Populist Politics in the New Malaysia
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Populist Politics in the New Malaysia by Shanon Shah (King’s College London) Abstract This article investigates the role of religion in populist politics by focusing on the nascent democratic transition in Malaysia, where a decades-old authoritarian regime was unseated in the 2018 general election. I propose that this result can partly be explained by analysing the moral and populist battle between political rivals, given the dominance of ethno-religious identity politics amid Malaysia’s diverse population. I argue that the nationalist claims of the incumbent regime were overcome by more inclusive claims based on economic justice employed by its political opponents. To illustrate the workings of these competing moral claims, the article briefly examines the debates on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT+) rights during this political transition. I suggest that public attitudes towards LGBT+ rights provide one clear example of the larger moral and populist contest that forms part of the confrontation between the erstwhile ethno-religious nationalist regime and the new government. This perspective contributes vital insights on the role of religion and morality in populist politics, especially in authoritarian or newly democratising contexts which are also highly diverse. The article is primarily based on public statements made by Malaysian politicians before and during the election campaign. Introduction: The Landmark 2018 Elections Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, [PH]) coali- What influence does religion have in populist tion defied these forecasts through what interna- politics, specifically in constructions of the notion tional headlines described as a ‘shocking’ victory, of a virtuous ‘people’ standing against villain- securing 113 seats out of 222 in the federal Par- ous ‘elites’ and ‘others’? This article addresses liament compared to the BN’s seventy-nine seats. this question by focusing on the 2018 Malaysian An alliance with Parti Warisan Sabah (the Sabah general elections, in which the incumbent Bari- Heritage Party) in East Malaysia and one inde- san Nasional (National Front, [BN]) coalition was pendent candidate increased the PH’s aggregate defeated for the first time in the country’s sixty- number of seats to 122 (Hutchinson 2018: 597). one-year modern history. This was despite the Significantly, eighteen seats were won by the BN’s escalation of repressive tactics leading up Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), which was to the polls, from last-minute gerrymandering part of the PH’s predecessor coalition, the Paka- and voter malapportionment to silencing politi- tan Rakyat (People’s Pact, [PR]). Yet PAS’s insis- cal opponents and civil society activists (Hutchin- tence on expanding the imposition of Islamic son 2018: 594-95). Several observers of Malay- criminal legislation catalysed conflict with its sian politics predicted that the BN would retain coalition partners – especially the secularist, cen- government – with some convinced that it could tre-left Democratic Action Party (DAP) – resulting actually increase its majority – despite popu- in the breakup of PR in 2015 (Hutchinson 2018: lar discontent with its corruption and misrule 592-93). In 2018, the PH garnered forty-eight per (Hutchinson 2018: 582, Welsh 2018: 86). The cent of the popular vote, compared to the BN’s NEW DIVERSITIES Vol. 21, No. 2, 2019 ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 NEW DIVERSITIES 21 (2), 2019 Shanon Shah thirty-four per cent and PAS’s seventeen per cent. nationalism and multicultural tokenism (Gomez In the previous, also tensely contested election and Jomo 1999: 4). in 2013, the PR won the popular vote by fifty-one This is why, in the past, it was largely taken per cent against the BN’s forty-seven per cent. for granted that the BN’s dominance was virtu- However, because of the impacts of malappor- ally unchallengeable. Furthermore, to bolster its tionment and gerrymandering in the country’s nationalist appeal, UMNO would not hesitate to first-past-the-post electoral system, the BN still demonise various minority groups whom it por- managed to retain Parliament with 133 seats trayed as proxies of the monolithically ‘liberal’ compared to the PR’s 89 seats (Hutchinson 2018: (and by association ‘Islamophobic’) West, includ- 588). ing Christians, ethnic Chinese, Shi’a Muslims The 2018 election results were also historic (since Malaysia’s official religion is Sunni Islam), because of abrupt changes in the ways that dif- human rights activists, and lesbian, gay, bisexual ferent political parties and coalitions could claim and transgender (LGBT+) people. to represent the interests of the electorate. His- In the 2008 general election, however, the BN torically, the BN government had to balance maintained power but lost its supermajority (con- two contradictory narratives – first, that Malay- trol of more than two-thirds of Parliament). The sia is primarily a Malay and