Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy 1977–1981

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HaroldHaroldHarold Brown Brown Brown and and andthe the the ImperativesImperativesImperatives of of Foreign ofForeign Foreign Policy Policy Policy 1977–19811977–19811977–1981

HistoricalHistorical OfficeHistorical Office Office OfficeOffice of theofOffice the Secretary Secretary of the of Secretary Defenseof Defense of Defense Washington, DC Washington,Washington, DC DC ColdCold ColdWar War Foreign War Foreign Foreign Policy Policy Policy Series Series Series Special Study 8 SpecialSpecial Study Study 8 8 Edward C. Keefer Edward C. Keefer Series EditorsEdward Erin C. R. Keefer Mahan • Jeffrey A. Larsen Series Series Editors Editors Erin Erin R. MahanR. Mahan • Jeffrey • Jeffrey A. Larsen A. Larsen

Historical Office HistoricalOfficeHistorical of the Office SecretaryOffice of Defense OfficeOffice of theof the Secretary Secretary of Defenseof Defense AboutAbout the theAuthor Author EdwardEdward C. KeeferC. Keefer received received a B.A. a B.A. from from McGill McGill University University in 1967 in 1967 and anda a Ph.D.Ph.D. in history in history from from Michigan Michigan State State University University in 1974. in 1974. For For34 years34 years he washe wasan editoran editor of the of theU.S. U.S. Department Department of State’s of State’s offi cialoffi cialdocumentary documentary series,series, Foreign Foreign Relations Relations of the of Unitedthe United States States. During. During that that time time he editedhe edited 25 Foreign25 Foreign Relations Relations volumes, volumes, many many of whichof which documented documented U.S. U.S. policy policy duringduring the Vietnamthe Vietnam War. War. After After 2002 2002 he was he wasthe generalthe general editor editor of the of seriesthe series untiluntil his retirementhis retirement in 2009, in 2009, when when he joined he joined the theHistorical Historical Offi Office of ce the of the SecretarySecretary of Defense. of Defense. He isHe the is authorthe author of Harold of Harold Brown: Brown: Off setting Off setting the Soviet the Soviet MilitaryMilitary Challenge, Challenge, 1977–1981 1977–1981, volume, volume 9 in 9 thein theSecretaries Secretaries of Defenseof Defense HistoricalHistorical Series Series published published by theby theOSD OSD Historical Historical Offi Office in ce 2017.in 2017. He He has hasalso alsowritten written articles articles and andcontributed contributed to books to books on U.S.on U.S. policy policy in East in East and andSoutheast Southeast Asia Asia and andtaught taught courses courses on 19th-on 19th- and and20th-century 20th-century British British militarymilitary and andpolitical political fi gures fi gures for thefor theSmithsonian Smithsonian Associates Associates program. program.

AboutAbout the theEditors Editors ErinErin R. Mahan R. Mahan has beenhas been Chief Chief Historian Historian for thefor Secretarythe Secretary of Defense of Defense since since 2010.2010. Previously, Previously, she sheworked worked in the in theCenter Center for thefor theStudy Study of Weapons of Weapons of of MassMass Destruction Destruction at National at National Defense Defense University University and andin the in theHistorian’s Historian’s Offi Office at ce the at theU.S. U.S. Department Department of State, of State, where where she shewas wasan editoran editor of the of the ForeignForeign Relations Relations of the of Unitedthe United States States series. series. Dr. Dr.Mahan Mahan holds holds a Ph.D. a Ph.D. in in historyhistory from from the theUniversity University of Virginia. of Virginia. Jeff reyJeff A.rey Larsen A. Larsen is Director is Director of the of Researchthe Research Division Division at the at NATOthe NATO Defense Defense CollegeCollege in Rome. in Rome. He Hepreviously previously served served as president as president of Larsen of Larsen Consulting Consulting GroupGroup and andas aas senior a senior scientist scientist with with Science Science Applications Applications International International Corporation.Corporation. He hasHe hasbeen been an adjunct an adjunct graduate graduate professor professor at the at universitiesthe universities of Denver,of Denver, Northwestern, Northwestern, and andTexas Texas A&M A&M and andserved served on the on facultythe faculty of the of the CoverCover Photo Photo U.S.U.S. Air AirForce Force Academy. Academy. Widely Widely published, published, Dr. Dr.Larsen Larsen holds holds an M.A.an M.A. in in nationalnational security security aff airs aff airsfrom from the theNaval Naval Postgraduate Postgraduate School School and andan M.A.an M.A. SecretarySecretary of Defense of Defense Harold Harold Brown Brown confers confers with with President President Jimmy Jimmy Carter Carter in the in the and andPh.D. Ph.D. in politics in politics from from Princeton Princeton University. University. OvalOval Offi ce,Offi 20 ce, July 20 July1979. 1979. Source:Source: NARA NARA II. II. CoverCover Design: Design: OSD OSD Graphics, Graphics, Pentagon. Pentagon. Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy 1977–1981

Special Study 8 Edward C. Keefer, Ph.D.

Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense

Jeff rey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group

Historical Offi ce Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense September 2017 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

103 Memos, Sick for Brzezinski, 6 Mar 1980, and 6 Jun 1980: both in 114 Ibid., 301–302; Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: Th e Last Year of the folder Mtgs MBB, 3/80–4/80, box 34, Subject File, Brzezinski Donated Carter Presidency (New York: ContentsG. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 249 (quotes). Material, Carter Library; Edward Keefer, Harold Brown, 276. Th is study is cleared for public release. Th e views expressed or implied 115 Keefer, Harold Brown, 321–326; Gates, From the Shadows, 143–149. within104 areMemo, solely Brown those offor theVance author and andBrzezinski, do not 16necessarily Jun 1980, represent folder 116 theMtgs views MBB, of the5/80–6/80, Department box of 34,Defense, Subject the File,Offi ceBrzezinski of the Secretary Donated of Foreword. Francis . . . . Fukuyama,...... RAND...... Note . . . . N-15797-RG,...... “Th . . . e . Future. . v of Defense,Material, orCarter any otherLibrary; agency memos, of the Brown Federal to Government. Carter, both dated 18 Jun the Soviet Role in Afghanistan,” Sep 1980, AF0001042, DNSA, accessed Harold Brown 1980: both in folder Saudi Arabia (May-Jun) 1980, box 17, SecDef Files, 15Introduction Dec 2011; .Keefer, ...... ,. 326–327...... 1 Acc 330-82-0217; Keefer, Harold Brown, 276–277 (quotes). Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, 117 S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An provided that a standard source credit line is included. Th e Historical 105 Keefer, Harold Brown, 281. HistoricalTh e Carter Analysis Foreign, 2nd Policy ed. (Oxford:Team and Oxford Policy UniversityStructure. Press,. . . . .1990), . . . . 6 432– Offi ce of the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense would appreciate a 446; Th omas P. Th ornton, “Between Two Stools? U.S. Policy Towards courtesy106 Cartercopy of Public reprints Papers or reviews.1980–1981, 2:2431; Keefer, Harold Brown, PakistanBrown and During Consultations the Carter with Administration,” NATO Allies. Asian . . . Survey...... 22, . . no.. . . 10. 8 (Oct 279–281 (quotes). 1982): 959–977. Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines...... 14 107 DCI Stansfi eld Turner frankly admits this intelligence failure 118 Keefer, Harold Brown, 327–332; Carter, White House Diary, 470 in Burn Before Reading: President, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence (quotes).SALT II...... 21 (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 180–181. Brown cites U.S. intelligence’s 119 agreement with the Iranian intelligence organization, Savak, to rely See Carter, Keeping Faith, 91–124, for an account of his energy on them for intelligence on domestic troubles in Iran, thus assuring a policy.Panama and Latin America ...... 24 pro-shah product. Brown also notes that U.S. intelligence leaders were 120 Keefer, Harold Brown, 332–333. unwilling to accept others’ (mostly academics’) warnings. Brown interview, Th e Middle East ...... 36 1 Mar 1993, pt. 4, 16. 121 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 443–444; Keefer, Harold Brown, 333. Iran, Afghanistan, and Southwest Asia...... 44 108 Charles Duncan, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 122 Keefer, Harold Brown, 335–333; Brown, Star Spangled Security, 75–76. 17 May 1996, 6–7, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO; Brzezinski, Power Th e Framework for Security in the Persian Gulf...... 51 and Principle, 369, 371–372, 374–375; Vance, Hard Choices, 330–332: 123 Keefer, Harold Brown, 336–338; Crist, Twilight War, 41. Keefer, Harold Brown, 291–293 (quotes). Conclusion124 Carter . . .Public . . . . .Papers . . . . .1980–1981 ...... , .1:197–198 ...... (quote);...... Brzezinski,. . 54 109 Vance, Hard Choices, 335; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 379; Power and Principle, 433–445; Statement Released by DoD, 27 Apr 1980, Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Encounter with Iran (New York: folderNotes. 560.1 . . . . .1980, . . . . .box . . .46, . . .SecDef ...... Files, . . . . Acc. . . 330-82-0216,...... SecDef. . . . 57 Files. Random House, 1985), 127, 131; David Crist, Th e Twilight War: Th e 125 Secret History of America’s Th irty-Year Confl ict with Iran (New York: Memo, Ermath and Welch for Brzezinski, 22 Jan 1980, folder Penguin Press, 2012), 7–8. Mtgs Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, 1/80–3/80, box 34, Subject File, Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library; Keefer, Harold Brown, 341. 110 Carter, White House Diary, 272, 277 (quotes); and Keeping Faith, 126 Power and Principle Council of War 446; Brown interview, 1 Mar 1993; Sick, All Fall Down, 139; William Brzezinski, , 456; Rearden, , 408–411. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 229–230. 111 Keefer, Harold Brown, 296; Robert E. Huyser, Mission to Tehran (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 142; Brown, Star Spangled Security, 76 (quote). 112 Keefer, Harold Brown, 298–299 (quote). 113 Ibid., 299–300.

68 69 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

68 69 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 and 19 Feb 1980: all in folder Mtgs MMB, 1/80–2/801, box 34, Subject File, Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library. Foreword 81 Wayne S. Smith, Th e Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 101–127, 163–164; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 346–353; Th is is the eighth special study by the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense memo, Brown for Brzezinski, 14 May 1979, 0000D51C.pdf, CD-2, (OSD) Historical Offi ce on the secretary’s role in foreign policy. It Declassifi ed SecDef Files; Keefer, Harold Brown, 82–88; Garthoff , Détente examines Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s foreign policy contribution and Confrontation, 913–934; David D. Newsom, Th e Soviet Brigade in to the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Brown began his tenure Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy (Bloomington: Indiana University at the Pentagon determined to limit his focus to national security policy Press, 1987), provides a case study. and military issues. As the Carter administration faced a series of complex 82 international challenges and crises, however, Brown became more involved PD 52, “Presidential Directive on U.S. Policy to Cuba,” 16 Oct in formulating and implementing foreign policy. National security issues 1979, PR01401, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011. and defense relationships with allies and friendly nations, coupled with 83 See Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: Th e United States a resurgent Soviet Union, required the secretary to actively engage in and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); and U.S. foreign policymaking. Brown was the fi rst secretary of defense to Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1989). visit China, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Among his foreign policy roles, he was a major adviser in the Strategic Arms Limitation 84 Minutes of PRC Meeting, 11 Jun 1978, CK3100554508, DDRS, Talks (SALT II) and a promoter of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1978. accessed 17 Jul 2007. In 1980 he argued successfully for military aid to the government of El

85 Salvador in a fi ght against a communist insurgency. He was part of the Keefer, Harold Brown, 91–96; Rearden, Council of War, 407; team that persuaded Western European NATO members to agree to base Anastaio Somoza, as told to David Cox, Nicaragua Betrayed (Boston: theater nuclear missiles on their soil in response to the Soviet theater Western Islands, 1980), 328–329. nuclear challenge. 86 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 147–148, 345n13; Carter, White House Diary, 333–334. Th e Historical Offi ce views this foreign policy series as part of an ongoing eff ort to assess the secretary’s myriad roles and accomplishments. Th e 87 Keefer, Harold Brown, 96 (quote). titles published to date have covered every secretary of defense since 1947 88 up to Secretary Brown. We anticipate continuing the series in tandem Ibid.; memo, Tarnoff for Brzezinski, 1 Aug 1979, EL01327, with future volumes in the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011. 89 Keefer, Harold Brown, 96–97. My thanks go to our senior editor, Sandy Doyle, for her careful editing of the manuscript and Amy Bunting of OSD Graphics for her expertise and 90 Ibid., 97. design. Th e series titles printed to date as well as other publications are 91 available on the OSD Historical Offi ce Website. We invite you to peruse Memo, Pastor for Brzezinski, 13 Mar 1980, EL01356, DNSA, accessed our selections at history.defense.gov. 28 Jul 2011; Keefer, Harold Brown, 98–99; Carter, Keeping Faith, 585–586. 92 Keefer, Harold Brown, 99–100; memo, Aaron for Carter, 12 Jan Erin R. Mahan 1981, EL01365, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011; memo, Brown for Carter, Chief Historian 16 Jan 1981, 0000CB39.pdf, CD-2 Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memo, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense Carter for Muskie, 16 Jan 1981, EL01215, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011.

66 v Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 and 19 Feb 1980: all in folder Mtgs MMB, 1/80–2/801, box 34, Subject File, Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library. Foreword 81 Wayne S. Smith, Th e Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 101–127, 163–164; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 346–353; Th is is the eighth special study by the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense memo, Brown for Brzezinski, 14 May 1979, 0000D51C.pdf, CD-2, (OSD) Historical Offi ce on the secretary’s role in foreign policy. It Declassifi ed SecDef Files; Keefer, Harold Brown, 82–88; Garthoff , Détente examines Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s foreign policy contribution and Confrontation, 913–934; David D. Newsom, Th e Soviet Brigade in to the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Brown began his tenure Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy (Bloomington: Indiana University at the Pentagon determined to limit his focus to national security policy Press, 1987), provides a case study. and military issues. As the Carter administration faced a series of complex 82 international challenges and crises, however, Brown became more involved PD 52, “Presidential Directive on U.S. Policy to Cuba,” 16 Oct in formulating and implementing foreign policy. National security issues 1979, PR01401, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011. and defense relationships with allies and friendly nations, coupled with 83 See Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: Th e United States a resurgent Soviet Union, required the secretary to actively engage in and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); and U.S. foreign policymaking. Brown was the fi rst secretary of defense to Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1989). visit China, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Among his foreign policy roles, he was a major adviser in the Strategic Arms Limitation 84 Minutes of PRC Meeting, 11 Jun 1978, CK3100554508, DDRS, Talks (SALT II) and a promoter of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1978. accessed 17 Jul 2007. In 1980 he argued successfully for military aid to the government of El

66 v Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8

59 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 325. 60 Keefer, Harold Brown, 161–162. 61 Carter, Keeping Faith, 242–261; Brown interview, 1 Mar 1993, pt. 4, 28. 62 Keefer, Harold Brown, 166–167, 169–170. Introduction 63 Brown, Star Spangled Security, 125–126. 64 Carter, Keeping Faith 152–157. Harold Brown had little interest in formulating and implementing foreign policy when he accepted President Jimmy Carter’s 65 Memo, Brown for Carter, 29 Aug 1977, folder Panama 821 (27 nomination to become secretary of defense. Later, observing Sep–10 Nov) 1977, box 77, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017; memo, that “in most Secretaries of Defense there is a Secretary of State Davis for Vance, Brown et al., 26 Jan 1977, w/attached response to PRM 1, “Policy Review Memorandum: Panama,” PD01537, DNSA, accessed striving to break out,” he professed no desire to assume that role, 15 Jul 2010. especially since he would be challenging his good friend, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Brown recalled that “two of them were 66 Perceived wisdom held that the Carter administration’s public relations campaign turned around overwhelming opposition (almost 80 already enough,” implying also that he had not wished to compete percent) to at least majority public support. George D. Moff et III, Th e with the other would-be dominator of foreign policy, National Limits of Victory: Th e Ratifi cation of the Panama Canal Treaties (Ithaca, NY: Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.1 Initially, Brown felt Cornell University Press, 1985), 116, argues convincingly that opposition content to provide national security advice and support to foreign remained static and opposed despite the Carter campaign. policymakers, eschewing broader topics. In early meetings of the 67 Memo, Davis for Vance, Brown et al., 26 Jan 1977, w/attached National Security Council (NSC), the Policy Review Committee response to PRM 1, “Policy Review Memorandum: Panama,” Tab 4, 15 (PRC), and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC)—the Jan 1977, PD01537, DNSA, accessed 15 Jul 2010; William J. Jorden, main deliberative forums for foreign policy debate and formulation Panama Odyssey (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 343–344; memo, Dolvin for Pastor, 31 Jan 1977, CK3100104729, DDRS, accessed during the Carter years—the Pentagon chief took the lead only 15 Jul 2010. when defense issues were clearly the primary topic.

68 Carter, Keeping Faith, 157; Vance, Hard Choices, 146. It was not that Brown was unqualifi ed. With his impressive 69 Fact Sheet, United States Southern Command, 13 Sep 1977, credentials as a nuclear scientist and weapons designer, an adept briefi ng book for Carter visit, 16–17 Jun 1978, folder Panama Canal administrator at the nation’s premier nuclear laboratory, a Secretary Treaty, Documents on Implementation, 1977–1978, box 418, Subject Robert McNamara “whiz kid” director for defense research and Files, OSD/HO; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 376–380. engineering, and then secretary of the Air Force, Brown was known 70 Sol M. Linowitz, Th e Making of a Public Man: A Memoir (Boston: as a savvy technocrat with a prodigious command of details and Little, Brown, 1985), 164–165; Carter, Keeping Faith, 168; Betty Glad, An the Pentagon’s internal workings. Compared with the 13 defense Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of secretaries who preceded him, he came to his offi ce with the most American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 92. Pentagon experience (eight years). While blessed with blazing 71 Carter, Keeping Faith, 152, 155, 162 (quote); memos, Brown intelligence and an almost superhuman work ethic, he remained for Carter, 26 Aug 1977, 0000CB30.pdf, CD-1; and 19 Sep 1977, by his own admission a shy and sometimes awkward person who 0000B403.pdf, CD-2: both in Declassifi ed SecDef Files. 64 1 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy foundWickham, it diffi 221921Z cult to engageDec 1979, in small 0000D3A1.pdf; talk and banter. memo, Brown McGiff was ert the to and national46 Testimony security by Jones, questions. SCFR, Th Taiwan: e Republic Hearings of Korea, 96th andCong., Japan 1st Brown,antithesis 29 ofJan Nobel 1980, w/Brown’sPeace Prize disapproval, winner and 000CD9E.pdf: controversial both statesman in CD- institutionalizedsess., 22 Feb 1979, their 740; military Congressional relations Quarterly with theAlmanac, United 1979 States, vol. with 33 2,Henry Declassifi Kissinger, ed SecDef who Files. employed humor to further his negotiations. annual(Washington, consultative DC: Congressional meetings between Quarterly, Brown 1980), and 35, his 104–105. counterparts As the39 Memo,Carter Greggadministration for Brzezinski, found 20 Mayitself 1980, increasingly folder Mtgs embroiled Muskie, in Tokyo47 Memo, or Seoul. Brown To for South Carter, Korea, 10 Mar the 1977, issues 0000D2D1.pdf, were how the United CD-2, Brown,in foreign Brzezinski policy disputes,[MBB], 5/80–6/80, Brown was Subject called File, to serve Brzezinski as a principal Donated DeclassifiStates would ed SecDef formulate Files. its policy to defend the South from the Material, Carter Library; Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, 127–143, foreign policy adviser and sometime diplomat. He did so with North,48 the number of U.S. tripwire forces in Korea, and the types Wickham, Korea on the Brink, 127–149; Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 124– Keefer, Harold Brown, 407 (quote). diligence, meeting with his share of successes and failures.2 of weapons to back them up. To the Japanese, Brown talked mostly 133; Department of State White Paper, “United States Statement on the 49 about theirBrown’s professed comments goal on to spendmemo, more Platt onto defense—1Brown, 23 Decpercent 1980, of Events in Kwangju, May 1980,” Jun 1989, reprinted in Wickham, Korea JA00803, DNSA, accessed 18 Aug 2009. onBy the1977 Brink the, 193–228.nature of the job had changed so that it was impossible gross national product (GNP)—and encouraged them to assume for an incumbent not to engage in foreign policy. Much of America’s 50 Memo, Armacost for Brzezinski, 204 Apr 1977, CK3100510895; 40 Keefer, Harold Brown, 394 (quote). more regional security responsibilities. interactions with friends and allies had revolved around military Summary of PRC Meeting of 21 Apr 1977, CK3100510319: both in relationships.41 Memo, ThBrown e most for obvious Vance case:and theBrzezinski, members 12 of Augthe North1980, DDRS,Th e second accessed Strategic 16 Sep Arms 2009; Limitation memos, Talks,Slocombe inherited for Brown, by the 23 Carter Aug 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, 25 Aug 1977: both in 0000CAC4.pdf, CD- 0000D3A0.pdf,Atlantic Treaty OrganizationCD-2, Declassifi (NATO). ed SecDef Brown Files; attended memos, theGregg annual for administration, were highly technical negotiations undertaken at Brzezinski, 15 Aug 1980; Brzezinski for Carter, 16 Sep 1980: both in 2, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memo, Claytor for Brown, 13 Jun 1977, foldergathering ROK of 9/80–1/81, defense ministers box 44, Countryand other File, alliance Korea, planning Brzezinski meetings. Material, PH00986,Helsinki, Geneva,DNSA, accessed and Vienna, 16 Sep augmented 2009; Keefer, by Harold high-level Brown discussions, 411–414. NATO defense ministers coordinated their defense budgets and in Moscow and Washington. While the Department of State and National Security Aff airs, Carter Library; msg 4232, State to Seoul, 5 51 Memos, McGiff ert for Brown, 9 Nov 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, Decforce 1980, structures, CK3100105195; planned broadmsg 16596, strategy Seoul (both to State, conventional 13 Dec 1980, and 12the Nov Arms 1977: Control both andin 0000CAF9.pdf, Disarmament CD-2,Agency Declassifi (ACDA) ed hadSecDef primary Files; CK3100109098:nuclear), arranged both for in joint DDRS, production accessed 22 of Jul weapons, 2009; Richard and purchased Holbrook memo,responsibility Slocombe for for the Brown, talks, 13Brown Dec 1977, and DoD 0000CB19.pdf, had an obvious ibid. stake andeach Michael other’s weaponArmacost, systems “A Future (mostly Leader’s Western Moment European of Truth,” purchases 24 Dec in the process. Furthermore, SALT II went to the very essence of 1997, New York Times, A17; Richard Allen, “On the Korea Tightrope, 52 of U.S. weapons). Any number of alliance questions ostensibly the U.S.-Soviet Memo, Mondale relationship—how for Carter, 26to Aprcontrol 1978, the CK3100514414, nuclear arms 1980,” 21 Jan 1998, ibid., A17. DDRS, accessed 16 Sep 2009; William E. Berry Jr., U.S. Bases in the about defense had inherent foreign policy implications—the pledge race so that neither side would be tempted to strive for superiority 42 Philippines: Th e Evolution of the Special Relationship (Boulder, CO: by each Brown, country Star to Spangled raise its Security total defense, 150–151, budget by 3 percent real Westviewand unbalance Press, what1989), Brown 202–205; called memo, “essential Platt forequivalence.” Brzezinski, Brown3 Nov growth43 Note, and a CarterNATO for decision Brown, to Vance,buy weapon and Brzezinski, systems—that 9 Sep went 1979, to 1978,increasingly CK3100469872; became a memcon,trusted sourceCarter, Inouyeof SALT et al.,II advice17 Nov to 1978, the folderthe heart PRC of Meeting the guns w/Deng or butter [1/9/78–10/3/78], debate that had box dominated 9, Geographic Western File, CK3100480547;president.5 memo, Vance for Carter, 29 Dec 1978, CK3100058883; Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library; memo, Brown for Carter, 16 ltr, Carter to Marcos, 4 Jan 1979, CK3100511475: all in DDRS, accessed Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. To persuade the 16 Sep 2009. SepNATO 1979, allies 0000CF73.pdf, to commit CD-2,their fair Declassifi defense ed SecDefshare required Files; memo, continual Carter Much of the foreign policy debate during the Carter years took for Vance and Brown, 17 Dec 1979, folder PRC Alpha [12/78–1/80], box 53 Poole, Decline of Détente, 17–21; see also Strobe Talbot, Endgame: 9,consultations Geographic File,and Brzezinskiarm-twisting Donated of NATO Material, counterparts Carter Library. by Brown place within the halls of Congress. Brown proved conscientious and and other Department of Defense (DoD) offi cials. Some of the effTh eective Inside inStory his of relations SAL T II with(New Capitol York: Harper Hill. &He Row, was 1979). never more so 44 most controversial Foreign Relations NATO of the issuesUnited turnedStates [FRUS into ],raging 1977–1980, international vol. 13, than 54in Talbot, the debate Endgame over, 50; the Brzezinski, return of Powerthe Panama and Principle Canal,, 158. a raucous China, ed. David P. Nickles (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), 1033–1035; debates, arousing vocal and determined public opposition—the and highly politicized ratifi cation process that supercharged the memcon, Brown and Deng, 8 Jan 1980,10 a.m., CK3100374514, DDRS, 55 Vance, Hard Choices, 47–55; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, neutronaccessed 13 bomb Aug 2009;and thealso printedagreement in FRUS to deploy 1977–1980 nuclear, 13:1055–1066. cruise and political157–164. right opposed to “giving away our canal.” Th e successful 3 ratifi cation, and then the passage of legislation to implement the Pershing45 II missiles on alliance soil. 56 Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 29 Sep 1978, CK3100010293; treaties, Brzezinski, became Powerbruising and Principle political, 167–171; battles Talbot, for which Endgame the, 184–185. Carter 26 Oct 1978, CK3100111050: both in DDRS, accessed 17 Aug 2009; 57 memo,NATO Brzezinski consultations for Brown had and represented Vance, 6 Oct a 1978,standard folder part China-ROK. of any administration Brzezinski, took Power out and allPrinciple the ,stops. 317; Keefer, Brown Harold maintained Brown, 159to 6–10/78,secretary ofbox defense’s 11, Country job since File, theKorea, establishment Brzezinski Material,of the alliance National in (quote).Congress that the real issue was not ownership of the canal, but Security Aff airs, Carter Library; memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 26 Oct 1949. With many allies, friends, and potential friends outside of rather58 Keefer,the canal’s Harold security Brown , and159–160. openness to all traffi c. To Brown, 1978,NATO, CK3100111050, U.S. foreign relations DDRS, accessedalso became 17 Aug intertwined 2009. with defense the danger of not returning the canal was far greater than trying to 622 633 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy foundWickham, it diffi 221921Z cult to engageDec 1979, in small 0000D3A1.pdf; talk and banter. memo, Brown McGiff was ert the to and national46 Testimony security by Jones, questions. SCFR, Th Taiwan: e Republic Hearings of Korea, 96th andCong., Japan 1st antithesisBrown, 29 ofJan Nobel 1980, w/Brown’sPeace Prize disapproval, winner and 000CD9E.pdf: controversial both statesman in CD- institutionalizedsess., 22 Feb 1979, their 740; military Congressional relations Quarterly with theAlmanac, United 1979 States, vol. with 33 Henry2, Declassifi Kissinger, ed SecDef who Files. employed humor to further his negotiations. annual(Washington, consultative DC: Congressional meetings between Quarterly, Brown 1980), and 35, his 104–105. counterparts As the39 Memo,Carter Greggadministration for Brzezinski, found 20 Mayitself 1980, increasingly folder Mtgs embroiled Muskie, in Tokyo47 Memo, or Seoul. Brown To for South Carter, Korea, 10 Mar the 1977, issues 0000D2D1.pdf, were how the United CD-2, Brown,in foreign Brzezinski policy disputes,[MBB], 5/80–6/80, Brown was Subject called File, to serve Brzezinski as a principal Donated DeclassifiStates would ed SecDef formulate Files. its policy to defend the South from the Material, Carter Library; Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, 127–143, foreign policy adviser and sometime diplomat. He did so with North,48 the number of U.S. tripwire forces in Korea, and the types Wickham, Korea on the Brink, 127–149; Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 124– Keefer, Harold Brown, 407 (quote). diligence, meeting with his share of successes and failures.2 of weapons to back them up. To the Japanese, Brown talked mostly 133; Department of State White Paper, “United States Statement on the 49 about theirBrown’s professed comments goal on to spendmemo, more Platt onto defense—1Brown, 23 Decpercent 1980, of Events in Kwangju, May 1980,” Jun 1989, reprinted in Wickham, Korea JA00803, DNSA, accessed 18 Aug 2009. onBy the1977 Brink the, 193–228.nature of the job had changed so that it was impossible gross national product (GNP)—and encouraged them to assume for an incumbent not to engage in foreign policy. Much of America’s 50 Memo, Armacost for Brzezinski, 204 Apr 1977, CK3100510895; 40 Keefer, Harold Brown, 394 (quote). more regional security responsibilities. interactions with friends and allies had revolved around military Summary of PRC Meeting of 21 Apr 1977, CK3100510319: both in relationships.41 Memo, ThBrown e most for obvious Vance case:and theBrzezinski, members 12 of Augthe North1980, DDRS,Th e second accessed Strategic 16 Sep Arms 2009; Limitation memos, Talks,Slocombe inherited for Brown, by the 23 Carter Aug 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, 25 Aug 1977: both in 0000CAC4.pdf, CD- 0000D3A0.pdf,Atlantic Treaty OrganizationCD-2, Declassifi (NATO). ed SecDef Brown Files; attended memos, theGregg annual for administration, were highly technical negotiations undertaken at Brzezinski, 15 Aug 1980; Brzezinski for Carter, 16 Sep 1980: both in 2, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memo, Claytor for Brown, 13 Jun 1977, foldergathering ROK of 9/80–1/81, defense ministers box 44, Countryand other File, alliance Korea, planning Brzezinski meetings. Material, PH00986,Helsinki, Geneva,DNSA, accessed and Vienna, 16 Sep augmented 2009; Keefer, by Harold high-level Brown discussions, 411–414. NATO defense ministers coordinated their defense budgets and in Moscow and Washington. While the Department of State and National Security Aff airs, Carter Library; msg 4232, State to Seoul, 5 51 Memos, McGiff ert for Brown, 9 Nov 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, Decforce 1980, structures, CK3100105195; planned broadmsg 16596, strategy Seoul (both to State, conventional 13 Dec 1980, and 12the Nov Arms 1977: Control both andin 0000CAF9.pdf, Disarmament CD-2,Agency Declassifi (ACDA) ed hadSecDef primary Files; CK3100109098:nuclear), arranged both for in joint DDRS, production accessed 22 of Jul weapons, 2009; Richard and purchased Holbrook memo,responsibility Slocombe for for the Brown, talks, 13Brown Dec 1977, and DoD 0000CB19.pdf, had an obvious ibid. stake andeach Michael other’s weaponArmacost, systems “A Future (mostly Leader’s Western Moment European of Truth,” purchases 24 Dec in the process. Furthermore, SALT II went to the very essence of 1997, New York Times, A17; Richard Allen, “On the Korea Tightrope, 52 of U.S. weapons). Any number of alliance questions ostensibly the U.S.-Soviet Memo, Mondale relationship—how for Carter, 26to Aprcontrol 1978, the CK3100514414, nuclear arms 1980,” 21 Jan 1998, ibid., A17. DDRS, accessed 16 Sep 2009; William E. Berry Jr., U.S. Bases in the about defense had inherent foreign policy implications—the pledge race so that neither side would be tempted to strive for superiority 42 Philippines: Th e Evolution of the Special Relationship (Boulder, CO: by each Brown, country Star to Spangled raise its Security total defense, 150–151, budget by 3 percent real Westviewand unbalance Press, what1989), Brown 202–205; called memo, “essential Platt forequivalence.” Brzezinski, Brown3 Nov growth43 Note, and a CarterNATO for decision Brown, to Vance,buy weapon and Brzezinski, systems—that 9 Sep went 1979, to 1978,increasingly CK3100469872; became a memcon,trusted sourceCarter, Inouyeof SALT et al.,II advice17 Nov to 1978, the folderthe heart PRC of Meeting the guns w/Deng or butter [1/9/78–10/3/78], debate that had box dominated 9, Geographic Western File, CK3100480547;president.5 memo, Vance for Carter, 29 Dec 1978, CK3100058883; Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library; memo, Brown for Carter, 16 ltr, Carter to Marcos, 4 Jan 1979, CK3100511475: all in DDRS, accessed Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. To persuade the 16 Sep 2009. SepNATO 1979, allies 0000CF73.pdf, to commit CD-2,their fair Declassifi defense ed SecDefshare required Files; memo, continual Carter Much of the foreign policy debate during the Carter years took for Vance and Brown, 17 Dec 1979, folder PRC Alpha [12/78–1/80], box 53 Poole, Decline of Détente, 17–21; see also Strobe Talbot, Endgame: 9,consultations Geographic File,and Brzezinskiarm-twisting Donated of NATO Material, counterparts Carter Library. by Brown place within the halls of Congress. Brown proved conscientious and and other Department of Defense (DoD) offi cials. Some of the effTh eective Inside inStory his of relations SAL T II with(New Capitol York: Harper Hill. &He Row, was 1979). never more so 44 most controversial Foreign Relations NATO of the issuesUnited turnedStates [FRUS into ],raging 1977–1980, international vol. 13, than 54in Talbot, the debate Endgame over, 50; the Brzezinski, return of Powerthe Panama and Principle Canal,, 158. a raucous China, ed. David P. Nickles (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), 1033–1035; debates, arousing vocal and determined public opposition—the and highly politicized ratifi cation process that supercharged the memcon, Brown and Deng, 8 Jan 1980,10 a.m., CK3100374514, DDRS, 55 Vance, Hard Choices, 47–55; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, neutronaccessed 13 bomb Aug 2009;and thealso printedagreement in FRUS to deploy 1977–1980 nuclear, 13:1055–1066. cruise and political157–164. right opposed to “giving away our canal.” Th e successful 3 ratifi cation, and then the passage of legislation to implement the Pershing45 II missiles on alliance soil. 56 Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 29 Sep 1978, CK3100010293; treaties, Brzezinski, became Powerbruising and Principle political, 167–171; battles Talbot, for which Endgame the, 184–185. Carter 26 Oct 1978, CK3100111050: both in DDRS, accessed 17 Aug 2009; 57 memo,NATO Brzezinski consultations for Brown had and represented Vance, 6 Oct a 1978,standard folder part China-ROK. of any administration Brzezinski, took Power out and allPrinciple the ,stops. 317; Keefer, Brown Harold maintained Brown, 159to 6–10/78,secretary ofbox defense’s 11, Country job since File, theKorea, establishment Brzezinski Material,of the alliance National in (quote).Congress that the real issue was not ownership of the canal, but Security Aff airs, Carter Library; memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 26 Oct 1949. With many allies, friends, and potential friends outside of rather58 Keefer,the canal’s Harold security Brown , and159–160. openness to all traffi c. To Brown, 1978,NATO, CK3100111050, U.S. foreign relations DDRS, accessedalso became 17 Aug intertwined 2009. with defense the danger of not returning the canal was far greater than trying to 622 633 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy retain(New York: it against Random an increasinglyHouse, 1989), nationalistic 209–216; Wilfried Panama Loth, and Overcoming the threat During32 Ltr, the Brownfi nal two to yearsVance of with his presidency,copy to Brzezinski, Carter came 14 Octto rely 1978, on ofthe sabotageCold War: from A History anti-American of Détente ,elements 1950–1991, in Latin trans. America. Robert F.6 Hogg 0000D0E8.pdf,Brown as an envoy, CD-2, a person Declassifi who ed couldSecDef explain Files; memo,the administration’s Brzezinski for (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 155. Carter,policies. 28 After Oct 1978, the fallCK3100104576; of the Shah memo,of Iran, Brzezinski Brown forembarked Carter with on Carter’s disapproval, 1 Nov 1979, CK31000117770; memcon, Park, Th e 27Panama Canal controversy has slipped into history, but the Brown, Star Spangled Security, 140–141. Brown,the most and clearly Gleysteen, defi ned CK diplomatic 3100509548; mission memo, of Platt his forcareer Brzezinski, to date— 13 Middle East confl ict between Israel and the Arabs festers on. to reassure Middle East allies about America’s commitment to 28 Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Nov 1979, CK3100517021: all in DDRS, accessed 21 Jul 2009. President Jimmy Carter is most remembered for his Camp David MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 85–86. Carter provides a long discussion them33 in light of the changed environment. Th e actual impact of Accords and follow-on peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, both Wood, “Persuading a President,” 107–110; Don Hirst, “North of his China policy in Keeping Faith, 186–211; Harold Brown, interview Koreathis mission Has Ground proved Unit diffi Edge,” cult 8to Jan quantify, 1978, Army but Times Brown’s, 1, 21. personal Neither 8 bymajor Alfred accomplishments Goldberg and Ronald in a diffiLanda, cult 1 andMar long-lasting1993, pt. 4, 12–13,dispute. Oral In Brownassurances nor Carterwere part fully ofaccepted the toolset this assessment.of Carter’s “I diplomacy. have never beenTh e Historytruth, the Collection, peace came OSD/HO; at the price Brown, of generous Star Spangled military Security assistance, 167–168. and convincedsuccess of ofthis the trip accuracy in the president’sof the report, eyes but led I tohad other to accept assignments. it,” the credits29 Joeto bothWood, countries. “Persuading Th ea secretaryPresident: ofJimmy state Carter and ultimately and American the presidentBrown worked remembered. closely Jimmy with Western Carter, interview European by leadersAlfred Goldbergto gain their and Troopspresident in Korea,” had the Studies responsibility in Intelligence for military6, no. 4 (1996): sales credits 98–99; and Oberdorfer, military Mauriceapproval—in Matloff the , Atlanta, face of GA, strong 12 Marlocal 1986, antinuclear Oral History opposition—for Collection, Twoassistance. Koreas , Congress101–102; hadmemo, to approve.Armacost Because for Brzezinski, DoD implemented9 Feb 1977, OSD/HO. Brown recalled: “What really undermined it [the withdrawal policy]stationing in the cruise end wasmissiles an intelligence and Pershing assessment, II missiles the validity with of nuclearwhich I CK3100502092,the agreed policy, Declassifi in practice ed Documents Brown playedReference a clear Service policy (DDRS), role, warheads on their soil. Brown traveled to mainland China, the fi rst accessed 20 Jul 2009; General John W. Vessey, interview by Alfred Goldberg still have some uncertainty about.” Brown interview, 1 Mar 1993, pt. 4, andespecially Maurice since Matloff the , details12 Mar of1990, the 3–4,implementation Oral History Collection,of broad policyOSD/ ibid.secretary of defense to do so, to explore with Chinese leaders the decisions became, many times in fact, the real negotiations. Brown HO; Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous expansion34 Memo, of PlattU.S.–People’s for Brzezinski, Republic 17 Jan 1979,of China CK3100519391, military relations DDRS; Duty:spent Anmany American hours Soldier with inIsraeli the Twentieth and Egyptian Century (Newdefense York: ministers Summit PRMand to 45, coordinate 22 Jan 1979, policy item PR001441,to obstruct Digital the Soviet National military Security takeover Archive Books,working 1991), out military 383; msgs, sales, CINCPAC credit, and to assistance JCS, 011957Z arrangements. May 1977, In (DNSA);of Afghanistan. memo, BrownPlatt to met Brzezinski, with Saudi 6 Jun Defense 1979, MinisterCK3100147779; Sultan CK3100119115; 052017Z May 1977, CK3100124436; and 110344Z addition, part of the Camp David Accords understanding was that Summarybin Abdulaziz of Conclusions al-Saud atto PRC explain Meeting, U.S. 8 Junpolicies 1979, andCK3100147884: limitations May 1977, CK3100111625; msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, all in DDRS, accessed 22 Jul 2009. 151330Zthe United May States 1977, would CK3100111627: fi nance and all construct in DDRS, Israeli accessed airfi 20 elds Jul in2009. the on rearming the Saudi air force. At the end of his tenure, Brown Negev to replace those in the Sinai (the peninsula would eventually 35 30 undertook Memcons, a mission Carter, to Brown,Seoul forVance, the Brzezinski, purpose ofPark dissuading et al., 30 theJan return Memo,to Egypt). Brown Carter for gaveCarter, Brown 29 Apr and 1977, DoD 000B3F9.pdf, this responsibility, CD-1, 1979,South 11 Korean a.m.–12:20 military p.m., dictator, CK3100511398; Chun Do Carter, Hwan, Park from and executingGleysteen, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memcon, Carter, Brown, Brzezinski, et al., 21 30 Jun 1979, 12:23–1:30 p.m., CK3100110798: both in DDRS, Maywhich 1977, the Israelis9:30–10:30 made a.m., a requirement CK3100500089; for their memo, agreement General Brownto the a key dissident leader, Kim Dae Jung, who later became the fi rst 7 Vance, Hard Choices peace accords. accesseddemocratically 22 Jul 2009; elected president of the, Republic129–130; ofWilliam South Gleysteen, Korea.9 and Habib for Carter, 28 May 1977, CK3100105174; memo, Brown Massive Entanglements, Marginal Infl uence: Carter and the Korean Crisis for Carter, 12 Jul 1977, CK3100145706; memo, Brown and Vance for (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 46–49; Oberdorfer, Carter,Saudi Arabia 13 Jul provided 1977, CK3100105178; a second focus andof U.S. memcon, policy Carter,in the MiddleBrown, TwoBrown Koreas, was not106–107. always successful in these missions, just as Carter’s Brzezinski,East. Sitting and on Armacost, the world’s 14 largestJul 1977, reservoir CK3100500095: of oil, its allmilitary in DDRS, was foreign36 policy was not an unqualifi ed success. By January 1981 accessedtotally unable 20 Jul to2009; protect memo, the Brzezinski country forand Carter, its vast 13 wealth Jul 1977, against folder a Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 12 Jul 1979, CK3100514579; ROK 7–9/77, box 43, Country File, Korea, Brzezinski Material, National Brown forhad Brzezinski, become 6an Oct acknowledged 1979, CK3100467908: and integral both part in DDRS,of the Securitydetermined Aff airs, outside Carter threat Library. (in U.S. eyes primarily the Soviet Union, accessedforeign policy22 Jul 2009; team. Carter Although Public hePapers never 1979 enjoyed, 2:1275–1276. a close personal or secondarily Iraq). Having relied for years on the U.S. promise to relationship with Brzezinski (unlike his friendship with Vance), 31 Memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 7 Sep 1977, CK3100500100, DDRS, 37 defend their sovereignty, the Saudis felt vulnerable after the 1979 Brown Gleysteen,found himself Massive more Entanglement in tune, 53–62,with Brzezinski’s132–133; Oberdorfer, hawkish accessed 20 Jul 2009; memo, Brown for Carter, 26 Aug 1977, 0000CAC4. Two Koreas, 111–115; msg, State to all diplomatic posts, 27 Oct 1977, pdf,revolution CD-1, Declassifiin Iran and ed SecDef the Soviet Files; invasion memcon, of Brown, Afghanistan Brzezinski, later Vance, that CK3100489352,approach to foreign DDRS, and accessed national 22 securityJul 2009. policies. In the last two 4year. Apr Th 1978, ey pressed CK3100496701, Washington DDRS, for more accessed advanced 21 Jul weapons,2009; memo, and years of his tenure, Brown proved more assertive and dominant at 38 BrzezinskiBrown and for DoD Carter, favored 18 Apr beefi 1978, ng CK3100505091, up the kingdom’s DDRS, defenses. accessed More 22 the various Oberdorfer, NSC, PRC,Two andKoreas SCC, meetings117–121; thatGleysteen, debated foreignMassive Julgenerally, 2009; memo they Brzezinskirevamped for the Carter, U.S. 19military Apr 1978, posture folder in ROK the 1–6/78,Persian Entanglement, 77–83, 210–212; John A. Wickham, Korea on the Brink: Frompolicy the issues. “12/12 His Incident” advice closelyto the Kwangju mirrored Uprising that of (Washington, Brzezinski (who DC: boxGulf, 44, the Country Indian File, Ocean, Korea, and Brzezinski South Asia, Material, the frameworkNational Security for security. Aff airs, Carter Library; Carter Public Papers 1978, 1:768. Nationalclaims Brown Defense was Universityby this time Press, even 1999), more hard-line53–66; msg, than Brown he was), to and was generally, although not always, accepted and followed by 604 615 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy retain(New York: it against Random an increasinglyHouse, 1989), nationalistic 209–216; Wilfried Panama Loth, and Overcoming the threat During32 Ltr, the Brownfi nal two to yearsVance of with his presidency,copy to Brzezinski, Carter came 14 Octto rely 1978, on ofthe sabotageCold War: from A History anti-American of Détente ,elements 1950–1991, in Latin trans. America. Robert F.6 Hogg 0000D0E8.pdf,Brown as an envoy, CD-2, a person Declassifi who ed couldSecDef explain Files; memo,the administration’s Brzezinski for (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 155. Carter,policies. 28 After Oct 1978, the fallCK3100104576; of the Shah memo,of Iran, Brzezinski Brown forembarked Carter with on Carter’s disapproval, 1 Nov 1979, CK31000117770; memcon, Park, Th e 27Panama Canal controversy has slipped into history, but the Brown, Star Spangled Security, 140–141. Brown,the most and clearly Gleysteen, defi ned CK diplomatic 3100509548; mission memo, of Platt his forcareer Brzezinski, to date— 13 Middle East confl ict between Israel and the Arabs festers on. to reassure Middle East allies about America’s commitment to 28 Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Nov 1979, CK3100517021: all in DDRS, accessed 21 Jul 2009. President Jimmy Carter is most remembered for his Camp David MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 85–86. Carter provides a long discussion them33 in light of the changed environment. Th e actual impact of Accords and follow-on peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, both Wood, “Persuading a President,” 107–110; Don Hirst, “North of his China policy in Keeping Faith, 186–211; Harold Brown, interview Koreathis mission Has Ground proved Unit diffi Edge,” cult 8to Jan quantify, 1978, Army but Times Brown’s, 1, 21. personal Neither 8 bymajor Alfred accomplishments Goldberg and Ronald in a diffiLanda, cult 1 andMar long-lasting1993, pt. 4, 12–13,dispute. Oral In Brownassurances nor Carterwere part fully ofaccepted the toolset this assessment.of Carter’s “I diplomacy. have never beenTh e Historytruth, the Collection, peace came OSD/HO; at the price Brown, of generous Star Spangled military Security assistance, 167–168. and convincedsuccess of ofthis the trip accuracy in the president’sof the report, eyes but led I tohad other to accept assignments. it,” the credits29 Joeto bothWood, countries. “Persuading Th ea secretaryPresident: ofJimmy state Carter and ultimately and American the presidentBrown worked remembered. closely Jimmy with Western Carter, interview European by leadersAlfred Goldbergto gain their and Troopspresident in Korea,” had the Studies responsibility in Intelligence for military6, no. 4 (1996): sales credits 98–99; and Oberdorfer, military Mauriceapproval—in Matloff the , Atlanta, face of GA, strong 12 Marlocal 1986, antinuclear Oral History opposition—for Collection, Twoassistance. Koreas , Congress101–102; hadmemo, to approve.Armacost Because for Brzezinski, DoD implemented9 Feb 1977, OSD/HO. Brown recalled: “What really undermined it [the withdrawal policy]stationing in the cruise end wasmissiles an intelligence and Pershing assessment, II missiles the validity with of nuclearwhich I CK3100502092,the agreed policy, Declassifi in practice ed Documents Brown playedReference a clear Service policy (DDRS), role, warheads on their soil. Brown traveled to mainland China, the fi rst accessed 20 Jul 2009; General John W. Vessey, interview by Alfred Goldberg still have some uncertainty about.” Brown interview, 1 Mar 1993, pt. 4, andespecially Maurice since Matloff the , details12 Mar of1990, the 3–4,implementation Oral History Collection,of broad policyOSD/ ibid.secretary of defense to do so, to explore with Chinese leaders the decisions became, many times in fact, the real negotiations. Brown HO; Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous expansion34 Memo, of PlattU.S.–People’s for Brzezinski, Republic 17 Jan 1979,of China CK3100519391, military relations DDRS; Duty:spent Anmany American hours Soldier with inIsraeli the Twentieth and Egyptian Century (Newdefense York: ministers Summit PRMand to 45, coordinate 22 Jan 1979, policy item PR001441,to obstruct Digital the Soviet National military Security takeover Archive Books,working 1991), out military 383; msgs, sales, CINCPAC credit, and to assistance JCS, 011957Z arrangements. May 1977, In (DNSA);of Afghanistan. memo, BrownPlatt to met Brzezinski, with Saudi 6 Jun Defense 1979, MinisterCK3100147779; Sultan CK3100119115; 052017Z May 1977, CK3100124436; and 110344Z addition, part of the Camp David Accords understanding was that Summarybin Abdulaziz of Conclusions al-Saud atto PRC explain Meeting, U.S. 8 Junpolicies 1979, andCK3100147884: limitations May 1977, CK3100111625; msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, all in DDRS, accessed 22 Jul 2009. 151330Zthe United May States 1977, would CK3100111627: fi nance and all construct in DDRS, Israeli accessed airfi 20 elds Jul in2009. the on rearming the Saudi air force. At the end of his tenure, Brown Negev to replace those in the Sinai (the peninsula would eventually 35 30 undertook Memcons, a mission Carter, to Brown,Seoul forVance, the Brzezinski, purpose ofPark dissuading et al., 30 theJan return Memo,to Egypt). Brown Carter for gaveCarter, Brown 29 Apr and 1977, DoD 000B3F9.pdf, this responsibility, CD-1, 1979,South 11 Korean a.m.–12:20 military p.m., dictator, CK3100511398; Chun Do Carter, Hwan, Park from and executingGleysteen, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memcon, Carter, Brown, Brzezinski, et al., 21 30 Jun 1979, 12:23–1:30 p.m., CK3100110798: both in DDRS, Maywhich 1977, the Israelis9:30–10:30 made a.m., a requirement CK3100500089; for their memo, agreement General Brownto the a key dissident leader, Kim Dae Jung, who later became the fi rst 7 Vance, Hard Choices peace accords. accesseddemocratically 22 Jul 2009; elected president of the, Republic129–130; ofWilliam South Gleysteen, Korea.9 and Habib for Carter, 28 May 1977, CK3100105174; memo, Brown Massive Entanglements, Marginal Infl uence: Carter and the Korean Crisis for Carter, 12 Jul 1977, CK3100145706; memo, Brown and Vance for (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 46–49; Oberdorfer, Carter,Saudi Arabia 13 Jul provided 1977, CK3100105178; a second focus andof U.S. memcon, policy Carter,in the MiddleBrown, TwoBrown Koreas, was not106–107. always successful in these missions, just as Carter’s Brzezinski,East. Sitting and on Armacost, the world’s 14 largestJul 1977, reservoir CK3100500095: of oil, its allmilitary in DDRS, was foreign36 policy was not an unqualifi ed success. By January 1981 accessedtotally unable 20 Jul to2009; protect memo, the Brzezinski country forand Carter, its vast 13 wealth Jul 1977, against folder a Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 12 Jul 1979, CK3100514579; ROK 7–9/77, box 43, Country File, Korea, Brzezinski Material, National Brown forhad Brzezinski, become 6an Oct acknowledged 1979, CK3100467908: and integral both part in DDRS,of the Securitydetermined Aff airs, outside Carter threat Library. (in U.S. eyes primarily the Soviet Union, accessedforeign policy22 Jul 2009; team. Carter Although Public hePapers never 1979 enjoyed, 2:1275–1276. a close personal or secondarily Iraq). Having relied for years on the U.S. promise to relationship with Brzezinski (unlike his friendship with Vance), 31 Memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 7 Sep 1977, CK3100500100, DDRS, 37 defend their sovereignty, the Saudis felt vulnerable after the 1979 Brown Gleysteen,found himself Massive more Entanglement in tune, 53–62,with Brzezinski’s132–133; Oberdorfer, hawkish accessed 20 Jul 2009; memo, Brown for Carter, 26 Aug 1977, 0000CAC4. Two Koreas, 111–115; msg, State to all diplomatic posts, 27 Oct 1977, pdf,revolution CD-1, Declassifiin Iran and ed SecDef the Soviet Files; invasion memcon, of Brown, Afghanistan Brzezinski, later Vance, that CK3100489352,approach to foreign DDRS, and accessed national 22 securityJul 2009. policies. In the last two 4year. Apr Th 1978, ey pressed CK3100496701, Washington DDRS, for more accessed advanced 21 Jul weapons,2009; memo, and years of his tenure, Brown proved more assertive and dominant at 38 BrzezinskiBrown and for DoD Carter, favored 18 Apr beefi 1978, ng CK3100505091, up the kingdom’s DDRS, defenses. accessed More 22 the various Oberdorfer, NSC, PRC,Two andKoreas SCC, meetings117–121; thatGleysteen, debated foreignMassive Julgenerally, 2009; memo they Brzezinskirevamped for the Carter, U.S. 19military Apr 1978, posture folder in ROK the 1–6/78,Persian Entanglement, 77–83, 210–212; John A. Wickham, Korea on the Brink: Frompolicy the issues. “12/12 His Incident” advice closelyto the Kwangju mirrored Uprising that of (Washington, Brzezinski (who DC: boxGulf, 44, the Country Indian File, Ocean, Korea, and Brzezinski South Asia, Material, the frameworkNational Security for security. Aff airs, Carter Library; Carter Public Papers 1978, 1:768. Nationalclaims Brown Defense was Universityby this time Press, even 1999), more hard-line53–66; msg, than Brown he was), to and was generally, although not always, accepted and followed by 604 615 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

