Vladislav Zubok, Constantine Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. xv + 282 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-674-45531-3.

Reviewed by Thomas R. Maddux

Published on H-Diplo (July, 1999)

Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov Zubok and Pleshakov came of age in the Sovi‐ have written the most infuential book to date us‐ et Union after the Soviet intervention in Czecho‐ ing recently available Soviet documents on Soviet slovakia in 1968 and graduated from Moscow Cold War policies under Joseph Stalin and Nikita State University in the early 1980s. They joined Khrushchev. Zubok has become quite familiar to the elite Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies Americans as a personable, regular commentator which they describe as a "pragmatic and infnitely on the "Postscript" sections of the CNN "Cold War" cynical think tank [that] gave us a good grasp of program during which he ofered perceptive and Soviet policy- making" (p. xi). After Mikhail Gor‐ judicious observations. As a Senior Fellow at the bachev arrived in 1985 and initiated glasnost, National Security Archive at George Washington Zubok and Pleshakov turned to a study of Soviet University, and active participant in the Cold War policy, moving from innocuous documents on fur‐ International History Project, Zubok has been at niture styles in Soviet embassies to signifcant the center of the opening and publication of Sovi‐ documents from the Soviet embassies and foreign et Cold War documents and emerging reinterpre‐ ministry to the International Department of the tations of not only Soviet leaders and policies but Central Committee and Politburo. Although the also the larger, emotional issue of Cold War re‐ authors had access to some documents from the sponsibility.[1] Pleshakov has written several Archive of the Russian President, most records of works of fction, an essay on Sino-Soviet relations, Stalin and his successors were not accessible in‐ and is currently teaching at Mount Holyoke.[2] cluding Politburo minutes and correspondence Despite complaints about the absence of reliable among Soviet leaders.[3] primary sources on Soviet policy, American schol‐ The central interpretive thesis of Zubok and ars have found it sometimes impossibly difcult Pleshakov to guide understanding of Soviet for‐ to adjust their assessments accumulated over thir‐ eign policy in the Cold War is a revolutionary-im‐ ty or forty years. perial paradigm, a "symbiosis of imperial expan‐ H-Net Reviews sionism and ideological proselytism" (p. 3), that tem and threat in terms of the expansion of their joined an imperial nature and interests from Rus‐ adversary's domestic system."[4] In his recent sia's past and present with communist revolution‐ study of Stalin's policies in the Cold War, Vojtech ary aspirations that fused Russia's messianic lega‐ Mastny also revives the central importance of ide‐ cy with Marxism and Leninism. Zubok and Ple‐ ology although he tends to emphasize how Stalin shakov explore the shifting nature and compo‐ used ideology as a means to power and security nents of this paradigm in a series of chapters that for his regime.[5] begin with Stalin's perspective with victory in What does this revival of ideology contribute hand in 1945, through Stalin's policies in the Cold with respect to understanding Soviet policy? Stal‐ War, to the eforts of his subordinates and succes‐ in is the most signifcant and most difcult chal‐ sors--Vyacheslav Molotov, Lavrenty Beria, Georgi lenge for Zubok and Pleshakov with respect to the Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev--to implement imperial-revolutionary paradigm. In two chapters their own versions of this infuential paradigm. on Stalin and one on Molotov and another on An‐ Although the authors move away from this para‐ drei Zhdanov, Stalin's chief "trumpeter of the Cold digm in their discussions of specifc Cold War War" as Central Committee head of the Depart‐ crises such as Stalin's views on Germany or ment of Agitation and Propaganda and the Inter‐ Khrushchev's handling of relations with China national Department, Zubok and Pleshakov push and Mao Zedong, they make an efort in each the published and primary sources including Ger‐ chapter to link their analysis to the paradigm. man language publications as far as they will go "Ideology was neither the servant nor the master to demonstrate that Stalin from the 1920s on of Soviet foreign policy," Zubok and Pleshakov came closest among Soviet leaders to implement‐ conclude, "but it was the delirium tremens of So‐ ing the imperial- revolutionary paradigm mixed viet statements, the core of the regime's self-legiti‐ with his sense of inferiority and xenophobic sus‐ macy, a terrifying delusion they could never picions toward anything foreign. Stalin's lodestar shake of" (p. 275-76). "was the promise of Communist revolutionary In reviving the role of ideology in shaping the universalism combined with the necessities of perspective of Soviet policy makers and in provid‐ survival for the Soviet Union...." (pp. 11-12). Zubok ing primary documentation of Soviet leaders from and Pleshakov have not found a "master plan" for Stalin to Khrushchev expressing an ideological a communist world in the Soviet archives and rec‐ perspective in conversations with Soviet and oth‐ ognize that fexible tactics characterize all of the er communist leaders, Zubok and Pleshakov have Soviet leaders. As Stalin surveyed the scene in signifcantly redirected the perspective of Ameri‐ 1945, the authors portray him as prepared to post‐ can Cold War specialists who for decades have pone the revolutionary side of the paradigm in or‐ found it difcult to accept what historians of the der to consolidate the new Soviet sphere in East‐ Soviet Union have usually recognized as an essen‐ ern Europe and wait for the inevitable postwar tial interpretive premise. "Ideology is back", notes capitalist economic crisis and falling out of the Nigel Gould-Davies, in a recent assessment on the Western capitalist powers, something that Molo‐ role of ideology in the Cold War that carefully sug‐ tov kept looking for into the 1980s. gests the need for evaluations that distinguish be‐ On the issue of responsibility for the ensuing tween personality, ideology and culture. Accord‐ Cold War, Zubok and Pleshakov resist the tempta‐ ing to Gould-Davies, "ideological states seek pow‐ tion "to lay total blame for the Cold War on the er to spread their domestic system rather than to delusions of Stalin and his lieutenants" (p. 276). enhance their own security.... They defne security On the one hand the paradigm predestines Soviet in terms of the expansion of their domestic sys‐

