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A Contemporary Assessment of Thomas Kuhn: the Detection of Gravitational Waves As a Kuhnian Revolution

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A Contemporary Assessment of Thomas Kuhn: the Detection of Gravitational Waves As a Kuhnian Revolution A contemporary assessment of Thomas Kuhn: The detection of gravitational waves as a Kuhnian revolution * David Bishel B.S. Candidate, Department of Physics, California State University Stanislaus, 1 University Circle, Turlock, CA 95382 Received 17 April, 2017; accepted 19 July 2017 Abstract What denotes a scientific revolution? What makes an event so groundbreaking that it fundamentally alters the course of science thereafter? These questions inspired Thomas S. Kuhn’s 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn’s work introduces and expounds upon the concepts of paradigms and paradigm shifts, sparking decades of debate and producing a more insightful understanding of the nature of science. Though Kuhn is occasionally understood one-dimensionally as a philosophical intermediary to later theories of scientific revolution, this paper argues that Kuhn’s theory can instead be successfully employed as a benchmark of revolutions, inspiring a more robust understanding of specific sciences and the nature of science in general. A brief delineation of Kuhn’s framework of paradigms establishes and defines terms that are central to the discourse (e.g. paradigm, theory, and normal science). Kuhn’s work is then converted from a way of talking about science to a way of identifying scientific revolutions. The recent detection of gravitational waves is employed as a case study to demonstrate that Kuhn’s work can be used specifically to delineate why a given event is revolutionary. As a result, this paper illuminates some of the central elements that comprise the emerging field of gravitational wave astronomy. Keywords: paradigm, Kuhn, scientific revolution, gravitational waves Predominant scientific theories are largely responsible subsequent sociological thought or an indirect contributor for informing the general conception of reality in the to the social sciences. In the other camp are the likes of current scientific era. What occurs when observation Devlin and other contributors to Kuhn’s Structure of contradicts the dominant conception of reality? If Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. These men and contradiction arises only in one instance, then likely women maintain that Kuhn’s theory is relevant as an nothing happens; science resumes its previous course. integrated whole and should be valued as a single unit, not However, the circumstance in which such contradictions only distributed piecewise to other disciplines. Many of the cannot be ignored is far more problematic and is a essays in Devlin’s anthology emphasize an accurate consideration central to the philosophy of Thomas S. Kuhn. interpretation of Kuhn as their primary goal. In so doing, Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Kuhn the authors treat Kuhn’s work as pertinent to current wrote extensively regarding science and scientific philosophy of science. Devlin’s colleagues consider revolutions, delineating both the normal operation of Kuhnian thought not as a historical relic but as an active scientific communities and the transition to new scientific and relevant ideology of science. Most notably, editor and paradigms. As with the writings of nearly all seminal author Devlin addresses what he believes to be a fatal thinkers, Kuhn’s have been reinterpreted and conscripted to contradiction within Kuhn’s theory and, instead of casting one philosophical faction and another1. His ideas have been aside an outdated and irreparable philosophy, posits an embroiled in a battle of interpretation nearly since they amendment to lend Kuhn’s theory greater consistency 3. were first published. The Kuhnian-inspired Strong Together, the authors justify, defend, and even expand Programme extrapolated Kuhn’s philosophy to its logical upon Kuhn’s philosophy – work that the authors would not extremes and essentially “develop[ed] a position that Kuhn engage in if the targeted philosophy were flawed. did not recognize as his own” even while Kuhn was striving In the same interpretive tradition, I propose a direct to “distinguish his own project from the new sociology of application of Kuhn’s relevant and vibrant philosophy. I science [that is, the Programme]”. 2 In one interpretive maintain that Kuhn’s theory itself can be deployed to camp are those who view Kuhn as a stepping stone to understand individual scientific revolutions and the * Corresponding author. Email: [email protected] 1 Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, “Rereading Kuhn.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23, no. 2 (July 1, 2009), 217. Kuukkuanen suggests that authors have interpreted Kuhn as belonging to various schools of thought – often to the benefit of whichever author is conducting the interpretation. 