Komer.to convince Brown the came West onGermans board later.of the In necessity late 1978, to afterdeploy a MiddleERWs. U.S.limitation forces innegotiations a Persian Gulf emergency.with the ThSoviets e Soviet toinvasion provide of Afghanistan political EastTh e Germansand East Africarefused trip, to Duncanagree to argueda deployment that with until a small the militaryUnited andcover the for Iran the hostage deployment. crisis persuaded Brown Carter and to McGiff follow throughert plugged on Brown’s away investmentStates produced (U.S. thenaval weapons. visits, joint And military Carter exercises, was unprepared and modest to recommendationsin consultations andwith go the even NATO further. allies.For example, Brown the recalled president a orderedprivate securityproduce andwithout fi nancial the commitmentassistance for poorerto deploy. countries), Brown theand UnitedVance anothermeeting carrier with battlethe German group led chancellor by the USS in Coralwhich Sea he totold join Schmidt, the USS Statesreceived could confi make rmation a diff that erence. the HeWest called Germans for a reviewwould ofconsider policy Nimitzin undiplomatic carrier battle terms, group, that in the “the Indian American Ocean presidentsince January can 1979. aff ord123 to incoupling the Persian a prohibition Gulf and of EastERW African production littoral. with During an arms this limitation review, have the German chancellor unhappy with him, but the German OSDproposal offi cialson a formednew Soviet a loose theater alliance nuclear with Brzezinski’sweapon, the NSC powerful staff , chancellorIn his State really of the can’t Union aff ordspeech to ofhave January the American1980, the president mobileespecially SS–20 his military missile, adviser, introduced General into William Eastern Odom,Europe. to When press thefor unhappyenunciated with the him. Carter So, Doctrine, let’s try to putting fi nd a waythe Sovietsthrough on this notice for yourthat Sovietsmore proactive turned downsteps in the the proposal, area.121 the West Germans and other benefian attempt t as much by “an as outsideours.”24 force to gain control of the Persian Gulf NATO members would have good cover to accept deployment of region” would be considered an assault on U.S. vital interests and theBrown neutron made bomb.his own It tripwas to a thegood area solution, in early but 1979 Carter not onlyat the to lastsell wouldItaly agreed be repelled to deploy by militaryGLCMs, force.fulfi lling It fell the to Schmidt DoD to requirement create the momentthe Egyptian-Israeli pulled back. Peace He could Treaty not but authorize also to scout deployment ways to of increase ERWs “cooperativethat West Germany framework not have for tosecurity” go it alone that (Great Carter Britain promised also agreedin his andU.S. bemilitary known presence as the presidentin the region. who approvedHe promoted nuclear the weapons idea of speech.to GCLMs; Technical the Netherlands teams traveled and Belgium to Kenya, eventually Oman, followed). and Somalia Since thatcontingent killed onlyoperating people bases, (an oversimplifiwhich involved cation, the Carteruse of localrealized, military but tothe assessweapons options would for not base deploy access, until followed 1983, plenty by political of time remainedteams to thefacilities popular in aperception). crisis. When He hedid returned agree to tobuild Washington, new warheads Brown so negotiateto discuss reducingthe deals. theater Diego nuclear Garcia weaponsunderwent with an the upgrade. Soviets. KomerBrown thatcontinued they could to review be converted policy in to the ERWs Persian (the Gulf. Reagan He administrationrecommended threwhimself himself had no intoillusions this about process, forging realizing a unifi theed NATOreal problem position was on producedregular bilateral and deployed security them, consultations but only within U.S.-based selected Gulf stockpiles). States, thehow inability to deal with to deploy the Soviets troops on andthis issue,equipment noting, quickly “We will enough fi nd this to Thresponsiveness e bungling ofto therequests ERW for issue arms became sales and/or a rallying credits cry to forall friendsCarter forestallnegotiation a Soviet with theattack Allies in athe long area. and His hard answer one. We was need better patience, access opponentsin the area, andwho participation painted him in as joint an exercisesinexperienced to improve president readiness too andpersistence, transit andrights, determination; additional rapid we also airlift need and to besealift fi rm capabilities, at times.”25 readyof local to forces. seek theBrown intellectual also urged comfort increasing of his MIDEASTFOR own moral high by Thprepositioning e problems Brown of supplies, feared turnedand Saudi out towillingness be less formidable to overbuild because air ground.two or threeTh ey sawsurface dire ships;consequences increasing in theroutine loss ofPACOM confi dence naval in thebases Soviet to allow proposals for U.S. in 1980use in seemed an emergency. little more Th than e White a series House of ploys and Washingtondeployments byto thethe Europeans Indian Ocean, and loss including of respect deployment by the Soviets. of a toNSC reverse staff the responded NATO decisionpositively to toupgrade these itssuggestions, theater nuclear noting forces. that Incarrier retrospect, group withthe damage one or wastwo notMarine that air-groundlasting, mainly task becauseforces; andthe Still,they werethe West already Germans implementing hoped for many a successful of them. agreement.124 At Brown’s Cartertactical administration air training and succeeded exercises with in obtaining local air forces.agreement For theto deploylonger strong recommendation, Carter took Schmidt to task in private for Pershingterm, the IIs secretary and GLCMs called infor Western a continuous Europe. U.S.23 naval presence in flBrown oating considered the idea of a aU.S. three-year base at moratoriumRas Banas vital. on HeNATO received deployment Carter’s the Indian Ocean, access and overfl ight rights to allow emergency ofpermission Pershing toIIs negotiateand GLCMs a deal in returnwith the for Egyptiansa Soviet agreement that would not pay to deploymentTo deploy Pershingof troops IIs to and the GLCMs,Persian Gulf,the Westernprepositioning European of deployfor upgrading any more the SS–20s. facilities In there. Brown’s Th mind, e secretary the delay envisioned just legitimized the base equipmentNATO allies and faced supplies strong there,popular and opposition expansion from of antinuclearthe facilities and at theas a Soviet staging theater area fornuclear U.S. force troops lead, and given prepositioned that SS–20s supplies had already that Diegoantiwar Garcia. groups,122 which constituted large segments of their civilian beencould deployed. provide aSchmidt, safe complex who neededto support a political combat success operations during in a tripthe populations, as well as from powerful elements within their own toGulf. Moscow, Only 800was kilometersfurious. Still, from the the agreement Gulf, yet held, out ofand hostile in 1983 tactical the oppositionIn late 1979 andCarter governing approved parties. negotiations Th e Sovietto establish Union a small propaganda U.S. air Reaganaircraft range,administration Ras Banas deployed could also Pershing provide IIs a and regional GLCMs training in Western venue apparatusbase in Oman played and a intonaval thisbase insentiment. Berbera, Somalia, In negotiations or Mombasa, with Kenya. the Europeand a base and forGreat B–52 Britain. interdiction26 operations. But upgrading cost EuropeansBrown reported during he had 1978 some and success 1979, in the obtaining same pattern limited asaccess with for ERW U.S. estimates rose from $250 million to $350 million. For their part, negotiationsAWACS aircraft emerged. to the Egyptian West German air base at Chancellor Wadi Qena, Helmetbut had yetSchmidt to nail theBrown Egyptians believed were this unwilling agreement to provideand the asubsequent written base deployment agreement wasdown prepared approval tofor agree a U.S. to facility deploy at onlyRas Banas, if another located continental on a peninsula NATO that tomarked show Congress,a turning whichpoint refusedin the Coldto fund War. the Inproject eff ect, without they bothone. allyjutted also into did the so.Red Schmidt Sea (Egypt’s further western-most required point) a parallel that could track be of used arms by indicatedTh e project that died. the125 United States and NATO were not prepared 1252 5313 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy theto letUSSR. the UnrealizedSoviet Union at the dominate time, the Western alliance betweenEurope theby Afghantheater themilitarily. future.” Carter Carter’s disregarded loss in the this 1980 assessment election meant and ordered that the plans Reagan for successornuclear force regime, superiority. the Taliban, Brown and a also small noted anti-Western that the terrorist U.S. military group, administrationwithdrawals to soldbegin. the Th F–16s. e Joint It Chiefs went onof Staffto forge reluctantly a much acceptedstronger al-Qaeda,technological would innovations have appalling of consequencesthe late 1970s—precision-guided in September 2001. relationshipthis instruction, with but Islamabad, some in the uncomplicated Army opposed by it. Thconcerns e commander about munitions, stealth technology, and integrated surveillance, ofnonproliferation, U.S. forces in Korea,human Generalrights, or John evenhandedness Vessey, met with India.Brown118 and intelligence,Events in Afghanistanreconnaissance, directly and affcommunications ected longtime systems—U.S. ally then the president to explain his concern. Vessey’s chief of staff , Pakistan.profoundly By infl 1977 uenced relations the Soviet between Union. Washington Having found and themselvesIslamabad Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, went public with his opposition. Brown Th e Framework for Security in the Persian Gulf hadchecked deteriorated in Western as Europethe Carter and losingadministration the technology followed race, a Sovietmore recalled Singlaub to Washington and Carter personally reassigned evenhandedleaders looked policy to their in ownits militaryhouse for sales reform to Pakistanand change. and27 WhileIndia. him,Ever sincecreating the 1973a hero oil and embargo, martyr the for Organization opponents of of the the withdrawal Petroleum Pakistan’sthe impact eff on ort Moscow to develop of these an atomic developments bomb, inis difficlear cult opposition to assess policy.Exporting Military Countries commanders (OPEC), in a Korea worldwide were unanimouscartel, kept ina fithe rm viewrein towithout Carter’s more nuclear evidence nonproliferation from the Soviet campaign, leadership won itself, the the military Carter onthat production a rapid pullout and thus was the“not price a viable of crude option.” oil, 29retaining a powerful governmentadministration’s in Islamabad success in no forging friends a inNATO the White agreement House. on In theater DoD, lever over the world’s economies. Th e Carter administration however,nuclear modernization support for Pakistan (paving remained the way strong.for deployment117 in 1983) soughtWithdrawal to breakplans alsoOPEC’s caused stranglehold consternation on in oil Seoul. production Brown andby was no doubt part of a process that presented the Kremlin with energyVance sent conservation JCS Chairman practices, General development George Brown of and domestic Under Secretarysources, Policysome tough toward choices. Pakistan Th ethus agreement divided to into modernize two camps. NATO’s DoD, theater the andof State creation for Political of an oil Aff consumerairs Philip organizationHabib to Seoul to counterbalanceto explain the militarynuclear forcesadvisers succeeded on the NSC against staff not , and only Brzezinski Soviet opposition favored a pro-but OPEC.decision,119 beginning A corollary a longof this negotiation energy policy with required South Korean that the President United Pakistanstrong domestic approach, political while opposition the State in Department Western Europe and itself.the Arms StatesPark Chung and its Heeallies about protect the their timing oil sources and extent in the of Middle the withdrawal East and Control and Disarmament Agency opposed an increase in military Persianand how Gulf the fromRepublic either of outsideKorea (ROK)threat—the armed Soviet forces Union—or would be sales to Pakistan. In early February 1980 David McGiff ert went to internalmodernized upheaval to compensate such as occurred for the in U.S. Iran. pullback. U.S. military Before assets the inSeoul the Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines Pakistan with Warren Christopher and Brzezinski. Upon his return, areaSecurity were Consultative limited. Th Meeting e U.S. Middle (SCM) Eastin July Force 1977, (MIDEASTFOR) Brown obtained McGiffCarter cameert promoted to offi ce military in January sales 1977to Islamabad determined that wouldto reduce allow the it consistedpresidential of approvala fl agship of and myriad two inducementssurface combatants to off er operating the ROK, in such the U.S.to defend military its borderpresence with in Afghanistan,East Asia and where to establish Soviet/Afghan relations forces with Arabianas a withdrawal Sea and ofthe support Persian troopsGulf, periodicallyfi rst, additional augmented tactical byfi ghters four thehad People’salready Republicengaged inof hotChina, pursuit the latter of the requiring mujahideen. termination Pakistan, of combatantstationed in vesselsSouth (sometimesKorea, joint includingmilitary exercises, an aircraft coproduction carrier) and of thea key long-standing ally in the military support relationship for the Afghan with the resistance, Republic providedof China logisticalweapons, andships a massivefrom the security U.S. Pacifipackage c Command of $800 million. (PACOM)30 that onsanctuary Taiwan. and Brown a conduit found for himself getting caught weapons between to them. the Inpresident’s summer made periodic deployments of about 50 days to the Indian Ocean. agenda1980 Brown, and the who concern had not of thebeen military much involvedand many with in CongressPakistan, ThAs eit Unitedturned out,States Brown’s had no eff bases;ort went its forclosest naught was because Diego Garcia,Congress a thatappealed the president’s to the president plans werefor a too better precipitous security relationship.to provide adequate Brown tinyrefused atoll to in fund the western the withdrawal, Indian Ocean the transfer(2,000 miles of equipment, from the Strait and securityobtained for approval U.S. interests for the insale East of Asia.60 tanks and the transfer of two ofthe Hormuz), security assistancerented from package. the British. In April As was 1978, made at painfullythe urging clear of obsolete U.S. destroyers, but the president balked at selling F–16s duringBrown deliberationsand Brzezinski, on potentialCarter scaled military back operations his withdrawal against plan a post- to 31 Southto Pakistan, Korea evenillustrated though Brown’s India dilemmaenjoyed virtualmost vividly. air superiority Th e president over shah700 combatIran, the and United 2,600 States support had troops severely with limited more accessto follow to staginglater. hadits old promised rival. during the 1976 campaign to withdraw U.S. combat groundsBrown traveled or bases to in Seoul the area, in November circumscribing 1978, the hoping ability to to confi project rm troops from South Korea. Th e services and defense specialists powerto Park there. that 120the United States would sell F–16 fi ghter aircraft to thoughtAll was notit a badlost idea. on aircraft.Brown felt When confl Cartericted, butmet fell Pakistan in with hisPresident leader South Korea, giving the South an edge in the air until 1990. Th e byMohammad rationalizing Zia-ul-Hak that an economicallyin September growing1980, he Southwas impressed Korea could and saleBrzezinski would claimedalso pave much the wayof the for credit future for U.S. remedying combat this withdrawals. situation. bechanged protected his mind: by U.S. “I met air andwith navalZia and forces liked outside him. He’s the calm, peninsula. I think28 CarterWhile disapprovedhe proved to the be sale, a prime and Brown mover, met he Park enjoyed essentially considerable empty- Avery problem courageous, soon intelligent.emerged: someHe’s willingin the tointelligence accommodate community refugees handed.support Thfrom e trip DoD lost offi its cials,luster. including32 the Joint Chiefs, Deputy concludedcoming into that Pakistan North from Korea Afghanistan. was becoming . . . We’ll substantially sell them F–16sstronger in Secretary Duncan, his successor W. Graham Claytor Jr., and 1450 5115 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy theto letUSSR. the UnrealizedSoviet Union at the dominate time, the Western alliance betweenEurope theby Afghantheater themilitarily. future.” Carter Carter’s disregarded loss in the this 1980 assessment election meant and ordered that the plans Reagan for successornuclear force regime, superiority. the Taliban, Brown and a also small noted anti-Western that the terrorist U.S. military group, administrationwithdrawals to soldbegin. the Th F–16s. e Joint It Chiefs went onof Staffto forge reluctantly a much acceptedstronger al-Qaeda,technological would innovations have appalling of consequencesthe late 1970s—precision-guided in September 2001. thisrelationship instruction, with but Islamabad, some in the uncomplicated Army opposed by it. Thconcerns e commander about munitions, stealth technology, and integrated surveillance, ofnonproliferation, U.S. forces in Korea,human Generalrights, or John evenhandedness Vessey, met with India.Brown118 and intelligence,Events in Afghanistanreconnaissance, directly and affcommunications ected longtime systems—U.S. ally then the president to explain his concern. Vessey’s chief of staff , profoundlyPakistan. By infl 1977 uenced relations the Soviet between Union. Washington Having found and themselvesIslamabad Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, went public with his opposition. Brown Th e Framework for Security in the Persian Gulf checkedhad deteriorated in Western as Europethe Carter and losingadministration the technology followed race, a Sovietmore recalled Singlaub to Washington and Carter personally reassigned leadersevenhanded looked policy to their in ownits militaryhouse for sales reform to Pakistanand change. and27 WhileIndia. him,Ever sincecreating the 1973a hero oil and embargo, martyr the for Organization opponents of of the the withdrawal Petroleum Pakistan’sthe impact eff on ort Moscow to develop of these an atomic developments bomb, inis difficlear cult opposition to assess policy.Exporting Military Countries commanders (OPEC), in a Korea worldwide were unanimouscartel, kept ina fithe rm viewrein towithout Carter’s more nuclear evidence nonproliferation from the Soviet campaign, leadership won itself, the the military Carter onthat production a rapid pullout and thus was the“not price a viable of crude option.” oil, 29retaining a powerful governmentadministration’s in Islamabad success in no forging friends a inNATO the White agreement House. on In theater DoD, lever over the world’s economies. Th e Carter administration however,nuclear modernization support for Pakistan (paving remained the way strong.for deployment117 in 1983) soughtWithdrawal to breakplans alsoOPEC’s caused stranglehold consternation on in oil Seoul. production Brown andby was no doubt part of a process that presented the Kremlin with energyVance sent conservation JCS Chairman practices, General development George Brown of and domestic Under Secretarysources, Policysome tough toward choices. Pakistan Th ethus agreement divided to into modernize two camps. NATO’s DoD, theater the andof State creation for Political of an oil Aff consumerairs Philip organizationHabib to Seoul to counterbalanceto explain the militarynuclear forcesadvisers succeeded on the NSC against staff not , and only Brzezinski Soviet opposition favored a pro-but decision,OPEC.119 beginning A corollary a longof this negotiation energy policy with required South Korean that the President United Pakistanstrong domestic approach, political while opposition the State in Department Western Europe and itself.the Arms StatesPark Chung and its Heeallies about protect the their timing oil sources and extent in the of Middle the withdrawal East and Control and Disarmament Agency opposed an increase in military Persianand how Gulf the fromRepublic either of outsideKorea (ROK)threat—the armed Soviet forces Union—or would be sales to Pakistan. In early February 1980 David McGiff ert went to internalmodernized upheaval to compensate such as occurred for the in U.S. Iran. pullback. U.S. military Before assets the inSeoul the Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines Pakistan with Warren Christopher and Brzezinski. Upon his return, areaSecurity were Consultative limited. Th Meeting e U.S. Middle (SCM) Eastin July Force 1977, (MIDEASTFOR) Brown obtained CarterMcGiff cameert promoted to offi ce military in January sales 1977to Islamabad determined that wouldto reduce allow the it consistedpresidential of approvala fl agship of and myriad two inducementssurface combatants to off er operating the ROK, in such the U.S.to defend military its borderpresence with in Afghanistan,East Asia and where to establish Soviet/Afghan relations forces with Arabianas a withdrawal Sea and ofthe support Persian troopsGulf, periodicallyfi rst, additional augmented tactical byfi ghters four thehad People’salready Republicengaged inof hotChina, pursuit the latter of the requiring mujahideen. termination Pakistan, of combatantstationed in vesselsSouth (sometimesKorea, joint includingmilitary exercises, an aircraft coproduction carrier) and of thea key long-standing ally in the military support relationship for the Afghan with the resistance, Republic providedof China logisticalweapons, andships a massivefrom the security U.S. Pacifipackage c Command of $800 million. (PACOM)30 that onsanctuary Taiwan. and Brown a conduit found for himself getting caught weapons between to them. the Inpresident’s summer made periodic deployments of about 50 days to the Indian Ocean. agenda1980 Brown, and the who concern had not of thebeen military much involvedand many with in CongressPakistan, ThAs eit Unitedturned out,States Brown’s had no eff bases;ort went its forclosest naught was because Diego Garcia,Congress a thatappealed the president’s to the president plans werefor a too better precipitous security relationship.to provide adequate Brown tinyrefused atoll to in fund the western the withdrawal, Indian Ocean the transfer(2,000 miles of equipment, from the Strait and securityobtained for approval U.S. interests for the insale East of Asia.60 tanks and the transfer of two ofthe Hormuz), security assistancerented from package. the British. In April As was 1978, made at painfullythe urging clear of obsolete U.S. destroyers, but the president balked at selling F–16s duringBrown deliberationsand Brzezinski, on potentialCarter scaled military back operations his withdrawal against plan a post- to 31 Southto Pakistan, Korea evenillustrated though Brown’s India dilemmaenjoyed virtualmost vividly. air superiority Th e president over shah700 combatIran, the and United 2,600 States support had troops severely with limited more accessto follow to staginglater. hadits old promised rival. during the 1976 campaign to withdraw U.S. combat groundsBrown traveled or bases to in Seoul the area, in November circumscribing 1978, the hoping ability to to confi project rm troops from South Korea. Th e services and defense specialists powerto Park there. that 120the United States would sell F–16 fi ghter aircraft to thoughtAll was notit a badlost idea. on aircraft.Brown felt When confl Cartericted, butmet fell Pakistan in with hisPresident leader South Korea, giving the South an edge in the air until 1990. Th e byMohammad rationalizing Zia-ul-Hak that an economicallyin September growing1980, he Southwas impressed Korea could and saleBrzezinski would claimedalso pave much the wayof the for credit future for U.S. remedying combat this withdrawals. situation. bechanged protected his mind: by U.S. “I met air andwith navalZia and forces liked outside him. He’s the calm, peninsula. I think28 CarterWhile disapprovedhe proved to the be sale, a prime and Brown mover, met he Park enjoyed essentially considerable empty- Avery problem courageous, soon intelligent.emerged: someHe’s willingin the tointelligence accommodate community refugees handed.support Thfrom e trip DoD lost offi its cials,luster. including32 the Joint Chiefs, Deputy concludedcoming into that Pakistan North from Korea Afghanistan. was becoming . . . We’ll substantially sell them F–16sstronger in Secretary Duncan, his successor W. Graham Claytor Jr., and 1450 5115 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy betweenTo make Brownmatters andworse, White a Defense House Intelligence Chief of Staff Agency Hamilton assessment Jordan of Thworker e Carter uprising administration’s in Kwangju Province;response andto naked the Chun Soviet government’s aggression epitomizedthe North, thenthe situation:generally accepted“We are inby amost box, ofHarold. the U.S. We’ve intelligence broken inplanned Afghanistan execution was of primarily major political clandestine opponent action. Kim Even Dae beforeJung. Ththe e relationscommunity, with leaked Iran to and the imposedpublic in Januarysanctions, 1979. but In we plain still words, have theno bizarreSoviet invasion,assassination the ofUnited Park Stateson 26 beganOctober a cautious1979 by and his modestKorean leverageleaked assessment on Khomeini. concluded Brown that replied: Carter’s “Neither withdrawal the wouldnaval blockade invite an centralprogram intelligence of secret operationsagency director to support took Washington Afghan insurgents, by surprise. the norattack mining from the harbors North. 33will Carter’s bring advisers, the hostages including home.” Brown, Jordanagreed Cartermujahideen was on (holy vacation, warriors), leaving that Brown, included Vance, propaganda and Brzezinski support, to interjected:it was time to“Except rethink in the boxes.” withdrawal Th e two policy. men Aagreed resulting that PRM rescue study was dealhumanitarian with the crisis, relief, which and nonlethal turned out aid. to beOSD a sordid offi cials aff airargued fueled that by “thestated best that of even a lousy with set timely of options.” U.S. air,114 naval, and logistical support, toothis muchsecret alcoholcampaign, and espoused internal byROK an NSCrivalries. group,37 concentrated too South Korean forces could not stop a North Korean invasion without much on propaganda and not enough on assistance that would ThU.S. e abortivecombat troops.rescue Carteroperation reluctantly of April agreed, 1980, buta military held off operationmaking a makeTh e subsequent a diff erence. rise ofAfter General the ChunSoviet Do invasion Hwan andof Decemberhis takeover 1979, of the thatfi nal endeddecision tragically until he incould the meetIranian face-to-face desert, is with beyond Park. the34 scope of acountry shocked in allCarter but nameinstituted in December a series of1979 diplomatic, provided neweconomic, challenges. and this study. Suffi ce it to say that Brown took full responsibility for its culturalWhen Chun steps crackedto protest down the oninvasion, student including and political calling opponents, off U.S. failure,Th e next which month had aCarter, devastating Brown, impact Vance, on the and morale Brzezinski of Carter visited and participationBrown postponed in the the 1980 1980 Moscow Security Olympics. Consultative Most important,Meeting with the hisSeoul. advisers Th e astrip well proved as on athe fi asco. president’s Carter future and Parkelectoral instantly chances. rubbed Nor UnitedSouth Korea States against increased the itsadvice support of Ambassador of the Afghan William rebels, Gleysteen adding eachwas DoDother involvedthe wrong in way.the frustratingPark complained diplomatic about negotiations the withdrawal, that theand purchaseGeneral John of lethal Wickham, weapons the commanderand communications in chief of equipmentU.S. forces hypingalso undercut the threat the Carterfrom the presidency. North. Th In e addition,president thepassed Iran Brown debacle a in Korea.conjunction 38 Chun’s with government other interested responded states to indemonstrations the area. Th e in United Seoul noterevealed stating a void that in theif Park U.S. continued ability to projectlike this its he power would into withdraw the Persian all Statesand Kwangju encountered with martial diffi cultieslaw and in repression. procuring When the demonstrations weapons the U.S.Gulf, troopsas DoD from ruled South out oneKorea. military Carter option countered after toanother Park thatagainst he mujahideenbroke out into needed, an armed such as rebellion the Soviet in shoulder-fiKwangju, redthe SA–7government missile wasIran. withdrawing Th e rescue mission, only 3,000 called (actually off for the3,300) lack ofof 42,000one helicopter, authorized did ablereacted to bringwith excessivedown helicopters force, implying or prop thatplanes, the asUnited Moscow States and hadthe troops,nothing lectured to diminish the theROK perception president of on U.S. human weakness. rights, and chided Easternsanctioned bloc such clamped a violent down put-down. on international In Washington, sales of Carter’s them. 115advisers him for not spending as much on defense based on a percentage (including Brown) concluded that the ROK had to restore order in ofTh egross Islamic national revolution product thatas the overthrew United Statesthe shahdid. Threpresented e Korean FightingKwangju beforebasically Washington with captured could resume weapons—few pressure for armsreform were and promisedonly one ofto spendthe dramatic more on events defense, in thebut theMiddle trip hadEast, not the obtained Persian actuallypolitical liberalization.reaching them Th in ey 1980—the never gave Chunmujahideen the green performed light to crackwell, Park’sGulf, andagreement Southwest on withdrawals. Asia that shook35 the underpinnings of U.S. downbut the on insurgencydissidents, norassumed were they the asked classic to dostalemate so.39 of a guerrilla policy across the region. In April 1978 Marxist/Leninist Afghan war. Th e Soviets controlled the cities, the air space, and lines of politiciansAfter returning overthrew to Washington, their government, Brzezinski, altering Brown, the and nonaligned Vance all communication.Unwilling to forgive Th eyand could forget, move Brown around remained by convoy an opponent or air, but of statusrecommended of this traditional that Carter buff withdraw er state. Inonly December one I-Hawk 1979 surface-to- the Soviet theChun rebels and heldhis militarythe countryside. junta. He Th argued e Afghan for armycontinued was adeferral shell of of a Unionair missile invaded battalion Afghanistan and 1,500 ostensibly support to troops, aid and revisiting to sustain further the force,SCM meetingsrequiring and the refusalSoviet totroops place to U.S. assume troops most in Koreaof the under fi ghting. the communistwithdrawals revolutionin 1981 during there. WithCarter’s Iran expected under asecond hostile term.theocracy Th e UnderCombined Secretary Forces of Command, Defense for so Policyas not “toRobert do them Komer any argued favors that andpresident Afghanistan’s agreed but governmentwashed his hands and of major Korea, instructingcities under Brown Soviet to thehelp stalemate legitimize off the ered new the crowd.” possibility40 When of keepingdissident the political resistance leader going Kim domination,consult with Congressthe Carter and Brzezinskiadministration to make faced the announcement.uncertainty and36 Daefor years Jung and was draining found guilty Soviet of resources. fomenting116 the Kwangju uprising—a instability in Southwest Asia. Pakistan emerged as the principal patently trumped-up charge—Carter assigned Brown the unenviable regionalCarter’s bulwarkdecision againstleft Korean these setbacks, policy butto itVance, was hardly Brown, an idealand taskAfter of Carter traveling lost toin 1980,Seoul inPresident December Ronald 1980 Reagan to persuade and Director Chun toof candidateBrzezinski. to While defend theSouthwest long, drawnAsia. In out addition, withdrawal Carter’s saga national had commuteCentral Intelligence the sentence. William Brown Casey, failed, with keybut supportersthe incoming in Congress, Reagan securityweakened team U.S.-ROK explored relations,ways to improve four interrelated the United events States’ disrupted ability to administrationincreased clandestine saved supportKim with of athe promise Afghan to resistance, Chun, by allowing then the it projectthem even its powermore: inthe the assassination Persian Gulf of and President Southwest Park; Asia. the political newlyto wear elected down ROKand eventually president defeat(2,500 the handpicked Soviets, and Electoral deal a Collegeserious rise of a new military strongman, Chun Do Hwan; the student- membersblow to the voted Soviet him Empire in), of anda visit the to Communist Washington Party’s in early dominance 1981.41 in 1648 4917 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy betweenTo make Brownmatters andworse, White a Defense House Intelligence Chief of Staff Agency Hamilton assessment Jordan of Thworker e Carter uprising administration’s in Kwangju Province;response andto naked the Chun Soviet government’s aggression epitomizedthe North, thenthe situation:generally accepted“We are inby amost box, ofHarold. the U.S. We’ve intelligence broken inplanned Afghanistan execution was of primarily major political clandestine opponent action. Kim Even Dae beforeJung. Ththe e relationscommunity, with leaked Iran to and the imposedpublic in Januarysanctions, 1979. but In we plain still words, have theno bizarreSoviet invasion,assassination the ofUnited Park Stateson 26 beganOctober a cautious1979 by and his modestKorean leverageleaked assessment on Khomeini. concluded Brown that replied: Carter’s “Neither withdrawal the wouldnaval blockade invite an centralprogram intelligence of secret operationsagency director to support took Washington Afghan insurgents, by surprise. the norattack mining from the harbors North. 33will Carter’s bring advisers, the hostages including home.” Brown, Jordanagreed Cartermujahideen was on (holy vacation, warriors), leaving that Brown, included Vance, propaganda and Brzezinski support, to interjected:it was time to“Except rethink in the boxes.” withdrawal Th e two policy. men Aagreed resulting that PRM rescue study was dealhumanitarian with the crisis, relief, which and nonlethal turned out aid. to beOSD a sordid offi cials aff airargued fueled that by “thestated best that of even a lousy with set timely of options.” U.S. air,114 naval, and logistical support, toothis muchsecret alcoholcampaign, and espoused internal byROK an NSCrivalries. group,37 concentrated too South Korean forces could not stop a North Korean invasion without much on propaganda and not enough on assistance that would ThU.S. e abortivecombat troops.rescue Carteroperation reluctantly of April agreed, 1980, buta military held off operationmaking a makeTh e subsequent a diff erence. rise ofAfter General the ChunSoviet Do invasion Hwan andof Decemberhis takeover 1979, of the thatfi nal endeddecision tragically until he incould the meetIranian face-to-face desert, is with beyond Park. the34 scope of acountry shocked in allCarter but nameinstituted in December a series of1979 diplomatic, provided neweconomic, challenges. and this study. Suffi ce it to say that Brown took full responsibility for its culturalWhen Chun steps crackedto protest down the oninvasion, student including and political calling opponents, off U.S. failure,Th e next which month had aCarter, devastating Brown, impact Vance, on the and morale Brzezinski of Carter visited and participationBrown postponed in the the 1980 1980 Moscow Security Olympics. Consultative Most important,Meeting with the hisSeoul. advisers Th e astrip well proved as on athe fi asco. president’s Carter future and Parkelectoral instantly chances. rubbed Nor UnitedSouth Korea States against increased the itsadvice support of Ambassador of the Afghan William rebels, Gleysteen adding waseach DoDother involvedthe wrong in way.the frustratingPark complained diplomatic about negotiations the withdrawal, that theand purchaseGeneral John of lethal Wickham, weapons the commanderand communications in chief of equipmentU.S. forces alsohyping undercut the threat the Carterfrom the presidency. North. Th In e addition,president thepassed Iran Brown debacle a in Korea.conjunction 38 Chun’s with government other interested responded states to indemonstrations the area. Th e in United Seoul revealednote stating a void that in theif Park U.S. continued ability to projectlike this its he power would into withdraw the Persian all Statesand Kwangju encountered with martial diffi cultieslaw and in repression. procuring When the demonstrations weapons the Gulf,U.S. troopsas DoD from ruled South out oneKorea. military Carter option countered after toanother Park thatagainst he mujahideenbroke out into needed, an armed such as rebellion the Soviet in shoulder-fiKwangju, redthe SA–7government missile Iran.was withdrawing Th e rescue mission, only 3,000 called (actually off for the3,300) lack ofof 42,000one helicopter, authorized did ablereacted to bringwith excessivedown helicopters force, implying or prop thatplanes, the asUnited Moscow States and hadthe troops,nothing lectured to diminish the theROK perception president of on U.S. human weakness. rights, and chided Easternsanctioned bloc such clamped a violent down put-down. on international In Washington, sales of Carter’s them. 115advisers him for not spending as much on defense based on a percentage (including Brown) concluded that the ROK had to restore order in ofTh egross Islamic national revolution product thatas the overthrew United Statesthe shahdid. Threpresented e Korean FightingKwangju beforebasically Washington with captured could resume weapons—few pressure for armsreform were and promisedonly one ofto spendthe dramatic more on events defense, in thebut theMiddle trip hadEast, not the obtained Persian actuallypolitical liberalization.reaching them Th in ey 1980—the never gave Chunmujahideen the green performed light to crackwell, Park’sGulf, andagreement Southwest on withdrawals. Asia that shook35 the underpinnings of U.S. downbut the on insurgencydissidents, norassumed were they the asked classic to dostalemate so.39 of a guerrilla policy across the region. In April 1978 Marxist/Leninist Afghan war. Th e Soviets controlled the cities, the air space, and lines of politiciansAfter returning overthrew to Washington, their government, Brzezinski, altering Brown, the and nonaligned Vance all communication.Unwilling to forgive Th eyand could forget, move Brown around remained by convoy an opponent or air, but of statusrecommended of this traditional that Carter buff withdraw er state. Inonly December one I-Hawk 1979 surface-to- the Soviet theChun rebels and heldhis militarythe countryside. junta. He Th argued e Afghan for armycontinued was adeferral shell of of a Unionair missile invaded battalion Afghanistan and 1,500 ostensibly support to troops, aid and revisiting to sustain further the force,SCM meetingsrequiring and the refusalSoviet totroops place to U.S. assume troops most in Koreaof the under fi ghting. the communistwithdrawals revolutionin 1981 during there. WithCarter’s Iran expected under asecond hostile term.theocracy Th e UnderCombined Secretary Forces of Command, Defense for so Policyas not “toRobert do them Komer any argued favors that andpresident Afghanistan’s agreed but governmentwashed his hands and of major Korea, instructingcities under Brown Soviet to thehelp stalemate legitimize off the ered new the crowd.” possibility40 When of keepingdissident the political resistance leader going Kim domination,consult with Congressthe Carter and Brzezinskiadministration to make faced the announcement.uncertainty and36 Daefor years Jung and was draining found guilty Soviet of resources. fomenting116 the Kwangju uprising—a instability in Southwest Asia. Pakistan emerged as the principal patently trumped-up charge—Carter assigned Brown the unenviable regionalCarter’s bulwarkdecision againstleft Korean these setbacks, policy butto itVance, was hardly Brown, an idealand taskAfter of Carter traveling lost toin 1980,Seoul inPresident December Ronald 1980 Reagan to persuade and Director Chun toof candidateBrzezinski. to While defend theSouthwest long, drawnAsia. In out addition, withdrawal Carter’s saga national had commuteCentral Intelligence the sentence. William Brown Casey, failed, with keybut supportersthe incoming in Congress, Reagan securityweakened team U.S.-ROK explored relations,ways to improve four interrelated the United events States’ disrupted ability to administrationincreased clandestine saved supportKim with of athe promise Afghan to resistance, Chun, by allowing then the it projectthem even its powermore: inthe the assassination Persian Gulf of and President Southwest Park; Asia. the political newlyto wear elected down ROKand eventually president defeat(2,500 the handpicked Soviets, and Electoral deal a Collegeserious rise of a new military strongman, Chun Do Hwan; the student- membersblow to the voted Soviet him Empire in), of anda visit the to Communist Washington Party’s in early dominance 1981.41 in 1648 4917 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

