the mission evolves over time based on the new strategic environment that leads to the development of new capabilities; such is the case of NATO’s non-proliferation mission and the inception of the Prague Capabilities
Commitment in 2002, which led to the advancement of various Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear teams based on concentration of allied resources within and across the various sub-clubs of allies.
The vertical and horizontal advancement of capabilities require extensive bargaining among allies before and during the NATO Summits and, therefore, does not occur automatically.
Contrary to the neofunctionalist logic, the advancement of one type of capabilities (e.g. peacekeeping) does not automatically lead to spillover into other types (e.g. crisis management and non-proliferation). The logic of complementarities indicates that when a new initiative is launched, the governments of the member states are usually involved in an extensive bargaining at various levels that precede the upcoming NATO Summit. As a result, the final documents of the Summit usually incorporate decisions with very ambitions targets that the member states are not able to meet within the expected timelines. That is why before the next Summit, the Allies once again need to revise the progress and renegotiate more realistic targets, which this time also include various mechanisms to monitor the progress of every individual state.
202 In the last section of this chapter, I also address the issue of interoperability, which is a separate variable that does not fit in the categories of alliance missions, military resources or specific allied capabilities but has impact on all the three sets of variables. Specifically, the advancement of interoperability among the new and potential allies is illustrated through various multinational efforts, such as the Southeast European Brigade (SEE BRIG) and the Baltic battalion (BALTBAT).
NATO’s Transformation after the End of the Cold War
Christopher Layne summarizes U.S. Grand Strategy during the Cold War as an attempt “to
subordinate an integrated Western Europe to U.S. hegemony and to prevent the emergence on
the Continent of an independent pole of power that could challenge Washington’s predominance
in the Euro-Atlantic Affairs.” 411 Furthermore, he claims that the U.S. strategy in Western Europe
rested on several strategic pillars. First, the United States exercised centralized control over
NATO’s nuclear weapons. Second, the United States could not afford to have the Atlantic
alliance weakened because it was a key component in ensuring America’s fundamental interest
in the Old Continent “by maintaining peace within Western Europe.” In other words, “the
preservation of the political stability and security in Western Europe” was regarded as utmost
importance to the U.S. national security.” In the words of Dean Acheson the mid-1960s NATO
was seen as “the vehicle for American stabilizer role in Western Europe,” i.e. the management
and functioning of the alliance was “not merely a military structure to prepare collective defense
against military aggression, but also a “political organization to preserve the peace of Europe.” 412
411 Christopher Layne (2006), pp. 96-7. 412 The diplomatic historians Leffer and Gregory Mitrovich discuss the offensive nature of the U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union; see also Layne (2006), p. 105.
203 Layne argues that even during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the United States was determined that NATO would outlive the Cold War.
The change in the distribution of power after 1990 did not alter fundamentally the level of
U.S. involvement in Europe. NATO is still in business and U.S. troops are still in Europe.
While their numbers in Germany are being reduced, other American troops are being stationed on a short-term basis in Eastern Europe. The U.S. European Command, headquartered in
Stuttgart, Germany, indicated that it plans to trim its military presence from 112,000 troops to about 68,500 over the next several years. At the same time, the United States signed agreements with Bulgaria and Romania to use some of its military facilities to station between 2,500 and
5,000 troops. 413 However, the operation of these units will be very different from the case of
Germany; they will be as large as 2,500-troop brigades “to rotate to Romania and Bulgaria for up to six months of training at a time, including training with host-nation troops.” 414
In addition, the change in the distribution of power not only did not mark the organizational
end of NATO but also it stimulated two new waves of expansion. In 1997, NATO expanded by
admitting three former Soviet satellites: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. On March
29, 2004, the alliance completed the second round of its post-Cold War enlargement with
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia assuming the rights and
obligations of membership. Logically, the question is why the predictions of NATO’s demise
and the American pullback from Europe have not been fulfilled so far? A possible explanation
suggested by Christopher Layne is that the United States has always been pursuing a grand
413 Vince Crawley, “U.S. Negotiating Use of Shared Military Bases in Romania, Bulgaria: Ambassador says all democratic nations have interest in security of Black Sea,” International Information Programs, Washington File Staff Writer, November 9, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Nov/04-490927.html , 02/29/2007. 414 Charlie Coon, “U.S., Bulgaria, Romania to kick off agreement with Immediate Response 2006 Exercise will get under way July 17 in southern Bulgaria,” Stars and Stripes , European edition, Wednesday, July 5, 2006, http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=37516&archive=true , 04/29/2007.
204 strategy of extraregional hegemony. The driving force behind the European grand strategy has not been “counter-hegemony” blocking the bids of other would-be European hegemons, but “the goal of imposing America’s own hegemony on the continent.” 415
Layne makes the case that NATO’s transformation, more specifically the alliance’s new
missions of preventing power vacuums and instability, providing “reassurance,” and promoting
the spread of democracy into Eastern Europe, is a reflection of the same U.S. Grand Strategy.
The foreign policy of the post-Cold War U.S. administrations confirmed this hypothesis: the
George H. W. Bush administration wanted to preserve America’s hegemony in Europe and to
keep NATO as an instrument through which Washington exercised its continental preeminence.
In the same way, the Clinton administration was resolved to preserve NATO and to assure that
the United States remained a “European power” also by reinventing NATO and investing the
Alliance with new roles and missions that would provide a convincing rationale for keeping it in
business. 416
This research departs from Layne’s approach that extra-regional hegemony is the major causal explanation for the driving forces behind NATO’s transformation and expansion. The study accepts the assumption that the distribution of power is a major factor that shapes alliance behavior it is needed to understand why NATO is undergoing such a transformation and how it functions in the post-Cold War world. However, the distribution of power as a structural variable is not sufficient to understand alliance dynamics and my model asserts that it is also necessary to look into the concept of complementarities that explores the link between military resources and transformational capabilities. The operationalization of transformational
415 Christopher Layne (2006), p. 106. 416 Ronald Asmus in Opening NATO’s Door refers to Albright’s speech, where she indicates that “if we get it right NATO will last for another fifty years” and that “if an institution such as NATO did not exist today, we would want to create one.” Also see Madeleine Albright quoted by Christopher Layne (2006), p. 109.
205 capabilities assumes a modification or transformation of existent resources and capabilities, acquisition of new capabilities that the states did not have previously and a mode or pattern of alliance behavior to develop these capabilities. The essence of transformational capabilities combines several components that include a decision-making process tied to a mutually agreed military doctrine and a clearly definable mission or missions. The transformational dimension reflects current and future capabilities that result from a long-lasting cumulative process, where the demand for specific allied missions leads the modification of the existent and the acquisition of new capabilities.
Therefore, the next sections of the chapter will present in detail the link between the various alliance missions (peacekeeping and crisis management, non-proliferation) and their influence on developing capabilities such as CJTFs, NRF, non-proliferation niche specialization, as well as the link between them and the alliance interoperability. The chapter will discuss how distribution of power in general, and the role of the hegemon in particular influence the enhancement of allied capabilities within the broader framework of heterogeneous clubs.
Peacekeeping Missions and Capabilities
MISSION An Agenda for Peace defines peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving
[United Nations] military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.” The document distinguishes between peacekeeping as a technique that deals with conflict prevention and peacemaking. 417 Therefore, on the one hand peacekeeping is a technique, a measure to
deploy military and/or civilian presence to achieve conflict prevention as a political goal. On the
417 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General A/47/277-S/24111,” June 17, 1992, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html , 12/22/2006.
206 other hand, peacekeeping is “an action to bring hostile parties to agreement;” it is a form through which to achieve a desired outcome that includes initiatives such as judicial settlement, mediation and other forms of negotiation.418 Peacekeeping was designed to respond to threats to
security, more specifically in truce supervision and monitoring the behavior of the standing
armies. The concept evolved over time from responses to international conflicts to internal
ones. 419 In this context peacekeeping can also be interpreted as a mission to enhance security.
The conceptualization of peacekeeping as a mission has several core characteristics. First, these are missions carried out by armed forces, which as indicated by the former Canadian Prime
Minister and diplomat Lester Pearson perform the function of a “de facto international police,” because of the anarchic structure of international relations where we have no international police force. 420 Second, peacekeeping operations are essentially consensual operations, based on the
consent of the territorial state, where the operations are conducted. Third, these operations are
provisional in their nature and are meant to serve “as an emergency measure, a fire brigade
action, just to stop the fighting and prevent it from recurring. 421
The scope and effectiveness of peacekeeping as a technique is determined by two sets of
variables – “hard” and “soft” ones. Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis argue that while the
hard variables are related with the implications of military power, the “soft” ones are associated
with “peacekeepers’ initiative and creativity, their training and abilities, their proactive use of
available resources, their ability to update their beliefs about the optimal strategy in a changing
environment. 422 The definition is not in conflict with the approach presented in chapter three.
418 Doyle and Sambanis (2006), p. 10. 419 Ibid, p. 49. 420 Georges Abi-Saab, “United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An Overview of the Issues,” in Daniel Warner (ed.) New Dimensions of Peacekeeping , Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, p. 1. 421 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 422 Doyle and Sambanis (2006), p. 61.
207 The only major difference is that I assume the scope of peacekeeping is limited exclusively to
“hard” power, i.e. number of troops stationed from a certain ally for a peacekeeping mission, while a part of the “soft” peacekeeping variables are captured by a broader concept of
“interoperability,” which also reflects training and a capacity to optimize and manage efficiently
“hard power” in the specific environment of the mission. The optimization of the proactive use of available resources is one of the aspects of complementarities. Without challenging the approach to peacekeeping in the work of Doyle and Sambanis, I do argue that there is a more complex interconnectedness between the “hard” and the “soft” components of peacekeeping, which also reflects the capacity of the peacekeepers from different allied countries to work together effectively.
Another specification in the analytical distinction between the different forms of peacekeeping missions is highlighted by studying their evolution in terms of mandate, capabilities, and range of operations. Originally, when these missions were introduced in the
United Nations, they incorporated three basic principles – (a) the troops were deployed in a buffer zone and their tasks were mostly limited to enforcing an agreed cease-fire; (b) the troops were stationed after the consent of the parties involved; they were expected to be impartial and to use no or very limited force; (c) the force composition excluded major (great) powers and reflected the diversity of the UN. Gradually, the concept evolved to what is known in the literature as “a second generation of peacekeeping” that was linked to the implementation of peace agreements and was extended toward peacemaking and peace-building. Lastly, the third generation later on expanded the concept to a combination of military and civilian activities. 423
Therefore, the three generations of peacekeeping reflect an evolutionary trend in the
423 Rachel Utley (ed.), Major powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and Challenges of Military Intervention , Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, VT (2006), p. 3.
208 peacekeeping missions where the “peacekeepers’ roles increasingly extended” in terms of their mandate, as well as capabilities. The “recourse to peacekeeping” in over thirty UN missions launched from 1993 to 2004 reflects a sustained and growing demand for such operations after the end of the Cold War. 424
The evolution of peacekeeping indicates that allied response cannot be based solely on number of troops, but should also include additional aspects that can be attributed to the increasing demand for such missions around the globe. On the one hand, the advancement from first to third generation of peacekeeping is a process that tracks down how the mandate, range and capabilities of the missions have expanded over time. The different missions also indicate how horizontal evolution has affected the outcome – whether, to what extent and how the different generations have produced a more efficient and effective peacekeeping. On the other hand, the evolution of peacekeeping reflects organizational transformation. The new types of operations with a more comprehensive and flexible mandate and capabilities and a broader range of operations also require new generations of military to accomplish the various peacekeeping tasks, which vary from pure military responsibilities to various reconstruction and civil engineering tasks. In The Blueprint for Action Thomas Barnett illustrates this trend through a discussion that he had with his Norwegian counterparts. The essence of his argument is the need for military transformation that distinguishes between “hard power” or Leviathan military that wages the wars and SystAdmins or forces that are primarily concerned with what is known as
“operations other than war” in other words a broad range of tasks that include post-conflict rehabilitation, the Norwegian officers immediately grasped where their own military could fit in: that seam between war and peace. 425 The Americans might field the world’s Leviathan force,
424 Ibid, p. 3. 425 Thomas Barnett (2005), p. 17.
209 and the US military will always play a crucial role in conducting the so-called Fourth-Generation warfare. However, unless the United States can integrate the contributions of smaller militaries like Norway into a larger peacekeeping and management effort, the international community will
“be left with two types of forces neither of which can secure the victory of its own: a Leviathan force that can run up the “score” in the first half, and a colonial style mopping-up force that can salvage an exit strategy once the peace is lost to never-ending insurgencies.” 426
This example of a Leviathan force and SysAdmins, given by Barnett illustrates how
complementarities and club goods dynamic interplay. First, in heterogeneous alliance structures
the different members complement each others’ capabilities – in our case the U.S. and
Norwegian militaries. Second, the Leviathan and SysAdmin forces complement each others’
capabilities for specific missions of peacekeeping and crisis management, not their general
military strength. Thus, they do not merge their armies or allocate special resources, but rather
use their comparative advantages to optimize the efficiency and maximize the utility of alliance
missions. Nonetheless, this distinction of the U.S. and Norwegian militaries illustrates only one
of the multiple aspects of complementarities. Third, the logic of complementarities holds that
the combined effect of Leviathan and SystAdmins forces ensures growing benefits from the
management of this club. Although the advantages of the heterogeneous clubs are present, the
members need to be proactive and seek distribution of various capabilities in a way that ensures
higher benefits. A good example that illustrates increasing demand for such kind of SystAdmin
forces is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where NATO has been involved in a
series of peacekeeping efforts from the late 1990s through mid-2000s.
The former Yugoslavia was one of the major hotspots in the 1990s that contributed to the
growing global demand for peacekeeping capabilities, where the wars of Yugoslav succession
426 Ibid, p. 11.
210 continued to create sources of instability and demand action from the NATO allies. This trend was confirmed in 2000-2001 with the conflict in one of the newly independent nations of former
Yugoslavia -- Macedonia. At the end of the 1990s, this small Balkan country had serious domestic difficulties in maintaining the precarious political balance between the ruling majority and the large Albanian minority. This resulted in skirmishes between Albanian guerillas and government security forces in the first half of 2001. The rebels advocated better integration of the Albanian minority into the different administrative levels of government and the introduction of Albanian as a second official language in the country and the conflict ended in August 2001 with a Framework agreement according to which the Albanian guerillas were expected to surrender voluntarily their weapons, while the Macedonian dominated parliament agreed to adopt a series of reforms granting ethnic Albanians an extensive package of rights and power. 427
Immediately after the agreement was signed, a NATO multi-national military force was authorized to begin the collection of arms and ammunition from the Albanian rebels, known as
Operation “Essential Harvest.” The mission was planned for thirty days and was initiated jointly by the Macedonian government and NLA. 428 “Essential Harvest” was followed by another
NATO operation – “Amber Fox.” The latter was a response to the request by the Macedonian
authorities and had a specific mandate to contribute to the protection of international monitors
who were supposed to oversee the implementation of the peace agreements. The mission was
authorized in September 2001 and deployed under German leadership with duration of three
months. It consisted of about 700 troops that joined the 300 troops already stationed in the
country. Upon its completion, the North Atlantic Council agreed that, in order to minimize any
risks for further destabilization, there would be “a follow-on international military presence in
427 “Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum,” ICG Balkans Briefing , Skopje/Brussels, 8 September 2001. 428 NATO Handbook, Chapter 5: The Alliance's Operational Role in Peacekeeping, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, Belgium, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf, 12/27/04.
211 the country.” The involvement of the Alliance in Macedonia in 2002 and 2003 continued under operation “Allied Harmony.” Its purpose was two-fold: to provide support for the international monitors, as well as to assist and advise the government in taking control of security throughout the country. 429 As a result of the growing demand for peacekeeping missions NATO needed the advancement of new allied peacekeeping capabilities, which is illustrated with the development of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES A good illustration of the evolution of capabilities for peacekeeping missions in the case of
NATO are the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The original intention behind the CJTFs was to give NATO’s forces mobility and flexibility and make them more suited to crisis- response operations. This concept originated and was successfully applied for first time in the
1991 Gulf War. 430
What is a Combined Joint Task Force? Essentially, it is a military organization or grouping that is organized for the purposes of carrying out a specific mission or task. It is furnished with certain military resources, such as manpower and equipment and involves two or more military services (army, navy, air force, etc.) accomplished by at least two or more nations. 431 Therefore,
CJTF is “a multinational, multi-service deployable task force generated and tailored primarily,
but not exclusively, for military operations” that include operations outside of the alliance
territory, including but not limited to operation such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. 432
429 See: NATO Handbook, Chapter 5. 430 Charles Barry, “Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice,” in Philip Gordon (ed), The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance , Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York (1997), pp. 203-219. 431 The operational definition in the NATO handbook actually discusses manpower and equipment as capabilities rather than military resources, but for the purposes of analytical distinction of this research, I will use the term resources to operationalize manpower, navy, army and air force equipment as discussed in the pervious chapter. 432 NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm, 12/10/2006.
212 Historically, the first CJTFs came into being with the Gulf war in 1991, but their conceptualization within NATO was launched in late 1993 and was formally endorsed at the
Brussels Summit in January 1994. On that occasion, NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed “the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.” 433 There are
several important components of this concept. First, CJTFs are planned in response to various
activities outside of NATO’s traditional territorial domain in the North Atlantic Area. These
required concentration of multilateral efforts in new types of operations for which the
organization was previously unprepared. Such missions incorporate primarily third generation
peacekeeping efforts. For this purpose, NATO’s assets should be made available on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, the type and scope of each operation determines the available resources.
Second, NATO assets would be available not only to the allies, but also in operations “with
participating nations outside the Alliance.” 434 Third, not only did CJTFs include non-allied states, but also NATO assets could be made available for operations led by other institutions and/or organizations, such as the Western European Union (WEU). The idea was to support the efforts of the Europeans to create “separable but not separate” collective defense capabilities known as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). 435 Fourth, the concept provided a
flexible and efficient way to generate rapidly deployable forces with appropriate command and
control arrangements. Therefore, the new command and control (a.k.a. C 2) was supposed to optimize the alliance for new common procedures and new regime of exercises. Ultimately, the
Combined Joint Task Forces was an unprecedented initiative in the sense that it permanently
433 “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” January 11, 1994 (a.k.a. “The Brussels Summit Declaration”). 434 Ibid. 435 Charles Barry (1997), p. 205.
213 institutionalized the multinational task force concept, which had previously been a temporary command-and-control arrangement applied by ad hoc coalitions. 436 The goal of the alliance was
to create a unique hybrid capability that combined the best attributes of both coalition and
alliance forces that are able to respond rapidly, their involvement is backed by pre-established
rules and standardized procedures and equipped with the necessary infrastructure. 437 CJTF also seek efficiency, namely that these forces rely on the available military resources without adding more resources, but gain synergy through “dual-hatting,” i.e. selecting personnel within existent organizations by modifying the existent procedures and introducing new employment and operational concepts. 438 Thus, CJTFs reflect the growing demand for new generation of peacekeeping capabilities within NATO, whereby the mission determines the development of new allied capabilities.
Certainly, the implementation of these task forces was easy to achieve. There were at least
several sources of weakness. Interoperability is one of them, where equipment routinely used by
a non-NATO troop-contributing nation may differ from that employed by NATO troops and,
therefore, be incompatible. A parent headquarters had to provide complete equipment suites to
certain participants just to ensure a minimal degree of compatibility. Even when problems of
interoperability were solved, there were further problems of political will – it was hard to
coordinate among number of allies and partner countries, each of which had a different vision of
their national interest. There was no guarantee that national support would arrive at the task
force headquarters as promised. ‘All politics is local’ and translates into every NATO language,
436 Ibid, p. 204. 437 Ibid. 438 Ibid, p. 203.
214 i.e. each sovereign NATO nation reserves the right of “first refusal” to requests such as those associated with forming a CJTF. 439
Furthermore, a serious initial problem was the “nucleus” staff of these forces. When the
Allied Forces conducted the first exercise of a CJTF operation in November 1997, its headquarters filled only a quarter of the 400 necessary CJTF staff officers. Some expressed reservations about the small nucleus staff, and argued that the parent headquarters should provide about seventy percent of the staff. Alternatively, a high percentage of nucleus personnel would adversely affect the residual capabilities of the parent headquarters and they would be understaffed because most of their officers would be serving as nucleus personnel. 440
Although, the inauguration of the CJTFs was certainly not an easy way to go, the first stage
was completed with the establishment of three CJTF “parent” headquarters. The initiation and
the launch of CJTFs came as a result of the demand of specific security capabilities that except
the United States, no other state or organizational structures had. The gravity of the situation in
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and other places in the world required immediate action that neither
NATO nor any other international alliance or organization were able to provide or deploy
quickly. In December 1995, NATO began operation “Joint Endeavor” in Bosnia, replacing the
United Nations Protection Force. This was NATO’s first UN-directed out-of-the-area operation
or known as operation other than war (OOTW). Furthermore, this was also a test for NATO’s
ability to bridge the gap between Article Five and non-Article Five missions, as well as control
of NATO and non-NATO forces under integrated command. 441
439 Thomas Cooke, “NATO CJTF Doctrine: the naked emperor,” Parameters , Winter 1998, pp. 124-36, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98winter/cooke.htm , 03/05/2007. 440 Ibid. 441 Kelly Thomas, Security in the 21 st Century: NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept , U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA390617&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
215 Operation “Joint Endeavor” deployed intelligence personnel provided aircrews and staffs at
several locations with critical threat information and airfield data. Multinational Division
(North) or MND(N) and Task Force Eagle’s history began in 1995 following the NATO-
imposed cease-fire, halting the destructive four-year Balkan conflict. Specifically, Task Force
Eagle was formed and assumed control of its area of responsibility in December 1995. Of the
60,000 troops that provided support for the operation, almost 20,000 were from the U.S. military.
Other nations included Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland,
Sweden, Russia and Turkey. After a year IFOR completed its mission and was replaced by the
“Stabilization Force” or SFOR. 442
As a next step, the Berlin and Brussels meetings of NATO foreign and defense ministers
(1996) approved the overall political-military framework for the CJTF concept. It was decided that the European Security and Defense Identity should be built within NATO, as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the Alliance. The underlying logic was to take full advantage of the CJTF concept and apply it to strengthen the joint European defense efforts based on “sound military principles supported by appropriate military planning” that would make possible the emergence of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. 443
As the reality of the late 1990s indicated, there was a need for transformation of the existent structures of collective defense determined by the demand of specific capabilities to react to the crises in various parts of the world. Furthermore, this demand was strengthened by the existent and further growing power inequalities between the United States and its allies.
Although the United States had significant power capabilities to deal with these missions, there
442 Operation Joint Endeavor , http://wwwglobalsecurity.org/ops/joint_endeavor.htm, 12/22/2007. 443 NATO Handbook.
216 was major demand for legitimacy of these efforts, which necessitated coordinated multinational efforts. Dealing alone with the growing need for peacekeeping efforts in the post-Cold War world would be economically inefficient for the United States as a rising hegemon and, by default, would lead to sub-optimal outcomes. From the perspective of economic rationality, the establishment of CJTFs was a cost efficient tool for the United States to have the European allies pool resources in such multinational combined joint task forces. Thus, if successfully implemented and efficiently used, the CJTFs could be a rationale to have the other nations involved, promote military transformation and, in general, decrease the costs of peacekeeping without altering the imbalanced distribution of power in the international system. Such an approach ipso facto means that, if correctly applied, this logic could challenge the conventional interpretation for managing power inequalities as suggested by Layne.
The second phase of implementation of the CJTFs focused on: (a) the Alliance’s capability to deploy small- and large-scale, land- and sea-based Task Force Headquarters and; (b) any need to nominate additional CJTF “parent” headquarters. 444 A number of trials of the CJTF concept were completed by 1999. The partner countries participated as observers in the context of the
Exercise Strong Resolve in March 1998 and were integrated throughout the structure of these forces. Based on these trials and other relevant staff analyses, the Alliance began the full implementation of the CJTFs. This process included the acquisition of necessary headquarters support and command, control and communications equipment. 445
The utility of these combined forces, particularly in their second stage of implementation became especially applicable with the launching of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in 2001.
Combined Joint Task Force -- 76 and Task Force Aegis are good instances of such a form of
444 Ibid. 445 Ibid.
217 allied interaction. Combined Joint Task Force – 76 (a.k.a. CJTF-76) was a U.S. led subordinate formation of Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan with headquarters in Kabul. This
CJTF reported to United States Central Command. While this task force command for
Afghanistan was deactivated by the end of 2006, CJTF-76 remains active and serves as a headquarters for ISAF's Regional Command East. The mission of CJTF-76 was designed to conduct a full spectrum of operations throughout its operations area to defeat the enemy extremist movement, establish “an enduring security and reshape its posture […] in order to set conditions for long-term stability in Afghanistan.”446
Task Force Aegis is another multinational force led by Canada in Southeastern
Afghanistan. Among other contributing nations are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Estonia and the United States. TF Aegis is responsible for provincial reconstruction in Kandahar,
Lashkar Gah, Qalat and Tarin Kowt and is also known as the Multinational Brigade - Regional
Command South or MNB RC South. Under the allied agreement the command was taken over
by the Dutch at the end of 2006.
Therefore, the brief survey of the advancement of CJTF indicated that the evolution of peacekeeping is linked to the overall alliance transformation and the distribution of power across the international system. First, the survey of the advancement of CJTF capabilities indicated that they are tied to efficient use of available resource and the demand for new peacekeeping missions as intervening variables. Furthermore, the advancement of the new peacekeeping missions indicated that there is a tendency for horizontal evolution from first to third generation of peacekeeping. Second, the anecdotal example of the Norwegian militaries indicates that the division of labor among the different allies reflects the club dynamics and is based on the distribution of power. Implicitly Thomas Barnett emphasizes that small allies are also important
446 Ibid.
218 cogs in the overall club mechanism because Leviathan force may have little use for the allies when fighting wars, but the participation of the small countries in the peacekeeping efforts as
SysAdmins is instrumental for the success of the missions. Third, the growing demand for peacekeeping mandates new capabilities managed by international alliances. This observation also confirms the second hypothesis explored throughout the dissertation, i.e. alliances such as
NATO make a difference in the management of military resources and stimulate the advancement of allied capabilities.
Crisis Management Missions and Capabilities
MISSION The crisis management missions are quite similar to peacekeeping, and often times it is
difficult to make clear-cut analytical distinction between these two types of missions. While the
evolution from first to third generation of peacekeeping reflects horizontal advancement within
the missions, the evolution from peacekeeping to crisis management reflects a vertical
advancement toward a new type of mission that comes into being as a result of the growing
demand for new capabilities that are more advanced than the previous ones.
The literature on international security does not agree on a universal definition of crisis
management or conflict resolution, nor does it agree on what constitutes the successful
accomplishment of either of these two. 447 Similar to peacekeeping, crisis management can be interpreted in terms of a mission and capabilities. The first group of definitions focuses on the specificity of the mission or what Bercovitch refers to as “implementability and permanence of an outcome.” 448 Evans and Newham interpret crisis management as an “attempt to control
447 For further information see Snyder and Diesing (1977), Stern and Druckman, (2000), quoted by Winkenfeld et al, Mediating International Crises , Taylor and Francis, New York (2005), pp. 8-9. 448 See Bercovitch (1992).
219 events during crisis to prevent systematic violence from occurring. 449 Along the same line of interpretation, for Maoz crisis management is “a set of actions designed to limit or control the level and scope of violence in a given conflict, while striving to accomplish a set of objectives at national, dyadic or international levels. 450
The second group of definitions approaches crisis management from the decision makers’
perspective as a problem faced by top-tier decision-makers. For Snyder and Diesing (1977),
decision-makers are rational actors and as such they must discover the optimal combination of
coercion and accommodation vis-à-vis other states, toward the goal of avoiding war while still
maximizing gains and minimizing losses. 451 The underlying assumption that actors behave
rationally is imbedded in the earlier works where crisis management is approached as winning by
maximizing one’s interests. 452 Alternatively, Kleiboer (1998) and Young (1967) describe crisis management as “effort to neutralize the destructive consequences of a conflict,” i.e. an effort to avoid the worst-case scenario in a conflict situation and, therefore, by being able to control the crisis to neutralize its destructive consequences. 453 Finally, crisis management is approached as
equilibrium, a settlement “towards eliminating the roots of conflict between the parties.” 454
However, it is a sub-optimal outcome, since there is always another optimal equilibrium that completely eliminates the conflict.
Yet, a third group of definitions studies crisis management as a process rather than outcome and imply the need for certain capabilities. For example, a crisis management situation can be
449 Evans and Newham (1998), p. 104. 450 Zeev Maoz, “Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution: A Conceptual and Methodological Introduction,” in Zeev Maoz et al, Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations, Lexington Books (2004), p. 13. 451 Snyder and Diesing (1977). 452 Wilkenfeld and Young, (2005), p. 8. See also Kitner and Schwartz (1965), Bell (1971), and Garnett, (1975). 453 See Young (1967) and Kleiboer (1998) quoted by Wilkenfeld and Young, (2005), p. 8. 454 Kolb and Babbitt, “Mediation practice on the Home Front” in Vasquez and Johnson et al, Beyond Confrontation, Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era , Ann Arbor, MI, 1995, p. 80. Also quoted by Winkenfeld and Young (2005), p. 9.
220 defined as a process of achieving “mutually agreeable arrangements between the parties to temporary resolve and or remove from contention one or more, but not necessarily all the issues underlying the dispute.” 455 Kleiboer (1998) emphasizes that crisis management is not the ultimate goal, but reflects only intermediate stages en route to an eradication of the roots of the conflict. Bercovitch (1992) suggests a definition that incorporates the process and the outcome aspects of crisis management, and thus implies the unity of clearly defined mission and effective capabilities to accomplish it. He emphasizes that the “the success of the attempts to resolve conflicts may also be judged in terms of implementability and permanence of an outcome.” 456
Several key factors determine the specificity of crisis management missions – urgency, time compression and uncertainty. Urgency and time compression pertain to the defining elements of the crisis, i.e. “the threat is perceived to be here, it is real and must be dealt with as soon as possible.” 457 Boin et al argue that time compression is especially relevant to
understanding leadership at the operational level where decisions on matters of life and death
must sometimes “be made within a few hours, minutes or even a split second. 458 Furthermore, the sense of time compression is also combined with a sense of uncertainty, which emanates from the nature and potential consequences of an existent and/or perceived threat. 459 Usually in
a crisis the perception of threat is accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty, which refers to
the nature as well as the potential consequences of the threat. Crisis management needs to
respond to the questions what is happening; how did it happen; what’s next and how bad will it
455 W. J. Dixon “Third Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement,” International Organization , Vol. 50, (1996), p. 656. 456 Wickenfeld, Young et al (2005), p. 9. 457 Arjen Boin et al, The Politics of Crisis Management , Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 3. 458 Ibid, p. 3; see also Wickenfled, Young et al, (2005), p. 8-9. 459 Arjen Boin et al (2005), p. 3.
221 be. Uncertainty is typically combined with other factors in the crisis process, such as people’s initial emergent responses to the crisis. 460
Crisis management also affects the functioning of alliances. The successful accomplishment of a crisis management mission, without any doubt, strengthens alliances; while its failure may actually have quite negative consequences on the way allies work together. The core question of this research – how alliances function in an imbalanced international system is linked to the problem of how to pool allied resources in order to manage international crises.
More specifically, the alliance literature addresses questions on how alliances function in order to respond quickly and efficiently to various international crises and what specific transformational capabilities they need to acquire. Therefore, although the literature does not explicitly discuss the variations in the definitions of crisis management and crisis response, I would prefer to interpret the crisis management missions in terms of response missions because such an approach implies a process that has core characteristics of a crisis -- urgency, time compression, uncertainty and demand for a quick and adequate response.
What is an adequate response? First, from the perspective of Kleiboer, Bercovitch and
Boin crisis response or crisis management should be efficient (i.e. minimizing costs and maximizing outcomes), timely and such that it prevents the worst-case scenario outcomes.
Second, Georges Abi-Saab links crisis management to the evolution of the third generation of peacekeeping and correctly observes that it is very different from the earlier stages of peacekeeping because it becomes a part of a larger strategy that “reverses the complacent tendency” of peacekeeping. 461 Therefore, the crisis management missions are a logical
continuation of the peacekeeping missions with several additional characteristics, such as
460 Ibid. 461 Georges Abi-Saab (1995), p. 7.
222 urgency of the crisis situation, comprehensiveness of the approach and maximization of the efficiency of the multinational mission. Thus, implicitly the peacekeeping mission reflects a demand for actual material capabilities that allies are able and willing to devote, while a crisis management mission implies involvement of a more comprehensive decision making process through which the allied nations pull together resources and make them work in the most efficient way.
In the case of NATO, by late 1990s it became clear that the new crisis management
operations would require better capabilities. The weaknesses of the CJTFs combined with the
increasing demand for more efficient and rapidly deployable crisis management capabilities
within NATO in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to the initiation of the NATO's Defense
Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was launched at the Alliance's 50th anniversary Washington
Summit in April 1999. While the CJTF concept emphasizes more on the peacekeeping and to
lesser degree on crisis management efforts, the DCI emphasis is the crisis management variable,
as well as various issues of interoperability. The focus of the targets is not on the multinational
character of the forces anymore but on their capacity to act as a single unit within a coherent and
responsive alliance. DCI covers almost all areas of military capability. This includes vast areas
of capabilities that states need to develop, such as mobility and deployability i.e. the ability to
deploy forces quickly to where needed, including areas outside of NATO’s territory. In addition,
the alliance troops need to be able to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to
ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations. Effective
engagement and survivability are the other two target capabilities, which include ability to
successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, from high to low intensity, as well as
ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats. Last but not least,
223 DCI demands compatible with each other "interoperable communications" in order to facilitate command, control and information systems among allies and enable them to work effectively together. 462 DCI clearly emphasizes the importance of establishing specific defense capabilities
by the NATO allies where time is a key factor. Therefore, the shift from CJTFs to DCI is also
indicative for a trend of re-conceptualization from peacekeeping to more advanced crisis
management efforts.
NATO’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES At its November 2002 summit in Prague, NATO approved a new initiative, the Prague
Capabilities Commitment (PCC), which built on the DCI foundations but had more specific and quantifiable goals. A part of the Prague Summit decision was a proposal put forward by the U.S.
Secretary for Defense Donald Rumsfeld in September 2002 to create a NATO rapid reaction force. This initiative was officially launched several months later, at the Summit as a package of several transformational proposals known as the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), which also included a fundamental revision of the NATO military command structure. 463 The allies agreed in Prague that PCC should be designed to enhance NATO's forces and close the capability gap between the North American and European allies.
NATO’s November 2002 meeting in Prague called the “transformation summit” adopted
three foundational decisions for transformation. First, NATO heads of state approved the
creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) -- a standing expeditionary force of 20,000 troops
that could be deployed quickly and sustained for thirty days. Second, NATO decided to invite
seven small countries from Eastern Europe to join the alliance. Third, NATO approved the
462 See NATO Handbook, NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato- dci.htm , 11/07/2006. 463 Ibid.
224 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). 464 PCC entailed specific commitments from individual nations and coalitions to invest in needed capabilities, which also included Allied Command
Transformation. The NRF agreement was also a part of the PCC. These measures aimed at creating NATO forces able to move faster and further afield, to apply military force more effectively, and to sustain for longer time in combat. 465
The problems with efficiency, interoperability and coordinating multilateral efforts that
CJTFs faced from their inception in 1994 combined with an enhanced international efforts to deal with the demand for new and more effective crisis management forces led to the inception of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The purpose of NRF is to provide the alliance with a robust and credible capacity to react quickly and efficiently to peacekeeping and crisis management with fully trained and certified as a joint and combined armed forces, able to deploy quickly to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions wherever required. During the first stage NRF should be able to deploy within five days and the whole force should be able to operate self-sufficiently for 30 days without re-supply. Also, NRF is intended to distribute the military burdens equitably among the different alliance members and avoid burgeoning gaps in capability between them. 466 Depending on circumstances under which these forces are initiated
and the stages of crisis-management that they address, NRF can operate as: (i) an Initial Entry
Force to facilitate the arrival and address earlier stages of conflict outbreak; (ii) a follow-on-force
that address the roots of the crisis management and conflict rehabilitation and; (iii) as a stand-
alone force. The specificity of crisis management missions determines NRF’s involvement in
464 Carl W. Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” CRS Report for Congress , January 18, 2006, Order Code RS21659. 465 John Shimkus (Rapporteur – United States), “Progress on the Prague Capability Commitments,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report , delivered at the 2005 Annual Meeting, http://www.nato- pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=684 , 11/10/2006. 466 Daniele Riggio, “EU - NATO Cooperation and Complementarity between the Rapid Reaction Forces,” The International Spectator , 3/2003, pp. 47-8.
225 operations that may vary from non-combatant evacuation to counter terrorism operations and embargo operations, as well as quick response operations to support diplomacy as required. 467
The evolution of NRF indicates that in the earlier stages it was focused primarily on enhanced peacekeeping capabilities, while stages two and three indicate the requirement to equip the
Response Force with capabilities linked to various sets of crisis management tasks.