2 Devlin, William, ed. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. New York: Springer International Publishing, 2015, 173, 167. 3 Ibid., 153-166. 5 paradigms they demarcate. Since Kuhn wrote about theory were imprecise, blending previous senses of the word while and theoretical change, paradigm and paradigm shifts, and adding on flavors of his own creation. In fact, linguist and science and scientific revolutions, his work would be philosopher Margaret Masterman shows Kuhn to have directly applicable if it can be used to accurately identify attached the term “paradigm” to twenty-one distinct whether an event constitutes a scientific revolution and, if phenomena.5 Therefore, I propose that “paradigm” be used so, in what ways the event constitutes such a change. After only to refer to the general construct to which a scientific delineating the central components of Kuhn’s philosophy, community adheres within the stage of normal science; I I will distill his criteria for revolution into an evaluative tool will maintain this usage throughout the discourse. More to readily identify scientific revolutions, for the same specifically, a paradigm is the broad yet definable purpose that a rubric is crafted to readily assess a work collection of theory, rules, and disciplinary matrix adhered based on some standardized benchmark. I will then apply to by a scientific community that enables it to conduct Kuhn’s criteria for revolution to recent scientific events that normal science. The elements of a paradigm tend to be have been popularly touted as revolutionary. These events elusive, tacitly posited, and largely assumed a priori by will serve as a test case of how accurately Kuhn’s theory members of the community. captures the essence of a scientific revolution. Theory Perhaps the term that is confounded the most with Kuhn’s Theory of Scientific Paradigms “paradigm” in Kuhn’s development of theory is the word “theory” itself. The theory is that which most think of as When Thomas Kuhn wrote The Structure of Scientific being the full description of a given discipline. However, Revolutions, he was proposing a genuinely novel as Kuhn employs it, a theory only pertains to what a philosophy of science. To delineate the structure of disciplinary community asserts is true. A theory is scientific communities, a pivotal concept in his philosophy, essentially a lexicon of entities and their properties, a list of Kuhn had to craft his own definitions from the language what exists and how each entity behaves and interacts with available to him, definitions that could exactly suit his the others. As an example, consider the classical intentions. 4 He thus developed a semi-hierarchical Aristotelian and Enlightenment-era Newtonian-Galilean framework of terms broadly encompassed by a “paradigm”. theories of motion. In the Aristotelian theory, any change While the term “paradigm” is commonly defined as one’s in an object was thought to be describable as a movement worldview or beliefs, Kuhn’s conception of paradigm towards its natural state; heavy objects fall without transcends this common definition in both precision and impedance to the ground, wood floats happily on water, and sophistication. As we will see in the following sections, the the planets suspend in the heavens all because such are their framework that Kuhn establishes is intricately self- respective ideal states. The Newtonian-Galilean theory referential. However, Kuhn does not present a circular makes no mention of natural states, but rather concerns argument, isolated from the rest of philosophy of science. itself with quantifiable forces applied to an object; heavy Instead, Kuhn’s framework functions like a truss bridge objects are attracted towards the massive earth under the whose every interconnecting strut increases the overall force of gravity that increases with the inverse-square of structural integrity. Unfortunately, this means that Kuhn’s separation, wood is buoyed upward by Archimedes’ theory is not as simple as the common definition; the buoyant force equivalent to the weight of water displaced, interactions among the whole are just as necessary as the and satellites and planets have circular orbits when their definitions of the parts. At the end a diagrammatic velocity and radius of orbit are in right proportion to each overview of the relationships among the terms has been other. included, and it may be helpful to refer to the figure throughout the discussion (see Figure 1). Rules If we consider “theory” to be the descriptive content of Paradigm the paradigm, then the rules are the preconceived First and foremost, a scientific discipline is pursued “commitments” 6 that dictate acceptable theory-content. and furthered by a scientific community, a collection of The dominating commitment of a community, the premise individuals
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