Muslim nation and, PR started posing a serious threat to the BN but second, that it is a multicultural utopia. This is was hampered by its own internal contradictions. because the BN’s three main component parties From its inception, the coalition was dogged by were established to defend specific communal PAS’s exclusivist focus on Muslims and Islam at interests – Malay, Chinese, and Indian – but the the expense of its more multiracial and multireli- United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), gious coalition partners, the DAP and PKR. Amid being the dominant partner, was always able this backdrop, the BN and the PR began escalat- to assert the primacy of its Malay nationalist ing populist elements in their political rivalry by agenda. In other words, ‘the people,’ according promising financial aid, subsidies, and (in the to the BN’s governing logic, was at once an exclu- case of the BN) cash handouts to entice voters sive and inclusive concept. The coexistence – and in their budgets and shadow budgets (Welsh political effectiveness – of these incongruent 2018: 94). For example, the BN introduced a cash narratives can be explained by the fact that the transfer system, Bantuan Rakyat Satu Malaysia Federal Constitution defines Malays as Muslims, (BR1M) in 2012 to offset cost of living issues but effectively fusing the ethnic and religious iden- this failed to neutralise the PR’s opposition to the tity of a numeric majority of Malaysians within a BN’s imposition of the unpopular Goods and Ser- religiously and ethnically diverse electorate.1 The vices Tax (GST) in 2015 (Hutchinson 2018: 589). BN also historically used its advantage of incum- Historically, the UMNO-led BN’s brand of bency and executive dominance to cultivate its Malay nationalism was a way of competing with patronage of well-connected business leaders PAS for core Malay votes. Since the 2013 elec- – Malays and non-Malays – as part of its Malay tions, however, PAS and UMNO had to contend with bitter in-fighting which resulted in the -for 1 Muslims comprise 61.3 percent of the Malaysian mation of two splinter parties – Parti Amanah population of 28 million, while 19.8 percent are Bud- Negara (the National Trust Party, henceforth dhist, 9.2 percent are Christian and 6.3 percent are ‘Amanah’) out of PAS and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Hindu. In terms of ethnicity, 67.4 percent are catego- rised as Bumiputera (a state-created term comprising Malaysia (the Malaysian United Indigenous Party, ethnic Malays and other indigenous peoples, mostly henceforth ‘Bersatu’) out of UMNO – both of in Malaysian Borneo, who may or may not be Muslim), which swiftly joined the PH coalition (Hutchinson 24.6 percent are Chinese, 7.3 percent are Indian, and 0.7 percent are classified as ‘Other’ (Department of 2018: 593). This fragmentation of Malay party Statistics, Malaysia 2011). politics accelerated UMNO’s decline while also 54 Populist Politics in the New Malaysia NEW DIVERSITIES 21 (2), 2019 transforming the relationship between expres- ers.”’ DeHanas and Shterin (2018: 182) contend sions of Islam, nationalism, and the different par- that the notion of ‘the people’ (who need to be ties’ moral claims on political legitimacy. defended against the twin threats posed by ‘the This detailed background underscores this arti- elite’ and ‘outsiders’) can be sacralised by popu- cle’s main argument, which is that, in the 2018 list politicians drawing upon religious ‘symbols, elections, the PH successfully countered the BN’s tropes, and ideas, and the feelings of belong- explicit ethno-religious nationalism and tokenis- ing, difference and entitlement they reinforce or tic multiculturalism by mobilising a different even generate.’ Bearing this in mind, this article moral narrative. I maintain that the PH primarily does not prescribe a particular definition of pop- focused upon economic grievances to calibrate ulism but approaches it as a form of ‘moral poli- the moral claims that contributed to its populist tics’ (Gidron and Bonikowski 2018: 3). In doing so, appeal. Yet I also critically examine the limits of it focuses on the role of religion as a resource for the PH’s more inclusive narrative by exploring a the construction of a ‘sacred people’ in Malay- controversy that rocked the PH government after sia’s political trajectory in the 2018 elections. the election, when UMNO and PAS supporters The role of religion in populist politics should closed ranks to decry the new administration’s also be contextualised by comparing it with alleged permissiveness on LGBT+ rights. The new nationalism as a parallel phenomenon in which UMNO-PAS alliance and the PH government’s the idea of the ‘people’ can be made sacred. ambivalent responses on LGBT+ rights are, I con- This is because religion is not the only resource tend, a valuable way of discerning the complex that populist politicians can utilise to construct role of religion in the construction of ‘the people,’ the notion of a ‘sacred’ people. This comparison the ‘elites’ and ‘others’ in populist politics.