The Prague Summit determined a timeline for NRF to become fully operational. The force was expected to reach an initial training capability no later than October 2004 and was declared in full operational capability at the NATO Summit meeting in Riga, Latvia in November 29,
2006. NRF is envisaged to function as a joint multinational force. Military command is in the hands of a Strategic Commander for Operations and will flow from him to the Joint Force
Commander (JFC). NRF is also directly linked to the CJTFs because it is composed of troops from several pools of such Joint Task Forces that are based on the principle of rotation. 468
Certainly there have been multiple difficulties and challenges -- the land component has major capability shortfalls and the activation of a rapid response has also been impeded by traditional problems of coordinating efforts among sovereign states, such as diverse domestic legislation or “different strategic cultures” among the member states. 469
Operationally, the size of the force will be determined by the crisis management mission
but will consist of military assets; command and control (C 2) capabilities to support up to 200 combat sorties per day, a brigade-sized land force, and maritime forces up to the size of a NATO
Standing Naval Force, which translates into about 21,000 personnel. The units are supposed to train prior to that assignment to ensure they are capable of fighting together on seven to thirty
467 NATO Response Force Factsheet, http://www.1gnc.de/history/history2005/nrf/LoRes%20NRF%20Mar05%20GBR.pdf , 12/15/2006. 468 “ NATO: Building New Capabilities for New Challenges,” The White House Factsheet , http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021121-6.html , 12/15/2006. 469 Daniele Riggio (2003), pp. 48.
226 days notice anywhere in the world. The NRF combines high-readiness forces with CJTFs in order to better integrate NATO's command and force structures and enhance “the deployability, sustainability, and fighting capability” of these troops given the new operational environment that they may face. 470
A brief survey of the similarities and differences between PCC and DCI can track down the evolution of capabilities from peacekeeping to crisis management. The two initiatives seek to improve members’ operational capabilities and to address evolving defense needs, whereby the allies agreed that both PCC and DCI would be monitored on a regular basis. The evolution from
DCI to Prague commitments is targeted at reorganizing the former initiative because its early conceptualization was too broad and diffuse. Furthermore, PCC was designed in light of the war on terror or fight against terrorism after September 11, 2001 and focused on specific tools to do so, particularly air lift, secure communications, PGMs, and protection against weapons of mass destruction. 471 In his speech before the Prague summit, President Bush explicitly emphasized the link between PCC and the war on terror or fight against terrorism when he declared that “NATO must develop new military capabilities,” and its forces must be “better able to fight side-by- side.” 472
Compared to DCI, PCC was more target-oriented and focused on fewer, more feasible
goals, emphasized multinational cooperation and specialization and required specific rather than
general commitments from the allies in eight specific areas that include non-proliferation,
intelligence, surveillance, command, control, and communications, combat effectiveness,
470 “NATO: Building New Capabilities for New Challenges,” The White House Factsheet , http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021121-6.html , 03/15/2007. 471 Carl W. Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” CRS Report for Congress , January 18, 2006, Order Code RS21659, CRS-3, http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21659_20060118.pdf , 03/15/2007. 472 Bradley Graham and Robert G. Kaiser, “Ahead of NATO’s Summit, Bush Speaks of ‘New Capabilities,” Washington Post , September 24, 2002, quoted by Carl Ek (2006).
227 deployability, etc. 473 PCC also emphasizes the development of various niche capabilities within
relatively homogenous sub-club entities, such as the Czech and Slovak units trained in
countering chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. The Netherlands, on the other hand, leads
a group of countries buying conversion kits to transform conventional bombs into precision-
guided munitions or PGMs. Germany manages a consortium that will acquire strategic air
transport capabilities, while Spain heads another group that would lease tanker aircraft. Norway
and Denmark coordinate procurement of sealift assets. This concept is even more relevant to the
new member states due to their scarce military resources. For this purpose, Romania develops
capability in alpine troops, while Hungary has a skilled engineering corps on call. 474 As a result, the November 2002 meeting in Prague that originally intended to be a celebration of the latest round of NATO enlargement, turned out to be NATO’s transformational summit. 475 It was not a coincidence that the implementation of the niche capabilities concept coincided with the fifth round “big-bang” round of expansion. Ultimately, the Prague Summit of 2002 turned out to be an important moment in addressing various levels of political engagement undertaken within both NATO and the EU to deal with enhancing crisis management capabilities and dealing with the capability gap. 476
The follow-up NATO Summits in Istanbul (2004) and Riga (2006) did not announce new goals and initiatives with regard to crisis management, but rather set out extensive programmatic objectives and monitoring on the progress of enhancing the already agreed upon commitments.
The Final Communiqué of the Istanbul Summit (2004) reaffirmed “further the transformation of
473 Carl W. Ek, (2006), CRS-4. 474 Carl W. Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” CRS Report for Congress , updated January 24, 2007; Order Code RS21659, CRS-3. 475 Paul Cornish, “From NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation,” International Affairs , 80(I), 2004, pp.63-74. 476 Daniele Riggio (2003), pp. 48-9.
228 our military capabilities to make them more modern, more usable and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions.” 477 The NATO leaders urged some nations to reorient
their national resources toward investments in much needed capabilities, such as deployability.
Also the Istanbul Summit approved the creation of a NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense program as an important element of force protection. The Riga Summit (2006)
noted progress on enhancement of crisis management capabilities such as airlift capacity and
several other areas that are also linked to the advancement of interoperability, such as
capabilities in special operations, networking, intelligence sharing, missile defense, and non-
proliferation and capabilities addressing nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological threats. 478
Finally, there are several important conclusions that can be inferred from the presentation
of crisis management. First, the survey confirmed the first hypothesis of dissertation that there is
a direct link between military resources and allied capabilities needed for crisis management
missions as summarized in the chart below. Second, the advancement of NATO’s capabilities
indicated vertical evolution from less advanced peacekeeping to more sophisticated crisis-
management. This advancement is due to the specific demand for new missions that among
other features must include cohesion, mobility and deployability, effectiveness and long duration
of the operations. Third, the analysis also confirmed the second hypothesis studied in the
dissertation, namely that the advancement of capabilities is tied to NATO’s political and military
decision making processes. The decision to develop NATO Response Force was made at the
Washington and Prague Summits in 1999 and 2002. These decisions were supported with
477 Istanbul Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, Turkey, June 28, 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm , 03/19/2007. 478 “Riga Summit Declaration,” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga, Latvia, November 29, 2006, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm , 03/19/2007. See also Carl W. Ek, (2007), CRS-4.
229 mechanisms that monitor the progress and implementation of NRF. The advancement of these rapid reaction capabilities was also carefully reviewed at the Riga Summit in 2006.
Crisis Management Crisis Management Crisis Management Definition Mission Capabilities Attempt to control events Capacity to act as a single NRF is essentially a CJTF during crisis to prevent unit (i.e. multinational, multi- systemic violence from service task force) based on occurring rotation Limit or control the level Mobility and Initial and Follow-on forces and scope of violence deployability Urgency, time compression Effective engagement Ability to deploy within 5 and uncertainty days Efforts to Long duration operations Self-sufficiency for 30 days neutralize/eliminate the roots of conflict Implementability and Survivability Stand-alone forces permanence of the outcome
Non-Proliferation Missions and Capabilities
MISSION There are at least different frameworks to study the topic of non-proliferation. While there
is abundant literature that approaches the issue from regime theory perspective, this chapter
approaches non-proliferation as a separate variable that is incorporated in the overall concept of
allied complementarities. 479 Unlike peacekeeping and crisis management, the non-proliferation variable is much clearer to define as “efforts in collecting and assessing on the spread of weapons of mass destruction” which in the case of NATO involves a two-track non-proliferation allied approach directed towards “stronger institutions and deterrence.” 480
479 Keith R. Krause (ed.), Culture and Security: multilateralism, arms control, and security building , London; Portland, OR; Frank Cass, 1999. 480 Hennig Riecke, “NATO’s Non-Proliferation and Deterrence Policies: Mixed Signals and the Norm of WMD Non-Use” in Eric Herring (ed.), Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction , Frank Cass, London, 2000, p. 25.
230 An important conceptual distinction needs to be introduced between non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. Counter-proliferation was introduced by the United States and reflects a policy-making strategy that rests on two pillars – prevention and protection. Furthermore, the strategy of counter-proliferation as pursued by the United States had five elements: (a) the creation a new mission by the U.S. President; (b) review of all relevant non-proliferation regimes aimed at “improved non-nuclear penetrating munitions to deal with underground installations;
(c) new approaches to fight wars; (d) improved intelligence gathering and; (e) active cooperation with the U.S. allies to meet these goals. 481 Therefore, counter-proliferation expands the concept beyond the traditional understanding of non-proliferation and transforms it into a systematic policy “to combat proliferation including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis.” 482
The advancement of peacekeeping and crisis management missions indicate that transformational allied capabilities entail a decision-making process that determines the scope and characteristics of the missions and is tied up to advancement of transformational allied capabilities. Albeit slightly different from the missions of peacekeeping and crisis management, non-proliferation is also tied up to the decision making process, whereby the specific allied missions determine the development of allied capabilities.
The growing threat of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) immediately after the end of the Cold War made it necessary to reevaluate the international efforts on non- proliferation, including NATO’s approach on this issue. The 1991 Rome Declaration was the first document in support of the “steps undertaken to address [various] aspects of proliferation
481 “Remarks by Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense,” National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, December 7, 1993 in Nuclear Proliferation Factbook , Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC, 1995. 482 See Nuclear Proliferation Factbook , Library of Congress, 1995. See also Robert S. Litwak, “The New Calculus of Pre-Emption,” Survival , Vol. 44, No 4, Winter 2002-03, p. 55.
231 and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security,” including a “global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.” 483 The
subsequent documents in 1993 reaffirmed the concern of NATO members and partners in the
growing proliferation of WMD, more specifically nuclear weapons, the pending arrangements on
the NPT’s unlimited extension and the settlement of the problem with the nuclear arsenals of
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 484 Although the alliance indicated willingness to tackle non- proliferation, there was no clear strategy how to approach this issue.
The non-proliferation variable also shows how the rising hegemon influenced the decision-
making process and stimulated new equilibria within the Alliance. Soon after the Rome
Declaration and the subsequent communiqués, the United States took a lead in the international
arena by launching the Defense Counter Proliferation Initiative (CPI). Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin introduced the concept to his NATO colleagues in December 1993, which rested in “a
drive to develop new military capabilities to deal with this threat” and had five elements. 485
First, the emphasis was on the creation of a new mission by the President of the United States who announced new aggressive non-proliferation policies. Second, the initiative paid special attention to technological equipment to localize and destroy WMD, which included a review of all relevant programs. Third, CPI focused on the development of new strategic doctrines to cope with enemies, including the development of “a military planning process for dealing with
483 “Declaration on Peace and Cooperation,” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (a.k.a. ‘The Rome Declaration’), http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108b.htm , 03/06/2007. 484 “Final Communiqués of the Ministerial Meetings of the North Atlantic Council,” Brussels, March 10, and March 23, 1992 and Athens, Greece, June 10, 1993. 485 Henning Riecke, “NATO’s Non-proliferation and Deterrence Policies: Mixed Signals and the Norms of WMD Non-Use” in Eric Herring (ed.), Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction , Frank Cass Publishers, p 36 and Angus McColl, Is Counter-Proliferation Compatible with non-Proliferation: Rethinking the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, CA, 1995, pp. 2-3.
232 adversaries who have WMD.” 486 Fourth, the initiative emphasized improved counter- proliferation intelligence capabilities. The fifth point paid special attention to international cooperation, more specifically, strengthening cooperation with the allies that called for increased
NATO efforts against the proliferation of WMD. Certainly DCI was an important step in several aspects – not only did it identify new sources of threats, but it also outlined a novel comprehensive strategy to deal with them. Aspin stated that “with this initiative, [the
Department of Defense] is making the essential change demanded by this increased threat. We are adding the task of protection to the task of prevention. The essence of the DCI was the combination of new capabilities to deal with this threat and a strategy to have the allies involved in this process.” 487 Thus, the initiative can be approached as a combination of political and
military means. Essentially it was an important test by the United States on its NATO allies and
the alliance as a whole to redefine non-proliferation and enhance allied capabilities to deal with
it.
The development of a comprehensive alliance strategy “to increase alliance efforts against
WMD proliferation” presents an interesting case to test the significance of non-proliferation and
how this variable interacts with the other components of NATO’s transformational capabilities.
The Alliance’s non-proliferation efforts after 1990 show how it works as a club in the new global
distribution of power. Also, the outcome of the non-proliferation efforts shows whether the
U.S.-initiated CPI leads to a stable equilibrium for the club members. If this is not the case, we
need to explore what is the optimal solution that allies are able to agree on.
486 “Remarks by Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense,” December 1994, pp. 198-9. 487 Chris Williams, “DOD’s Counter-proliferation Initiative: A Critical Assessment,” in Henry Sokolski (ed), Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties , The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, D. C., http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/index.html , 03/03/2007.
233 The incorporation of the CPI into a successful alliance strategy required the core NATO members, among which France, Britain and Germany, to agree on the different pillars of this strategy. Although some nations (e.g. Italy, Greece and Spain) were relatively hostile to the initiative while Turkey has disputes with several potential proliferant states in the Middle East, it was clear from the beginning that no NATO policy would work without the active participation, or at least endorsement of the four key alliance members -- the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and Germany. 488 The United Kingdom and France were quite supportive of
the approach of the United States. The British support was expected not only because the United
Kingdom has always been a close U.S. ally, but also because the Brits have supported a
comprehensive approach to WMD that combined political and military means, quite similar to
the U.S.-initiated CPI. The major source of threat was not perceived to be on the territory of the
United Kingdom, but rather the British forces, hoping thereby to respond to the regional causes
of such proliferation and provide the operational military means to deter and defend against these
threats. The view was that the threat was not to London, but rather to its deployed forces, mostly
overseas. 489
Unlike Britain, France had historically led the opposition to U.S. initiatives within NATO.
In this particular occasion, however, France was supportive to CPI, as indicated in a 1994 French
White Paper on defense, because WMD have been identified as one of the major challenges for
international security and for French defense. Paris was especially concerned about two issues:
(a) missile-delivered WMD from North Africa or the Mediterranean and; (b) the widespread
488 Jeffrey A. Larsen, “NATO Counterproliferation Policy: A Case Study In Alliance Politics,” Occasional Paper #17 , Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies, November 1997, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/ocp17.htm , 03/11/2007. 489 Jeffrey Larsen, (1997).
234 deployment of French troops overseas, which raised the stakes for the French forces in strategic areas outside Europe. 490
Germany, on the other hand, was much more skeptical about the proposed U.S. initiative than Britain and France. Domestically, Berlin was divided between the policy of non- intervention incorporated in its constitution ( Grundgesetz ) which stipulates that German military forces could not be deployed outside its borders on the one hand, and the demand that the country needs to assume greater responsibilities in line with its increasing influence in the international system, specifically more active involvement in the peacekeeping efforts, on the other. At the same time, the Federal Republic did not want to remain isolated from the non- proliferation efforts. The government made it clear in its White paper of 1994 that the country
“must assume new international responsibility,” and “the Federal Government is prepared to assume this responsibility,” calling nonproliferation a “priority task of security policy in the years ahead.” 491 There are several reasons why the German government took this position. First, the German public and political elite did not identify major proliferation threats. Therefore,
Germany saw the proliferation threat as a peripheral problem that had limited importance, particularly when compared to other major issues such as NATO expansion, for example. 492
Second, the Germans were particularly sensitive about the incorporation of the military dimension into traditional non-proliferation policy, claiming that counter-proliferation should not replace the traditional non-proliferation. An additional objection to the DCI originated from the fact that key non-proliferation agreements such as NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were “standing at crossroads.” 493
490 Ibid; see also Henning Riecke (2000), p. 37. 491 Ibid. 492 Ibid. 493 Henning Riecke (2000), p. 38.
235 The early post-Cold War years indicated that the division among the allies on the issue of non-proliferation was not along the traditional lines of the United States versus France. The counter-proliferation initiative came from the perspective of the United States as an emerging hegemonic power and incorporated political and military approach to deal with proliferation.
While France and Britain seemed to be supportive of this approach, other allies, primarily
Germany regarded the approach opposing the traditional nonproliferation tools of diplomacy and arms control. As a result, NATO was not able to embrace the original U.S. proposal based on the CPI initiative. Rather, an outcome within NATO was feasible only to the extent that it was limited to the defensive aspects of non-proliferation. The alliance tried to reorient itself toward new risk assessment and find a compromise at the subsequent NATO summit in Brussels in
January 1994. For this purpose, the participants agreed to create two groups that had to work out a compromise – a Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and a Senior Defense
Group on Proliferation (DGP). SGP examined measures to enforce the existent arms control and non-proliferation agreements. DGP, on the other hand, discussed the adaptation of the forces to the new conditions. They both convened in a joint committee that came up with a common document known as “Political Framework of the Alliance to the Problem of Proliferation of the
Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Framework was officially issued at the NATO meeting in
Istanbul in June 1994 and expressed strong support for the nuclear, biological and chemical non- proliferation and the unlimited extension on NPT based on the concern that “there are developments in the evolving security environment that give rise to the possibility of increased
WMD proliferation.” 494 Furthermore, it outlined a three-fold objective that rested on: (i) review of the alliance efforts on the prevention of WMD; (ii) finding ways to decrease the risks of
494 “Alliance Policy Framework in the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” NATO Handbook , http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940609a.htm , 03/11/2007.
236 proliferation and; (iii) maintaining of security in the face of ongoing WMD. The core of the document underlined that the alliance policy should be aimed at “supporting, reinforcing and complementing, not at duplicating or substituting” already existent agreements. 495
The process of initiating NATO’s new non-proliferation missions were tied to the overall distribution of power and the optimization of the decision making process within the various heterogeneous entities of the club. The original design of the U.S.-launched Counter-
Proliferation Initiative was not an acceptable equilibrium for all other allies and, therefore, was not incorporated in its original format into alliance politics. Ultimately, the agreed framework amended the CPI in three major directions: (a) it suggested a more comprehensive approach; (b) it rejected duplication and; (c) it promoted efficiency among the allies. Thus, the slow and cumbersome path of compromise among the allies actually stimulated a more optimal outcome than CPI originally proposed. However, if it were not the U.S.-initiated approach, the
Framework would not be negotiated.
The Istanbul Framework illustrated a successful outcome of a decision-making process at intergovernmental level that aimed at redefining an existent alliance mission. It reoriented
NATO’s approach from nonproliferation toward new risk assessment and identified the political and defense dimensions of the non-proliferation variable. The emphasis, however, was on the political, rather than the military aspects. As previously discussed, this was mostly due to the
German position expressed in the “Ten Point Initiative” of the German Bundestag on non- proliferation policy of December 1993. The incorporation of the German perspective, however, strengthened the legitimacy of NATO’s efforts in this direction. The outcome of the negotiated modalities of this new mission determined the path of advancing new allied capabilities
495 Henning Riecke (2000), p. 37.
237 incorporated in the 1995 “Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” the 1999
Strategic Concept of the Alliance and the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment.
NATO’S NON-PROLIFERATION CAPABILITIES Whereas the 1994 Istanbul framework laid the conceptual foundation NATO’s post-Cold
War mission of non-proliferation, in 1995 the Alliance released NATO’s Response to
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which focused on development of much needed alliance capabilities. The document illustrated how the non-proliferation mission fits a broader capabilities framework. After conducting a “comprehensive assessment of the risks to the
Alliance posed by proliferation,” the DGP identified a range of capabilities “needed to support
NATO's defense posture.” More specifically, The Response focuses on the following capabilities: (a) “robust military” (b) core, integrative capabilities that would make the most substantial contributions to the Alliance's objectives for dealing with proliferation; (c) a combination of various capabilities that “will provide a firm basis for deterring or protecting against the risks from proliferation.” 496
The various capabilities included in NATO’s Response reflect different aspects of the allied
complementarities model presented earlier. The document identifies three different tiers of
capabilities -- military, core and a combination of various “mix” of different capabilities.
Furthermore, the response strategy clearly states that “alliance military capabilities reinforce and
complement international efforts to prevent proliferation.” 497 The focus is on intelligence gathering that will enrich the knowledge about supplier-proliferant relations, various programs on weapons development and strategic intelligence capabilities, as well as “robust military
496 “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Press Release (95) 124, November 29, 1995, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-124.htm , 03/11/2007. 497 Ibid.
238 capabilities” that send deterrent signals to proliferants about the seriousness with which the
Alliance approaches these risks. 498
Furthermore, the response strategy stresses the significance of “core, integrative
capabilities that would make the most substantial contributions to the Alliance's objectives.” The
ultimate goal is to develop such capabilities that will have an impact on the overall effectiveness
of the NATO's defense. These focus on strategic and operational intelligence, automated and
deployable command, control, and communications (C 3), ground surveillance, NBC agent
detection, identification, and warning, and extended air defense and thus are directly linked to
interoperability, which will be discussed separately in this chapter.
NATO’s 1995 document on non-proliferation clearly indicates the efforts made by the club
to improve its defense efficiency. While the non-proliferation capabilities are linked to the other
three missions, the primary connection between them is interoperability, which means that
enhanced intelligence, C 3 and ground surveillance are directly liked to the advancement of allied capabilities. However, non-proliferation is also related to military resources, especially extended air defense, including Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense and Individual Protective Equipment for
Deployed Forces. The Response is also important in recognizing the multiple aspects of the alliance transformation. It stresses “the mix of capabilities” that “will provide a firm basis for deterring or protecting against the risks from proliferation, and will [ultimately] contribute significantly to the […] primary aim of preventing proliferation.” 499
Lastly, the document also stresses that “complementing nuclear forces with an appropriate mix of conventional response capabilities […] would reinforce the Alliance's overall deterrence posture against the threats posed by proliferation.” The interpretation of “complementing
498 Ibid. 499 Ibid.
239 nuclear forces,” is different from the conceptualization of complementarities presented in the earlier chapters of this dissertation. The model of complementarities focuses on two clearly identifiable sets of variables referred to as military resources and transformational allied capabilities. Alternatively, The Response deals primarily with the use of nuclear deterrence as complementary to conventional forces. The 1995 document elaborates on the various aspects of the needed alliance capabilities, but does not say much about the needed resources. Nonetheless,
The Response remains an important document not only in the sense that it identifies non- proliferation as a key variable, but also because it emphasizes the link between the redefined non-proliferation mission and the needed allied capabilities tied to it.
The next set of NATO meetings in the mid- and late 1990s confirmed the allied efforts to develop separate plans of action and improve the existent weapons system. The Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), for example, developed thirty-nine separate plans for action, including
R&D and financial requirements for the different projects. 500 The Berlin NATO Council in June
1996 indicated satisfaction in the progress with the SGP and endorsed recommendations for improvement. Also, the Council reaffirmed that non-proliferation is an integral part of NATO’s transformation and that the alliance is committed to develop further the “ability to carry out new roles and missions” relating to conflict prevention, crisis management and non-proliferation, while maintaining the capability for collective defense. 501
The next major event of NATO’s transformation was the Washington Summit in 1999. It was important not only in celebrating the 50 th anniversary of the Alliance but also in negotiating a new strategic concept, where non-proliferation was an important variable of the overall alliance
500 Henning Riecke (2000), p. 39. 501 Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, June 3, 1996, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm , 03/14/2007.
240 transformation. The new Strategic Concept formally incorporated the non-proliferation capabilities in the overall framework of alliance transformation:
As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable [...] The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons. 502
On the characteristics of nuclear forces , the 1999 Strategic Concept reiterated that “the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political” and “they will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression.” The Washington Summit preserved the approach of the 1991 Strategic Concept, which endorsed the irrationality of WMD aggression. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, “particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, remained the supreme guarantee of the security of the allies.” 503
The Prague Summit was the next major event that impacted the advancement of
transformational capabilities for non-proliferation. The Summit was important in several
instances. First, it launched a new initiative – the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as a
part of the “continuing effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern
warfare in a high threat environment.” The individual allies made a political commitment to
improve their capabilities in various spheres, including in the areas of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear defense. 504 Second, the Prague Summit was the first forum when an
502 “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., April 23 and 24, 1999, Para 56, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm , 03/15/2007. 503 Ibid, Para 62. 504 “Prague Summit Declaration,” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, November 21, 2002, Para 4c, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm , 03/05/2006.
241 expanded NATO of nineteen members had to make decisions, therefore the first opportunity of the three new Central and East European states to participate in the decision making process and influence the outcome in defining allied missions and strengthening allied capabilities. The result was that the alliance endorsed for the first time in its history five defense initiatives that enhanced NATO’s capabilities in dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The underlying logic was to enhance “capabilities against weapons of mass destruction” by establishing prototype deployable “NBC Analytical Laboratory; NBC Event Response Team; a virtual Center of Excellence for NBC Weapons Defense; a NATO Biological and Chemical
Defense Stockpile; and a Disease Surveillance system.” 505
The PCC rationale was to place greater emphasis on multinational commitments that
manage military resources in a way that enables the smaller countries to combine resources in
order to purchase hardware that otherwise would be unaffordable for each ally individually. 506
The niche capabilities or role specialization were introduced and, based on this logic, several different teams were formed. The Czech Republic, for example, as a leader on countering the effects of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons teamed up with
Slovakia to concentrate efforts in CBRN weapons. There were two key reasons for pooling up resources among two or more smaller countries. First, PCC recognized the value of role specialization in order to advance niche non-proliferation capabilities. In the case of the Czech
Republic, the country has traditions linked to its history and territory in developing such capabilities. During the Cold War period, it specialized among the Warsaw Pact allies in the protection against chemical and biological weapons. Whereas other East European countries gave up their focus on CBRN capabilities after the end of the Cold War, the Czech Republic
505 Ibid, Para 4e. 506 Carl Ek, “NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment,” CRC Report for Congress , Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Order Code RS21659, Updated January 24, 2007.
242 continued to specialize in this niche. A Czech unit participated in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and its skills were fully acknowledged by its allies, including the United States. Furthermore, in
2000 the Czech Republic again responded to the crisis in the Middle East by dispatching a
CBRN protection unit of 251 soldiers to Kuwait and the unit remained in the Gulf during the military campaign of 2003 ready to protect Kuwait against expected retaliation by Saddam
Hussein’s regime with missiles carrying CBRN agents. 507
Second, the formation of such multinational entities is based on the rationale that they bring
economies of scale that ultimately reduce costs and maximize the efficient use of the military
resources in order to develop much needed non-proliferation allied capabilities. In order to
achieve economies of scale and maximize the efficiency of its CBRN capabilities, the Czech
Republic offers its training facilities, new know-how, and other non-proliferation detection
instruments to other club members. For example, in the context of preparing the 2004 Summer
Olympic Games in Athens, Greek experts used the Czech experience for training and transfer of
expertise, which was a more cost-efficient option for Greece or any other ally than trying to
acquire these capabilities alone. 508
Third, the experience of the Czech and Slovak CBRN niche specialization under PCC indicates that the optimization of these teams is based on several core criteria: (a) relative homogeneity of the participating countries; (b) optimization of size and scope of the team and;
(c) expectation for a long-term cooperation. In order to function efficiently, such a team of nations needs to operationalize its military resources and size. Therefore, it needs to consist of
507 Borek Lizec, Transatlantic Team versus Transatlantic Partnership: European and Transatlantic Institutional Architectures Through the Lenses of Two Alternative Visions, Doctoral Dissertation, Department of European Studies, University of Economics, Prague, the Czech Republic (2005), pp. 86-7. 508 Ibid, p. 83.
243 larger military units such as battalions. 509 Also, the formation of Czech and Slovak non- proliferation niche specialization is based on similarities of common statehood, including similar military technology, linguistic and cultural compatibility, and common experience and performance in this area. 510 Lastly, the success of these arrangements depends on the
expectation for a long-term cooperation. This is due to the need for a successful professional
training and preparedness. As a result, it is advisable to have fewer long-term cooperation
initiatives than multiple, overlapping short-term ones. 511
The case of the Czech and Slovak non-proliferation specialization clearly indicates a trend
for utilization of the allied military resources based on homogeneity of the sub-club members
within a larger heterogeneous club. Whereas there were such attempts prior to 2002, the
admission of the new members in 1999 and 2002 strengthened this tendency within NATO. As a
result, the Prague Summit marked a pattern of clustering the club members into homogeneous
groups or sub-clubs based on the resources that they have in order to contribute to the
enhancement of allied non-proliferation capabilities. The mini-clubs essentially serve as a tool to
diversify capabilities and manage military resources efficiently within the heterogeneous club,
which is why they are also endorsed by the hegemon. That is why NATO expressed support on
an institutional level for this approach at the Istanbul Summit (2004) and indicated that the
Alliance needs to continue efforts “on a […] multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear defense battalion in order to achieve full operational capability […] together with the
509 Author’s personal interview with Mr. Jan Michal, Head of the Czech Delegation to NATO, January 24, 2006, Brussels, Belgium. 510 Author’s personal interview with Mr. Juraj Podhorsky, Deputy Head of the Slovak Delegation to NATO, January 16, 2006, Brussels, Belgium. 511 Personal interview with Mr. Jan Michal, January 24, 2006.
244 development of the NATO Response Force.” The full operational capacity of the CBRN battalion was achieved in July 2004. 512
To sum up, this section confirmed the first hypothesis studied in the dissertation, namely that the horizontal advancement of non-proliferation capabilities is tied to the demand for advanced missions that can respond adequately to these new sources of threats in the post-
September 11 th security environment. The processes of decision-making and implementation in
the advancement of new allied capabilities are congruent with the intergovernmental bargaining
theory. The negotiations over the U.S.-initiated DCI and the agreed upon Istanbul Framework indicated that the new initiatives “take place within a non-coercive system of unanimous voting in which governments can and will reject agreements that would leave them worse off than unilateral policies.” 513 Also, the distribution of benefits reflects the bargaining power of the
participants, where the hegemon has unique role in setting up the transformational agenda,
managing the bargaining process and pushing forward various implementation mechanisms.
Lastly, the intergovernmental theory makes that case that the outcome of the bargaining process
will reduce the transaction costs and increase the benefits of interstate cooperation. This is also
confirmed by the logic of complementarities applied in process of developing CJTF and NRF
capabilities, as well as CBRN teams that pool together resources, provide economies of scale and
increase the benefits from the membership of the new allies. The case study also confirmed that
the advancement of niche capabilities corresponds closely to the logic of club goods, where the
emphasis is on specialization among the allies that leads to economies of scale and equitable
contribution of the smaller nations. Club goods dynamics is also consistent with
intergovernmental bargaining theory and shows that NATO provides a venue for specialization
512 “Istanbul Summit Communiqué,” issued by the North Atlantic Council, June 28, 2006, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-148e.htm , 03/03/2007. 513 Andrew Moravcsik (1998), p. 60-1.
245 within the various sub-clubs of smaller allies. Therefore, the chapter also presents evidence in support of the second hypothesis explored throughout the dissertation, namely that alliances make a difference in the mobilization of nations’ resources for advancement of new capabilities.
Interoperability and Allied Capabilities
INTEROPERABILITY AS A CONCEPT Interoperability is a variable which has multiple, complex dimensions that include but are not limited to various political, economic, strategic, and operational, tactical and technological implications. 514 In the model presented earlier in the dissertation, interoperability does not fall in the category of alliance missions or capabilities, but has influence on the efficient use of resources, the advancement of allied capabilities and the overall success of NATO’s missions.
What is interoperability? The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Related
Terms defines interoperability as “the ability of systems, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.” 515 In other words, the narrow definition of
interoperability determines its scope as a “degree to which various organizations or individuals
are able to operate together to achieve a common goal.” 516 However, this general conceptualization implies that interoperability is situation-dependent and varies in forms, degrees and levels.
There are at least two different implications from the definition. First, interoperability
touches upon the issues of costs and limits. The costs may vary in their nature (i.e. military,
514 Myron Hura et al, Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, Rand Project Air Force, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, p. xv. 515 See Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Related Terms , Joint Staff Publication, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 1999. 516 Hura et al (2000), p. 7.
246 political and economic) and they determine the price at which certain nations are able to operate with other allies or coalition members toward achieving a common goal. 517 Furthermore, interoperability also imposes certain limits “on the extent to which any nation is willing to trust another.” For example, “common or interoperable information systems or databases are vulnerable to disruption, corruption and theft of data by an expanded number of insiders.” 518 As a result, the cost and limits of interoperability affect the effectiveness of the coalition or alliance and its overall capability to achieve a certain common goal. Again, the definition of interoperability illustrates the relevance of the club goods framework. Interoperability costs are a part of the overall membership costs that each ally should contribute in order for the club to be able to function. Alternatively, the various limits of cooperation under allied structures are an example of negative externalities that the necessity to work together and share various types of information imposes to the allies or coalition members. Both, the costs and limits associated with interoperability impact the effectiveness of this collective effort. Therefore, the level of interoperability may result in various optimal or sub-optimal equilibria. The decreasing costs and the capacity to deal successfully with the limit of interoperability stimulate efficiency and lead toward enhanced optimality. Alternatively, the growing costs and insurmountable constraints by the individual states tend to lead toward sub-optimality and inefficiency.
Second, interoperability operates at three different levels – operational, tactical and technological. The major benefits at operational and tactical levels “derive from the fungibility or interchangeability of force elements and units.”519 As a result, the coalition or alliance may have either integrated operations that require a high level of interoperability or at a much lower level it may result in coordinated partitioning of the mission into separate country-specific
517 Ibid. 518 Ibid, p. 11. 519 Ibid, p. 12.
247 chunks. 520 Also, at operational and tactical levels, integration may be achieved through common
or interoperable command centers that include various networks, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems. For example, the RAND report on interoperability from 2000 lists
various decision-making procedures within the alliance or a coalition as a part of strategic or
political interoperability. The technological perspective of interoperability, on the other hand,
focuses on “the technical capabilities and interfaces between organizations and systems,”
including but not limited to communications, software and hardware technical capabilities of the
systems that result in various levels of mission compatibility. 521
What is the link between interoperability and the transformational allied capabilities? First, on the level alliance functioning, interoperability affects all three sets of observed variables – the military resources, the missions and the allied capabilities. As previously discussed, it has operational, tactical and technological implications. Thus, the enhancement of interoperability contributed toward a more efficient use of the available military resources and the advancement of allied capabilities as expected in the first hypothesis of the dissertation. Second, allied interoperability is an integral part of the transformational allied capabilities; it is embedded in the transformational dimension of NATO that was discussed in detail in Chapter Three. Albeit directly linked to the alliance missions of peacekeeping, crisis management and non- proliferation, interoperability does not have the same level of interaction with the other three mission variables. Third, interoperability also serves as a connection that explains the link between the various resources as independent variables and the allied capabilities as a dependent variable. As noted above, interoperability is associated with certain costs and provides tremendous benefits to the allies. Thus, the successful advancement of interoperability among
520 Ibid. 521 Ibid, p. 13.
248 the allies would confirm the hypothesized relationship that NATO membership makes a difference in the advancement of allied capabilities, in comparison to the other nations that are not a part of the Alliance and, therefore, cannot achieve the same level of interoperability.
Applied to the dynamics of NATO’s post-Cold War transformation, the problems associated with interoperability came into being right after the Gulf War of 1991, but became much more salient during the operations in former Yugoslavia in the mid- and late 1990s.
NATO’S PROBLEMS WITH INTEROPERABILITY One of NATO’s major operations was the campaign in Kosovo. The evidence of human rights violations by the Serbian authorities in this province of former Yugoslavia against the local ethnic Albanians demanded action on the part of NATO allies. As a result, NATO became involved in a 78-day bombing campaign from March 23 to June 9, 1999, where NATO’s Article
IV deployments tested the sufficiency of common values for binding the Alliance in the absence of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact threat. In part, the problems with interoperability were associated with the difficulties that the North Atlantic Council faced in generating consensus to implement the bombing and in utilizing the integrated military command during the campaign. 522 The campaign ended with Serbia ceding its sovereignty rights over the province to UN-led peacekeeping administration KFOR.
Certainly the disproportionate capabilities between the allies and the Serb forces determined the outcome of the campaign, but the war for Kosovo indicated major problems of allied interoperability of NATO air forces. These problems were among the major reasons about the discrepancy between the European and American contributions to the campaign. Of all the
European allies, France’s contribution to the campaign in terms of aircraft and total sorties was
522 Jeffrey Simon, “Can We Mediate the Transatlantic Relationship or Are We Headed for Divorce?,” The Transatlantic Relationship: Problems and Prospects , Washington DC, 2003, p. 68.
249 the highest (more than 100 aircraft and 2,414 sorties). The United Kingdom was second and
Italy was the third contributor overall. The advantage of the Italian and the German aircraft was their equipment with anti-radiation missiles and combat reconnaissance aircraft. Alternatively, the Dutch aircraft was equipped with forward-looking infrared and was, therefore, able to conduct operations at night. Compared to the American efforts, the Europeans contributed marginally – about 36 percent of the total aircraft deployed and less than half of the sorties. 523
Therefore, the case of Kosovo intervention clearly indicated that the military operations
conducted by an alliance demanded substantial efforts to enhance coordination among the
different allies. A NATO military operation led by the United States and the major European
states in Kosovo had a very different sense of legitimacy than that of a fragile international
coalition or a single country operation. Such a format, nonetheless, indicated that NATO’s
Article IV deployments would severely test the sufficiency of common values for binding the
Alliance. This was evident in the North Atlantic Council’s difficulty in generating consensus
required for decision making within NATO to implement the bombing and in utilizing the
integrated military command during the 78-day campaign. The difficulty in making decisions to
act was followed by the insufficient levels of interoperability, which resulted in multiple allied
reports that focused on the interoperability gap. The British, for example, acknowledged
European reliance on the United States and noted several core areas of deficiency – precision all
weather strike, strategic lift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, air defense and air-to-air refueling. The British report was more concerned about the European dependency on the U.S. capabilities and favored an approach where European views will carry more weight. The French
523 Carl Hodge, Atlanticism for a New Century: The Rise, Triumph and Decline of NATO , Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2005, p. 74.
