Olmert’s Unilateral Option An Early Assessment David Makovsky Policy Focus #55 | May 2006 Patrick Clawson, Series Editor All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any infor- mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2006 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2006 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: Acting Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert (center), accompanied by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz (far left), reviews a map of the Gush Etzion settlement bloc as he begins a tour of Israel’s West Bank fence, February 7, 2006. Copyright AP Wide World Photos/Avi Ohayon/Israeli Government Press Office. About the Author David Makovsky is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute’s Project on the Middle East Peace Process. He has written extensively on Israeli-Palestinian issues, including their implications for U.S. Middle East policy. His recent publications include Engagement through Disengagement: Gaza and the Potential for Israeli-Palestin- ian Peacemaking (The Washington Institute, 2005) and A Defensible Fence: Fighting Terror and Enabling a Two- State Solution (The Washington Institute, 2004), which focuses on Israel’s security barrier and its relationship to demography and geography in the West Bank. He also authored Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Govern- ment’s Road to the Oslo Accord (Washington Institute/Westview Press/HarperCollins, 1996) and contributed to a history of U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, Triumph without Victory (Random House, 1992). Since 2000, Mr. Makovsky has also served as an adjunct lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. His commentary on the peace pro- cess and the Arab-Israeli conflict has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, the Chicago Tribune, Foreign Policy, and National Interest. A native of St. Louis, Missouri, Mr. Makovsky received a bachelor’s degree from Columbia University and a master’s degree in Middle East studies from Harvard University. n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Table of Contents Acknowledgments. v Foreword . vii Executive Summary . ix Introduction . 1 1. Evolution of Unilateralism . 2 2. Olmert’s Ideological Journey. 8 3. Olmert’s Plan . 13 4. Domestic Challenges to Olmert’s Plan. 17 5. Implications for the Palestinians. 22 6. Implications for U.S. Policy and the International Community. 25 Conclusion . 29 Map West Bank Fence Route, April 2006. xii Acknowledgments I AM GR ATEFUl to the many senior and midlevel policymakers in Washington, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Cairo, and Amman who shared their insights during the research for this paper. I am grateful to my colleagues who offered helpful comments during the drafting process, including Rob Satloff, Dennis Ross, Michael Herzog, Patrick Clawson, and Ben Fishman. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my research assistant Elizabeth Young. Her dedi- cated research assistance, keen eye, and good cheer were invaluable to me from the start to the end of this process. I also want to thank my intern Diana Greenwald for her assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Ellen and Murray Koppelman and Janine and Peter Lowy for their generous support of my work. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v Foreword UNlIKE MOST ISRAEli candidates for prime min- Hamas may find disengagement attractive if for no ister, Ehud Olmert spelled out a very clear platform other reason than it requires so little of them. that he intended to act on if his party, Kadima, was to Palestinians can choose to be passive observers of lead the Israeli government. His “convergence” plan, separation, taking comfort in Israel’s withdrawal from a which amounts to withdrawing at least 60,000 settlers significant part of the West Bank even as they complain into settler blocs adjacent to the so-called Green Line, that Israel is imposing on them and leaving such issues was spelled out in unprecedented detail as Olmert as Jerusalem and refugees unresolved. But if Palestin- sought a mandate for his vision. ians want to deal with the core issues of the conflict Although some may argue that he did not receive and have some say in how they are resolved, then they the mandate he sought, garnering only 29 of the 120 must also put themselves in a position where they are Knesset seats, the more relevant number may be the prepared to do their part of the bargain in any negotia- loss in power that the right suffered in the new Knes- tion. So long as Hamas seems capable of preventing the set, going from 70 seats to 50. The center-left parties Palestinians from negotiating or assuming any of their now have an unmistakable majority, and those voting responsibilities toward the Israelis, it is hard to see what for the center-left knew well that their votes would alternative exists to separation. constitute support for what Olmert intended and not Ultimately, as David points out, the United States support for those opposed to his plan. has a major role to play. If any coordination is to take With “convergence” or Israeli separation from the place—or even the possibility of negotiations—the bulk of the West Bank now the aim of the new Israeli United States will need to create parallel discussions government, a multitude of issues must be considered: with the two sides on how we and they are prepared What will be the scope of the Israeli withdrawal? Will to approach separation. Indeed, should direct coor- the evacuation involve both settlers and the Israeli mili- dination prove difficult, the United States can medi- tary? Will any coordination with the Palestinians be ate, offering either to help broker a real negotiation if possible? If so, what might it look like and what issues the Palestinians can produce on their side or to work are most likely to be coordinated? Is the United States out some parallel understandings on how, where, and prepared to help Israel defray the costs, at least in part, when separation might unfold and what each side of Israeli disengagement from the West Bank? Will the will do. United States try to negotiate the route of the with- The less the Palestinians are able to do on their side, drawal line as the price for trying to gain support from the more Israel will seek to gain from the United States. the other members of the Quartet or for offering recog- The American readiness to respond to the Israelis on nition or quasi-recognition of the new Israeli border? the borders will be influenced by how much contiguity Can disengagement or convergence make an eventual exists for Palestinians and a state on their side of the peace agreement with Palestinians more likely? border—and whether the Israel Defense Forces remain David Makovsky addresses these and other ques- in Palestinian territory even if the settlers are gone. The tions in his lucid examination of the Israeli disengage- less territory the Israelis appear to annex, leaving room ment. For that reason alone, his study makes a real con- for the principle of a swap of territory, the further the tribution. But David offers more than an exploration United States is likely to go in accepting the Israeli bor- of these important issues. He offers insight into why der as a political border—even if it is not a fully recog- “separation” became Israel’s policy; how and why both nized political border. Ariel Sharon’s and Ehud Olmert’s strategies evolved; In the end, the Bush administration and the Israeli and why Palestinians are likely to resist it, even while government will have to make hard calls. Although The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii David Makovsky Olmert’s Unilateral Option we should not expect a rush to make such decisions required. If so, such decisions will take the kind of on either side, the reality of 2008 and the end of the intensive, hands-on diplomacy that the Bush adminis- Bush administration could lead both sides to make tration has been reluctant to undertake thus far. them. For Ehud Olmert, he may feel he can achieve But, as David points out, the potential gains from his objective of resolving Israel’s borders by 2010 only doing so could make peace far more likely over time. if he can reach an understanding with the Bush admin- Conversely, shying away from this effort is likely to make istration—which he may believe is more likely to be separation less a way-station to greater stability and hope responsive than an unknown successor administration. and more a new staging ground for confrontation. Knowing that it is possible to conclude his adminis- tration with Israel ending most of its occupation and Ambassador Dennis Ross committed to withdrawing from the bulk of the West Former U.S. Special Middle East Bank, President Bush may feel that big decisions are Coordinator for the Peace Process viii Policy Focus #55 Executive Summary T H E V I C T O RY O F Israeli Prime Minister Ehud it is likely to depend upon the level of support from the Olmert’s Kadima Party in the March elections follow- United States.