AyatollahKorean policy Ruhollah was hardly Khomeini, a success. was On poised the otherto return hand, toCarter’s Iran. thesouped-up, end of Carter’sexport-only term. version Brown of andthe F–5EDoD Tigerwere responsibleII. ACDA andfor ConfusedChina policy and of dejected,normalizing the relationsIranian withHigh Beijing Command proved vacillated a major examiningOMB opposed military the saleoperations (the former that forcould arms punish control Iran reasons, after the betweenaccomplishment. supporting Brown the Bakhtiar successfully government, reintroduced mounting DoD ato military China hostageslatter for fiwere nancial). released Carter (Carter’s off ered onlyinitial more inclination), F–5E aircraft, encourage which coup,policy orfrom cutting which a dealit had with been Khomeini. shut out Withduring Khomeini’s the Nixon-Ford- return IranTaiwan to bealready more had,forthcoming and/or Israeliin negotiations Kfi r interceptors for their withrelease, U.S. or imminent,Kissinger years. Brown Unlike probed Brzezinski, Huyser Brown about did what not circumstanceswant to poke discourageengines. Taiwan Iran turnedfrom harming down the the deal. captives.45 Unlike many in the wouldthe China require card a in coup the Sovietand whether Union’s there eye. Hewas emphasized a specifi c window the off setof Carter administration who expected the hostages to be released opportunityvalue of China for insuch the action. U.S.-Soviet Huyser military replied balance,that the moregiven time that the20 quickly,Th e next Brown issue centered worried onthat what it “may arms be the a long United crisis.” States He wouldsuggested sell generalspercent ofhad Soviet the better, military but assetsthey werefaced “psychologically China. Brown preparedargued for to andto Taiwan received after presidential the one-year authorization embargo following to move the 1 U.S.January military 1979 act.”early Brownnormalization asked if aof coup relations would and involve a rough many parallelism casualties. ofHuyser U.S. forcesnormalization closer to of Iran relations so as withto improve China. Brownthe prospects and JCS for Chairman military answeredmilitary relations yes.110 with the Soviet Union and China.42 actionGeneral should David the Jones need assured arise.112 senators that Taiwan was secure and an invasion from the mainland unlikely, but Congress insisted on AfterHuyser’s Washington advice proved and Beijingoverly optimistic.established As full Eric diplomatic von Marbod, relations the AlthoughU.S. sales suffihe believedcient to defendthat diplomacy the island. was Just the before best Brown option went for indeputy January director 1979, of theVice Defense President Security Walter Assistance Mondale Agency, visited reported China. theto Beijing, time being, the Carter Brown administration worried that announced time would the sap sale the of $287U.S. Afrom year Tehran later Brown(where hewas was the working next high-level out arrangements visitor to to trek terminate to the casemillion and in diminish defensive international weapons, almost support all older for theweapons hostages’ that Taiwanrelease. Middlethe military Kingdom, assistance the program),fi rst secretary the ofgenerals defense could to do not so. stage Just abefore coup Healready considered possessed. the46 mining of Iran’s harbors (instead of the more hebecause left, thethey Soviet could notUnion count invaded on the Afghanistan support of their in late troops. December When intensive and risky options of blockading ports, bombing Iran’s 1979.Khomeini Carter returned, revised theBrown’s Iranian instructions High Command to allow discussiondisintegrated of oilGiven refi nerythe onconservative Kharg Island, nature or bombing of Japanese the Iranian security air force)policy, as theand salethe Bakthiarof U.S. nonlethalgovernment military was replaced equipment by one and controlled some high- by theKorean best eventualwithdrawal military plans action. and theMining, normalization although anof act relations of war, tKhomeiniechnology andtran sthefer sother to C hreligiousina.43 Br oleaders.wn als oIn re cretrospect,eived last- mBrowninute waswith a China “bloodless upset act the of leadership war, like invadingin Tokyo. an Th embassy e traditional and takingU.S.- candidlyauthorization summed to consultup the U.S.on howdilemma to deal about with the Afghanistancoup possibility: and hostages,”Japan relationship according seemed to Brown. to be Carter changing. seemed Brown receptive, took onbut thehe “[It]to support was an Pakistan. attractive When idea. ThBrown e trouble met withwas that Deng he Xiaoping,[Huyser] wasthe preferredmajor responsibility to give economic for reassuring sanctions the a chance,Japanese especially that their given security that pushingChinese atpremier the wet made end itof clear a stick.” that111 coordinating anti-Soviet policy thererelations was withstill somethe United hope that States negotiations remained mightsound succeed.and permanent.113 was fi ne as long as it was more than “symbolic.” Deng continued During his numerous trips to Japan—more than twice as many U.S.prophetically: fortunes in “We Iran mustwent fromturn badAfghanistan to worse when, into ona quagmire4 November in Byas SecretaryMarch 1980 Vance negotiations made—and seemed with tovisiting be getting Japanese nowhere. leaders Th ine 1979,which Iranianthe Soviet radical Union students is bogged seized down the for U.S. a long Embassy time, engagedin Tehran, in nextWashington, month Carter Brown again pressed asked for for more military Japanese operations, defense but spending, by this takingguerrilla 63 warfare.” hostages Brown (an additional agreed, but three noted were that at the “we Iranian must keep Foreign our timeimproved Brown joint decided U.S.-Japanese that mining defense was not planning, a viable optionand a largerfor several role Ministry;intentions six confi escaped dential.” to the Discounted Canadian byEmbassy pundits residence at the time, and werewho reasons:in regional the Sovietssecurity could for sweepthe Japan the mines; Self-Defense mining wouldForces also(JSDF). close rescuedexpected in an a announcementlater operation). of Of a jointthe 66 strategy hostages, on 28Afghanistan, were military the theIt could principal be an Iraqi exasperating oil port of Basratask. Japan’s(Iraq was 1947 considered American-written a potential ortrip DoD laid the employees. foundation For for the a Sino-American remainder of themilitary Carter relationship. presidency,44 friend);constitution, it might the encourageJapanese perceptionretaliation thatagainst the the Soviet hostages; Union and and it the crisis dominated foreign and national security policy, engaging wouldChina diddiminish not pose support real threats, within theand Islamic the nation’s world post-World for the U.S. War case. II NormalizationCarter and his oftop relationsadvisers, withincluding Beijing Brown, ended in thealmost close endless U.S. Carter’scommitment advisers, to antimilitarism including Brown, made itsuccessfully hard to persuade persuaded Japanese him militarymeetings relationshipon how to free with the Taiwan. hostages. Brown oversaw an extensive toleaders go the to attainrescue theroute. goal When of 1 percent negotiations of GNP for spending the hostage on defense. release drawdown of U.S. military facilities on the island. Th e fi rst collapsed,Th e secretary Carter warned broke the diplomatic president relationsthat the Japanesewith Iran, were declared unlikely an Thcontroversial e White House issue the and administration the State Department, tackled was bothwhat responsibleall-weather embargoto quicken on “their U.S. exportstortoise-like to Iran, pace” and on allowed defense. claims He tohoped be made that forinterceptor the negotiating fi ghter aircrafteff orts tothe release United the States hostages, should endured sell to Taiwana long, againstduring thefrozen next Iranian fi ve years assets the in JSDF the United would States.be able A to conversation perform its frustratingbefore normalization. series of dead DoD, ends andState, dashed and hopesJCS recommendedthat lasted until a own air defense, broaden its antisubmarine coverage, assume a

1846 4719 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

AyatollahKorean policy Ruhollah was hardly Khomeini, a success. was On poised the otherto return hand, toCarter’s Iran. thesouped-up, end of Carter’sexport-only term. version Brown of andthe F–5EDoD Tigerwere responsibleII. ACDA andfor ConfusedChina policy and of dejected,normalizing the relationsIranian withHigh Beijing Command proved vacillated a major examiningOMB opposed military the saleoperations (the former that forcould arms punish control Iran reasons, after the betweenaccomplishment. supporting Brown the Bakhtiar successfully government, reintroduced mounting DoD ato military China hostageslatter for fiwere nancial). released Carter (Carter’s off ered onlyinitial more inclination), F–5E aircraft, encourage which coup,policy orfrom cutting which a dealit had with been Khomeini. shut out Withduring Khomeini’s the Nixon-Ford- return IranTaiwan to bealready more had,forthcoming and/or Israeliin negotiations Kfi r interceptors for their withrelease, U.S. or imminent,Kissinger years. Brown Unlike probed Brzezinski, Huyser Brown about did what not circumstanceswant to poke discourageengines. Taiwan Iran turnedfrom harming down the the deal. captives.45 Unlike many in the wouldthe China require card a in coup the Sovietand whether Union’s there eye. Hewas emphasized a specifi c window the off setof Carter administration who expected the hostages to be released opportunityvalue of China for insuch the action. U.S.-Soviet Huyser military replied balance,that the moregiven time that the20 quickly,Th e next Brown issue centered worried onthat what it “may arms be the a long United crisis.” States He wouldsuggested sell generalspercent ofhad Soviet the better, military but assetsthey werefaced “psychologically China. Brown preparedargued for to andto Taiwan received after presidential the one-year authorization embargo following to move the 1 U.S.January military 1979 act.”early Brownnormalization asked if aof coup relations would and involve a rough many parallelism casualties. ofHuyser U.S. forcesnormalization closer to of Iran relations so as withto improve China. Brownthe prospects and JCS for Chairman military answeredmilitary relations yes.110 with the Soviet Union and China.42 actionGeneral should David the Jones need assured arise.112 senators that Taiwan was secure and an invasion from the mainland unlikely, but Congress insisted on AfterHuyser’s Washington advice proved and Beijingoverly optimistic.established As full Eric diplomatic von Marbod, relations the AlthoughU.S. sales suffihe believedcient to defendthat diplomacy the island. was Just the before best Brown option went for indeputy January director 1979, of theVice Defense President Security Walter Assistance Mondale Agency, visited reported China. tothe Beijing, time being, the Carter Brown administration worried that announced time would the sap sale the of $287U.S. Afrom year Tehran later Brown(where hewas was the working next high-level out arrangements visitor to to trek terminate to the millioncase and in diminish defensive international weapons, almost support all older for theweapons hostages’ that Taiwanrelease. Middlethe military Kingdom, assistance the program),fi rst secretary the ofgenerals defense could to do not so. stage Just abefore coup alreadyHe considered possessed. the46 mining of Iran’s harbors (instead of the more hebecause left, thethey Soviet could notUnion count invaded on the Afghanistan support of their in late troops. December When intensive and risky options of blockading ports, bombing Iran’s 1979.Khomeini Carter returned, revised theBrown’s Iranian instructions High Command to allow discussiondisintegrated of oilGiven refi nerythe onconservative Kharg Island, nature or bombing of Japanese the Iranian security air force)policy, as theand salethe Bakthiarof U.S. nonlethalgovernment military was replaced equipment by one and controlled some high- by theKorean best eventualwithdrawal military plans action. and theMining, normalization although anof act relations of war, tKhomeiniechnology andtran sthefer sother to C hreligiousina.43 Br oleaders.wn als oIn re cretrospect,eived last- mBrowninute waswith a China “bloodless upset act the of leadership war, like invadingin Tokyo. an Th embassy e traditional and takingU.S.- candidlyauthorization summed to consultup the U.S.on howdilemma to deal about with the Afghanistancoup possibility: and hostages,”Japan relationship according seemed to Brown. to be Carter changing. seemed Brown receptive, took onbut thehe “[It]to support was an Pakistan. attractive When idea. ThBrown e trouble met withwas that Deng he Xiaoping,[Huyser] wasthe preferredmajor responsibility to give economic for reassuring sanctions the a chance,Japanese especially that their given security that pushingChinese atpremier the wet made end itof clear a stick.” that111 coordinating anti-Soviet policy thererelations was withstill somethe United hope that States negotiations remained mightsound succeed.and permanent.113 was fi ne as long as it was more than “symbolic.” Deng continued During his numerous trips to Japan—more than twice as many U.S.prophetically: fortunes in “We Iran mustwent fromturn badAfghanistan to worse when, into ona quagmire4 November in Byas SecretaryMarch 1980 Vance negotiations made—and seemed with tovisiting be getting Japanese nowhere. leaders Th ine 1979,which Iranianthe Soviet radical Union students is bogged seized down the for U.S. a long Embassy time, engagedin Tehran, in nextWashington, month Carter Brown again pressed asked for for more military Japanese operations, defense but spending, by this takingguerrilla 63 warfare.” hostages Brown (an additional agreed, but three noted were that at the “we Iranian must keep Foreign our timeimproved Brown joint decided U.S.-Japanese that mining defense was not planning, a viable optionand a largerfor several role Ministry;intentions six confi escaped dential.” to the Discounted Canadian byEmbassy pundits residence at the time, and werewho reasons:in regional the Sovietssecurity could for sweepthe Japan the mines; Self-Defense mining wouldForces also(JSDF). close rescuedexpected in an a announcementlater operation). of Of a jointthe 66 strategy hostages, on 28Afghanistan, were military the theIt could principal be an Iraqi exasperating oil port of Basratask. Japan’s(Iraq was 1947 considered American-written a potential ortrip DoD laid the employees. foundation For for the a Sino-American remainder of themilitary Carter relationship. presidency,44 friend);constitution, it might the encourageJapanese perceptionretaliation thatagainst the the Soviet hostages; Union and and it the crisis dominated foreign and national security policy, engaging wouldChina diddiminish not pose support real threats, within theand Islamic the nation’s world post-World for the U.S. War case. II NormalizationCarter and his oftop relationsadvisers, withincluding Beijing Brown, ended in thealmost close endless U.S. Carter’scommitment advisers, to antimilitarism including Brown, made itsuccessfully hard to persuade persuaded Japanese him militarymeetings relationshipon how to free with the Taiwan. hostages. Brown oversaw an extensive toleaders go the to attainrescue theroute. goal When of 1 percent negotiations of GNP for spending the hostage on defense. release drawdown of U.S. military facilities on the island. Th e fi rst collapsed,Th e secretary Carter warned broke the diplomatic president relationsthat the Japanesewith Iran, were declared unlikely an controversialTh e White House issue the and administration the State Department, tackled was bothwhat responsibleall-weather embargoto quicken on “their U.S. exportstortoise-like to Iran, pace” and on allowed defense. claims He tohoped be made that interceptorfor the negotiating fi ghter aircrafteff orts tothe release United the States hostages, should endured sell to Taiwana long, againstduring thefrozen next Iranian fi ve years assets the in JSDF the United would States.be able A to conversation perform its beforefrustrating normalization. series of dead DoD, ends andState, dashed and hopesJCS recommendedthat lasted until a own air defense, broaden its antisubmarine coverage, assume a

1846 4719 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

(minusgreater sharethe bomb of the racks) Northern and Pacifithe sale c sea of laneAWACS. defense, Meeting and improve in late militarya second assistance car, were andheld $18.5 at gunpoint in foreign by militarya soldier sales until (FMS) the Iranians credits November,its logistics capability. Carter agreed47 In late to the1978 sale Brown of AIM–9L reported Sidewinders from Tokyo thatand toaccompanying the Philippines. Mrs. Th Duncan e secretary talked told the presidentsoldier into this standing was no way down to fuelhe had tanks, seen but “ample not refuelingevidence ofcapability. a substantial In lieu increase of the in AWACS US-Japanese sale, beginand allowing base negotiations. them to proceed. Carter restored At the theend cuts of December in military 1978,assistance the thedefense United cooperation.” States would48 continue its AWACS patrols over the andshah’s sales opponents but insisted closed that down further the grants oil fi eldshad toand be refi off neries.ered as Assistantquid pro kingdom. Brown favored selling the aerial tankers and bomb racks, quosSecretary for the McGiff bases. ert51 After suggested visits to that Manila “the by time Vice has President come Mondaleto begin butUnfortunately felt he had these to consult improvements with the fellReagan victim transition to the recession team. Since and disassociatingand Senator Danielourselves Inouye from (D–HI),the shah’s the ruleUnited (as distinguishedStates upped Reagan’sinfl ation teamof 1979 refused and to1980 be tiedthat down, gripped Brown both sent the SultanUnited a Statesletter fromits off hiser toreign),” Marcos since to $500 “supporting million ain politically security assistanceweak government over fi ve (twoand Japan.weeks afterTh e thepowerful deadline Japanese of the Financeultimatum) Ministry stating vetoed that after the proppedyears, Philippine up by military jurisdiction forces, over is thenot bases,a likely and formula a return for of success.” half the consultationJapanese Defense with Ministry’sSecretary ofmodest State-designate plans for Alexanderincreased spending,Haig and Brownacreage ofcommented: the bases. Although“Th e Shah’s Congress absolute would power have is to over appropriate in any Secretarycausing Brown of Defense-designate to comment: “I Casparhope the Weinberger, Japanese Finance he found Ministry them event.the money, Th e questionthe Carter is whatadministration the new distribution promised “its of bestpower eff ort”will beto “sympathetic”is prepared to defendto the JapanSaudi fromrequests. external Th e attack,”baton passed because to their the nextcuts andobtain (to the us) funding.whether thoseMarcos who accepted. exercise Th it ewill deal be represented pro-American.” a good108 administration.would discourage106 the United States from doing so. Brown’s chagrin faith eff ort to meet the Philippines’ demands for compensation while at this setback did not diminish his overall achievements in Japan Thallowing e “moment the United of truth” States came to continuein January anchoring 1979, according its forces to in U.S. the during his tenure.49 Ambassador William Sullivan. 52Carter authorized Sullivan to Iran, Afghanistan, and Southwest Asia Western Pacifi c and Indian Ocean. reinforce the shah’s decision to create a civilian government and IranOversight was the of rock DoD on whichrenegotiations the Carter of presidencythe U.S.-Philippine fl oundered. baseTh e assure him of a welcome in the United States should he chose to leave. SALT II agreementscollapse of forthe thegovernment Subic Bay of navalU.S. complexally Shah and Mohammed Clark Air RezaBase Duncan suggested sending Army General Robert “Dutch” Huyser, comprisedPahlavi at Brown’sthe hands fi nal of foreign the Iranian policy Islamic tasks in revolutionEast Asia. Philippinesended the deputyCarter inheritedcommander the ofsecond the U.S. Strategic European Arms Command, Limitation to Talks Tehran from to Presidentlong-held Ferdinand U.S. strategy Marcos of relying demanded on Iran “rent” as forthe the policeman bases and of more the consultthe Ford with administration, the Iranian military.which had Th worked e Huyser out mission a basic became agreement the controlPersian overGulf. them. Th e subsequentBrown directed Iran ahostage task force crisis that sapped promoted the lifethe focalwith thepoint Soviets for OSDat Vladivostok and Brown in November in the unfolding 1974. Hard-liners crisis that ledin the to conceptout of theof “Filipinization,”Carter administration. which gave Th ethe shah’s Philippines White Revolutionjurisdiction theRepublican fall of the Party shah thought and the it establishment fl awed. Two issuesof an Islamicpredominated: government. How overof modernization the bases, but alsoand carried social a monetarytransformation, value—the backed worth up of theby Huyserwould the was U.S. to gauge cruise the missile strength (CM) of fithe t into Iranian the agreement,military and and assure was returnedauthoritarian facilities rule, to put the himPhilippines, on a collision defense coursecooperation, with Islamicdirect- the newgenerals Soviet they Tu–22M had U.S. bomber, support. known At Brzezinski’s in the West urgingas the Backfi and withre, a hirefundamentalists and contractual and militantservices youngof Filipinos, Iranians. and It transferalso did ofnot excess help Brown’sstrategic weapon?support, SecretaryHuyser hadof Defense a second Donald objective: Rumsfeld to encourage successfully a property—thatthat the shah had could an bealmost added insatiable to the compensation appetite for deal.the purchase Neither militarydelayed thecoup deal. if the Brown new sawcivilian this governmentas a plus since of Shapour the Vladivostok Bakhtiar, Brownof sophisticated nor the task weapons force wouldthat sopped recommend up Iran’s that oil the revenues. United ThStates ese agreementor any new wouldgovernment have limited that replaced air-launched it, threatened cruise missilesthe stability (ALCMs) of the paypressures, “rent,” dismissed but it would by the provide U.S. intelligence military assistance community, as approved threatened by asIranian well asarmed ground- forces and and sea-launched society.109 missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) Congress.to topple theDoD shah. considered107 Clark useful and deemed Subic crucial. to a range of 600 kilometers. Brown and OSD wanted to ensure that Th e U.S. Air Force agreed to reduce its presence by 25–30 percent at theCarter United welcomed States had the theadvice option of underDutch SALT Huyser, II of whom loading he multiple saw as Clark;In late and 1978 the the Navy Carter by 5–7 administration percent at Subic. explored Brown the agreed possibilities with the nucleara better orsource nonnuclear of information cruise missiles than thewith “biased adequate and range erroneous” (2,500 JCSof persuading recommendation the shah to todelay accept these a reductionsmoderate civilianuntil after coalition the South or kilometers)Sullivan. Huyser on bombers “followed of its orders;”own choice, Sullivan presenting was “insubordinate.”the Soviet Union Koreanform a militarywithdrawals, government. lest the Browntwo send received an adverse a fi rsthand signal report about thatthe withTwo ansets off of ensive reports weapon from diffiTehran cult toreached counter. Washington: He also did onenot fromwant 50 U.S.all was commitment not well in in Iran. East DeputyAsia and Secretary the Western Duncan Pacifi c.visited Iran in toSullivan limit the and potential the embassy, of GLCMs and oneand SLCMsfrom Huyser to only through 600 kilometers. Brown. December 1978, reporting back to the secretary that he had heard ByCarter the listenedmid-1970s to Huyser, smaller disregardingand more effi Sullivan. cient engines As the and ailing ground shah Asgunfi DoD re throughout prepared for the base night negotiations, in Tehran. When Carter, traveling who had back no fromlove tracking(his terminal systems cancer gave was cruise not missilesknown (aat relativelythe time) old left technology) Tehran on forIsfahan, a human his wife rights and abuser his military like Marcos, aide, Col.eliminated Colin Powell,$18.1 million riding in great16 January promise. 1979, Brown the sought exiled to spiritualensure that leader the Departmentof Iranian ofShiites, State 2044 4521 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy sparselyand the Armspopulated Control kingdom and Disarmament by dramatically Agency upgrading did not trade their away air Thof the e meeting treaty inon 1985. 26 June Brown 1980 and with his Sultan staff lastedfought seven a rearguard hours. Brownaction force.the potential With increased of CMs for range a quick and andbomb easy and SALT missile II agreement. fi repower,53 the reportedagainst attempts to the president by ACDA that and “I thinkState weto haveoff er defusedthese and the F–15other F–15 became essentially an attack fi ghter that could potentially issue,”concessions but he to warned the Soviets that tothe gain Saudis an agreement.expected more56 approvals after poseBrown a threathad some to Israel. advantages To make during the issuedeliberations more controversial, in Washington the the presidential election. As for AWACS aircraft, Brown fi nessed Saudisabout SALT were pushingII. An expert for the in F–15 nuclear enhancements weapons and in conversant 1980, the U.S.with theIn late issue December by off ering 1977 to deploy Vance U.S.-piloted and ACDA and Director maintained Paul Warnke aircraft presidentialSALT technical election issues, year. he had been an adviser to SALT I before forinformed joint U.S.-Saudi Carter that training “the serious and study issues of remaining their capacity. were Brownsmall” alsoand joining the Carter team. During early 1977 policy discussions at raiseda treaty with could Sultan be thesigned use inof Saudispring facilities 1978.57 inBrown the event disagreed of a Soviet that U.S.Special Ambassador Coordination to Saudi Committee Arabia meetings John West Brown argued took that the the lead. U.S. If theattack issues in theremaining Middle wereEast andinconsequential. urged improved Th ey U.S.-Saudi included themilitary U.S. responseBrown supported to the Big a specifi Five cprovided SALT initiative, a “litmus Carter test” andof thethe specialWhite rightcooperation. to decide A whatworried aircraft Sultan could asked carry if BrownALCMs was and talking the need about to relationshipHouse (although between not SALT Washington II critics) and could Riyadh, feel assured and ita waspositive both rebutU.S. bases the Soviet in his contentionkingdom (the that Saudis CM carriersgreatly fearedshould the be prospectcounted ofas responsefeasible and was not “no detrimental longer an option”to U.S. butinterests. rather Furthermore,“an imperative.” the moreAmerican than GIs one on strategic their soil). nuclear Brown delivery answered system no bases, in the just fi nal potential SALT BrownSenate haddisagreed: to ratify “I SALTthink II.this Th is e aJoint terrible Chiefs idea. of ItStaff would would feed need the IIuse aggregates. of facilities. Brown A relieved opposed Sultan the Soviet rose fromcontention his chair that and the shooktreaty Saudi’sto bless [thesic] delusiontreaty in thatSenate they hearings. can defend With themselves his good relationsfrom external with shouldthe secretary’s apply to hand. both Th nuclear e consensus and conventional among the cruiseNSC staffmissiles. was thatTh e &the internal Chiefs, threatsBrown providedwith sophisticated the conduit weapons for JCS they approval. can’t use.”54 But BackfiBrown re did question, a “superb in jobthe ofsecretary’s delivering view, the was F–15 far news” from resolved.and trying Th toe Brown found himself odd man out as both Brzezinski and Carter Jointengage Chiefs the Saudis of Staff in werejoint adamantplanning infor their defense belief of thatthe Middle the Backfi East. re agreedCarter withinsisted West. on102 presenting the Soviets with the so-called constitutedStill, Brown a reminded strategic weapon, the president a view that also the held Saudis by SALT expected II critics. some58 Comprehensive/Deep Cuts Proposal in early 1977 in an attempt good news on the F–15 enhancements after the election.104 Brownto jump-start did persuade the negotiations. the president Th eto proposal allow him drastically to meet limitedwith Saudi the In SCC meetings that spring, the heated debates on the fi nal details numberDefense ofMinister strategic Prince nuclear Sultan delivery before systems responding for both to the sides, request but ofAt SALTthe endII betweenof September Brown and1980, Warnke Iraq sometimesinvaded Iran, degenerated causing retainedfor the Big the Five. 2,500km In the limitsecretary’s for ALCMs mind, thein returnU.S.-Saudi for accepting relationship the intogreat shoutingconcern matches. in Saudi Th eArabia. ACDA Atdirector DoD’s wanted recommendation, to button up Soviethad descended assertion into that athe “Sears Backfi and re Roebuck”was not a strategicapproach weapon. of equipment When the agreement.administration Th e secretaryrushed four opposed AWACS concessions to Saudi that Arabia, he believed with thedeliveries Soviets instead rejected of the focusing proposal on as the too overall advantageous military to relationship the United gavesupporting potential equipment advantages and to personnel, Moscow. 59and Brown two land-basedinsisted to mobileCarter States,and better some absorption arms control and management proponents of grumbledweapon systems. that Brown’s Brown thatradar U.S.systems intercontinental as well as military ballistic teams missiles to assess (ICBMs) and defi had ne Saudito be insistencehoped to driveon the home 2,500km this pointlimit hadwith doomed Sultan. theBefore deal. he55 traveled to mobile,needs. Th with e Saudis multiple agreed aiming to raise points, their or oil they production would be to vulnerable make up Geneva to meet the Saudi defense minister, Brown conferred with tofor a the Soviet loss fiof rst Iraqi strike oil by from its accuratethe war.105 SS–18 and SS–19 ICBMs. If BrzezinskiTh e Carter andadministration Secretary of regrouped, State Edmund fashioned Muskie SALT (Vance II initiatives resigned Moscow refused to accept this proposition, Brown recommended afterthat wouldthe failed defer Iran the hostage Backfi rescuere and mission). CM issues Th eyuntil agreed SALT Brown III thatIn the the midst president of a makereelection a unilateral campaign, declaration Carter of had U.S. little intention time for to shouldnegotiations, off er the and Saudis envisioned only Sidewinders, both a shorter but protocolpromise Sultanlasting theytwo produceSaudi Arabia. a mobile Military ICBM. sales Carter to theeventually desert agreed.kingdom60 Negotiations could only wouldyears (later consult changed Congress to three) on the and conformal a treaty extending fuel tanks, to aerial 1985. boom U.S. hurtwith histhe electionSoviets chances.continued. When By Januarynews of 1979the F–15 the enhancementsWhite House tankers,policymakers and includedAWACS in(Airborne the SALT Warning II protocol and theControl Soviet System)600km leaked,began preparations Carter confi forrmed a summit that the to Saudis sign the would SALT get II noagreements, off ensive aircraft.limitation Th on e secretary the range was of enjoined all CMs, from except raising those the launched topic of bomb from capabilitiesbut minor although that could still be diffi used cult against issues Israel,prevented including an early the signing. bomb racks.heavy Brownbombers. argued Brown that disagreed. he should To also DoD, off erthis the would aerial eliminaterefueling racks.Finally, Th in e June Saudis 1979, were with outraged. all issues Visiting ironed out,Saudi the Arabia agreement in mid- was tankersGLCMs (a and capability SLCMs deniedas theater Israel), nuclear but forceswith theor asproviso longer-range that it Novemberready. At a Vienna1980, JCSsummit, Chairman attended General by Brown David and JCSJones Chairman received requiredconventional congressional weapons forapproval, at least andthe termshould of Congressthe protocol. agree, It mightIsrael anGeneral earful. David Without Jones, the Carter Big Five,and BrezhnevSultan considered signed the the protocol six F–15s and wouldset the demandprecedent and for probably future limitations get the same since capability. the Soviets103 continued scheduledthe treaty.61 to arrive shortly valueless. Sultan gave Jones two weeks to maintain that the 600km limit should extend through the end to come up with an answer on the sale of F–15 enhancements 2242 4323 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy sparselyand the Armspopulated Control kingdom and Disarmament by dramatically Agency upgrading did not trade their away air Thof the e meeting treaty inon 1985. 26 June Brown 1980 and with his Sultan staff lastedfought seven a rearguard hours. Brownaction force.the potential With increased of CMs for range a quick and andbomb easy and SALT missile II agreement. fi repower,53 the reportedagainst attempts to the president by ACDA that and “I thinkState weto haveoff er defusedthese and the F–15other F–15 became essentially an attack fi ghter that could potentially issue,”concessions but he to warned the Soviets that tothe gain Saudis an agreement.expected more56 approvals after poseBrown a threathad some to Israel. advantages To make during the issuedeliberations more controversial, in Washington the the presidential election. As for AWACS aircraft, Brown fi nessed Saudisabout SALT were pushingII. An expert for the in F–15 nuclear enhancements weapons and in conversant 1980, the U.S.with theIn late issue December by off ering 1977 to deploy Vance U.S.-piloted and ACDA and Director maintained Paul Warnke aircraft presidentialSALT technical election issues, year. he had been an adviser to SALT I before forinformed joint U.S.-Saudi Carter that training “the serious and study issues of remaining their capacity. were Brownsmall” alsoand joining the Carter team. During early 1977 policy discussions at raiseda treaty with could Sultan be thesigned use inof Saudispring facilities 1978.57 inBrown the event disagreed of a Soviet that U.S.Special Ambassador Coordination to Saudi Committee Arabia meetings John West Brown argued took that the the lead. U.S. If theattack issues in theremaining Middle wereEast andinconsequential. urged improved Th ey U.S.-Saudi included themilitary U.S. responseBrown supported to the Big a specifi Five cprovided SALT initiative, a “litmus Carter test” andof thethe specialWhite rightcooperation. to decide A whatworried aircraft Sultan could asked carry if BrownALCMs was and talking the need about to relationshipHouse (although between not SALT Washington II critics) and could Riyadh, feel assured and ita waspositive both rebutU.S. bases the Soviet in his contentionkingdom (the that Saudis CM carriersgreatly fearedshould the be prospectcounted ofas responsefeasible and was not “no detrimental longer an option”to U.S. butinterests. rather Furthermore,“an imperative.” the moreAmerican than GIs one on strategic their soil). nuclear Brown delivery answered system no bases, in the just fi nal potential SALT BrownSenate haddisagreed: to ratify “I SALTthink II.this Th is e aJoint terrible Chiefs idea. of ItStaff would would feed need the IIuse aggregates. of facilities. Brown A relieved opposed Sultan the Soviet rose fromcontention his chair that and the shooktreaty toSaudi’s bless [thesic] delusiontreaty in thatSenate they hearings. can defend With themselves his good relationsfrom external with shouldthe secretary’s apply to hand. both Th nuclear e consensus and conventional among the cruiseNSC staffmissiles. was thatTh e the& internal Chiefs, threatsBrown providedwith sophisticated the conduit weapons for JCS they approval. can’t use.”54 But BackfiBrown re did question, a “superb in jobthe ofsecretary’s delivering view, the was F–15 far news” from resolved.and trying Th toe Brown found himself odd man out as both Brzezinski and Carter Jointengage Chiefs the Saudis of Staff in werejoint adamantplanning infor their defense belief of thatthe Middle the Backfi East. re agreedCarter withinsisted West. on102 presenting the Soviets with the so-called constitutedStill, Brown a reminded strategic weapon, the president a view that also the held Saudis by SALT expected II critics. some58 Comprehensive/Deep Cuts Proposal in early 1977 in an attempt good news on the F–15 enhancements after the election.104 Brownto jump-start did persuade the negotiations. the president Th eto proposal allow him drastically to meet limitedwith Saudi the In SCC meetings that spring, the heated debates on the fi nal details Defensenumber ofMinister strategic Prince nuclear Sultan delivery before systems responding for both to the sides, request but ofAt SALTthe endII betweenof September Brown and1980, Warnke Iraq sometimesinvaded Iran, degenerated causing forretained the Big the Five. 2,500km In the limitsecretary’s for ALCMs mind, thein returnU.S.-Saudi for accepting relationship the intogreat shoutingconcern matches. in Saudi Th eArabia. ACDA Atdirector DoD’s wanted recommendation, to button up hadSoviet descended assertion into that athe “Sears Backfi and re Roebuck”was not a strategicapproach weapon. of equipment When the agreement.administration Th e secretaryrushed four opposed AWACS concessions to Saudi that Arabia, he believed with deliveriesthe Soviets instead rejected of the focusing proposal on as the too overall advantageous military to relationship the United gavesupporting potential equipment advantages and to personnel, Moscow. 59and Brown two land-basedinsisted to mobileCarter andStates, better some absorption arms control and management proponents of grumbledweapon systems. that Brown’s Brown thatradar U.S.systems intercontinental as well as military ballistic teams missiles to assess (ICBMs) and defi had ne Saudito be hopedinsistence to driveon the home 2,500km this pointlimit hadwith doomed Sultan. theBefore deal. he55 traveled to mobile,needs. Th with e Saudis multiple agreed aiming to raise points, their or oil they production would be to vulnerable make up Geneva to meet the Saudi defense minister, Brown conferred with tofor a the Soviet loss fiof rst Iraqi strike oil by from its accuratethe war.105 SS–18 and SS–19 ICBMs. If BrzezinskiTh e Carter andadministration Secretary of regrouped, State Edmund fashioned Muskie SALT (Vance II initiatives resigned Moscow refused to accept this proposition, Brown recommended afterthat wouldthe failed defer Iran the hostage Backfi rescuere and mission). CM issues Th eyuntil agreed SALT Brown III thatIn the the midst president of a makereelection a unilateral campaign, declaration Carter of had U.S. little intention time for to shouldnegotiations, off er the and Saudis envisioned only Sidewinders, both a shorter but protocolpromise Sultanlasting theytwo produceSaudi Arabia. a mobile Military ICBM. sales Carter to theeventually desert agreed.kingdom60 Negotiations could only wouldyears (later consult changed Congress to three) on the and conformal a treaty extending fuel tanks, to aerial 1985. boom U.S. hurtwith histhe electionSoviets chances.continued. When By Januarynews of 1979the F–15 the enhancementsWhite House tankers,policymakers and includedAWACS in(Airborne the SALT Warning II protocol and theControl Soviet System)600km leaked,began preparations Carter confi forrmed a summit that the to Saudis sign the would SALT get II noagreements, off ensive aircraft.limitation Th on e secretary the range was of enjoined all CMs, from except raising those the launched topic of bomb from capabilitiesbut minor although that could still be diffi used cult against issues Israel,prevented including an early the signing. bomb racks.heavy Brownbombers. argued Brown that disagreed. he should To also DoD, off erthis the would aerial eliminaterefueling racks.Finally, Th in e June Saudis 1979, were with outraged. all issues Visiting ironed out,Saudi the Arabia agreement in mid- was tankersGLCMs (a and capability SLCMs deniedas theater Israel), nuclear but forceswith theor asproviso longer-range that it Novemberready. At a Vienna1980, JCSsummit, Chairman attended General by Brown David and JCSJones Chairman received requiredconventional congressional weapons forapproval, at least andthe termshould of Congressthe protocol. agree, It mightIsrael anGeneral earful. David Without Jones, the Carter Big Five,and BrezhnevSultan considered signed the the protocol six F–15s and wouldset the demandprecedent and for probably future limitations get the same since capability. the Soviets103 continued scheduledthe treaty.61 to arrive shortly valueless. Sultan gave Jones two weeks to maintain that the 600km limit should extend through the end to come up with an answer on the sale of F–15 enhancements 2242 4323 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

