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NCH Annual Report 2008

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NCH Annual Report 2008 Network of Concerned Historians NCH Annual Report 2017 http://www.concernedhistorians.org INTRODUCTION The twenty-third Annual Report of the Network of Concerned Historians (NCH) contains news about the domain where history and human rights intersect, especially about the censorship of history and the persecution of historians, archivists and archaeologists around the globe, as reported by various human rights organizations and other sources. It mainly covers events and developments of 2016 and 2017. Disclaimer. The fact that the NCH presents this news does not imply that it shares the views and beliefs of the historians and others mentioned in it. Download this report at: http://www.concernedhistorians.org/ar/17.pdf Cite this report as: Network of Concerned Historians, Annual Report 2017 (http://www.concernedhistorians.org/ar/17.pdf). For the complete set of NCH Annual Reports, see: http://www.concernedhistorians.org/content/ar.html Or click: 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 All Annual Reports (1995–2017) were compiled by Antoon De Baets. Please send any comments to [email protected] Network of Concerned Historians, Annual Report 2017 (July 2017) 2 ____________________________________________________________ AFGHANISTAN Previous Annual Report entries: 2000–2016. ALBANIA Previous Annual Report entries: 1996, 2012, 2015−2016. In April 2015, the parliament passed a law opening up files from the secret police (Sigurimi) of the Communist era (1944–1991) to people who were spied upon and barring former Sigurimi members from holding public office in the future. An estimated 7,000 opponents of the regime were killed and more than 100,000 deported to labor camps. During the Communist era, 90 percent of the Sigurimi files were destroyed every five years as a routine practice. In 1991 many of the remaining files were destroyed; the rest is kept in the Interior Ministry archive. Kastriot Dervishi, the archive’s former director, estimated that the surviving documents comprised random samples from the files of only 12,000 or so Sigurimi collaborators—roughly 10 percent of the total. Unofficial sources believe that about 20 percent of Albanians collaborated with the Sigurimi. In December 2016, Prime Minister Edi Rama announced that, as a follow-up to the 2015 law, a commission had been charged with opening the Sigurimi files and with vetting candidates for public office to see if they collaborated with the repressive regime. The commission was chaired by Gentiana Sula, a former deputy minister of social welfare. She said that initial estimates suggested that there were “millions of pages of documents, more than 120,000 files and 250,000 records.” Critics feared that the 2015 law did not oblige the government to publicize the findings of searches or to remove officials who were former collaborators. Albania also planned to sign an agreement with the International Commission on Missing Persons, paving the way for an official effort to find and identify the remains of some 6,000 disappeared.1 1 “Albania Opens Communist Secret Police Files,” BBC News (1 May 2015); Matthew Brunwasser, “As Albania Reckons With Its Communist Past, Critics Say It’s Too Late,” New York Times (26 February 2017); Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the World’s Human Rights (London: AI, 2017), 62; Briseida Mema, “Opening Secret Police Files, Albania Seeks to Drain the Swamp,” AFP News (27 March 2017). Network of Concerned Historians, Annual Report 2017 (July 2017) 3 ____________________________________________________________ ALGERIA Previous Annual Report entries: 1996, 2001–2016. Perpetrators of human rights crimes and abuses during the internal armed conflict (1992−2000) continued to enjoy impunity under the 2006 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. The charter criminalized comments deemed to denigrate the security forces or state institutions for their conduct during the armed conflict, when both state forces and extremist Islamist groups committed torture, enforced disappearances, unlawful killings, and other serious abuses. Associations representing the families of the disappeared continued to face denial for legal registration. Families of the disappeared alleged being subject to pressures because they refused compensation from the state in exchange for accepting a death certificate for their still-missing relatives. The authorities also continued to protect state forces responsible for serious crimes in the 1990s by criminalizing calls for justice, thus turning the law on its head.2 In June 2016, the French gave 22 volumes of copies of diplomatic documents about the Liberation War (1954–1962) to the Algerian