2 H-Net Reviews expansion and Stalin's xenophobic regime would trast with the authors' presentation of limit any cooperation with the West but the au‐ Khrushchev as a very dynamic and dangerous thors note the extent of Soviet sacrifce to defeat challenge to Kennedy, revisionists led by Thomas Hitler, the necessity for time to reconstruct a dev‐ Paterson and proteges of Paterson and Walter astated western Russia, and reasonably successful LaFeber in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American cooperation with the West after 1941 (pp. 6-7, Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 devote very little atten‐ 33-35). The authors do suggest that Stalin's inter‐ tion to Khrushchev and focus instead on what Pa‐ est in cooperation with the West was "always on terson defnes as Kennedy's overall failure in his his own terms" and when the United States and its doomed quest to "win the Cold War." The chal‐ Western allies moved to promote economic recov‐ lenge and opportunities posed by Khrushchev do ery with the Marshall Plan and bring the Western not merit a separate chapter in the collection, and zones of Germany into their coalition Stalin Frank Costigliola's essay that discusses the Berlin launched a counterofensive that backfred in Eu‐ crisis admits that Khrushchev precipitated the rope and approved a North Korean invasion of Berlin crisis but ofers little analysis of the Soviet South Korean in 1950 that blew away the rem‐ leader's strategy before and during the Berlin nants of the Yalta system of cooperation in Asia Wall crisis.[7] The pursuit of victory is not neces‐ along with a new revolutionary ofensive with sarily undesirable and, as many observers failed Mao's China. Yet the authors include other factors to note in 1991, victory was the original objective on the responsibility issue, noting the impact of in George Kennan's containment strategy (either a power politics, "choices of U.S. and British policy- change in Soviet international behavior and/or an makers, and the deeper causes of hostility and erosion of the Kremlin's ability to hold its sphere mistrust between dictatorships and democracy in Eastern Europe), although Kennan probably ..." (p. 276). did not anticipate a total Soviet collapse. Since the Zubok and Pleshakov's assessment of Nikta revisionists want to portray Kennedy as a most Khrushchev dominates the second half of their aggressive Cold Warrior, the Zubok and Pleshakov study and poses a signifcant challenge to revi‐ analysis of Khrushchev as a sometimes impulsive sionist assessments of Khrushchev and his chief gambler precipitating crises contradicts the cen‐ Western antagonist, John Kennedy. According to tral slant of their interpretations. the authors, Khrushchev is trapped in the legacies Zubok and Pleshakov's reemphasis on the of the results of Stalin's contributions to the revo‐ role of ideology and its impact on the issue of re‐ lutionary-imperial paradigm and represents a sponsibility has had the most impact in challeng‐ very unstable mixture of attitudes: a desire to es‐ ing and shifting American views of Stalin and So‐ cape from the undesirable legacies of Stalin on viet diplomacy in the Cold War. American histori‐ the international and domestic scene, a desire for ans since the 1960s have minimized the infuence a grand accomodation with the United States, en‐ of ideology on both sides of the Cold War. Revi‐ thusiasm for third world revolutionaries like Fi‐ sionists since William Appleman Williams have del Castro, a willingness to engage in nuclear bluf recognized Stalin's communist rhetoric--"To use and blackmail, and a dangerous propensity for the language of Wall Street, Stalin was a bull on spontaneous decisions with considerable risks communism"[8]-- but placed little signifcance on (pp. 182-94). The interpretation is probably closest it as they focused on U.S. expansion in pursuit of to Adam Ulam's assessment of Khrushchev which an economic Open Door, or to rebuild capitalism left out only the Soviet leaders genuine enthusi‐ in Western Europe, or to head of revolutionary asm for the successful advance of communism nationalism in the Third World. Post-revisionists through new leaders in the third world.[6] In con‐ like John Lewis Gaddis devoted more attention to

