Open up the Documents, Let the Games Continue
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Vladislav Zubok, Constantine Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. xv + 282 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-674-45531-3. Reviewed by Thomas R. Maddux Published on H-Diplo (July, 1999) Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov Zubok and Pleshakov came of age in the Sovi‐ have written the most influential book to date us‐ et Union after the Soviet intervention in Czecho‐ ing recently available Soviet documents on Soviet slovakia in 1968 and graduated from Moscow Cold War policies under Joseph Stalin and Nikita State University in the early 1980s. They joined Khrushchev. Zubok has become quite familiar to the elite Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies Americans as a personable, regular commentator which they describe as a "pragmatic and infinitely on the "Postscript" sections of the CNN "Cold War" cynical think tank [that] gave us a good grasp of program during which he offered perceptive and Soviet policy- making" (p. xi). After Mikhail Gor‐ judicious observations. As a Senior Fellow at the bachev arrived in 1985 and initiated glasnost, National Security Archive at George Washington Zubok and Pleshakov turned to a study of Soviet University, and active participant in the Cold War policy, moving from innocuous documents on fur‐ International History Project, Zubok has been at niture styles in Soviet embassies to significant the center of the opening and publication of Sovi‐ documents from the Soviet embassies and foreign et Cold War documents and emerging reinterpre‐ ministry to the International Department of the tations of not only Soviet leaders and policies but Central Committee and Politburo. Although the also the larger, emotional issue of Cold War re‐ authors had access to some documents from the sponsibility.[1] Pleshakov has written several Archive of the Russian President, most records of works of fction, an essay on Sino-Soviet relations, Stalin and his successors were not accessible in‐ and is currently teaching at Mount Holyoke.[2] cluding Politburo minutes and correspondence Despite complaints about the absence of reliable among Soviet leaders.[3] primary sources on Soviet policy, American schol‐ The central interpretive thesis of Zubok and ars have found it sometimes impossibly difficult Pleshakov to guide understanding of Soviet for‐ to adjust their assessments accumulated over thir‐ eign policy in the Cold War is a revolutionary-im‐ ty or forty years. perial paradigm, a "symbiosis of imperial expan‐ H-Net Reviews sionism and ideological proselytism" (p. 3), that tem and threat in terms of the expansion of their joined an imperial nature and interests from Rus‐ adversary's domestic system."[4] In his recent sia's past and present with communist revolution‐ study of Stalin's policies in the Cold War, Vojtech ary aspirations that fused Russia's messianic lega‐ Mastny also revives the central importance of ide‐ cy with Marxism and Leninism. Zubok and Ple‐ ology although he tends to emphasize how Stalin shakov explore the shifting nature and compo‐ used ideology as a means to power and security nents of this paradigm in a series of chapters that for his regime.[5] begin with Stalin's perspective with victory in What does this revival of ideology contribute hand in 1945, through Stalin's policies in the Cold with respect to understanding Soviet policy? Stal‐ War, to the efforts of his subordinates and succes‐ in is the most significant and most difficult chal‐ sors--Vyacheslav Molotov, Lavrenty Beria, Georgi lenge for Zubok and Pleshakov with respect to the Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev--to implement imperial-revolutionary paradigm. In two chapters their own versions of this influential paradigm. on Stalin and one on Molotov and another on An‐ Although the authors move away from this para‐ drei Zhdanov, Stalin's chief "trumpeter of the Cold digm in their discussions of specific Cold War War" as Central Committee head of the Depart‐ crises such as Stalin's views on Germany or ment of Agitation and Propaganda and the Inter‐ Khrushchev's handling of relations with China national Department, Zubok and Pleshakov push and Mao Zedong, they make an effort in each the published and primary sources including Ger‐ chapter to link their analysis to the paradigm. man language publications as far as they will go "Ideology was neither the servant nor the master to demonstrate that Stalin from the 1920s on of Soviet foreign policy," Zubok and Pleshakov came closest among Soviet leaders to implement‐ conclude, "but it was the delirium tremens of So‐ ing the imperial- revolutionary paradigm mixed viet statements, the core of the regime's self-legiti‐ with his sense of inferiority and xenophobic sus‐ macy, a terrifying delusion they could never picions toward anything foreign. Stalin's lodestar shake off" (p. 275-76). "was the promise of Communist revolutionary In