DOCSLIB.ORG

Olmert's Unilateral Option

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Olmert's Unilateral Option Olmert’s Unilateral Option An Early Assessment David Makovsky Policy Focus #55 | May 2006 Patrick Clawson, Series Editor All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any infor- mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2006 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2006 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: Acting Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert (center), accompanied by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz (far left), reviews a map of the Gush Etzion settlement bloc as he begins a tour of Israel’s West Bank fence, February 7, 2006. Copyright AP Wide World Photos/Avi Ohayon/Israeli Government Press Office. About the Author David Makovsky is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute’s Project on the Middle East Peace Process. He has written extensively on Israeli-Palestinian issues, including their implications for U.S. Middle East policy. His recent publications include Engagement through Disengagement: Gaza and the Potential for Israeli-Palestin- ian Peacemaking (The Washington Institute, 2005) and A Defensible Fence: Fighting Terror and Enabling a Two- State Solution (The Washington Institute, 2004), which focuses on Israel’s security barrier and its relationship to demography and geography in the West Bank. He also authored Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Govern- ment’s Road to the Oslo Accord (Washington Institute/Westview Press/HarperCollins, 1996) and contributed to a history of U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, Triumph without Victory (Random House, 1992). Since 2000, Mr. Makovsky has also served as an adjunct lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. His commentary on the peace pro- cess and the Arab-Israeli conflict has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, the Chicago Tribune, Foreign Policy, and National Interest. A native of St. Louis, Missouri, Mr. Makovsky received a bachelor’s degree from Columbia University and a master’s degree in Middle East studies from Harvard University. n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Table of Contents Acknowledgments. v Foreword . vii Executive Summary . ix Introduction . 1 1. Evolution of Unilateralism . 2 2. Olmert’s Ideological Journey. 8 3. Olmert’s Plan . 13 4. Domestic Challenges to Olmert’s Plan. 17 5. Implications for the Palestinians. 22 6. Implications for U.S. Policy and the International Community. 25 Conclusion . 29 Map West Bank Fence Route, April 2006. xii Acknowledgments I AM GR ATEFUl to the many senior and midlevel policymakers in Washington, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Cairo, and Amman who shared their insights during the research for this paper. I am grateful to my colleagues who offered helpful comments during the drafting process, including Rob Satloff, Dennis Ross, Michael Herzog, Patrick Clawson, and Ben Fishman. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my research assistant Elizabeth Young. Her dedi- cated research assistance, keen eye, and good cheer were invaluable to me from the start to the end of this process. I also want to thank my intern Diana Greenwald for her assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Ellen and Murray Koppelman and Janine and Peter Lowy for their generous support of my work. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v Foreword UNlIKE MOST ISRAEli candidates for prime min- Hamas may find disengagement attractive if for no ister, Ehud Olmert spelled out a very clear platform other reason than it requires so little of them. that he intended to act on if his party, Kadima, was to Palestinians can choose to be passive observers of lead the Israeli government. His “convergence” plan, separation, taking comfort in Israel’s withdrawal from a which amounts to withdrawing at least 60,000 settlers significant part of the West Bank even as they complain into settler blocs adjacent to the so-called Green Line, that Israel is imposing on them and leaving such issues was spelled out in unprecedented detail as Olmert as Jerusalem and refugees unresolved. But if Palestin- sought a mandate for his vision. ians want to deal with the core issues of the conflict Although some may argue that he did not receive and have some say in how they are resolved, then they the mandate he sought, garnering only 29 of the 120 must also put themselves in a position where they are Knesset seats, the more relevant number may be the prepared to do their part of the bargain in any negotia- loss in power that the right suffered in the new Knes- tion. So long as Hamas seems capable of preventing the set, going from 70 seats to 50. The center-left parties Palestinians from negotiating or assuming any of their now have an unmistakable majority, and those voting responsibilities toward the Israelis, it is hard to see what for the center-left knew well that their votes would alternative exists to separation. constitute support for what Olmert intended and not Ultimately, as David points out, the United States support for those opposed to his plan. has a major role to play. If any coordination is to take With “convergence” or Israeli separation from the place—or even the possibility of negotiations—the bulk of the West Bank now the aim of the new Israeli United States will need to create parallel discussions government, a multitude of issues must be considered: with the two sides on how we and they are prepared What will be the scope of the Israeli