3 H-Net Reviews the impact of the international system, i.e., the he initiated as a series of lectures at Oxford in power vacuum in Central Europe, and the role of 1992, Gaddis embraces the new research in Soviet a variety of factors from domestic politics, bu‐ documents by Zubok and Pleshakov and others reaucratic imperatives as well as misperception and refnes his post-revisionist perspective to give and miscalculation. One response to the release of more infuence to their revolutionary-imperial Soviet documents is to deny their signifcance and paradigm and to place more emphasis on an un‐ refuse to reevaluate the issue of responsibility the avoidable Cold War as long as Stalin was in the Cold War. "No amount of new documentation 're‐ Kremlin.[11] In his masterful review essay, "The vealing' that, sure enough, Stalin was a brutal to‐ Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?", Melvyn Lef‐ talitarian will change the fact that the Cold War fer directly challenges not only Gaddis but also emerged and escalated as a result of mutual con‐ Zubok and Pleshakov's paradigm and interpreta‐ fict, misperception, and excessive militarization tion of the origins of the Cold War. After minimiz‐ in the midst of a fuid and fearful international ing the revisionist emphasis on primary U.S. re‐ environment," announced Walter Hixson, for "all sponsibility for origins of the Cold War in one eforts, including the triumphalist or vindication‐ clause--revisionists "assigned the United States a ist ones of recent years, that attempt to blame the share of responsibility for the Cold War"--Lefer USSR more or less exclusively for the Cold War describes Gaddis as abandoning post- revisionism can be dismissed as parochial nationalism, albeit and moving to the traditional interpretation by parochial nationalism armored with footnotes emphasizing revolutionary ideology as Stalin's from the corrupt bowels of fn-de-siecle Mos‐ lodestar.[12] Lefer apparently has been infu‐ cow."[9] A second response is to shift the perspec‐ enced by Zubok and Pleshakov as well as Mastny's tives, as Anna Kasten Nelson does in a recent study to accept ideology as shaping Stalin's per‐ Chronicle of Higher Education essay, in which she spective but prefers the more familiar revisionist portrays the orthodox view as putting full blame lodestar, security: "Soviet actions in eastern Ger‐ on the Soviet Union whereas "revisionists empha‐ many and Eastern Europe, though ruthless and sized the dual responsibility of the United States counterproductive, might not have been a conse‐ and the Soviet Union, and described American quence of Stalin's revolutionary fervor, or an im‐ foreign policy as a search for global economic perial/revolutionary paradigm, or an inbred irra‐ hegemony."[10] Nelson has conveniently moved tional paranoia. They might have been a result of the revisionists into the post-revisionists perspec‐ his quest for security."[13] In reverting back to a tive, which is refected in part in Hixson's com‐ defensive, security focus, Lefer minimizes the ments above, and promoted post-revisionists like fndings of Zubok and Pleshakov and incorrectly John Gaddis to the old orthodox perspective. "It is accuses them of ignoring the impact of Western time to move on," complains Nelson, "... but many policies on Stalin and his successors. Although of today's authors are still rehashing old debates." Zubok and Pleshakov correctly focus on the new When new documents emerge on a global phe‐ Soviet documents and assessments of Soviet lead‐ nomenon that dominated half a century, should ers, they do note the impact of Western policies, not historians review the documents and reevalu‐ most notably the development and use of the ate the old issues? atomic bomb, the Truman administration's eforts John Gaddis and Melvyn Lefer have re‐ to work out a satisfactory settlement over the dis‐ sponded more directly to Zubok and Pleshakov's agreements concerning the Yalta agreements on revolutionary-imperial paradigm for understand‐ Eastern Europe and Stalin's policies from Poland ing Stalin's Cold War policies. In his recent We to Bulgaria, and the critical impact of the Marshall Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History which Plan and Western policies on Germany (pp. 40-46,