250 report, on the other hand, paid more attention on the political dimension and the need for greater
European autonomy. 524
Another set of problems was related to rapid and secure communications because most of
the European equipment lacked frequency hopping UHF and radios for encrypted
communications. Therefore, classified information had to be passed “in the clear” or by hard
copy. Furthermore, the allies lacked a common identification friend or foe system. 525 The reliance on the U.S. military power and the capabilities gap between the hegemon and the rest of the allies was illustrated with the fact that 70% of the deployed European allied forces performed a supportive role, such as aerial refueling, tactical jamming for SEAD missions and airlift operations. This led General Claus Naumann, the Chairman of the North Atlantic Military
Committee to confess in a statement before the Senate Armed Service Committee of the U.S.
Congress that “as a European I am ashamed that we have to ask for American help to deal with something as small as Kosovo.” 526 The interoperability gap became particularly obvious in the
case of France, which has not been a part of NATO’s military structures for decades and much
less obvious in the case of Great Britain. Therefore, NATO embarked on a process of improving
its overall interoperability not only among the allies but also among its partners and potential
entrants. The Southeast European Multinational Brigade (SEE BRIG) and the Baltic Battalion
(BALTBAT) are two such forums of intergovernmental bargaining that illustrate the efforts to
stimulate multilateral military cooperation and prepare the applicants to work together in joint
missions and improve interoperability.
524 Ibid, p. 95. 525 Ibid, p. 74. 526 See Air Force Times 60, (No 15), November 1999; also Carl Hodge (2005), p. 95.
251 ENHANCEMENT OF ALLIED INTEROPERABILITY: SEE BRIG AND BALTBAT The idea behind establishing the Southeast European Multinational Brigade (SEE BRIG)
originated in mid-1990s and was a part of a strategy to foster regional security and stability
within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Southeastern Europe Defense
Ministerial (SEDM), and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The establishment of
such a multilateral body was prompted by developments in the region over the past decade,
especially by concerns over fighting in the Serbian province of Kosovo. This brigade of about
5,000 troops comprises seven nations – Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania
and Turkey, while the United States, Slovenia and Croatia have observer status. Formally, the
agreement was signed in Skopje, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on September 26,
1997 by the defense ministers of the member states and the rotation of the headquarters has been
agreed among the participating nations. Currently, the brigade is hosted in Constantza, Romania.
The proposed format allowed the development of interoperability at various levels: strategic,
political, operational and tactical.
The old NATO allies from the region had major impact on the successful launch of the brigade: Turkey was instrumental in the implementation of the SEEBRIG project and Greece's strong support for the brigade helped overcome most of the organizational problems concerning its initial establishment. Italy, Hungary, and Slovenia combined their resources to form a unit with similar capabilities and missions. Similar to NATO’s CJTFs and NRF, the brigade was designed as an “on-call” land force of battalion-size units, with combined training in reconnaissance, command post exercises, field maneuvers, and crisis management. 527
527 Vince Crawley, “Southeast Europe Ministers Approve Troop Brigade for Afghanistan: Rumsfeld welcomes Romania basing deal; talks under way with Bulgaria,” International Information Agency , USINFO Current Issues, December 07, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/ ,03/19/2007.
252 The command of the brigade is based on a two-year rotational basis, with commanders coming respectively from Turkey, Greece, Italy and Bulgaria. The commander assumes authority over subordinate units upon approval of the member-states while an executive body called Steering Committee supervises, coordinates and directs the brigade’s activities. The brigade itself has several goals: contribute to confidence building among the nations in the region and improve operational, tactical and technological interoperability. 528 Furthermore, after the
admission of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO, the brigade has been used as a model to build on
future cooperation in the Black Sea region and as a hub for current MAP members and potential
NATO allies, such as Ukraine that expressed desire to become a part of the brigade. 529
During the first four years after its establishment, the SEE BRIG remained inactive due to
lack of organizational autonomy and institutional capacity, as well as insufficient commitment
from the members and inability in coordinate their interests with regard to the specific
missions. 530 In the last several years following the last wave of NATO expansion, the brigade was certified by the Alliance and is fully operational for various peacekeeping and crisis management missions. The South East European Defense ministerial meeting in December 2005 in Washington came up with the decision to incorporate the brigade into the ISAF mission in
Afghanistan. The brigade took over its first overseas mission under "Kabul Multinational
Brigade IX” in February 2006. Currently, the brigade is a fully interoperable tactical unit of
ISAF with three combat groups that conduct joint training and operations with the Afghan national police and army.
528 Author’s personal interview with Dr. Todor Tagarev, “G.S. Rakovski” Defense and Staff College, February 6, 2006, Sofia, Bulgaria. 529 Author’s personal interview with Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, former Deputy Minister of Defense, February 3, 2006, Sofia, Bulgaria. 530 Dimitris Bourantonis and Panayotis Tsakonas, “The Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force: Problems of and Prospects for a Regional Security Agency,” Politics: 2003 , Vol. 23(2), pp. 75–81.
253 This example of multilateral military cooperation among some of NATO’s entrants was
possible thanks to the involvement of the United States. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, SEE
BRIG became a dormant structure of international cooperation. It was reinvigorated at the
SEDM ministerial meeting in Washington, DC in December 2005 hosted by Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld. The ministers approved and signed a document entitled “Implementation
Decision on the Deployment, Employment and Redeployment of SEEBRIG in the ISAF
Mission,” in which under the U.S. guidance and supervision the SEDM initiative undertook the
commitment that SEE BRIG will assume the command for ISAF’s Kabul Multinational Brigade
for six months. The Defense Ministers “expressed their appreciation” to the Commander of the
Brigade and his Staff.” 531 They also approved timeline for the Deployment of SEE BRIG in
ISAF, as well as Annual Exercise, Training and Travel Plans. The ministers thanked the Joint
Forces Command Brunssum, Joint Forces Command Naples, Joint Forces Training Center
Poland, and NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Turkey for “their training and pre-deployment support provided to SEE BRIG Headquarters” and emphasized their continuous support for ongoing NATO-led operations in the region and beyond. 532 Again, the success of the declaration
was in part thanks to the involvement of the United States, which assisted in overcoming the
differences among the participants and in improving coordination and interoperability among the
partners of this multinational defense structure.
The Baltic peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT) is another example of regional cooperation
aimed at enhancing interoperability among the new NATO allies. In June 1992, the three Baltic
nations -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- signed a protocol which established the foundation of
the Baltic defense cooperation. Initially this cooperation was stimulated by the insecurity from
531 Joint Statement at the SEDM Ministers of Defense Meeting, December 6, 2005, Washington D.C. 532 Ibid.
254 the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Because their military and financial resources were limited, the Baltic nations approached the neighboring Nordic states and requested their assistance with the establishment of a regional peacekeeping battalion. The agreement was signed in 1994 and BALTBAT became the first trilateral regional military project between
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that was established to contribute the development of national defense forces and make them tactically, strategically and technologically interoperable. The crucial support in terms of funding and training came from Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The
United Kingdom was also among the ardent proponents of the project and provided English language training. The Netherlands, France, the United States and Germany endorsed the initiative in 1996.
Currently, BALTBAT is composed of a combined tri-national headquarters that includes a
representative from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, logistics and national infantry companies.
Each of the three Baltic States provides one-third of the total staff that mounts to approximately
720 people. For example, Estonia’s presence in Kosovo under BALTBAT is on a rotational
basis, where each country sends one company for six months, followed by another Baltic
country. 533 While originally the idea behind BALTBAT was to strengthen the Baltic national
defense capabilities, by the mid-1990s it became clear that this multilateral structure could be a
very useful basis for the participation of these countries in the international peacekeeping efforts
in the Balkans. As a result, the battalion gradually became a tool for enhancing interoperability
of the national units of these countries under PfP and MAP and later as a part of their
membership.
533 Annikab Bergman, BALTBAT: The Emergence of a Common Defense Dimension to Nordic Co-operation, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, August 2000.
255 In addition, the Baltic nations decided that while it was a good basis for regional cooperation, the Baltic cooperation touched various aspects of interoperability and, based on the current achievements; it could be expanded into the field of naval, surveillance, and defense education cooperation. For this purpose, in 1998 they established the BALTRON squadron, which was a beneficial and cost-effective project to enhance the naval capabilities of the three nations. BALTRON is incorporated in the training structure of the NATO’s Mine
Countermeasure unit (MCM). By the same token, BALTNET was established in 1998 as a system for acquisition, coordination, distribution and display of air surveillance data within the three Baltic countries. The regional Airspace Surveillance and Coordination Center was based in
Lithuania. In order to further facilitate interoperability and coordination, the three countries also agreed to establish Baltic Defense College for mid-career officers hosting students from twenty- three nations. 534
BALTBAT differs in its origins and evolution from the SEEBRIG, but it is based on the same foundation of enhanced interoperability among current and potential NATO members from the region and efficient use of the scarce military resources. The underlying logic was to have these three small countries work together based on their similar geographic and cultural background. Also, BALTBAT or any other regional form of cooperation is used as a tool to test whether the countries are able to work together and meet the required standards for the various allied capabilities in order to become NATO members. Since these countries are neighbors, it is natural to expect that they will continue to work together within NATO in fields where they can complement each other. Lastly, the Baltic military cooperation serves as a pattern that can be used for other MAP countries, such as the Adriatic group or prospective NATO members, for
534 “Estonia Today: Support for NATO Membership,” Press and Information Department , Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Factsheet, Tallinn, Estonia, December 2005.
256 example Ukraine and Georgia. 535 The major difference from SEE BRIG is that the major driving
forces came from the neighboring Nordic countries like Denmark, Finland and Sweden, not so
much from the United States. This pattern indicates that whenever other nations are able and
willing to contribute to the enhancement of interoperability and optimization of the resources,
then the role of the hegemon becomes more tangential.
This section indicated that the improvement of NATO’s interoperability is a very important
component in putting the resources of the individual states together in order to advance their
capabilities as expected in the first hypothesis of the dissertation. NATO’s experience with the
Operation Allied Force in the former Yugoslavia confirmed this observation. Furthermore,
NATO’s efforts to enhance the capacity of the prospective NATO members to work together
presented also evidence in support of the third hypothesis, namely that the prospect for NATO
membership contributes for the advancement of the capabilities of the new allies. Lastly, in
some of the cases such as SEE BRIG, the involvement of the United States was instrumental,
which also supported the hypothesized observation that in certain cases the distribution of power
makes a difference in the advancement of the relationship between resources and capabilities of
the potential NATO allies.
The Distribution of Power and the Enhancement of Capabilities
The survey of the evolution of NATO’s missions and interoperability in relation to its
capabilities implicitly indicated that the success for the enhancement of NATO’s capabilities
depends on the distribution of power. This section will briefly discuss how the foreign policy
behavior of the hegemon affects successfully the enhancement of allied capabilities. The
535 Author’s personal interview with Mr. Toomas Kukk, Deputy Head of Mission, Estonian Delegation to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, January 12, 2006.
257 findings in the section are relevant in the context of the fourth hypothesis of the study, i.e. whether and to what extent the distribution of power, specifically the foreign policy behavior of the hegemon, affects the advancement of allied capabilities.
The hegemon has without any doubt vast resources and outweighs in its capabilities any other ally, while at the same time it is not in its interest to use these resources inefficiently. That is why the hegemon endorses the optimization of resources and the specialization of capabilities.
In the same token, it is in the hegemon’s interest that the smaller allies become more active for the reasons of cost-efficiency. This reverses the disproportional distribution of allied burden between the small and the big allies as discussed by Olson and Zeckhauser. Last but not least, such a proportional distribution of the allied burden sharing will enhance the legitimacy of the peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation missions through their internationalization.
An example that illustrates how the hegemon stimulates the smaller allies to become more active for the reasons of cost-efficiency and legitimacy of the alliance missions is the PCC and the niche approach of building various teams, which was endorsed by the United States. In this context, Washington has been willing to embrace any major initiative whether at the EU or
NATO level that will ensure larger allied contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan and help with
Iran from Europe. 536
At the same time, the hegemon has the unique clout in the alliance to tilt the balance and manage inter-allied relations; it is the only one that has unique capability to intervene in situations when the allies do not have either capabilities or political will to reach a compromise.
A good example in this respect is the incorporation of nuclear weapons in a more comprehensive
536 Author’s Personal Interview with Dr. Jeremy Shapiro, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, September 29, 2006.
258 non-proliferation strategy, which also illustrates how the distribution of power within the heterogeneous clubs affects the management of the relationship between the hegemon and the smaller allies. NATO’s nuclear weapons have always played a vaguely defined but relevant role in deterring the advancement of WMD programs of hostile non-NATO nations. The alliance’s promise to retaliate against WMD is designed to make troops less vulnerable and to reverse the cost-benefit ratio of WMD programs, making them extremely costly for those that aspire to develop them. This compromise had been agreed upon during the Cold War and consistently applied in the post-Cold War environment and all core documents prior to 1999 have already reaffirmed it. Prior to the Washington Summit in 1999 the then German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fisher tried to put that issue on the table for re-negotiation with the argument that the
German coalition government had committed to renegotiating this Cold War element of NATO’s strategy. 537 This German initiative, however, faced serous opposition in Washington, where the
DOD leadership indicated clearly that the ambiguity in the definition of the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore the possibility to use them contributes to the U.S. security by “keeping any potential adversary who might either use chemical or biological weapons unsure” of what the U.S. response would be. 538 This example illustrates two major points. First, it is much harder to reverse the already agreed upon framework even though the strategic environment might have changed. The success of preserving the ambiguity in the use of nuclear weapons is due to the fact the use of threat to nuclear weapons was successfully incorporated in the new post-Cold War non-proliferation concept and is tied to the overall alliance capabilities needed for the furtherance of the non-proliferation mission. Second, it also indicates that a single member, even though an influential ally such as Germany, is not able alone to reverse the agreed upon
537 Henning Riecke (2000), p. 41. 538 See: “U.S. Rejects Any NATO Shift,” International Herald Tribune , November 28-29, 1998, also quoted by Henning Riecke (2000), p. 41.
259 framework without the support of the hegemon, i.e. the United States. The German attempt to renegotiate the use of nuclear weapons framework shows the resiliency on the part of the alliance to modify already agreed upon frameworks. In the same way, the US-initiated CPI was originally unacceptable for all the allies and had to be carefully renegotiated and agreed upon in order to be incorporated in the 1994 Framework .
Another example, which illustrates how the hegemon can use its clout to stimulate optimal outcomes, is the troop surge in Afghanistan. Prior to the Riga summit, NATO circulated to all allies a request to restate their national restrictions and send additional troops in Afghanistan.
Although many of the allies removed a large part of the operationally restrictive caveats and agreed to send an additional 1,500 to 2,000 troops, the alliance was still short of about ten percent of the needed intelligence capabilities communications assets, and the like. When the contribution of the United States surged with another 1,500 to 2,000 troops and reached about
12,000 troops at the end of 2006, this “made a huge difference.” After receiving the much- needed capabilities support, the commander of ISAF “has a lot more ability to execute his mission than he did six months ago.” 539
Finally, the section indicates several important conclusions. First, cases like the German attempts to renegotiate NATO’s Flexible Response Doctrine present evidence that the hegemon plays an instrumental role in managing the advancement of capabilities within heterogeneous clubs such as NATO. The role of the United States was particularly important in preparing the transformational agenda of the alliances and in pushing for strategic solutions. At the same time, the hegemon cannot act alone because it is constrained by the alliance framework, which serves as a sort of optimizer that helps to find and negotiate equilibria. Nonetheless, the negotiated
539 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), December 21, 2006, pp. 10-11.
260 outcomes are not always optimal and the final outcome depends to a considerable degree on the negotiation skills of all parties that participate in the club. Second, the cases of the SEE BRIG indicated that in some occasions, the U.S. involvement was instrumental in revitalizing and improving various forms of military cooperation among the new and potential NATO members.
At the same time, other cases such as BALTBAT showed that when other partners are involved in the process of mentoring the potential NATO entrants (e.g. the Nordic nations), the hegemon willing to cede these responsibilities to other partners. Therefore, these partners can also play the role of substitutes or near- substitutes of the hegemon.
The Processes of Transformation and Expansion
The survey on the evolution of peacekeeping, crisis-management and non-proliferation capabilities and the advancement of interoperability indicated a direct link between the processes of transformation and expansion. The study did not find any evidence that the admission of a total number of ten new allies in 1999 and 2004 eroded the process of developing new capabilities. As a matter of fact, the study indicates that the admission of new allies is an integral
part of the overall advancement of capabilities. There are several factors explaining this trend.
First, not surprisingly, the new allies had to undergo serious and lengthy restructuring of their
economies, which is why they have limited military resources. Despite the two percent GDP
spending on defense target, the actual amounts per capita in currency values (dollars or Euro)
spent for defense are insufficient compared to the old NATO allies or the United States. Second,
due to various domestic and international factors, the political elites of the new allies find it
difficult to persuade their citizens that their countries should contribute more resources to various
261 out-of-the-area missions undertaken by the alliance. 540 These domestic constraints force the elites to conduct reforms only under pressure from external institutions, such as NATO and explain that the needed reforms are pursued in the context of meeting the membership requirements. 541 On the other hand, the same resource constraints force the new allies to be
much more supportive of the optimization and specialization approach in developing new
capabilities among the various NATO members. The survey of the development of the task
force capabilities clearly indicated that the evolution in the advancement of multilateral forces is
a long and cumbersome process and that multinational efforts are much harder to coordinate,
which is why the allies faced major hurdles related to interoperability. It is certainly more
difficult to agree on anything within an alliance of twenty-six members due to the various
domestic and foreign policy constraints that each of these nations faces. As a result, the capacity
of the alliance to deliver quick and effective reaction to major international crises remains
limited. However, this feature of post-Cold War NATO should not always be seen as a
weakness. In fact, the slow process of negotiations and the vague wording of the final
declarations and communiqués of the NATO summits actually define the range of possible
equilibria that delineate the space of the possible outcomes for the different mutually agreed
workable decisions and targets. Furthermore, as the evidence of the CJTF and DCI evolution
indicated that these multilateral compromises within NATO usually reflect optimal rather than
suboptimal outcomes. Although the different implications of the complementarities on the
organizational dynamic will be discussed separately, at this point it is worth noting that the
540 During my interviews with political elite in Sofia, Bulgaria, the interviewees identified various reasons for reluctance to advance with the military transformation – lack of leadership and argumentation of the need for reforms, social and organizational resiliency and clash of different lobbyist interests. For further reference see author’s interviews with Dr. Todor Tagarev, Nikolai Slatinski and Dr. Velizar Shalamanov. Although the observations are valid for Bulgaria, to various degrees, they are true for the other new members, too. 541 Author’s personal interview with Professor Todor Tagarev, February 6, 2006.
262 complicated and slow decision-making structure is a characteristic of NATO is “an alliance of sovereign democratic nations [that] works as such.”542
Last but not least, the insufficient military resources actually stimulate efficiency and advancement across the capabilities needed for the advancement of the alliance missions of peacekeeping and crisis management and non-proliferation. Surprisingly, the presence of smaller and poorer nations in the alliance intensifies this process because they cannot afford to be inefficient; otherwise they have to pay a very high domestic and international price. The domestic price is usually related to the nature of military transformation and the pressure that they face to cut down military jobs, while the international pressure is associated with efforts to avoid the image of being a group of free riders within the club. 543 Ultimately, the small powers modify the decision-making balance within NATO and produce a new outcome in which they actually strengthen and streamline the alliance by searching their niches and developing respective allied capabilities.
In conclusion, this chapter surveyed the path of NATO’s transformation from the Rome
Summit (1991) to the Riga Summit (2006) and, by looking at the advancement of capabilities
needed for the new out-of-the-area missions, it addressed the core question of the dissertation,
namely why NATO embarked on a path of transformation after 1990. Furthermore, the chapter
surveyed the power transformation of the individual NATO member-states by exploring the link
between missions, resources and capabilities. I argue that the old and new NATO allies embark
on careful negotiations within the club, which leads to an increasing effectiveness in the
allocation of resources needed for NATO’s out-of-the-area missions of peacekeeping, crisis
542 Author’s interview with the French Deputy Head of Mission at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, January 19, 2006. 543 Although the majority of the interviewees implicitly admitted about the concerns among the political elites in Eastern Europe that their countries may be viewed as free riders, the Slovak representative explicitly emphasized his country’s concerns about the prospects of being perceived as such.
263 management and non-proliferation. Specifically, the study indicated three major conclusions.
First, the process-tracing of NATO’s new capabilities shows that the demand for various alliance missions, such as peacekeeping, crisis management, non-proliferation, as well as the need for enhanced interoperability determines the advancement of the new capabilities and is the major driving force for alliance transformation. NATO’s involvement in the Balkans in the 1990s and the Middle East after 9/11 is driven by the demand from the allies to be able to send faster larger number of troops and accomplish very specific missions. Second, the peacekeeping and crisis management missions illustrated trends for horizontal and vertical evolution, whereby the demand for new missions determined the enhancement of allied capabilities, such as CJTFs and
NRF and CBRN teams. Although the advancement of new allied capabilities follows an evolutionary pattern, it is not a self-propelling process but requires continuous and careful bargaining among the various groups (or sub-clubs) within NATO. Third, NATO’s conceptual evolution from Brussels (1994) to Prague (2002) is essentially a process of trial and error in which we can distinguish several different stages: (a) in the early 1990s the alliance was seeking to re-define its post-Cold War mission and function; (b) in the mid and late 1990s where NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative and set itself overly ambitious goals but had limited achievements; (c) the interim stage between the Washington Summit (1999) and the Prague
Summit (2002) and; (d) the post-Prague NATO, where the alliance set itself clear transformational goals and a strategy for monitoring and implementing its transformational progress. The chapter also discussed the causal link between unipolar distribution of power and the advancement of NATO’s transformation and expansion. The purpose was to expand the analysis based on the model of complementarities presented in chapter three by discussing how the alliance missions of peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation influence the
264 development of the transformation of allied capabilities such as CJTFs, NRF and different niche capabilities.
While this chapter addressed the development of new capabilities needed for the new alliance missions, the next chapter will discuss how the incorporation of new allies fits NATO’s broader transformational framework. More specifically, I will discuss how the processes of transformation and expansion that involve intergovernmental bargaining can be explained from the perspective complementarities within the broader club goods framework. Lastly, special attention will be paid in chapter six to the management of transatlantic relations in terms of sharing military resources and allied capabilities between NATO and the EU as clubs of international security.
265 Chapter 5. Case Study on the Evolution of NATO Expansion
The previous chapters of this study dealt with alliance transformation from the perspective of club goods theory and the concept of complementarities. Based on the club goods theory, I conceptualized complementarities as a relationship between various military resources and specific allied capabilities, where the alliance mission in terms of peacekeeping, crisis management, non-proliferation, and interoperability are key intervening variables that shape the development of allied capabilities. The proposed theoretical framework in this dissertation aims at explaining how NATO functions in the post-Cold War world and why it undergoes profound transformation. For this purpose, I explored the relationship between military personnel, army, navy and air forces, as well as defense spending on the one hand, and number of troops abroad, on the other. This relationship turned out to be more robust in the case of the old NATO allies compared to the countries that joined the alliance in 1999 and 2004. The study confirmed the hypothesized explanation that NATO members use their resources more efficiently in order to enhance specific allied capabilities needed for the new allied out-of-the-area operations. The proposed argument is consistent with the logic of intergovernmental bargaining theory, where the benefits of such cooperation among the participating nations are much higher compared to the transaction costs associated with it. Interestingly, the relationship between resources and capabilities is not observable in the cases of countries such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and
Sweden who participate in various European and Euro-Atlantic structures, but are not NATO members.
In this chapter, I will discuss the effects of complementarities in the context of the third dimension of NATO’s transformation, the admission of new members – and the implications for
266 the functioning of the alliance as a club in international security. Although the findings are primarily theoretical, I will also briefly discuss some policy implications. The chapter is organized around three major themes. First, it focuses on the third hypothesis of dissertation which explores whether and to what extent the prospects for NATO membership has stimulated more efficient use of military resources among the aspirant nations and has contributed toward the advancement of allied capabilities. For this purpose, I will survey the logic and pace of military transformation in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s in order to explain why the complementarities approach is less observable in their case than in the case of the “core”
NATO nations. Second, I test the relevance of this hypothesis for the non-NATO European
Union countries. I explore cases of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden and survey whether the lack of a robust relationship between military resources and transformational capabilities in these countries is due to the absence of prospects for NATO membership. Third, I focus on the broader issue of Alliance management in the light of the admission of new members. More specifically, I study the growing heterogeneity within NATO as an institution with a particular emphasis on transaction costs and the expected payoffs among club members. I also examine effects of crowding and depreciation on the expansion of the heterogeneous clubs.
Tracing the Process of NATO Expansion
NATO expansion is, without any doubt, not only an inherent part of the alliance’s overall
transformation, but also the most visible component of this multifaceted process. The expansion
produced an increase of membership from sixteen to twenty-six nations and added another
267 hundred million people to the 770 million people of the old members. We can expect that an alliance of twenty-six nations with a population of a total of 870 million people is much more heterogeneous and certainly functions quite differently. The process of expansion was not accomplished overnight, but underwent several major stages of required transition and needed accommodation on the part of the new allies in order to make them fit this new club setup.
Interestingly, the institutional accommodation took place without any amendment of the
Washington Treaty. In this sub-section I will review the major adjustments that the new allies had to undergo before joining the alliance in order to develop the required allied capabilities.
Also, I will address the question of how the new members complement the existing alliance structure and why the significance of complementarities is much more limited in the case of the new allies compared to the old NATO countries.
FROM PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) TO MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP) The issue of the admitting new members from Eastern Europe to NATO was first discussed at a special committee of the North Atlantic Assembly in January 1993 when the possibilities of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joining NATO were given “serious consideration.” 544
The formulation of strategy on how to put forward such an agenda came during the historic
Brussels Summit of 1994. As discussed previously in the dissertation, the summit was important not only in defining out-of-the-area operations, but also for launching Partnership for Peace (PfP)
-- a new framework of managing relations with the countries from the former communist bloc.
PfP was certainly a novel cooperative framework, and “without doubt a diplomatic invention of first order,” and “a policymaker’s dream.” 545 First and foremost, PfP was a very flexible
544 Stanley Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: the transatlantic bargain reconsidered , Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New York (2003), p. 139. 545 Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: the battle for consensus, Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries, Herndon, VA, 1997, p. 83 and Sloan (2003), p. 140.
268 framework that provided a “possibility for non-member military leaders and forces to accommodate cooperation for countries that had quite different military and political objectives in cooperating with NATO.” 546 The proposed formula 16+1, where the sixteen then NATO member-states committed to individual partnership programs with each of the new partners from
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, allowed each of the new partners to determine the
“nature and depth” of its cooperation with the Alliance. 547 The countries that wanted to become members of the alliance pressed for a more in-depth form of cooperation with NATO, while at the same time other nations that did not indicate any interest in becoming full members now had a mechanism through which they could manage their relations with the alliance. NATO policymakers did their best to accommodate all the partners. Second, PfP clearly indicated to potential new members that their admission was not a one-shot deal but rather a continuous process that required fundamental political and military transformation.
Given the specific political climate of the early 1990s, PfP’s broad and flexible framework was the only possible compromise able to accommodate this extremely diverse crowd of nations.
Nonetheless, the partnership had several inherent weaknesses. First, the cooperation was very broadly defined and did not focus explicitly on the aspects of needed transformation that the aspirant countries had to undergo in order to meet the requirements of membership. The East
European nations that wanted to become members were not given precise guidelines on their path to membership. Second, the flexibility of the PfP framework sent a somewhat unclear message to the political elites and bureaucratic entities in these countries. Although NATO made it clear that it was concerned about their internal stability and external security, the alliance did not give any formal guarantees of security or clear promises for membership, thus avoiding a
546 Ibid, p. 83. 547 Ibid.
269 situation where Moscow would be “able to accuse NATO of enticing these countries into the
Western camp.” 548 The political precautions dominated over the precision in commitments and guidelines, which is why little practical progress was achieved in the beginning. Third, PfP incorporated not only countries with different visions about their cooperation with NATO, but also different size and overall role in the international system. For example, the ten countries that subsequently joined the alliance in 1999 and 2004 were much smaller in terms of size and resources and played a lot less influential role than other partners, such as Russia and Ukraine, for example. Overall, at this early stage, the partnership focused exclusively on the improvement of cooperation from simple crisis control to more advanced forms of peacekeeping and military planning. Romania was the first country to sign the PfP Framework Document in January 1994, shortly followed by all major countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Since then thirty-three nations have participated in the partnership, including the ten new allies which “graduated to membership status” in 1999 and 2004, respectively. 549 Every country that joined PfP had to sign an individual Peace Framework Document and submit a Presentation
Document. Originally, the partners presented overambitious projects, which later they had to revise under NATO’s supervision, with an emphasis on the importance of seminars and joint exercises. 550
Soon after its inception in 1994, PfP changed its emphasis from peacekeeping exercises to more thorough planning. As a result, in January 1995 the allies and their partners introduced the
Planning and Review Process (PARP). 551 It was based on a two-year cycle and had several core
objectives; the primary of which was to improve interoperability between the allies and the
548 Ibid, p. 84. 549 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia were the last three nations to join NATO Partnership for Peace in December 2006. Twenty-three nations currently participate in the PfP. 550 Rob De Wijk (1997), p. 84. 551 Ibid.
270 partners. The scope of the PfP operations, however, remained relatively limited – it included primarily humanitarian aid, search and rescue, and peacekeeping.
Gradually, the NATO leadership and the partner nations realized the need for diversification and specialization in the forms of cooperation among the individual partners.
This need was specified in the presentation documents of the partners, as well as the various political means between the individual partners and the NATO allies. 552 Also, a major re-
organization of the partnership with Russia and Ukraine was implemented in 1996 and 1997.
Russian forces joined NATO in the Implementation Force (I-FOR) in Bosnia. In addition,
NATO and Russia signed in May 1997 the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security. 553 The Founding Act was replaced in 2002 by the NATO-Russia Council, which was built on the goals and principles of the 1997 Founding Act. 554 In the same token, in July 1997
NATO signed with Ukraine a “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and Ukraine.” 555 First, this modification of partnership relations with
Russia and Ukraine was necessary in terms of the recognition of the major role that these nations play in the international system relative to the other smaller PfP nations. Second, the Founding
Act and the Charter were able to introduce much needed differentiation between these two major
552 Ibid. 553 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,” signed on May 27, 1997 in Paris, France, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm , 05/26/2007. 554 The NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in May 1997 after four months of negotiations and dealt with various aspects of the relations between the former adversaries. It developed the practice of consultation and cooperation between the Alliance and Russia especially in terms of the participation of Russian troops alongside those of NATO and other partner countries in the peacekeeping efforts in former Yugoslavia. More specifically, it deals with the principles of partnership, various aspects of consultations and cooperation that include peacekeeping, crisis-management and non-proliferation efforts, as well as the exchanging information on various security and defense policies and practices. The last section of the agreement deals with specific military aspects of the deployment of nuclear weapons and development of minimum required level interoperability between Russia and the NATO troops. 555 “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,” signed in Madrid on July, 9 1997, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm, 05/26/2007.
271 European powers and the other partners, especially those countries in Central and Eastern Europe who wanted to join the alliance.
This reformulation of NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relations was followed by a major
restructuring of the Partnership for Peace format, with the addition of new and important
elements. These included the replacement of the relatively archaic North Atlantic Cooperation
Council with more flexible and efficient structures such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC). The Partnership Council was designed to serve as a security forum for a more
enhanced and operational partnership between the allies and the partners. Thus, it provided a
political framework for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues and
brought together a total of 49 NATO and partner nations, 26 of which are currently members of
the Alliance and 23 that are partner nations. EAPC was formally introduced at the Sintra
Summit in May 1997 in Portugal. Similar to the bilateral forums with Russia and Ukraine, this
multilateral Council dealt with consolations and cooperation in several sets of issues: crisis
management and peacekeeping operations; regional issues and issues related to arms control and
proliferation; various aspects of defense planning and policy implementations, terrorism and
emergency planning and civil military cooperation. 556 The diversity among the different PfP partners was managed through different partnership “cells” in which military and civilian officials of the PfP countries worked hand in hand with officials from the NATO Headquarters and the member-states. For this purpose, a special partnership coordination cell was established in Mons, Belgium at NATO’s European command, in order to coordinate the various PfP activities directly with the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) and his staff.
These included contributions to the NATO mission in Bosnia, as well as consultations among the
556 For detailed information on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council see NATO Handbook, http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html , 01/20/2008.
272 allies and the PfP partners. 557 PfP was substantially modified in 1996-97 with the introduction of
various levels of partnership among the participants that allowed deeper and improved
interaction with the prospective NATO members. This change ultimately contributed toward
more advanced planning, improved interoperability and a higher participation in joint operations.
Despite its substantial modification from the original framework, PfP itself was unable to
address the most important issue for some of the partners from Central and Eastern Europe,
primarily the three Visegrad states; that was, the question of membership. 558 The ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1997 reconfirmed the commitment that the door of the alliance remained open and that Article 10 would be honored to all candidates that qualified for full membership. 559 The NATO allies made it clear that the key criterion for the admission of new allies would be the capacity of the applicants to work effectively within NATO’s Integrated
Command Structure. The officials in Brussels were primarily concerned with the capacity of the potential members to become effective contributors to the alliance. In the same token, the U.S. administration remained committed to the principles of expansion and the first exploratory talks were conducted in 1996-97 at the NATO Headquarters. The candidates’ applications were thoroughly examined, but it became clear that the U.S. preferences would influence the final decision about the invitees. The influence of the United States in NATO, where Washington is seen as primus inter pares among the allies, whose preferences “have almost always carried the day,” 560 determined the final outcome of the Madrid Summit. It was decided that the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland would be the only invitees. This was primarily due to the
557 Sloan (2003), pp. 141-2. 558 The three Visegrad nations are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 559 The broad criteria for membership are incorporated in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These include: (a) geographic location, i.e. only European states can join NATO; (b) requirement to “further the principles of the treaty” and; (c) expectation to “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.” See “NATO Basic Texts: the North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO online library, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm , 06/05/2007. 560 Sloan (2003), p. 149.
273 domestic factors in the United States, where the Clinton administration determined that “the core package of three candidates would be a sufficient challenge for the process of ratification in the
United States as well as for the absorption by the alliance.” 561 Stanley Sloan correctly notes that
the context of finalizing the list of countries invited to join NATO in 1997 indicated that one of
the biggest challenges for the Clinton administration and for the administrations before and after
that “was to be a hegemon without acting like one.”562 In other words, Washington faced the
structural challenge how to manage the North Atlantic affairs without openly showing that the
distribution of power in the North Atlantic Area influences the ultimate outcome of the
bargaining processes within NATO.
The first wave of NATO’s post-Cold War expansion was launched at the Madrid Summit
in July 1997 with the invitation of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Of these three,
Poland was regarded as the only state that would add significant military strength to the alliance
due to its size. In the end of the day, this package was regarded as the optimal choice on both
sides of the Atlantic Ocean. From Washington’s perspective the three countries could be sold to
the United States Senate as “strategically important politically acceptable.” From Germany’s
point of view, the three countries “satisfied the desire to move off the front lines into Central
Europe” and could serve as a buffer between Germany and Russia. 563 From the viewpoint of the
United Kingdom, the smaller the package, the better because London thought that too rapid or
large an increase in membership would ultimately weaken the alliance. Other major allies such
as France and Italy advocated a southern focus of enlargement, where the applications of
Slovenia and Romania were also on the table. Slovenia was considered as one of the strongest
candidates in terms of efficiency and military preparedness and whose application had support in
561 Ibid. 562 Ibid. 563 Ibid, p. 148.
274 Europe, as well as in the U.S. Senate. In the case of Slovenia, as early as 2004, Ryan
Hendrickson and Thomas Erthridge noted that the country was a front runner in military reforms and was “moving forward very positively and continue{ed} to challenge nearly all criticism of
NATO expansion.” 564 Nonetheless, the Clinton administration decided that the “core package of
three nations” would be a sufficient challenge for the ratification process in the United States in
terms of absorption by the alliance. 565 Romania, on the other hand, had an important strategic
position in Southeastern Europe but lagged far behind in military reforms and capacity to
contribute to the specific military capabilities. In the end, the compromise among the allies
excluded both nations. While Slovenia was considered a given for the next round, in the case of
Romania, the allies recognized the continued need for “positive developments towards
democracy and the rule of law” and encouraged the furtherance of military reforms. 566
The Madrid round of expansion opened the door of the alliance for the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland to become full members. In that sense, it was certainly a historic decision.
But it also was important in that the alliance expressed a commitment that this wave of
expansion would not be the last one and that the other applicant countries would be given
opportunities to join the alliance.
The experience from the first wave of expansion was important in identifying the challenges of expanding NATO eastwards. First, similar to other NATO transformational projects (CJTFs, for example), PfP was overly ambitious and was not designed from the beginning to reflect the diversity the different PfP partners. From club goods theory perspective, the sheer fact that the clubs have exclusion mechanism which discriminates between members
564 Ryan Hendrickson and Thomas Erthridge, “Slovenia and NATO Membership: Testing the Criticisms of NATO Expansion,” Baltic Defense Review , No 12, Vol. 2, 2004. 565 Sloan (2003), p. 148. 566 “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation,” issued by the Heads of State and Government, July, 8-9, 1997, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm , 05/27/2007.
275 and non-members mandates the elaboration of inclusion mechanisms that will prepare the aspirants for full membership. Therefore, the period 1997-1997 was important in terms of determining the conditions for the inclusions of new allies. Thus, the decision to expand needed to be tied to a careful cost benefit-analysis of the individual member states and the club as a whole. The last time NATO expanded was in 1982 and included only one country – Spain. The lack of experience in dealing with new entrants mandated an elaboration of a careful inclusion mechanism that will prepare the new members and the alliance as a whole to meet the challenges of expansion. Gradually, by 1996 the NATO political and military leadership realized that
Brussels should have a different approach with regard to the countries that wanted to become allies as opposed to those that were interested in PfP simply as a framework for cooperation with the alliance, which is why PfP was reorganized.