withdrawal? Will to approach separation. Indeed, should direct coor- the evacuation involve both settlers and the Israeli mili- dination prove difficult, the United States can medi- tary? Will any coordination with the Palestinians be ate, offering either to help broker a real negotiation if possible? If so, what might it look like and what issues the Palestinians can produce on their side or to work are most likely to be coordinated? Is the United States out some parallel understandings on how, where, and prepared to help Israel defray the costs, at least in part, when separation might unfold and what each side of Israeli disengagement from the West Bank? Will the will do. United States try to negotiate the route of the with- The less the Palestinians are able to do on their side, drawal line as the price for trying to gain support from the more Israel will seek to gain from the United States. the other members of the Quartet or for offering recog- The American readiness to respond to the Israelis on nition or quasi-recognition of the new Israeli border? the borders will be influenced by how much contiguity Can disengagement or convergence make an eventual exists for Palestinians and a state on their side of the peace agreement with Palestinians more likely? border—and whether the Israel Defense Forces remain David Makovsky addresses these and other ques- in Palestinian territory even if the settlers are gone. The tions in his lucid examination of the Israeli disengage- less territory the Israelis appear to annex, leaving room ment. For that reason alone, his study makes a real con- for the principle of a swap of territory, the further the tribution. But David offers more than an exploration United States is likely to go in accepting the Israeli bor- of these important issues. He offers insight into why der as a political border—even if it is not a fully recog- “separation” became Israel’s policy; how and why both nized political border. Ariel Sharon’s and Ehud Olmert’s strategies evolved; In the end, the Bush administration and the Israeli and why Palestinians are likely to resist it, even while government will have to make hard calls. Although The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii David Makovsky Olmert’s Unilateral Option we should not expect a rush to make such decisions required. If so, such decisions will take the kind of on either side, the reality of 2008 and the end of the intensive, hands-on diplomacy that the Bush adminis- Bush administration could lead both sides to make tration has been reluctant to undertake thus far. them. For Ehud Olmert, he may feel he can achieve But, as David points out, the potential gains from his objective of resolving Israel’s borders by 2010 only doing so could make peace far more likely over time. if he can reach an understanding with the Bush admin- Conversely, shying away from this effort is likely to make istration—which he may believe is more likely to be separation less a way-station to greater stability and hope responsive than an unknown successor administration. and more a new staging ground for confrontation. Knowing that it is possible to conclude his adminis- tration with Israel ending most of its occupation and Ambassador Dennis Ross committed to withdrawing from the bulk of the West Former U.S. Special Middle East Bank, President Bush may feel that big decisions are Coordinator for the Peace Process viii Policy Focus #55 Executive Summary T H E V I C T O RY O F Israeli Prime Minister Ehud it is likely to depend upon the level of support from the Olmert’s Kadima Party in the March elections follow- United States.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Hezbollah-Israeli
    The Hizbullah-Israeli War: an American Perspective Aaron David Miller It was unusual for an Israeli Prime Minster to break open a bottle of champagne in front of American negotiators at a formal meeting. But that’s exactly what Shimon Peres did. It was late April 1996, and Peres was marking the end of a bloody three week border confrontation with Hizbullah diffused only by an intense ten day shuttle orchestrated by Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Those understandings negotiated between the governments of Israel and Syria (the latter standing in for Hizbullah) would create an Israeli-Lebanese monitoring group, co-chaired by the United States and France. These arrangements were far from perfect, but contributed, along with on-again-off-again Israeli-Syrian negotiations, to an extended period of relative calm along the Israeli- Lebanese border. The April understandings would last until Israel’s withdrawal. The recent summer war between Hizbullah and Israel, triggered by the Shia militia’s attack on an Israeli patrol on July 12, masked a number of other factors which would set the stage for the confrontation as well as the Bush administration’s response. Six years of relative quiet had witnessed Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in June of 2000, a steady supply of Katushya rockets—both short and long range—from Iran to Hizbullah, the collapse of Israel’s negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians, and the onset of the worst Israeli-Palestinian war in half a century. A perfect storm was brewing, spawned by the empowerment of both Hizbullah and Hamas, Iranian reach into the Arab-Israeli zone, Syria’s forced withdrawal from Lebanon, a determination by Israel to restore its strategic deterrence in the wake of unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza, and an inexperienced Israeli prime minister and defense minister uncertain of how that should be done.