national archives. On 31 October 2016, Director General of the National Archives Abdelmadjid Sheikhi (Chikhi) accused the French authorities of hiding their Algerian archives (estimated by him at sixty tons of documents), which were secretly transferred to France in the last years of colonization (1961−1962). On 2 February 2017, the Cour des comptes (public auditor) found that the archives brought to France from Algeria and Indochina after decolonization and located in its National Archives had not been preserved, catalogued or made accessible adequately. Only an unspecified quantity of records relating to the 17 October 1961 massacre and to the Algerian war of independence had been made accessible after May 1999 and April 2001 respectively.3 In 2017, Leila Sidhoum, assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Algiers 3, was awarded a distinction for her PhD research on the role of governing elites in the period between 1989 and 2016. However, the acting dean reportedly blocked her degree and pulled her work from the university library. Sidhoum said that she had been told to remove parts of the thesis referring to the army, the president and the banned Islamic Salvation Front political party (FIS) during the 2 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of the World’s Human Rights (London: AI, 2017), 54, 65; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017: Events of 2016 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2017), 76. 3 “La France remet à l'Algérie des copies d’archives de guerre,” CRIonline (22 June 2016); “France Accused of Hiding Its Archive Smuggled during Colonial Era,” Memo: Middle East Monitor (1 November 2016); APS “La Conservation des archives rapatriés d'Algérie en 1962 est ‘défaillante’” Al Huffington Post (4 February 2017). Network of Concerned Historians, Annual Report 2017 (July 2017) 4 ____________________________________________________________ armed conflict (1992–2000).4 See also France, Mali. ANGOLA Previous Annual Report entries: 2003, 2009, 2016. On 29 June 2016, the Supreme Court in Luanda ordered the conditional release of the group of seventeen known as the Luanda Book Club [see NCH Annual Report 2016] after it upheld a habeas corpus petition filed in April, requesting that the seventeen be released pending a decision on their appeal to the Constitutional Court. The seventeen were not allowed to leave Angola and were required to check in with the authorities every month while waiting for the decision. Upon their release, they reportedly walked through the streets of Luanda, shouting “Reading is not a crime!”5 ARGENTINA Previous Annual Report entries: 1997–2016. As of September 2016, 2,541 people had been charged, 723 convicted, and 76 acquitted of crimes allegedly committed by the military junta during the “Dirty War” (1976−1983), according to the Attorney General’s Office. Prosecutions were made possible by a series of actions taken in the early 2000s by Congress, the Supreme Court, and federal judges annulling amnesty laws and striking down pardons of former officials implicated in the crimes. As of November 2016, 121 children illegally taken from their parents during the war had been located. In May 2016, a federal court convicted fourteen former military and intelligence chiefs from Argentina and one from Uruguay of crimes against humanity committed as part of the “Plan Condor,” a coordinated intelligence plan launched in the 1970s by the de facto governing military regimes in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Reynaldo Bignone, the last de facto president of Argentina at the time, was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment for his role in hundreds of enforced disappearances during Plan Condor. A further fourteen military leaders were 4 Ahmed Rouaba, “Algerian Student: ‘University Censored My Political Thesis’,” BBC News (4 July 2017). 5 “Angola Court Orders Conditional Release of Jailed Activist Book Club,” Guardian (29 June 2016); PEN International, “Luanda Book Club Activists Conditionally Released” (Update #1 to RAN 07/16; 8 July 2016). Network of Concerned Historians, Annual Report 2017 (July 2017) 5 ____________________________________________________________ sentenced to imprisonment. In August 2016, the sentence on the “La Perla” historical trial—which included clandestine centers in Córdoba Province—was rendered, sentencing 28 perpetrators to life imprisonment without parole for crimes that included torture, homicide, and the illegal abduction of babies in 1974—the first conviction for abuses committed before the 1976 coup. Nine sentences were passed for between two and fourteen years’ imprisonment and six acquittals. By December 2016, the Bicameral Commission to identify economic and financial interests
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