Second, although PfP promoted the development of certain components of allied capabilities in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as peacekeeping, it was definitely an insufficient framework for transformation because it did not incorporate other aspects, such as the development of allied interoperability. The partnership mostly promoted political dialogue without exerting sufficient pressure for military reforms in the applicant countries. The model of complementarities indicated the importance of the advancement of all three types of capabilities, as well as interoperability, as discussed in Chapter Four of the dissertation. Although NATO specified the basic criteria for membership, the alliance failed to institute a detailed and rigorous monitoring process as a part of the prospective inclusion mechanism. Such a mechanism had to determine the problem areas in the advancement of
276 capabilities and the substantial improvements that each aspirant nation had to accomplish in order to be considered for full membership. 567
Third, it seemed that the decision to expand was primarily based on political compromises
within and among the NATO allies, rather than on clearly defined criteria and readiness to
assume the responsibilities of membership. A careful inclusion mechanism would have
evaluated Slovenia’s application positively and Ljubljana’s bid would have received a much
more thorough consideration. 568 In part, the outcome of the bargaining process that followed the first round of NATO expansion in 1997 was due to absence of a clear-cut distinction entrepreneur and a set of consumers, as determined by Sorenson Tschirhart, and Whinston.
Based on the distribution of power, the United States was the only nation that could assume the responsibilities of club entrepreneur, while the European allies and the aspirant could only fall in the category of consumers. However, the Clinton administration indicated that in the early years of America’s preponderance the main concern about the expansion was not to determine the best optimal outcome for NATO as a club but to seek the most acceptable one at home and abroad.
That is why the first round indicated a tendency that deviates from the logic of complementarities and resulted in criticism directed to some of the allies that they were unprepared to assume the responsibilities of club membership. Nonetheless, the first wave of
NATO’s post-Cold War expansion was also a good learning experience in dealing with the other
567 In September 1995, two months after the invitation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland Brussels came with five criteria for membership. They were political and military. The political criteria required that the applicants resolve the disputes with neighboring countries and commit to solving international disputes peacefully. Also, they need to contribute militarily to the alliance and be willing to take steps to achieve interoperability with other alliance members. For detail see Thomas Szayna (2001), pp. 42-3, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1243/MR1243.ch3.pdf , 06/05/2007. 568 The application of Slovenia enjoyed substantial support in the Senate represented by Senator Joseph Biden (D- Del.) and Senator William Roth Jr. (R-Del.) also because it would add a land bridge between Italy and Hungary. Otherwise, Hungary would be surrounded only by non-NATO neighbors. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration was worried about the opposition to the ratification process in the Senate and decided to advocate a minimalist package while leaving NATO’s doors open and keeping Slovenia as a given for the next round.
277 prospective applicants, where the Alliance focused on the pace of military transformation by introducing rigorous mechanisms that carefully monitored the success of the applicants.
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND NATO EXPANSION The study of military transformation in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of resources and allied capabilities also needs to address the organizational and bureaucratic aspects of the transformation. Donna Winslow and Jeffrey Schwerzel correctly indicate that, in general, military culture is a specific organizational culture, where “different units have their own customs, ceremonies and even uniforms” and where “navies, air forces, land forces and marines have distinctly different organizational cultures.”569 Furthermore, Winslow and Schwerzel’s analysis confirms Graham Allison’s findings that the military is a “large bureaucracy” with
“routine, repetitive, orderly action” that is not likely to “innovate or change by [its] nature.” 570
These observations are particularly valid for the organizational structures of the military in CEE.
That is why most of the countries that were seeking NATO membership faced tremendous organizational and bureaucratic resistance from inside to transform their militaries.
We can distinguish between the size of military bureaucracy and the level of organizational
resistance to transformation and, based on these two variables, CEE countries can be divided into
two groups. The first one consists of those nations that had heavy Cold War armies and were
once members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland,
Romania and Slovakia. 571 The second group includes countries such as Estonia, Latvia,
569 Donna Winslow and Jeffrey Schwerzel, “(Un-) Changing Military Culture?” in K. Spohr Readman (ed.), Building Sustainable and Effective Military Capabilities , IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2004. 570 Ibid, p. 57. 571 Although Czech Republic and Slovakia are new states that emerged with the spit of Czechoslovakia in 1993, they not only shared common statehood for about seventy-five years but also, unlike the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Czechs and the Slovaks split the resources of Czechoslovakia, including the military ones, in a ratio that corresponded to the contribution of each of the two nations, usually in a ratio of two to one.
278 Lithuania and Slovenia that had no experience with independent statehood prior to 1990. 572
These two sets of countries differed in the nature of their transformation. For the first group of six countries the transformation was a multi-dimensional, continuous process that included a substantial reduction of various resources and their more effective re-allocation, whereas for the other four nations the military transformation in the early and mid-1990s was first and foremost a process state- and institution-building. Although a large part of the military resources of the former WTO members have been used by or continue to serve in their transforming militaries, the reality is that in many occasions the old military structures and the overall distribution of resources were based on strategies prior to 1990 and thus became serious impediments to make these nations more efficient allies. Military transformation has often been compared to the construction business, where sometimes it is more cost-efficient to demolish an existing building and build a new one from scratch than trying to refurbish an old one. As a result, the experience of countries like Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria indicated that it was more difficult to change the existing structure also because “the reforms had direct effect on the lives of people.” 573 Alternatively, nations that had to establish for the first time after 1990 their own structures and institutions of independent statehood, such as the Baltic countries and Slovenia, had much less trouble in transforming their military and developing the needed capabilities for peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation that became interoperable with the other allies. Also, political elites in these cases had fewer troubles to persuade their societies that conducting military reforms was not only for the sake of the requirements to become NATO or
572 As a matter of fact, the Baltic nations gained independence after World War I and experienced statehood in the interwar period but were occupied by the Soviet Union after 1945 and restored their independence after its collapse in 1991. 573 Author’s personal interview with a representative from the Slovak Delegation to NATO, January 16, 2006, Brussels, Belgium and Dr. Nikolay Slatinski, advisor of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia, February 2, 2006.
279 EU members, but also to develop their own modern national army and economy. 574 This is an
important feature of the path of military transformation among the new NATO allies since it
indicates that there is substantial variation even within a relatively coherent sub-club of nations,
such as the new entrants. The analysis indicates that state-related features such as identity
discussed by Sorenson, Tschirhart, and Whinston are major factors in determining sub-club
dynamics.
The sheer fact of NATO membership required from the aspiring nations to become
“compatible” in terms of capabilities with the rest of the alliance, which also mandated substantial efforts to transform their militaries. At the same time, the nature of the military culture and its resilience to change posed major challenges to the transformation and military reforms in the new allies and aspirant countries. Therefore, NATO leadership had to promptly address these challenges. The Washington Summit in April 1999 pledged that “NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic Area.” 575 With this in mind, NATO leaders
launched the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which not only outlined the perspective for
membership but also established a mechanism that provided feedback on the progress of every
individual applicant. The plan employed the same tools that PfP used earlier, namely
consultations, reports and recommendations. However, MAP was designed on the basis of the
experience with first three entrants and thus made some significant improvements from PfP.
Specifically, the individual annual programs of the applicants included a vast array of allied
transformation -- political, economic, defense, resource, and legal aspects. NATO’s supervision
574 Author’s personal interview with a representative from the Estonian Mission to NATO, January 12, 2006. 575 “An Alliance for the 21st Century,” Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm , 06/05/2007.
280 was exercised through “a candid feedback mechanism” that included political and technical advising and annual review meetings in a format 19 plus one at the Council level, which meant that every MAP nation negotiates and reviews its individual Action Plan with NATO. 576
The Membership Action Plan had several major improvements compared to the PfP
mechanism that preceded the admission of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. First, the
plan established a clearing-house to help coordinate assistance by NATO to the aspirant
countries in the needed areas of reform. Therefore, the new framework was much more
conductive toward the efficient use of military resources and the advancement of allied
capabilities, as indicated in the first and third hypotheses of the dissertation. Second, the plan
institutionalized the Planning and Review Process (PARP) that was established under PfP to
provide feedback. The new PARP focused on specific variables measuring the reforms of the
“aspirant countries to develop interoperability with NATO forces and to prepare their force
structures and capabilities for possible future membership.” 577 Thus, MAP incorporated an
inclusion mechanism that PfP previously lacked. MAP entailed a clear promise for NATO
membership and a monitoring mechanism that controlled for the advancement of the
membership criteria. Third, implementation mechanisms were incorporated in the MAP to
tamper the bureaucratic resistance to transformation that comprised of “inter-ministerial
meetings at the national level, fulfilling the objectives of the Plan.” 578 Initially, nine applicant
states signed up for the plan – Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.579 These nine countries were promised
576 “The Process of NATO Expansion: The Membership Action Plan,” NATO’s Handbook, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030103.htm, 05/28/2007. 577 Ibid. 578 Ibid. 579 Croatia was the tenth nation to join MAP in May 2002 after officially submitting application for NATO membership.
281 that the alliance would review the enlargement process again during the Prague Summit in 2002.
Therefore, MAP also implicitly distinguished between an entrepreneur and a set of consumers, whereby the United States played a crucial role of entrepreneur that will be discussed in the next sub-section.
Soon after the MAP was launched, the nine countries consolidated efforts in lobbying for
their admission by forming the so-called Vilnius group in May 2000. After its inception, the
Vilnius group conducted regular meetings at various levels – foreign and defense ministers, as
well as various experts from both ministries. Furthermore, regular meetings were conducted in
the NATO capitals with participation of NATO decision makers involved in the enlargement
process. The group worked closely with NATO Headquarters in Brussels and various
policymakers and think-tanks in Washington, as well as at the EAPC meetings. From the
perspective of club goods theory, the Vilnius group was a mechanism that brought together
relatively similar nations to enhance their homogeneity and overcome major political and
military differences and possible gaps on their road to NATO membership. Nonetheless, it can
only be interpreted as a tool for achieving the common goal of membership, but not as a separate
club within NATO because the goals of membership was achieved the group disbanded itself.
THE VILNIUS GROUP AND THE “BIG BANG” EXPANSION The first indication that the allies were willing to endorse a “big bang” approach to the forthcoming expansion came during President Bush’s visit to Poland in June 2001. He addressed faculty and students at Warsaw University and indicated that “all of Europe's new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom -- and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe -- as Europe's old
282 democracies have.” 580 President Bush underlined that the alliance should continue to admit new members and that its doors would remain open “for all of Europe's democracies that seek
[NATO membership] and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings.” President
Bush asserted with regard to NATO expansion that “the question of ‘when’ may still be up for debate within NATO; the question of ‘whether’ should not be.” 581
The aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 strengthened the expansionist case. A study of the Brookings Institution released in 2001 indicated that “the case of enlargement is stronger than ever before” and it “will contribute to the process of integration … and promote the development of strong new allies in the war on terrorism.” 582 Aside from this
political context, the basis for a “big bang” approach to expansion was aided through a high level
of coordination of efforts among the aspiring nations. From June 2001 to July 2002 the foreign
ministers of the MAP countries met a total of four times in Tallinn, Estonia; Bled, Slovenia;
Bucharest, Romania and Skopje, FYR of Macedonia. In addition, the prime ministers met three
times, while Sofia, Bulgaria hosted a meeting of the heads of state. The intensified contacts and
improved coordination among the ten capitals and between them and Brussels resulted in
accepting these nations as a coherent group of well-motivated candidates for membership.
Furthermore, the support for a “big bang” approach was endorsed not only in Washington,
DC but also in the other major European capitals. Similar to the first wave in 1999, France was a
proponent of the second round, but emphasized that the new allies should “contribute to
security,” without “creating any difficulties.” The French position insisted, however, that in
order to be accepted, the new members should not “dilute the alliance” from its core task of
580 “Remarks by President George W. Bush in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University,” Warsaw, Poland, June 15, 2001, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/docs/bush150601.htm , 05/29/2007. 581 “Remarks by President George W. Bush in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University,” Warsaw, Poland, June 15, 2001, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/docs/bush150601.htm , 05/29/2007. 582 Sloan (2003), p. 199.
283 collective defense; thus “creating difficulties for NATO and European security.” 583 France did
not see the admission of new allies as a shift in the balance within NATO in favor of the United
States. Paris supported the enlargement with the assumption that it would not change the internal
status quo within NATO, and, therefore, the nature of the alliance. 584 In the same token,
Germany gave the green light to the “big bang” approach. During the first round in 1999, Berlin
was particularly supportive of Hungary’s admission because the Germans had “special feelings
toward Hungary since Hungarians were the first to open the border in 1989.” 585 Alternatively, during the second wave there were serious concerns among the German political elite that NATO may not be able to function as an effective alliance of many members. Nonetheless, the applicants showed Berlin that they were able to work together within the Vilnius group and once
MAP was put into force, it paved the way toward their effective contribution to NATO response operations. Therefore, Germany supported the 2004 expansion because the entrants presented sufficient evidence to the decision-making elite in Berlin that they were prepared to meet the obligations of membership. 586
London, however, had been consistently cautious regarding NATO expansion. The British support for expanding the alliance rested upon two imperatives: (a) not to endanger “the political cohesion and military effectiveness of NATO;” and (b) not to antagonize Russia. 587 More than any other major European ally, the British support was linked to the requirement that the candidates for membership should “above all modernize their armed forces according to the provisions of MAP and the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), as well as make them available
583 Author’s personal interview with the French Deputy Head of Mission to NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, January 19, 2006. 584 Ibid. 585 Author’s personal interview with a representative from the Permanent Delegation of The Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, January 20, 2006. 586 Ibid. 587 Ji ři Šedivy, “The puzzle of NATO Enlargement,” Contemporary Security Policy , Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 7.
284 for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).” 588 Thus, the endorsement of Berlin and
London was tied to the successful implementation of military reforms in the aspirant nations that
requires a more efficient use of resources and ensures the advancement of capabilities, as
determined in the first hypothesis. This explains why during the second wave of expansion the
invitation of new allies was tied to the successful implementations of the transformational
objectives. In the end of the day, the outcome of the bargaining process strengthened the
evidence is support of the third hypothesis explored in the dissertation that there is a relationship
between the prospect for membership and advancement of capabilities.
The Prague Summit (2002) officially rubberstamped the “big bang wave” by inviting seven of the ten applicants from the Vilnius Group -- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia. Slovenia and Romania were, without any doubt, the mostly likely invitees. The three Baltic nations, on the other hand had very similar features and pace of reforms, but Russia’s opposition remained a major obstacle. Moscow’s position on NATO expansion remained unchanged throughout the whole process, namely that “the expansion is incapable of tackling the modern threats.” 589 Nonetheless, the allies made substantial efforts to soften the voice of disapproval in Moscow. In 2000 the then NATO Secretary-General, Lord
George Robertson, initiated a strategy of engaging Russia in a security dialogue within NATO proper. This dialogue specifically included efforts to enhance military cooperation with
Russia. 590 Three days after the admission of the seven new allies, the NATO Secretary General
Jaap De Hoop Scheffer paid a symbolic visit to Moscow, where he reassured the Russian
leadership that the expansion was not targeted against Moscow and he consistently promoted
588 Šedivy (2001), p. 7. 589 “Russia regards NATO Expansion as Big Strategic Mistake,” Pravda Online, April 12, 2004, http://newsfromrussia.com/main/2004/04/12/53374.html , 06/09/2007. 590 Šedivy (2001), pp. 7-8.
285 dialogue within the Russia-NATO Council especially at the forthcoming NATO Summits in
Istanbul (2004) and Riga (2006). 591
The United States played a crucial role in the second round of NATO’s post-Cold War
expansion. On May 8, 2003 the Senate confirmed its support for the seven invitees by ratifying a
bill by an amazing 96-0 vote that ultimately allowed the seven nations to join NATO in 2004.
This support by the U.S. Senate was much stronger than in 1998 when it ratified the admission of
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland with an 80-12 vote. The 2002-2004 wave of expansion
clearly indicated that the United States moved from emerging to extant hegemon and played
much more successfully the role of entrepreneur in comparison to the first wave of expansion
(1997-1999). Therefore, the management of heterogeneous clubs is tied to the systemic
explanation of the distribution of power. This observation has implications for the fourth
hypothesis of the dissertation, namely that the presence of the hegemon enhances the
development of allied capabilities by stimulating the efficient use of the available resources.
This proposition will be studied in detail in Chapter Six of the dissertation.
During the first post-Cold War wave of expansion the big question for U.S. and NATO
decision-makers was who would be invited rather than who will not be invited. Since NATO did
not pick the best candidates, from club goods perspective this approach was not the most
efficient one. Alternatively, during the second wave, the question was which of the Vilnius
group countries will not be invited, rather than which of them will actually be invited. From club
goods theory argues that the optimum size of the club (and therefore, the number of new
invitees) is the one for which average net benefits are maximized. Thus, there are two possible
ways to approach the expansion dynamic. On the one hand, if NATO extends an invitation to
591 [Putin’s] Meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, April 8, 2004, Moscow, the Kremlin, http://www.cdi.org/russia/301-2.cfm , 06/09/2007.
286 fewer candidates, it is less likely to reach the point of declining total net benefits (such as the case of members 9 or 10 as presented in the chart in Chapter One.) On the other hand, if NATO invites and admits a higher number of allies, it is more likely that the alliance will reach the point of congestion. The alternative approach, namely inviting fewer allies may also sometimes be sub-optimal, especially when the invitees are not the best picks. What is then the right approach?
The logic of complementarities indicates that the number is tied to the overall optimization of the resources and advancement of capabilities. The evidence from the 2002-2004 wave indicated that this was the case because the three countries that were invited faced major problems in their mode of transformation. Conversely, the seven invitees underwent major transformation and strict monitoring under MAP, while at the same time proved that they can work together in the
Vilnius group.
PREPARING THE NEXT ROUND: THE ADRIATIC CHARTER Albania, Croatia and Macedonia were the only three countries from the Vilnius group that were not invited at the Prague Summit. They formed the so-called Adriatic Charter in May 2003 and continued to prepare for membership under the MAP guidelines. The three applicants not invited at the Prague Summit were certainly outliers within the Vilnius group with regard to the political stability variable. Although the roots of the problems that each country was facing were different, all these issues were related to the capacity or willingness of the political elites in
Tirana, Zagreb and Skopje to transform their political and military systems, ensure the rule of law, and facilitate cooperation with various international institutions.
Isolated from the rest of the world during the Cold War, Albania experienced a deficit of mature political leadership and lacked visionary reformist elite, which caused major political and economic disturbances in the early and mid-1990s. Continuing poverty, corruption and the
287 collapse of several pyramid investment schemes weakened the government and resulted in serious civil unrest in 1997. In the years after 1997, the government has been unable to exercise effectively the rule of law and some parts of the country remained under the control of the opposition or criminal organizations. The parliamentary elections since 1997 have been highly contested, and international monitoring groups admitted that there were "serious flaws" in the election process. Since early 2000s Albania has gradually stabilized its political system and in
2002 the NATO Secretary General highlighted Albania’s recent progress confronting corruption and organized crime as part of a larger effort to strengthen the rule of law, as well as the country’s contribution to ISAF and efforts to establish the final status of neighboring Kosovo.
Nonetheless, as of 2007 much progress was still needed in improving “the efficiency of
Albania’s military and judicial system.” 592
Similar to Albania, Macedonia’s biggest problem has been the insufficiency of democratic
governance. Its poor record is connected to the tense ethnic relations between the Slavic
majority and the large Albanian minority with regard to the use of minority languages and
participation of minority representatives at the different levels of local and administrative
governance. By 2000, Albanian guerrillas were operating in areas with a high concentration of
Albanian population. Their activity involved attacks against the police and military units, which
led the country to the verge of civil war in the spring and summer of 2001. Among the
guerrillas' political demands were changes to the Macedonian constitution, greater use of the
Albanian language in official institutions, and an increase in the number of Albanians in the civil
services. Later the same year, a political compromise was achieved in which all minorities were
guaranteed proportional representation and a quasi-veto over sensitive issues, such as the choice
592 “NATO Leader Praises Albania's Progress Toward Membership,” International Information Programs of the State Department, Washington, DC, July 06, 2002, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile- english&y=2006&m=July&x=20060707171053idybeekcm0.6916773 , 05/29/2007.
288 of judges, laws on local government, culture and the use of languages. Just like Albania,
Macedonia has made substantial progress in the last several years but much progress needs to be accomplished in judicial reform, police sector restructuring and combating corruption. 593
Croatia is certainly the most different of the three cases in the Adriatic group. The country entered MAP in May 2002 shortly before the decision on the fifth wave of enlargement was made, which was one of the major reasons why it was not considered for the 2004 wave of expansion. Only after the death of its nationalist leader Franjo Tudjman in 1999, was Croatia able put an end to the violent period that followed the declaration of independence in 1991.
Since 2000, the Croatian governments became much more cooperative with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on the issues of war crimes committed by Croats in the first half of the 1990s. However, the political elite in the country remained seriously divided over the level of interaction and compliance with the tribunal in The Hague. The refusal to turn over former state officials indicted for war crimes and former Croatian state officials convicted for a massacre of Serbian civilians during the war of independence (1991-1995) undercut significantly the credibility for Croatia’s democracy. At the same time significant progress was made in the political and military reforms and by 2006 Croatia was considered the most prepared of the three remaining MAP countries. Although the evaluation for NATO membership is made based on the individual progress of each applicant country, the experience from the previous two rounds in 1999 and 2004 indicates that it is almost certain the next wave will include more than one country. There are several reasons why Croatia might not be invited in by itself. First, the decision for the next round of invitations is first and foremost political. In other words, in order to expand, NATO needs a consensus among the political leaders of the twenty-six allies that it
593 “NATO Chief Praises Macedonia's Progress, Urges Serious Political Dialogue,” Southeast European Times , February 15, 2007, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2007/02/15/nb-09 , 05/29/2007.
289 will go ahead with extending invitation, which has not happened so far. Second, it is very inefficient from negotiation and ratification perspective to separate the invitees and deal with each of them individually, especially since the three applicants have coordinated their efforts within the Adriatic Charter. Third, despite its remarkable progress, Croatia was the last of the
Adriatic Charter members to join MAP because of the problems that it faced with the arrest of alleged war criminals during the Croatian war of independence, such as Ante Gotovina, for example. 594 Therefore, of all the applicants Croatia has had the shortest experience in accommodating with the specific alliance requirements under MAP.
The Adriatic Charter continues the tradition of the Vilnius Group and has conducted frequent meetings tri-partite between high-ranking officials from Albania, Croatia and
Macedonia to review the advancement of the “individual and cooperative efforts to intensify and hasten domestic reforms” aimed at “enhancing the security, prosperity and stability of the region” and preparing these three nations for NATO membership. 595 More specifically, these reforms include the establishment of “democratic institutions, civil society, rule of law, market economies, and NATO-compatible militaries; to fight corruption and crime; and to protect human rights and civil liberties.” 596 The conditionality of the individual MAPs and the agenda of
the Adriatic Charter meetings clearly indicated that the logic of complementarities is also
applicable in this case because Albania, Croatia and FYR of Macedonia showed that they can
work together in order to address the problems of military transformation and advance their
capabilities in order to catch up with the new allies. Furthermore, the Adriatic Charter has been
594 Ante Gotovina is a former lieutenant-general of the Croatian Army who served in the 1991-1995 war in Croatia. 2001 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but was not captured until December 2001. His arrest was one of the major stumbling blocs for Croatia’s accession talks to NATO and the European Union. 595 U.S. Department of State Factsheet, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, May 2, 2003, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20153.htm , 05/29/2007. 596 Ibid.
290 in operation for about five years, which is longer than the existence of the Vilnius group (2000-
03) and has contributed significantly toward the advancement of institutionalized forms of cooperation among the individual allies.
The United States’ active involvement in the Adriatic Charter has been instrumental in promoting dialogue and cooperation among these three nations and in promoting reforms. The
U.S. Secretary of State Collin Powell signed the Charter together with the three foreign ministers in Tirana in May 2003 and Washington hosted a meeting of the three foreign ministers in
February 2006. Later, Vice-President Dick Cheney attended the May 2006 summit of the three prime ministers in Dubrovnik, Croatia. 597 The United States’ support for the efforts of the
Adriatic group was also demonstrated at the meeting of the three prime ministers with the U.S. president in Tirana, Albania on June 10, 2007 as a part of his visit to Albania. Similar to the
Southeast European Brigade, the United States’ support and encouragement seems to be crucial in promoting multilateral dialogue and internal military and political reforms in Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. Again, this observation touches upon the link between hegemony and the advancement of capabilities that will be addressed in the next chapter.
EVALUATION OF THE EXPANSION PROCESS THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF COMPLEMENTARITIES A careful overview of the expansion process explains why complementarities indicated lower relevance in the case of the new compared to the old allies. The study indicated that PfP laid down a loose framework for cooperation that was not particularly conducive for the individual applicants to transform their Cold War armies and develop needed specific allied capabilities. That is why the three Visegrad nations from the first wave were “repeatedly castigated […] for the relatively modest sums they spend on defense despite their earlier pledges
597 Ibid.
291 to reform their militaries in accordance with NATO criteria.” 598 Alternatively, clear guidelines
and monitoring mechanisms on the progress of the prospective members means that the
perspective of membership is tied to the advancement of the capabilities as outlined in the third
hypothesis of the dissertation. Thus, the prospect for NATO expansion contributes to more
efficient use of military resources and it is more likely that these countries will develop allied
capabilities as determined by the concept of complementarities.
Most of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe that submitted their applications for
membership before 1997 were not prepared to be invited at the Madrid Summit. There were
various sources that contributed to their lack of preparedness such as the slow path of reforms
that was combined with internal resistance to transformation and lack of a consistent monitoring
and implementation system on the part of NATO in the early years of PfP. Therefore, the
resiliency to transformation is an alternative to the third hypothesis of this dissertation. There are
various sources of such a resistance that challenge the logic of complementarities. Political elites
become reluctant to conduct reforms due to various domestic and organizational factors that raise
the stakes of transformation higher than they can afford themselves to pay. Although this trend
can be observed in any of the NATO allies, (also in the United States with Rumsfeld’s plans to
transform the U.S. military in the early 2000s), it was particularly noticeable in some of the
former communist countries that aspired to become NATO members. Therefore, as a part of the
hypothesized relationship between the prospects of NATO expansion and the advancement of
allied capabilities, it is necessary to explore whether the aspirant nations were able to overcome
resiliency to reforms and successfully manage the advancement of allied capabilities. Slovakia
and Bulgaria are two cases that clearly indicated a tendencies for resiliency to military
transformation.
598 Zoltan Barany, The Future of NATO Expansion, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. i.
292 After the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Czech and Slovak officials agreed to divide
military assets in a two to one ratio. Since most of the military facilities remained in the territory
of the Czech Republic, the Slovaks experienced insufficient military infrastructure and some of
the resources that they inherited from Czechoslovakia (tanks and artillery, for example) were left
directly on the field. Despite marginal efforts to restructure their inefficient armed forces by
establishing corpses and brigades, the actual reforms in Slovakia between 1993 and 1999 were
very limited. The pace of military transformation accelerated after 1999 when Slovakia laid the
institutional groundwork for implementation of the national MAP. 599 More specifically these military reforms included reduction by half of the army’s personnel and training for officers.
Furthermore, in 2001 the Slovak MOD underwent major reorganization and the country adopted important defense documents such as a National Security Strategy and a Military Strategy, as well as embarked on planning a complete abolition of the draft by 2006. 600 Although actual
accomplishments fell short of targets, the country proved it was committed to the MAP criteria
and to joining NATO during the second post-Cold War wave of its expansion.
The Slovak political elite realized that in spite of the institutional resistance to
transformation, the country “needed to conduct those reforms” and as the Slovak Deputy Head
Mission to NATO in Brussels indicated “we always think that we did it because we had to do it
anyway; not because we were required to do so.” 601 While Slovakia was spending much less than 2 percent of its GDP on defense in the late 1990s, the country’s bid of membership and participation in MAP in the early 2000s increased its defense spending to around 1.7 – 1.9 percent; close to the 2 percent benchmark set by NATO. Furthermore, the Slovak political elite
599 Ibid, p. 77. 600 Ibid. 601 Author’s personal interview with Deputy Head of the Slovak Permanent Delegation to NATO, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, January 16, 2006.
293 evolved in its perception of national security. Whereas in the early and mid-1990s Slovakia emphasized the significance of geography, after 1999 the focus became strengthening the Slovak case for admission to NATO by improving the efficiency in the use of its military resources to develop as required by MAP allied capabilities. In 2006, Slovakia participated actively in
Afghanistan and Iraq because the country “did not want to be perceived as a free-rider in the
Transatlantic Community.” 602
Similar to Slovakia, prior to the inception of MAP, Bulgaria lagged noticeably behind the
other CEE countries in terms of military reforms. Although the country joined PfP in 1994, by
1996 its political elite was deeply divided on the issue of NATO membership and after several
rounds of discussions Sofia concluded that it did not want to pursue membership. 603 Only after the change in government of February 1997 did Bulgaria formally announce aspirations toward
NATO membership. Because of the reluctance to conduct substantial military reforms before
1997, Bulgaria’s political institutions and military were “largely unprepared for integration with the Alliance” and the Bulgarian government and military officials ended up in a situation of
“self-imposed isolation lacking an understanding of how far behind they are, as well as what they need to do.” 604 The change of guard in Sofia in February 1997 caused by the social and economic crisis led to Bulgaria’s formal application for NATO membership. Due to its unreformed military and the late application submission, the country was not even mentioned in the final communiqué of the Madrid Summit as a potential invitee. 605
602 Ibid. 603 Jeffrey Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years,” National Defense University, Washington DC, Institute for International and Strategic Studies , May 1998, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF142/forum142.html , 06/13/2007. 604 Ibid. 605 While by 1997 most Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic reduced their armed forces by half Bulgaria had not even started the optimization of its armed forces. Furthermore, the country did not made effective use of U.S. programs aimed at improving interoperability, remained relatively inactive in international peacekeeping and its defense budget remained very limited. For further details see Jeffrey Simon (1998) and Zoltan Barany (2003).
294 The actual military reform began in 1998 when Bulgaria conducted its first Strategic
Defense Review together with the United States and Britain. 606 Soon after that, the parliament
adopted a new National Security Concept, a new Military Doctrine and the 2004 Plan designed for the implementation of these reforms. The 2004 Plan envisaged the reduction of the army from 100 thousand people to slightly more than 40 thousand to consist of Rapid Reaction Corps and two additional Corps. Upon the completion of the 2004 Plan , the government introduced a long-range strategy for the modernization of the armed forces until 2015. 607 Since 1997 Bulgaria
has been spending on average about 2.4 percent of its GDP for defense as a part of the
commitment to modernization, which was one of the highest percentages among the applicant
countries. Similar to Slovakia and Romania, Bulgaria has been lagging behind in its military
transformation and modernization timeline with on average two to four years compared to the
Visegrad nations. For example, while the Czech Republic fully professionalized its armed forces
by 2006, Bulgaria plans to complete this process by 2008. 608
This brief survey of NATO expansion shows how various aspects of military
transformation, such as the willingness of the political elites in Eastern Europe and the
monitoring mechanisms of the Alliances determine the successful adaptation of these countries
to the new security realities and their preparedness to assume the responsibilities of NATO
membership. The scope and the pace of the actual reforms, differ substantially on a case-by-case
basis. The trend of transformation depends on various external and internal factors. From the
viewpoint of external or structural factors, at least two different sets of countries could be
identified among the new NATO allies. The first group includes the six Eastern European
606 Author’s Personal Interview with Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, former Deputy Minister of Defense, the George Marshall Center in Sofia, Bulgaria, February 3, 2006. 607 “Modernization Plan for Bulgarian Armed Forces 2002 -2015,” Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, Sofia, Bulgaria 2002, http://www.mod.bg/bg/modern/plan.html, 06/14/2007 (in Bulgarian). 608 Author’s Personal Interviews with Jan Michal, January 24, 2006 and Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, February 3, 2006.
295 countries that had heavy Cold War armies and were once members of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The second one has mostly countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia that had very limited or no experience at all with independent statehood prior to 1990. The survey of the expansion process confirmed that these two groups underwent through different types of transformation. In the case of the six “Cold warriors” the transformation dealt primarily with the reorganization and reduction of armed forces, while in the case of the newly independent states this process involved accumulation of new resources and parallel institution-building and development of capabilities.
At the same time, the study indicates that various domestic and elite-related factors had a negative impact on the relationship between resources and capabilities and, thus, curtailed the effect of complementarities. In most of the cases the efficient allocation of funding meant substantial cuts in manpower and outdated equipment, which necessitated layoffs and resulted in job losses and increasing unemployment. That is why certain segments of the political elites and bureaucratic entities in the militaries opposed and attempted to delay the pace of transformation.
This could certainly explain why the relationship between military resources and specific allied capabilities is not always as robust as the case of the “old” NATO allies. In the same token, both
MAP and the various coordinated efforts of the aspiring nations in the Vilnius group and the
Adriatic Charter should be approached not solely as mechanisms of improved coordination, but also as a form of exercising pressure against the domestic bureaucratic resiliency and reluctance to conduct reforms. Therefore, the analysis of the second wave of NATO’s post Cold War expansion (2002-2004) identified the domestic, bureaucratic and organizational sources of resilience to transformation. While these could explain tangential outcomes and protracted
296 military transformation, they were not able to address the core question of this inquiry – why alliances transform and adapt to the new security challenges. Alternatively, the logic of club goods and the concept of complementarities offer a logically consistent explanation that connects the ongoing process of NATO expansion analyzed in the previous sections of this chapter with the advancement of allied capabilities discussed in Chapter Four.
From a policy standpoint, the logical question is how does the proposed framework of analysis approach the issue of further waves of NATO expansion? In other words, should
NATO continue to expand and under what conditions? This question is particularly relevant in the light of the upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008. First and foremost the notion of complementarities is primarily a theoretical concept that explains a certain dynamic rather than predicting the patterns of upcoming waves of expansion. Second, it would be incorrect to interpret the theoretical concept presented in Chapter Three as pro- or anti- expansionist. The tracing of NATO expansion in the last decade indicates that this process becomes longer, more institutionalized and tougher for the applicants. This is an objective trend determined not only by the demand for specific allied capabilities but also by the supply of the
“quality” of potential club members. On the one hand, NATO needs additional specific allied capabilities and would be interested in inviting new members. On the other hand, however, the supply of capabilities by the potential new members among the MAP and PfP nations is far from impressive as they can barely meet the expectation associated with the membership.
The logic of complementarities indicates two foundational rules (axioms). First, NATO does not need to incorporate in its structures countries that face various forms of domestic political and military problems or major bureaucratic resistance to transformation because this would be detrimental for the club and the collective defense that it provides. It seems that
297 NATO underestimated the sources of resistance to alliance transformation in 1999 and focused on the political acceptability of the invitees rather than the payoffs for the club, which also strengthened the argument that NATO expansion consolidates democratic reforms and economic development in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, as the club grows bigger, the admission standards increase because of the concerns for crowing, depreciation and possible negative externalities associated with the admission of unprepared members.
Second, NATO’s experience with the accession of new members over time resulted in an admission process that became more streamlined and target-oriented as far as the different procedures and path of military reforms are concerned. Currently, the applicants are thoroughly observed with regard to their capacity and commitment to resolve disputes with the neighboring countries, their military contributions to various alliance activities and degree of interoperability with the other alliance members. They are encouraged to work together, where the Vilnius
Group and the Adriatic Charter are good examples in this respect. From the complementarities perspective this means that the applicants need to optimize their resource base and maximize allied outcomes in order to be eligible to join the alliance. This is not so much because of the expanded NATO has less need and provision of security but because of the likelihood for congestion and depreciation of the club. Therefore, NATO policy-makers in Brussels are particularly careful in picking new entrants which should be able to contribute toward the advancement of allied capabilities. It is also determined by the fact that the supply for potential allies is quite limited and the capabilities of the current and potential applicants are far from remarkable, which is why without fundamental military transformation their contribution can only be very marginal. The picture of the expansion dynamic indicates that not the size of the individual applicants but the level of progress matters in the final decision and if the applicant
298 meets the benchmark requirements, there is no reason to deny them from the prospects of membership.
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER EXPANSION Aside from the three current MAP nations, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and even Israel
have been mentioned as potential NATO members. Since 1997 Ukraine has had a formal special
relationship with NATO outlined in the Partnership Charter. Furthermore, the Prague Summit
introduced the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in 2002, the purpose of which was to “to identify
clearly Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities in pursuit of its aspirations towards full
integration into the Euro-Atlantic security structures and to provide a strategic framework for
existing and future NATO-Ukraine cooperation under the Charter.” 609 The plan sets short and
long-term objectives and provides for semi-annual and annual assessment meetings. 610 The
Ukrainian bid to join NATO was given a serious consideration after the pro-Western and pro-
reformist government of Viktor Yushchenko came to power as a result of the Orange Revolution
of 2004-2005. In January 2008 the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the
Parliament wrote a letter to NATO asking it to accept Ukraine into the Membership Action Plan,
as a step toward NATO accession. Nonetheless, the U.S., NATO and Ukrainian officials agree
that the country needs a thorough public debate before its entry to the alliance. 611 Contemporary
Ukrainian politics faces several key constraints to NATO membership. First, Ukrainian society
is deeply divided and “the polls indicated until recently that two-thirds of the population opposes
membership.” 612 Second, the domestic political is volatile because Kiev is divided between the
609 “Introduction to the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan,” NATO Handbook, Brussels, Belgium, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm , 06/14/2007. 610 Ibid. 611 Sabina Zawadzki And Yuri Kulikov, “Ukraine Says Ready for NATO Membership Steps,” Reuters , January 16, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3312687&C=europe , 01/21/2008. 612 Author’s Personal Interview with Dr. Samuel Wells, director of the West European Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, September 28, 2006.