reviving the role of ideology in shaping the universalism combined with the necessities of perspective of Soviet policy makers and in provid‐ survival for the Soviet Union...." (pp. 11-12). Zubok ing primary documentation of Soviet leaders from and Pleshakov have not found a "master plan" for Stalin to Khrushchev expressing an ideological a communist world in the Soviet archives and rec‐ perspective in conversations with Soviet and oth‐ ognize that fexible tactics characterize all of the er communist leaders, Zubok and Pleshakov have Soviet leaders. As Stalin surveyed the scene in significantly redirected the perspective of Ameri‐ 1945, the authors portray him as prepared to post‐ can Cold War specialists who for decades have pone the revolutionary side of the paradigm in or‐ found it difficult to accept what historians of the der to consolidate the new Soviet sphere in East‐ Soviet Union have usually recognized as an essen‐ ern Europe and wait for the inevitable postwar tial interpretive premise. "Ideology is back", notes capitalist economic crisis and falling out of the Nigel Gould-Davies, in a recent assessment on the Western capitalist powers, something that Molo‐ role of ideology in the Cold War that carefully sug‐ tov kept looking for into the 1980s. gests the need for evaluations that distinguish be‐ On the issue of responsibility for the ensuing tween personality, ideology and culture. Accord‐ Cold War, Zubok and Pleshakov resist the tempta‐ ing to Gould-Davies, "ideological states seek pow‐ tion "to lay total blame for the Cold War on the er to spread their domestic system rather than to delusions of Stalin and his lieutenants" (p. 276). enhance their own security.... They define security On the one hand the paradigm predestines Soviet in terms of the expansion of their domestic sys‐ 2 H-Net Reviews expansion and Stalin's xenophobic regime would trast with the authors' presentation of limit any cooperation with the West but the au‐ Khrushchev as a very dynamic and dangerous thors note the extent of Soviet sacrifice to defeat challenge to Kennedy, revisionists led by Thomas Hitler, the necessity for time to reconstruct a dev‐ Paterson and proteges of Paterson and Walter astated western Russia, and reasonably successful LaFeber in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American cooperation with the West after 1941 (pp. 6-7, Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 devote very little atten‐ 33-35). The authors do suggest that Stalin's inter‐ tion to Khrushchev and focus instead on what Pa‐ est in cooperation with the West was "always on terson defines as Kennedy's overall failure in his his own terms" and when the United States and its doomed quest to "win the Cold War." The chal‐ Western allies moved to promote economic recov‐ lenge and opportunities posed by Khrushchev do ery with the Marshall Plan and bring the Western not merit a separate chapter in the collection, and zones of Germany into their coalition Stalin Frank Costigliola's essay that discusses the Berlin launched a counteroffensive that backfired in Eu‐ crisis admits that Khrushchev precipitated the rope and approved a North Korean invasion of Berlin crisis but offers little analysis of the Soviet South Korean in 1950 that blew away the rem‐ leader's strategy before and during the Berlin nants of the Yalta system of cooperation in Asia Wall crisis.[7] The pursuit of victory is not neces‐ along with a new revolutionary offensive with sarily undesirable and, as many observers failed Mao's China. Yet the authors include other factors to note in 1991, victory was the original objective on the responsibility issue, noting the impact of in George Kennan's containment strategy (either a power politics, "choices of U.S. and British policy- change in Soviet international behavior and/or an makers, and the deeper causes of hostility and erosion of the Kremlin's ability to hold its sphere mistrust between dictatorships and democracy in Eastern Europe), although Kennan probably ..." (p. 276). did not anticipate a total Soviet collapse. Since the Zubok and Pleshakov's assessment of Nikta revisionists want to portray Kennedy as a most Khrushchev dominates the second half of their aggressive Cold Warrior, the Zubok and Pleshakov study and poses a significant challenge to revi‐ analysis of Khrushchev as a sometimes impulsive sionist assessments of Khrushchev and his chief gambler precipitating crises contradicts the cen‐ Western antagonist, John Kennedy. According to tral slant of their interpretations. the authors, Khrushchev is trapped in the legacies Zubok and Pleshakov's reemphasis on the of the results of Stalin's contributions to the revo‐ role of ideology and its impact on the issue of re‐ lutionary-imperial paradigm and represents a sponsibility has had the most impact in challeng‐ very unstable mixture of attitudes: a desire to es‐ ing and shifting American views of Stalin and So‐ cape from the undesirable legacies of Stalin on viet diplomacy in the Cold War.