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48-52, 94-98, 103-108). In fact, the authors further and students of the Cold War would have beneft‐ undermine one of the original revisionist posi‐ ted from a complete bibliography in the work un‐ tions on the origins of the Cold War--most notably der review. that Truman launched an ofensive on Eastern [2]. Constantine Pleshakov's essay is in Odd Europe that intensifed Stalin's suspicions and Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and prompted him to move towards Stalinization in Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963 (Palo this area. Instead, as Zubok and Pleshakov point Alto, 1999). out, U.S. protests and requests on Eastern Europe [3]. See Ilya Gaiduk, "Stalin: Three Approach‐ in 1945-1946 did not produce much of a lasting re‐ es to One Phenomenon," Diplomatic History, XXI‐ action in the Kremlin.[14] II, No. 1 (Winter 1999), 124-125. As a senior re‐ Open up the documents, let the games contin‐ search fellow at the Institute of World History and ue: instead of dismissing or resisting the new doc‐ deputy head of the Center for the Study of the uments, American historians should revisit old Cold War at the Russian Academy of Science and battlefelds with understanding and humility--we author of The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War will all be wrong on some issues--and proft from (Chicago, 1996), Gaiduk is very familiar with the the new documents and studies such as Zubok limitations and opportunities in Soviet docu‐ and Pleshakov's stimulating study, Gaddis' re‐ ments. working of his infuential post-revisionist studies [4]. Nigel Gould-Davies, "Rethinking the Role into a new master narrative, and Lefer's rebuttal of Ideology in International Politics during the based on a masterful review of the current litera‐ Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies, I, No. 1 ture. There are many issues to explore, most no‐ (Winter 1999), 102-103. tably (1) Molotov and Khrushchev have been in‐ terpreted more thoroughly than Stalin as we wait [5]. Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet for much more primary sources on this key fg‐ Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York, 1996), ure; (2) why did the U.S. efort to reach a settle‐ 3-24. ment with Stalin at Yalta and Potsdam fail?; (3) [6]. See Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexis‐ the central dynamics and interaction of the Cold tence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, War should receive more comprehensive assess‐ 1917-67 (New York, 1968), 572-689, and The Ri‐ ments along the lines of Gaddis' synthesis as we vals: America and Russia Since World War II are able to integrate the concerns and perspec‐ (New York, 1971), 286-313. tives of both sides; (4) the outpouring of docu‐ [7]. See Thomas G. Paterson, "John F. ments on the Kremlin's relations with its allies Kennedy's Quest for Victory and Global Crisis", have already considerable enhanced our histori‐ 3-23, and Frank Costigliola, "The Pursuit of At‐ cal understanding in this area and projects and lantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and journals such as the Cold War International Histo‐ Berlin," 25, 37-38, 42-46, in Thomas G. Paterson, ry Project will only continue to provide new in‐ _Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign sights. Policy, 1961-1963 (New York, 1989). Paterson does Notes: refer to Khrushchev's "bellicose rhetoric" and "an [1]. See also Vladislav Zubok, "Stalin's Plans alarming speech in which he endorsed anti- impe‐ and Russian Archives," Diplomatic History, XXI, rialist wars of national liberation", and Costigliola No. 1 (Spring 1997), 295-306. Zubok has a forth‐ does note that the "Russians precipitated crises coming book of essays on Soviet behavior in the over Berlin". Cold War from Stalin through Gorbachev. Readers

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[8]. William Appleman Williams, _The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 1972), 215. [9]. Hixson made this statement in a response on H-DIPLO, April 12, 1999, in a favorable assess‐ ment of Arnold Ofner's SHAFR presidential ad‐ dress, "'Another Such Victory': President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War". [10]. Anna Kasten Nelson, "Illuminating the Twilight Struggle: New Interpretations of the Cold War," The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 25, 1999. [11]. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Re‐ thinking Cold War History (New York, 1997), 29-31, 290-292. [12]. Melvyn P. Lefer, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?", American Historical Re‐ view, CIV, No. 2 (April 1999), 503. If you have read revisionists for over thirty years from William Ap‐ pleman Williams to Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, Gabriel Kolko, Thomas Paterson and their many Ph.D. proteges, the phrase "a share of responsibility" catches your attention and your memory of ancient battles even as you enjoy Lef‐ fer's synthesis of the post-Cold War literature. [13]. Ibid., 512-513. [14]. See Lefer, 512-521. Copyright (c) 1999 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected].

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Citation: Thomas R. Maddux. Review of Zubok, Vladislav; Pleshakov, Constantine. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. July, 1999.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3262

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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