Welland air before ordnance. the U.S In negotiators,all, it amounted special to advisersa request Sol for Linowitz $1.5 billion and lobby.rest of Brzezinskithe housing concluded to be jointly that managedthe initiative and hadhanded been over a necessary in fi ve- Ellsworthin foreign militaryBunker, salesclosed (in the 1977 deal dollars) with Panama per year and through military 1983. leader As “costlyyear intervals. diversion,” Most since of Ancon it won Hill, the overlookingtrust of the PanamaArab moderates. City and Generalthe JCS andOmar ISA Torrijos, pointed the out, White without House priorities knew andit had justifi to cations,sell the Thof egreat administration symbolic importance, had to raise wouldthe number return of to F–15 Panama. sales forPrevious Israel MATMONreturn to the C Senate was “not and a torational the public. planning Th edocument.” fi rst step required95 the tooff ersequal included those fortransferring Saudi Arabia, only theand top agree of thatthe hill,the Saudisbut the could fi nal Joint Chiefs of Staff to support it. Th at task fell to Brown. Th e notdeal buymade air-to-ground exceptions only missiles for U.S. for hospitals,the aircraft. schools, Two andmonths other after key BrownChiefs’ maingreeted concerns Israeli Defensewere Panama’s Minister sovereignty Ezer Weizman over the on canal the theinstallations. package narrowlyIn all, the passeddeal off Congress,ered 40 percent Brown of reportedthe zone’s to land Carter and stepsand zoneof the after riverside its return entrance and tothe the need Pentagon for a unilateralon a frigid, right snowy of thatwater at to his Panama. meeting Th erewith would Jewish-American be wrangling overleaders, the amount“there wasof land no dayU.S. in intervention early March if 1978.the canal Th e wassecretary endangered. aff orded Brown him ansuggested equally inclinationand water to on be their returned, part to and rehash additional the Mid-East details toarms iron package out, but sale.” the coldto JCS reception Chairman in his General Pentagon George offi ce. Brown He informed a neutrality Weizman agreement that CarterLinowitz-Alexander believed the dealpackage cleared had the made way fora signifi an agreement. cant contribution69 MATMONthat would e Cxt wasend aa “longfter th shoppinge return olist”f th withe can aa “lotl, w iofth margin the rig inht it.”of to peace. He maintained a defeat would have been a real win for Theither e United the United States was States prepared or Panama to sell Israelto protect only $1 and billion defend in FMS the Ththe e Israelilast major lobby hurdle and waswould to disabusehave emboldened Torrijos of Begin thinking to bethat more the perwaterway year. Surprised as they saw at Brown’sfi t. Th e “veryother reserved”Chiefs were and not unforthcoming enthusiastic, Unitedintransigent States while would defl pay ating Panama the Saudisfor “past and injustices.” Egyptians. He DoD demanded spent attitude,yet they endorseda disappointed the idea. Weizman Th is “Brown-Brown left Washington. formula” He told proved Begin a billionconsiderable dollars eff up ort front juggling and $300 the aircraft million allotments per year until and the trying return to toone go of overthe keysthe toPentagon breaking chief’s the negotiation head with deadlockCarter when with theTorrijos two ofconvince the canal. Congress Linowitz that informedthe package him would that actuallyCongress increase would Israelinever leadersand persuading met later the that JCS month. to support At their the meeting, return. 67Begin Th e otherpared majordown “‘appropriateair superiority. taxpayers’ In retrospect, money the for eff ortthe seemedpurpose worth of persuading it.98 the breakthroughthe MATMON came C list,from but the notU.S. enough negotiators. for DoD’s Instead purposes. of one treaty Th e Panamanians to take away ‘our canal.’” An equally enraged Carter therepresident would passed be two: the one requests to cover to theDoD, period where until Deputy the termination Secretary Withagreed. the Torrijos passage backed of the aircraftdown, acceptingpackage, theinstead peace a processmore modestpicked ofCharles U.S. Duncanoperations advised of the Carter canal, to “holdand one off untilto ensure after the aircraftcanal’s up.package Brown of wasloans not and involved increased in thetolls. 13-day Th e dealnegotiations was sealed. at CampNow, neutralitypackage has after cleared its return. Congress.”68 Th e deal made sense to Carter and David,could the Maryland, Carter administration where Carter, sellSadat, it to and the Begin Senate hammered or would outthe the NSC staff .96 tentativecanal treaties peace go theaccords. way ofHe President did go Woodrowto the Catoctin Wilson’s MountainLeague of Still, the devil remained in the details in these negotiations. For presidentialNations?70 retreat for one day to brief Carter on the Defense Althoughthe Defense initially Department, skeptical the about key issuesthe proposed were: How $8 muchbillion ofFMS the budget. It was 15 September 1978, the day Sadat threatened to aircraftCanal Zone package should for beIsrael, returned Egypt, before and theSaudi fi nal Arabia turnover (since in 2000?it ran leave,Carter almost described collapsing ratifi cation the talks.of the Later Panama on Canalthe 15th, Treaties Brown as “theand againstHow could the DoDgrain Southernof his policies Command to limit headquartered arms sales), thereCarter operate came Brzezinskimost diffi cult met political with Weizman. battle I ever Th eyfaced, agreed including that as my part campaign of the aroundeff ectively to thewithin idea. a Itsmaller could greasearea? theAnd peace how processcould DoDin the sellMiddle the Campfor President.” David Accords, All the Washingtonnational security/foreign would fund policythe transfer agencies of East.return Brown’s to many advice in the was military to make for the whom combined the zone, package with for its Egypt neat Israelicontributed airfi elds to inan the orchestrated Sinai to the public Negev relations (under theand accords legislative the andsuburban Saudi lawns,Arabia golf roughly courses, equal and to commissaries,the one for Israel had and been assure a home the Sinaicampaign would to persuadebe returned a reluctant to Egypt). Congress Brown and later a skepticaltold Weizman: public twoaway were from inextricably home. Th elinked. main institutionalTo ensure success, opposition Brown resided argued, in “We the “Myto accept marching the treaties. orders State were andto make the White those House[bases] headed no more the capable eff ort. needArmy, from which the had outset been to draggingtie the elements its feet ofover the land package and togetherwater issues. and orBrown luxurious and other in the DoD Sinai offi than cials thosegave hundredsthey are toof replace.”speeches Carterto the maintainLinowitz wentthe political directly will to Secretaryto keep them of the tied.” Army Th Cliff is proved ord Alexander diffi cult, commentedAmerican public to Brzezinski (by comparison that he State did offinot cials “want gave Harold 1,500). 71Brown as(the Israel “stockholder” was unhappy of the with canal the enterprise, rough equality the direct of therepresentative package and of wandering around in the desert trying to fi gure out where to put the president—notfact that the Saudis under would Brown receive for this ten function). more sophisticated Th ey agreed F–15 on theWhere airfi eldsSecretary for the Brown Israelis, could with usbe havingmost toeff ective,foot the however, bill.” True was to aircraftPanamanian than solethe Isrealisauthority did. for97 the Pacifi c Port of Balboa (similar to hisconvincing instructions, senators Brown that and the DoD treaties drove adequately a hard bargain—no protected frills,U.S. Cristobal on the Atlantic) and joint control of waterway traffi c. Th e justsecurity; two basicand airconversely, bases built if withthe treatiesthe U.S. were Army rejected, Corps of the Engineers canal’s trans-isthmusAs expected, the railroad sales packages would passrequired to Panama a bruising without fi ght in conditions, Congress. actinginfrastructure as construction would be manager. vulnerable.99 Brown testifi ed before a number alongCarter with complained zone housing about occupied opposition by non-U.S.from the citizens,Jewish-American with the of congressional committees, but his testimony before the Senate 2638 3927 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

Welland air before ordnance. the U.S In negotiators,all, it amounted special to advisersa request Sol for Linowitz $1.5 billion and lobby.rest of Brzezinskithe housing concluded to be jointly that managedthe initiative and hadhanded been over a necessary in fi ve- Ellsworthin foreign militaryBunker, salesclosed (in the 1977 deal dollars) with Panama per year and through military 1983. leader As year“costly intervals. diversion,” Most since of Ancon it won Hill, the overlookingtrust of the PanamaArab moderates. City and Generalthe JCS andOmar ISA Torrijos, pointed the out, White without House priorities knew andit had justifi to cations,sell the ofTh egreat administration symbolic importance, had to raise wouldthe number return of to F–15 Panama. sales forPrevious Israel MATMONreturn to the C Senate was “not and a torational the public. planning Th edocument.” fi rst step required95 the offto ersequal included those fortransferring Saudi Arabia, only theand top agree of thatthe hill,the Saudisbut the could fi nal Joint Chiefs of Staff to support it. Th at task fell to Brown. Th e dealnot buymade air-to-ground exceptions only missiles for U.S. for hospitals,the aircraft. schools, Two andmonths other after key BrownChiefs’ maingreeted concerns Israeli Defensewere Panama’s Minister sovereignty Ezer Weizman over the on canal the installations.the package narrowlyIn all, the passeddeal off Congress,ered 40 percent Brown of reportedthe zone’s to land Carter and stepsand zoneof the after riverside its return entrance and tothe the need Pentagon for a unilateralon a frigid, right snowy of waterthat at to his Panama. meeting Th erewith would Jewish-American be wrangling overleaders, the amount“there wasof land no dayU.S. in intervention early March if 1978.the canal Th e wassecretary endangered. aff orded Brown him ansuggested equally andinclination water to on be their returned, part to and rehash additional the Mid-East details toarms iron package out, but sale.” the coldto JCS reception Chairman in his General Pentagon George offi ce. Brown He informed a neutrality Weizman agreement that Linowitz-AlexanderCarter believed the dealpackage cleared had the made way fora signifi an agreement. cant contribution69 MATMONthat would e Cxt wasend aa “longfter th shoppinge return olist”f th withe can aa “lotl, w iofth margin the rig inht it.”of to peace. He maintained a defeat would have been a real win for Theither e United the United States was States prepared or Panama to sell Israelto protect only $1 and billion defend in FMS the Ththe e Israelilast major lobby hurdle and waswould to disabusehave emboldened Torrijos of Begin thinking to bethat more the perwaterway year. Surprised as they saw at Brown’sfi t. Th e “veryother reserved”Chiefs were and not unforthcoming enthusiastic, Unitedintransigent States while would defl pay ating Panama the Saudisfor “past and injustices.” Egyptians. He DoD demanded spent attitude,yet they endorseda disappointed the idea. Weizman Th is “Brown-Brown left Washington. formula” He told proved Begin a billionconsiderable dollars eff up ort front juggling and $300 the aircraft million allotments per year until and the trying return to toone go of overthe keysthe toPentagon breaking chief’s the negotiation head with deadlockCarter when with theTorrijos two ofconvince the canal. Congress Linowitz that informedthe package him would that actuallyCongress increase would Israelinever leadersand persuading met later the that JCS month. to support At their the meeting, return. 67Begin Th e otherpared majordown “‘appropriateair superiority. taxpayers’ In retrospect, money the for eff ortthe seemedpurpose worth of persuading it.98 the breakthroughthe MATMON came C list,from but the notU.S. enough negotiators. for DoD’s Instead purposes. of one treaty Th e Panamanians to take away ‘our canal.’” An equally enraged Carter therepresident would passed be two: the one requests to cover to theDoD, period where until Deputy the termination Secretary Withagreed. the Torrijos passage backed of the aircraftdown, acceptingpackage, theinstead peace a processmore modestpicked ofCharles U.S. Duncanoperations advised of the Carter canal, to “holdand one off untilto ensure after the aircraftcanal’s up.package Brown of wasloans not and involved increased in thetolls. 13-day Th e dealnegotiations was sealed. at CampNow, neutralitypackage has after cleared its return. Congress.”68 Th e deal made sense to Carter and David,could the Maryland, Carter administration where Carter, sellSadat, it to and the Begin Senate hammered or would outthe the NSC staff .96 tentativecanal treaties peace go theaccords. way ofHe President did go Woodrowto the Catoctin Wilson’s MountainLeague of Still, the devil remained in the details in these negotiations. For presidentialNations?70 retreat for one day to brief Carter on the Defense Althoughthe Defense initially Department, skeptical the about key issuesthe proposed were: How $8 muchbillion ofFMS the budget. It was 15 September 1978, the day Sadat threatened to aircraftCanal Zone package should for beIsrael, returned Egypt, before and theSaudi fi nal Arabia turnover (since in 2000?it ran leave,Carter almost described collapsing ratifi cation the talks.of the Later Panama on Canalthe 15th, Treaties Brown as “theand againstHow could the DoDgrain Southernof his policies Command to limit headquartered arms sales), thereCarter operate came mostBrzezinski diffi cult met political with Weizman. battle I ever Th eyfaced, agreed including that as my part campaign of the aroundeff ectively to thewithin idea. a Itsmaller could greasearea? theAnd peace how processcould DoDin the sellMiddle the Campfor President.” David Accords, All the Washingtonnational security/foreign would fund policythe transfer agencies of East.return Brown’s to many advice in the was military to make for the whom combined the zone, package with for its Egypt neat Israelicontributed airfi elds to inan the orchestrated Sinai to the public Negev relations (under theand accords legislative the andsuburban Saudi lawns,Arabia golf roughly courses, equal and to commissaries,the one for Israel had and been assure a home the Sinaicampaign would to persuadebe returned a reluctant to Egypt). Congress Brown and later a skepticaltold Weizman: public twoaway were from inextricably home. Th elinked. main institutionalTo ensure success, opposition Brown resided argued, in “We the “Myto accept marching the treaties. orders State were andto make the White those House[bases] headed no more the capable eff ort. needArmy, from which the had outset been to draggingtie the elements its feet ofover the land package and togetherwater issues. and orBrown luxurious and other in the DoD Sinai offi than cials thosegave hundredsthey are toof replace.”speeches Carterto the maintainLinowitz wentthe political directly will to Secretaryto keep them of the tied.” Army Th Cliff is proved ord Alexander diffi cult, commentedAmerican public to Brzezinski (by comparison that he State did offinot cials “want gave Harold 1,500). 71Brown as(the Israel “stockholder” was unhappy of the with canal the enterprise, rough equality the direct of therepresentative package and of wandering around in the desert trying to fi gure out where to put the president—notfact that the Saudis under would Brown receive for this ten function). more sophisticated Th ey agreed F–15 on theWhere airfi eldsSecretary for the Brown Israelis, could with usbe havingmost toeff ective,foot the however, bill.” True was to aircraftPanamanian than solethe Isrealisauthority did. for97 the Pacifi c Port of Balboa (similar to hisconvincing instructions, senators Brown that and the DoD treaties drove adequately a hard bargain—no protected frills,U.S. Cristobal on the Atlantic) and joint control of waterway traffi c. Th e justsecurity; two basicand airconversely, bases built if withthe treatiesthe U.S. were Army rejected, Corps of the Engineers canal’s trans-isthmusAs expected, the railroad sales packages would passrequired to Panama a bruising without fi ght in conditions, Congress. actinginfrastructure as construction would be manager. vulnerable.99 Brown testifi ed before a number alongCarter with complained zone housing about occupied opposition by non-U.S.from the citizens,Jewish-American with the of congressional committees, but his testimony before the Senate 2638 3927 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

CommitteeBrown again onweighed Foreign in withRelations the president. was the Thmost e 16,000 eloquent. troops Th ofe shiningof U.S. lightproperty. burst Thon e the battle Middle to win East funding scene.” Itactually fell to thetook secretary longer secretarythe El Salvador told the military, committee: comprising “Use theof theNational canal Guardis more and important security thanto discourage ratifi cation an andexuberant proved Egyptian almost as president bitter. Carter from describedexpecting ittoo as thanpolice, ownership. were fi ghting Effi cient5,000 operation guerrillas of trained the canal by Cuba, in years Nicaragua, ahead is “horrible.”much in military Instead sales of convincing and assistance two-thirds until the of peace100 senators, process wasthe moreand the important Palestine Liberationthan nostalgia Organization for a simpler and armedpast. .by . .a Icoalition believe administrationfurther along. Sadat needed was a particularly majority of desperate 435 representatives, for aircraft, whoespecially were personallyof leftist states . . . thatthat includedthese treaties Cuba, fully Nicaragua, serve and Ethiopia, greatly Vietnam,promote highlyF–5 fi ghterssusceptible and C–130 to public Hercules opinion transports, given their as welltwo-year as armored terms. ourand nationalthe Eastern security European interests.” countries. As for defenseUndersupplied of the canal, Salvadoran Brown Opponentspersonnel carriers in the (APCs). House hopedBrown toalso forge reminded a majority him andto defeat Egyptian the maintainedforces found thatthemselves the United in dire States straits. would When, be in able January to defend 1981, the fundingMinister billof War and Generaltorpedo Mohammedthe treaties. Carter Abdel againGhani called al-Gamasy on Brown that Atlanticrebels blew and up Pacifi one cof approaches the military’s with three overwhelming remaining helicopters, force. For andthe andany DoDU.S.-Egyptian offi cials to deal explain required in testimony congressional and in approval,seemingly makingendless durationammunition of thesupplies fi rst treatywere down(until to 2000), a week’s U.S. worth, forces Carter in the agreed zone informalthe U.S. commitmentbriefi ngs of 30to Israelor 40 an House overriding members consideration. the intricacies93 of andto send key baseshelicopters and training and MTTs. areas wouldTwo helicopters remain under and U.S.their control teams the legislation.74 anddeparted could immediately be reinforced from as Panama;needed. fourTh e morereal danger,were to accordingarrive on Although the United States had been a key supporter of Israel since to1 February.Brown, would Th is last-minute not come fromdecision conventional ended the attack,impasse but between from Thits ecreation Senate inpassed 1948, the it was legislation not until easily. the 1967 Th e Arab-IsraeliHouse was Waranother that DoD,terrorism, which sabotage, felt without and such guerrilla assistance attacks the onjunta vulnerable could not locks survive, or matter.the United Five States days providedbefore the Israel operations with sophisticated treaty was to military take eff weapons ect, the andother State facilities and the by Whitedissident House, Panamanians both of which or other wanted Latin to American withhold House,and equipment, which had an rejectedeff ort it therepeated Senate on version a much in conferencelarger scale induring part militaryopponents. aid Thto eencourage new treaties reform. would Th lessen e fate thisof U.S. threat. policy72 toward El asthe a 1973protest, war. fi nally When passed Brown a bill took similar over tothe the Pentagon, conference the version Israeli Salvador and Central America would soon rest in the hands of the theygovernment had just had turned placed down. $4 billionTh e canal in militarytransfer hadsales been orders an witharduous the ReaganIt would administration. be nice to report92 that Brown’s words swayed the Senate, andUnited a closely States runto replace process. equipment Th e passion lost about in the “giving 1973 war. back Israeli our canal”Prime but U.S. politics does not work that way. Th e Carter team made eventuallyMinister Yitzhak dissipated, Rabin and and the thencanal his operated successor, as a nondiscriminatoryMenachem Begin, promises to senators, accepted amendments it would have rather internationalcame to Washington waterway, in as1977 Carter determined and Brown to envisioned.continue and75 expand Th e Middle East not, and expedited travel of uncommitted legislators to Panama the U.S. military supply pipeline. Two considerations loomed large Whileto observe DoD offifi rsthand. cials and After others the in theSenate Carter concluded administration its extensive diff ered inWhile DoD’s Brown approach and to DoD these requests.had supported First, the Carter’s Israeli claimsreturn that of theythe overdeliberations Latin American in early policy, spring little 1978, divergence the administration existed on the endured Middle werecanal vulnerable and zone, to they an all-out found Arab themselves attack were increasingly based on someat odds dubious with East,nail-biting Iran, thevotes. Persian On 16 Gulf, March, and Southwestby a vote of Asia. 75 toBrown 23, theand Senate OSD assessments.the White House Th ey based over theirthe restmilitary of Latin needs Americanon a potential policy. attack Latin by remainedpassed an in amendment accord with bythe Senator president’s Dennis Middle DeConcini East initiatives. (D–AZ) In allAmercanists Arab states inincluding the White Iraq, theHouse Persian and Gulf State states, Department and even somesaw thestating accomplishment that the United of the States Camp could David intervene Accords andin Panama the subsequent against inhuman East Africa, rights, hardly economic a realistic equality, scenario, and democracyespecially given as basis Sadat’s for peacetheir Egyptian-Israeliany action that impeded Peace Treaty, operations Carter’s of thefi nest canal moments, (already Brown implicit and in overtures.overall approach Second, to Brown the hemisphere. agreed with Th the ey president’s looked askance conviction at DoD’s that OSDthe neutrality played a treaty).secondary Th but e Senate important then ratifirole ined expediting the neutrality the peace.treaty longstanding,sales of U.S. weapons close andrelations military with equipment Latin providedAmerican the militaries, best lever by a vote of 68 to 32, followed by ratifi cation of the treaty on manyon Israel of to which make peaceran their with countriesits Arab neighbors. as military Th ereforedictatorships. sales would To Peaceoperations came through at a price: 1999 additional by the same military vote, sales, in both credits, cases grants, two more and behuman contingent rights onand Israeli democracy concessions. advocates,94 U.S. arms sales to such othervotes thanmilitary required assistance for a two-thirdsto Israel and majority. Egypt,73 as well as a three- dictatorships merely propped them up. pronged aircraft deal including not only the two Middle East Th e 1977 Israeli request, which they called MATMON C, was antagonistsTh e fi ght should but also have Saudi been Arabia. over, butBrown it was had not. the Thdiffi e cultSenate task and of anBrown eight-page, and his single-spacedstaff argued for list preserving of weapons these (including military-to-military 400 tanks, movingHouse offrom Representatives the president’s neededbroad promises to fund about the treaty security that assistance would 3105relations, APCs, forged 25 oversophisticated decades, since F–15 they aircraft, could be150 a forcebasic forbut good. still tooperate negotiating the canal the until actual 2000. details. Most A caseof the in oppositionpoint: Egyptian came President from the formidableUntil Latin F–16s,Americans 60 helicopters,felt secure, they12 hydrofoils,would not anddivert 100 scarce all- AnwarHouse, Sadat’swhere sometrips membersto Washington felt they in shouldApril 1977have hadand aFebruary vote on weatherresources antiship to economic Harpoon and social missiles), betterment. equipment Since (including Latin American $200 1978.ratifi cation, Sadat sincecharmed the operationsand inspired treaties Carter, concerned who described the disposition him as “a millionmilitaries for would communications), remain key politicaland huge players amounts for ofthe ammunition foreseeable 2836 3729 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy future,Washington it was frayedessential and to then harness snapped. their eff His orts government toward U.S. deteriorated objectives. inTime September was running 1978. outDoD on offi El cials Salvador, thought described they saw succinctlysome human by Militariesquickly. When would he be unleashed encouraged the to Nicaraguan embrace social, National economic, Guard and to rightsAssistant improvement, Secretary McGiff but it ertwas as hard “one to of tell. the Brzezinskisickest societies also claimed in the politicalattack indiscriminately reforms. Arms rebel-held sales provided cities, the towns, president and villages, a useful he andlost someworld.” success. An alliance In 1980 of theU.S.-Argentine military and relations an economic deteriorated oligarchy because faced flthe exible support tool toof this the end. middle At a class.major Although PRC meeting Somoza on Latin was quickAmerica to ofa radical Argentina’s opposition grain sales with to a theterrorist Soviet nucleus. Union, Thdespite e Romero private regime promises was incharge March that 1977, Cuba wasDeputy behind Secretary the Sandinistas, of Defense the CubansCharles hadDuncan been tounable support to prevent the U.S. opposition embargo kidnappings,and the junta’s bombings, support forand a shootingcoup in stressedcircumspect that inDoD’s their International support, working Military through Education Panama and and Training Costa Bolivia.of government Still, at offithe cials. end 88of Brown the year recommended Carter offi cials providing anticipated economic better (IMET)Rica. In program,May 1979, which sensing brought the kill, foreign they offijoined cers theto theSandinistas United relationsand military in an aid expected (nonlethal second tear term. gas,79 commercial purchases of U.S. Statesin earnest. for military Th e National training, Guard provided found an itself opportunity short of everything— to infl uence military equipment, and new engines for Guatemalan C–47 transport youngrockets, military hand grenades,leaders. Th mortar e rest ofrounds, the group and wasrecoilless less impressed, rifl e and Whileaircraft) Argentinaand taking hadpressure the offworst other human countries rights not to record sell arms in tothe El recommendingheavy machine gun“warm ammunition. relations withIts former civilian suppliers, and democratic Israel and hemisphere,Salvador—in Chilereturn under for better President human Augusto rights and Pinochet political ranreform. a close89 governments,Argentina, joined normal the United relations States with in embargoing non-repressive weapons. military85 second. In the face of Chile’s unwillingness to extradite Chilean regimes, but correct relations with repressive governments.”76 intelligenceBefore the deal offi could cers responsiblebe fi nalized withfor the Romero, assassination “reformist” of politicalmilitary In June 1979 Carter met with his key advisers. Brzezinski made the opponentoffi cers overthrew Orlando him Letelier in October in 1979.Washington, Th e Pentagon DC, stoodthe readyState Thcase ere for were a U.S. plenty peacekeeping of repressive force, military but regimesneither inBrown Latin nor America, Vance Departmentto provide the persuaded new Revolutionary Carter to sever Governing all military Junta ties with with nonlethal Chile. butagreed. initially Th e Brazil,president Argentina, emphatically and Chile opposed provided it. Brownthe focus. argued Of the it Brownmilitary felt assistance, compelled a 36-man to dissent military from mobile Vance’s training recommendation. team (MTT), three,was time Brazil to wasresupply the least the repressive.National Guard, Brown andnot tohis save staff Somozaencouraged but Given$4.5 million Chile’s instrategic FMS forsignifi trucks cance, and he communicationsargued for some honey equipment, rather Carterto allow to it opento stand a dialogue up to the with Sandinistas the military in a post-Somozaleadership to era.reverse On thanand $7.5all vinegar. million Afor total six cutoffUH–1H would Iroquois result helicopters. in loss of inflTh euence new “the17 July serious 1979 erosion Somoza of ourfl ed militaryNicaragua ties for with Miami; Brazil in . . two. our days fi rmest the amongSalvadoran the Chileanjunta and military the White and the House possibility dithered. of increased Both wanted Soviet allySandinistas in South assumed America.” power. Brzezinski86 supported OSD, noting that infl“multilateral uence there. cover” Carter for disregardedthe training thisteams advice, (Venezuela siding agreedwith the to Brazil, with its great economic prospects, could become a “regional anti-Pinochetprovide aid). Afteroffi cials talking in the to White Catholic House Archbishop and State. Oscar When Romero DoD stabilizer.”Brown outlined Carter for made the anpresident eff ort, buta plan the initiativeprepared failedin ISA to to create save recommendedof El Salvador, Carterthat Chile agreed participate with his plea in toSouth make Americanpolitical reforms naval athe better rest ofand Central lasting America. relationship, In Guatemala, in part because where Brazil’sthe leftists military were exercisesa precondition in 1980, for the NSC military Latin aid. American90 staff er Robert Pastor governmentweak and the was military unwilling and to ruling sign agreementselite strong that and required brutal (theyit to opposed DoD’s suggestion, discounting their concern that Chile submitsystematically human killedrights moderatereports to opponents),the State Department. Brown recommended77 mightIn October turn 1980to Moscow. Brown “Wetold arethe hardlypresident in dangerthat after of ninelosing months Chile no new programs but suggested cultivating moderate Guatemalan toof delayanyone it wasbut timethe militarists,”to send the aid.he stated. Brown’s Brzezinski case received excluded a setback the Ifmilitary Brazil hadleaders a relatively in thebenign hopes military they government, would moderate the same couldtheir Chileanwhen, in navy.late 1980, Pastor Salvadoran complained right-wing about “their security [DoD’s] forces continuedmurdered notgovernment’s be said for repressive Argentina, actions. whose “dirtyIn Honduras, war” against where Marxist the leftistrebels efffour orts American to undermine women the (three president’s of them human Catholic rights nuns). and security Carter andthreat other was opponents minimal, heof recommendedthe regime resulted making in thousands sure the military of Argentine held objectivessuspended in all Latin aid America.”and sent specialIn Pastor’s representatives eyes it was not to ainvestigate diff erence politicalpromised opponents,elections by dissidents,using increased and economicpotential aid,insurgents more foreigneither ofthe opinionmurder overand insisttactics, that but the outright government opposition. in San80 Salvador In all three rein disappearingmilitary sales, never and IMETto be asseen incentives. again or In thrown El Salvador, into secret the military- prisons countriesin the right-wing DoD’s eff deathort to squads.protect orTh reestablishe team concluded military relationsthat the whereappointed they werepresident, often tortured.Carlos ThHumberto is appalling Romero, record caused who theseemed U.S. failed,government but at wouldleast in investigate Brazil and Argentinaand move theyagainst made the some death tentative squads, Congressresponsive to to prohibit U.S. pressure all forms for of politicalsecurity assistanceliberalization, and arms represented sales to progressbut they thatrecommended eventually resultedwithholding in better fi scal relations year 1981 under military Reagan. aid Argentinato Brown inand August ISA 1977.the only78 Brown choice. wrote Th Vanceey favored in March encouraging 1978 that On(MTTs, Chile, trucks, DoD’s communications advice fell completely equipment, on deaf and ears. helicopters) until theRomero prohibition with nonmilitary was not contributing aid and limiting to better any humanactions rightsthat “would there, Washington could see the results of their eff orts. Carter agreed.91 butsqueeze rather him having because the of oppositehuman rightseff ect. violations.” Finally, the87 administration Another long-term problem child in the hemisphere was Cuba. agreed to release some money for spare military parts for Argentina Carter began his term hopeful that he could achieve a rapprochement 3430 3135 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy future,Washington it was frayedessential and to then harness snapped. their eff His orts government toward U.S. deteriorated objectives. inTime September was running 1978. outDoD on offi El cials Salvador, thought described they saw succinctlysome human by Militariesquickly. When would he be unleashed encouraged the to Nicaraguan embrace social, National economic, Guard and to rightsAssistant improvement, Secretary McGiff but it ertwas as hard “one to of tell. the Brzezinskisickest societies also claimed in the politicalattack indiscriminately reforms. Arms rebel-held sales provided cities, the towns, president and villages, a useful he andlost someworld.” success. An alliance In 1980 of theU.S.-Argentine military and relations an economic deteriorated oligarchy because faced flthe exible support tool toof this the end. middle At a class.major Although PRC meeting Somoza on Latin was quickAmerica to ofa radical Argentina’s opposition grain sales with to a theterrorist Soviet nucleus. Union, Thdespite e Romero private regime promises was incharge March that 1977, Cuba wasDeputy behind Secretary the Sandinistas, of Defense the CubansCharles hadDuncan been tounable support to prevent the U.S. opposition embargo kidnappings,and the junta’s bombings, support forand a shootingcoup in stressedcircumspect that inDoD’s their International support, working Military through Education Panama and and Training Costa Bolivia.of government Still, at offithe cials. end 88of Brown the year recommended Carter offi cials providing anticipated economic better (IMET)Rica. In program,May 1979, which sensing brought the kill, foreign they offijoined cers theto theSandinistas United relationsand military in an aid expected (nonlethal second tear term. gas,79 commercial purchases of U.S. Statesin earnest. for military Th e National training, Guard provided found an itself opportunity short of everything— to infl uence military equipment, and new engines for Guatemalan C–47 transport youngrockets, military hand grenades,leaders. Th mortar e rest ofrounds, the group and wasrecoilless less impressed, rifl e and Whileaircraft) Argentinaand taking hadpressure the offworst other human countries rights not to record sell arms in tothe El recommendingheavy machine gun“warm ammunition. relations withIts former civilian suppliers, and democratic Israel and hemisphere,Salvador—in Chilereturn under for better President human Augusto rights and Pinochet political ranreform. a close89 governments,Argentina, joined normal the United relations States with in embargoing non-repressive weapons. military85 second. In the face of Chile’s unwillingness to extradite Chilean regimes, but correct relations with repressive governments.”76 intelligenceBefore the deal offi could cers responsiblebe fi nalized withfor the Romero, assassination “reformist” of politicalmilitary In June 1979 Carter met with his key advisers. Brzezinski made the opponentoffi cers overthrew Orlando him Letelier in October in 1979.Washington, Th e Pentagon DC, stoodthe readyState Thcase ere for were a U.S. plenty peacekeeping of repressive force, military but regimesneither inBrown Latin nor America, Vance Departmentto provide the persuaded new Revolutionary Carter to sever Governing all military Junta ties with with nonlethal Chile. butagreed. initially Th e Brazil,president Argentina, emphatically and Chile opposed provided it. Brownthe focus. argued Of the it Brownmilitary felt assistance, compelled a 36-man to dissent military from mobile Vance’s training recommendation. team (MTT), three,was time Brazil to wasresupply the least the repressive.National Guard, Brown andnot tohis save staff Somozaencouraged but Given$4.5 million Chile’s instrategic FMS forsignifi trucks cance, and he communicationsargued for some honey equipment, rather Carterto allow to it opento stand a dialogue up to the with Sandinistas the military in a post-Somozaleadership to era.reverse On thanand $7.5all vinegar. million Afor total six cutoffUH–1H would Iroquois result helicopters. in loss of inflTh euence new “the17 July serious 1979 erosion Somoza of ourfl ed militaryNicaragua ties for with Miami; Brazil in . . two. our days fi rmest the amongSalvadoran the Chileanjunta and military the White and the House possibility dithered. of increased Both wanted Soviet allySandinistas in South assumed America.” power. Brzezinski86 supported OSD, noting that infl“multilateral uence there. cover” Carter for disregardedthe training thisteams advice, (Venezuela siding agreedwith the to Brazil, with its great economic prospects, could become a “regional anti-Pinochetprovide aid). Afteroffi cials talking in the to White Catholic House Archbishop and State. Oscar When Romero DoD stabilizer.”Brown outlined Carter for made the anpresident eff ort, buta plan the initiativeprepared failedin ISA to to create save recommendedof El Salvador, Carterthat Chile agreed participate with his plea in toSouth make Americanpolitical reforms naval athe better rest ofand Central lasting America. relationship, In Guatemala, in part because where Brazil’sthe leftists military were exercisesa precondition in 1980, for the NSC military Latin aid. American90 staff er Robert Pastor governmentweak and the was military unwilling and to ruling sign agreementselite strong that and required brutal (theyit to opposed DoD’s suggestion, discounting their concern that Chile submitsystematically human killedrights moderatereports to opponents),the State Department. Brown recommended77 mightIn October turn 1980to Moscow. Brown “Wetold arethe hardlypresident in dangerthat after of ninelosing months Chile no new programs but suggested cultivating moderate Guatemalan toof delayanyone it wasbut timethe militarists,”to send the aid.he stated. Brown’s Brzezinski case received excluded a setback the Ifmilitary Brazil hadleaders a relatively in thebenign hopes military they government, would moderate the same couldtheir Chileanwhen, in navy.late 1980, Pastor Salvadoran complained right-wing about “their security [DoD’s] forces continuedmurdered notgovernment’s be said for repressive Argentina, actions. whose “dirtyIn Honduras, war” against where Marxist the leftistrebels efffour orts American to undermine women the (three president’s of them human Catholic rights nuns). and security Carter andthreat other was opponents minimal, heof recommendedthe regime resulted making in thousands sure the military of Argentine held objectivessuspended in all Latin aid America.”and sent specialIn Pastor’s representatives eyes it was not to ainvestigate diff erence politicalpromised opponents,elections by dissidents,using increased and economicpotential aid,insurgents more foreigneither ofthe opinionmurder overand insisttactics, that but the outright government opposition. in San80 Salvador In all three rein disappearingmilitary sales, never and IMETto be asseen incentives. again or In thrown El Salvador, into secret the military- prisons countriesin the right-wing DoD’s eff deathort to squads.protect orTh reestablishe team concluded military relationsthat the whereappointed they werepresident, often tortured.Carlos ThHumberto is appalling Romero, record caused who theseemed U.S. failed,government but at wouldleast in investigate Brazil and Argentinaand move theyagainst made the some death tentative squads, Congressresponsive to to prohibit U.S. pressure all forms for of politicalsecurity assistanceliberalization, and arms represented sales to progressbut they thatrecommended eventually resultedwithholding in better fi scal relations year 1981 under military Reagan. aid Argentinato Brown inand August ISA 1977.the only78 Brown choice. wrote Th Vanceey favored in March encouraging 1978 that On(MTTs, Chile, trucks, DoD’s communications advice fell completely equipment, on deaf and ears. helicopters) until theRomero prohibition with nonmilitary was not contributing aid and limiting to better any humanactions rightsthat “would there, Washington could see the results of their eff orts. Carter agreed.91 butsqueeze rather him having because the of oppositehuman rightseff ect. violations.” Finally, the87 administration Another long-term problem child in the hemisphere was Cuba. agreed to release some money for spare military parts for Argentina Carter began his term hopeful that he could achieve a rapprochement 3430 3135 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy with Fidel Castro but, if anything, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated militaries ruled. During the early years of the Carter administration, during his last three years. Much of that deterioration derived from Central America did not appear on the radar screen, with the concern that the Soviet Union was modernizing Cuba’s armed exception of Panama. Although hardly beacons of democracy forces in violation of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis agreement on (Costa Rica excepted), the regimes of the isthmus kept a low Soviet off ensive weapons, which the Carter administration assumed profi le, allowing human rights advocates to focus on Argentina, to be more specifi c than it actually was. In 1978 the Soviet Union Chile, and Brazil. Insurgencies in Nicaragua and El Salvador raised provided Cuba with 12 to 24 MiG–23 aircraft, which eventually the prospect of Cuban support, posing another series of problems. were determined not to be nuclear-capable. Still, Brown and the JCS feared if unchallenged they could lead to more dangerous Long ruled by the corrupt Somoza family, the Nicaraguan Soviet upgrades. Brown also worried about their eff ect on SALT government began to unravel in 1978 under pressure from a leftist II ratifi cation. By May 1979 Brown and Assistant Secretary (ISA) insurgency led by the Sandinistas that exploded into civil war. Th e David McGiff ert were seriously concerned about the Soviet buildup Carter administration hoped to ease out President Anastasio Somoza in Cuba—in addition to the MiG–23s, the Soviets upgraded the and replace him with an interim and then elected government naval base at Cienfuegos and provided Cuba diesel-electric Soviet dominated by the non-Sandinista opposition. What Washington Foxtrot- and older Whiskey-class submarines. Th en, in August 1978, feared was a Sandinista government closely allied to Cuba. Th e U.S. intelligence determined that there was a Red Army brigade in U.S. response to the downfall of Somoza is a long, convoluted story Cuba. It was not known at the time that the brigade had been there in which DoD initially argued for an evenhanded policy toward since 1962. Without airlift or sealift capability DoD concluded that Somoza’s Nicaragua.83 it posed no real threat to the United States. Yet, when its existence was leaked by Senator Frank Church (D–ID), it caused a media DoD offi cials feared that the administration’s human rights fi restorm and further damages to SALT ratifi cation chances.81 advocates, who wished to expedite Somoza’s exit at all costs, were dominating U.S. policy. As Deputy Secretary Duncan told the PRC By the end of September 1978, Brown joined Vance and Brzezinski in early June 1978, the Sandinistas succeed “because of the support in successfully recommending to the president a strategy to curb they are getting from Cuba, Panama, and Costa Rica, which Cuban adventurism and off set Soviet augmentation of the Cuban permits them refuge.” Lean on Somoza, Duncan argued, but also armed forces. DoD responsibilities included increased military “lean on these countries” to calm the violence. Deputy Secretary presence in the Caribbean through Navy ports of call, training of State Warren Christopher disagreed, and Duncan found himself programs for friendly countries’ armed forces, joint training odd man out.84 exercises, use of military personnel in Caribbean natural disasters, and additional military assistance to Latin American nations that Carter asked DoD to send General Dennis McAuliff e, a close respected democratic values and human rights. By the end of 1980, friend of Somoza, to Managua. McAuliff e did not mince words in the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean had been upgraded, informing the Nicaraguan president his time was up. If he refused but Havana remained very much a thorn in Washington’s side.82 to come to terms with the non-Marxist opposition and agree to a plebiscite on his future, the United States would cut ties with Cuba was only 90 miles from the United States, but it was almost him, including military aid. Somoza refused, and his lifeline from as close to Central America, where for the most part caudillos or 32 33 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy with Fidel Castro but, if anything, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated militaries ruled. During the early years of the Carter administration, during his last three years. Much of that deterioration derived from Central America did not appear on the radar screen, with the concern that the Soviet Union was modernizing Cuba’s armed exception of Panama. Although hardly beacons of democracy forces in violation of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis agreement on (Costa Rica excepted), the regimes of the isthmus kept a low Soviet off ensive weapons, which the Carter administration assumed profi le, allowing human rights advocates to focus on Argentina, to be more specifi c than it actually was. In 1978 the Soviet Union Chile, and Brazil. Insurgencies in Nicaragua and El Salvador raised provided Cuba with 12 to 24 MiG–23 aircraft, which eventually the prospect of Cuban support, posing another series of problems. were determined not to be nuclear-capable. Still, Brown and the JCS feared if unchallenged they could lead to more dangerous Long ruled by the corrupt Somoza family, the Nicaraguan Soviet upgrades. Brown also worried about their eff ect on SALT government began to unravel in 1978 under pressure from a leftist II ratifi cation. By May 1979 Brown and Assistant Secretary (ISA) insurgency led by the Sandinistas that exploded into civil war. Th e David McGiff ert were seriously concerned about the Soviet buildup Carter administration hoped to ease out President Anastasio Somoza in Cuba—in addition to the MiG–23s, the Soviets upgraded the and replace him with an interim and then elected government naval base at Cienfuegos and provided Cuba diesel-electric Soviet dominated by the non-Sandinista opposition. What Washington Foxtrot- and older Whiskey-class submarines. Th en, in August 1978, feared was a Sandinista government closely allied to Cuba. Th e U.S. intelligence determined that there was a Red Army brigade in U.S. response to the downfall of Somoza is a long, convoluted story Cuba. It was not known at the time that the brigade had been there in which DoD initially argued for an evenhanded policy toward since 1962. Without airlift or sealift capability DoD concluded that Somoza’s Nicaragua.83 it posed no real threat to the United States. Yet, when its existence was leaked by Senator Frank Church (D–ID), it caused a media DoD offi cials feared that the administration’s human rights fi restorm and further damages to SALT ratifi cation chances.81 advocates, who wished to expedite Somoza’s exit at all costs, were dominating U.S. policy. As Deputy Secretary Duncan told the PRC By the end of September 1978, Brown joined Vance and Brzezinski in early June 1978, the Sandinistas succeed “because of the support in successfully recommending to the president a strategy to curb they are getting from Cuba, Panama, and Costa Rica, which Cuban adventurism and off set Soviet augmentation of the Cuban permits them refuge.” Lean on Somoza, Duncan argued, but also armed forces. DoD responsibilities included increased military “lean on these countries” to calm the violence. Deputy Secretary presence in the Caribbean through Navy ports of call, training of State Warren Christopher disagreed, and Duncan found himself programs for friendly countries’ armed forces, joint training odd man out.84 exercises, use of military personnel in Caribbean natural disasters, and additional military assistance to Latin American nations that Carter asked DoD to send General Dennis McAuliff e, a close respected democratic values and human rights. By the end of 1980, friend of Somoza, to Managua. McAuliff e did not mince words in the U.S. military presence in the Caribbean had been upgraded, informing the Nicaraguan president his time was up. If he refused but Havana remained very much a thorn in Washington’s side.82 to come to terms with the non-Marxist opposition and agree to a plebiscite on his future, the United States would cut ties with Cuba was only 90 miles from the United States, but it was almost him, including military aid. Somoza refused, and his lifeline from as close to Central America, where for the most part caudillos or 32 33 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy future,Washington it was frayedessential and to then harness snapped. their eff His orts government toward U.S. deteriorated objectives. inTime September was running 1978. outDoD on offi El cials Salvador, thought described they saw succinctlysome human by Militariesquickly. When would he be unleashed encouraged the to Nicaraguan embrace social, National economic, Guard and to rightsAssistant improvement, Secretary McGiff but it ertwas as hard “one to of tell. the Brzezinskisickest societies also claimed in the politicalattack indiscriminately reforms. Arms rebel-held sales provided cities, the towns, president and villages, a useful he andlost someworld.” success. An alliance In 1980 of theU.S.-Argentine military and relations an economic deteriorated oligarchy because faced flthe exible support tool toof this the end. middle At a class.major Although PRC meeting Somoza on Latin was quickAmerica to ofa radical Argentina’s opposition grain sales with to a theterrorist Soviet nucleus. Union, Thdespite e Romero private regime promises was incharge March that 1977, Cuba wasDeputy behind Secretary the Sandinistas, of Defense the CubansCharles hadDuncan been tounable support to prevent the U.S. opposition embargo kidnappings,and the junta’s bombings, support forand a shootingcoup in stressedcircumspect that inDoD’s their International support, working Military through Education Panama and and Training Costa Bolivia.of government Still, at offithe cials. end 88of Brown the year recommended Carter offi cials providing anticipated economic better (IMET)Rica. In program,May 1979, which sensing brought the kill, foreign they offijoined cers theto theSandinistas United relationsand military in an aid expected (nonlethal second tear term. gas,79 commercial purchases of U.S. Statesin earnest. for military Th e National training, Guard provided found an itself opportunity short of everything— to infl uence military equipment, and new engines for Guatemalan C–47 transport youngrockets, military hand grenades,leaders. Th mortar e rest ofrounds, the group and wasrecoilless less impressed, rifl e and Whileaircraft) Argentinaand taking hadpressure the offworst other human countries rights not to record sell arms in tothe El recommendingheavy machine gun“warm ammunition. relations withIts former civilian suppliers, and democratic Israel and hemisphere,Salvador—in Chilereturn under for better President human Augusto rights and Pinochet political ranreform. a close89 governments,Argentina, joined normal the United relations States with in embargoing non-repressive weapons. military85 second. In the face of Chile’s unwillingness to extradite Chilean regimes, but correct relations with repressive governments.”76 intelligenceBefore the deal offi could cers responsiblebe fi nalized withfor the Romero, assassination “reformist” of politicalmilitary In June 1979 Carter met with his key advisers. Brzezinski made the opponentoffi cers overthrew Orlando him Letelier in October in 1979.Washington, Th e Pentagon DC, stoodthe readyState Thcase ere for were a U.S. plenty peacekeeping of repressive force, military but regimesneither inBrown Latin nor America, Vance Departmentto provide the persuaded new Revolutionary Carter to sever Governing all military Junta ties with with nonlethal Chile. butagreed. initially Th e Brazil,president Argentina, emphatically and Chile opposed provided it. Brownthe focus. argued Of the it Brownmilitary felt assistance, compelled a 36-man to dissent military from mobile Vance’s training recommendation. team (MTT), three,was time Brazil to wasresupply the least the repressive.National Guard, Brown andnot tohis save staff Somozaencouraged but Given$4.5 million Chile’s instrategic FMS forsignifi trucks cance, and he communicationsargued for some honey equipment, rather Carterto allow to it opento stand a dialogue up to the with Sandinistas the military in a post-Somozaleadership to era.reverse On thanand $7.5all vinegar. million Afor total six cutoffUH–1H would Iroquois result helicopters. in loss of inflTh euence new “the17 July serious 1979 erosion Somoza of ourfl ed militaryNicaragua ties for with Miami; Brazil in . . two. our days fi rmest the amongSalvadoran the Chileanjunta and military the White and the House possibility dithered. of increased Both wanted Soviet allySandinistas in South assumed America.” power. Brzezinski86 supported OSD, noting that infl“multilateral uence there. cover” Carter for disregardedthe training thisteams advice, (Venezuela siding agreedwith the to Brazil, with its great economic prospects, could become a “regional anti-Pinochetprovide aid). Afteroffi cials talking in the to White Catholic House Archbishop and State. Oscar When Romero DoD stabilizer.”Brown outlined Carter for made the anpresident eff ort, buta plan the initiativeprepared failedin ISA to to create save recommendedof El Salvador, Carterthat Chile agreed participate with his plea in toSouth make Americanpolitical reforms naval athe better rest ofand Central lasting America. relationship, In Guatemala, in part because where Brazil’sthe leftists military were exercisesa precondition in 1980, for the NSC military Latin aid. American90 staff er Robert Pastor governmentweak and the was military unwilling and to ruling sign agreementselite strong that and required brutal (theyit to opposed DoD’s suggestion, discounting their concern that Chile submitsystematically human killedrights moderatereports to opponents),the State Department. Brown recommended77 mightIn October turn 1980to Moscow. Brown “Wetold arethe hardlypresident in dangerthat after of ninelosing months Chile no new programs but suggested cultivating moderate Guatemalan toof delayanyone it wasbut timethe militarists,”to send the aid.he stated. Brown’s Brzezinski case received excluded a setback the Ifmilitary Brazil hadleaders a relatively in thebenign hopes military they government, would moderate the same couldtheir Chileanwhen, in navy.late 1980, Pastor Salvadoran complained right-wing about “their security [DoD’s] forces continuedmurdered notgovernment’s be said for repressive Argentina, actions. whose “dirtyIn Honduras, war” against where Marxist the leftistrebels efffour orts American to undermine women the (three president’s of them human Catholic rights nuns). and security Carter andthreat other was opponents minimal, heof recommendedthe regime resulted making in thousands sure the military of Argentine held objectivessuspended in all Latin aid America.”and sent specialIn Pastor’s representatives eyes it was not to ainvestigate diff erence politicalpromised opponents,elections by dissidents,using increased and economicpotential aid,insurgents more foreigneither ofthe opinionmurder overand insisttactics, that but the outright government opposition. in San80 Salvador In all three rein disappearingmilitary sales, never and IMETto be asseen incentives. again or In thrown El Salvador, into secret the military- prisons countriesin the right-wing DoD’s eff deathort to squads.protect orTh reestablishe team concluded military relationsthat the whereappointed they werepresident, often tortured.Carlos ThHumberto is appalling Romero, record caused who theseemed U.S. failed,government but at wouldleast in investigate Brazil and Argentinaand move theyagainst made the some death tentative squads, Congressresponsive to to prohibit U.S. pressure all forms for of politicalsecurity assistanceliberalization, and arms represented sales to progressbut they thatrecommended eventually resultedwithholding in better fi scal relations year 1981 under military Reagan. aid Argentinato Brown inand August ISA 1977.the only78 Brown choice. wrote Th Vanceey favored in March encouraging 1978 that On(MTTs, Chile, trucks, DoD’s communications advice fell completely equipment, on deaf and ears. helicopters) until theRomero prohibition with nonmilitary was not contributing aid and limiting to better any humanactions rightsthat “would there, Washington could see the results of their eff orts. Carter agreed.91 butsqueeze rather him having because the of oppositehuman rightseff ect. violations.” Finally, the87 administration Another long-term problem child in the hemisphere was Cuba. agreed to release some money for spare military parts for Argentina Carter began his term hopeful that he could achieve a rapprochement 3430 3135 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy future,Washington it was frayedessential and to then harness snapped. their eff His orts government toward U.S. deteriorated objectives. inTime September was running 1978. outDoD on offi El cials Salvador, thought described they saw succinctlysome human by Militariesquickly. When would he be unleashed encouraged the to Nicaraguan embrace social, National economic, Guard and to rightsAssistant improvement, Secretary McGiff but it ertwas as hard “one to of tell. the Brzezinskisickest societies also claimed in the politicalattack indiscriminately reforms. Arms rebel-held sales provided cities, the towns, president and villages, a useful he andlost someworld.” success. An alliance In 1980 of theU.S.-Argentine military and relations an economic deteriorated oligarchy because faced flthe exible support tool toof this the end. middle At a class.major Although PRC meeting Somoza on Latin was quickAmerica to ofa radical Argentina’s opposition grain sales with to a theterrorist Soviet nucleus. Union, Thdespite e Romero private regime promises was incharge March that 1977, Cuba wasDeputy behind Secretary the Sandinistas, of Defense the CubansCharles hadDuncan been tounable support to prevent the U.S. opposition embargo kidnappings,and the junta’s bombings, support forand a shootingcoup in stressedcircumspect that inDoD’s their International support, working Military through Education Panama and and Training Costa Bolivia.of government Still, at offithe cials. end 88of Brown the year recommended Carter offi cials providing anticipated economic better (IMET)Rica. In program,May 1979, which sensing brought the kill, foreign they offijoined cers theto theSandinistas United relationsand military in an aid expected (nonlethal second tear term. gas,79 commercial purchases of U.S. Statesin earnest. for military Th e National training, Guard provided found an itself opportunity short of everything— to infl uence military equipment, and new engines for Guatemalan C–47 transport youngrockets, military hand grenades,leaders. Th mortar e rest ofrounds, the group and wasrecoilless less impressed, rifl e and Whileaircraft) Argentinaand taking hadpressure the offworst other human countries rights not to record sell arms in tothe El recommendingheavy machine gun“warm ammunition. relations withIts former civilian suppliers, and democratic Israel and hemisphere,Salvador—in Chilereturn under for better President human Augusto rights and Pinochet political ranreform. a close89 governments,Argentina, joined normal the United relations States with in embargoing non-repressive weapons. military85 second. In the face of Chile’s unwillingness to extradite Chilean regimes, but correct relations with repressive governments.”76 intelligenceBefore the deal offi could cers responsiblebe fi nalized withfor the Romero, assassination “reformist” of politicalmilitary In June 1979 Carter met with his key advisers. Brzezinski made the opponentoffi cers overthrew Orlando him Letelier in October in 1979.Washington, Th e Pentagon DC, stoodthe readyState Thcase ere for were a U.S. plenty peacekeeping of repressive force, military but regimesneither inBrown Latin nor America, Vance Departmentto provide the persuaded new Revolutionary Carter to sever Governing all military Junta ties with with nonlethal Chile. butagreed. initially Th e Brazil,president Argentina, emphatically and Chile opposed provided it. Brownthe focus. argued Of the it Brownmilitary felt assistance, compelled a 36-man to dissent military from mobile Vance’s training recommendation. team (MTT), three,was time Brazil to wasresupply the least the repressive.National Guard, Brown andnot tohis save staff Somozaencouraged but Given$4.5 million Chile’s instrategic FMS forsignifi trucks cance, and he communicationsargued for some honey equipment, rather Carterto allow to it opento stand a dialogue up to the with Sandinistas the military in a post-Somozaleadership to era.reverse On thanand $7.5all vinegar. million Afor total six cutoffUH–1H would Iroquois result helicopters. in loss of inflTh euence new “the17 July serious 1979 erosion Somoza of ourfl ed militaryNicaragua ties for with Miami; Brazil in . . two. our days fi rmest the amongSalvadoran the Chileanjunta and military the White and the House possibility dithered. of increased Both wanted Soviet allySandinistas in South assumed America.” power. Brzezinski86 supported OSD, noting that infl“multilateral uence there. cover” Carter for disregardedthe training thisteams advice, (Venezuela siding agreedwith the to Brazil, with its great economic prospects, could become a “regional anti-Pinochetprovide aid). Afteroffi cials talking in the to White Catholic House Archbishop and State. Oscar When Romero DoD stabilizer.”Brown outlined Carter for made the anpresident eff ort, buta plan the initiativeprepared failedin ISA to to create save recommendedof El Salvador, Carterthat Chile agreed participate with his plea in toSouth make Americanpolitical reforms naval athe better rest ofand Central lasting America. relationship, In Guatemala, in part because where Brazil’sthe leftists military were exercisesa precondition in 1980, for the NSC military Latin aid. American90 staff er Robert Pastor governmentweak and the was military unwilling and to ruling sign agreementselite strong that and required brutal (theyit to opposed DoD’s suggestion, discounting their concern that Chile submitsystematically human killedrights moderatereports to opponents),the State Department. Brown recommended77 mightIn October turn 1980to Moscow. Brown “Wetold arethe hardlypresident in dangerthat after of ninelosing months Chile no new programs but suggested cultivating moderate Guatemalan toof delayanyone it wasbut timethe militarists,”to send the aid.he stated. Brown’s Brzezinski case received excluded a setback the Ifmilitary Brazil hadleaders a relatively in thebenign hopes military they government, would moderate the same couldtheir Chileanwhen, in navy.late 1980, Pastor Salvadoran complained right-wing about “their security [DoD’s] forces continuedmurdered notgovernment’s be said for repressive Argentina, actions. whose “dirtyIn Honduras, war” against where Marxist the leftistrebels efffour orts American to undermine women the (three president’s of them human Catholic rights nuns). and security Carter andthreat other was opponents minimal, heof recommendedthe regime resulted making in thousands sure the military of Argentine held objectivessuspended in all Latin aid America.”and sent specialIn Pastor’s representatives eyes it was not to ainvestigate diff erence politicalpromised opponents,elections by dissidents,using increased and economicpotential aid,insurgents more foreigneither ofthe opinionmurder overand insisttactics, that but the outright government opposition. in San80 Salvador In all three rein disappearingmilitary sales, never and IMETto be asseen incentives. again or In thrown El Salvador, into secret the military- prisons countriesin the right-wing DoD’s eff deathort to squads.protect orTh reestablishe team concluded military relationsthat the whereappointed they werepresident, often tortured.Carlos ThHumberto is appalling Romero, record caused who theseemed U.S. failed,government but at wouldleast in investigate Brazil and Argentinaand move theyagainst made the some death tentative squads, Congressresponsive to to prohibit U.S. pressure all forms for of politicalsecurity assistanceliberalization, and arms represented sales to progressbut they thatrecommended eventually resultedwithholding in better fi scal relations year 1981 under military Reagan. aid Argentinato Brown inand August ISA 1977.the only78 Brown choice. wrote Th Vanceey favored in March encouraging 1978 that On(MTTs, Chile, trucks, DoD’s communications advice fell completely equipment, on deaf and ears. helicopters) until theRomero prohibition with nonmilitary was not contributing aid and limiting to better any humanactions rightsthat “would there, Washington could see the results of their eff orts. Carter agreed.91 butsqueeze rather him having because the of oppositehuman rightseff ect. violations.” Finally, the87 administration Another long-term problem child in the hemisphere was Cuba. agreed to release some money for spare military parts for Argentina Carter began his term hopeful that he could achieve a rapprochement 3430 3135 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