    [Show full text]
  • Amir Peretz Begins As Defense Minister by J. Zel Lurie
    Amir Peretz Begins as Defense Minister by J. Zel Lurie While this three-day symposium [at AJ Committee — with Yehoshua] was going on in Washington, Ehud Olmert was introducing his new government in Jerusalem. Most newsworthy are the two of the five new Labor ministers, Amir Peretz, minister of defense and Yuli Tamir, minister of education. Peretz confronts a large group of army officers and bureaucrats who have been coddling and cooperating with the settlers for decades They are accustomed to running the West Bank arbitrarily and no one dared question their decisions. Here is one small example of what Peretz is up against: A couple of Saturdays ago, the Jewish settlers in Maon, south of Hebron, wearing masks, attacked Israeli soldiers who were escorting 18 Arab kids to the regional school in at-Tawani. On the following Saturday, Peace Now received the army’s permission to send two busloads of peaceniks to a demonstration in at-Tawani. At Gush Etzion junction the buses were stopped. “Since we gave permission, the area has been declared a closed military zone,” the Peace Now demonstrators were told. “You cannot proceed.” Ran Cohen, a Meretz M.K., was on one of the buses. He called Peretz who must have raised the roof with his army subordinates. After an hour the buses were allowed to continue on their journey and hold their demonstration. Brigadier General Ilan Paz, who recently retired after 28 years in the army, seven of which were in the West Bank. commented: “For 18 months the settlers in Maon have been harassing kids passing their farm on their way to school.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Conflicts Report - Israel
    Armed Conflicts Report - Israel Armed Conflicts Report Israel-Palestine (1948 - first combat deaths) Update: February 2009 Summary Type of Conflict Parties to the Conflict Status of the Fighting Number of Deaths Political Developments Background Arms Sources Economic Factors Summary: 2008 The situation in the Gaza strip escalated throughout 2008 to reflect an increasing humanitarian crisis. The death toll reached approximately 1800 deaths by the end of January 2009, with increased conflict taking place after December 19th. The first six months of 2008 saw increased fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas rebels. A six month ceasefire was agreed upon in June of 2008, and the summer months saw increased factional violence between opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah. Israel shut down the border crossings between the Gaza strip and Israel and shut off fuel to the power plant mid-January 2008. The fuel was eventually turned on although blackouts occurred sporadically throughout the year. The blockade was opened periodically throughout the year to allow a minimum amount of humanitarian aid to pass through. However, for the majority of the year, the 1.5 million Gaza Strip inhabitants, including those needing medical aid, were trapped with few resources. At the end of January 2009, Israel agreed to the principles of a ceasefire proposal, but it is unknown whether or not both sides can come to agreeable terms and create long lasting peace in 2009. 2007 A November 2006 ceasefire was broken when opposing Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah renewed fighting in April and May of 2007. In June, Hamas led a coup on the Gaza headquarters of Fatah giving them control of the Gaza Strip.
    [Show full text]
  • Command and Control | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Command and Control by David Makovsky, Olivia Holt-Ivry May 23, 2012 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Makovsky David Makovsky is the Ziegler distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Koret Project on Arab-Israel Relations. Olivia Holt-Ivry Articles & Testimony his week, the world's major powers resumed negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Should they fail, T the specter of a possible Israeli strike looms large, seeming to grow more likely as Tehran's nuclear program advances. In recent weeks, however, the conventional wisdom has shifted to favor the view that Israel is not on the cusp of a strike against Iran. This has been driven in part by public comments from former Israeli security officials -- notably former Mossad head Meir Dagan and former Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin -- questioning the wisdom of such an attack. An Israeli strike is not feasible, the thinking goes, so long as its security community remains divided -- and the thinly veiled threats of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are therefore mere bluster. Don't be so sure. Dagan and Diskin's views aren't likely to tell us much about the likelihood of a strike on Iran one way or the other. For starters, they're former officials -- given the sensitivity of this issue, and the recent media misinterpretation of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Benny Gantz's remarks earlier this month, no other current members of the security establishment are likely to go public with their views.