299 pro-Russian and pro-Western camps and, therefore, the proponents and opponents of NATO membership have approximately the same influence. This results in a stalemate situation and leads to unpredictability in Kiev’s foreign policy. As one NATO official put it “the minimum and perhaps the only requirement that NATO might have for Ukraine to join the alliance is that the country should have a government and the government has to ask to get in.” 613 Third, similar
to Russia, Ukraine is certainly an outlier among the PfP nations, which is why its relations with
the Alliance have always been managed within a separate framework. In part this can be
attributed to the fact that with a population of about 45 million people Ukraine is significantly
bigger than the ten new NATO members. It also has a very specific geography “next to Russia,
sharing a lot of border and resources with Russia, where the population is fairly evenly divided
whether they want to be in the alliance or not.” 614 However, the logic of complementarities
indicates that not the size of the individual applicants, but the level of transformational progress
matters in determining whether the country can contribute to enhanced allied capabilities. In this
regard, Ukraine’s military requires substantial reforms and adaptation under MAP before it
meets the criteria for membership. 615
Georgia’s potential application for membership became relevant after the Rose Revolution in November 2003. The new reformist government embarked on law enforcement, the state bureaucracy reforms aimed at reducing corruption and improving transparency in the country. 616
At the same time Georgia upgraded its relationship with NATO under the PfP. In September
2006, NATO announced that Georgia’s application for Intensified Dialogue with the alliance was approved and the country was formally admitted in the Dialogue in December 2007, which
613 Author’s Personal Interview with Dr. Jeremy Shapiro, September 29, 2006, Washington DC. 614 Author’s Personal Interview with Dr. Samuel Wells, September 28, 2006. 615 Ibid. 616 Freedom House Country Report for Georgia, 2007 Edition, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007&country=7181, 07/10/2007.
300 was a substantial step forward for this nation. Georgia has focused on military reforms and only within six months NATO Assistant Secretary General John Colston noted that “the alliance was impressed with Georgia’s progress.” 617 In this way, Georgia’s bid for membership became among the most competitive of all the PfP nations. Also, Georgia is among the few NATO applicants that held a referendum on January 5, 2008 asking the citizens of this former Soviet republic whether they would like to join NATO. Georgian voters backed the bid for membership with 72.5 percent approval. 618 Furthermore, Tbilisi announced that it is going to boost defense
spending by a third, which is now a quarter of the government’s total budget. Russia reacted
negatively to Georgia’s aspirations to become a NATO member, which resulted in severance of
relations with Moscow. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov made it clear that “Russia was
preparing for war in light of the likelihood that NATO would soon be at its southern border.” 619
Not surprisingly, NATO membership is highest priority for the government in Tbilisi.
Gaining MAP status will be a major achievement for this country in the Caucuses. Although
Georgia clearly indicated that it has serious intentions, there are several additional factors that could influence the outcome of Georgia’s bid for membership. First, the loci of complementarities indicates that the major criterion for invitation is the level of military reforms that Tbilisi has already completed or plans to conduct in order to have a military that can contribute toward enhancing allied capabilities. Second, although Georgia allocates a substantial share of its National Product for defense, it GDP is much lower than any of the current NATO members ($3,900 per capita measured in PPP). The Georgian economy is growing very quickly
617 Kakha Jibladze, “Georgia Gains NATO Intensified Dialogue Amid Russia Crisis,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (CACI), 10/04/2006; http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/4229 , 07/11/2007. 618 “Georgia Referendum To Include NATO Membership Question,” Agence France-Presse , Tbilisi, November 26, 2007 and “Russia's NATO Ambassador: Georgia Unqualified to Join NATO,” Agence France-Presse , Moscow, January 18, 2008. 619 Kakha Jibladze, “Georgia Gains NATO Intensified Dialogue Amid Russia Crisis,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (CACI), 10/04/2006, http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/4229 , 07/11/2007.
301 (on average with 8-10 percent annually) in the last several years, which in the long run can make it an attractive candidate not only in terms of geography but also allied capabilities. Third, a major problem for Tbilisi is the deterioration of its relations with Russia, which does not contribute in any way toward enhancing Tbilisi’s bid for membership. The case of the Baltic countries indicates that Russia’s approval is not required for a country to join NATO. The
Alliance, however, would not extend invitation to countries that have problems in controlling their territories or outstanding disputes with its neighbors. The major difference between the
Baltics and Georgia are the conflicts that Tbilisi has with Moscow over the break away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 620 Both of these territories are located in the Georgia and are
recognized by the UN, the EU, the United States and the other major international organizations
as integral part of Georgia. The local population, however, is loyal to Russia and seeks
protection from Moscow. That is why Russian troops together with Georgian and local troops
are located in both of these republics as peacekeepers. Currently Georgia is very active
diplomatically in proposing plans that can settle these two outstanding disputes and unless the
conflicts are permanently settled, Georgia’s membership to NATO seems unrealistic because the
Alliance would not agree to extend the protection of Article Five into areas with unsettled
conflicts. 621 The settlement of disputes with neighboring countries is a core condition for NATO
membership, which is why Hungary, Romania and Slovakia had to sign the so-called “Basic
Treaties” in the early and mid-1990s, which regulated status of the large Hungarian minorities in
620 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are located in Georgia’s North and Northwest close to the border with Russia. Both entities broke away from Tbilisi in 1992 and sought protection for independence from Russia. Since then the conflicts are practically frozen, little progress has been achieved over the years. While overall the region has been peaceful, there were outbreaks of tension in 2004 and 2006. 621 Daria Vaisman, “Russia, Georgia Rattle Sabers over Ossetia: South Ossetia is pushing hard to break from Georgia with support from Russia,” The Christian Science Monitor , August 1, 2006; “Commission to Work on S. Ossetia Status,” Civil Georgia , Tbilisi, July 13, 2007, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15431 , 01/21/2008.
302 Slovakia and Romania and where these countries declared that they have no territorial disputes with their neighbors. These agreements became known as the Pact on Stability in Europe .622
Nonetheless, it is conceptually inappropriate to tie the logic of incorporation of new
members such as Georgia to the NATO-Russian (and ipso facto Western-Russian) relations. The
criteria for NATO expansion outlined in 1995 are in line with the concept of complementarities
and indicate the driving force for the admission of new members depends on their capacity to
contribute to the missions of club as a whole, not to balance out former, current or potential
rivals. Again, this logic is applicable to the specific structural conditions of imbalanced
distribution of power in which the management of IR including inter-allied relations rest
primarily on the hegemon. The allies, however, are expected to settle their territorial disputes
with neighboring nations in line with the “Basic Treaties” and the Pact on Stability in Europe.
Azerbaijan is another interesting case of a current PfP nation that has expressed interest in
becoming a NATO member. The country is pressing ahead with plans to overhaul the country’s
armed forces in order to bring them up to North Atlantic Treaty Organization standards. 623
Furthermore, Baku intends to adopt a new strategic doctrine by mid-2007 and increase the contribution of troops serving with NATO in Afghanistan. 624 In addition, the Azeri President
named integration into NATO a “top foreign policy priority for Azerbaijan.” 625 The country
participates in NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is scheduled to end in
2007. However officials in Baku have already indicated that they want to continue with the
program and Turkey, a NATO member with strong ties to Azerbaijan, has stepped in to assist in
622 “Pact on Stability in Europe (1995)” in NATO: An Encyclopedia of International Security , edited by Craig Cobane, ABC-Clio, forthcoming October 2008. 623 Khazri Bakinsky and Mina Muradova, “Azerbaijan Pursues NATO Integration,” Eurasia Insight , 3/16/07, http://eurasianet.net/departments/insight/articles/eav031607.shtml , 6/28/2007. 624 As of 2005 Azerbaijan has contributed with 22 troops in the NATO operation in Afghanistan. 625 Khazri Bakinsky and Mina Muradova, “Azerbaijan Pursues NATO Integration,” Eurasia Insight, 3/16/07, http://eurasianet.net/departments/insight/articles/eav031607.shtml , 6/28/2007.
303 expediting the reform process. Also, the two countries have established a high-level military commission to coordinate bilateral military cooperation. 626 This ambitious plan seems feasible because, unlike the new allies and the PfP nations, Azerbaijan has substantial oil and gas deposits. Its wealth surged in the last several years due to the increasing oil output and part of the generated revenue may be successfully used to quickly modernize its armed forces.
However, Azerbaijan is far from being eligible to join the alliance. Of the four PfP nations,
Baku has the highest democratic deficit and the biggest concern is whether the country’s political system is able to effectively manage its oil wealth. 627 Furthermore, Azerbaijan remains locked in the unresolved conflict with neighboring Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, which significantly reduces the possibility for the country to meet the current enlargement conditions of resolving territorial disputes with neighboring countries and, thus, contribute to the security in the North
Atlantic Area under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.
Israel represents another possible candidate, according to some. There have recently been arguments presented by intellectuals and think-tank researchers that one of the best ways to respond to Iran's growing threat in the Middle East and Israel, in particular, is to use NATO’s nuclear weapons to deter the Iranian nuclear threats and implicitly defend Israel from a future
Iranian nuclear capability. Ronald Asmus, for example, argues that “the best way to provide
Israel with that additional security (and thus balance against Iran) is to upgrade its relationship with the collective defense arm of the West: NATO.”628 He suggests various options for Israel that vary from “upgraded relationship” with NATO to full membership. As previously mentioned, the complementarities concept explains outcomes rather than applicability of specific policy-oriented or decision-making steps. Nonetheless, it implies that even before considering
626 Ibid. 627 Freedom House Country Report for Azerbaijan (2007). 628 Ronald D. Asmus, “Contain Iran: Admit Israel to NATO,” The Washington Post, February 21, 2006.
304 such steps, it is necessary to make a careful cost-benefit analysis whether the state in question can bring additional alliance capabilities at low cost and, most importantly, what would be the consequences of the Article Five commitments for the entire region. Given the complexity of the relations in the Middle East, it seems that the idea of upgrading Israel’s relationship with NATO is hardly feasible. Although nobody challenges the defense capabilities of the Israeli army, its vast military resources and outstanding training, the core issue in this case is legitimacy. First, it is not clear whether Israel meets the definition of North Atlantic Area under Article Six of the
Washington treaty. More importantly, the country has major conflicts with its neighbors, which will position NATO’s institutional setup in a very unstable and volatile region from the perspective of international security. Even much more than in the cases of Georgia and
Azerbaijan, Israel’s enhanced relationship with or even membership into NATO can only proceed after the successful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, not precede it. Second, the logic of complementarities implies that it is conceptually incorrect to expect that institutional involvement will modify the outcome of a certain conflict and lead to its resolution. On the contrary, the dynamic of NATO expansion indicates that institutional expansion is tied to previous settlement of existent in-the-area conflicts in order to be an efficient tool for management and settlement of other out-of-the-area conflicts. Third, the overall survey of
NATO’s transformation indicates that the specific allied capabilities are not solely related to military power because peacekeeping and crisis management are at the same time tied to legitimacy. Even if Israel is more capable to conduct successful peacekeeping than most of the new NATO allies, its success can be challenged because of the legitimacy of its troops to become involved in peacekeeping and crisis management in certain out-of-the-area hotspots.
305 Not surprisingly, there is a common pattern among the current allies in support for inviting new allies – the new ten allies tend to be much more enthusiastic about inviting new nations than other “core” alliance members such as France and Germany. The Visegrad and the Baltic nations, for example, tend to approach the invitation of new members also from an “emotional perspective.” They stress that the aspirant nations such as “Ukraine and Georgia should be encouraged in every possible way through bilateral and multilateral means, including the
European Union,” especially if they have shown “significant progress in terms of domestic, political and economic reforms in order to meet the standards of democracy.” 629
Alternatively, the old allies, including Germany and France, are much more reserved about
upcoming invitations. Although France has overall been supportive of the expansion process, it
has stressed several concerns. First, expansion should not result in deteriorating relations with
other major powers such as Russia as in the case of Ukraine and Georgia. Second, “there should
be manageability of expansion,” which primarily refers to NATO’s decision making procedures
that require consensus but also the overall issue of NATO’s congestion as a club. 630 In the same
way, Germany’s official position is that in light of an upcoming wave of expansion, “NATO
should proceed carefully, so that Russia should not be scared.” 631 Also, Berlin is concerned that
public opinion in countries like Ukraine is deeply divided, while in the case of Georgia the
concern is that geographically the Caucuses barely fits the confines of the North Atlantic Area. 632
These diverging perspectives on the future of NATO expansion also reflect a broader debate about how the alliance should function efficiently as a club of twenty-six or more (say twenty-
629 Author’s Personal Interview with Jan Michal, January 24, 2006. 630 Author’s personal interview with a representative from the French Delegation to NATO, January 19, 2006. 631 Author’s Personal Interview with a representative from the German Delegation to NATO, January 20, 2006. 632 Ibid.
306 nine) members while overcoming at the same time the effect of crowding and depreciation.
These issues will be addressed separately later in this chapter.
To sum up, the concept of complementarities neither advocates against the invitation of
new countries to join NATO, nor does it argue against the expansion. Rather it supports the
concerns of the anti-expansionist camp in the context of benchmarks not met, but clarifies the
condition under which new allies that are prepared to share the responsibilities and burdens of
“club” membership might join. The reality is that NATO needs additional allied capabilities for
the operation in Afghanistan whether it is going to develop these by adding new members or by
transforming the military of the current members. The assessment that “the future of NATO
depended on the success of the mission in Afghanistan,” seems a very realistic statement that
echoes not only from the editorials of leading newspapers and journals but also from the
decision-making elites within NATO. 633
The survey of NATO’s expansion confirmed the original hypothesis that incorporation of
new members can be successful only if they mobilize and manage the available resources in
order to advance capabilities needed for the missions in which NATO participates after 1991.
Therefore, the Alliance has certainly become attractive to the ten new allies, the current MAP
and some of the PfP countries, and has led them to mobilize military resources on the road to
membership. At the same time, such membership has remained unattractive for several
European nations that joined the European Union, but are not interested in becoming NATO
633 “NATO Launches Offensive Against Taliban,” The New York Times , March 6, 2007; “NATO’s Success and Future Depend on Afghanistan,” Panel Discussion with the participation of the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Germany's Minister of Defense Franz Josef Jung, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer and Senator John McCain, 43 rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2007/nato_panel_2007.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&spr ache=en& , 07/11/2007.
307 members. In the next sub-section I will approach the foreign policy behavior of Austria, Finland,
Ireland and Sweden and offer an explanation from the perspective of complementarities.
Complementarities and Alliance Politics outside the Club
FOUR CASES OF NEUTRALITY: AUSTRIA, FINLAND, IRELAND AND SWEDEN In addition to the “new” and the “old” allies, the model presented in Chapter Three explored evidence for complementarities in the cases of the European neutral nations. Thus, the hypothesis that NATO membership stimulates the advancement of allied capabilities will be checked against the countries that are not NATO members and for which the model presented in
Chapter Three indicated no link between military resources and allied capabilities. The section will explain why they are not motivated to join NATO and, more importantly, how this lack of motivation influences the relationship between resources and capabilities in their case. Special attention will be paid to several explanations consistent with the logic of complementarities: (a) the politics of neutrality is an essential component of the foreign policy of these countries and they prioritize it in their preference ordering to the benefits from alliance membership; (b) unlike the new members or the aspiring nations, these EU neutrals can afford to allocate more resources to defense and do not need to optimize their available resources; (c) in essence these nations accomplish the same tasks with regard to peacekeeping, crisis-management and non-proliferation and, therefore, the sheer fact of membership would not change their overall contributions to international peacekeeping and crisis management.
The survey includes Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden but excludes Switzerland. There are several reasons to exclude the Swiss case from the focus of this study. First, Switzerland has
308 probably the longest tradition of neutrality in the modern world. The first instance when
Switzerland officially declared neutrality dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
Although violated in the 1700s and early 1800s, the Congress of Vienna (1815) reestablished
Swiss independence and the European powers agreed to permanently recognize Swiss neutrality.
Since then the country has remained uninvolved in any international conflict. Furthermore,
Switzerland joined the United Nations as a full member only in 2002. Therefore, the so-called
“culture of neutrality” is deeply embedded in Swiss national identity. Second, the Swiss case clearly represents “legal neutrality,” rather than merely a policy of neutrality and has historically been abided by all parties involved in major conflicts in Europe. Third, unlike Austria, Finland,
Ireland and Sweden, Switzerland only recently joined UN, but is not a member of the European
Union and has not indicated any intention to join the EU, participate in any form of the CFSP or
ESDP or at least coordinate its foreign policy with the EU. Alternatively, the four neutrals
(Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) are EU members and participate in the CFSP and ESDP.
Under the EU community law ( acquis communautaire ), they should make available military units for EU operations under the "Petersberg tasks." These tasks are an integral part of ESDP and were explicitly included in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union. 634 They include: (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (2) peace-keeping tasks and; (3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Membership in the EU required that these four nations harmonize and adjust their national legislation in accordance with the EU norms and policies that included legislative and even constitutional amendments. Furthermore, the Draft Constitutional
Treaty provided for an expanded supranational role of the EU by proposing a solidarity clause.
It stipulates the EU Member States “assist each other in a spirit of solidarity in event of a terrorist
634 For further details see the EU website, Europa Glossary , http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm , 07/17/2007.
309 attack, natural disaster or a man-made disaster,” and make available various instruments, including “the military resources [of the] Member States.” 635 The solidarity clause is designed in
very general terms and covers a broad range of legal and political issues. Although the EU
institutional setup and the nature of the EU-NATO relations will be addressed in the next
chapter, it is necessary to stress that the institutional transformation of the EU changes the role of
these four European nations in international politics and poses a serious challenge to the
traditional interpretation of their neutrality. That is why the sample of these particular four
nations was important in order to test the relevance of NATO as a club with regard to the
proposed concept of complementarities.
Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden vary in their historical experience with neutrality and
have different reasons to pursue it. While Austria has been neutral only after World War II, its
approach to the matter is more “legalistic” compared to the other three nations and somewhat
closer to Switzerland in this respect. This legal basis of neutrality is embedded in the Austrian
constitution, which assumes automatic recognition by the states with which Austria has
diplomatic relations. Therefore, these acts of recognition were generally believed to have
created “a contractual relationship between Austria and the recognizing states.” 636 Austria
benefited significantly from this status during the Cold War, which allowed it to serve as a
“neutral wedge” that bridged NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. 637 Currently Vienna’s
neutrality primarily results in barring overflight of military aircraft under various NATO and
non-NATO missions over the territory of Austria.
635 “Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,” CIG 86/04, http://gandalf.aksis.uib.no/~brit/EXPORT-EU- Constitution/Draft-EU-Constitution-June-2004/Article_I-42.html , 07/17/2007. 636 Hanspeter Neuhold, “Comments on the Austrian Positions,” in Hanna Ojanen (ed), Neutrality and Non- Alignment in Europe Today , The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, pp. 15-16. 637 Ibid.
310 Unlike Austria, Ireland pursues a policy of military neutrality defined as “non-membership
of military alliances.” 638 Ireland is not however a “permanent neutral” or “neutralized state” in
the sense that such a policy is set out in any international treaty or a specific “domestic
constitutional or legal basis.” 639 At the same time, Ireland joined the European Union (then
European Economic Community) in 1973 and, unlike the other three neutrals, it undertakes a minimalist approach to national defense policy in the sense that it allocates very few resources.
This security policy can also be explained with the role of geography that “reduced the need to play expensive war games in order to sustain credibility.” 640 This is also one of the main reasons
why, unlike Austria, Sweden and Finland which joined PfP as early as 1994, Ireland joined the
Partnership in 1999 despite the high levels of public support for participation (about 77
percent). 641 However, the change in the international system and the development of the new
European Security System made it necessary for Ireland to become more active in these processes. That is why since 1999 Ireland supported and has participated in various NATO and
UN-led campaigns, such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo or Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in response to September 11. Ireland has been involved in Kosovo from the beginning of the mission in 1999 with a transport company as part of a Multinational Brigade.
It’s unit was under the control of KFOR Headquarters and their principal mission was to provide equipment and material lift to military units in KFOR, as well as to humanitarian organizations working with the UN. In October 2004 the Irish Transport Company was replaced by an
Armored Personnel Carrier-mounted infantry company, which still remains in the province.
638 Keith McBean, “Ireland,” in Hanna Ojanen (ed), Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today , The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, p. 30. 639 Ibid. 640 Patrick Keatinge, “Comments on the Irish Positions” in Hanna Ojanen (ed.), Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today , The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, 2003, p. 38. 641 Stanley R. Sloan, “NATO Enlargement and the Former European Neutrals,” CRS Report for Congress , http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs2.htm#summary , 01/22/2008.
311 Furthermore, in August 2007 Ireland took command for twelve months of the Multinational Task
Force. The Irish contribution under SFOR began in May 1997 and currently it contributes with
7,000 troops serving under EUFOR. Unlike KFOR and EUFOR, where the Irish involvement is linked to the EU membership, the country’s contribution to ISAF is quite marginal -- seven personnel, who operate in ISAF Headquarters, four of them being employed in the Liaison and
Negotiations Branch. 642
Sweden also has a long tradition of neutrality that has been in effect since the early 19 th century. The country approaches this issue primarily as a policy of non-alignment that “has greatly facilitated, and is still contributing to, an independent and active policy in certain fields of international security, such as disarmament, non-proliferation and conflict resolution.” 643 The biggest advantage of neutrality policy for Sweden is that, as a militarily non-aligned country, it has been able to perform various special services in the international arena, such as good offices, mediation, arbitration, which otherwise Stockholm would not be able to provide. 644 In the same token, participation in various peacekeeping efforts has been another distinctive domain of
Sweden’s involvement in contemporary international affairs. Furthermore, the country maintains close co-operation with NATO and its troops have participated or currently participate in various operations under NATO command in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. 645
The Finish case is probably the most distinct of the other three discussed. First, all through
the Cold War, Finland emphasized its foreign policy of neutrality, in contrast to the “law of
642 “Defense Forces: Overseas Operations,” Official Website of the Irish Defense Forces, http://www.military.ie/overseas/ops/asia/isaf/index.htm , 01/21/2008. 643 Anders Bjurner, “Sweden,” in Hanna Ojanen (ed.), Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today , The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, 2003, p. 43. 644 Bo Huldt, “Comments on the Swedish Positions,” in Hanna Ojanen (ed.), Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today , The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, 2003 p. 48. 645 Anders Bjurner (2003), p. 45.
312 neutrality” approach undertaken by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. 646 Second, Finland does
not have a long experience with neutrality. In fact, it was the war experience during the 1939 -
1944 that stimulated incorporation of neutrality policy into Finland’s foreign policy orientation.
This experience convinced the Finnish society that it should not “believe as theologically in
security guarantees the way some other nations” or any forms of international alignments. 647
Third, geography was also a key determinant in the choice of neutrality. With the Soviet Union next door constantly reminding Finland of its expectations during the Cold War, Finland had to
“successfully anticipate the Soviet reactions and proactively introduce initiatives designed to keep the potential menace at bay.” 648 Lastly, Finland made a good use of its geography and foreign policy by providing good offices and mediation available to both East and West.
The quantitative test of the model of complementarities indicated that the outcome for these
four nations differs from the old and the new allies – there is no sufficient evidence for a
relationship between military resources (manpower, army, navy, air force and defense spending)
and specific allied capabilities tested through troops aboard. The lack of relationship between
military resources and transformational capabilities does not mean, however, that these nations
do not contribute to the various peacekeeping efforts. In fact, a careful snapshot of data on the
troops sent overseas indicates that on average the old NATO members have between 100-150
troops per million people overseas, where Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and partly Britain
are the only outliers with on average 200–300 troops. At the same time the new allies contribute
only with about 50-80 troops. The non-NATO four EU nations send between 150 and 280
troops per million overseas. Therefore, with an average contribution to troops abroad higher
646 Hanu Himanen, “Finland,” in Hanna Ojanen (ed.), Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today , The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland, 2003, p. 19. 647 Ibid. 648 Ibid, p. 20.
313 than the old NATO fifteen nations and several times that of new allies, these four EU nations form a “group of countries that are security producers, i.e. countries that are able and willing to participate to peacekeeping efforts.” 649 The Nordic nations are traditionally among the highest contributors to international peacekeeping and crisis management efforts, which can be attributed to other factors that are not necessarily related to the management of resources and development of capabilities. At the same time, the decision to invite new allies is directly linked to their increasing contribution to peacekeeping and crisis management. That is why we can observe effect of complementarities for the new allies but not for these four neutral nations.
The high numbers of troops abroad, nonetheless, does not explain completely why there is no relationship between the resources and capabilities for these nations. Looking into the military resources of these four countries, there are several noticeable trends. First, aside from
Ireland, the other three nations have higher defense spending that the average NATO 15 states and much higher than the new allies. Second, the neutrals tend to maintain higher military personnel than the “core” NATO 15 and somewhat higher than the new NATO 10, particularly after the new members reduced military personnel is a result of the respective reforms. Third, the neutrals also tend to have on average higher indicators for army equipment than the old and the new allies, with the exception of Greece. Finland and Sweden maintain a high level of navy resources that none of the new allies can match and only Denmark, Norway, Greece and Portugal of the “old” NATO 15 can. Austria is a land-locked country and does not have a navy, and
Ireland maintains very low resources despite its insular geography. While Sweden has a high air equipment indicator, all other neutrals do not seem to differ significantly from the NATO members. Albeit with some variations, we can conclude that the neutral nations tend to allocate
649 Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Antti Sierla, the Mission of Finland to NATO, January 17, 2006, Brussels, Belgium.
314 or maintain higher resource base of some variables, which is why we are not able to find significant relationship between their military resources and capabilities. This means that while the alliance membership matters for the new ten countries from CEE, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden prefer to follow their own path, which is not necessarily congruent with the NATO requirements set out in the individuals MAPs. Unlike in the new NATO allies, the political elites in the neutral nations deal with a specific environment of neutrality at home that can mobilize higher levels of military resources for the sake of maintaining the current policy.
Complementarities indicate that club membership reduces overall defense expenditures because it produces more efficient use resources which are translated into more effective capabilities. This logic applies equally to the current allies, as well as to the prospective members. In the case of these four EU neutral nations, however, not joining the club is more valuable politically than the efficient advancement of capabilities. Aside from Ireland, Austria,
Finland and Sweden have no problems motivating their societies to allocate higher resource for defense based on various political arguments, which is why NATO membership is not attractive for them. In the next sub-section, based on my interview with the Finnish Ambassador to NATO
Antti Sierla, I will briefly discuss the motives of Finland to remain neutral.
FINNISH NEUTRALITY AND ALLIANCE POLITICS The Finnish case is certainly the most specific of all the four cases. The political elite in
Helsinki recognizes that, despite the changing dynamics of European security after the end of the
Cold War, the major sources of threat originate from Northeastern and Southeastern Europe.
Alternatively, there are very few indications for potential threats from Southwestern and
Northwestern. That is why countries like Ireland, Belgium, and Austria consider the idea of major military attack by foreign force geographically quite remote. Alternatively, “countries that
315 are closer to the former Iron Curtain, even Turkey and Greece” face major concerns for their national security. 650 Therefore, given its geography, Finland has decided to maintain neutrality
based on strong territorial defense. There are several sources for this choice of foreign policy
behavior. First, historically the country has been involved in conflicts related to the axis of
Berlin, Moscow and Stockholm. Second, Finland was one of two European countries not
occupied during the Second World War. As a result, there is a compelling conviction in the
Finnish society that the country can rely only on itself as far as its defense is concerned, which is
quite different than in many other NATO members, including the new ones. An indication of
this self-reliance is the overwhelming support for conscription (more than 80 percent of the
young people in Finland). In part, the high support for mandatory military service is because the
service is relatively short – only six months -- and because it is much of an appreciated ritual to
become an adult. Interestingly, sixty percent of the Finns say they would do the military service
even if it were not mandatory. 651
Third, although constrained by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty on the number of troops and
certain kinds of weapons systems (including submarines, marine mines and missiles), Finland
developed a defense system based on conscription and a large reserve. Helsinki recognized the
major threat was coming from the Soviet Union and signed an Agreement of Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (also known as the YYA Treaty) with the Soviet Union. 652
Article One of the treaty stipulated that Finland was obliged to resist armed attacks by "Germany or its allies" (which, in fact, meant NATO and the United States and its allies) against the Soviet
Union through Finland’s territory. If necessary, Finland was to ask for Soviet military aid to do
650 Ibid. 651 Ibid. 652 “Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” Encyclopedia Britannica , http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-26107/Finland#393175.hook, 07/15/2007.
316 so. Also, Finland decided to follow the Communist Bloc countries and did not participate in the
Marshall Plan and was quite reserved in its military relations with the West. As a result, the country was able to fend off the pressure from the neighboring Soviet Empire and avoid military confrontation with Moscow or its allies during the Cold War. This international position made it possible for Helsinki to become involved on an international level in numerous efforts including peacekeeping under the CSSE/OSCE, NATO, EU and UN auspices. In 2005 Finland celebrated fifty years of Finnish participation in peacekeeping operations with a total contribution of about
50,000 troops throughout these years, which in and of itself is one of the highest contributions relative to the size of country. 653
Currently, Finland participates actively in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and together with Ireland, Norway and Denmark, Helsinki has one of the highest contributions per capita to the stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. The active participation in various multilateral peacekeeping efforts reflects an unwritten rule followed by the political elite, namely “to pull
[our] weight; not to be a free rider,” which holds to various degrees across the rest of the neutral and non-aligned countries. 654
In essence, Finland is accomplishing tasks similar to NATO and considers itself “a security producer” in international politics. 655 Such a foreign policy orientation is also typical for the
other Scandinavian nations and can be attributed much more to the Nordic peacekeeping model,
than any other institutional or alliance involvement. 656 Nonetheless, when it comes down to a political decision to join NATO, there are several factors that come into play. First, Finland
653 Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Antti Sierla, January 17, 2006. 654 Ibid. 655 Ibid. 656 Peter Viggo Jackobsen, “The Nordic Peacekeeping Model: Rise, Fall and Resurgence,” International Peacekeeping , Vol. 13 No. 3 (2006), pp. 381-95. Jackbsen lists five factors that that are specific for the Nordic peacekeeping model and have made “the Nordic governments more inclined to support UN policies than they might otherwise have been: (1) suitability; (2) common interests; (3) distinct national interests; (4) high overlap between national interests and values and UN goals and ideals; and (5) the narrative of success; see Jackobsen (2006), p. 382.
317 approaches the current distribution of power across the international system somewhat with concern because the neutrality policy worked successfully in the bipolar world and produced a stable and favorable equilibrium for the country. Unlike the countries from CEE, the Finish public opinion approaches NATO membership with concerns and currently only about 25 percent say that they support their country joining the alliance, while about 60 percent do not support it. At the same time, the support for NATO membership among the new allies usually varies between 50 and 70 percent. Second, the lower approval ratings can in part be attributed to the fact that “it is not very clear for public opinion the relationship between NATO and the
United States.” 657 This explanation is consistent with the argument that NATO is perceived as
playing a largely supportive role in the U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. 658 Third, the British and the Americans are generally perceived by the Finns as the “hard task masters” and sometimes it is hard for the public to understand U.S. foreign policy interests and, more importantly, to support them. Fourth, the Finnish public equates NATO with the overall U.S. position on issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court and, therefore, shares a “negative sentiment that plays against an early membership.” 659
Initially the support for NATO membership in this Nordic country in the early and mid-
1990s was more than 30% but it dropped significantly after Kosovo and the war Iraq since
2003. 660 Furthermore, when asked whether Finland will ultimately join NATO, the majority
(more than 50 percent) of the Finns believe that this will happen anyway. 661
657 Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Antti Sierla, January 17, 2006. 658 Renée De Nevers, “NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era,” International Security , Vol. 31 (4), April 2007, pp. 35. 659 Author’s personal interview with Ambassador Antti Sierla, January 17, 2006. 660 Ibid. 661 Ibid.
318 There are two possible explanations why Finns expect that NATO membership will happen anyway. The first one is associated with the link between resources and capabilities as described in the third hypothesis of the study. Within this framework of analysis, Finland’s accession to
NATO is driven by a cost-benefit analysis, where NATO membership would enhance the country’s efficient use of its military resources and further contribute toward the advancement of its peacekeeping and crisis management capabilities. Therefore, NATO membership is expected to reduce substantially the costs to acquire these capabilities. The second reason why the Finns believe that their country will eventually become NATO member is linked to the role and influence of the hegemon in managing the heterogeneous clubs. The Finns view the perspectives for NATO membership in the context of the Euro-Atlantic security and in recognition of the leadership role of the United States in managing Alliance politics. The evidence presented in this section seems to be in line with the second explanation. While the Finnish public is not so much concerned about the efficiency of its armed forces, it does take into account the influence of the hegemon in managing alliance politics. These are several reasons in support of this observation. First, many of Finland’s neighbors are now NATO allies -- Germany, Denmark and
Norway; some of them were adversaries during the Cold War -- Baltic nations and Poland.
Nonetheless, Finland is surrounded by Sweden and Russia; two non-NATO neighbors. Second, the Finish public implicitly captures the growing heterogeneity within the expanded NATO and understands that Helsinki’s participation in this diverse club will enhance the nation’s influence in the transatlantic decision-making with regard to peacekeeping and crisis management. Third, the support for NATO membership is linked to the recognition of the role and significance of the
United States and somehow reflects the Finnish approval of U.S. foreign policy. That is why the expectation for NATO membership can be attributed to the expectations among the Finns for the
319 persistence of U.S. leadership in the North Atlantic Area and Washington’s continued involvement in the transatlantic affairs.
These observations are confirmed by public opinion data, which indicate that Finland is
probably the least supportive among the four neutral nations of the U.S. hegemonic leadership.
For example, in a Eurobarometer study on Public Opinion in the European Union about America
after 9/11 conducted between 2001 and 2003 only 11 percent of the Finns agreed to have their
military bases available to the antiterrorist coalition led by the United States, while 83 percent
opposed such an idea. At the same time 26 percent of the Austrians and 29 percent of the
Swedes supported this idea. With its 38 percent approval Ireland had the highest public support
among the four non-aligned countries. When asked whether the EU citizens would agree to put
their national intelligence services at the disposal of the anti-terrorist coalition led by the U.S.,
the Finns had again the lowest approval rate in the EU (34%), while 64 percent of the Irish and
66 percent of the Swedes would support such as measure. Lastly, only 5 percent of the
population in Finland (the lowest in the EU) and 8 percent in Austria would agree to send their
troops to fight with the United States in the war on terror, while at the same time 20 percent of
the Swedes and 26 percent of the Irish would consider such a foreign policy step appropriate.
Interestingly, in five European nations more than half of the public expressed approval to send
troops overseas in support of the U.S.-led coalition – France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and
the United Kingdom. 662 In a Gallup International survey, Voice of the People conducted in 2002, about 33 percent of the Finns, 43 percent of the Austrians, 48 percent of the Swedes and 29 percent of the Irish believed that U.S. Foreign Policy has a negative effect on their country.
Canada was the only NATO ally that had more than half of its public view U.S. Foreign Policy
662 “America After 9/11: Public Opinion on The War on Terrorism, The War with Iraq, and America’s Place in the World,” updated September 19, 2003, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16974/pub_detail.asp , 01/22/2008.
320 negatively, while only between 15 and 30 percent of the public in the new NATO members perceived the U.S. foreign policy behavior negatively. 663
As far as the European Union and its ESDP is concerned, Finland belongs to the group of
European nations supporting the idea that Europe needs a more credible defense less reliant on the United States. At the same time, Helsinki does not reject the significance of transatlantic partnership stressing that it is “vital for the European interest to have the United States as ally, as much as it is a vital American interest to have the Europeans as allies.” There is no doubt that
Finland and the other three neutral EU states are important partners in managing various peacekeeping crisis-management and stabilization missions and play a role in managing transatlantic relations the implications of which will be discussed in details in the next chapter of the dissertation.
To sum up, the various sources of neutrality in the case of Finland and the other three nations do not stop them from accomplishing the same tasks that NATO does without restraining themselves in the alliance framework. The politics of neutrality or non-alignment associated with the Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish behavior allows them to use ample military resources in order to develop specific capabilities to manage peacekeeping, crisis-management and non-proliferation. There is no immediate expectation for NATO membership among these countries, which is why there is no tendency to use the available military resources more efficiently in order to translate them into more effective capabilities. In the end of the day, not being tied to an institutional membership is somewhat an advantage for these four nations and for the alliance as a whole because it offsets the effects of potential crowding and depreciation within NATO.
663 “Voice of the People: Global Survey,” Gallup International for Media Release , September 7, 2002, http://www.voice-of-the-people.net/ContentFiles/docs%5CTerrorism_and_US_foreign_policy.pdf , 01/22/2008.
321
NATO’s Heterogeneity and Anticipated Outcomes
The theoretical part of this study on NATO rests on the conceptualization of complementarities as an integral part of club goods theory. The model presented in Chapter Two recognizes that there are differences in the size and resource base among the different groups of allies that reflect variations in their capabilities, namely that certain members may contribute more or less than others. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, today’s NATO of twenty-six nations is more heterogeneous than ever and the dynamic of admitting current and potential applicants indicates that admission of new members will only strengthen this tendency. In this section, I will briefly discuss how heterogeneity impacts the outcomes that NATO produces as a club in terms of members’ payoffs and transaction costs, as well as the crowding and depreciation effects.