Welland air before ordnance. the U.S In negotiators,all, it amounted special to advisersa request Sol for Linowitz $1.5 billion and lobby.rest of Brzezinskithe housing concluded to be jointly that managedthe initiative and hadhanded been over a necessary in fi ve- Ellsworthin foreign militaryBunker, salesclosed (in the 1977 deal dollars) with Panama per year and through military 1983. leader As year“costly intervals. diversion,” Most since of Ancon it won Hill, the overlookingtrust of the PanamaArab moderates. City and Generalthe JCS andOmar ISA Torrijos, pointed the out, White without House priorities knew andit had justifi to cations,sell the ofTh egreat administration symbolic importance, had to raise wouldthe number return of to F–15 Panama. sales forPrevious Israel MATMONreturn to the C Senate was “not and a torational the public. planning Th edocument.” fi rst step required95 the offto ersequal included those fortransferring Saudi Arabia, only theand top agree of thatthe hill,the Saudisbut the could fi nal Joint Chiefs of Staff to support it. Th at task fell to Brown. Th e dealnot buymade air-to-ground exceptions only missiles for U.S. for hospitals,the aircraft. schools, Two andmonths other after key BrownChiefs’ maingreeted concerns Israeli Defensewere Panama’s Minister sovereignty Ezer Weizman over the on canal the installations.the package narrowlyIn all, the passeddeal off Congress,ered 40 percent Brown of reportedthe zone’s to land Carter and stepsand zoneof the after riverside its return entrance and tothe the need Pentagon for a unilateralon a frigid, right snowy of waterthat at to his Panama. meeting Th erewith would Jewish-American be wrangling overleaders, the amount“there wasof land no dayU.S. in intervention early March if 1978.the canal Th e wassecretary endangered. aff orded Brown him ansuggested equally andinclination water to on be their returned, part to and rehash additional the Mid-East details toarms iron package out, but sale.” the coldto JCS reception Chairman in his General Pentagon George offi ce. Brown He informed a neutrality Weizman agreement that Linowitz-AlexanderCarter believed the dealpackage cleared had the made way fora signifi an agreement. cant contribution69 MATMONthat would e Cxt wasend aa “longfter th shoppinge return olist”f th withe can aa “lotl, w iofth margin the rig inht it.”of to peace. He maintained a defeat would have been a real win for Theither e United the United States was States prepared or Panama to sell Israelto protect only $1 and billion defend in FMS the Ththe e Israelilast major lobby hurdle and waswould to disabusehave emboldened Torrijos of Begin thinking to bethat more the perwaterway year. Surprised as they saw at Brown’sfi t. Th e “veryother reserved”Chiefs were and not unforthcoming enthusiastic, Unitedintransigent States while would defl pay ating Panama the Saudisfor “past and injustices.” Egyptians. He DoD demanded spent attitude,yet they endorseda disappointed the idea. Weizman Th is “Brown-Brown left Washington. formula” He told proved Begin a billionconsiderable dollars eff up ort front juggling and $300 the aircraft million allotments per year until and the trying return to toone go of overthe keysthe toPentagon breaking chief’s the negotiation head with deadlockCarter when with theTorrijos two ofconvince the canal. Congress Linowitz that informedthe package him would that actuallyCongress increase would Israelinever leadersand persuading met later the that JCS month. to support At their the meeting, return. 67Begin Th e otherpared majordown “‘appropriateair superiority. taxpayers’ In retrospect, money the for eff ortthe seemedpurpose worth of persuading it.98 the breakthroughthe MATMON came C list,from but the notU.S. enough negotiators. for DoD’s Instead purposes. of one treaty Th e Panamanians to take away ‘our canal.’” An equally enraged Carter therepresident would passed be two: the one requests to cover to theDoD, period where until Deputy the termination Secretary Withagreed. the Torrijos passage backed of the aircraftdown, acceptingpackage, theinstead peace a processmore modestpicked ofCharles U.S. Duncanoperations advised of the Carter canal, to “holdand one off untilto ensure after the aircraftcanal’s up.package Brown of wasloans not and involved increased in thetolls. 13-day Th e dealnegotiations was sealed. at CampNow, neutralitypackage has after cleared its return. Congress.”68 Th e deal made sense to Carter and David,could the Maryland, Carter administration where Carter, sellSadat, it to and the Begin Senate hammered or would outthe the NSC staff .96 tentativecanal treaties peace go theaccords. way ofHe President did go Woodrowto the Catoctin Wilson’s MountainLeague of Still, the devil remained in the details in these negotiations. For presidentialNations?70 retreat for one day to brief Carter on the Defense Althoughthe Defense initially Department, skeptical the about key issuesthe proposed were: How $8 muchbillion ofFMS the budget. It was 15 September 1978, the day Sadat threatened to aircraftCanal Zone package should for beIsrael, returned Egypt, before and theSaudi fi nal Arabia turnover (since in 2000?it ran leave,Carter almost described collapsing ratifi cation the talks.of the Later Panama on Canalthe 15th, Treaties Brown as “theand againstHow could the DoDgrain Southernof his policies Command to limit headquartered arms sales), thereCarter operate came mostBrzezinski diffi cult met political with Weizman. battle I ever Th eyfaced, agreed including that as my part campaign of the aroundeff ectively to thewithin idea. a Itsmaller could greasearea? theAnd peace how processcould DoDin the sellMiddle the Campfor President.” David Accords, All the Washingtonnational security/foreign would fund policythe transfer agencies of East.return Brown’s to many advice in the was military to make for the whom combined the zone, package with for its Egypt neat Israelicontributed airfi elds to inan the orchestrated Sinai to the public Negev relations (under theand accords legislative the andsuburban Saudi lawns,Arabia golf roughly courses, equal and to commissaries,the one for Israel had and been assure a home the Sinaicampaign would to persuadebe returned a reluctant to Egypt). Congress Brown and later a skepticaltold Weizman: public twoaway were from inextricably home. Th elinked. main institutionalTo ensure success, opposition Brown resided argued, in “We the “Myto accept marching the treaties. orders State were andto make the White those House[bases] headed no more the capable eff ort. needArmy, from which the had outset been to draggingtie the elements its feet ofover the land package and togetherwater issues. and orBrown luxurious and other in the DoD Sinai offi than cials thosegave hundredsthey are toof replace.”speeches Carterto the maintainLinowitz wentthe political directly will to Secretaryto keep them of the tied.” Army Th Cliff is proved ord Alexander diffi cult, commentedAmerican public to Brzezinski (by comparison that he State did offinot cials “want gave Harold 1,500). 71Brown as(the Israel “stockholder” was unhappy of the with canal the enterprise, rough equality the direct of therepresentative package and of wandering around in the desert trying to fi gure out where to put the president—notfact that the Saudis under would Brown receive for this ten function). more sophisticated Th ey agreed F–15 on theWhere airfi eldsSecretary for the Brown Israelis, could with usbe havingmost toeff ective,foot the however, bill.” True was to aircraftPanamanian than solethe Isrealisauthority did. for97 the Pacifi c Port of Balboa (similar to hisconvincing instructions, senators Brown that and the DoD treaties drove adequately a hard bargain—no protected frills,U.S. Cristobal on the Atlantic) and joint control of waterway traffi c. Th e justsecurity; two basicand airconversely, bases built if withthe treatiesthe U.S. were Army rejected, Corps of the Engineers canal’s trans-isthmusAs expected, the railroad sales packages would passrequired to Panama a bruising without fi ght in conditions, Congress. actinginfrastructure as construction would be manager. vulnerable.99 Brown testifi ed before a number alongCarter with complained zone housing about occupied opposition by non-U.S.from the citizens,Jewish-American with the of congressional committees, but his testimony before the Senate 2638 3927 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

IfTh SALTe Negev II was bases ever constituted to gain Senate just ratifione cation—hardlypart of a larger a sure program thing Inand March poor, 1979Carter Carter would undertook stress human a mission rights, to Egyptimproved and Israeleconomic that givenwhereby strong the Carter opposition administration from conservative provided assistanceopponents—it and weapons would culminatedconditions, inand a peace democracy. treaty between By lifting the twoup thelongtime poor combatants.and middle needto Israel, JCS modernized approval. Brown the Egyptian had to army, bring and the sold Chiefs high-end on board, weapons but Brown,classes, Vance,Carter andhoped Brzezinski to blunt accompanied the appeal theof Cubanpresident. leader Realizing Fidel asto heSaudi told Arabia the president, to encourage they awere Middle only East tepidly peace. in favorIn February of it. Carter 1979 theCastro psychological and communism. importance Th eof fi U.S.rst step arms in sales this tonew Israel policy and Egypt,would proposedBrown visited to leave Israel, for Egypt,Vienna Jordan, to sign andSALT Saudi II without Arabia, even the fimeeting rst by a beBrown return again of thesuggested Panama speeding Canal tothem the up.Panamanian During the government, trip, when secretarywith the Joint of defense Chiefs, to a any potential of these blunder. nations. Brown Th e president insisted that instructed he fi nd whichBegin seemedhad been about seeking to turnsuch downa decision a peace for treaty,over a Browndecade. advised Carter Brownthe time. to Carter use his agreed. trip to Even emphasize more important, that a rapid he agreedEgyptian-Israeli to deploy sawCarter: a canal “I sense treaty Mr. as aBegin break considers from the concluding U.S. paternalistic a peace approach treaty is peacethe mobile treaty MX,was a the fi rst largest step to and a larger most accommodation powerful U.S. missile,in the Middle as the tomore Latin urgent America. for you With than one him. magnanimous If so, we need gesture to convince he would him thatwin East.price forIn Israel,JCS support Carter forauthorized SALT II. Brown62 to provide equipment and thetime respect has run and out gratitude . . . and of make the hemisphere. a fi nal attempt Yet the to canalblast himprovided into technical assistance in overcoming the loss of intelligence and early thea vital orbit shipping of statesman link between and peacemaker.” the Atlantic andIf Begin Pacifi refused,c Oceans, Brown with warningAs was often stemming the case fromfor the the Carter Sinai administration, withdrawal, but issues not did go not beyond work greatwanted strategic the president signifi cance.to tell himDoD the was deal able, was with off . Whilesome reluctance,Carter did theout asalready planned. decided After thefi scal Soviet year invasion1981 $1 of billion Afghanistan, in FMS the and president $785 tonot align follow itself Brown’s with advice Carter’s per policies se, he and for hisPanama. aides conveyed Th e successful to the millionpulled the in treatysecurity from assistance. the ratifi cationIn Egypt, process, Brown’s knowing message that was he would clear: Israelinegotiation prime of minister the canal that treaties, it was their showdown ratifi cation time. campaign At last, inBegin the anever closer get security a two-thirds relationship majority. with Nevertheless, Washington Brown’s required eff orts peace to ensure with agreedSenate, to and the the terms successful for a peace passage treaty. of legislationA more fl exible to fund Sadat the followed transfer Israel.that the If agreements the Saudis did wanted not impair a special U.S. national relationship, security Washington were hardly suit.process After constituted some fi nal major negotiations accomplishments between Brown in which and his Brown Egyptian and expectedin vain. While them SALTto support II was the never peace ratifi and ed keep by thethe Senate,oil fl owing. both sides andDoD Israeli fully participated.counterparts64 on respective FMS, Carter, Sadat, and initially abided by its terms and it became the basis for negotiating Begin signed a peace treaty in Washington on 26 March 1979.101 theBrown Strategic reported Arms to Carter Reduction after his Treaty trip that (START) “time is probablynegotiated running under Completed in 1914, the canal had lost some of its military usefulness Presidentagainst success” Ronald of Reagan, an Egyptian-Israeli signed by President peace treaty. George To makeH. W. Sadat’s Bush Carterby 1977, hoped mainly to usebecause the successthe 13 ofU.S. the aircraft peace treatycarriers to (and forge thus an inpeace 1991, with and Israel ratifi ed“digestible in 1994. STARTto the Iother outlived moderate the Cold Arabs,” War itself the overalltheir multiple settlement escorts) in the could Middle not Easttransit that it included(nor could the supertankers). Palestinians. untilUnited it expiredStates had in lateto off 2009. er more In April than 2010 a comprehensive President Barack Middle Obama East ABrown key toinformed this process Carter: would “In besum, support assured from ability Saudi to Arabia,transit the andpeace. Russian Brown Presidentsuggested regionalDmitry economicMedvedev development, signed a new additional START, chiefcanal firemains nancial of supporter military importance,of the Palestinians. though Althoughrather less opposedthan in the to reducingarms sales the (although START Inot limits blank on warheadschecks), and and a delivery U.S. presence systems (notby 74 a thepast.” treaty Brown’s on theview grounds was in keepingit did not with solve the Carterthe overall administration’s Palestinian percent.military63 base) SALT in IIthe did region. not cap Joint the military nuclear planning arms race and as armsintelligence- control problem,conclusion after that the the Iranian basic U.S. Revolution national and interest the Soviet did not invasion reside inof sharingadvocates were had nothoped; enough. rather, “Everyone it established has parameters a [FMS] underlist,” Brownwhich Afghanistanownership of the the desert canal kingdom and zone, felt but vulnerable. rather in a For waterway years the that Saudis was continued.both sides spent For allenormous Middle amountsEast allies, of moneyhe recommended within those speeding ground hadsafe, discussedeffi cient, neutral,with Washington and continuously ways to openupgrade to shipping. their obsolete65 air uprules. approvals Nevertheless, of arms SALT sales II (without gave impetus increasing to a process dollar thatlevels over where the force. Th e Ford administration had agreed to sell the Saudis F–15s. creditdecades was drastically involved). reduced Egypt, nuclear formerly weapons. dependent Brown’s on Soviet insistence arms thatand ItTh eis Carteralmost 1978 impossible aircraft topackage exaggerate deal wonhow U.S.controversial congressional the spareit not partslimit nowthe potentialno longer for available, conventional required cruise a sharpmissiles infusion has been of returnapproval of of the the canal sale. Thand e Saudiszone became now wanted in 1977. a package It energized of weapon the U.S.justifi armsed by and the equipment.eff ective use Carter of these took weapons from Brown’sin recent advice confl icts. that the Newsystems Right, and equipmentwhich opposed that wouldit through enhance a grassroots the F–15s campaign which they of Arabs and Israelis all wanted “excessive American military sales and/ politicalwould receive techniques in the that 1980s. would It becomecomprised its hallmark—directthe so-called Big mail,Five: or fi nancial aid.” Th e president and NSC staff concluded that arms computerizedmultiple ejector support/donor bomb racks lists,for a engagementlarger payload, of the conformal news media, fuel Panama and Latin America sales should not exclusively drive Middle East policy, but such sales populartanks extending demonstrations, the F–15s’ and range, focused AIM–9L pressure Sidewinder on legislators. air-to-air andCarter grants envisioned proved a adetermining Latin America factor. diff100 erent from the one he Politicians,missiles for mediaF–15s, fi gures,KC–130 fi lm boomstars, andtanker military aircraft offi cersfor refuelinglined up inherited in January 1977. Instead of dictatorial rule by caudillo onthem, either and side AWACS of the aircraftargument, to supportwith the the public F–15s. overwhelmingly All of these leaders, military juntas, or oligarchies, and a chasm separating rich opposingsystems would return. better66 allow the Saudis to protect their large and 2440 4125 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy sparselyand the Armspopulated Control kingdom and Disarmament by dramatically Agency upgrading did not trade their away air Thof the e meeting treaty inon 1985. 26 June Brown 1980 and with his Sultan staff lastedfought seven a rearguard hours. Brownaction force.the potential With increased of CMs for range a quick and andbomb easy and SALT missile II agreement. fi repower,53 the reportedagainst attempts to the president by ACDA that and “I thinkState weto haveoff er defusedthese and the F–15other F–15 became essentially an attack fi ghter that could potentially issue,”concessions but he to warned the Soviets that tothe gain Saudis an agreement.expected more56 approvals after poseBrown a threathad some to Israel. advantages To make during the issuedeliberations more controversial, in Washington the the presidential election. As for AWACS aircraft, Brown fi nessed Saudisabout SALT were pushingII. An expert for the in F–15 nuclear enhancements weapons and in conversant 1980, the U.S.with theIn late issue December by off ering 1977 to deploy Vance U.S.-piloted and ACDA and Director maintained Paul Warnke aircraft presidentialSALT technical election issues, year. he had been an adviser to SALT I before forinformed joint U.S.-Saudi Carter that training “the serious and study issues of remaining their capacity. were Brownsmall” alsoand joining the Carter team. During early 1977 policy discussions at raiseda treaty with could Sultan be thesigned use inof Saudispring facilities 1978.57 inBrown the event disagreed of a Soviet that U.S.Special Ambassador Coordination to Saudi Committee Arabia meetings John West Brown argued took that the the lead. U.S. If theattack issues in theremaining Middle wereEast andinconsequential. urged improved Th ey U.S.-Saudi included themilitary U.S. responseBrown supported to the Big a specifi Five cprovided SALT initiative, a “litmus Carter test” andof thethe specialWhite rightcooperation. to decide A whatworried aircraft Sultan could asked carry if BrownALCMs was and talking the need about to relationshipHouse (although between not SALT Washington II critics) and could Riyadh, feel assured and ita waspositive both rebutU.S. bases the Soviet in his contentionkingdom (the that Saudis CM carriersgreatly fearedshould the be prospectcounted ofas responsefeasible and was not “no detrimental longer an option”to U.S. butinterests. rather Furthermore,“an imperative.” the moreAmerican than GIs one on strategic their soil). nuclear Brown delivery answered system no bases, in the just fi nal potential SALT BrownSenate haddisagreed: to ratify “I SALTthink II.this Th is e aJoint terrible Chiefs idea. of ItStaff would would feed need the IIuse aggregates. of facilities. Brown A relieved opposed Sultan the Soviet rose fromcontention his chair that and the shooktreaty Saudi’sto bless [thesic] delusiontreaty in thatSenate they hearings. can defend With themselves his good relationsfrom external with shouldthe secretary’s apply to hand. both Th nuclear e consensus and conventional among the cruiseNSC staffmissiles. was thatTh e &the internal Chiefs, threatsBrown providedwith sophisticated the conduit weapons for JCS they approval. can’t use.”54 But BackfiBrown re did question, a “superb in jobthe ofsecretary’s delivering view, the was F–15 far news” from resolved.and trying Th toe Brown found himself odd man out as both Brzezinski and Carter Jointengage Chiefs the Saudis of Staff in werejoint adamantplanning infor their defense belief of thatthe Middle the Backfi East. re agreedCarter withinsisted West. on102 presenting the Soviets with the so-called constitutedStill, Brown a reminded strategic weapon, the president a view that also the held Saudis by SALT expected II critics. some58 Comprehensive/Deep Cuts Proposal in early 1977 in an attempt good news on the F–15 enhancements after the election.104 Brownto jump-start did persuade the negotiations. the president Th eto proposal allow him drastically to meet limitedwith Saudi the In SCC meetings that spring, the heated debates on the fi nal details numberDefense ofMinister strategic Prince nuclear Sultan delivery before systems responding for both to the sides, request but ofAt SALTthe endII betweenof September Brown and1980, Warnke Iraq sometimesinvaded Iran, degenerated causing retainedfor the Big the Five. 2,500km In the limitsecretary’s for ALCMs mind, thein returnU.S.-Saudi for accepting relationship the intogreat shoutingconcern matches. in Saudi Th eArabia. ACDA Atdirector DoD’s wanted recommendation, to button up Soviethad descended assertion into that athe “Sears Backfi and re Roebuck”was not a strategicapproach weapon. of equipment When the agreement.administration Th e secretaryrushed four opposed AWACS concessions to Saudi that Arabia, he believed with thedeliveries Soviets instead rejected of the focusing proposal on as the too overall advantageous military to relationship the United gavesupporting potential equipment advantages and to personnel, Moscow. 59and Brown two land-basedinsisted to mobileCarter States,and better some absorption arms control and management proponents of grumbledweapon systems. that Brown’s Brown thatradar U.S.systems intercontinental as well as military ballistic teams missiles to assess (ICBMs) and defi had ne Saudito be insistencehoped to driveon the home 2,500km this pointlimit hadwith doomed Sultan. theBefore deal. he55 traveled to mobile,needs. Th with e Saudis multiple agreed aiming to raise points, their or oil they production would be to vulnerable make up Geneva to meet the Saudi defense minister, Brown conferred with tofor a the Soviet loss fiof rst Iraqi strike oil by from its accuratethe war.105 SS–18 and SS–19 ICBMs. If BrzezinskiTh e Carter andadministration Secretary of regrouped, State Edmund fashioned Muskie SALT (Vance II initiatives resigned Moscow refused to accept this proposition, Brown recommended afterthat wouldthe failed defer Iran the hostage Backfi rescuere and mission). CM issues Th eyuntil agreed SALT Brown III thatIn the the midst president of a makereelection a unilateral campaign, declaration Carter of had U.S. little intention time for to shouldnegotiations, off er the and Saudis envisioned only Sidewinders, both a shorter but protocolpromise Sultanlasting theytwo produceSaudi Arabia. a mobile Military ICBM. sales Carter to theeventually desert agreed.kingdom60 Negotiations could only wouldyears (later consult changed Congress to three) on the and conformal a treaty extending fuel tanks, to aerial 1985. boom U.S. hurtwith histhe electionSoviets chances.continued. When By Januarynews of 1979the F–15 the enhancementsWhite House tankers,policymakers and includedAWACS in(Airborne the SALT Warning II protocol and theControl Soviet System)600km leaked,began preparations Carter confi forrmed a summit that the to Saudis sign the would SALT get II noagreements, off ensive aircraft.limitation Th on e secretary the range was of enjoined all CMs, from except raising those the launched topic of bomb from capabilitiesbut minor although that could still be diffi used cult against issues Israel,prevented including an early the signing. bomb racks.heavy Brownbombers. argued Brown that disagreed. he should To also DoD, off erthis the would aerial eliminaterefueling racks.Finally, Th in e June Saudis 1979, were with outraged. all issues Visiting ironed out,Saudi the Arabia agreement in mid- was tankersGLCMs (a and capability SLCMs deniedas theater Israel), nuclear but forceswith theor asproviso longer-range that it Novemberready. At a Vienna1980, JCSsummit, Chairman attended General by Brown David and JCSJones Chairman received requiredconventional congressional weapons forapproval, at least andthe termshould of Congressthe protocol. agree, It mightIsrael anGeneral earful. David Without Jones, the Carter Big Five,and BrezhnevSultan considered signed the the protocol six F–15s and wouldset the demandprecedent and for probably future limitations get the same since capability. the Soviets103 continued scheduledthe treaty.61 to arrive shortly valueless. Sultan gave Jones two weeks to maintain that the 600km limit should extend through the end to come up with an answer on the sale of F–15 enhancements 2242 4323 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy sparselyand the Armspopulated Control kingdom and Disarmament by dramatically Agency upgrading did not trade their away air Thof the e meeting treaty inon 1985. 26 June Brown 1980 and with his Sultan staff lastedfought seven a rearguard hours. Brownaction force.the potential With increased of CMs for range a quick and andbomb easy and SALT missile II agreement. fi repower,53 the reportedagainst attempts to the president by ACDA that and “I thinkState weto haveoff er defusedthese and the F–15other F–15 became essentially an attack fi ghter that could potentially issue,”concessions but he to warned the Soviets that tothe gain Saudis an agreement.expected more56 approvals after poseBrown a threathad some to Israel. advantages To make during the issuedeliberations more controversial, in Washington the the presidential election. As for AWACS aircraft, Brown fi nessed Saudisabout SALT were pushingII. An expert for the in F–15 nuclear enhancements weapons and in conversant 1980, the U.S.with theIn late issue December by off ering 1977 to deploy Vance U.S.-piloted and ACDA and Director maintained Paul Warnke aircraft presidentialSALT technical election issues, year. he had been an adviser to SALT I before forinformed joint U.S.-Saudi Carter that training “the serious and study issues of remaining their capacity. were Brownsmall” alsoand joining the Carter team. During early 1977 policy discussions at raiseda treaty with could Sultan be thesigned use inof Saudispring facilities 1978.57 inBrown the event disagreed of a Soviet that U.S.Special Ambassador Coordination to Saudi Committee Arabia meetings John West Brown argued took that the the lead. U.S. If theattack issues in theremaining Middle wereEast andinconsequential. urged improved Th ey U.S.-Saudi included themilitary U.S. responseBrown supported to the Big a specifi Five cprovided SALT initiative, a “litmus Carter test” andof thethe specialWhite rightcooperation. to decide A whatworried aircraft Sultan could asked carry if BrownALCMs was and talking the need about to relationshipHouse (although between not SALT Washington II critics) and could Riyadh, feel assured and ita waspositive both rebutU.S. bases the Soviet in his contentionkingdom (the that Saudis CM carriersgreatly fearedshould the be prospectcounted ofas responsefeasible and was not “no detrimental longer an option”to U.S. butinterests. rather Furthermore,“an imperative.” the moreAmerican than GIs one on strategic their soil). nuclear Brown delivery answered system no bases, in the just fi nal potential SALT BrownSenate haddisagreed: to ratify “I SALTthink II.this Th is e aJoint terrible Chiefs idea. of ItStaff would would feed need the IIuse aggregates. of facilities. Brown A relieved opposed Sultan the Soviet rose fromcontention his chair that and the shooktreaty toSaudi’s bless [thesic] delusiontreaty in thatSenate they hearings. can defend With themselves his good relationsfrom external with shouldthe secretary’s apply to hand. both Th nuclear e consensus and conventional among the cruiseNSC staffmissiles. was thatTh e the& internal Chiefs, threatsBrown providedwith sophisticated the conduit weapons for JCS they approval. can’t use.”54 But BackfiBrown re did question, a “superb in jobthe ofsecretary’s delivering view, the was F–15 far news” from resolved.and trying Th toe Brown found himself odd man out as both Brzezinski and Carter Jointengage Chiefs the Saudis of Staff in werejoint adamantplanning infor their defense belief of thatthe Middle the Backfi East. re agreedCarter withinsisted West. on102 presenting the Soviets with the so-called constitutedStill, Brown a reminded strategic weapon, the president a view that also the held Saudis by SALT expected II critics. some58 Comprehensive/Deep Cuts Proposal in early 1977 in an attempt good news on the F–15 enhancements after the election.104 Brownto jump-start did persuade the negotiations. the president Th eto proposal allow him drastically to meet limitedwith Saudi the In SCC meetings that spring, the heated debates on the fi nal details Defensenumber ofMinister strategic Prince nuclear Sultan delivery before systems responding for both to the sides, request but ofAt SALTthe endII betweenof September Brown and1980, Warnke Iraq sometimesinvaded Iran, degenerated causing forretained the Big the Five. 2,500km In the limitsecretary’s for ALCMs mind, thein returnU.S.-Saudi for accepting relationship the intogreat shoutingconcern matches. in Saudi Th eArabia. ACDA Atdirector DoD’s wanted recommendation, to button up hadSoviet descended assertion into that athe “Sears Backfi and re Roebuck”was not a strategicapproach weapon. of equipment When the agreement.administration Th e secretaryrushed four opposed AWACS concessions to Saudi that Arabia, he believed with deliveriesthe Soviets instead rejected of the focusing proposal on as the too overall advantageous military to relationship the United gavesupporting potential equipment advantages and to personnel, Moscow. 59and Brown two land-basedinsisted to mobileCarter andStates, better some absorption arms control and management proponents of grumbledweapon systems. that Brown’s Brown thatradar U.S.systems intercontinental as well as military ballistic teams missiles to assess (ICBMs) and defi had ne Saudito be hopedinsistence to driveon the home 2,500km this pointlimit hadwith doomed Sultan. theBefore deal. he55 traveled to mobile,needs. Th with e Saudis multiple agreed aiming to raise points, their or oil they production would be to vulnerable make up Geneva to meet the Saudi defense minister, Brown conferred with tofor a the Soviet loss fiof rst Iraqi strike oil by from its accuratethe war.105 SS–18 and SS–19 ICBMs. If BrzezinskiTh e Carter andadministration Secretary of regrouped, State Edmund fashioned Muskie SALT (Vance II initiatives resigned Moscow refused to accept this proposition, Brown recommended afterthat wouldthe failed defer Iran the hostage Backfi rescuere and mission). CM issues Th eyuntil agreed SALT Brown III thatIn the the midst president of a makereelection a unilateral campaign, declaration Carter of had U.S. little intention time for to shouldnegotiations, off er the and Saudis envisioned only Sidewinders, both a shorter but protocolpromise Sultanlasting theytwo produceSaudi Arabia. a mobile Military ICBM. sales Carter to theeventually desert agreed.kingdom60 Negotiations could only wouldyears (later consult changed Congress to three) on the and conformal a treaty extending fuel tanks, to aerial 1985. boom U.S. hurtwith histhe electionSoviets chances.continued. When By Januarynews of 1979the F–15 the enhancementsWhite House tankers,policymakers and includedAWACS in(Airborne the SALT Warning II protocol and theControl Soviet System)600km leaked,began preparations Carter confi forrmed a summit that the to Saudis sign the would SALT get II noagreements, off ensive aircraft.limitation Th on e secretary the range was of enjoined all CMs, from except raising those the launched topic of bomb from capabilitiesbut minor although that could still be diffi used cult against issues Israel,prevented including an early the signing. bomb racks.heavy Brownbombers. argued Brown that disagreed. he should To also DoD, off erthis the would aerial eliminaterefueling racks.Finally, Th in e June Saudis 1979, were with outraged. all issues Visiting ironed out,Saudi the Arabia agreement in mid- was tankersGLCMs (a and capability SLCMs deniedas theater Israel), nuclear but forceswith theor asproviso longer-range that it Novemberready. At a Vienna1980, JCSsummit, Chairman attended General by Brown David and JCSJones Chairman received requiredconventional congressional weapons forapproval, at least andthe termshould of Congressthe protocol. agree, It mightIsrael anGeneral earful. David Without Jones, the Carter Big Five,and BrezhnevSultan considered signed the the protocol six F–15s and wouldset the demandprecedent and for probably future limitations get the same since capability. the Soviets103 continued scheduledthe treaty.61 to arrive shortly valueless. Sultan gave Jones two weeks to maintain that the 600km limit should extend through the end to come up with an answer on the sale of F–15 enhancements 2242 4323 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