    [Show full text]
  • Congressional Record—Senate S1918
    S1918 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE March 7, 2001 an agreement would remove a direct Foreigners increasingly are free to matically in recent years. U.S. exports North Korean threat to the region and travel widely in the country and talk to Southeast Asia, for instance, sur- improve prospects for North-South rec- to average North Koreans without gov- pass our exports to Germany and are onciliation. It would also remove a ernment interference. North Korea has double our exports to France. U.S. di- major source of missiles and missile even begun to issue tourist visas. The rect investment in East Asia now tops technology for countries such as Iran. presence of foreigners in North Korea $150 billion, and has tripled over the Getting an agreement will not be is gradually changing North Korean at- past decade. easy, but it helps a lot that we are not titudes about South Korea and the And of course these are just a few of the only country which would benefit West. the raw economic realities which un- from the dismantlement of North Ko- One American with a long history of derscore East Asia’s importance. The rea’s missile program. Our allies South working in North Korea illustrated the United States has important humani- Korea and Japan, our European allies change underway by describing an im- tarian, environmental, energy, and se- who already provide financial support promptu encounter he had recently. curity interests throughout the region. for the Agreed Framework, the Chi- While he was out on an unescorted We have an obligation, it seems to nese, the Russians, all share a desire to morning walk, a North Korean woman me, not to drop the ball.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel: Growing Pains at 60
    Viewpoints Special Edition Israel: Growing Pains at 60 The Middle East Institute Washington, DC Middle East Institute The mission of the Middle East Institute is to promote knowledge of the Middle East in Amer- ica and strengthen understanding of the United States by the people and governments of the region. For more than 60 years, MEI has dealt with the momentous events in the Middle East — from the birth of the state of Israel to the invasion of Iraq. Today, MEI is a foremost authority on contemporary Middle East issues. It pro- vides a vital forum for honest and open debate that attracts politicians, scholars, government officials, and policy experts from the US, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. MEI enjoys wide access to political and business leaders in countries throughout the region. Along with information exchanges, facilities for research, objective analysis, and thoughtful commentary, MEI’s programs and publications help counter simplistic notions about the Middle East and America. We are at the forefront of private sector public diplomacy. Viewpoints are another MEI service to audiences interested in learning more about the complexities of issues affecting the Middle East and US rela- tions with the region. To learn more about the Middle East Institute, visit our website at http://www.mideasti.org The maps on pages 96-103 are copyright The Foundation for Middle East Peace. Our thanks to the Foundation for graciously allowing the inclusion of the maps in this publication. Cover photo in the top row, middle is © Tom Spender/IRIN, as is the photo in the bottom row, extreme left.
    [Show full text]
  • Public Companies Profiting from Illegal Israeli Settlements on Palestinian Land
    Public Companies Profiting from Illegal Israeli Settlements on Palestinian Land Yellow highlighting denotes companies held by the United Methodist General Board of Pension and Health Benefits (GBPHB) as of 12/31/14 I. Public Companies Located in Illegal Settlements ACE AUTO DEPOT LTD. (TLV:ACDP) - owns hardware store in the illegal settlement of Ma'ale Adumim http://www.ace.co.il/default.asp?catid=%7BE79CAE46-40FB-4818-A7BF-FF1C01A96109%7D, http://www.machat.co.il/businesses.php, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/world/middleeast/14israel.html?_r=3&oref=slogin&oref=slogin&, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/snapshot/snapshot.asp?ticker=ACDP:IT ALON BLUE SQUARE ISRAEL LTD. (NYSE:BSI) - has facilities in the Barkan and Atarot Industrial Zones and operates supermarkets in many West Bank settlements www.whoprofits.org/company/blue- square-israel, http://www.haaretz.com/business/shefa-shuk-no-more-boycotted-chain-renamed-zol-b-shefa-1.378092, www.bsi.co.il/Common/FilesBinaryWrite.aspx?id=3140 AVGOL INDUSTRIES 1953 LTD. (TLV:AVGL) - has a major manufacturing plant in the Barkan Industrial Zone http://www.unitedmethodistdivestment.com/ReportCorporateResearchTripWestBank2010FinalVersion3.pdf (United Methodist eyewitness report), http://panjiva.com/Avgol-Ltd/1370180, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/avgol- sees-bright-future-for-nonwoven-textiles-in-china-1.282397 AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC. (NASDAQ:CAR) - leases cars in the illegal settlements of Beitar Illit and Modi’in Illit http://rent.avis.co.il/en/pages/car_rental_israel_stations, http://www.carrentalisrael.com/car-rental- israel.asp?refr= BANK HAPOALIM LTD. (TLV:POLI) - has branches in settlements; provides financing for housing projects in illegal settlements, mortgages for settlers, and financing for the Jerusalem light rail project, which connects illegal settlements with Jerusalem http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/bank-hapoalim-to-lead-financing-for-jerusalem-light-rail-line-1.97706, http://www.whoprofits.org/company/bank-hapoalim BANK LEUMI LE-ISRAEL LTD.