The logic of complementarities for the new allies indicates that the new NATO members need to transform and optimize their resources in order to boost capabilities and contribute adequately to the alliance missions. As the former SACEUR Gen. James Jones jokingly indicated “if [these] nations realized what they were signing up to in 2002, they probably wouldn't have done it, because it does cost money and [it] has caused a lot of pain.” 664 For these not so wealthy nations, NATO membership means that they have joined an expensive club that provides exclusive benefits such as the Article Five clause. At the same time, it involves costs that are not solely associated with the membership fees but also with investments in advanced modern military technology that can make the new allies interoperable and capable to
664 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, December 21, 2006, p. 4.
322 successfully conduct out-of-area operations. NATO has always existed “off the largeness of contributing countries” and the expansion of the club in 1999 and 2002 has been able to provide
“multinational logistics and organic intelligence, which NATO has never had.” 665
The transaction costs are also directly associated with the development of capabilities. In
her 2007 article “NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era,” Renee de Nevers
studies the link between the changing transaction costs with the admission of new members and
the enhancement of NATO’s capabilities and argues that “the U.S.-backed expansion of the
alliance contributed to the erosion of NATO’s military capabilities.” 666 The link between military resources and capabilities of the allies, explored in the first and second hypothesis of the dissertation as the concept of complementarities, suggests quite a different explanation. The club goods theory assumes that it is optimal to expand a heterogeneous club if the net membership criteria for an entrant exceeds or at least equals the costs associated with the utilization of the club during the membership. 667 In the case of NATO this means that the new members must
optimize resources and possibly increase them in order to improve their allied capabilities and,
when needed, send more troops overseas for NATO missions. The survey of the expansion
dynamics in this chapter showed that the new allies are complying with the requirements coming
from Brussels and, to the extent that it is feasible, they have responded positively to the request
to send more troops to Afghanistan or other NATO operations. Furthermore, the test of the
complementarities concept indicated that, albeit slow, this is a steady trend. Therefore, to argue
that there has been an erosive outcome within NATO emanating from the admission new
members does not hold. At the same time, Nevers is correct in mentioning that “when the
second expansion decision was made in 2004, […] it was already apparent that the states that
665 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, December 21, 2006, p. 4. 666 Renee De Nevers, (2007), p. 62. 667 Cornes and Sandler (1992), p. 236.
323 joined NATO in 1999 had failed to meet [some of the] the goals set for transforming their militaries to accord with NATO standards; and they were not likely to achieve them soon.” 668
Aside from the bureaucratic inertia and organizational resistance at home, one of the major reasons why the new countries did not complete their reforms faster is NATO’s own inexperience in exercising pressure on allies to improve their capabilities. In fact, it was not until the late 1990s, that the alliance was equipped with reliable and efficient institutional mechanisms for monitoring the progress of individual applicants in the form of the Membership Action Plan.
That is why it was unable to exercise pressure and control over the new allies.
De Nevers correctly states that as far as the alliance outcomes are concerned “NATO plays
a largely supportive role in the war on terror” where “NATO countries are engaged in key
elements of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.” 669 To a major degree this finding is determined by the structural imperative of the non-competitive unipolar environment in which post-Cold War
NATO operates. In the same token, the logic of club goods theory provides a plausible explanation why unipolarity strengthens the divergence within the club. A single club, such as
NATO, stimulates the formation of other sub-clubs that provide near substitution and reduce the monopoly effect. This is also known as the non-competitive provision, as discussed in Chapter
Two. However, the non-competitive provision does not automatically assume that the club is fading away or breaking up into various constituent units or sub-clubs. Renee de Nevers correctly notes that “the shifting alignments and attitudes toward threats confronting NATO have reduced the United States’ willingness to accept alliance constraints,” which means more outcomes have been produced within issue-oriented sub-clubs or various alignments that within
668 Ibid, pp. 62-3. 669 Ibid.
324 the club as a whole. 670 This effect is combined with the growing gap in capabilities among the
various sub-clubs as discussed in Chapter Two of the dissertation. 671 The 1999 and 2002 waves of expansion only strengthened the overall heterogeneity and made the sub-club of the new members more cohesive, which resulted in frequent alignments and various coalitions between these countries and the United States.
Heterogeneity affects, without any doubt, the overall outcomes that the alliance produces as a whole because it is much harder to reach consensus on multiple issues. For example, in the
2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom the United States faced major residence on the part of France,
Germany and Belgium all of whom argued that NATO should not remain involved in any way in the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq. For this purpose, the United States decided to use the Defense
Planning Committee (DPC) in order to avoid the most likely French veto in the North Atlantic
Council. In the end of the day, Belgium was the only holdout for 24 hours but finally all the participating nations agreed “to do collectively what most individual members agreed anyway,” namely to come to Turkey’s defense in the event that Iraq retaliated against Ankara during the war. 672
Alternatively, when NATO agrees to support a certain mission its involvement remains quite limited because of various reservations from some allies. Again, at the U.S. initiative,
NATO agreed in 2004 in Istanbul to play a more important role in Iraq by training Iraqi security forces. The mission had several components: mentoring of Iraqi military officers by NATO personnel, as well as officer training in Iraq and in the NATO facilities. Initially, some members objected to the precedent set by taking on the training mission, which slowed the inception of the
670 Ibid, p. 59. 671 For details about the growing heterogeneity within NATO see James Golden’s work The Dynamics of Change in NATO and the application of his findings to the enlarged NATO as discussed in Chapter two. 672 Gordon and Shapiro (2006), pp. 137-8.
325 mission. 673 France, for example, agreed to participate in the mission and provide the necessary
funding under the condition that they do this outside of Iraq in the neighboring United Arab
Emirates and Kuwait. The underlying assumption in Paris was that they would be involved “in
an effort to train the National Army of Iraq as a united state, rather than some sort of tribal
armies or paramilitaries.” 674 Ultimately, NATO agreed to set itself the target of training 1,000
officers inside Iraq annually, and 500 outside of the country. By September 2006, the alliance
had trained 650 Iraqi officers in European facilities and roughly 2,000 officers overall. In
addition, the former Warsaw Pact members agreed to donate military equipment to the Iraqi
security forces because their equipment is compatible with Iraq’s Soviet-supplied military
hardware. 675 The mission of training Iraqi officers may not have always produced the most
optimal outcomes in terms of funding, scope of the mission and level of involvement, but it
seems that overall the effects of crowding and depreciation are being overcome. For example,
all the allies support and fund the mission, but sixteen of them have sent staff in Iraq. The others
such as France and Norway prefer to train Iraqi officers in the neighboring countries or in
Europe. 676 Whereas NATO and the Iraqi government emphasized their preference for training in
Iraq from cost-effectiveness and confidence-building perspectives, the flexible options for each of the allies to choose how they want to participate guarantees their involvement in this Alliance effort. Interestingly, as of October 2007 eight of the ten new allies have sent staff in Iraq; only
Latvia and Slovakia have not sent staff in the theater.
673 Renee De Nevers (2007), pp. 52-3. 674 Author’s personal interview with the Deptuty Head the French Delegation to NATO, January 19, 2006. 675 Renee De Nevers (2007), p. 53. 676 Rick Lynch and Phillip Janzen “Looking to the future: NATO Training Mission–Iraq,” JFO , Issue 40, 1 st Quarter 2006 and Official Webpage of NATO Training Mission in Iraq, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM- I/NTM-I.htm , 01/22/2008.
326 As a club of twenty-six heterogeneous members, NATO occasionally faces problems due to the effects of crowding and depreciation. Crowding is directly related to the increased number of members, (i.e. allies) using the facilities of a club, which surpasses the club’s carrying capacity. Depreciation, on the other hand, occurs when the surrounding environment deteriorates as a direct result of the crowding effect and is not directly linked to the admission of the new members. An example of depreciation may be the inefficient management of the alliance missions. If certain nations impose major restriction on the rules of engagement or if the allies are not able to work together that will certainly affect negatively the overall outcome of the mission. Nonetheless, the inefficient management of a certain mission should not necessarily be attributed to the increasing number of allies and the effect of crowding. NATO, or by the same logic any other alliance, may not be able to coordinate its efforts and face the possibility of
“becoming a two-tiered Alliance of those who are willing to fight and those who are not” 677 in a format of twelve, sixteen or twenty-six members. Therefore, not only the number but also the identity of the allies determines the effect of depreciation of the heterogeneous clubs. In other words, had the expansion not occurred, we would probably be able to track down the same patterns, since some of these features were noticeable during the Cold War and in the early
1990s. Translated in the case of NATO, it means that the alliance becomes incapable of producing efficient and timely decisions due to the extremely diverse nature of its allies and its outdated decision-making procedures. There are several sources of these effects.
First, the “Military Committee of NATO, which is supposed to give the military advice, is in danger of becoming overrun by the early input of political influence before the military advice
677 Speech of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in Munich, Germany, Sunday, February 10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1214 , 02/12/2008.
327 is developed.” 678 Not surprisingly, this results in distorting the persuasive power of the rational military expert advice. While this problem can be fixed with “some structural reorganization that preserves the integrity of the military advice,” the consensus rule at the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) becomes a much bigger problem. NAC is supported in its work from about 350 committees all of which operate on the rule of consensus. Even if twenty-five countries agree on a particular decision, such a mechanism allows a single nation to block it if it decides to do so.
The rule has remained unrevised since 1949 and, given the perspective that “NAC is getting bigger and bigger, NATO needs to address this issue.” 679
Certainly over the year NATO has developed mechanisms to deal with dissenting nations, such as the flexibility of opting out or the so-called “silence procedure.” In this way, the allies who disagree would feel unconformable to “break silence” and the decisions tend to get passed. 680 In other occasions, however, the diverging identity of the allies may overcome the
“science procedure” and result in excessive use of the veto power by some allies. Such is the case of the recent negotiations between Greece and FYR of Macedonia, where Athens made it clear that unless Skopje agrees to change its name and both countries settle the dispute permanently; it will block Macedonia’s invitation efforts to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. 681
678 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, December 21, 2006, p. 6. 679 Ibid, p. 7. 680 Celeste Wallander explains the “silence procedure.” When the office of the secretary-general seeks to get agreement on a decision, it drafts a memo to the permanent representatives of all the member countries. The memo takes the form “I propose decision X, and unless I hear no from you, I will go ahead.” See Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization , Vol. 54 (2000), p. 724. 681 Most countries recognize FYR of Macedonia under its constitutional name as the Republic of Macedonia. Greece, nonetheless, argues that the name implies claims to the history and culture of its northern province and has taken the position of not recognizing the name Republic of Macedonia. The relations between these two neighbors have been managed with the Interim Agreement of 1995, but no ultimate settlement of the dispute has been achieved. Although the position of Athens is not favored by the vast majority of the NATO allies, who would like to extend an invitation to Skopje at the upcoming NATO Summit in Bucharest, Athens made it clear that it will use
328 Therefore, the growing heterogeneity strengthens the differences of identity among the allies and we cannot expect that the alliances as institutions of international security will always
“magically fix” all conflicts among its members with regard to other states (members or non- members), out-of-the-area operations or new capabilities. The European experience with integration clearly indicates that the consensus rule does not always stimulate efficiency and in many instances it undermines the success of club efforts. That is why until this problem is properly addressed, the rule will primarily stimulate formation of sub-clubs and alignment outcomes, rather than coherent alliance decisions. As a result, the decision-making process occasionally tends to favor suboptimal outcomes. That is why the four neutral nations (Austria,
Finland, Ireland and Sweden) are not less beneficial for NATO’s missions if they preserve their current status and remain outside of the alliance framework. Their membership will only add burden to the NAC without substantially improving the alliance capabilities, which is consistent with the key argument presented in this chapter, namely that four neutral nations do not need to join NATO because they complement the alliance efforts and achieve the same mission outcomes that would be achieved under NATO. By the same logic, the incorporation of new allies that currently contribute only marginally to the efforts of peacekeeping crisis management and non-proliferation and are not interoperable with NATO can actually enhance NATO’s capabilities in the long run provided they transform their militaries and make them compatible with the rest of the alliance.
Whereas complementarities assume that, under certain conditions, the inclusion of new allies will enhance NATO’s capabilities, the upcoming invitations of new allies, possibly at the
Bucharest Summit in April 2008, needs to consider seriously the possibilities for modifying or at
its veto power unless Skopje agrees to change the name. See Anthee Carassava, “Greece and Macedonia to Restart Talks on Name,” New York Times, December 6, 2007.
329 least adjusting the consensus rule, because otherwise NATO’s decision-making process may seriously face the congestion problem. An example in this respect is the extension of invitation to Macedonia. This former Yugoslav Republic has a standing dispute with its neighbor Greece over the name of the country, which dates back to the early 1990s when it declared independence from the rest of Yugoslavia. Greece claims that historically and geographically the name
Macedonia refers to Northern Greece and would not accept recognition and diplomatic relations with the state under such a name. A compromise was reached in 1995 with the Interim Accord between the two nations that they will use the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM) until the Interim Accord is superseded by a definitive agreement. No such agreement has been concluded so far and although intensive negotiations are going on, Athens made it clear that it will veto Skopje’s invitation for NATO membership if this political dispute is not settled.
At the same time, allies like France are among the major sources of opposition to the modification of the consensus rule and, until the French position changes, there is little chance that this trend will be reversed. As a matter of fact, contrary to the opinion of most U.S. decision-makers, the French position of “constructive opposition” has not always resulted in suboptimal outcomes. For example, the French participation in the NATO Training Mission in
Iraq since 2004 is instrumental due to the capabilities and experience that France has for such types of missions. Aside from the added legitimacy coming from the French participation, having Paris on board even from the position of “constructive opposition” was much more important for the success of the mission than the combined support of the ten new allies. When
France agreed to participate in training officers for the Iraqi National Army outside of the country, this significantly increased the chances for success of the mission. During the first training mission Paris participated in training 1,500 Iraqi military police in Qatar and contributed
330 with $10.7 million in monetary donations to the Coalition and the U.N./World Bank Trust Fund.
The core rationale behind such a commitment was that, thus, Paris participates in an international effort to stabilizing Iraq by training and preparing a United National Army, not some sort of tribal or paramilitary militias. 682
That is why France always stresses upon the importance of its position as a “constructive
opposition” within NATO. At the same time, some of the instructions that the French diplomats
and military experts occasionally receive from Paris put tremendous pressure on their arts and
skills to have such instructions conveyed in the most diplomatic and least conflicting way at the
various deliberating and decision-making bodies of the alliance. 683 It seems that it would be a lot
more beneficial if France considers modifying its position from a “constructive” to a “rational”
opposition. This would certainly make the lives of their diplomats and military experts less
problematic and at the same time stimulate the overall optimality of NATO’s decision making.
The analysis of the French position within NATO and the formation of various sub-clubs and
alignments cannot be separated from the bigger picture of transatlantic relations and the
interaction between the European Union and NATO, which will be addressed separately in the
next chapter of the dissertation.
In conclusion, this chapter explored the relevance of intergovernmental bargaining studied
through club goods theory and the concept of complementarities against NATO’s expansion in
1999 and 2004 with ten new members. The goal was to provide an answer why NATO is willing
to incorporate small and poor nations with marginal contributions to the overall allied
682 “Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction,” CRS Report for Congress , June 6, 2005, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48623.pdf , 01/22/08 and author’s personal interview with the Deputy Head of the French Delegation to NATO, January 19, 2006. 683 These observations are based on my interviews with various representatives of the NATO member-states at the NATO Headquarters is Brussels, Belgium who participate at various committees, as well as think-tank analysts in Washington, DC in 2006. Although it was not openly stated in the course of the interviews, the elite representatives indirectly admitted that there are such tendencies.
331 capabilities. The study confirmed the hypothesized explanation that NATO membership optimizes the use of available resources and enhances the capabilities of the new allies. This was observed in the cases of the ten new allies, the three MAP countries and the various potential candidates among the PfP nations. Alternatively, by focusing on the cases of Austria, Ireland,
Sweden and particularly Finland, the concept of complementarities suggested an explanation why NATO membership is not an appealing option for these four nations as much as it has been for the countries from the former Soviet bloc. Furthermore, I explained how the expansion stimulated the growing heterogeneity within NATO and the outcomes of tendency for the overall club dynamics. Lastly, the suggested framework requires surveying NATO’s transformation within the bigger picture of the transatlantic relations and exploring complementarities on inter- institutional level with regard to NATO and the European Union.
332 Chapter 6. European Union and NATO Capabilities: Implications for Transatlantic Security
So far we discussed the more tangible aspect of NATO’s post-Cold War transformation, namely the incorporation of new allies into the alliance, as well as the theoretical and policy implications that these events have for transatlantic security and diplomacy. However, NATO’s transformation cannot be approached isolated from the European Union (EU) enlargement and the EU efforts to advance its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as develop
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Club goods theory, more specifically the heterogeneous clubs approach, suggests a loose and yet manageable framework of studying the involvement of these institutions in international security. This framework is also consistent with the logic of intergovernmental bargaining theory presented by Andrew Moravcik and discussed in detail in Chapter one. The conceptualization of complementarities in terms of allied resources and capabilities requires a thorough research on European Union security to address these issues since both organizations share significantly overlapping military resources and allied capabilities of twenty-one nations which are full members of both organizations and, in one form or another, participate or intend to take part in EU- or NATO-led missions overseas.
This chapter approaches NATO’s transformation in the context of its cooperation with
other regional institutions of international security, such as the European Union and its Security
and Defense Policy, whereby the participants negotiate among themselves the advancement of
capabilities based on the logic of intergovernmental bargaining. The goal is to explore whether
and to what extent the presence of a hegemon makes a difference by promoting a more efficient
use of the available military resources by the allies in developing allied capabilities as outlined in
333 the fourth hypothesis of the dissertation. For this purpose I will offer a comparative survey of the advancement of NATO and EU capabilities. Thus, the focus of the EU institutional setup and its Security and Defense Policy in the context of NATO’s transformation serves two purposes of analytical inquiry. First, it explores the difference between the EU and NATO in the advancement of their allied capabilities. Second, it explores the implications of club goods framework for managing transatlantic relations and the division of labor between the two institutions.
However, I need to emphasize that this chapter does not focus on the EU Foreign and
Security Policy and ESDP per se or the future of the Common European Defense Project. In the same token, the chapter is not a study about the nature and state of the transatlantic relations, the commonalities and differences in the approaches of the European countries and the United States or the future of transatlanticism. There is ample literature on this topics and this dissertation cannot contribute significantly. 684 The last section of the chapter discusses the implications of
heterogeneous clubs for the formation of bilateral and multilateral coalitions within the European
Union. In this context, the chapter surveys the Atlanticist and Europeanist perspectives with
regard to the management of transatlantic relations in “old” and “new” Europe and how the
differentiated approach of European integration has effected the development of EU capabilities.
For this purpose, I will discuss the implications of the Teuveren statement (2003) initiated by
684 For further details about the debate on the advancement of EU integration and the future of trans-atlanticism see Stanley Hoffman, “Toward a Common European Foreign and Security Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies , Vol. 38, No. 2, (2000); Trevor Salmon, “The European Security and Defense: Built on Rocks or Sand?,” European Foreign Affairs Review , No 10, 2005; Ronald Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, “The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 18, No 2, July 2005; Juan Diez Medrano, “The European Union: economic giant, political dwarf,” in TV Paul and John Hall, International Order and the Future of World Politics , Cambridge University Press, 1999; Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's companion - or competitor? Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002; Anand Menon, Anthony Foster And William Wallace, “A Common European Defense,” Survival , 34 (1992); Jörg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels (eds), The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, New York: Continuum, 2001; Hanspeter Neuhold, “Die Europäische Union auf dem Weg zu einem politischen und militärischen Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen,” Occasional Papers of the Diplomatic Academy Vienna , No. 4 (2001).
334 Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg in the context of differentiated integration to advancement of autonomous EU military capabilities.
There are several reasons why such an analysis of transatlantic security through club goods
theory and the concept of complementarities necessitates approaching the EU and NATO’s
involvement in security business from a comparative perspective. First, the European Union and
NATO share largely similar membership structure and, therefore, common military resources:
currently twenty one nations are NATO and EU members; eleven from old Europe and ten from
Central and Eastern or new Europe. In addition to the United States and Canada, only three
European countries that are NATO members are not EU countries (Iceland, Norway and
Turkey), while six EU nations do not participate in the North Atlantic alliance: Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Sweden, Malta and Cyprus. The latest waves of NATO and EU enlargement only
confirmed the similarities in the pattern of admitting new members since both institutions
incorporated the same ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 685
Second, both NATO’s 1994 Brussels declaration and the EU’s 2003 security strategy (ESS) recognize similar threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and states failure. The EU security strategy implies that “Europe is both a target and a base for [such] terrorism” and that “the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction” in now “entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East.” 686 Furthermore, the ESS indicates a growing demand
for peacekeeping and crisis management where “violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on
685 While the three Visegrad nations (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) joined NATO in 1999, they were admitted to the EU in 2004 together with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The latter five countries, together with Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004, but Bulgarians and Romanians had to prepare for full EU membership until 2007. The short timelines of about eight years between the two rounds of EU and NATO expansions (1999 – 2007) indicates interconnectedness of these processes that comes into play with regard to European security and transatlantic diplomacy. 686 “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf , 09/20/2007.
335 our borders, threaten regional stability, […] destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights.” 687 Therefore, the identification of similar threats also demands similar missions to approach them: peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation, as well as military capabilities in order to accomplish them successfully.
Third, it has been emphasized in numerous NATO and EU official documents that the
capabilities required for the EU and NATO missions need to be “complementary, rather than
being duplicative,” where if “correctly managed, there is considerable potential for synergy
between the two initiatives.” 688 In other words, the idea of complementing capabilities is an
inherent part of NATO and EU strategies. That is why it is necessary to study carefully the
meanings of this concept implied in the official documents. Currently, the majority of
policymaking and theoretical literature links EU and NATO’s complementing capabilities to
Madeleine Albright’s “3-Ds,” who emphasized that the European project has to advance only on
conditions of avoiding decoupling and duplication of already scare defense resources, as well as
discrimination against NATO’s non-EU members. 689 As elaborated in the theoretical section of
my dissertation, the concept of complementarities presented throughout the dissertation is much
more comprehensive than the “3-Ds” formulated by the former U.S. Secretary of State.
The parallel efforts of the European Union and NATO to develop capabilities that would allow the member states to address specific types of missions indicates several specific features of these international institutions. In the case of NATO, the process of developing such allied
687 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 688 “EU Battlegroups,” Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defense to the Chairman of the Select Committee on European Union, The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, February 19, 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16100.htm , 09/21/2007. 689 Madeleine Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future,” Financial Times , December 7, 1998.
336 capabilities for peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation missions began with the
Brussels Declaration in 1994. The European Union addressed this issue in 1998 at the Franco-
British meeting in San Mâlo. The French President Jacques Chirac and the British Prime-
Minister Tony Blair agreed that the core EU nations need to develop European Union capabilities needed for specific operations. In 1998 eleven out of fifteen EU member-states were also NATO members. This means that from the very beginning, the European Union relied on the vast majority of the states that constitute NATO’s European pillar in order to advance its own capabilities. 690 Thus, resource wise the bigger picture of European security indicates that EU security and defense efforts rest largely on NATO’s capabilities minus those of the United
States, Canada, Turkey and Norway.
There are several core assumptions about the model presented earlier in the dissertation that will be applied to this chapter. First, albeit different in their nature, size and scope, both EU and
NATO can be approached as heterogeneous clubs. However, the major difference between these two clubs is the distribution of power. The presence of several major allies among which the
United States makes a significant difference in the distribution of capabilities within and among these clubs. While there is no ally that can match the U.S. capabilities within NATO, the EU has at least several major actors, such as France, Germany, Britain and Italy, with relatively similar capabilities, which makes it possible for them to form a relatively homogeneous sub-club of the most powerful and influential EU members sometimes referred to in the literature as directoire .
Second, on the European side we have currently twenty-one nations who are NATO and EU members. At the same time, the advancement of NATO and EU capabilities rests on the national military resources of the same allies, which is why the Cologne European Council Declaration
690 Currently twenty-one out of twenty seven EU nations are also NATO allies: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom.
337 (1999) emphasized that ESDP’s framework will “lead to more complementarity, cooperation and synergy.” 691
Based on these assumptions, the chapter explores the fourth hypothesis of the dissertation,
namely whether the presence of the hegemon enhances the development of allied capabilities by
stimulating the efficient use of the available resources. This hypothesis has only been implicitly
studied in the Chapters Four and Five. Specifically, two separate aspects will be explored. First,
the chapter will study whether the different success in the development of EU and NATO
capabilities can be attributed to the North American pillar represented primarily by the United
States. Second, it will also focus on the question whether EU and NATO are developing
“complementing” or separate capabilities which include peace-enforcement, crisis management
and non-proliferation missions. However, before studying the applicability of the club goods
model and the concept of complementarities, I would like to briefly discuss the development and
evolution of ESDP.
The EU Efforts to Develop Security and Defense Policy
The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP) was launched in
1993 with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and rests on the European political cooperation
(EPC) provided for in the Single European Act of 1987. The Treaty on the European Union
(a.k.a. the Maastricht treaty) stipulates that CFSP concerns “all questions related to the security
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time
lead to a common defense.” The tools for foreign and security policy were essentially the
691 “Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense,” Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, p. 1, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Cologne%20European%20Council%20- %20Annex%20III%20of%20the%20Presidency%20conclusions.pdf, 09/23/2007.
338 “common positions,” that remained from the Single European Act and which refer to EPC practice together with new measures called “joint actions.” The joint actions are “operational” initiatives that “bind” member states to adjust their policies to the actions taken by the Union as a whole (TEU, Article J.3 and J.4). 692 In this early stage, the Common Foreign and Security
Policy of the EU emphasized its intergovernmental nature and consensual decision-making.
The Treaty of Amsterdam made advances on the decision making component of the common foreign policy and largely left defense component outside its framework. 693 There were noticeable improvements in several aspects. First, by eliminating the consensual requirement, there was greater flexibility in the process of decision-making. Qualified majority voting (QMV) was applied not only to the implementation, but also the actual adoption of the EU joint actions, which meant that a member would not be obliged to accept a decision that it does not fully support. Second, the EU members agreed that states could abstain from joining CFSP decisions, which became known as “constructive abstention.” Thus, the Union could move forward toward a decision without necessarily requiring open consensus of all the member states (Article
23.1). 694 Third, the Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the supranational foundation of the EU by appointing a High Representative for the CFSP who deals with the day-to-day CFSP business, and who also serves in his or her dual capacity as Secretary General of the Council.695 On the
defense side, the Amsterdam Treaty made marginal progress in incorporating the Petersberg
tasks into the European Union legal and institutional framework. 696
692 Sten Rynning, “Autonomous Defense? The Role of Military Forces in EU External Affairs,” National Europe Centre Paper No. 17 , Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2002, p. 3-4. 693 Ibid, p. 9. 694 Ibid. 695 Ibid, p. 10. 696 Petersberg Tasks, as previously discussed in Chapter four of the dissertation, include “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (Amsterdam Treaty, Article 17.2).
339 The crises of Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and mostly Kosovo instigated another round of efforts by the core EU players such as Britain and France to develop Common European Security and Defense. Against the background of the fiasco of the EDC in the 1950s, the British Prime
Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac began to discuss the possibilities for strengthening this pillar of EU cooperation. 697 Britain made it clear that it would oppose any
“institutional reform of Europe’s security architecture which could weaken NATO and put at risk the continued American military commitment to Europe.” 698 In December 1998, the French and
British leaders agreed in San Mâlo that the EU should in the future “acquire capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises.” 699
The underlying assumption of this bilateral agreement in San Mâlo was that when NATO
as an alliance could not become engaged, the European Union will step in and become involved
if it has a vested interest to do so. Such a policy would allow making use of the military
resources of the member states to conduct these operations. The agreement assumed that the EU
would essentially use similar if not the same pool of military resources that NATO does, in
particular resources from those nations that are both NATO and EU members, which as a matter
of fact constitute majority of all European military resources. 700
697 Earlier attempts to establish Common European Defense were made with the European Defense Community and the Fouchet Plan in the 1950s and 1960s. These plans got caught in “cross-currents of two conflicts:” one about institutions, one about purposes. Also they failed in part because of the lack of consensus among the French political elite, and in part because “the orientations of France and Britain were fundamentally different with London so ‘Atlanticist’ and […] Paris always eager to champion European autonomy.” West Germany, on the other hand, was heavily reliant on the U.S. forces in Europe for its defense. For further detail see Stanley Hoffman, “Toward Common European Common and Security Policy?,” Journal of Common Market Studies , Vol. 35, No 2, June 2000, pp. 189-98. 698 Martin Reichard, “Some Legal Issues Concerning EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement,” Nordic Journal of International Law , Vol. 73, 2004, p. 41. 699 Ibid, p. 41; see also Sten Rynning “Why not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union,” Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 26, No 1, 2003, pp. 53-72. 700 The eleven countries which were EU and NATO members in 1999s included Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
340 While highly supportive of the San Mâlo decisions, the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright stressed the need that European security structures should not be diverted outside of
NATO. That is why she emphasized three underlying conditions for the success of ESDP: (a) no decoupling from NATO; (b) no duplication of already scare defense resources; (c) no discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members. 701 These three points have
remained the fundamental pillars of the U.S. position on the ESDP throughout the years. A
confirmation of NATO’s support for the French-British agreement from San Mâlo was the
Washington Summit in 1999 when the Alliance confirmed its approval for access to allied
planning capabilities for EU operations in which NATO is not institutionally involved. 702
As far as NATO is concerned, the assumption of the San Mâlo’s Agreement was that these planning capabilities would be accessible only “under a ‘presumption of availability,’ but not
‘assured by default.” 703 As a result, the European Union began to distinguish between two types
of operations depending on whether they will require the use of NATO assets or not. The
Cologne European Council (June 3-4, 1999) confirmed the goals set out at the meeting in San
Mâlo and reiterated that “in order for the EU to be in a position to play its full role on the
international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities.” 704
Furthermore, the Cologne European Council differentiated between completely autonomous operations and operations where NATO resources have been used. The Council emphasized that
“the Amsterdam Treaty would be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty, where the process of sharing
701 Madeleine Albright, ‘The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future’, Financial Times , December 7 1998. 702 Martin Reichard (2004), p. 42. 703 Ibid. 704 Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, June, 3-4 1999, p. 1.
341 capabilities “will lead to more complementarity, cooperation and synergy.” 705 Therefore, the
Council reiterated the need for the Union to gain “assured access to NATO planning capabilities” that have been pre-identified. 706
HELSINKI HEADLINE GOALS AND BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENT The EU leadership realized the needs for European capabilities and that ESDP would not be able to meet this needs if it is not backed up by certain crisis management capabilities.
Otherwise, it will be in a position to always request NATO to borrow “upon availability” certain
“pre-approved” capabilities. For this purpose the 1999 European Council decided to create a
“Headline Goal Task Force.” The target was set up to create a force of fifty to sixty thousand troops that are deployable within sixty days and sustainable within one year. The original expectation was that this force would be available by 2003. The Helsinki declaration also included the possibility for participation of non-EU countries, i.e. NATO countries would participate only if the operation required recourse to “NATO assets and capabilities.” 707 The reliance on NATO’s capabilities demanded also efforts on the part of the EU to improve coordination with the North Atlantic Alliance. For this purpose, the Union proposed four ad-hoc joint working groups within NATO to address various issues of the EU-NATO security relations.
In December 2000, the EU leadership agreed at the Nice Summit of the European Council to establish three separate institutional bodies as a part of the EU common security and defense setup. Furthermore, the EU presidency sought permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultations and cooperation. Most importantly, the Nice Summit conclusions indicated that
“the San Mâlo-Helsinki process did not involve the establishment of a European Army, and also
705 Ibid. 706 Martin Reinchard (2004), p. 42-3. 707 Ibid.
342 iterated the key role that NATO continued to play in the collective defense of its members.” 708
The document also stressed the issue of participation and non-discrimination of non-EU NATO members. This was mostly caused by Turkey’s concerns that ESDP operations might be used in
Cyprus against Ankara’s national interests. Efforts were made at the Brussels Summit in
October 2002 to accommodate the Turkish fears by stressing that “under no circumstances” will
ESDP be used against NATO ally. 709 Nonetheless, Turkey’s endorsement was given only after it was confirmed that an agreement between NATO and the European Union will “apply only to those EU Member States, which are also either NATO members or parties to the Partnership for
Peace and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO.” 710
While Turkey’s biggest concern was to prevent Cyprus from accessing NATO’s capabilities for
EU operations, such an agreement would guarantee that since Cyprus did not participate in the
PfP, it would not take part in the EU operations that use NATO military resources once the country joined the European Union. Thus, the Copenhagen Council overcame the Turkish veto and paved the way to the Berlin Plus Agreement between NATO and the European Union.
The agreement itself was a product of the growing demand to establish a framework that
regulates the rules and conditions under which the European Union will borrow resources from
NATO members, where the alliance as a whole is not a part. NATO Secretary-General George
Robertson and the EU High Representative for CFSP signed in November 2002 a document
known as the “NATO-EU Declaration on CFSP” that allowed the EU to draw on NATO-owned
military assets. The actual agreement was finalized and formally adopted on March 17, 2003
and currently serves as a basis for practical work in peacekeeping and crisis management
between the two organizations. The Berlin Plus Agreement was also preceded by a separate
708 Ibid, p. 45. 709 Ibid, p. 47. 710 Ibid.
343 “NATO-EU agreement on the Security of Information” (March 2002) and opened for the first time the possibility for the EU to become engaged in missions that until then were considered exclusively NATO and UN domain. The first EU mission launched under the Berlin Plus agreement was when the EU took over the Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia, which was previously managed by NATO. The Alliance supported the EU with strategic, operational and tactical planning. In the same way, the EU took over the command in Bosnia and the NATO-led
SFOR was transformed into EUFOR. The new mission was named Operation Althea. Currently
the EU maintains about the same force levels as SFOR (7,000 troops). In the last several years,
the EU troops have concentrated efforts primarily in providing assistance to the local authorities
and police to detect and destroy illegal arms and to disrupt activities by organized crime entities
and various sources of corruption. 711
In addition to borrowing from NATO, the European Union has been trying to develop autonomous capabilities for the ESDP missions. In the next sub-section, I will focus on the goals that the EU members have set themselves and the progress that they made in developing such autonomous capabilities for the ESDP missions. More specifically I will survey four European
Initiatives: European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), the EU Battlegroups (EU BG), as well as
Eurocorps and the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).
ESDP CAPABILITIES: RAPID REACTION FORCES AND BATTLEGROUPS The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) is one of several EU projects to address violent crises in Europe’s neighborhood and is an integral part of the European Security and
Defense Policy. The rationale behind the ERRF is to intervene in crises and conflicts before they
711 “EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” EUFOR Mission Webpage, http://www.euforbih.org/ , 09/25/2007.
344 become full-scale wars and, in part, to release NATO from involvement in some military operations where EU participation is also of strategic importance for the Union. 712
The Rapid Reaction Force concept rests on the Petersberg tasks, which have been expanded from humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping to include also joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilization. The goal of developing
ERRF is directly linked to the EU’s contribution in the fight against terrorism, including the goal of “supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” 713 The ERRF was officially introduced at the European Council Summit in Helsinki (1999). The Council set itself the goal to establish “smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.” 714 The original goals, knows as Helsinki Headline Goals were to establish by 2003
an associated catalogue of about 50–60 thousand troops. Based on the Helsinki guidelines, the
Nice Summit (December 2000) initiated new structures that have responsibilities to oversee the
policies, strategies and implementation of ERRF operations. First, the Political and Security
Committee (PSC) was designed to meet during crisis and non-crisis periods and provide
“political control and strategic direction” to the EU military response. Second, the Military
Committee was formed by the Chiefs of Defense with responsibility to report back to the
Political and Security Committee on the military aspects of these missions. Furthermore, this
committee is in charge of maintaining official military relations with non-EU countries and
institutions including NATO, where regular meetings are scheduled twice a year at the highest
level between the PSC and the North Atlantic Committee and six times a year at the
712 Chris Lindborg, “The EU Rapid Reaction Force: Europe Takes on a New Security Challenge,” Occasional Papers on International Security Policy , August 2001 No. 37, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP37.htm , 09/28/2007. 713 Martin Ortega, “Petersberg Tasks and Missions for the EU Military Forces,” Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, February 2005, http://iss.europa.eu/esdp/04-mo.pdf , 09/28/2007. 714 Conclusions of the European Council Presidency, Annex IV, December 10-11, 1999, Helsinki, Finland, pp. 19- 29, http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/imgLib/user/usk/uskolel/annex_en.rtf , 09/27/2007.
345 ambassadorial level. 715 The third structure is made up of the broader Military Staff, whose
responsibility is to monitor political developments, assist with strategic planning and to liaise
frequently among various national and multinational institutions. The Military Staff also
provides military expertise on the actual incorporation of the ERRF into CFSP and ESDP. 716
The point of the Helsinki Headline Goals was to put at the disposal of the European Union a reserve of forces, not to give an additional hatting to national forces. Nonetheless, these goals were extremely optimistic and did not account for numerous political, administrative and legal constraints originating from the various EU member countries. Nations like Germany, for example, had major domestic hurdles regarding participation in military operations on foreign soil. Also, few of these countries had major if any capabilities to transfer troops to distant areas in any quantity and, therefore, the Headline Goals required re-allocation of major resources and time to develop these capabilities. Jean-Yves Haine identifies at least three major problems with the Helsinki Goals. First, the quantitative target was set in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict without taking into account the actual strategic challenges today. Second, only a tiny percentage of the presented catalogue of forces was actually rapidly deployable. Third and most important, if deficiencies were to be identified, the Union had “no real incentives to remedy them.” 717
The concept of EU Rapid Reaction Force was first put into test with the Operation
Concordia in the Macedonia in March 2003, where the EU assumed command of the previous
NATO-led Operation Allied Harmony. This operation was the first to make use of NATO assets and capabilities that was made possible with the completion of the EU-NATO arrangements, including Berlin Plus. The operation was initiated at the request of Macedonian government for
715 William Anthony Hay and Harvey Sicherman, “Europe’s Rapid Reaction Force: What, Why, and How,” A Newsletter of FPRI’s Center for the Study of America and the West, Volume 2, Number 2, February 2001, http://www.fpri.org/ww/0202.200102.haysicherman.europerapidreaction.html , 09/28/2007. 716 Ibid. 717 Jean-Yves Haine, “Back to Transatlantic Pragmatism,” The International Spectator , 2/2005, p. 47.