1846 4719 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

AyatollahKorean policy Ruhollah was hardly Khomeini, a success. was On poised the otherto return hand, toCarter’s Iran. thesouped-up, end of Carter’sexport-only term. version Brown of andthe F–5EDoD Tigerwere responsibleII. ACDA andfor ConfusedChina policy and of dejected,normalizing the relationsIranian withHigh Beijing Command proved vacillated a major examiningOMB opposed military the saleoperations (the former that forcould arms punish control Iran reasons, after the betweenaccomplishment. supporting Brown the Bakhtiar successfully government, reintroduced mounting DoD ato military China hostageslatter for fiwere nancial). released Carter (Carter’s off ered onlyinitial more inclination), F–5E aircraft, encourage which coup,policy orfrom cutting which a dealit had with been Khomeini. shut out Withduring Khomeini’s the Nixon-Ford- return IranTaiwan to bealready more had,forthcoming and/or Israeliin negotiations Kfi r interceptors for their withrelease, U.S. or imminent,Kissinger years. Brown Unlike probed Brzezinski, Huyser Brown about did what not circumstanceswant to poke discourageengines. Taiwan Iran turnedfrom harming down the the deal. captives.45 Unlike many in the wouldthe China require card a in coup the Sovietand whether Union’s there eye. Hewas emphasized a specifi c window the off setof Carter administration who expected the hostages to be released opportunityvalue of China for insuch the action. U.S.-Soviet Huyser military replied balance,that the moregiven time that the20 quickly,Th e next Brown issue centered worried onthat what it “may arms be the a long United crisis.” States He wouldsuggested sell generalspercent ofhad Soviet the better, military but assetsthey werefaced “psychologically China. Brown preparedargued for to andto Taiwan received after presidential the one-year authorization embargo following to move the 1 U.S.January military 1979 act.”early Brownnormalization asked if aof coup relations would and involve a rough many parallelism casualties. ofHuyser U.S. forcesnormalization closer to of Iran relations so as withto improve China. Brownthe prospects and JCS for Chairman military answeredmilitary relations yes.110 with the Soviet Union and China.42 actionGeneral should David the Jones need assured arise.112 senators that Taiwan was secure and an invasion from the mainland unlikely, but Congress insisted on AfterHuyser’s Washington advice proved and Beijingoverly optimistic.established As full Eric diplomatic von Marbod, relations the AlthoughU.S. sales suffihe believedcient to defendthat diplomacy the island. was Just the before best Brown option went for indeputy January director 1979, of theVice Defense President Security Walter Assistance Mondale Agency, visited reported China. tothe Beijing, time being, the Carter Brown administration worried that announced time would the sap sale the of $287U.S. Afrom year Tehran later Brown(where hewas was the working next high-level out arrangements visitor to to trek terminate to the millioncase and in diminish defensive international weapons, almost support all older for theweapons hostages’ that Taiwanrelease. Middlethe military Kingdom, assistance the program),fi rst secretary the ofgenerals defense could to do not so. stage Just abefore coup alreadyHe considered possessed. the46 mining of Iran’s harbors (instead of the more hebecause left, thethey Soviet could notUnion count invaded on the Afghanistan support of their in late troops. December When intensive and risky options of blockading ports, bombing Iran’s 1979.Khomeini Carter returned, revised theBrown’s Iranian instructions High Command to allow discussiondisintegrated of oilGiven refi nerythe onconservative Kharg Island, nature or bombing of Japanese the Iranian security air force)policy, as theand salethe Bakthiarof U.S. nonlethalgovernment military was replaced equipment by one and controlled some high- by theKorean best eventualwithdrawal military plans action. and theMining, normalization although anof act relations of war, tKhomeiniechnology andtran sthefer sother to C hreligiousina.43 Br oleaders.wn als oIn re cretrospect,eived last- mBrowninute waswith a China “bloodless upset act the of leadership war, like invadingin Tokyo. an Th embassy e traditional and takingU.S.- candidlyauthorization summed to consultup the U.S.on howdilemma to deal about with the Afghanistancoup possibility: and hostages,”Japan relationship according seemed to Brown. to be Carter changing. seemed Brown receptive, took onbut thehe “[It]to support was an Pakistan. attractive When idea. ThBrown e trouble met withwas that Deng he Xiaoping,[Huyser] wasthe preferredmajor responsibility to give economic for reassuring sanctions the a chance,Japanese especially that their given security that pushingChinese atpremier the wet made end itof clear a stick.” that111 coordinating anti-Soviet policy thererelations was withstill somethe United hope that States negotiations remained mightsound succeed.and permanent.113 was fi ne as long as it was more than “symbolic.” Deng continued During his numerous trips to Japan—more than twice as many U.S.prophetically: fortunes in “We Iran mustwent fromturn badAfghanistan to worse when, into ona quagmire4 November in Byas SecretaryMarch 1980 Vance negotiations made—and seemed with tovisiting be getting Japanese nowhere. leaders Th ine 1979,which Iranianthe Soviet radical Union students is bogged seized down the for U.S. a long Embassy time, engagedin Tehran, in nextWashington, month Carter Brown again pressed asked for for more military Japanese operations, defense but spending, by this takingguerrilla 63 warfare.” hostages Brown (an additional agreed, but three noted were that at the “we Iranian must keep Foreign our timeimproved Brown joint decided U.S.-Japanese that mining defense was not planning, a viable optionand a largerfor several role Ministry;intentions six confi escaped dential.” to the Discounted Canadian byEmbassy pundits residence at the time, and werewho reasons:in regional the Sovietssecurity could for sweepthe Japan the mines; Self-Defense mining wouldForces also(JSDF). close rescuedexpected in an a announcementlater operation). of Of a jointthe 66 strategy hostages, on 28Afghanistan, were military the theIt could principal be an Iraqi exasperating oil port of Basratask. Japan’s(Iraq was 1947 considered American-written a potential ortrip DoD laid the employees. foundation For for the a Sino-American remainder of themilitary Carter relationship. presidency,44 friend);constitution, it might the encourageJapanese perceptionretaliation thatagainst the the Soviet hostages; Union and and it the crisis dominated foreign and national security policy, engaging wouldChina diddiminish not pose support real threats, within theand Islamic the nation’s world post-World for the U.S. War case. II NormalizationCarter and his oftop relationsadvisers, withincluding Beijing Brown, ended in thealmost close endless U.S. Carter’scommitment advisers, to antimilitarism including Brown, made itsuccessfully hard to persuade persuaded Japanese him militarymeetings relationshipon how to free with the Taiwan. hostages. Brown oversaw an extensive toleaders go the to attainrescue theroute. goal When of 1 percent negotiations of GNP for spending the hostage on defense. release drawdown of U.S. military facilities on the island. Th e fi rst collapsed,Th e secretary Carter warned broke the diplomatic president relationsthat the Japanesewith Iran, were declared unlikely an controversialTh e White House issue the and administration the State Department, tackled was bothwhat responsibleall-weather embargoto quicken on “their U.S. exportstortoise-like to Iran, pace” and on allowed defense. claims He tohoped be made that interceptorfor the negotiating fi ghter aircrafteff orts tothe release United the States hostages, should endured sell to Taiwana long, againstduring thefrozen next Iranian fi ve years assets the in JSDF the United would States.be able A to conversation perform its beforefrustrating normalization. series of dead DoD, ends andState, dashed and hopesJCS recommendedthat lasted until a own air defense, broaden its antisubmarine coverage, assume a

1846 4719 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy betweenTo make Brownmatters andworse, White a Defense House Intelligence Chief of Staff Agency Hamilton assessment Jordan of Thworker e Carter uprising administration’s in Kwangju Province;response andto naked the Chun Soviet government’s aggression epitomizedthe North, thenthe situation:generally accepted“We are inby amost box, ofHarold. the U.S. We’ve intelligence broken inplanned Afghanistan execution was of primarily major political clandestine opponent action. Kim Even Dae beforeJung. Ththe e relationscommunity, with leaked Iran to and the imposedpublic in Januarysanctions, 1979. but In we plain still words, have theno bizarreSoviet invasion,assassination the ofUnited Park Stateson 26 beganOctober a cautious1979 by and his modestKorean leverageleaked assessment on Khomeini. concluded Brown that replied: Carter’s “Neither withdrawal the wouldnaval blockade invite an centralprogram intelligence of secret operationsagency director to support took Washington Afghan insurgents, by surprise. the norattack mining from the harbors North. 33will Carter’s bring advisers, the hostages including home.” Brown, Jordanagreed Cartermujahideen was on (holy vacation, warriors), leaving that Brown, included Vance, propaganda and Brzezinski support, to interjected:it was time to“Except rethink in the boxes.” withdrawal Th e two policy. men Aagreed resulting that PRM rescue study was dealhumanitarian with the crisis, relief, which and nonlethal turned out aid. to beOSD a sordid offi cials aff airargued fueled that by “thestated best that of even a lousy with set timely of options.” U.S. air,114 naval, and logistical support, toothis muchsecret alcoholcampaign, and espoused internal byROK an NSCrivalries. group,37 concentrated too South Korean forces could not stop a North Korean invasion without much on propaganda and not enough on assistance that would ThU.S. e abortivecombat troops.rescue Carteroperation reluctantly of April agreed, 1980, buta military held off operationmaking a makeTh e subsequent a diff erence. rise ofAfter General the ChunSoviet Do invasion Hwan andof Decemberhis takeover 1979, of the thatfi nal endeddecision tragically until he incould the meetIranian face-to-face desert, is with beyond Park. the34 scope of acountry shocked in allCarter but nameinstituted in December a series of1979 diplomatic, provided neweconomic, challenges. and this study. Suffi ce it to say that Brown took full responsibility for its culturalWhen Chun steps crackedto protest down the oninvasion, student including and political calling opponents, off U.S. failure,Th e next which month had aCarter, devastating Brown, impact Vance, on the and morale Brzezinski of Carter visited and participationBrown postponed in the the 1980 1980 Moscow Security Olympics. Consultative Most important,Meeting with the hisSeoul. advisers Th e astrip well proved as on athe fi asco. president’s Carter future and Parkelectoral instantly chances. rubbed Nor UnitedSouth Korea States against increased the itsadvice support of Ambassador of the Afghan William rebels, Gleysteen adding eachwas DoDother involvedthe wrong in way.the frustratingPark complained diplomatic about negotiations the withdrawal, that theand purchaseGeneral John of lethal Wickham, weapons the commanderand communications in chief of equipmentU.S. forces hypingalso undercut the threat the Carterfrom the presidency. North. Th In e addition,president thepassed Iran Brown debacle a in Korea.conjunction 38 Chun’s with government other interested responded states to indemonstrations the area. Th e in United Seoul noterevealed stating a void that in theif Park U.S. continued ability to projectlike this its he power would into withdraw the Persian all Statesand Kwangju encountered with martial diffi cultieslaw and in repression. procuring When the demonstrations weapons the U.S.Gulf, troopsas DoD from ruled South out oneKorea. military Carter option countered after toanother Park thatagainst he mujahideenbroke out into needed, an armed such as rebellion the Soviet in shoulder-fiKwangju, redthe SA–7government missile wasIran. withdrawing Th e rescue mission, only 3,000 called (actually off for the3,300) lack ofof 42,000one helicopter, authorized did ablereacted to bringwith excessivedown helicopters force, implying or prop thatplanes, the asUnited Moscow States and hadthe troops,nothing lectured to diminish the theROK perception president of on U.S. human weakness. rights, and chided Easternsanctioned bloc such clamped a violent down put-down. on international In Washington, sales of Carter’s them. 115advisers him for not spending as much on defense based on a percentage (including Brown) concluded that the ROK had to restore order in ofTh egross Islamic national revolution product thatas the overthrew United Statesthe shahdid. Threpresented e Korean FightingKwangju beforebasically Washington with captured could resume weapons—few pressure for armsreform were and promisedonly one ofto spendthe dramatic more on events defense, in thebut theMiddle trip hadEast, not the obtained Persian actuallypolitical liberalization.reaching them Th in ey 1980—the never gave Chunmujahideen the green performed light to crackwell, Park’sGulf, andagreement Southwest on withdrawals. Asia that shook35 the underpinnings of U.S. downbut the on insurgencydissidents, norassumed were they the asked classic to dostalemate so.39 of a guerrilla policy across the region. In April 1978 Marxist/Leninist Afghan war. Th e Soviets controlled the cities, the air space, and lines of politiciansAfter returning overthrew to Washington, their government, Brzezinski, altering Brown, the and nonaligned Vance all communication.Unwilling to forgive Th eyand could forget, move Brown around remained by convoy an opponent or air, but of statusrecommended of this traditional that Carter buff withdraw er state. Inonly December one I-Hawk 1979 surface-to- the Soviet theChun rebels and heldhis militarythe countryside. junta. He Th argued e Afghan for armycontinued was adeferral shell of of a Unionair missile invaded battalion Afghanistan and 1,500 ostensibly support to troops, aid and revisiting to sustain further the force,SCM meetingsrequiring and the refusalSoviet totroops place to U.S. assume troops most in Koreaof the under fi ghting. the communistwithdrawals revolutionin 1981 during there. WithCarter’s Iran expected under asecond hostile term.theocracy Th e UnderCombined Secretary Forces of Command, Defense for so Policyas not “toRobert do them Komer any argued favors that andpresident Afghanistan’s agreed but governmentwashed his hands and of major Korea, instructingcities under Brown Soviet to thehelp stalemate legitimize off the ered new the crowd.” possibility40 When of keepingdissident the political resistance leader going Kim domination,consult with Congressthe Carter and Brzezinskiadministration to make faced the announcement.uncertainty and36 Daefor years Jung and was draining found guilty Soviet of resources. fomenting116 the Kwangju uprising—a instability in Southwest Asia. Pakistan emerged as the principal patently trumped-up charge—Carter assigned Brown the unenviable regionalCarter’s bulwarkdecision againstleft Korean these setbacks, policy butto itVance, was hardly Brown, an idealand taskAfter of Carter traveling lost toin 1980,Seoul inPresident December Ronald 1980 Reagan to persuade and Director Chun toof candidateBrzezinski. to While defend theSouthwest long, drawnAsia. In out addition, withdrawal Carter’s saga national had commuteCentral Intelligence the sentence. William Brown Casey, failed, with keybut supportersthe incoming in Congress, Reagan securityweakened team U.S.-ROK explored relations,ways to improve four interrelated the United events States’ disrupted ability to administrationincreased clandestine saved supportKim with of athe promise Afghan to resistance, Chun, by allowing then the it projectthem even its powermore: inthe the assassination Persian Gulf of and President Southwest Park; Asia. the political newlyto wear elected down ROKand eventually president defeat(2,500 the handpicked Soviets, and Electoral deal a Collegeserious rise of a new military strongman, Chun Do Hwan; the student- membersblow to the voted Soviet him Empire in), of anda visit the to Communist Washington Party’s in early dominance 1981.41 in 1648 4917 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy betweenTo make Brownmatters andworse, White a Defense House Intelligence Chief of Staff Agency Hamilton assessment Jordan of Thworker e Carter uprising administration’s in Kwangju Province;response andto naked the Chun Soviet government’s aggression epitomizedthe North, thenthe situation:generally accepted“We are inby amost box, ofHarold. the U.S. We’ve intelligence broken inplanned Afghanistan execution was of primarily major political clandestine opponent action. Kim Even Dae beforeJung. Ththe e relationscommunity, with leaked Iran to and the imposedpublic in Januarysanctions, 1979. but In we plain still words, have theno bizarreSoviet invasion,assassination the ofUnited Park Stateson 26 beganOctober a cautious1979 by and his modestKorean leverageleaked assessment on Khomeini. concluded Brown that replied: Carter’s “Neither withdrawal the wouldnaval blockade invite an centralprogram intelligence of secret operationsagency director to support took Washington Afghan insurgents, by surprise. the norattack mining from the harbors North. 33will Carter’s bring advisers, the hostages including home.” Brown, Jordanagreed Cartermujahideen was on (holy vacation, warriors), leaving that Brown, included Vance, propaganda and Brzezinski support, to interjected:it was time to“Except rethink in the boxes.” withdrawal Th e two policy. men Aagreed resulting that PRM rescue study was dealhumanitarian with the crisis, relief, which and nonlethal turned out aid. to beOSD a sordid offi cials aff airargued fueled that by “thestated best that of even a lousy with set timely of options.” U.S. air,114 naval, and logistical support, toothis muchsecret alcoholcampaign, and espoused internal byROK an NSCrivalries. group,37 concentrated too South Korean forces could not stop a North Korean invasion without much on propaganda and not enough on assistance that would ThU.S. e abortivecombat troops.rescue Carteroperation reluctantly of April agreed, 1980, buta military held off operationmaking a makeTh e subsequent a diff erence. rise ofAfter General the ChunSoviet Do invasion Hwan andof Decemberhis takeover 1979, of the thatfi nal endeddecision tragically until he incould the meetIranian face-to-face desert, is with beyond Park. the34 scope of acountry shocked in allCarter but nameinstituted in December a series of1979 diplomatic, provided neweconomic, challenges. and this study. Suffi ce it to say that Brown took full responsibility for its culturalWhen Chun steps crackedto protest down the oninvasion, student including and political calling opponents, off U.S. failure,Th e next which month had aCarter, devastating Brown, impact Vance, on the and morale Brzezinski of Carter visited and participationBrown postponed in the the 1980 1980 Moscow Security Olympics. Consultative Most important,Meeting with the hisSeoul. advisers Th e astrip well proved as on athe fi asco. president’s Carter future and Parkelectoral instantly chances. rubbed Nor UnitedSouth Korea States against increased the itsadvice support of Ambassador of the Afghan William rebels, Gleysteen adding waseach DoDother involvedthe wrong in way.the frustratingPark complained diplomatic about negotiations the withdrawal, that theand purchaseGeneral John of lethal Wickham, weapons the commanderand communications in chief of equipmentU.S. forces alsohyping undercut the threat the Carterfrom the presidency. North. Th In e addition,president thepassed Iran Brown debacle a in Korea.conjunction 38 Chun’s with government other interested responded states to indemonstrations the area. Th e in United Seoul revealednote stating a void that in theif Park U.S. continued ability to projectlike this its he power would into withdraw the Persian all Statesand Kwangju encountered with martial diffi cultieslaw and in repression. procuring When the demonstrations weapons the Gulf,U.S. troopsas DoD from ruled South out oneKorea. military Carter option countered after toanother Park thatagainst he mujahideenbroke out into needed, an armed such as rebellion the Soviet in shoulder-fiKwangju, redthe SA–7government missile Iran.was withdrawing Th e rescue mission, only 3,000 called (actually off for the3,300) lack ofof 42,000one helicopter, authorized did ablereacted to bringwith excessivedown helicopters force, implying or prop thatplanes, the asUnited Moscow States and hadthe troops,nothing lectured to diminish the theROK perception president of on U.S. human weakness. rights, and chided Easternsanctioned bloc such clamped a violent down put-down. on international In Washington, sales of Carter’s them. 115advisers him for not spending as much on defense based on a percentage (including Brown) concluded that the ROK had to restore order in ofTh egross Islamic national revolution product thatas the overthrew United Statesthe shahdid. Threpresented e Korean FightingKwangju beforebasically Washington with captured could resume weapons—few pressure for armsreform were and promisedonly one ofto spendthe dramatic more on events defense, in thebut theMiddle trip hadEast, not the obtained Persian actuallypolitical liberalization.reaching them Th in ey 1980—the never gave Chunmujahideen the green performed light to crackwell, Park’sGulf, andagreement Southwest on withdrawals. Asia that shook35 the underpinnings of U.S. downbut the on insurgencydissidents, norassumed were they the asked classic to dostalemate so.39 of a guerrilla policy across the region. In April 1978 Marxist/Leninist Afghan war. Th e Soviets controlled the cities, the air space, and lines of politiciansAfter returning overthrew to Washington, their government, Brzezinski, altering Brown, the and nonaligned Vance all communication.Unwilling to forgive Th eyand could forget, move Brown around remained by convoy an opponent or air, but of statusrecommended of this traditional that Carter buff withdraw er state. Inonly December one I-Hawk 1979 surface-to- the Soviet theChun rebels and heldhis militarythe countryside. junta. He Th argued e Afghan for armycontinued was adeferral shell of of a Unionair missile invaded battalion Afghanistan and 1,500 ostensibly support to troops, aid and revisiting to sustain further the force,SCM meetingsrequiring and the refusalSoviet totroops place to U.S. assume troops most in Koreaof the under fi ghting. the communistwithdrawals revolutionin 1981 during there. WithCarter’s Iran expected under asecond hostile term.theocracy Th e UnderCombined Secretary Forces of Command, Defense for so Policyas not “toRobert do them Komer any argued favors that andpresident Afghanistan’s agreed but governmentwashed his hands and of major Korea, instructingcities under Brown Soviet to thehelp stalemate legitimize off the ered new the crowd.” possibility40 When of keepingdissident the political resistance leader going Kim domination,consult with Congressthe Carter and Brzezinskiadministration to make faced the announcement.uncertainty and36 Daefor years Jung and was draining found guilty Soviet of resources. fomenting116 the Kwangju uprising—a instability in Southwest Asia. Pakistan emerged as the principal patently trumped-up charge—Carter assigned Brown the unenviable regionalCarter’s bulwarkdecision againstleft Korean these setbacks, policy butto itVance, was hardly Brown, an idealand taskAfter of Carter traveling lost toin 1980,Seoul inPresident December Ronald 1980 Reagan to persuade and Director Chun toof candidateBrzezinski. to While defend theSouthwest long, drawnAsia. In out addition, withdrawal Carter’s saga national had commuteCentral Intelligence the sentence. William Brown Casey, failed, with keybut supportersthe incoming in Congress, Reagan securityweakened team U.S.-ROK explored relations,ways to improve four interrelated the United events States’ disrupted ability to administrationincreased clandestine saved supportKim with of athe promise Afghan to resistance, Chun, by allowing then the it projectthem even its powermore: inthe the assassination Persian Gulf of and President Southwest Park; Asia. the political newlyto wear elected down ROKand eventually president defeat(2,500 the handpicked Soviets, and Electoral deal a Collegeserious rise of a new military strongman, Chun Do Hwan; the student- membersblow to the voted Soviet him Empire in), of anda visit the to Communist Washington Party’s in early dominance 1981.41 in 1648 4917 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy theto letUSSR. the UnrealizedSoviet Union at the dominate time, the Western alliance betweenEurope theby Afghantheater themilitarily. future.” Carter Carter’s disregarded loss in the this 1980 assessment election meant and ordered that the plans Reagan for successornuclear force regime, superiority. the Taliban, Brown and a also small noted anti-Western that the terrorist U.S. military group, administrationwithdrawals to soldbegin. the Th F–16s. e Joint It Chiefs went onof Staffto forge reluctantly a much acceptedstronger al-Qaeda,technological would innovations have appalling of consequencesthe late 1970s—precision-guided in September 2001. relationshipthis instruction, with but Islamabad, some in the uncomplicated Army opposed by it. Thconcerns e commander about munitions, stealth technology, and integrated surveillance, ofnonproliferation, U.S. forces in Korea,human Generalrights, or John evenhandedness Vessey, met with India.Brown118 and intelligence,Events in Afghanistanreconnaissance, directly and affcommunications ected longtime systems—U.S. ally then the president to explain his concern. Vessey’s chief of staff , Pakistan.profoundly By infl 1977 uenced relations the Soviet between Union. Washington Having found and themselvesIslamabad Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, went public with his opposition. Brown Th e Framework for Security in the Persian Gulf hadchecked deteriorated in Western as Europethe Carter and losingadministration the technology followed race, a Sovietmore recalled Singlaub to Washington and Carter personally reassigned evenhandedleaders looked policy to their in ownits militaryhouse for sales reform to Pakistanand change. and27 WhileIndia. him,Ever sincecreating the 1973a hero oil and embargo, martyr the for Organization opponents of of the the withdrawal Petroleum Pakistan’sthe impact eff on ort Moscow to develop of these an atomic developments bomb, inis difficlear cult opposition to assess policy.Exporting Military Countries commanders (OPEC), in a Korea worldwide were unanimouscartel, kept ina fithe rm viewrein towithout Carter’s more nuclear evidence nonproliferation from the Soviet campaign, leadership won itself, the the military Carter onthat production a rapid pullout and thus was the“not price a viable of crude option.” oil, 29retaining a powerful governmentadministration’s in Islamabad success in no forging friends a inNATO the White agreement House. on In theater DoD, lever over the world’s economies. Th e Carter administration however,nuclear modernization support for Pakistan (paving remained the way strong.for deployment117 in 1983) soughtWithdrawal to breakplans alsoOPEC’s caused stranglehold consternation on in oil Seoul. production Brown andby was no doubt part of a process that presented the Kremlin with energyVance sent conservation JCS Chairman practices, General development George Brown of and domestic Under Secretarysources, Policysome tough toward choices. Pakistan Th ethus agreement divided to into modernize two camps. NATO’s DoD, theater the andof State creation for Political of an oil Aff consumerairs Philip organizationHabib to Seoul to counterbalanceto explain the militarynuclear forcesadvisers succeeded on the NSC against staff not , and only Brzezinski Soviet opposition favored a pro-but OPEC.decision,119 beginning A corollary a longof this negotiation energy policy with required South Korean that the President United Pakistanstrong domestic approach, political while opposition the State in Department Western Europe and itself.the Arms StatesPark Chung and its Heeallies about protect the their timing oil sources and extent in the of Middle the withdrawal East and Control and Disarmament Agency opposed an increase in military Persianand how Gulf the fromRepublic either of outsideKorea (ROK)threat—the armed Soviet forces Union—or would be sales to Pakistan. In early February 1980 David McGiff ert went to internalmodernized upheaval to compensate such as occurred for the in U.S. Iran. pullback. U.S. military Before assets the inSeoul the Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines Pakistan with Warren Christopher and Brzezinski. Upon his return, areaSecurity were Consultative limited. Th Meeting e U.S. Middle (SCM) Eastin July Force 1977, (MIDEASTFOR) Brown obtained McGiffCarter cameert promoted to offi ce military in January sales 1977to Islamabad determined that wouldto reduce allow the it consistedpresidential of approvala fl agship of and myriad two inducementssurface combatants to off er operating the ROK, in such the U.S.to defend military its borderpresence with in Afghanistan,East Asia and where to establish Soviet/Afghan relations forces with Arabianas a withdrawal Sea and ofthe support Persian troopsGulf, periodicallyfi rst, additional augmented tactical byfi ghters four thehad People’salready Republicengaged inof hotChina, pursuit the latter of the requiring mujahideen. termination Pakistan, of combatantstationed in vesselsSouth (sometimesKorea, joint includingmilitary exercises, an aircraft coproduction carrier) and of thea key long-standing ally in the military support relationship for the Afghan with the resistance, Republic providedof China logisticalweapons, andships a massivefrom the security U.S. Pacifipackage c Command of $800 million. (PACOM)30 that onsanctuary Taiwan. and Brown a conduit found for himself getting caught weapons between to them. the Inpresident’s summer made periodic deployments of about 50 days to the Indian Ocean. agenda1980 Brown, and the who concern had not of thebeen military much involvedand many with in CongressPakistan, ThAs eit Unitedturned out,States Brown’s had no eff bases;ort went its forclosest naught was because Diego Garcia,Congress a thatappealed the president’s to the president plans werefor a too better precipitous security relationship.to provide adequate Brown tinyrefused atoll to in fund the western the withdrawal, Indian Ocean the transfer(2,000 miles of equipment, from the Strait and securityobtained for approval U.S. interests for the insale East of Asia.60 tanks and the transfer of two ofthe Hormuz), security assistancerented from package. the British. In April As was 1978, made at painfullythe urging clear of obsolete U.S. destroyers, but the president balked at selling F–16s duringBrown deliberationsand Brzezinski, on potentialCarter scaled military back operations his withdrawal against plan a post- to 31 Southto Pakistan, Korea evenillustrated though Brown’s India dilemmaenjoyed virtualmost vividly. air superiority Th e president over shah700 combatIran, the and United 2,600 States support had troops severely with limited more accessto follow to staginglater. hadits old promised rival. during the 1976 campaign to withdraw U.S. combat groundsBrown traveled or bases to in Seoul the area, in November circumscribing 1978, the hoping ability to to confi project rm troops from South Korea. Th e services and defense specialists powerto Park there. that 120the United States would sell F–16 fi ghter aircraft to thoughtAll was notit a badlost idea. on aircraft.Brown felt When confl Cartericted, butmet fell Pakistan in with hisPresident leader South Korea, giving the South an edge in the air until 1990. Th e byMohammad rationalizing Zia-ul-Hak that an economicallyin September growing1980, he Southwas impressed Korea could and saleBrzezinski would claimedalso pave much the wayof the for credit future for U.S. remedying combat this withdrawals. situation. bechanged protected his mind: by U.S. “I met air andwith navalZia and forces liked outside him. He’s the calm, peninsula. I think28 CarterWhile disapprovedhe proved to the be sale, a prime and Brown mover, met he Park enjoyed essentially considerable empty- Avery problem courageous, soon intelligent.emerged: someHe’s willingin the tointelligence accommodate community refugees handed.support Thfrom e trip DoD lost offi its cials,luster. including32 the Joint Chiefs, Deputy concludedcoming into that Pakistan North from Korea Afghanistan. was becoming . . . We’ll substantially sell them F–16sstronger in Secretary Duncan, his successor W. Graham Claytor Jr., and 1450 5115 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy theto letUSSR. the UnrealizedSoviet Union at the dominate time, the Western alliance betweenEurope theby Afghantheater themilitarily. future.” Carter Carter’s disregarded loss in the this 1980 assessment election meant and ordered that the plans Reagan for successornuclear force regime, superiority. the Taliban, Brown and a also small noted anti-Western that the terrorist U.S. military group, administrationwithdrawals to soldbegin. the Th F–16s. e Joint It Chiefs went onof Staffto forge reluctantly a much acceptedstronger al-Qaeda,technological would innovations have appalling of consequencesthe late 1970s—precision-guided in September 2001. thisrelationship instruction, with but Islamabad, some in the uncomplicated Army opposed by it. Thconcerns e commander about munitions, stealth technology, and integrated surveillance, ofnonproliferation, U.S. forces in Korea,human Generalrights, or John evenhandedness Vessey, met with India.Brown118 and intelligence,Events in Afghanistanreconnaissance, directly and affcommunications ected longtime systems—U.S. ally then the president to explain his concern. Vessey’s chief of staff , profoundlyPakistan. By infl 1977 uenced relations the Soviet between Union. Washington Having found and themselvesIslamabad Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, went public with his opposition. Brown Th e Framework for Security in the Persian Gulf checkedhad deteriorated in Western as Europethe Carter and losingadministration the technology followed race, a Sovietmore recalled Singlaub to Washington and Carter personally reassigned leadersevenhanded looked policy to their in ownits militaryhouse for sales reform to Pakistanand change. and27 WhileIndia. him,Ever sincecreating the 1973a hero oil and embargo, martyr the for Organization opponents of of the the withdrawal Petroleum Pakistan’sthe impact eff on ort Moscow to develop of these an atomic developments bomb, inis difficlear cult opposition to assess policy.Exporting Military Countries commanders (OPEC), in a Korea worldwide were unanimouscartel, kept ina fithe rm viewrein towithout Carter’s more nuclear evidence nonproliferation from the Soviet campaign, leadership won itself, the the military Carter onthat production a rapid pullout and thus was the“not price a viable of crude option.” oil, 29retaining a powerful governmentadministration’s in Islamabad success in no forging friends a inNATO the White agreement House. on In theater DoD, lever over the world’s economies. Th e Carter administration however,nuclear modernization support for Pakistan (paving remained the way strong.for deployment117 in 1983) soughtWithdrawal to breakplans alsoOPEC’s caused stranglehold consternation on in oil Seoul. production Brown andby was no doubt part of a process that presented the Kremlin with energyVance sent conservation JCS Chairman practices, General development George Brown of and domestic Under Secretarysources, Policysome tough toward choices. Pakistan Th ethus agreement divided to into modernize two camps. NATO’s DoD, theater the andof State creation for Political of an oil Aff consumerairs Philip organizationHabib to Seoul to counterbalanceto explain the militarynuclear forcesadvisers succeeded on the NSC against staff not , and only Brzezinski Soviet opposition favored a pro-but decision,OPEC.119 beginning A corollary a longof this negotiation energy policy with required South Korean that the President United Pakistanstrong domestic approach, political while opposition the State in Department Western Europe and itself.the Arms StatesPark Chung and its Heeallies about protect the their timing oil sources and extent in the of Middle the withdrawal East and Control and Disarmament Agency opposed an increase in military Persianand how Gulf the fromRepublic either of outsideKorea (ROK)threat—the armed Soviet forces Union—or would be sales to Pakistan. In early February 1980 David McGiff ert went to internalmodernized upheaval to compensate such as occurred for the in U.S. Iran. pullback. U.S. military Before assets the inSeoul the Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines Pakistan with Warren Christopher and Brzezinski. Upon his return, areaSecurity were Consultative limited. Th Meeting e U.S. Middle (SCM) Eastin July Force 1977, (MIDEASTFOR) Brown obtained CarterMcGiff cameert promoted to offi ce military in January sales 1977to Islamabad determined that wouldto reduce allow the it consistedpresidential of approvala fl agship of and myriad two inducementssurface combatants to off er operating the ROK, in such the U.S.to defend military its borderpresence with in Afghanistan,East Asia and where to establish Soviet/Afghan relations forces with Arabianas a withdrawal Sea and ofthe support Persian troopsGulf, periodicallyfi rst, additional augmented tactical byfi ghters four thehad People’salready Republicengaged inof hotChina, pursuit the latter of the requiring mujahideen. termination Pakistan, of combatantstationed in vesselsSouth (sometimesKorea, joint includingmilitary exercises, an aircraft coproduction carrier) and of thea key long-standing ally in the military support relationship for the Afghan with the resistance, Republic providedof China logisticalweapons, andships a massivefrom the security U.S. Pacifipackage c Command of $800 million. (PACOM)30 that onsanctuary Taiwan. and Brown a conduit found for himself getting caught weapons between to them. the Inpresident’s summer made periodic deployments of about 50 days to the Indian Ocean. agenda1980 Brown, and the who concern had not of thebeen military much involvedand many with in CongressPakistan, ThAs eit Unitedturned out,States Brown’s had no eff bases;ort went its forclosest naught was because Diego Garcia,Congress a thatappealed the president’s to the president plans werefor a too better precipitous security relationship.to provide adequate Brown tinyrefused atoll to in fund the western the withdrawal, Indian Ocean the transfer(2,000 miles of equipment, from the Strait and securityobtained for approval U.S. interests for the insale East of Asia.60 tanks and the transfer of two ofthe Hormuz), security assistancerented from package. the British. In April As was 1978, made at painfullythe urging clear of obsolete U.S. destroyers, but the president balked at selling F–16s duringBrown deliberationsand Brzezinski, on potentialCarter scaled military back operations his withdrawal against plan a post- to 31 Southto Pakistan, Korea evenillustrated though Brown’s India dilemmaenjoyed virtualmost vividly. air superiority Th e president over shah700 combatIran, the and United 2,600 States support had troops severely with limited more accessto follow to staginglater. hadits old promised rival. during the 1976 campaign to withdraw U.S. combat groundsBrown traveled or bases to in Seoul the area, in November circumscribing 1978, the hoping ability to to confi project rm troops from South Korea. Th e services and defense specialists powerto Park there. that 120the United States would sell F–16 fi ghter aircraft to thoughtAll was notit a badlost idea. on aircraft.Brown felt When confl Cartericted, butmet fell Pakistan in with hisPresident leader South Korea, giving the South an edge in the air until 1990. Th e byMohammad rationalizing Zia-ul-Hak that an economicallyin September growing1980, he Southwas impressed Korea could and saleBrzezinski would claimedalso pave much the wayof the for credit future for U.S. remedying combat this withdrawals. situation. bechanged protected his mind: by U.S. “I met air andwith navalZia and forces liked outside him. He’s the calm, peninsula. I think28 CarterWhile disapprovedhe proved to the be sale, a prime and Brown mover, met he Park enjoyed essentially considerable empty- Avery problem courageous, soon intelligent.emerged: someHe’s willingin the tointelligence accommodate community refugees handed.support Thfrom e trip DoD lost offi its cials,luster. including32 the Joint Chiefs, Deputy concludedcoming into that Pakistan North from Korea Afghanistan. was becoming . . . We’ll substantially sell them F–16sstronger in Secretary Duncan, his successor W. Graham Claytor Jr., and 1450 5115 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