    [Show full text]
  • CA 6821/93 Bank Mizrahi V. Migdal Cooperative Village 1
    CA 6821/93 Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Cooperative Village 1 CA 6821/93 LCA 1908/94 LCA 3363/94 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. 1. Migdal Cooperative Village 2. Bostan HaGalil Cooperative Village 3. Hadar Am Cooperative Village Ltd 4. El-Al Agricultural Association Ltd. CA 6821/93 1. Givat Yoav Workers Village for Cooperative Agricultural Settlement Ltd 2. Ehud Aharonov 3. Aryeh Ohad 4. Avraham Gur 5. Amiram Yifhar 6. Zvi Yitzchaki 7. Simana Amram 8. Ilan Sela 9. Ron Razon 10. David Mini v. 1. Commercial Credit Services (Israel) Ltd 2. The Attorney General LCA 1908/94 1. Dalia Nahmias 2. Menachem Nahmias v. Kfar Bialik Cooperative Village Ltd LCA 3363/94 The Supreme Court Sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals [November 9, 1995] Before: Former Court President M. Shamgar, Court President A. Barak, Justices D. Levine, G. Bach, A. Goldberg, E. Mazza, M. Cheshin, Y. Zamir, Tz. E Tal Appeal before the Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals 2 Israel Law Reports [1995] IsrLR 1 Appeal against decision of the Tel-Aviv District Court (Registrar H. Shtein) on 1.11.93 in application 3459/92,3655, 4071, 1630/93 (C.F 1744/91) and applications for leave for appeal against the decision of the Tel-Aviv District Court (Registrar H. Shtein) dated 6.3.94 in application 5025/92 (C.F. 2252/91), and against the decision of the Haifa District Court (Judge S. Gobraan), dated 30.5.94 in application for leave for appeal 18/94, in which the appeal against the decision of the Head of the Execution Office in Haifa was rejected in Ex.File 14337-97-8-02.
    [Show full text]
  • 7. Politics and Diplomacy
    Hoover Press : Zelnick/Israel hzeliu ch7 Mp_119 rev1 page 119 7. Politics and Diplomacy as israeli forces were clearing recalcitrant settlers from their Gaza homes on August 16, 2005, Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ra- mallah, published a column in the Jerusalem Post headlined, “How Sharon and Abbas Can Both Win.”1 Shikaki, a pollster and political analyst respected in Israel and the west, questioned the wisdom of Israeli unilateralism in Gaza and on the West Bank as opposed to Lebanon, where no one on the other side wanted to talk. Here, he argued, Hamas may be as close-minded as Hez- bollah, preferring to paint Israel’s withdrawal as a victory for Pal- estinian resistance, but Abu Mazen, supported by Palestinian pub- lic opinion, wanted to reduce tensions and negotiate. Make him look good by easing restrictions on Palestinian trade and move- ment, and he will help Sharon and Israel by defeating Hamas and talking about the terms for settling the conflict. In other words, let the PA rather than Hamas control the Palestinian narrative of withdrawal. Shakaki updated his survey data two months later for a con- ference at Brandeis University hosted by Shai Feldman, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies and former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. By that October conference, 84 percent of Palestinians were convinced that violence had played a role in the Israeli withdrawal. Irre- 1. Khalil Shikaki, “How Sharon and Abbas Can Both Win,” Jerusalem Post, August 16, 2005.