346 assistance with stabilizing the security environment in the country and the implementation of the
August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. 718
The actual operation lasted six months after which the responsibility for security was
handed back to the local government in Skopje. The personnel involved was not numerous --
320 soldiers and 80 civilians under the EU command, where France provided half the troops and
the command on the ground. The European force was lightly armed with primary responsibility
to patrol the ethnic Albanian regions in Macedonia close to the border with Albania, Serbia and
Kosovo. Since the EU legislation does not allow funding from the budget of the Union, each
individual participating country paid their share of the financial burden. Ultimately, Operation
Concordia seems to have been a ‘laboratory’ testing the EU capacity to deliver capabilities for
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and crisis management. That is why it was often considered to
be probably equally if not more important to the EU than to Macedonia. Macedonia endorsed
the operation because there was a wide consensus among the political elite in Skopje that the
success of the operation would bring the country closer to the desired EU membership. 719
While Concordia was considered a successful pilot test of EU’s plans to develop rapid reaction forces, the EU leadership realized that there was still a major gap between the actual and targeted capabilities. In order to address this problem the European Capabilities Action Plan
(ECAP) was launched in 2001. The Plan focused primarily on “procurement and structural or doctrinal initiatives, and therefore did not contribute directly to enhancing Europe’s crisis
718 The Ohrid Framework Agreement was a political compromise between the government in Skopje and the ethnic Albanian guerillas reached in August 2001 that put an end to the short-term conflict in the country. The agreement guarantees to all minorities proportional representation and a quasi-veto power over sensitive political issues. It restored the political dialogue between the Slavic majority and the Albanian minority in the country based on the model of power-sharing and consensual democracy. 719 Chris Lindborg (2001).
347 management capability.” 720 Part of the problem was that until 2003 many EU countries had listed the same troops for several pools and registers. In addition to the Helsinki Force
Catalogue, the same units were also listed for use by NATO and the UN. 721 Under the Helsinki
Headline Goal, the expectation for development of new capabilities rested solely on the member states, where no European army type of forces or any other special supranational troops were envisaged. Thus, in essence the dual hatting produced no new capabilities by 2003.
The Helsinki Summit in 1999 agreed that the EU rapid reaction capabilities should consist of up to fifteen brigades or a total of fifty to sixty thousand troops and should have their own command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, as well as “other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements” that are deployable within 60 days. 722 In addition, the EU leaders agreed that within the ERRF there will be smaller rapid
response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. These smaller units are
known as Battlegroups (EU BG) and should include approximately 1,500 military personnel with
an expectation of deployability within 15 days and ability to sustain various missions from 30 to
120 days. The actual framework of the EU BG concept was put to test several months after
Concordia with the Operation Artemis . It was the first independent EU operation that dealt with
crisis management and was designed on the concept of the EU BG. Artemis took place in the
Democratic Republic of Congo during the summer of 2003. Although the Berlin Plus agreement
was reached a few months earlier, the operation was not managed on the basis of this agreement.
Originally, Artemis was meant to be a French operation but the European leadership agreed that
it was a good opportunity to test the Battlegroups format. The Union sent about 1,800 troops
720 Tommi Koivula, “EU Battlegroup: The Big Picture,” in Mika Kerttunen, Tommi Koivula and Tommy Jeppsson, EU Battlegroups: Theory and Development in the Light of Finnish-Swedish Cooperation, National Defense College, Helsinki 2005, p. 12. 721 Ibid. 722 Conclusions of the European Council Presidency, Annex IV, December 10-11, 1999, Helsinki, Finland, pp. 22.
348 from several EU nations, whose task was to stabilize the security conditions in certain areas of
Democratic People’s Republic of Congo, improve the humanitarian situation, and ensure the protection of the airport, displaced persons and the civilian population. 723 Operation Artemis lasted only several months and was quite limited in terms of time, area and available resources.
Upon the completion of this operation, France and Britain held a series of meetings to discuss the possibilities to further improve the planning and deployment, where these forces were expected to achieve initial deployment of land, sea and air forces within five to ten days. 724
Several months later Germany joined the coalition and the three major European players came with a joint “food-for-thought paper” in February 2004 that outlined the framework of the
Battlegroup concept. The agreed package set the size of the groups at approximately 1,500 military personnel and the expectation to be deployable within two weeks and sustain military operations between one and three months until these groups are relieved by the UN or other regional organizations under whose mandate they act. 725 The Union should have the capacity to undertake two concurrent single Battlegroup-size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both operations nearly simultaneously. The EU members made initial commitment in
November 2004 to the formation of 13 EU Battlegroups. Based on the lessons from Operation
Artemis , the Union concluded that EU BGs have to be prepared for high-intensity operations, either as stand-alone forces or as initial-entry forces for operations on a larger scale.
Furthermore, unlike ERRF which has to be multinational, it was agreed that the Battlegroops could be designed either as national or multinational units, i.e. composed of troops from one or
723 Tommi Koivula (2005), p. 16. 724 Franco-British Meeting in Le Touquet, February 2003, Franco-British Summit in London, November 2003; also see Gustav Lindstrom, “Enter the EU Battle Groups,” Chaillot paper No 97 , February 2007, p. 19. 725 Gustav Lindstrom (2007), p. 11-12.
349 more Member States. 726 The assumption was that such a flexible framework would provide open options and guarantee quick and efficient reaction to the demand for peacekeeping and crisis management operations. The progress of EU BG actual operational capabilities underwent several stages. Initial operational capabilities were achieved in 2005 and full operational capabilities in 2007. The successful initiation and implementation of the EU Battlegroups has been an important component of the overall “ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness in a response to a crisis” as formulated in the European Security Strategy (2003).
Therefore, the EU Battlegroups are a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. 727
ESDP CAPABILITIES: EUROCORPS AND EUROPEAN GENDARMERIE FORCE While the European Rapid Reaction Force and the EU Battlegroups were initiated
institutionally by the European Union at its Helsinki Council Meeting in 1999, Eurocorps and the
European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) are separate initiatives launched by an agreement of several
EU members states and, therefore, are not initiatives of the Union as a whole. The development
of Eurocorps originates back in the Elysée Treaty of 1963, signed by the French President
Charles de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, where established special relations
and agreed on defense cooperation. However, it was not until the early 1990s that Paris and
Berlin intensified military cooperation by creating a bilateral Security and Defense Council that
also allowed the creation of the Franco-German Brigade. 728 Belgium joined the Franco-German initiative in 1993 and this multi-lateral military cooperation was officially named Eurocorps.
Spain and Luxembourg were the latest additions to this multinational brigade. With the inception of the Helsinki Headline Goals, Eurocorps focused on orientation of its activities
726 Tommi Koivula (2005), p. 17. 727 European Security Strategy (2003) and Headline Goal 2010, endorsed by the European Council (2004), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf , 09/27/2007. 728 “Eurocorps: A Force of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance: History,” Eurocorps official web page, http://www.eurocorps.net/history/ , 09/29/2007.
350 toward humanitarian and population assistance missions, as well as peacekeeping and crisis- management. In 2001 the member nations agreed on the establishment of a ‘Deployable High
Readiness Force Headquarters’ in Strasbourg, France. Eurocorps participated in the NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo and led the ISAF-6 Force in Afghanistan from
August 2004 to February 2005. For this purpose, NATO evaluated the operational capabilities of
Eurocorps in 2002 and it was certified by the Alliance as a Rapid Reaction Force. Currently four other nations have integrated military personnel into the Eurocorps Headquarters, but are not members of the brigade: Canada, Greece, Poland, and Turkey. 729 All four of these nations are
NATO allies.
The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) is a relatively new institutional tool of European security that formally came into existence in January 2006. It is an initiative of five EU members - France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain – with headquarters in Vicenza,
Italy. The aims of EGF is to be able to respond rapidly to a wide spectrum of civil security actions either on its own or in parallel with a possible military intervention by providing a multinational and effective tool especially in crisis management capabilities. More specifically, the EGF is designed to facilitate the handling of crises that require management by police forces, usually in a critical situation. Thus, albeit important, it has largely a supportive function in modern peacekeeping and crisis management missions. Currently the Gendarmerie Force focuses on the development of a comprehensive and coherent operational system that will enable prompt deployment. It is primarily designed to provide additional operational capabilities at disposal of the EU, but can also be used by other international institutions in peacekeeping and
729 Ibid.
351 crisis management business such as NATO, UN and OSCE, as well as various ad hoc coalitions. 730
The major difference between the EU Rapid Reaction Force and Battlegroups on the one
hand, and Eurocorps and European Gendarmerie Force on the other, is that while the former
represent a pattern of uniform integration of the European security and defense, the latter
represent the differentiated approach to developing military capabilities undertaken by the EU
members. 731 Furthermore, these four instances indicate evidence for similarities and differences in the EU and NATO pattern of developing such capabilities. The evolution of the European
Rapid Reaction Force and, to a certain degree, the EU Battlegroups is similar to the advancement of NATO’s CJTFs and NRF. The initial goals set out at the Brussels Summit of 1994 and the
Helsinki Council of 1999 were quite ambitious and the targets were not met within the expected deadlines. That is why the negotiating parties had to revise them, set up more realistic goals and introduce more effective oversight mechanisms which guarantee that these goals will be met. In the case of the EU, the original ERRF was modified by introducing the Battlegroups as smaller, more flexible national or multi-national units prepared for peacekeeping and crisis management missions. A major difference in the NATO and EU approaches is the presence of an efficient implementation mechanism that ensures the individual allies will meet the goals. Since NATO is focused solely in the security business, the Alliance has been more efficient in setting up targets and not allowing individual state to bail out of its core initiatives. This is particularly true for the new NATO allies where both the Secretary General and SACEUR have several times been on recruitment missions in Eastern Europe with request to contribute additional military capabilities
730 “EGF Organization: Strategic and Political Levels,” European Gendarmerie Force Website, http://www.eurogendfor.eu/ , 09/30/2007. 731 Neil Walker, “Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union,” in Bankowski and Scott (eds.) The European Union and Its Order: the Legal Theory of European Integration , Blackwell Publishers, 2000, pp. 30- 64.
352 to the allied operations overseas. Although it is too early to evaluate how successful the ESDP project is, there are two major substantial differences between the EU and NATO approaches in developing allied capabilities. First, there is no hegemonic power in the EU, such as the United
States in NATO, which also makes it much harder to establish and develop initiation and implementation mechanisms. That is why the outcome of the EU efforts to accommodate the different interests of the nation-states results in what Stanley Hoffman calls “indeed Byzantine, institutional set-up […], a labyrinth in which only lawyers have a chance of not getting lost, with its overlapping agencies, wide array of voting rules, and babel of official languages.” 732 Second,
the core difference between the EU and NATO approach is that the Union embraces a
differentiated approach to integration, which includes security and defense. This allows for
flexibility, i.e. states can choose whether and to what extent they want to participate in the efforts
to develop EU capabilities. For this purpose, in the next section, I will discuss how the
differentiated approach to the EU integration affects the evolution of the EU capabilities in
comparison to NATO’s capabilities. Lastly, I will also establish an analytical link between
differentiated integration and the distribution of power, in order to explain how the distribution
of power within EU and NATO affects their functioning as heterogeneous clubs.
Theoretical Conceptualization of European Defense
The history of European integration indicated at least two patterns with regard to the level of involvement of the member states. At one extreme is the traditional model of uniform integration, where all member states are expected to fully embrace a certain initiative of
European integration. Alternatively, the model of differentiated integration assumes that while
732 Stanley Hoffman, “Toward Common European Common and Security Policy?” Journal of Common Market Studies , Vol. 35, No 2, June 2000, p. 198.
353 the core of the European integration is accepted by all the members, their policies with regard to specific initiatives, pillars or areas of cooperation may vary and it is up to the members to choose whether and to what extent they want to become involved. The idea is to allow for a greater degree of flexibility, where the member-states can choose from a carte or menu of EU initiatives and policies that they would like to join. The possibility to choose whether to participate or not in a specific area of integration has been particularly useful for the member states in the course of EU integration. It guarantees that states which would like to move forward with a specific integration agenda would not be stopped by those who are not ready to accept supranational authority and multinational coordination in this particular field. Well known examples of flexible integration are the Euro zone and the Schengen agreement. The common currency, for example, excludes Britain, Denmark and Sweden, as well as the new members (except Slovenia, which joined the zone in January 2007), while the Schengen common border policies are in effect for most of the old EU members but have only very limited effect for Britain and Ireland.
At the same time the Schengen Covenant is accepted by non-EU member states such as Norway and Iceland. The type and scope of differentiated integration has been conceptualized theoretically through four different explanatory models: multi-speed (or multi-ratchet ) Europe,
Europe of concentric circles, Europe á la carte and directoire of Europe. 733
Multi-speed Europe has been defined as a “mode of differentiated integration according to which the pursuit of common objective is driven by a core group of member states which are both able and willing to go further with integration the underlying assumption being that the others will follow later.” 734 Therefore, the explanation is that at a certain point in the future all
members in one way or another will catch up and reach similar level of integration. Multi-speed
733 Neil Walker (2000), p. 39. 734 A.C.G. Stubb, “A Categorization of Differentiated Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies , No 34, 1996, p. 285, also quoted by Neil Walker (2000), p. 40.
354 Europe, however, suggests that there will be a slow lane of integration for those members that find certain issues “politically unattractive.” At the same time the fast lane allows the most impatient pace-settlers to “to forge ahead indefinitely, leaving those Member States less equipped for or less committed to integration to find a more shallow depth of common interests and concerted action.” 735
Europe of concentric circles is a much more structural approach, similar to the conceptualization of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in developmental politics. The idea is that, aside from the traditional functions of the Union, the EU states can choose the extent to which they would commit themselves to a common approach and a supranational authority in a specific issue area. Based on their foreign policy approaches to various issues of common interest, there are core EU nations, such as the Benelux countries, France and Germany and a periphery (e.g.
Britain and most of the new EU members) which do not apply some areas of integration in sectors such as the common currency, the Schengen agreement or the free movement of labor force. Unlike the multi-speed Europe, the concentric circles model assumes that the “core” and
“peripheral” nations establish a stable equilibrium over an extended period of time and that is why the model is being criticized for introducing “discrimination on a sector-by-sector basis.” 736
Europe á la carte has been defined in the literature as a “mode of differentiated integration
whereby respective Member States are able to pick-and-choose, as from a menu, in which policy
area they would like to participate, whilst at the same time holding only to a minimum number of
common objectives.” 737 Therefore, Europe á la carte is seen as open ended arrangements where the EU members are free to decide their own levels and patterns of integration without reference to other member states and without deferring to the interests of the Union as whole. Europe á la
735 Neil Walker (2000), p. 41. 736 Ibid, p. 42. 737 Ibid, p. 40.
355 carte was proposed by Britain’s Prime Minister John Major to emphasize the intergovernmental nature of the European integration.
Directoire is the last of the four approaches to differentiated integration. The term dates back to the French Revolution when an executive directory (a.k.a. the Directory or Directoire) of
five directors shared the executive power in France after the Convention and before the
Consulate. In the same way, it refers to the major powers in the EU who have the most votes in
the Council of the EU and act as directors in the decision-making process. The number of
‘directors’ varies and in a smaller format may include only France, Germany and Britain, while
in a more extended format also Italy and Spain. Similar to the concentric circles and unlike
Europe á la carte and multi-speed Europe, directoire is essentially a structural approach that
recognizes and emphasizes the significance of the distribution of power within the EU with
regard to the decision making process. 738
These four concepts of differentiated integration are important in two aspects. First, they show how the EU decision making and implementation works in most areas, including the common European defense. Second, these theoretical models also depict the mode of European integration in security and defense that can be tested against the club goods framework. As directoire indicates, there is no dominant power in the European Union that sets up the EU agenda and enforces the agreed upon decisions but instead at least several major powers that make the key decisions. Europe á la carte and the concentric circles approaches explain how the lack of a dominant state in the European Union makes it possible for some states to opt out of some ESDP initiatives and why various issue-specific sub-clubs of five or six members are formed, such as the cases of EGF and Eurocorps. In the same way, multi-speed Europe allows
738 Wolfgang Wessels and Jürgen Mittag, “Evolutionary perspectives for the European Union: Between ‘Deepening and Widening,” Contribution for the Jean Monnet-Chairholders Group on IGC 2000, Tans European Policy Studies Association, 2000, p. 5.
356 some states to drive in the slow lane. However, unlike driving on the freeway, in the case of
ESDP, there is a strong incentive for the member states to switch to the slow lane because of the high cost of new military capabilities, while the target is to get them all in the fast lane. That is why the demand for growing European capabilities creates a powerful stimulus for the EU members to avoid spending more resources on defense and possibly to free ride. The different speed at which the EU members move forward and meet the targets was obvious in the case of the Helsinki Headline Goals when in the first two years following the initiative most of the EU members decided to double dip and report the same capabilities to NATO and the EU. The picture of the new NATO allies is not much different. Although they would not like to be perceived as free riders, the new members from Central and Eastern Europe face major challenges in their efforts to catch up economically with the rest of the Union. It is hard for the elites in these countries to explain to the voters why their governments should allocate more than two percent of their gross domestic product to defense. As a result, there is a powerful incentive to contribute minimally to new capabilities and this observation applies to NATO as well as the
European Union. The major difference in the timeline and success of targeted capabilities is when the distribution of power comes into play. As indicated in the previous chapters, NATO’s focus on international security and the U.S. role in influencing the terms and conditions of
NATO’s transformation makes a difference and keeps NATO actively involved in security business. As a result, despite the similar patterns in developing EU and NATO capabilities,
NATO allows for a lot less flexibility than the European Union in terms of capability building which results in higher possibilities to meet the targeted goals.
This finding is also related to the second argument, namely that club goods theory is much harder to apply to ESDP. In the case of NATO, the theory conceptualizes the formation of
357 different sub-clubs within the bigger heterogeneous institution based exclusively on the basis of the distribution of power as discussed in Chapter three. In the case of EU, different voting configurations (or quasi-coalitions) vary not only in terms of their voting power in the EU but also across different issues. The picture is further complicated when taking into consideration that, unlike NATO, the EU has never been specialized in international security and does not provide the same level of security guarantees that NATO does. In particular, Article Five of the
Modified Brussels Treaty is not as explicit in providing for collective defense as is Article Five of the Washington Treaty executed through NATO. 739 Also, the several rounds of EU
enlargement since the 1970s increased EU’s heterogeneity at least as much if not more than in
the case of NATO. With the last round of enlargement in 2004, the European Union has a total
of six countries that do not belong to major alliances (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden,
Malta, Cyprus), whereas just thirty five years ago Ireland was the only neutral EU nation.
The evolution of ESDP since the San Mâlo Summit in 1998 indicates that it is much harder
to find equilibrium within clubs with high variation of coalitions configurations and possible
coalition partners where there is no leading hegemonic state to set up the agenda. Nonetheless,
this finding does not automatically lead to the conclusion that ESDP is predetermined to failure
or that the EU will never be able to “speak and act as a single voice.” 740 Given the fact that
European Rapid Reaction Force and EU Battlegroups achieved operational capabilities in 2006
and 2007, scholars in European security need more time and evidence concerning these military
capabilities to be able to make further conclusions. The unsuccessful referenda on the EU
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands and the need to renegotiate the already
agreed framework to a more loose and flexible format will probably further slow down the
739 Author’s Personal Interviews with Jan Michal, January 24, 2006. 740 Trevor Salmon, “The European Security and Defense: Built on Rocks or Sand?,” European Foreign Affairs Review, No 10, 2005, pp. 359-79.
358 process of establishing these EU military capabilities. At the same time, the data available in the quantitative model capture the capabilities dynamics from the first half of 1990s until 2004, where NATO membership seems to be the key factor that makes a difference in terms of allied capabilities.
Lastly, the surveys on the EU-NATO agreements and the efforts to develop ESDP capabilities offer additional insight on the scope and meaning of the term complementarities.
First and foremost certainly ‘complementarities’ does not imply sharing autonomous EU and
NATO capabilities. Second, the concept is primarily about sharing the resources of the allies.
However, these resources are not exclusive property of NATO or EU. They belong to the states that participate in both organizations and in the end of the day it is up to the governments of these countries to decide to what extent they are willing to commit any current and future resources. The legal framework of Berlin Plus by far does not limit complementarities down to avoiding decoupling, duplication and discrimination between members and non-members.
Complementarities are primarily about sharing between NATO and ESDP or any other clubs resources of their members in a way that it would increase efficiency, reduce maintenance costs, and, in general manage these resources in a way that they enhance capabilities for peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation missions.
Therefore, the interpretation of the complementarities and the functional dynamic of club goods theory indicate that alliance politics often times boils down to managing the relations between the different allies in the format of European concert, sub-clubs or directoire . That is why in the last section of this chapter I will discuss how the formation of various ESDP sub- clubs based on Atlanticism as opposed to Europeanism affects the development of European capabilities.
359 The EU Politics of Sub-Clubs: Implications for Transatlantic Security
The approaches of directoire and concentric circles imply that sub-clubs are stable structures in European politics. In the directoire the size and power of the countries is the criterion for membership, while in the case of the concentric circles such a criterion is the overall level of integration. The major problem, however, comes from the definition of EU ‘core’ with regard to ESDP. Historically France and Germany after World War II have been the engines of the integration and, based on the Treaty of Elysée are often approached as ‘foundational powers’ of the Common European Defense. Surprisingly, of the seven countries which participate in
Eurocorps or EGF, only France and Spain are members of both initiatives. The two countries barely represent the full content of the ‘the core.’ As I mentioned it earlier, club goods theory does not always offer a compelling logic of studying EU politics because the composition of the
‘core’ and the various ‘concentric circles’ or coalitions vary due to the multiple issues at stake.
For this purpose, in this last section of the chapter I will discuss how various coalitions within
EU determine the outcomes of European efforts to develop capabilities for EU missions overseas. More specifically, I will focus on the debate between the ‘Europeanist’ as opposed to
‘Atlanticist’ members and the effect of multilateral initiatives such as the “Teuveren Statement” signed by France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium in April 2003 and that also became know as “the gang of the four.”
EUROPE’S ‘ATLANTICIST’ AND ‘EUROPEANIST’ APPROACHES On the European side, the debate on transatlantic relations in the past six decades has been driven by two different views: Atlanticist and Europeanist. As these terms indicate, the
Atlanticists are proponents for closer transatlantic ties with the United States, while the
Europeanists emphasize the need for Europe to develop autonomous capabilities and act
360 independently of the United States. France is always seen as the most staunch Europeanist, while Britain has been a proponent of the Atlanticist view. The positions of the other major
Western European nations vary from pure Atlanticism to staunch Europeanism depending on other factors such as the specific issue in discussion, the political leadership and overall tradition in transatlantic diplomacy. Belgium is usually closest to France on the issues of transatlantic relations and often shares common position with the other two nations in the Belnelux --
Luxemburg and, sometimes also with the Netherlands as well. In the same token, France and
Germany share many common views about the pace of European integration and are often referred to as the “the engines of European integration.” That is why President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder asserted in 2003 that “each decisive step in Europe is taken thanks to the motor that Germany and France represent… [and] … experience shows that when
Berlin and Paris agree, Europe can move forward; if there is disagreement, Europe marks time.” 741 This finding is correct with regard to the path of European integration, where the
endorsement of major documents and implementation strategies, such as the European Security
Strategy (ESS) are essentially a product of the Franco-German security relationship.
France has been particularly enthusiastic in attracting other major European players to form
a sub-club or coalition that would eventually balance against the U.S. preponderance in Europe
or what Jeremy Shapiro refers to as a “French plan to undo the U.S. hegemony in Europe and
create a European pole that is essentially French-controlled.” 742 Certainly one of the major reasons why the U.S. government believes these French aspirations is because the French political leadership openly admits that they are interested in expanding the cooperation between
741 Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq, Brookings Institution, McGrow-Hill, New York, 2003, p. 130. 742 Author’s Personal Interview with Dr. Jeremy Shapiro, September 29, 2006.
361 France, Germany and possibly the United Kingdom. 743 Germany is often seen as France’s
closest ally in the EU directoire , an indication of which have been the numerous successful
initiatives in the EU and the close institutional cooperation between Paris and Berlin, which
among other steps also includes historically unprecedented integrational steps, like Franco-
German proposals on the EU future, presence of Germans in high positions at the French Foreign
Ministry and vice versa, the French President representing Germany at a European Council
meeting, even thoughts on sharing a common seat at the UN Security Council. 744 At the same
time Washington is not truly concerned about France’s plans and intentions in part because while
there is a Franco-German engine in the European Union, there is no such Franco-German
alliance in NATO. There is a NATO institutional caucus in OSCE, but no EU caucus or a
special balancing sub-club or coalition between the two countries within NATO. Although Paris
and Berlin share similar positions on certain issues such as Ukraine’s aspirations for NATO
membership; on other occasions there are major disagreements between these two nations.745 In
fact, the German Ministry of Defense always makes it clear that Berlin would not like to make a
special choice between France and the United States. This outcome is, in part, determined by the
Atlantic clause that the German parliament introduced to the Franco-German Elysee treaty of
1963. This clause has a very important function for Germany, creating a duality whereby
Germany committed itself to the close relations with France with the expectation that France
stays in the Atlantic alliance and that the Federal Republic will not be forced to choose between
Washington and Paris. 746
743 Author’s personal interviews with a representative from the French Delegation to NATO, January 19, 2006 and Dr. Jeremy Shapiro, September 29, 2006. 744 Borek Lizec (2005), p. 65. 745 Author’s personal interviews with the French and German representatives to NATO, January 2006. 746 Personal Interview with Dr. Dieter Dettke, director of the West European Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, October 2, 2006.
362 This is also the major reason why there are no specials consultations between Paris and
Berlin within NATO. During the Iraq crisis in 2003 there were major concerns in Washington that Germany might remain diplomatically isolated from the United States. If nothing else, the conclusion from the U.S. policymaking perspective was that the United States needs to “preserve
Germany as a balancer” and not to isolate Berlin diplomatically which “will thrust them in the hands of France.” 747 Certainly there is very little doubt that the transatlantic relations in 2003
and 2004 were seasoned in part with the personal leadership styles of Chirac and Schroeder,
which inevitably resulted in what became known as the “transatlantic storm.” The change in
guard in Berlin and Paris resulted in restoring the pre-2003 equilibrium. The coalition agreement
between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in 2005 that laid the foundation of the
Grand Coalition in Germany emphasized that “the European unity and the transatlantic
partnership are not two alternatives but two pillars of [Germany’s] foreign policy.” 748 In the same token, NATO is defined as “the strongest anchor of [Berlin’s] security and defense policy” and therefore, “the Atlantic alliance plays a central role in the transatlantic security dialogue,” whereby Germany plays a strategic role in facilitating consultations and coordination. 749 This
approach to transatlantic diplomacy was confirmed by Chancellor Merkel who emphasized that
“NATO remains the bond keeping together the transatlantic community of shared interests and
values.” 750 Furthermore, Merkel outlined NATO’s three core functions in the future. First, it
must be a consultative body that “constantly carries out and discusses joint threat analyses.”
Second, “it must be the place where political consultations take place on new conflicts arising
747 Author’s Personal Interview with Jeremy Shapiro, September 29, 2006. 748 Koalitionsvertrag CDU, CSU, SPD, 11.11.2005, p. 125. 749 Ibid, p. 130-1. 750 “Germany's Foreign and Security Policy in the Face of Global Challenges,” speech of Dr. Angel Merkel, Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 4, 2006, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=170 &, 10/12/2007.
363 around the world;” and third, “it should be the place where political and military actions are coordinated.” 751 Whereas Schroeder emphasized the Europe-first strategy, Merkel laid out the
NATO-first strategy in which “NATO has … primacy, and that other courses should not be explored until the Alliance fails to arrive at an agreement.” 752
EASTERN EUROPE’S ATLANTICISM The expansion of the European Union and NATO resulted in incorporating new allies that
tipped the balance with their “markedly ‘Atlanticist’ orientation.” 753 Antonio Missiroli correctly notes that there are “various shades of ‘Atlanticism’ among the newcomers. Poland, the Baltic states and Romania are staunchly Atlanticist, while Czech Republic and Slovakia are somewhere in the middle where the political elites are much more Atlanticist that the public.” 754 The same finding is also true for Hungary and Bulgaria, while Slovenia leans toward the European side of the spectrum. Nonetheless, the East European Atlanticism “differs from the kind that can be found in London and Rome.” 755 First and foremost it is overwhelmingly anti-Russian. These
sentiments became clear during the negotiations with Moscow on issues such as the transit to and
from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad in 2002; the extension of partnership and cooperation
agreements between EU and Russia to the new members in the spring of 2004, as well as the
discussion on the EU position about the Beslan massacre in North Ossetia in September 2004. 756
Interestingly, although being staunch Atlanticists, the new NATO members find common ground to cooperate with countries like France on issues such as the “swallow-and-digest” approach with regard to the new global role of NATO. Whereas the United States would like to
751 Ibid. 752 Ibid. 753 Antonio Missiroli, “Central and Eastern Europe between the EU and NATO,” Survival , Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 2004-2005, p. 127. 754 Ronald Asmus and Alex Vondra, “The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 18, No 2, July 2005, p. 203 and Missiroli (2005), p. 127. 755 Asmus and Vondra (2005), p. 203 and Missiroli (2005), p. 127. 756 Antonio Missiroli (2005), p. 127.
364 see NATO developing and expanding global partnerships with countries like South Korea, Japan and Australia, France, for example, argues that such steps “should be taken slowly and progressively.” Paris finds substantial common ground to work with the new allies who are seriously concerned about Russia and would like to keep NATO primarily focused in Europe. 757
In that sense the approach of the Central and East European nations with regard to Atlanticism differs from the kind that can be found in Paris and Berlin, but also London and Rome. 758
Ronald Asmus and Alex Vondra list several factors that explain the roots of Eastern
Europe’s ‘new Atlanticism.’ The first group is historical and geographic. Historically, Eastern
Europe has had much more positive experience with the United States compared to other
European great powers, especially Germany and Russia. This can be also explained with the geography of the United States and the fact that it has not been involved in the European balance of power during the 19 th and early 20 th century, which has made it “the only one major Western
power that has never constituted a threat to any of them.” 759 Second, the United States has always been able to present itself in the role of a champion of Eastern Europe’s liberation from communism and integration into the West, especially in comparison to other major European powers such as Germany and France. For example, there was the strong U.S. lobby including many Republicans and Democrats that advocated opening the doors for Eastern Europe to join
NATO, while at the same time political elites in Paris and Berlin emphasized the long road to EU and the need for reforms that Eastern Europe needed to complete in order to be incorporated in the West. The message from Brussels and the European capitals that it would take decades before Eastern Europe meets the criteria for EU membership was sending quite ambivalent signals. Although the German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe was the first to raise the issue of
757 Author’s personal interview with a representative from the French Delegation to NATO, January 19, 2006. 758 Antonio Missiroli (2005), p. 127. 759 Ronald Asmus and Alex Vondra, (2005), pp. 204-5.
365 NATO enlargement, soon Washington took over the leadership during the Clinton administration and became the driving force “in overcoming the opposition and moving alliance to open its doors to new members.” 760 George W. Bush’s administration continued this foreign policy
orientation and tried to influence the West to incorporate the “new Europe’ quickly not only into
NATO but also into the European Union. In part, the effect of the U.S. position was pre-
determined by its leadership role and the unmatched power that Washington has in the
transatlantic community. In other words, it was not just important to support the integration of
the region into the Western institutional framework, but also to have the capabilities in order to
make it happen. Third, from the perspective of large part of Eastern Europe’s dissidents during
the Cold War who subsequently became the core of the reformist elites after 1989, the region
shares common vision with Washington on number of issues including but not limited to human
rights, democracy and liberal market economy. Based on the experience of the recent past, the
political elites in New Europe have embraced “an active approach in confronting and combating
dictators and totalitarian regimes.” 761 For example, the Czechs and Poles supported the U.S.
initiatives for sanctions on Cuba and Myanmar. After the end of the Cold War the United States
accepted Vaclav Havel’s proposal to reallocate Radio Free Europe/ Radio liberty in Prague and
support broadcasting to Iran and Iraq. In most of the cases the East European reformist elites
were advised to embark on essentially neoliberal reforms of their economies in the 1990s, which
made them more sympathetic to American-style individualism and capitalism than Western
Europe’s social democracy and coordinated market economy.
However, it would be incorrect to assume that Eastern Europe accepts and follows
unconditionally all of America’s foreign policy choices. For example, on issues such as the
760 Ibid, p. 208. 761 Ibid, p. 210.
366 International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol, the positions of CEE countries are much closer to their West European counterparts that the United States and they follow the EU position. Finally, as discussed previously Eastern Europe may often be a lot tougher on Russia than the United States proper. This may in part be attributed to the region’s recent past and the fact that, unlike the United States, none of the countries in Eastern Europe completely understands the responsibility of the hegemonic leadership in the world that requires diplomatic tact and bridge-building with other major powers.
The roots and scope of European and, in particular, East European Atlanticism is important
in several instances. First, it indicates that there is ‘a new status quo in town’ which also
determines a slightly different dynamic of transatlantic relations after the expansion of NATO
and the European Union. Second, the different bargaining outcomes within EU and NATO make
Europe more Atlanticist and weaken the Europeanist caucus. Third, this status quo implies that
attempts that rely exclusively on differentiated approach to integration in order to strengthen the
ESDP and develop new autonomous European capabilities outside of the NATO framework
would most likely have very limited success. Such was the case of the Teuveren Declaration ,
which also became known as the initiative of the “band of the four,” implying the four initiating
member states – Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg.
THE EUROPEANIST APPROACH: THE CASE OF THE TEUVEREN DECLARATION (2003) In the peak of the transatlantic storm during the Iraqi crisis in April 2003, Belgium, France,
Germany and Luxembourg, which had led the resistance against the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq and opposed NATO planning to aid Turkey, initiated a declaration that was designed to give a new impetus of the ESDP. This initiative called for enhanced cooperation in the field of defense which included a solidarity clause and a European Security and Defense Union. The Union
367 required the participating states to commit themselves to mutual help, coordination of defense efforts and development of new capabilities. Although the declaration reiterated that
“transatlantic partnership remains essential strategic priority for Europe,” it also emphasized the demand for EU to “introduce a new stage in the development of European security and defense that is based on strengthening the European military capabilities.”762 Furthermore, the document
stressed the intention to create a “nucleus of collective capability for planning and conducting
operations for the European Union” which would liaise with national headquarters and SHAPE.
763 These include the establishment by June 2004 of a European Command Center for strategic air lift and the introduction of a common multinational headquarters for common operations by the end of 2004. 764
The United States and European nations such as Britain saw the initiative as an effort to develop independent EU structures that duplicate existing NATO capabilities and infrastructure.
This impression was confirmed with the intention to create “a nucleus capability around the
Franco-German brigade in which Belgian commando elements and Luxembourg reconnaissance elements will be integrated.” 765 The specific context of the tense transatlantic relations in 2003
further left the impression that the Teuveren group was in essence a French or Franco-German
attempt to create capabilities that would “counterweight the military power of the United
States.” 766 As a result, the proposal was overwhelmingly turned down by all other European
Union members. In order to have the ESDP amendment presented to the European Convention
762 “Gemeinsame Erkaerung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur Europaeischen Sicherheits- und Verteidugungspolitik,” (“Common Declaration by Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium for European Security and Defense Policy”), Europe Dokumente , 1 Mai 2003, Agence Europe, http://www.agenceeurope.com . 763 Trevor Salmon, “The European Security and Defense Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?” European Foreign Affairs Review , Vol. 10, 2005, p. 368. 764 “Gemeinsame Erkaerung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur Europaeischen Sicherheits- und Verteidugungspolitik,” 1 Mai 2003. 765 Trevor Salmon (2005), p. 368. 766 Ibid, p. 369.
368 before the end of the constitutional debate in Europe, the four had to seek a compromise with
Britain and the other nations that supported a more NATO-oriented approach.
The Teuveren Declaration caused major concerns among the other European partners and the United States. The U.S. major concern was that the declaration implied unnecessary duplication. The proposal did not take into account the delicate situation that the four neural EU states (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) would face and in the end of the day offended their sensitivity. Furthermore, it created bigger problems for the Brits, Spaniards and Italians who supported the Bush administration and believed that any development of ESDP should mutually reinforce the strategic relationship between NATO and the European Union.
The Teuveren Statement reflected the vision of the Europeanists and was immediately
turned down by those who supported the ‘Atlanticist’ approach to ESDP. As a result, the
original text of the declaration had to be substantially revised where the final version which was
included in the draft constitution stated “if a Member State is a victim of armed aggression on its
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all
means in their power.” 767 The final wording of the draft constitution reflected a compromise but failed to introduce an efficient defense mechanism of ESDP comparable to NATO’s Article Five.
Ultimately, the project of EU constitution was turned down by the French and Dutch voters.