Astactical Carter aircraft prepared (5,400 to toleave 4,500), offi ce, NATO the framework enjoyed an foredge security thanks toin trustcommitment. in détente Th with e eff ortthe requiredSoviet Union constant and nagging not enough of both in military NATO the qualityPersian ofGulf planes remained and their unfi weapons, nished. Still,and the considerable skill of their progress pilots, powercolleagues to andassure Carter Soviet and good his budget intentions. offi cials. Th Duringe tension his fibetween rst two hadcontrollers, been made. and Thcrews. ere wasStill, a strongNATO’s Navy–Marine technological Corps advantage, presence as yearsBrzezinski’s Brown hardfought line for atoward budget Moscow that had andat least Vance’s some semblancedesire for otherin the intelligenceIndian Ocean assessments and an expandedalso confi onermed, in wasthe Arabianfading fast.Sea ofaccommodation 3 percent real growth,is credited asking with how encouraging the United Carter’s States could vacillation. expect Studiesand Persian by the Gulf. Senate Th (the e Navy Sam also Nunn–Dewey prepositioned F. Bartlett in Diego report Garcia was NATOIronically, members for his toresponses meet the to pledgeSoviet ifadventures it did not. in Althoughthe Horn the of theseven most ships infl withuential) supplies and aand U.S. equipment Army report capable prepared of supporting by retired WesternAfrica and European its invasion members of Afghanistan, rarely made Carterthe goal has (backsliding been taken was to Generalthe dispatch James of Hollingsworth12,000 troops. warnedIt also purchasedthat a Soviet eight conventional high-speed endemictask for overreacting, to them), they for diddumping increase détente, defense for expenditures. becoming too Within hard- blitzkriegcontainer wouldships capable cut through of rapid the deploymentNorth German to the Plain Middle so quickly East. theline. United Th e Iran States, hostage which crisis provided and failed 60 rescue percent mission of NATO’s hurt Carter’s total thatPerhaps NATO most would important, not have DoD time created to reinforce the Rapid and Deployment would have Joint to defensereputation spending and made and his40 administrationpercent of its troops, seem both Brown indecisive was able and to goTask nuclear. Force (RDJTF),While, in retrospect,headquartered the evidenceat MacDill of SovietAir Force plans Base for in a persuadeineff ectual. Carter Th ese and characterizations an increasingly beliereceptive some Congress of the real to approveforeign blitzkriegFlorida. Brzezinski conventional initially attack promoted was not conclusive,the idea of most a “surge considered force” Defensepolicy successes budgets that that, Carter, for thewith fi Brown’srst two help,years accomplishedat least, had insome the itable a real to possibility.respond to18 worldwide crises (minus Europe and Korea). claimMiddle to East, 3 percent within growth, NATO, and with for China,the fi nal in two Panama, years had in strategicactually Brown smoothed the way by dampening interservice rivalries that metarms the limitations, goal.21 and in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. For threatenedTo remedy tothese slow problems down the for idea. NATO, Under Brown Brown brought and DoD in longtimetutelage, a secretary of defense who initially saw his role in foreign policy thenational force concentratedsecurity specialist on the Robert Persian Komer, Gulf and who Southwest had been Asia working rather asTh limited,e other bygreat the foreign end of thepolicy Carter challenge presidency within Brown NATO had wasgained to thanon a RANDthe world. Corporation While the RDJTFstudy on was revamping still in its NATO early stages, for the it pasthad inflpersuade uence members,within the especially administration’s West Germany, foreign policyto agree deliberations to upgrade afew command years.19 Plansstructure to reformresponsible and forreenergize planning, NATO training, would military only andNATO’s undertook theater foreign nuclear policy posture. missions. Most Heimportant, was a crucial this required adviser succeedexercises, if prepositioning, alliance members and agreedpotential to deploymentincrease defense of forces spending. to the indeployment SALT II ofnegotiations nuclear-armed with PershingMoscow. II He missiles and theand Pentagon ground- AfterPersian a NATOGulf and North Southwest Atlantic Asia. Council Most (NAC)planners meeting saw the attended force, if helpedlaunched sell cruise the Panama missiles Canal (GLCMs) Treaties on to their a skeptical soil. In Congress. addition, Ththe e bycalled Carter to action,and Brown as a meansin May of 1977, countering the members a Soviet inaugurated intervention a presidentCarter administration sent Brown onfl oated foreign a plan policy to introducemissions toa newthe Middlenuclear long-termin the Persian defense Gulf plan or infor SouthwestNATO, with Asia “Blowtorch (most likely Bob” Iran), Komer but Eastweapon, and Saudithe enhanced Arabia. Carterradiation entrusted weapon Brown (ERW), and knownthe Pentagon better actingthey also as thedesigned U.S. pointit to counterman. At localthis NATOconfl icts summit or upheavals meeting— that withas the the “neutron redeployment bomb.” of ERWs the Israeli were Sinai more airfi accurate elds to andthe Negev,reliable, a Carter’sthreatened attendance U.S. interests. meant126 NATOWhile fewheads could of governmenthave envisioned felt signifirequired cant less part fi ssionableof the Egyptian-Israeli material, and peace produced process. smaller nuclear thecompelled Iraqi invasion to attend—the of Kuwait participants and resulting resolved Gulf Warto increase in 1991, their the explosions (about one-tenth the size of the Army’s existing atomic RDJTF—upgradeddefense spending by to3 percentU.S. Central real growth Command every in year. 1983—directed Action plans Notshells). all ofWhat Brown’s made initiatives the ERWs succeeded. such an In innovation South America, was that he could they aand major promises war to were roll fiback ne, but the moneyIraqi invasion talked.20 of Kuwait, followed by notyielded convince high levelsthe White of lethal House radiation, and the making president them that ideal the for local use two additional wars to depose Saddam Hussein and to counter the militariesagainst Warsaw could Pactbe a tanksforce forand political their crews. reform Since if encouragedthey caused by less a TalibanTh is “3 inpercent Afghanistan. solution” became one of Brown’s major goals in systemcollateral of damagerewards. to In buildings Central America,and infrastructures, the Pentagon’s ERWs urging seemed for consultations with other NATO defense ministers and heads of militarywell suited assistance to a potential to governments war in congested losing ground West toGermany. insurgencies22 was government. Th e secretary worked equally hard within the U.S. only accepted by the White House at the end of the administration. Conclusion government, where the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) BombsTh e president that killed did not people agree but with saved all of buildings—as the secretary’s criticsand DoD’s soon foughtAt best, a determinedHarold Brown rearguard is viewed eff ort by to critics limit defenseas a technocrat spending and to, dubbedadvice, but them—created Brown increasingly a public became relations a part nightmare. of the Carter As hardforeign as atcompetent best, token manager compliance of the Pentagonwith the NATOin an administration nonbinding 3 suff percent ering theypolicy tried, team. Brown Th e reluctant and his diplomat staff could and notforeign overcome policy adviserthe public was pledge.from a Worldwidedysfunctional infl ation,foreign which policy. by theTh e later conventional years of the wisdom Carter reluctanthysteria in no the more. United States and Europe, especially West Germany, administrationholds that Carter’s fl irted foreign with policy double was digits,an unrealistic complicated approach Brown’s that about these people-killer weapons. Brown sent Assistant Secretary effoveremphasized orts to persuade human the rightsEuropeans and morality,to live up and to placed their too3 percent much of Defense for International Security Aff airs (ISA) David McGiff ert 1054 5511 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy and Brzezinski, especially one that revolved around what worked contributions commensurate with their growing prosperity. Instead, best with the Soviet Union. To put it simply, Vance favored détente they directed resources to social welfare programs. Th e Europeans with the Soviets to encourage better behavior. Brzezinski held that took peace for granted, especially as the United States and the the Soviets only respected power, so he opted for show of and even Soviet Union pursued a policyNotes of détente, and West Germany use of force to moderate Moscow’s actions. Brown found himself forged its own policy of better relations with the Eastern bloc. To in the middle of these two positions, much to the chagrin of NATO’s Western European members, a Warsaw Pact conventional 1 Harold Brown, interview by Edward Keefer and Erin Mahan, Brzezinski who expected Brown to support his hard-line approach. 11attack Feb seemed2011, 18–19, far-fetched. Oral History Th ey wereCollection, content OSD to relyHistorical on nuclear Offi ce Th e national security adviser later complained about Brown: “Th ere (hereafterdeterrence. OSD/HO). Such a mindset made persuading NATO members to was in him an ambivalence and lack of interest in broader strategy pay their fair share for improvements to their conventional military 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National which reduced the impact of what we had to say to the President. Securityforces diffi Adviser, cult. 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), . . . I suspect that the reason was rooted partly in his intellectual 12, 44–47. Another fl aw resided in the post-Vietnam War United States, brilliance, which often is the enemy of clear cut action, and partly 3 where Thresources e 3 percent potentially pledge is inavailable the North for Atlantic U.S.-funded Council NATO(NAC) in the fact that broader strategy was not his central concern. Th is American 15 Communiqué, 11 May 1977, printed in Department of State, occasionally created a Hamlet-like impression.” Foreignimprovements Policy: Basichad Documents,been shifted 1977–1980 to Southeast (Washington, Asian operations DC: GPO, in 1983),the decade 272–274; after see1965. also U.S. Foreign NATO-obligated Policy Research conventional Institute Staff forces, Th e Brzezinski acknowledged that Brown did not remain the reluctant Thand ree weaponPer Cent systemsSolution hadand thenot Future been ofimproved, NATO (Philadelphia: and readiness Foreign had fi gure he described initially.16 In the later Carter years, Brown became Policybeen allowedResearch toInstitute, deteriorate. 1981). Most of the conventional weapons more assertive, more in concert with Brzezinski’s pessimistic view of that the4 Harold United Brown, States wouldStar Spangleddeploy to Security: defend CentralApplying Europe the Lessons were the Soviet Union and its leadership, and certainly more eff ective in Learned1950s and Over early Six 1960sDecades vintage. of Safeguarding Weapon America systems, withof other Joyce individual Winslow convincing the president that foreign and national security policy NATO(Washington, members DC: Brookingswere fragmented, Institution Press,uncoordinated, 2012), 166–175. duplicative, could not succeed if not supported by increased defense spending and often5 Ibid., competitive. 117–118. Command, control, communications, and and better use of military technology. How Brown came to that intelligence were equally disorganized systems and functions. Eff orts 6 conclusion and how he successfully sold it to the president is one by Secretaries Statement of Defenseby Harold James Brown, Schlesinger Senate and Committee Donald Rumsfeldon Foreign to Relations (SCFR), Panama Canal Treaties: Hearings, 95th Cong.,17 1st sess., of the major accomplishments of his tenure as secretary of defense, 26correct Sep 1977,these 96–98.inadequacies were only marginally successful. and one of the reasons for his transformation into an important 7 member of the Carter foreign policy team. To make Brown, matter Star worse, Spangled the SovietSecurity Union, 144–147; had made Frank great N. stridesSchubert, in improvingBuilding Air itsBases conventional in the Negev: forces Th e U.S. and Army its tacticalCorps of nuclearEngineers weapons in Israel, 1979–1982 (Washington, DC: Offi ce of History, Corps of Engineers and in Central Europe. Th e DoD director of net assessment concluded Brown and Consultations with NATO Allies U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), provides a brief account thatof the there agreement existed and“a roughmuch standoffmore exhaustive ” in theater account nuclear of theweapons, actual In January 1977 a general consensus among experts in both of the butconstruction the scales process. had tipped to the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces. previous Republican administrations and the incoming Carter team By his8 reckoning,Brown, Star theSpangled pact enjoyedSecurity, 147–148.numerical superiority in troops, held that NATO was in trouble, ill-prepared to counter a Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers, antitank missile launchers and 9 conventional attack in Central Europe. NATO’s conventional antitank For guns, Brown’s artillery role inand negotiations multiple rocketover modernization launchers, air of defense, NATO theater nuclear weapons, see section “Brown and Consultations with weaknesses could force it to resort to a nuclear defense of Western NATOand ground Allies” attack herein; aircraft. and Brown, NATO Star held Spangled the advantage Security only, 139–140. in tactical For Europe, with the resulting dangers of escalation. Th e Western morenuclear on theweapons China (artillerytrip, see Edward and air-delivered) Keefer, Harold and Brown: in Offhelicopters. setting the European alliance members had failed to increase their military SovietTh ere Militarywere qualifi Challenge, cations. 1977–1981 Although, vol. outnumbered 9 of Secretaries by ofover Defense 900 8 579 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy and Brzezinski, especially one that revolved around what worked contributions commensurate with their growing prosperity. Instead, best with the Soviet Union. To put it simply, Vance favored détente they directed resources to social welfare programs. Th e Europeans with the Soviets to encourage better behavior. Brzezinski held that took peace for granted, especially as the United States and the the Soviets only respected power, so he opted for show of and even Soviet Union pursued a policyNotes of détente, and West Germany use of force to moderate Moscow’s actions. Brown found himself forged its own policy of better relations with the Eastern bloc. To in the middle of these two positions, much to the chagrin of NATO’s Western European members, a Warsaw Pact conventional 1 Harold Brown, interview by Edward Keefer and Erin Mahan, Brzezinski who expected Brown to support his hard-line approach. 11attack Feb seemed2011, 18–19, far-fetched. Oral History Th ey wereCollection, content OSD to relyHistorical on nuclear Offi ce Th e national security adviser later complained about Brown: “Th ere (hereafterdeterrence. OSD/HO). Such a mindset made persuading NATO members to was in him an ambivalence and lack of interest in broader strategy pay their fair share for improvements to their conventional military 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National which reduced the impact of what we had to say to the President. Securityforces diffi Adviser, cult. 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), . . . I suspect that the reason was rooted partly in his intellectual 12, 44–47. Another fl aw resided in the post-Vietnam War United States, brilliance, which often is the enemy of clear cut action, and partly 3 where Thresources e 3 percent potentially pledge is inavailable the North for Atlantic U.S.-funded Council NATO(NAC) in the fact that broader strategy was not his central concern. Th is American 15 Communiqué, 11 May 1977, printed in Department of State, occasionally created a Hamlet-like impression.” Foreignimprovements Policy: Basichad Documents,been shifted 1977–1980 to Southeast (Washington, Asian operations DC: GPO, in 1983),the decade 272–274; after see1965. also U.S. Foreign NATO-obligated Policy Research conventional Institute Staff forces, Th e Brzezinski acknowledged that Brown did not remain the reluctant Thand ree weaponPer Cent systemsSolution hadand thenot Future been ofimproved, NATO (Philadelphia: and readiness Foreign had fi gure he described initially.16 In the later Carter years, Brown became Policybeen allowedResearch toInstitute, deteriorate. 1981). Most of the conventional weapons more assertive, more in concert with Brzezinski’s pessimistic view of that the4 Harold United Brown, States wouldStar Spangleddeploy to Security: defend CentralApplying Europe the Lessons were the Soviet Union and its leadership, and certainly more eff ective in Learned1950s and Over early Six 1960sDecades vintage. of Safeguarding Weapon America systems, withof other Joyce individual Winslow convincing the president that foreign and national security policy NATO(Washington, members DC: Brookingswere fragmented, Institution Press,uncoordinated, 2012), 166–175. duplicative, could not succeed if not supported by increased defense spending and often5 Ibid., competitive. 117–118. Command, control, communications, and and better use of military technology. How Brown came to that intelligence were equally disorganized systems and functions. Eff orts 6 conclusion and how he successfully sold it to the president is one by Secretaries Statement of Defenseby Harold James Brown, Schlesinger Senate and Committee Donald Rumsfeldon Foreign to Relations (SCFR), Panama Canal Treaties: Hearings, 95th Cong.,17 1st sess., of the major accomplishments of his tenure as secretary of defense, 26correct Sep 1977,these 96–98.inadequacies were only marginally successful. and one of the reasons for his transformation into an important 7 member of the Carter foreign policy team. To make Brown, matter Star worse, Spangled the SovietSecurity Union, 144–147; had made Frank great N. stridesSchubert, in improvingBuilding Air itsBases conventional in the Negev: forces Th e U.S. and Army its tacticalCorps of nuclearEngineers weapons in Israel, 1979–1982 (Washington, DC: Offi ce of History, Corps of Engineers and in Central Europe. Th e DoD director of net assessment concluded Brown and Consultations with NATO Allies U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), provides a brief account thatof the there agreement existed and“a roughmuch standoffmore exhaustive ” in theater account nuclear of theweapons, actual In January 1977 a general consensus among experts in both of the butconstruction the scales process. had tipped to the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces. previous Republican administrations and the incoming Carter team By his8 reckoning,Brown, Star theSpangled pact enjoyedSecurity, 147–148.numerical superiority in troops, held that NATO was in trouble, ill-prepared to counter a Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers, antitank missile launchers and 9 conventional attack in Central Europe. NATO’s conventional antitank For guns, Brown’s artillery role inand negotiations multiple rocketover modernization launchers, air of defense, NATO theater nuclear weapons, see section “Brown and Consultations with weaknesses could force it to resort to a nuclear defense of Western NATOand ground Allies” attack herein; aircraft. and Brown, NATO Star held Spangled the advantage Security only, 139–140. in tactical For Europe, with the resulting dangers of escalation. Th e Western morenuclear on theweapons China (artillerytrip, see Edward and air-delivered) Keefer, Harold and Brown: in Offhelicopters. setting the European alliance members had failed to increase their military SovietTh ere Militarywere qualifi Challenge, cations. 1977–1981 Although, vol. outnumbered 9 of Secretaries by ofover Defense 900 8 579 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