    [Show full text]
  • Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation in Syria | The
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Bracing for an Israel-Iran Confrontation in Syria by Ehud Yaari Apr 30, 2018 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Ehud Yaari Ehud Yaari is a Lafer International Fellow at The Washington Institute. Articles & Testimony Despite the recent escalation, the United States has options for preventing, or at least limiting the scope of, a regional showdown in Syria. srael and Iran are on course for a collision in the near future. Indeed, a military clash that could expand well I beyond Syrian territory appears almost inevitable. In particular, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is determined to transform Syria into a platform for a future war against Israel, whereas leaders of the Jewish state have sworn to prevent what they often describe as the tightening of a noose around Israel’s neck. The past five years have already seen a series of direct clashes between the two powers. These include more than 120 Israeli Air Force (IAF) strikes against weapons shipments to Hezbollah, Iranian attempts to instigate cross- border incidents along the Golan Heights, and Israeli targeting of arms-production facilities introduced by Iran. In early 2018, these exchanges have escalated to include Israeli airstrikes on Iranian UAV facilities established deep in the Syrian desert, at the T-4 Air Base, and a first Iranian attempt to stage an armed drone attack in Israel. Iran has committed publicly to conducting a forceful retaliation for the Israeli strike in January that killed eight Iranian officers, including UAV unit commander Colonel Mehdi Dehghani. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has threatened vaguely that a confrontation in Syria could prompt Israel to target Iranian territory.
    [Show full text]
  • H.E. Mr. Ariel Sharon Prime Minister of the State of Israel
    Statement by H.E. Mr. Ariel Sharon Prime Minister of the State of Israel High-Level Plenary Meeting of the 60'h Session of the General Assembly United Nations, New York 15 September 2005 Translation Prime Minister Ariel Sharon' Speech at the United Nations Assembly September 15, 2005 My friends and colleagues, heads and representatives of the UN member states, I arrived here from Jerusalem, the capital of the Jewish people for over 3,000 years, and the undivided and eternal capital of the State of Israel. At the outset, I would like to express the profound feelings of empathy of the people of Israel for the American nation, and our sincere condolences to the families who lost their loved ones. I wish to encourage my friend, President George Bush, and the American people, in their determined effo rts to assist the victims of the hur ricane and rebuild the ruins after the destruction. The State of Israel, which the United States stood beside at times of trial, is ready to extend any assistance at its disposal in this immense humanitarian mission. Ladies and Gentlemen, I stand before you at the gate of nations as a Jew and as a citizen of the free and sovereign State of Israel, a proud representative of an ancient people, whose numbers are few, but whose contribution to civilization and to the values of ethics, justice and faith, surrounds the world and encompasses history. The Jewish people have a long memory, the memory which united the exiles of Israel for thousands of years: a memory which has its origin in G-d's commandment to our forefather Abraham: "Go forth!" and continued with the receiving of the Torah at the foot of Mount Sinai and the wanderings of the children of Israel in the desert, led by Moses on their journey to the promised land, the land of Israel.
    [Show full text]
  • AMIR PERETZ Member of Parliament, State of Israel
    SESSION 3 • Saturday, October 16, 2010 page 1 AMIR PERETZ Member of Parliament, State of Israel First of all I would like to thank the IFRI organization for the conference that is taking place here in Morocco. Here with me, are two other members of the Israeli parlimant - Meir Sheetrit, former minister of justice and Ahmad Tibi who represents the Arab – Israeli citizens. I was born in Morocco and feel that a big part of my values as a person were acquired here. Even though I left as a young boy, the strengths that I received here have been a part of me all through the way. I want to send a message of peace to his Majesty the king of Morocco and wish him all the very best. For a big part of Israeli citizens his majesty and the Kingdom of Morocco, remains a lasting symbol and example of possible coexistence, rooted deep in our hearts. Ladies and gentlemen, I could have talked about many issues which occupy many countries around the world - Financial crisis, human rights and poverty. I could have talked about security threats, Iran and it’s race for obtaining unconventional weapons, sources of terror and their effect on personal security in each and every country. But today I want to focus in the chance for an optimist future in all the Middle East states, especially a better future between Israel and the Palestinians. Members of the conference, Some of us are experienced in war, and we all know that war comes at a heavy price for all sides.
    [Show full text]