The fate of the Teuveren Declaration indicated the limited success of the differentiated
approach represented by “core Europe” to push forward the advancement of ESDP. The inherent
division of Atlanticists as opposed to Europeanists was not conductive to developing new EU
capabilities. It seems that a consensual approach which can lead to a compromise between
NATO and the EU may be more successful with regard to the advancement of new European
capabilities. The statement of the four was turned down because it emphasized autonomous EU
767 Draft Constitution of the European Union, note 1 above, Article 1-41.7.
369 capabilities and that was not accepted by the majority of the EU members, which means that there is substantial lack of support for any European project that presents even remote evidence for emerging balancing dynamic against the U.S. preponderance.
The survey of the differentiated approach to integration and the roots of the divide into
Europeanist and Atlanticist camps indicated some of the reasons why the efforts to establish EU capabilities have had a limited success. The lack of a great power that dominates the EU agenda such as the United States in NATO explains why there is no European Article Five and why so far NATO’s efforts in developing allied capabilities have been more successful that the EU.
When studying the effect of complementarities in the case of NATO and EU, the distribution of power across the North Atlantic Area seems to be a key explanatory variable. The effect of the differentiated approach and various coalitions and sub-clubs within the European Union dilutes the efforts to use the available resources for developing new ESDP capabilities for the missions overseas. Structures such as ‘the core’ or directoire cannot substitute the effect of the hegemon as a dominant power that sets up and facilitates the implementation of the agenda. Therefore, the success of the EU capabilities depends exclusively on the will and desire of the individual states to build such capabilities, while the Union itself has very limited mechanisms to stimulate the advancement and implementation of such capabilities.
The purpose of this chapter was to explain the development of the European Security and
Defense in comparison to NATO’s efforts to develop new capabilities through the club goods framework and the concept of complementarities. For this purposes I surveyed the conceptualization of different approaches to integration with specific focus on cases that address the European security and defense. The different path of advancing NATO’s capabilities in comparison to ESDP leads to several important conclusions.
370 First in comparison to the European Union, it seems that the distribution of power within
NATO turns out to be more supportive for developing complementing capabilities. The hegemonic role of the United States allows it to set up rules and agenda while offering at the same time the carrots of Article Five of the Washington treaty, whereas the European Union has a problem to define its agenda due to major differences of opinion among its Member States, which among other things rests on different philosophies about the state and future of transatlantic relations. As a result, ESDP turns out to be a weaker mechanism for stimulating
Member States to develop new capabilities.
Second, the survey indicated that the effect of complementarities is much stronger in the case of NATO that the EU. Given the steady and growing demand for new capabilities for peacekeeping, crisis management and non-proliferation, NATO’s days or years may not be numbered in part because of the effect of complementarities which is combined with the imbalanced distribution of power in the North Atlantic Alliance. Again, this finding does not assume that the EU efforts to develop new capabilities should fail automatically. At this point, however, it seems that the EU has been playing primarily a supportive function and borrowing from NATO’s capabilities rather than sharing with it.
Third, it is not surprising that the EU faces major obstacles to quickly develop its own capabilities. The Union has a complicated “Byzantine institutional set-up” and deals with an extremely large set of problems primarily in the realm of international political economy and regional integration. At the same time the Union faces a lot of challenges, such as the incorporation of the new members and the rejection of the EU Constitution. The multiple priorities logically distract the Member States from focusing on common defense and the allocation of resources toward achieving this goal. Currently, the biggest problem is how to
371 move forward with the Treaty of Lisbon that was put together after the French and Dutch “no” to the EU Draft Constitution. The Union cannot agree on a common position with regard to such a basic and at the same time important issue for EU’s immediate neighborhood like the independence of Kosovo. Given these circumstances, it makes a lot of sense to have NATO the primary international institution involved in transatlantic security. At the same time, as a high- ranking representative at the French mission in Brussels put it “NATO has proven to be a very good tool” with a capacity to produce optimal outcomes. Despite the consensus rule that makes
NATO sometimes inoperable, the alliance is being managed by a hegemon, which generally facilitates the development of new allied capabilities. Alternatively, in the case of the EU we can see a direct link between the absence of hegemon and the protraction in development of military capabilities.
Lastly, while the EU capabilities such as ERRF, EU BGs and Eurocorps, and European
Gendarmerie Force are important, it makes no sense to duplicate or develop autonomous
capabilities of basically the same members in Europe. Once again, the logic of
complementarities suggests there is no need for competition between EU and NATO or
otherwise such a competition would be detrimental for both institutions.
372 Conclusion
Major Findings of the Dissertation
The primary goal of this dissertation was to examine NATO’s transformation and in order to understand the aspects of this process I introduced the concept of complementarities and linked it to the existing literature on club goods. Through a careful examination of the causal link between military resources and allied capabilities the concept of complementarities and a club goods framework has illuminated the three aspects of NATO’s transformation, namely the involvement in out-of-the-area operations, the incorporation of new allies and the development of advanced capabilities. While the argument may seem to be consistent with the rational institutionalist framework, the primary focus of this study is on the management of military power among NATO members. The findings of this research are relevant for the specific path of
NATO’s transformation, but by extension, the same logic may be applied in other cases that deal with transformation and management of alliances in the specific condition of an imbalanced distribution of power. In this concluding section, I will emphasize the key findings of the dissertation, and their relevancy for IR theoretical and foreign policy. Finally, I will also briefly discuss where the argument developed in the dissertation positions my future research agenda.
The study combined quantitative and qualitative methods aimed at providing insight on the question how current and potential NATO member states manage power throughout the process of alliance transformation. The quantitative part of the research studied three groups of nations: the core NATO allies, which are either founding members or joined NATO before 1990, the new members that joined the Alliance in 1999 and 2004 and four of the non-NATO nations that are
373 members of the European Union – Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. It indicated a number of interesting conditions that need to be considered by those who study alliance behavior and transatlantic relations.
First, the case of the old NATO members showed that there is a strong relationship between resources and allied capabilities and five out of six independent variables are significant
(military personnel, land, navy and air force equipments and defense spending per capita). The only variable that is not significant in the model of the fifteen old members is GDP per capita, which indicates that it is not important how rich or poor these allies are because the advancement of their allied capabilities does not depend on their national wealth. For example, less wealthy allies such as Portugal, Greece or Turkey have, in fact, been able to contribute much more to
NATO’s peacekeeping efforts than other wealthier nations.
In the case of the ten new NATO allies, however, the observed relationship between military resources and allied capabilities is much less powerful. There are two contending explanations for this observation. First, although homogenous from outside, the new allies actually include two different groups of allies as far as background and basic characteristics of their military reforms and transformation are concerned. While the three Baltic Republics
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Slovenia had to build their armed forces from scratch, the other six nations – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia had to undergo major reduction of the existent resources and their more effective re-allocation in order to meet the demand for new capabilities. These six nations faced major challenges emanating from the bureaucratic and organizational resistance to transformation, which is why the overall process of transformation proved to be much more challenging than originally expected. The experience with the first wave indicated that, unless they do not face rigorous requirements to
374 transform their militaries backed up by a strict monitoring process from Brussels, these nations would not be ready for membership. That is why NATO initiated Membership Action Plan in
1999, which was tailored to the individual needs and comparative advantages of the applicants.
At the same time the aspirant nations formed various semi-institutionalized forms of coordination and lobbying in order to make a persuasive case that they are fit to meet the requirements for membership, such as the Vilnius Group and the Adriatic Charter. The survey of
NATO expansion indicated also that the process of inviting and admitting new members has became longer, more rigorous and cumbersome. This is consistent with the logic of complementarities, because the new allies must be fit to meet the requirements of membership and contribute adequately to NATO’s growing involvement out of its traditional area of operation. Thus, MAP was able exercise the necessary pressure over the potential allies to overcome the domestic obstacles in order to contribute adequately to the various out-of-the-area operations.
Second, the model focuses on the period between 1993 and 2004 and does not capture the transformational dynamic of these countries in its entirety because the pace of military reforms in these countries accelerated after the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was introduced in 1999.
For the purposes of the inquiry, however, it can be concluded that the perspective for membership among these countries stimulated the efficient allocation of resources and advancement of allied capabilities. Therefore, MAP could be compared to an optimization mechanism that required from the applicants to reduce the overall number of armed forces and to focus on certain niche capabilities that will give them comparative advantages to the other allies.
One of the most important criteria for membership of these relatively small and not so wealthy
375 nations is to be able to work together in various multinational task forces, rapid reaction forces or teams such as the Czech and Slovak CBRN team.
Lastly, the model explored the relationship between resources and allied capabilities in the cases of the four non-NATO European Union countries: Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.
The test unequivocally indicated that none of the observed variables is significant and it can be confidently concluded that there is no evidence in support of the relationship between military resources and allied capabilities in the North Atlantic Area for the countries that are not NATO members.
Therefore, the study confirmed that the membership itself, as well as the prospects to become NATO ally makes a difference in the advancement of allied capabilities. The capabilities, on the other hand, are not determined only by the re-allocation and efficient use of current and future resources, but also by the growing and changing demand for specific alliance missions. I found out that the evolution of NATO’s new missions may result in vertical and horizontal advancement of allied capabilities. The vertical evolution of capabilities shows how the demand for new missions leads to development of new types of capabilities. Thus, the allied capabilities are tied to the respective mission; they follow similar evolutionary pattern and are linked to the distribution of power, where the hegemon uses various tools to stimulate their advancement. This trend is illustrated with the evolution from peacekeeping, backed up by CJTF capabilities to a more thorough crisis management for the purpose of which NATO needed rapid reaction capabilities and, therefore, NATO Response Force was introduced.
The path of horizontal evolution indicates how the mission evolves over time based on the new strategic environment that leads to the development of new capabilities. For example, in the case of NATO’s non-proliferation efforts, the inception of the Prague Capabilities Commitment
376 in 2002 led to the advancement of various Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear capabilities based on concentration of allied resources within and across the various groups of allies. The advancement of capabilities is also linked to the advancement of allied interoperability, namely the capacity of the allies to work together efficiently and forward the alliance agenda. The Southeast European Brigade (SEE BRIG) and the Baltic Battalion
(BALTBAT) are only two such instances that been illustrate how various multinational entities can enhanced allied interoperability. Therefore, by tracing the evolutionary dynamic of NATO’s capabilities, the dissertation finds that NATO membership plays a key role in shaping and improving the capabilities of the individual member states. This does not mean that the advancement of capabilities is a self-propelling process that automatically spills over from one to another type of capabilities. Instead, it indicates that the advancement of new capabilities is a result of non-coercive bargaining among the different allies, where the distribution of benefits reflects the relative bargaining power of the members. The advantages of such cooperation are higher than the costs associated with, but the implementation of the commitments may sometimes be quite challenging, which is why the military transformation of the allies often follows a path of trial and error. These observations are consistent with intergovernmental bargaining theory and explain why the logic of complementarities applies to the long-standing
NATO members and, in part, to those countries who want to be a part of the Alliance, but not to those nations that do not seek membership.
The dissertation surveyed how the prospect for membership has stimulated a more efficient use of the available resources and development of new capabilities for the countries that have recently joined NATO as opposed to those that are not NATO members and do not plan to join the alliance in the near future. The process of military transformation of the new allies indicates
377 that various domestic and elite-related factors had a negative impact on the relationship between resources and capabilities and, thus, curtailed the effect of complementarities. In most of the cases, the efficient allocation of funding leads to substantial cuts in manpower and outdated equipment, which necessitated layoffs and resulted in job losses and increased unemployment.
That is why certain segments of the political elites and bureaucratic entities in the militaries opposed and attempted to delay the pace of transformation, which certainly weakened the strength of the relationship between military resources and specific allied capabilities. This trend was most noticeable in the cases of Bulgaria and Slovakia. By the same logic, some bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation with Brussels should be interpreted not only as mechanisms of improved coordination, but also as a form of exercising pressure against bureaucratic resiliency and reluctance to conduct reforms at home. The Membership Action Plan and the Individual
Partnership Action Plans, as well as the coordinated efforts of the applicant nations within the
Vilnius group and the Adriatic Charter are good examples in this respect.
Alternatively, in the cases of the four neutral nations, the absence of alliance membership makes it possible for them to allocate or maintain higher or lower resource base compared to the alliance members, which is why the model does not capture a relationship between their military resources and capabilities. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden prefer to follow their own path, which often times diverges from NATO’s recommendations embedded in the individuals MAPs.
Unlike the new NATO allies, the political elites in the neutral nations deal with specific background of neutrality at home that can mobilize higher levels of military resources for the sake of maintaining the current policy. The conventional logic of complementarities holds that club membership reduces overall defense expenditures because it provides economies of scale that leads to more efficient use of resources and effective advancement of capabilities. From the
378 perspective of the neutrals, however, not joining the club is more valuable for them because they choose independence in policymaking over efficiency. This is particularly relevant in the case of
Finland, where the domestic support for neutrality allows the Finnish political elite to use ample military resources in order to develop advanced peacekeeping and crisis-management capabilities. Thus, Helsinki is able to accomplish the same tasks that NATO does without restraining itself in an alliance framework.
Lastly, the study also focuses on the distribution of power and investigates whether the
presence of a hegemon makes a difference by promoting a more efficient use of the available
military resources by the allies in developing allied capabilities. This proposition was explored
by surveying the European Union capabilities as opposed to NATO capabilities. The dissertation
concludes that there is a causal link between the distribution of power in the North Atlantic Area
and the effectiveness of advancing defense capabilities. Specifically, the difference between the
EU and NATO approaches can be attributed to the concept of differentiated integration. The
model of differentiated integration embraced by the European Union assumes that while the core
of the European integration is accepted by all the members, their policies in regard to specific
initiatives, pillars or areas of cooperation may vary and it is up to the members to choose whether
and to what extent they want to become involved. While this approach has been particularly
helpful in advancing various aspects of the European economic integration, in the case of the
ESDP it creates powerful stimuli for the member states to bail out on issues that require
additional financial contributions and sharing of common burdens. The lack of a hegemon and
the divergent national interests of the major players such as France, Britain and Germany create a
powerful stimulus for the EU nations to avoid allocating additional resources on common
defense and possibly to free ride. Despite some similarities in the modes of developing EU and
379 NATO capabilities, NATO allows for a lot less flexibility than the European Union in terms of capability-building, which results in a higher potential for the allies to meet targeted goals.
Furthermore, NATO’s exclusive focus on international security and the U.S. involvement in defining the terms and conditions of alliance transformation makes a difference and keeps the alliance actively involved in international security.
While both NATO and EU resemble heterogeneous clubs, the European Union is much more diverse because the different sub-clubs or quasi-coalitions vary not only in terms of their voting power but also across different issues of European integration of which ESDP is only one.
Unlike NATO, the European Union is primarily an institution of political economy and has only recently been involved in international security business, thus it can not provide the same level of security guarantees that NATO does. The lack of a dominating power in Europe and the absence of an EU “Article Five” serve to enhance the value of NATO as a fundamental pillar in the
European and North Atlantic security area. At the same time, the success of EU capabilities depends exclusively on the will and desire of individual states to build such capabilities.
Furthermore, EU’s inability to establish an effective ESDP increases the reliance of the smaller
EU nations on NATO as a key institution of European and transatlantic security. Thus, ipso facto the distribution of capabilities in Europe explains the presence of the Altanticist and the
Europeanist camps. While such a division existed even throughout the Cold War, it became much more noticeable in the absence of Soviet threat after 1989. The differentiated approach to
European Security and Defense not only reinforces the differences between these two camps but also indirectly determines the limited success of the EU efforts to advance its autonomous capabilities.
380 Theoretical and Policy Contributions of the Research
The dissertation seeks primarily to expand the existing theoretical literature on NATO and explore certain causal relationships among the allies that could potentially have broader implications for other cases. Since the research does not grapple with other similar cases, the applicability of the theory outside of NATO is, to say the least, limited. By focusing on the management of allied relations within the transforming NATO, the dissertation has several important theoretical contributions to offer. First, the research applies the micro-economic concept of complementarities to the specific dynamic of international alliances. In this analytical framework, complements are considered goods that are normally consumed along with another product. If the demand for a certain product increases, then the demand for the complementary good will also increase. In the realm of international security such complementing goods may be the military resources that countries have and the capabilities that they need to make available to the alliance in which they participate. The observations made from the test of the first two hypotheses show without any doubt that in the case of NATO there is sufficient evidence in support of this relationship. This finding stands in contrast to the 1993 Waltzian expectation about NATO, as well as similar arguments presented by scholars like Renee De Nevers, who claim that NATO becomes a peripheral alliance, that has a “largely supportive role” in the efforts to combat terrorism. 768 At the same time, the argument presented in the dissertation holds that
NATO remains an alliance that continues to provide collective defense to its members while undergoing major transformation, but is far from becoming an “inclusive security-management
768 Renee De Nevers (2007), p. 35.
381 institution,” 769 similar to the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
Second, while complementarities can be approached as an independent concept that
grapples with the causal link between resources and capabilities, it can also be contextualized
within club goods theory. The club goods framework originates from collective goods literature
developed in the 1960s 770 and suggests that alliances have features similar to clubs – voluntarism, the idea of sharing, cost-benefit analysis and exclusion mechanisms. 771 As
indicated earlier, such an approach is consistent with the theory of intergovernmental bargaining
in integration studies. In the case of NATO, alliances work as heterogeneous clubs that comprise
several relatively homogeneous sub-clubs. 772 Within this framework, the concept of complementarities implies that the management of alliances mandates: (a) efficient distribution and use of resources among its members; (b) specialization and development of niche capabilities for those countries that can provide economies of scale and; (c) ability to work together in coherent multinational structures such as CJTFs, NRF or different teams that require enhanced interoperability among the different allies. The tracing of NATO’s transformation indicated that although the states face major organizational and bureaucratic resistance or impediments, they are able to overcome these roadblocks and enhance the development of new and efficient use of the existent resources that are made available.
769 Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane, “Risk, Threat and Security in Institutions,” Robert Keohane (ed.) Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World , Routledge, 2002, p. 108. 770 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Gods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965 and Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser Economic Theory of Alliances, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA (1966). 771 Тodd Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. 772 Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, Cambridge University Press, 1996 and Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Political Economy of NATO: past, present, and into the 21st century, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
382 Third, the concept of complementarities and the club goods framework suggest a flexible and yet manageable framework of analysis that can be expanded and tested in various groups of allies and alliance partners. The current participants in the Partnership for Peace, which includes primarily countries in the Western Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, are only one such group. Some of these nations like Albania, Croatia and Macedonia have enhanced relations with
NATO under MAP and expect invitation to join the Alliance. 773 Others such as Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Ukraine have expressed their interest to upgrade relations with NATO by joining
MAP. Yet others like Serbia, Bosnia and most of the Central Asian Republics have developed partnership with the Alliance but for different reasons are not interested to become members.
The framework applied in this research can be used to explore the advancement of their capabilities over extended period of time, as well as their potential to contribute to NATO and non-NATO peacekeeping, crisis-management and non-proliferation capabilities. In the cases of
Albania, Bosnia, Serbia, FYR of Macedonia, Ukraine the former Soviet Republics in the
Caucuses, such a test could show the degree to which they have been able to transform themselves and change their role from consumers to contributors to international security.
Lastly, the model of complementarities can also be explored for countries such as Australia, New
Zealand and South Korea that joined NATO’s Global Partnerships Initiative but due to their geography cannot become members.
The findings of this research conceptualized through complementarities and club goods
theory contribute toward understanding foreign policy of the individual allies, as well as the
decisions that NATO makes as an institution of international security. From a policy standpoint,
the logical question is how the dissertation approaches the invitation of new allies. In other
773 The Heads of State and Government agreed to invite Albania and Croatia at the Bucharest Summit, while the invitation of Macedonia was tabled until the name dispute with Greece is settled.
383 words, should the alliance continue to expand and under what conditions? First, it would be incorrect to interpret the proposed framework of analysis as pro- or anti-expansionist. Part of the utility of any theory is to be able to apply the same framework and explain the arguments in favor or against a certain foreign policy decision – in this case whether to invite new allies or not. Second, the process of NATO expansion indicates that currently the applicants are being carefully monitored with regard to their capacity and commitment to resolve disputes with neighboring countries, military contributions to various alliance activities and degree of interoperability with the other alliance members. They are encouraged to work together as evidenced in the Vilnius Group and the Adriatic Charter. From the complementarities perspective, this means that the applicants need to optimize their resource base and maximize allied outcomes in order to be eligible to join the alliance. NATO’s transformational dynamic indicates that it is not the size of the individual applicants but the level of progress that matters in the final decision. If the applicants are able to meet the benchmark requirements, there is no reason to deny them the prospective of membership.
Third, the survey of NATO expansion presented in the dissertation shows that the process has become longer, more institutionalized and somewhat more difficult and cumbersome for the applicants. This is an objective trend determined not only by the demand for specific allied capabilities but also by the supply of the “quality” of applicants. While NATO needs additional specific allied capabilities and would be interested in inviting new members, Brussels has no interest in inviting nations that are not able to meet the expectation associated with membership and provide the necessary capabilities.
Fourth, the logic of complementarities indicates that NATO does not need to incorporate in its structures countries that face various forms of domestic political and military problems or
384 major bureaucratic resistance to transformation because this would be detrimental for the club and the collective defense that it provides. This issue has always been NATO’s concern and the applicants had been monitored before invitations were extended. Prior to 1997, NATO did not have much experience with incorporating the former Soviet allies and Brussels did not know the exact scope and types of reforms needed in these countries. However, as the club grew bigger and the problems associated with these countries became clearer, NATO was able to formulate more precise standards and monitoring mechanisms for the potential applicants.
Fifth, while the concept of complementarities does not advocate in favor or against the invitation of new allies, the reality check shows that NATO needs additional allied capabilities for missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan. It is up to the Alliance to decide whether they are going to develop these by adding new members, by transforming the military of the existent members or by combining both processes. While one of these processes does not exclude the other, the parallel advancement of the expansion and transformation processes may actually be quite challenging. Nonetheless, the assessment that “the future of NATO depended on the success of the mission in Afghanistan,” seems very realistic and echoes not only from the editorials of leading newspapers and journals but also from the decision-making elites within
NATO. 774
This dissertation has also important implications for the foreign policy of the different
groups of alliance members. The findings have relevancy for the United States as a hegemon in
the North Atlantic Area, for the old NATO allies, for the new coming members, as well as the
774 See “NATO Launches Offensive Against Taliban,” The New York Times , March 6, 2007 and “NATO's Success and Future Depend on Afghanistan,” Panel Discussion with the participation of the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Germany's Minister of Defense Franz Josef Jung, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer and Senator John McCain, 43 rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2007/nato_panel_2007.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&spr ache=en& , 07/11/2007.
385 countries that would like to join the Alliance and are currently preparing for membership or are awaiting invitation to join MAP. The dissertation makes the argument that the hegemon has a key role in managing the inter-allied relations, while at same time influencing the decision to invite new allies and pushing forward NATO’s transformational agenda.
In a 2007 International Security article entitled, “NATO's International Security Role in the
Terrorist Era,” Renee De Nevers studies the role of the hegemon in promoting NATO expansion and concludes that “the U.S.-backed expansion of the alliance contributed to the erosion of
NATO’s military capabilities.” 775 Furthermore, she presents the argument that “NATO plays a
largely supportive role in the war on terror” where “NATO countries are engaged in key
elements of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism.” 776 To a major degree these findings are determined by the existence of a structural condition, i.e. non-competitive unipolar environment in which post-Cold War NATO operates. The logic of club goods argues that a single club of international security, such as NATO, stimulates the formation of other sub-clubs that provide near substitution and reduce the monopoly effect. This condition, also known in the economic literature as the non-competitive provision, nonetheless, does not automatically lead to the collapse of the club or its break up into various constituent units or sub-clubs. Therefore, the main problem with the argument presented by Dr. De Nevers is that she does not distinguish between the processes of strengthening NATO’s overall heterogeneity and the erosion of the alliance due to crowding and depreciation. Both crowding and depreciation are effects associated with the increasing number of heterogeneous allies. In part, the weakness of De
Nevers’ argument is due to the fact that it does not rest on a comprehensive theoretical framework that addressed the multi-faceted aspects of alliance management.
775 Renee De Nevers, "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era," International Security, Vol. 31, No 4, (2007), p. 62. 776 Renee De Nevers (2007), p. 63.
386 At the same time, Dr. De Nevers makes an appropriate observation that “the shifting alignments and attitudes toward threats confronting NATO have reduced the United States’ willingness to accept alliance constraints.” Her argument is consistent with the findings of heterogeneous club framework that more outcomes have been produced within issue-oriented sub-clubs or various alignments than within the club as a whole. 777 While it is possible to negotiate an outcome outside of the alliance, such an accommodation is usually sub-optimal and temporary, which means that in the long run the allies will most likely revise the original bargain. Consider for example the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 when the United
States faced major residence on the part of France, Germany and Belgium all of whom argued that NATO should not remain involved in any way in the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq. For this purpose, the United States decided to use the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in order to avoid the most likely French veto in the North Atlantic Council. In the end of the day, Belgium was the only holdout for 24 hours but finally all the participating nations agreed “to do collectively what most individual members agreed anyway,” namely to come to Turkey’s defense in the event that Iraq retaliated against Ankara during the war. 778 Furthermore, the
United States extended invitations to all NATO allies, especially those who have training
capabilities to join the NATO Training Mission (NTM) in Iraq and since December 2004 both
supporters and opponents of the 2003 U.S. invasion in Iraq work together in “in order to help
Iraq develop an effective, democratically led and enduring security sector.” 779
Based on these observations, there are at least two major conclusions for U.S. foreign
policy that can be drawn from the perspective of the club dynamic. First, the evidence of the
777 Renee De Nevers (2007), p. 59. 778 Gordon and Shapiro (2006), pp. 137-8. 779 NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM) website: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM- I/NTMI_intro.htm , 03/11/2008.
387 transatlantic diplomacy in the early and mid-2000s clearly suggests that alliances matter much more than other more loose and flexible groupings, such as international coalitions. There is a potent stimulus for the hegemon to seek outcomes outside of the established alliance structures because it is much easier to manage more flexible groupings of states. The logic of club goods, however, indicates that usually such coalitions lead to sub-optimal outcomes. It is true that alliances are often times much harder to coordinate but usually they increase legitimacy and enhance overall allied capabilities which results in more optimal outcomes.
Second, the successful management of imbalance over an extended period of time requires the hegemon to use its power and influence in order to stimulate optimality. Such an optimization cannot be achieved solely by establishing the image of a “pervasive” or hegemon that “enables other states” but can only be managed through a careful cost-benefit analysis. 780
The club goods framework supports the observation that “the manner in which power is conceived and exercised matters more,” 781 where diplomacy is the key tool for the persistence of
unipolar or non-competitive provision. The proposed framework indicates from U.S. foreign
policy perspective that all allies whether they have significant or limited capabilities are valuable
to the extent that they enhance the legitimacy, minimize costs and share the burdens of
international security. The use of formal and informal diplomatic mechanisms is a long, time
consuming and cumbersome process that requires tact, diplomatic skills at various levels, a
“language and set of behaviors that draws on the ability to see the world through the eyes of
780 Richard Harknett, “A World Challenged: Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Material Capability to Harm,” Fulbright Public Lecture , delivered on March 19, 2002, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, Austria. The terms “pervasive hegemony and “enabling power” come from a presentation by Professor Richard to the Graduate Research Seminar on International Relations, University of Cincinnati, Spring 2004. 781 Ibid.
388 others.” 782 There is no doubt that the path of diplomacy takes a lot of time and efforts. The benefits, nonetheless, are immeasurably higher compared to other forms of unilateral diplomacy.
The second group of conclusions refers to the old or ‘core’ NATO allies from Western
Europe. The dynamics of transatlantic relations indicates that they have a key role in maintaining the transatlantic link. The logic of club goods theory shows that these countries perform the function of optimizers in the decision making process. Any equilibrium that excludes these allies not only decreases dramatically the legitimacy of allied missions, but also leads to sub-optimal outcomes. The transatlantic storm in 2003 and the aftermath of the French and German foreign policy behavior shows that these allies are needed to actively endorse alliance agenda that leads to optimal decisions that can accommodate all the allies. The alternative of simply rejecting sub-optimal ones and bailing out of the transatlantic dialogue seems to be the least favorable option for everybody. Therefore, the logic of complementarities indicates that this group of allies needs to remain actively involved in the transatlantic bargain because their positions can amend and adjust earlier proposals made by the hegemon or any other major club players that otherwise could lead to sub-optimality. Alternatively, if these nations embrace positions of disengagement and self-isolation, such a policy would be detrimental not only for them as major alliance partners, but also for the overall club dynamic.
The attempts to manage transatlantic relations using approaches similar to the “gang of the four” and the Teuveren Declaration of 2004 indicated that they cannot be successful because they are not supported by the other members of the club and are not backed with substantial military resources. Rather than focusing on the division between Europeanist and Atlanticist approaches, which ultimately leads to self-isolation and sub-optimality, the old NATO allies need to actively engage in dialogue with the hegemon, as well as the new and potential applicants in order to
782 Ibid.
389 stimulate a more efficient distribution of burden and responsibilities among the various sub-clubs of nations. The current state of the transatlantic relations after the storm of 2003 and 2004 indicates that political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean are willing to take a more pragmatic approach that focuses on actual contributions and burden sharing, not so much on the political rhetoric and differences of opinions. The context of the Vilnius Meeting of the foreign ministers in February 2008 confirmed this trend, which seemed to be the guiding principle of the preparations for the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.
The third group of conclusions has relevancy for the foreign policy of the new allies from
Central and Eastern Europe that joined NATO in 1999 and 2004. The logic of complementarities indicates that in the case of the new allies, they need to transform and optimize their resources in order to boost capabilities and contribute adequately to the new alliance missions. As the former SACEUR Gen. James Jones jokingly indicated “if [these] nations realized what they were signing up to in 2002, they probably wouldn't have done it, because it does cost money and has caused a lot of pain.” 783 For these not so wealthy nations,
NATO membership means that they have joined an expensive club that provides exclusive
benefits such as the Article Five clause. At the same time, it involves costs that are not solely
associated with the membership fees but also with investments in advanced up-to-date military
technology that can make the new allies interoperable and capable to conduct successfully out-
of-area operations. NATO has always existed “off the largeness of contributing countries” and
the expansion of the club in 1999 and 2004 has been able to provide “multinational logistics and
organic intelligence, which NATO has never had.” 784
783 Transcripts from the Atlantic Council Meeting with General James Jones, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2006, p. 4. 784 Ibid.
390 At the same time, the membership in this expensive club means that the new allies need to take new responsibilities. For example, they are expected to spend at least two percent of their
GDP on defense and most of them barely meet this requirement. Since they are much poorer than their ‘old’ counterparts, these countries need to manage their resources even more efficiently in order to have adequate contributions to the alliance missions. Therefore, the transformational process in these countries is far from complete and they need to continue making progress in this respect. Niche capabilities, for example, are a good venue for optimization of the available resources; an example of which is the Czech and Slovak CBRN team. In addition to economies of scale, niche capabilities offer a convenient mechanism for the allies from CEE to show their specialization among the other allies and send a clear signal that they are not free riders. At the same time, a major problem of NATO’s public diplomacy is that many of the political elites in these countries fail to explain to their citizens that Alliance membership is primarily a form of security commitment. Therefore, NATO and ESDP require from the member states to be able to send adequate number of troops for various EU- and
NATO-led missions following the principles of no duplication, no decoupling and no discrimination between the two institutions of international security. In other words, there is an expectation from these allies to send more, better equipped and better trained troops overseas in support of allied missions.
Lastly, there are several conclusions for those nations that would like to join NATO in the near future. These include not only the current MAP countries, which expected to receive invitations at the Bucharest Summit, but also some of the current PfP members that would like to upgrade their relationship with NATO. It is a general tendency that NATO’s conditions for membership have become more thorough, specific and precise, which is why the admission
391 process is now lengthier and necessitates further transitional stages during which the applicant have to prepare for membership. This path is consistent with the logic of club goods theory and the concept of complementarities, since the new allies are expected to have high levels of preparedness and efficiency. At the same time, the next rounds of expansion demand from
NATO to reform its decision making mechanisms as a part of the overall efforts to enhance the management of the club. NATO has grown from an alliance of twelve to an alliance of twenty six (and potentially twenty-nine) countries and its primary decision-making body, the North
Atlantic Council (NAC), is supported in its work from about 350 committees all of which operate on the rule of consensus. Even if twenty-five countries agree on a particular decision, such a mechanism allows a single nation to block a decision if it wants to do so. The rule has remained unrevised since 1949 and, given the perspective that “NAC is getting bigger and bigger, NATO needs to address this issue.” 785 At the same time, the concept of
complementarities indicates that NATO’s door should remain open, but the alliance can always
adjust the membership requirements in order to meet the needs of its expanding structures.
Lastly, the foreign policy conclusions for the different groups of allies should not be interpreted individually, but in their entirety. The logic of the proposed framework means that if
Brussels and the individual allies have a mutual understanding about the trend of alliance transformation and the expectations that are related to this process, all parties will be very predictable in their foreign policy behavior and the chances of miscommunication would be reduced to a minimum. Therefore, the allies would be able to manage carefully the differences of their opinions and future transatlantic storms would be very rare if not impossible.
785 Ibid, p. 7.
392 Implications for Future Research
Although the incorporation of the new allies seems to be a lengthy and cumbersome
process, the biggest challenges for club goods theory and the concept of complementarities come
not so much from the expansion of membership, but from NATO’s actual involvement on the
ground in the KFOR mission in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan. The mission in Afghanistan
was established in December 2001 after the Taliban regime was brought down and the
international community decided to embark on a process of reconstructing the country. Soon
after that NATO took over the command, coordination and planning of the stabilization efforts.
Currently more than 43,000 troops from 40 countries and 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) are involved in the country, which makes it NATO’s first and largest ground operation
outside of Europe. 786 The scope and size of this operation and the level of involvement poses
unprecedented challenges for NATO, especially since violence has continued to rise in the south
of the country. 787 These developments prompted the United States and NATO officials to raise the question of adequate force contribution from allies, equitable burden-sharing among them and appropriate force training including the ability to counter insurgency. 788 The U.S. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates remarked the dangers that NATO faces from “becoming a two-tiered
Alliance of those who are willing to fight and those who are not,” which may ultimately
786 See International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO Website: http://www.nato.int/issues/isaf/index.html , 02/12/2008. 787 Britain saw 42 soldiers killed last year, almost all in southern Afghanistan, its highest annual fatality count of the war; Canada lost 31, close to the 36 from that country killed in 2006. The Netherlands lost a total of 14 solders, six of which since August 2007. For further details see “Canada wants the Netherlands to extend mission in Afghanistan beyond 2008,” International Herald Tribune, June 11, 2007 and “Gates Faults NATO Force in Southern Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times , January 16, 2008. 788 “Rice says Afghanistan Fight is Testing NATO Alliance,” International Herald Tribune , February 6, 2008 and “Gates’s Comments on NATO’s Afghan Force Anger Dutch,” New York Times , January 17, 2008.
393 challenge the overall success of the efforts in Afghanistan. 789 Out-of-the-area operations such as
the one in Afghanistan are good cases to test the successful incorporation of new allies and the
advancement of NATO capabilities.
The developments in Afghanistan have also relevancy to NATO’s transformation on
several different levels. First, there is a major discussion about the extent to which the Alliance
is able to meet the demand for expeditionary force. Second, this discussion is also related to the
long-standing debate on burden sharing and cost sharing among the United States and the
European allies that dates back to the 1950s and 1960s. Third, implicitly, the debate is also a
reflection of the role that the United States and the European allies have in the international
system based on their actual commitments and capabilities.
Therefore, the debate about the contributions of NATO allies and the success of the
mission raises several core questions of inquiry. First, have NATO allies and the other
participating nations been able to meet the expectations for their contributions to ISAF? Second,
how is the burden being distributed among the allies and other participating nations? Third, have
the allies and other ISAF countries been able to work together efficiently to address the mission-
related problems, including the gap between actual and expected contributions? These questions
mandate a multi-stage research agenda, which needs to explore the evidence for enhanced
capabilities in Afghanistan. Also, we need to research how various domestic factors influence
the overall outcome of the mission. These variables include the type of government, the stability
of the ruling coalition, the levels of public support and how the presence of mission-related
obstacles influence the overall behavior of the contributing nations.
789 Speech of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in Munich, Germany, Sunday, February 10, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1214 , 02/12/2008.
394 In conclusion, the choice of a particular contemporary case, such as the case of NATO is challenging because of the rapidly changing dynamic of international politics. The post-9/11 security environment shows a steady trend that international alliances such as NATO have become more relevant than ever before. This study also showed that NATO shifts its domain in international politics from territorial defense and transatlantic diplomacy to conflict management and resolution, as well as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. In this case, how credible is it to expect that NATO to fade away and cease to exist? It seems that the participating nations have invested a lot in the alliance. This does not mean, however, that they have done so just in order to keep already established international structures alive with the expectation that eventually it may be used and pay off in the future. The rationality assumption and the careful cost-benefit analysis indicate that states can afford to do so only if these structures come in hand and are able to successfully accomplish today’s missions and tasks that they have been assigned and are expected to deal with.
Going back to the Waltzian skepticism about alliances in an imbalanced distribution of
power, should we expect that NATO’s new out-of-the-area operations will ultimately lead to the
Alliance’s decline? The analytical framework developed in the dissertation is consistent with the
viewpoint that the biggest challenges for contemporary NATO come from the internal
management of its new operations. Unlike Waltz and his consideration of the likely balancing
dynamics which he assumed would follow from the collapse of bipolarity, based on my findings,
I argue that the alliance will be able to reach across its various sub-clubs and continue to deliver
on its promises and commitments to advance the national interests of the its members and the
international security objectives of the international community as a whole.
395
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