Carter.Historical10 BrownSeries (Washington,the reluctant DC:diplomat, OSD theHistorical secretary Offi ofce, defense 2017), of the19 Auten,Joint ChiefsCarter’s of ConversionStaff (JCS),, 104–106; the secretary RAND of theCorporation, treasury, who395–402; had initiallyand Brown, vowed Star toSpangled stay out Security of foreign, 150–155. aff airs More and detailpolitical on Alliancethe director Defense of in central the Eighties intelligence, (AD-80) , andNov the1976; national Frank L.security Jones, questions,the meeting becamewith the Saudione ofdefense Carter’s minister top isforeign in Keefer, aff Haroldairs advisers, Brown, Blowtorch:adviser—was Robert primarily Komer, responsibleVietnam, and for Cold advising War Strategy the president. (Annapolis, In 274–283. MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 223–224. entrusted to undertake key diplomatic missions. practice, the two subcommittees held the real debates, and their 10 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 47. recommendations20 Carter Speech usually at the went fi rst to sessionthe president of the mostlyNATO unchanged. Ministerial Meeting, 10 May 1977, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Th e 11Carter Th e thesis Foreign that PolicyCarter underwentTeam and a Policy conversion Structure was suggested in ThJimmy e PRC Carter, was 1977 supposed (Washington, to be DC:the dominantGPO, 1978), group, 1:848–852; headed Vance, by a Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: Th e Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Hard Choices, 65: NAC Communiqué, 11 May 1977, Department of NotwithstandingPresidents and How hisTh ey ten Won years the Cold in the War Navy, (New York:Carter Simon was initially& Schuster, an CabinetState, American offi cer Foreignresponsible Policy: for Basic a study Documents, paper called1977–1980 the Presidential, 472–474; antidefense1996), 108–115, president, and elaborated who remained in Brian skeptical J. Auten, ofCarter’s the Department Conversion: Th ofe ReviewForeign PolicyMemorandum Research Institute, (PRM) Thprepared ree Per Cent by Solutionhis agency’s, 26–31. staff . For Hardening of American Defense Policy (Columbia: University of Missouri Defense and military spending throughout his entire four years. He foreign aff airs, Vance and State took the lead. For military strategy Press, 2008). Brown’s role in changing Carter’s mind is introduced in 21 Brown, Star Spangled Security, 136–137. cameKeefer, to Harold offi ce determinedBrown, viii–xvi, to cut and waste highlighted and mismanagement throughout the in book. defense and defense issues, the baton passed to Brown and OSD (Offi ce of the22 RaymondSecretary L.of Garthoff Defense). , Détente If the and issue Confrontation: dealt with American-Soviet international spending12 by 3–5 billion dollars in his fi rst year. It is a testament to Brown Haroldthat he Brown, was able interview to persuade by Alfred the Goldbergpresident and to increase Maurice militaryMatloff , Relationseconomics, from Treasury Nixon tomight Reagan step, rev. forward. ed. (Washington, For intelligence DC: issues,Brookings the pt. 1, 28 Feb 1991, 2, Oral History Collection, OSD/HO; Brzezinski, Institution, 1994), 937–938. spendingPower and during Principle his, 5–7;last two Hamilton years in Jordan, response Crisis: to the Th eperceived Last Year Sovietof the director of central intelligence would be the front man. Th ese latter 23 threat.Carter PresidencyAlthough (New not deservingYork: G. P. of Putnam’s all the creditSons, 1982),for Carter’s 45. reluctant two contingencies Memos, Brzezinski were rare.for Carter,Vance (and15 Apr later, 1977, Edmund folder Muskie)ERW & 11 Radiological Warfare, 6–8/77, box 16; Brown for Carter, n.d. [23 Sep conversion,13 Brown was instrumental in the process. and State did the major share of the PRC work during the Carter Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 57–62; Presidential Directive 1977],presidency, folder with ERW Brown & Radiological and OSD Warfare, a clear 9/77–1/78, second.13 box 17; Brzezinski (PD) 1, “Establishment of the Presidential Review and Directive Series/ for Carter, n.d. [16 Jan 1978?], folder ERW & Radiological Warfare, NSC;If Carter PD could2, “Th claim e National some Security modicum Council of national System”: security both dated experience 20 Jan 9/77–1/78, box 17; Brzezinski for Carter, folder ERW & Radiological 1977,based Presidentialon his naval Directives career, and he Presidentialcould not Reviewdo the Memoranda, same for foreign Carter Warfare,Brzezinski 2–4/78, convinced box 17: theall in president Subject File, that Brzezinski he and Material, the NSC National staff Library,policy, where ,of the Trilateral accessed Commission, 8 Mar 2009. Zbigniew Brzezinski organized a Cartersubcommittee Library), oftenAtlanta, dealt GA; with Brzezinski, major Powerforeign and policy Principle issues,, 302–304; most Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, cram14 course to get Carter up to snuff in foreign policy issues.12 signifi cantly Iran and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. It also Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign 2010), 79; memos, Brzezinski to Carter, 24 Mar 1978, and 4 Apr 1979: WhatPolicy (New Carter York: did Simon not want & Schuster, was a so-called1983), 37. “Lone Ranger” foreign bothbecame in folderthe mechanismERW & Radiological for approving Warfare, intelligence 2–4/78, box operations.17, Subject Since Carter did not require unanimity of advice when there was policy15 Brzezinski,system, in Power which and onePrinciple man, 44–45. essentially controlled policy File, Brzezinski Material, National Security Aff airs, Carter Library; Carter recommendations and advice to the president, as Carter believed Publica diff erencePapers 1978of opinion, 1:702. or when the NSC, PRC, or SCC were 16 Ibid., 47. unable to make recommendations, Brzezinski took responsibility Henry Kissinger had done under Presidents Richard Nixon and 24 Brown, Star Spangled Security, 139–140; William Leonard, Gerald17 WalterFord. S.President-elect Poole, Th e Decline Carter of Détente:also favored Elliot aRichardson, simpler, moreJames “‘Closingfor detailing the theGap’: various Th e Euromissiles diff erences andof opinion President and Carter’s problems Strategy for Schlesinger,diversifi ed andforeign Donald policy Rumsfeld, establishment 1973–1977 in, Coldwhich War a wide Foreign range Policy of forCarter. Western Vance Europe bitterly (1977–1979),” regretted 21allowing Dec 2010, Brzezinski Center thisfor Strategicpower, Series,advisers Special would Study be 7free (Washington, to give him DC: advice. OSD Historical He created Offi onlyce, 2015), two Internationalbelieving it gave toStudies, the national ,to frame the issues for the president.14 accessed 23 Feb Staff , 1942–1991 (Washington, DC: Joint History Offi ce, Offi ce of the 2012; Garthoff , Détente and Confrontation, 940–957. Director,Review CommitteeJoint Staff , Joint and Chiefs the ofSpecial Staff , 2012),Coordination 400–401. Committee. Th e fi rst dealt with larger, long-term national security and foreign Brown25 Keefer,was less Harold bothered Brown, 743by Brzezinski’s(quote). control of the policy 18 Keefer, Harold Brown, 417–422; NATO and the New Soviet Th reat: process, trusting that a voracious reader and detail-oriented man policy issues; the latter handled crises and supposedly lesser issues. 26 Garthoff , Détente and Confrontation, 940–957; Jimmy Carter, Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett to the Committee on such as Carter—similar to Brown himself—would not be content InArmed theory, Services, the United National States SenateSecurity, 95th Council—a Cong., 1st sess.,statutory 24 Jan group1977, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), consisting4–6, 12–13, of 15. the president, vice president, and secretaries of state 535–538;to read only Brzezinski, the NSC Power staff and account. Principle Also,, 309–310, Brown 462–463;was not initiallyHelmut and defense, but augmented by other offi cials such as the chairman Schmidt,prepared Mento jump and Powers:into the A foreignPolitical policyRetrospective debate, trans. between Ruth Vance Hein 586 597 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy retain(New York: it against Random an increasinglyHouse, 1989), nationalistic 209–216; Wilfried Panama Loth, and Overcoming the threat During32 Ltr, the Brownfi nal two to yearsVance of with his presidency,copy to Brzezinski, Carter came 14 Octto rely 1978, on ofthe sabotageCold War: from A History anti-American of Détente ,elements 1950–1991, in Latin trans. America. Robert F.6 Hogg 0000D0E8.pdf,Brown as an envoy, CD-2, a person Declassifi who ed couldSecDef explain Files; memo,the administration’s Brzezinski for (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 155. Carter,policies. 28 After Oct 1978, the fallCK3100104576; of the Shah memo,of Iran, Brzezinski Brown forembarked Carter with on Carter’s disapproval, 1 Nov 1979, CK31000117770; memcon, Park, Th e 27Panama Canal controversy has slipped into history, but the Brown, Star Spangled Security, 140–141. Brown,the most and clearly Gleysteen, defi ned CK diplomatic 3100509548; mission memo, of Platt his forcareer Brzezinski, to date— 13 Middle East confl ict between Israel and the Arabs festers on. to reassure Middle East allies about America’s commitment to 28 Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Nov 1979, CK3100517021: all in DDRS, accessed 21 Jul 2009. President Jimmy Carter is most remembered for his Camp David MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 85–86. Carter provides a long discussion them33 in light of the changed environment. Th e actual impact of Accords and follow-on peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, both Wood, “Persuading a President,” 107–110; Don Hirst, “North of his China policy in Keeping Faith, 186–211; Harold Brown, interview Koreathis mission Has Ground proved Unit diffi Edge,” cult 8to Jan quantify, 1978, Army but Times Brown’s, 1, 21. personal Neither 8 bymajor Alfred accomplishments Goldberg and Ronald in a diffiLanda, cult 1 andMar long-lasting1993, pt. 4, 12–13,dispute. Oral In Brownassurances nor Carterwere part fully ofaccepted the toolset this assessment.of Carter’s “I diplomacy. have never beenTh e Historytruth, the Collection, peace came OSD/HO; at the price Brown, of generous Star Spangled military Security assistance, 167–168. and convincedsuccess of ofthis the trip accuracy in the president’sof the report, eyes but led I tohad other to accept assignments. it,” the credits29 Joeto bothWood, countries. “Persuading Th ea secretaryPresident: ofJimmy state Carter and ultimately and American the presidentBrown worked remembered. closely Jimmy with Western Carter, interview European by leadersAlfred Goldbergto gain their and Troopspresident in Korea,” had the Studies responsibility in Intelligence for military6, no. 4 (1996): sales credits 98–99; and Oberdorfer, military Mauriceapproval—in Matloff the , Atlanta, face of GA, strong 12 Marlocal 1986, antinuclear Oral History opposition—for Collection, Twoassistance. Koreas , Congress101–102; hadmemo, to approve.Armacost Because for Brzezinski, DoD implemented9 Feb 1977, OSD/HO. Brown recalled: “What really undermined it [the withdrawal policy]stationing in the cruise end wasmissiles an intelligence and Pershing assessment, II missiles the validity with of nuclearwhich I CK3100502092,the agreed policy, Declassifi in practice ed Documents Brown playedReference a clear Service policy (DDRS), role, warheads on their soil. Brown traveled to mainland China, the fi rst accessed 20 Jul 2009; General John W. Vessey, interview by Alfred Goldberg still have some uncertainty about.” Brown interview, 1 Mar 1993, pt. 4, andespecially Maurice since Matloff the , details12 Mar of1990, the 3–4,implementation Oral History Collection,of broad policyOSD/ ibid.secretary of defense to do so, to explore with Chinese leaders the decisions became, many times in fact, the real negotiations. Brown HO; Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous expansion34 Memo, of PlattU.S.–People’s for Brzezinski, Republic 17 Jan 1979,of China CK3100519391, military relations DDRS; Duty:spent Anmany American hours Soldier with inIsraeli the Twentieth and Egyptian Century (Newdefense York: ministers Summit PRMand to 45, coordinate 22 Jan 1979, policy item PR001441,to obstruct Digital the Soviet National military Security takeover Archive Books,working 1991), out military 383; msgs, sales, CINCPAC credit, and to assistance JCS, 011957Z arrangements. May 1977, In (DNSA);of Afghanistan. memo, BrownPlatt to met Brzezinski, with Saudi 6 Jun Defense 1979, MinisterCK3100147779; Sultan CK3100119115; 052017Z May 1977, CK3100124436; and 110344Z addition, part of the Camp David Accords understanding was that Summarybin Abdulaziz of Conclusions al-Saud atto PRC explain Meeting, U.S. 8 Junpolicies 1979, andCK3100147884: limitations May 1977, CK3100111625; msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, all in DDRS, accessed 22 Jul 2009. 151330Zthe United May States 1977, would CK3100111627: fi nance and all construct in DDRS, Israeli accessed airfi 20 elds Jul in2009. the on rearming the Saudi air force. At the end of his tenure, Brown Negev to replace those in the Sinai (the peninsula would eventually 35 30 undertook Memcons, a mission Carter, to Brown,Seoul forVance, the Brzezinski, purpose ofPark dissuading et al., 30 theJan return Memo,to Egypt). Brown Carter for gaveCarter, Brown 29 Apr and 1977, DoD 000B3F9.pdf, this responsibility, CD-1, 1979,South 11 Korean a.m.–12:20 military p.m., dictator, CK3100511398; Chun Do Carter, Hwan, Park from and executingGleysteen, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memcon, Carter, Brown, Brzezinski, et al., 21 30 Jun 1979, 12:23–1:30 p.m., CK3100110798: both in DDRS, Maywhich 1977, the Israelis9:30–10:30 made a.m., a requirement CK3100500089; for their memo, agreement General Brownto the a key dissident leader, Kim Dae Jung, who later became the fi rst 7 Vance, Hard Choices peace accords. accesseddemocratically 22 Jul 2009; elected president of the, Republic129–130; ofWilliam South Gleysteen, Korea.9 and Habib for Carter, 28 May 1977, CK3100105174; memo, Brown Massive Entanglements, Marginal Infl uence: Carter and the Korean Crisis for Carter, 12 Jul 1977, CK3100145706; memo, Brown and Vance for (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 46–49; Oberdorfer, Carter,Saudi Arabia 13 Jul provided 1977, CK3100105178; a second focus andof U.S. memcon, policy Carter,in the MiddleBrown, TwoBrown Koreas, was not106–107. always successful in these missions, just as Carter’s Brzezinski,East. Sitting and on Armacost, the world’s 14 largestJul 1977, reservoir CK3100500095: of oil, its allmilitary in DDRS, was foreign36 policy was not an unqualifi ed success. By January 1981 accessedtotally unable 20 Jul to2009; protect memo, the Brzezinski country forand Carter, its vast 13 wealth Jul 1977, against folder a Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 12 Jul 1979, CK3100514579; ROK 7–9/77, box 43, Country File, Korea, Brzezinski Material, National Brown forhad Brzezinski, become 6an Oct acknowledged 1979, CK3100467908: and integral both part in DDRS,of the Securitydetermined Aff airs, outside Carter threat Library. (in U.S. eyes primarily the Soviet Union, accessedforeign policy22 Jul 2009; team. Carter Although Public hePapers never 1979 enjoyed, 2:1275–1276. a close personal or secondarily Iraq). Having relied for years on the U.S. promise to relationship with Brzezinski (unlike his friendship with Vance), 31 Memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 7 Sep 1977, CK3100500100, DDRS, 37 defend their sovereignty, the Saudis felt vulnerable after the 1979 Brown Gleysteen,found himself Massive more Entanglement in tune, 53–62,with Brzezinski’s132–133; Oberdorfer, hawkish accessed 20 Jul 2009; memo, Brown for Carter, 26 Aug 1977, 0000CAC4. Two Koreas, 111–115; msg, State to all diplomatic posts, 27 Oct 1977, pdf,revolution CD-1, Declassifiin Iran and ed SecDef the Soviet Files; invasion memcon, of Brown, Afghanistan Brzezinski, later Vance, that CK3100489352,approach to foreign DDRS, and accessed national 22 securityJul 2009. policies. In the last two 4year. Apr Th 1978, ey pressed CK3100496701, Washington DDRS, for more accessed advanced 21 Jul weapons,2009; memo, and years of his tenure, Brown proved more assertive and dominant at 38 BrzezinskiBrown and for DoD Carter, favored 18 Apr beefi 1978, ng CK3100505091, up the kingdom’s DDRS, defenses. accessed More 22 the various Oberdorfer, NSC, PRC,Two andKoreas SCC, meetings117–121; thatGleysteen, debated foreignMassive Julgenerally, 2009; memo they Brzezinskirevamped for the Carter, U.S. 19military Apr 1978, posture folder in ROK the 1–6/78,Persian Entanglement, 77–83, 210–212; John A. Wickham, Korea on the Brink: Frompolicy the issues. “12/12 His Incident” advice closelyto the Kwangju mirrored Uprising that of (Washington, Brzezinski (who DC: boxGulf, 44, the Country Indian File, Ocean, Korea, and Brzezinski South Asia, Material, the frameworkNational Security for security. Aff airs, Carter Library; Carter Public Papers 1978, 1:768. Nationalclaims Brown Defense was Universityby this time Press, even 1999), more hard-line53–66; msg, than Brown he was), to and was generally, although not always, accepted and followed by 604 615 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy retain(New York: it against Random an increasinglyHouse, 1989), nationalistic 209–216; Wilfried Panama Loth, and Overcoming the threat During32 Ltr, the Brownfi nal two to yearsVance of with his presidency,copy to Brzezinski, Carter came 14 Octto rely 1978, on ofthe sabotageCold War: from A History anti-American of Détente ,elements 1950–1991, in Latin trans. America. Robert F.6 Hogg 0000D0E8.pdf,Brown as an envoy, CD-2, a person Declassifi who ed couldSecDef explain Files; memo,the administration’s Brzezinski for (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 155. Carter,policies. 28 After Oct 1978, the fallCK3100104576; of the Shah memo,of Iran, Brzezinski Brown forembarked Carter with on Carter’s disapproval, 1 Nov 1979, CK31000117770; memcon, Park, Th e 27Panama Canal controversy has slipped into history, but the Brown, Star Spangled Security, 140–141. Brown,the most and clearly Gleysteen, defi ned CK diplomatic 3100509548; mission memo, of Platt his forcareer Brzezinski, to date— 13 Middle East confl ict between Israel and the Arabs festers on. to reassure Middle East allies about America’s commitment to 28 Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Nov 1979, CK3100517021: all in DDRS, accessed 21 Jul 2009. President Jimmy Carter is most remembered for his Camp David MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 85–86. Carter provides a long discussion them33 in light of the changed environment. Th e actual impact of Accords and follow-on peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, both Wood, “Persuading a President,” 107–110; Don Hirst, “North of his China policy in Keeping Faith, 186–211; Harold Brown, interview Koreathis mission Has Ground proved Unit diffi Edge,” cult 8to Jan quantify, 1978, Army but Times Brown’s, 1, 21. personal Neither 8 bymajor Alfred accomplishments Goldberg and Ronald in a diffiLanda, cult 1 andMar long-lasting1993, pt. 4, 12–13,dispute. Oral In Brownassurances nor Carterwere part fully ofaccepted the toolset this assessment.of Carter’s “I diplomacy. have never beenTh e Historytruth, the Collection, peace came OSD/HO; at the price Brown, of generous Star Spangled military Security assistance, 167–168. and convincedsuccess of ofthis the trip accuracy in the president’sof the report, eyes but led I tohad other to accept assignments. it,” the credits29 Joeto bothWood, countries. “Persuading Th ea secretaryPresident: ofJimmy state Carter and ultimately and American the presidentBrown worked remembered. closely Jimmy with Western Carter, interview European by leadersAlfred Goldbergto gain their and Troopspresident in Korea,” had the Studies responsibility in Intelligence for military6, no. 4 (1996): sales credits 98–99; and Oberdorfer, military Mauriceapproval—in Matloff the , Atlanta, face of GA, strong 12 Marlocal 1986, antinuclear Oral History opposition—for Collection, Twoassistance. Koreas , Congress101–102; hadmemo, to approve.Armacost Because for Brzezinski, DoD implemented9 Feb 1977, OSD/HO. Brown recalled: “What really undermined it [the withdrawal policy]stationing in the cruise end wasmissiles an intelligence and Pershing assessment, II missiles the validity with of nuclearwhich I CK3100502092,the agreed policy, Declassifi in practice ed Documents Brown playedReference a clear Service policy (DDRS), role, warheads on their soil. Brown traveled to mainland China, the fi rst accessed 20 Jul 2009; General John W. Vessey, interview by Alfred Goldberg still have some uncertainty about.” Brown interview, 1 Mar 1993, pt. 4, andespecially Maurice since Matloff the , details12 Mar of1990, the 3–4,implementation Oral History Collection,of broad policyOSD/ ibid.secretary of defense to do so, to explore with Chinese leaders the decisions became, many times in fact, the real negotiations. Brown HO; Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous expansion34 Memo, of PlattU.S.–People’s for Brzezinski, Republic 17 Jan 1979,of China CK3100519391, military relations DDRS; Duty:spent Anmany American hours Soldier with inIsraeli the Twentieth and Egyptian Century (Newdefense York: ministers Summit PRMand to 45, coordinate 22 Jan 1979, policy item PR001441,to obstruct Digital the Soviet National military Security takeover Archive Books,working 1991), out military 383; msgs, sales, CINCPAC credit, and to assistance JCS, 011957Z arrangements. May 1977, In (DNSA);of Afghanistan. memo, BrownPlatt to met Brzezinski, with Saudi 6 Jun Defense 1979, MinisterCK3100147779; Sultan CK3100119115; 052017Z May 1977, CK3100124436; and 110344Z addition, part of the Camp David Accords understanding was that Summarybin Abdulaziz of Conclusions al-Saud atto PRC explain Meeting, U.S. 8 Junpolicies 1979, andCK3100147884: limitations May 1977, CK3100111625; msg, COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, all in DDRS, accessed 22 Jul 2009. 151330Zthe United May States 1977, would CK3100111627: fi nance and all construct in DDRS, Israeli accessed airfi 20 elds Jul in2009. the on rearming the Saudi air force. At the end of his tenure, Brown Negev to replace those in the Sinai (the peninsula would eventually 35 30 undertook Memcons, a mission Carter, to Brown,Seoul forVance, the Brzezinski, purpose ofPark dissuading et al., 30 theJan return Memo,to Egypt). Brown Carter for gaveCarter, Brown 29 Apr and 1977, DoD 000B3F9.pdf, this responsibility, CD-1, 1979,South 11 Korean a.m.–12:20 military p.m., dictator, CK3100511398; Chun Do Carter, Hwan, Park from and executingGleysteen, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memcon, Carter, Brown, Brzezinski, et al., 21 30 Jun 1979, 12:23–1:30 p.m., CK3100110798: both in DDRS, Maywhich 1977, the Israelis9:30–10:30 made a.m., a requirement CK3100500089; for their memo, agreement General Brownto the a key dissident leader, Kim Dae Jung, who later became the fi rst 7 Vance, Hard Choices peace accords. accesseddemocratically 22 Jul 2009; elected president of the, Republic129–130; ofWilliam South Gleysteen, Korea.9 and Habib for Carter, 28 May 1977, CK3100105174; memo, Brown Massive Entanglements, Marginal Infl uence: Carter and the Korean Crisis for Carter, 12 Jul 1977, CK3100145706; memo, Brown and Vance for (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 46–49; Oberdorfer, Carter,Saudi Arabia 13 Jul provided 1977, CK3100105178; a second focus andof U.S. memcon, policy Carter,in the MiddleBrown, TwoBrown Koreas, was not106–107. always successful in these missions, just as Carter’s Brzezinski,East. Sitting and on Armacost, the world’s 14 largestJul 1977, reservoir CK3100500095: of oil, its allmilitary in DDRS, was foreign36 policy was not an unqualifi ed success. By January 1981 accessedtotally unable 20 Jul to2009; protect memo, the Brzezinski country forand Carter, its vast 13 wealth Jul 1977, against folder a Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 12 Jul 1979, CK3100514579; ROK 7–9/77, box 43, Country File, Korea, Brzezinski Material, National Brown forhad Brzezinski, become 6an Oct acknowledged 1979, CK3100467908: and integral both part in DDRS,of the Securitydetermined Aff airs, outside Carter threat Library. (in U.S. eyes primarily the Soviet Union, accessedforeign policy22 Jul 2009; team. Carter Although Public hePapers never 1979 enjoyed, 2:1275–1276. a close personal or secondarily Iraq). Having relied for years on the U.S. promise to relationship with Brzezinski (unlike his friendship with Vance), 31 Memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 7 Sep 1977, CK3100500100, DDRS, 37 defend their sovereignty, the Saudis felt vulnerable after the 1979 Brown Gleysteen,found himself Massive more Entanglement in tune, 53–62,with Brzezinski’s132–133; Oberdorfer, hawkish accessed 20 Jul 2009; memo, Brown for Carter, 26 Aug 1977, 0000CAC4. Two Koreas, 111–115; msg, State to all diplomatic posts, 27 Oct 1977, pdf,revolution CD-1, Declassifiin Iran and ed SecDef the Soviet Files; invasion memcon, of Brown, Afghanistan Brzezinski, later Vance, that CK3100489352,approach to foreign DDRS, and accessed national 22 securityJul 2009. policies. In the last two 4year. Apr Th 1978, ey pressed CK3100496701, Washington DDRS, for more accessed advanced 21 Jul weapons,2009; memo, and years of his tenure, Brown proved more assertive and dominant at 38 BrzezinskiBrown and for DoD Carter, favored 18 Apr beefi 1978, ng CK3100505091, up the kingdom’s DDRS, defenses. accessed More 22 the various Oberdorfer, NSC, PRC,Two andKoreas SCC, meetings117–121; thatGleysteen, debated foreignMassive Julgenerally, 2009; memo they Brzezinskirevamped for the Carter, U.S. 19military Apr 1978, posture folder in ROK the 1–6/78,Persian Entanglement, 77–83, 210–212; John A. Wickham, Korea on the Brink: Frompolicy the issues. “12/12 His Incident” advice closelyto the Kwangju mirrored Uprising that of (Washington, Brzezinski (who DC: boxGulf, 44, the Country Indian File, Ocean, Korea, and Brzezinski South Asia, Material, the frameworkNational Security for security. Aff airs, Carter Library; Carter Public Papers 1978, 1:768. Nationalclaims Brown Defense was Universityby this time Press, even 1999), more hard-line53–66; msg, than Brown he was), to and was generally, although not always, accepted and followed by 604 615 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy foundWickham, it diffi 221921Z cult to engageDec 1979, in small 0000D3A1.pdf; talk and banter. memo, Brown McGiff was ert the to and national46 Testimony security by Jones, questions. SCFR, Th Taiwan: e Republic Hearings of Korea, 96th andCong., Japan 1st Brown,antithesis 29 ofJan Nobel 1980, w/Brown’sPeace Prize disapproval, winner and 000CD9E.pdf: controversial both statesman in CD- institutionalizedsess., 22 Feb 1979, their 740; military Congressional relations Quarterly with theAlmanac, United 1979 States, vol. with 33 2,Henry Declassifi Kissinger, ed SecDef who Files. employed humor to further his negotiations. annual(Washington, consultative DC: Congressional meetings between Quarterly, Brown 1980), and 35, his 104–105. counterparts As the39 Memo,Carter Greggadministration for Brzezinski, found 20 Mayitself 1980, increasingly folder Mtgs embroiled Muskie, in Tokyo47 Memo, or Seoul. Brown To for South Carter, Korea, 10 Mar the 1977, issues 0000D2D1.pdf, were how the United CD-2, Brown,in foreign Brzezinski policy disputes,[MBB], 5/80–6/80, Brown was Subject called File, to serve Brzezinski as a principal Donated DeclassifiStates would ed SecDef formulate Files. its policy to defend the South from the Material, Carter Library; Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, 127–143, foreign policy adviser and sometime diplomat. He did so with North,48 the number of U.S. tripwire forces in Korea, and the types Wickham, Korea on the Brink, 127–149; Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 124– Keefer, Harold Brown, 407 (quote). diligence, meeting with his share of successes and failures.2 of weapons to back them up. To the Japanese, Brown talked mostly 133; Department of State White Paper, “United States Statement on the 49 about theirBrown’s professed comments goal on to spendmemo, more Platt onto defense—1Brown, 23 Decpercent 1980, of Events in Kwangju, May 1980,” Jun 1989, reprinted in Wickham, Korea JA00803, DNSA, accessed 18 Aug 2009. onBy the1977 Brink the, 193–228.nature of the job had changed so that it was impossible gross national product (GNP)—and encouraged them to assume for an incumbent not to engage in foreign policy. Much of America’s 50 Memo, Armacost for Brzezinski, 204 Apr 1977, CK3100510895; 40 Keefer, Harold Brown, 394 (quote). more regional security responsibilities. interactions with friends and allies had revolved around military Summary of PRC Meeting of 21 Apr 1977, CK3100510319: both in relationships.41 Memo, ThBrown e most for obvious Vance case:and theBrzezinski, members 12 of Augthe North1980, DDRS,Th e second accessed Strategic 16 Sep Arms 2009; Limitation memos, Talks,Slocombe inherited for Brown, by the 23 Carter Aug 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, 25 Aug 1977: both in 0000CAC4.pdf, CD- 0000D3A0.pdf,Atlantic Treaty OrganizationCD-2, Declassifi (NATO). ed SecDef Brown Files; attended memos, theGregg annual for administration, were highly technical negotiations undertaken at Brzezinski, 15 Aug 1980; Brzezinski for Carter, 16 Sep 1980: both in 2, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memo, Claytor for Brown, 13 Jun 1977, foldergathering ROK of 9/80–1/81, defense ministers box 44, Countryand other File, alliance Korea, planning Brzezinski meetings. Material, PH00986,Helsinki, Geneva,DNSA, accessed and Vienna, 16 Sep augmented 2009; Keefer, by Harold high-level Brown discussions, 411–414. NATO defense ministers coordinated their defense budgets and in Moscow and Washington. While the Department of State and National Security Aff airs, Carter Library; msg 4232, State to Seoul, 5 51 Memos, McGiff ert for Brown, 9 Nov 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, Decforce 1980, structures, CK3100105195; planned broadmsg 16596, strategy Seoul (both to State, conventional 13 Dec 1980, and 12the Nov Arms 1977: Control both andin 0000CAF9.pdf, Disarmament CD-2,Agency Declassifi (ACDA) ed hadSecDef primary Files; CK3100109098:nuclear), arranged both for in joint DDRS, production accessed 22 of Jul weapons, 2009; Richard and purchased Holbrook memo,responsibility Slocombe for for the Brown, talks, 13Brown Dec 1977, and DoD 0000CB19.pdf, had an obvious ibid. stake andeach Michael other’s weaponArmacost, systems “A Future (mostly Leader’s Western Moment European of Truth,” purchases 24 Dec in the process. Furthermore, SALT II went to the very essence of 1997, New York Times, A17; Richard Allen, “On the Korea Tightrope, 52 of U.S. weapons). Any number of alliance questions ostensibly the U.S.-Soviet Memo, Mondale relationship—how for Carter, 26to Aprcontrol 1978, the CK3100514414, nuclear arms 1980,” 21 Jan 1998, ibid., A17. DDRS, accessed 16 Sep 2009; William E. Berry Jr., U.S. Bases in the about defense had inherent foreign policy implications—the pledge race so that neither side would be tempted to strive for superiority 42 Philippines: Th e Evolution of the Special Relationship (Boulder, CO: by each Brown, country Star to Spangled raise its Security total defense, 150–151, budget by 3 percent real Westviewand unbalance Press, what1989), Brown 202–205; called memo, “essential Platt forequivalence.” Brzezinski, Brown3 Nov growth43 Note, and a CarterNATO for decision Brown, to Vance,buy weapon and Brzezinski, systems—that 9 Sep went 1979, to 1978,increasingly CK3100469872; became a memcon,trusted sourceCarter, Inouyeof SALT et al.,II advice17 Nov to 1978, the folderthe heart PRC of Meeting the guns w/Deng or butter [1/9/78–10/3/78], debate that had box dominated 9, Geographic Western File, CK3100480547;president.5 memo, Vance for Carter, 29 Dec 1978, CK3100058883; Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library; memo, Brown for Carter, 16 ltr, Carter to Marcos, 4 Jan 1979, CK3100511475: all in DDRS, accessed Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. To persuade the 16 Sep 2009. SepNATO 1979, allies 0000CF73.pdf, to commit CD-2,their fair Declassifi defense ed SecDefshare required Files; memo, continual Carter Much of the foreign policy debate during the Carter years took for Vance and Brown, 17 Dec 1979, folder PRC Alpha [12/78–1/80], box 53 Poole, Decline of Détente, 17–21; see also Strobe Talbot, Endgame: 9,consultations Geographic File,and Brzezinskiarm-twisting Donated of NATO Material, counterparts Carter Library. by Brown place within the halls of Congress. Brown proved conscientious and and other Department of Defense (DoD) offi cials. Some of the effTh eective Inside inStory his of relations SAL T II with(New Capitol York: Harper Hill. &He Row, was 1979). never more so 44 most controversial Foreign Relations NATO of the issuesUnited turnedStates [FRUS into ],raging 1977–1980, international vol. 13, than 54in Talbot, the debate Endgame over, 50; the Brzezinski, return of Powerthe Panama and Principle Canal,, 158. a raucous China, ed. David P. Nickles (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), 1033–1035; debates, arousing vocal and determined public opposition—the and highly politicized ratifi cation process that supercharged the memcon, Brown and Deng, 8 Jan 1980,10 a.m., CK3100374514, DDRS, 55 Vance, Hard Choices, 47–55; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, neutronaccessed 13 bomb Aug 2009;and thealso printedagreement in FRUS to deploy 1977–1980 nuclear, 13:1055–1066. cruise and political157–164. right opposed to “giving away our canal.” Th e successful 3 ratifi cation, and then the passage of legislation to implement the Pershing45 II missiles on alliance soil. 56 Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 29 Sep 1978, CK3100010293; treaties, Brzezinski, became Powerbruising and Principle political, 167–171; battles Talbot, for which Endgame the, 184–185. Carter 26 Oct 1978, CK3100111050: both in DDRS, accessed 17 Aug 2009; 57 memo,NATO Brzezinski consultations for Brown had and represented Vance, 6 Oct a 1978,standard folder part China-ROK. of any administration Brzezinski, took Power out and allPrinciple the ,stops. 317; Keefer, Brown Harold maintained Brown, 159to 6–10/78,secretary ofbox defense’s 11, Country job since File, theKorea, establishment Brzezinski Material,of the alliance National in (quote).Congress that the real issue was not ownership of the canal, but Security Aff airs, Carter Library; memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 26 Oct 1949. With many allies, friends, and potential friends outside of rather58 Keefer,the canal’s Harold security Brown , and159–160. openness to all traffi c. To Brown, 1978,NATO, CK3100111050, U.S. foreign relations DDRS, accessedalso became 17 Aug intertwined 2009. with defense the danger of not returning the canal was far greater than trying to 622 633 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy foundWickham, it diffi 221921Z cult to engageDec 1979, in small 0000D3A1.pdf; talk and banter. memo, Brown McGiff was ert the to and national46 Testimony security by Jones, questions. SCFR, Th Taiwan: e Republic Hearings of Korea, 96th andCong., Japan 1st antithesisBrown, 29 ofJan Nobel 1980, w/Brown’sPeace Prize disapproval, winner and 000CD9E.pdf: controversial both statesman in CD- institutionalizedsess., 22 Feb 1979, their 740; military Congressional relations Quarterly with theAlmanac, United 1979 States, vol. with 33 Henry2, Declassifi Kissinger, ed SecDef who Files. employed humor to further his negotiations. annual(Washington, consultative DC: Congressional meetings between Quarterly, Brown 1980), and 35, his 104–105. counterparts As the39 Memo,Carter Greggadministration for Brzezinski, found 20 Mayitself 1980, increasingly folder Mtgs embroiled Muskie, in Tokyo47 Memo, or Seoul. Brown To for South Carter, Korea, 10 Mar the 1977, issues 0000D2D1.pdf, were how the United CD-2, Brown,in foreign Brzezinski policy disputes,[MBB], 5/80–6/80, Brown was Subject called File, to serve Brzezinski as a principal Donated DeclassifiStates would ed SecDef formulate Files. its policy to defend the South from the Material, Carter Library; Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, 127–143, foreign policy adviser and sometime diplomat. He did so with North,48 the number of U.S. tripwire forces in Korea, and the types Wickham, Korea on the Brink, 127–149; Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 124– Keefer, Harold Brown, 407 (quote). diligence, meeting with his share of successes and failures.2 of weapons to back them up. To the Japanese, Brown talked mostly 133; Department of State White Paper, “United States Statement on the 49 about theirBrown’s professed comments goal on to spendmemo, more Platt onto defense—1Brown, 23 Decpercent 1980, of Events in Kwangju, May 1980,” Jun 1989, reprinted in Wickham, Korea JA00803, DNSA, accessed 18 Aug 2009. onBy the1977 Brink the, 193–228.nature of the job had changed so that it was impossible gross national product (GNP)—and encouraged them to assume for an incumbent not to engage in foreign policy. Much of America’s 50 Memo, Armacost for Brzezinski, 204 Apr 1977, CK3100510895; 40 Keefer, Harold Brown, 394 (quote). more regional security responsibilities. interactions with friends and allies had revolved around military Summary of PRC Meeting of 21 Apr 1977, CK3100510319: both in relationships.41 Memo, ThBrown e most for obvious Vance case:and theBrzezinski, members 12 of Augthe North1980, DDRS,Th e second accessed Strategic 16 Sep Arms 2009; Limitation memos, Talks,Slocombe inherited for Brown, by the 23 Carter Aug 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, 25 Aug 1977: both in 0000CAC4.pdf, CD- 0000D3A0.pdf,Atlantic Treaty OrganizationCD-2, Declassifi (NATO). ed SecDef Brown Files; attended memos, theGregg annual for administration, were highly technical negotiations undertaken at Brzezinski, 15 Aug 1980; Brzezinski for Carter, 16 Sep 1980: both in 2, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memo, Claytor for Brown, 13 Jun 1977, foldergathering ROK of 9/80–1/81, defense ministers box 44, Countryand other File, alliance Korea, planning Brzezinski meetings. Material, PH00986,Helsinki, Geneva,DNSA, accessed and Vienna, 16 Sep augmented 2009; Keefer, by Harold high-level Brown discussions, 411–414. NATO defense ministers coordinated their defense budgets and in Moscow and Washington. While the Department of State and National Security Aff airs, Carter Library; msg 4232, State to Seoul, 5 51 Memos, McGiff ert for Brown, 9 Nov 1977; Brown for Brzezinski, Decforce 1980, structures, CK3100105195; planned broadmsg 16596, strategy Seoul (both to State, conventional 13 Dec 1980, and 12the Nov Arms 1977: Control both andin 0000CAF9.pdf, Disarmament CD-2,Agency Declassifi (ACDA) ed hadSecDef primary Files; CK3100109098:nuclear), arranged both for in joint DDRS, production accessed 22 of Jul weapons, 2009; Richard and purchased Holbrook memo,responsibility Slocombe for for the Brown, talks, 13Brown Dec 1977, and DoD 0000CB19.pdf, had an obvious ibid. stake andeach Michael other’s weaponArmacost, systems “A Future (mostly Leader’s Western Moment European of Truth,” purchases 24 Dec in the process. Furthermore, SALT II went to the very essence of 1997, New York Times, A17; Richard Allen, “On the Korea Tightrope, 52 of U.S. weapons). Any number of alliance questions ostensibly the U.S.-Soviet Memo, Mondale relationship—how for Carter, 26to Aprcontrol 1978, the CK3100514414, nuclear arms 1980,” 21 Jan 1998, ibid., A17. DDRS, accessed 16 Sep 2009; William E. Berry Jr., U.S. Bases in the about defense had inherent foreign policy implications—the pledge race so that neither side would be tempted to strive for superiority 42 Philippines: Th e Evolution of the Special Relationship (Boulder, CO: by each Brown, country Star to Spangled raise its Security total defense, 150–151, budget by 3 percent real Westviewand unbalance Press, what1989), Brown 202–205; called memo, “essential Platt forequivalence.” Brzezinski, Brown3 Nov growth43 Note, and a CarterNATO for decision Brown, to Vance,buy weapon and Brzezinski, systems—that 9 Sep went 1979, to 1978,increasingly CK3100469872; became a memcon,trusted sourceCarter, Inouyeof SALT et al.,II advice17 Nov to 1978, the folderthe heart PRC of Meeting the guns w/Deng or butter [1/9/78–10/3/78], debate that had box dominated 9, Geographic Western File, CK3100480547;president.5 memo, Vance for Carter, 29 Dec 1978, CK3100058883; Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library; memo, Brown for Carter, 16 ltr, Carter to Marcos, 4 Jan 1979, CK3100511475: all in DDRS, accessed Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. To persuade the 16 Sep 2009. SepNATO 1979, allies 0000CF73.pdf, to commit CD-2,their fair Declassifi defense ed SecDefshare required Files; memo, continual Carter Much of the foreign policy debate during the Carter years took for Vance and Brown, 17 Dec 1979, folder PRC Alpha [12/78–1/80], box 53 Poole, Decline of Détente, 17–21; see also Strobe Talbot, Endgame: 9,consultations Geographic File,and Brzezinskiarm-twisting Donated of NATO Material, counterparts Carter Library. by Brown place within the halls of Congress. Brown proved conscientious and and other Department of Defense (DoD) offi cials. Some of the effTh eective Inside inStory his of relations SAL T II with(New Capitol York: Harper Hill. &He Row, was 1979). never more so 44 most controversial Foreign Relations NATO of the issuesUnited turnedStates [FRUS into ],raging 1977–1980, international vol. 13, than 54in Talbot, the debate Endgame over, 50; the Brzezinski, return of Powerthe Panama and Principle Canal,, 158. a raucous China, ed. David P. Nickles (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), 1033–1035; debates, arousing vocal and determined public opposition—the and highly politicized ratifi cation process that supercharged the memcon, Brown and Deng, 8 Jan 1980,10 a.m., CK3100374514, DDRS, 55 Vance, Hard Choices, 47–55; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, neutronaccessed 13 bomb Aug 2009;and thealso printedagreement in FRUS to deploy 1977–1980 nuclear, 13:1055–1066. cruise and political157–164. right opposed to “giving away our canal.” Th e successful 3 ratifi cation, and then the passage of legislation to implement the Pershing45 II missiles on alliance soil. 56 Memos, Brzezinski for Carter, 29 Sep 1978, CK3100010293; treaties, Brzezinski, became Powerbruising and Principle political, 167–171; battles Talbot, for which Endgame the, 184–185. Carter 26 Oct 1978, CK3100111050: both in DDRS, accessed 17 Aug 2009; 57 memo,NATO Brzezinski consultations for Brown had and represented Vance, 6 Oct a 1978,standard folder part China-ROK. of any administration Brzezinski, took Power out and allPrinciple the ,stops. 317; Keefer, Brown Harold maintained Brown, 159to 6–10/78,secretary ofbox defense’s 11, Country job since File, theKorea, establishment Brzezinski Material,of the alliance National in (quote).Congress that the real issue was not ownership of the canal, but Security Aff airs, Carter Library; memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 26 Oct 1949. With many allies, friends, and potential friends outside of rather58 Keefer,the canal’s Harold security Brown , and159–160. openness to all traffi c. To Brown, 1978,NATO, CK3100111050, U.S. foreign relations DDRS, accessedalso became 17 Aug intertwined 2009. with defense the danger of not returning the canal was far greater than trying to 622 633 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy

59 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 325. 72 Testimony by Brown, SCFR, Panama Canal Treaties: Hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 27 Sep 1977, 96–98. 60 Keefer, Harold Brown, 161–162. 73 61 Linowitz, Making of a Public Man, 199–203. Th e text of the Carter, Keeping Faith, 242–261; Brown interview, 1 Mar 1993, pt. 4, 28. treaties are printed in Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic 62 Keefer, Harold Brown, 166–167, 169–170. Documents, 1977–1980, 1384–1403, 1412–1421. Introduction74 63 Brown, Star Spangled Security, 125–126. Jimmy Carter, interview by Richard E. Neustadt et al., 29 Nov 1983, Presidential Projects, Jimmy Carter, Presidential Oral History, 64 Carter, Keeping Faith 152–157. AcademicHarold Brown Programs, had littleMiller interest Center, in formulatingUniversity of and Virginia, implementing ,nomination accessed to31 becomeMar 2009; secretary Carter, ofKeeping defense. Faith ,Later, 182; Factobserving Sheet, Sep–10 Nov) 1977, box 77, SecDef Files, Acc 330-80-0017; memo, Implementingthat “in most Legislation,Secretaries Majorof Defense Issues, there 8 Feb is 1978,a Secretary folder ofPanama State Davis for Vance, Brown et al., 26 Jan 1977, w/attached response to PRM Canalstriving Treaty, to break Documents out,” he professedre 1978 Presidentialno desire toTrip, assume Congressional that role, 1, “Policy Review Memorandum: Panama,” PD01537, DNSA, accessed Hearing, McGiff ert Briefi ng Book, Hearing, HRAC, 3/79, box 426; 15 Jul 2010. memo,especially McIntryre since he for would Carter, be 27 challenging Jul 1978, folder his good Panama friend, Canal Secretary Treaty: of State Cyrus Vance. Brown recalled that “two of them were 66 Perceived wisdom held that the Carter administration’s public Documents on Implementation, 1977–1981, DoD Original Treaty relations campaign turned around overwhelming opposition (almost 80 Implementation,already enough,” box implying 416: both also in Subjectthat he Files, had OSD/HO;not wished memo, to compete Brown percent) to at least majority public support. George D. Moff et III, Th e forwith Carter, the other27 Jul 1979,would-be 0000B421.pdf, dominator CD-1, of foreign Declassifi policy, ed SecDef National Files. 1 Limits of Victory: Th e Ratifi cation of the Panama Canal Treaties (Ithaca, NY: Security75 Mary Adviser Russell, Zbigniew “House TurnsBrzezinski. Down Bill Initially, to Implement Brown Canal felt Cornell University Press, 1985), 116, argues convincingly that opposition Treaty,”content Washingtonto provide Postnational, 12 Sepsecurity 1979, advice 1; Russell, and support“Conferees to foreignSwiftly remained static and opposed despite the Carter campaign. Reachpolicymakers, Compromise eschewing on Canal,” broader ibid., topics. 25 Sep In1979; early A.O. meetings Sulzberger of theJr., 67 Memo, Davis for Vance, Brown et al., 26 Jan 1977, w/attached “HouseNational Enacts Security Bill toCouncil Carry Out(NSC), Terms the of PolicyPanama Review Canal Treaty,”Committee New York Times, 27 Sep 1979, 1. response to PRM 1, “Policy Review Memorandum: Panama,” Tab 4, 15 (PRC), and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC)—the Jan 1977, PD01537, DNSA, accessed 15 Jul 2010; William J. Jorden, main76 deliberative Keefer, Harold forums Brown for, 75–76; foreign Minutes policy debateof PRC andMeeting, formulation 24 Mar Panama Odyssey (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), 343–344; 1977, CK3100146753, DDRS, accessed 27 Jul 2011. memo, Dolvin for Pastor, 31 Jan 1977, CK3100104729, DDRS, accessed during the Carter years—the Pentagon chief took the lead only 15 Jul 2010. when77 defense Keefer, Haroldissues wereBrown clearly, 77–82, the 77 primary (quote); topic. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 128. 68 Carter, Keeping Faith, 157; Vance, Hard Choices, 146. It was not that Brown was unqualifi ed. With his impressive 78 Pub. L. No. 95-92, 91 Stat. 619-620 (1977). 69 Fact Sheet, United States Southern Command, 13 Sep 1977, credentials as a nuclear scientist and weapons designer, an adept briefi ng book for Carter visit, 16–17 Jun 1978, folder Panama Canal administrator79 Keefer, Haroldat the nation’s Brown, premier77–80; memo, nuclear Brzezinski laboratory, for a Carter,Secretary 13 Treaty, Documents on Implementation, 1977–1978, box 418, Subject JulRobert 1978, McNamara CK3100117377, “whiz DDRS,kid” director accessed for 27 defense Jul 2010; research Brzezinski, and Files, OSD/HO; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 376–380. Power and Principle, 128–129; memo, Christopher for Carter, 19 Jun 1980,engineering, CK3100135823, and then secretaryDDRS, accessed of the Air 27 Force,Jul 2011; Brown memos, was knownMuskie 70 Sol M. Linowitz, Th e Making of a Public Man: A Memoir (Boston: foras aCarter, savvy 18technocrat Oct 1980; with Th ornton a prodigious for Brzezinski, command 28 Oct of 1980: details both and in Little, Brown, 1985), 164–165; Carter, Keeping Faith, 168; Betty Glad, An folderthe Pentagon’s Mtgs MBB, internal 10/80–1/81, workings. box 34, Compared Subject File, with Brzezinski the 13 Donateddefense Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of Material,secretaries Carter who Library.preceded him, he came to his offi ce with the most American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 92. Pentagon80 Keefer, experience Harold Brown(eight, 80–82;years). memo, While Brzezinski blessed withfor Vance, blazing 27 71 Carter, Keeping Faith, 152, 155, 162 (quote); memos, Brown intelligenceNov 1979, CK3100496688, and an almost DDRS, superhuman accessed work27 Jul ethic,11; memo, he remained Pastor for for Carter, 26 Aug 1977, 0000CB30.pdf, CD-1; and 19 Sep 1977, byBrzezinski, his own 20 admission Feb 1980; amemos, shy and Th sometimes ornton for Brzezinski,awkward person13 Feb 1980who 0000B403.pdf, CD-2: both in Declassifi ed SecDef Files. 64 651 Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy and 19 Feb 1980: all in folder Mtgs MMB, 1/80–2/801, box 34, Subject 93 Carter, Keeping Faith, 282 (quote); and White House Diary, 38–39; File, Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library. memos, Brown for Vance andForeword Brzezinski, 14 Dec 1977, 0000CB20.pdf; 81 Vance and Brown for Brzezinski, n.d. [c. 23 Dec 1977], 0000CB12.pdf: Wayne S. Smith, Th e Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic both in CD-2, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; Keefer, Harold Brown, 247–251. Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 101–127, 163–164; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 346–353; Th is is94 theKeefer, eighth Harold special Brown study, 251–252, by the Offi 255; ce ofCarter, the Secretary Keeping Faith of Defense, 299– memo, Brown for Brzezinski, 14 May 1979, 0000D51C.pdf, CD-2, (OSD)300; Brzezinski, Historical Power Offi andce onPrinciple the secretary’s, 115–120. role in foreign policy. It Declassifi ed SecDef Files; Keefer, Harold Brown, 82–88; Garthoff , Détente examines95 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s foreign policy contribution and Confrontation, 913–934; David D. Newsom, Th e Soviet Brigade in to the administration Keefer, Harold of Brown President, 256 Jimmy(quote). Carter. Brown began his tenure Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy (Bloomington: Indiana University at the96 Pentagon Ibid., 256–258 determined (quotes); to limit Ezer hisWeizman, focus to Th national e Battle securityfor Peace policy(New Press, 1987), provides a case study. andYork: military Bantam issues. Books, As the1981), Carter 233–236, administration 238–240, faced 242–248. a series of Weizman complex 82 internationaldescribes Brown challenges as “reserved and crises, and shy however, . . . almost Brown incapable became moreof small involved talk,” PD 52, “Presidential Directive on U.S. Policy to Cuba,” 16 Oct in formulating and implementing foreign policy. National security issues 1979, PR01401, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011. adding he was “a descendent of the Jewish people who had grown away andfrom defense his roots.” relationships with allies and friendly nations, coupled with 83 See Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: Th e United States a resurgent Soviet Union, required the secretary to actively engage in 97 and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); and U.S. foreign Carter, policymaking. Keeping Faith Brown, 284; wasand theWhite fi rst Housesecretary Diary of ,defense 39, 122; to Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1989). visitBrzezinski, China, Power Egypt, and Israel, Principle Jordan,, 247–248; and Saudi memo, Arabia. Brown Among for hisCarter, foreign 21 policyMay 1977, roles, 0000CA5A.pdf, he was a major CD-1, adviser Declassifi in the edStrategic SecDef ArmsFiles. Limitation 84 Minutes of PRC Meeting, 11 Jun 1978, CK3100554508, DDRS, Talks98 (SALT II) and a promoter of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1978. accessed 17 Jul 2007. In 1980 Carter, he argued White successfully House Diary for military, 194–195; aid toBrzezinski, the government Power ofand El Principle, 247 (quote); memo Brown for Carter, 7 Jul 1978, 0000B443. 85 Salvador in a fi ght against a communist insurgency. He was part of the Keefer, Harold Brown, 91–96; Rearden, Council of War, 407; teampdf, CD-1, that persuaded Declassifi Westerned SecDef European Files. NATO members to agree to base Anastaio Somoza, as told to David Cox, Nicaragua Betrayed (Boston: theater99 nuclear missiles on their soil in response to the Soviet theater Western Islands, 1980), 328–329. Carter, Keeping Faith, 391–192; and White House Diary, 236–238; nuclearWilliam challenge. B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, 86 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 147–148, 345n13; Carter, White DC: Brookings Institution, 1986), 238–239; Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, House Diary, 333–334. ThCamp e Historical David OffiAccords: ce views A Testimony this foreign (London: policy series PKI, as part1986), of an 352–357; ongoing eff ort to assess the secretary’s myriad roles and accomplishments. Th e 87 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 267, 296 (Carter quote); Brown, Star Keefer, Harold Brown, 96 (quote). titlesSpangled published Security to, 146–147.date have coveredTh e bases every were secretary constructed of defense on time since at a1947 cost 88 upof $1.038to Secretary million, Brown. just $20 We millionanticipate over continuing budget. Schubert, the series Building in tandem Air Ibid.; memo, Tarnoff for Brzezinski, 1 Aug 1979, EL01327, with future volumes in the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011. Bases in the Negev, 270–274. 100 89 Keefer, Harold Brown, 96–97. My thanks Keefer, go to Harold our senior Brown ,editor, 256–258 Sandy (quotes); Doyle, Carter, for White her careful House Diaryediting, 294. of the manuscript101 and Amy Bunting of OSD Graphics for her expertise and 90 Ibid., 97. design. ThCarter, e series Keeping titles printedFaith, 424; to dateWhite as Housewell as Diary,other publications303; Brzezinski, are availablePower and on Principle the OSD, 283–285; Historical Vance, Offi ce Hard Website. Choices We, 245–252.invite you to peruse 91 Memo, Pastor for Brzezinski, 13 Mar 1980, EL01356, DNSA, accessed our selections102 at history.defense.gov. 28 Jul 2011; Keefer, Harold Brown, 98–99; Carter, Keeping Faith, 585–586. Memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 14 Mar 1980; note, Carter to Brzezinski, 20 Mar 1980: both in folder Mtgs MBB, 3/80–4/80, box 34, 92 Keefer, Harold Brown, 99–100; memo, Aaron for Carter, 12 Jan Subject File, Brzezinski Donated Material,Erin R. CarterMahan Library; Keefer, Harold 1981, EL01365, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011; memo, Brown for Carter, Brown , 274–276 (quotes). Chief Historian 16 Jan 1981, 0000CB39.pdf, CD-2 Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memo, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense Carter for Muskie, 16 Jan 1981, EL01215, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011.

66 67v Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 8 Harold Brown and the Imperatives of Foreign Policy and 19 Feb 1980: all in folder Mtgs MMB, 1/80–2/801, box 34, Subject 93 Carter, Keeping Faith, 282 (quote); and White House Diary, 38–39; File, Brzezinski Donated Material, Carter Library. memos, Brown for Vance andForeword Brzezinski, 14 Dec 1977, 0000CB20.pdf; 81 Vance and Brown for Brzezinski, n.d. [c. 23 Dec 1977], 0000CB12.pdf: Wayne S. Smith, Th e Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic both in CD-2, Declassifi ed SecDef Files; Keefer, Harold Brown, 247–251. Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 101–127, 163–164; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 346–353; Th is is94 theKeefer, eighth Harold special Brown study, 251–252, by the Offi 255; ce ofCarter, the Secretary Keeping Faith of Defense, 299– memo, Brown for Brzezinski, 14 May 1979, 0000D51C.pdf, CD-2, (OSD)300; Brzezinski, Historical Power Offi andce onPrinciple the secretary’s, 115–120. role in foreign policy. It Declassifi ed SecDef Files; Keefer, Harold Brown, 82–88; Garthoff , Détente examines95 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s foreign policy contribution and Confrontation, 913–934; David D. Newsom, Th e Soviet Brigade in to the administration Keefer, Harold of Brown President, 256 Jimmy(quote). Carter. Brown began his tenure Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy (Bloomington: Indiana University at the96 Pentagon Ibid., 256–258 determined (quotes); to limit Ezer hisWeizman, focus to Th national e Battle securityfor Peace policy(New Press, 1987), provides a case study. andYork: military Bantam issues. Books, As the1981), Carter 233–236, administration 238–240, faced 242–248. a series of Weizman complex 82 internationaldescribes Brown challenges as “reserved and crises, and shy however, . . . almost Brown incapable became moreof small involved talk,” PD 52, “Presidential Directive on U.S. Policy to Cuba,” 16 Oct in formulating and implementing foreign policy. National security issues 1979, PR01401, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011. adding he was “a descendent of the Jewish people who had grown away andfrom defense his roots.” relationships with allies and friendly nations, coupled with 83 See Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: Th e United States a resurgent Soviet Union, required the secretary to actively engage in 97 and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); and U.S. foreign Carter, policymaking. Keeping Faith Brown, 284; wasand theWhite fi rst Housesecretary Diary of ,defense 39, 122; to Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1989). visitBrzezinski, China, Power Egypt, and Israel, Principle Jordan,, 247–248; and Saudi memo, Arabia. Brown Among for hisCarter, foreign 21 policyMay 1977, roles, 0000CA5A.pdf, he was a major CD-1, adviser Declassifi in the edStrategic SecDef ArmsFiles. Limitation 84 Minutes of PRC Meeting, 11 Jun 1978, CK3100554508, DDRS, Talks98 (SALT II) and a promoter of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1978. accessed 17 Jul 2007. In 1980 Carter, he argued White successfully House Diary for military, 194–195; aid toBrzezinski, the government Power ofand El Principle, 247 (quote); memo Brown for Carter, 7 Jul 1978, 0000B443. 85 Salvador in a fi ght against a communist insurgency. He was part of the Keefer, Harold Brown, 91–96; Rearden, Council of War, 407; teampdf, CD-1, that persuaded Declassifi Westerned SecDef European Files. NATO members to agree to base Anastaio Somoza, as told to David Cox, Nicaragua Betrayed (Boston: theater99 nuclear missiles on their soil in response to the Soviet theater Western Islands, 1980), 328–329. Carter, Keeping Faith, 391–192; and White House Diary, 236–238; nuclearWilliam challenge. B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, 86 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 147–148, 345n13; Carter, White DC: Brookings Institution, 1986), 238–239; Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, House Diary, 333–334. ThCamp e Historical David OffiAccords: ce views A Testimony this foreign (London: policy series PKI, as part1986), of an 352–357; ongoing eff ort to assess the secretary’s myriad roles and accomplishments. Th e 87 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 267, 296 (Carter quote); Brown, Star Keefer, Harold Brown, 96 (quote). titlesSpangled published Security to, 146–147.date have coveredTh e bases every were secretary constructed of defense on time since at a1947 cost 88 upof $1.038to Secretary million, Brown. just $20 We millionanticipate over continuing budget. Schubert, the series Building in tandem Air Ibid.; memo, Tarnoff for Brzezinski, 1 Aug 1979, EL01327, with future volumes in the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011. Bases in the Negev, 270–274. 100 89 Keefer, Harold Brown, 96–97. My thanks Keefer, go to Harold our senior Brown ,editor, 256–258 Sandy (quotes); Doyle, Carter, for White her careful House Diaryediting, 294. of the manuscript101 and Amy Bunting of OSD Graphics for her expertise and 90 Ibid., 97. design. ThCarter, e series Keeping titles printedFaith, 424; to dateWhite as Housewell as Diary,other publications303; Brzezinski, are availablePower and on Principle the OSD, 283–285; Historical Vance, Offi ce Hard Website. Choices We, 245–252.invite you to peruse 91 Memo, Pastor for Brzezinski, 13 Mar 1980, EL01356, DNSA, accessed our selections102 at history.defense.gov. 28 Jul 2011; Keefer, Harold Brown, 98–99; Carter, Keeping Faith, 585–586. Memo, Brzezinski for Carter, 14 Mar 1980; note, Carter to Brzezinski, 20 Mar 1980: both in folder Mtgs MBB, 3/80–4/80, box 34, 92 Keefer, Harold Brown, 99–100; memo, Aaron for Carter, 12 Jan Subject File, Brzezinski Donated Material,Erin R. CarterMahan Library; Keefer, Harold 1981, EL01365, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011; memo, Brown for Carter, Brown , 274–276 (quotes). Chief Historian 16 Jan 1981, 0000CB39.pdf, CD-2 Declassifi ed SecDef Files; memo, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense Carter for Muskie, 16 Jan 1981, EL01215, DNSA, accessed 28 Jul 2011.

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AboutAbout the theAuthor Author EdwardEdward C. KeeferC. Keefer received received a B.A. a B.A. from from McGill McGill University University in 1967 in 1967 and anda a Ph.D.Ph.D. in history in history from from Michigan Michigan State State University University in 1974. in 1974. For For34 years34 years he washe wasan editoran editor of the of theU.S. U.S. Department Department of State’s of State’s offi cialoffi cialdocumentary documentary series,series, Foreign Foreign Relations Relations of the of Unitedthe United States States. During. During that that time time he editedhe edited 25 Foreign25 Foreign Relations Relations volumes, volumes, many many of whichof which documented documented U.S. U.S. policy policy duringduring the Vietnamthe Vietnam War. War. After After 2002 2002 he was he wasthe generalthe general editor editor of the of seriesthe series untiluntil his retirementhis retirement in 2009, in 2009, when when he joined he joined the theHistorical Historical Offi Office of ce the of the SecretarySecretary of Defense. of Defense. He isHe the is authorthe author of Harold of Harold Brown: Brown: Off setting Off setting the Soviet the Soviet MilitaryMilitary Challenge, Challenge, 1977–1981 1977–1981, volume, volume 9 in 9 thein theSecretaries Secretaries of Defenseof Defense HistoricalHistorical Series Series published published by theby theOSD OSD Historical Historical Offi Office in ce 2017.in 2017. He He has hasalso alsowritten written articles articles and andcontributed contributed to books to books on U.S.on U.S. policy policy in East in East and andSoutheast Southeast Asia Asia and andtaught taught courses courses on 19th-on 19th- and and20th-century 20th-century British British militarymilitary and andpolitical political fi gures fi gures for thefor theSmithsonian Smithsonian Associates Associates program. program.

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