Article

Critical Sociology 37(2) 199­–216 State Decay and Civil War: A © The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: Discourse on Power in sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0896920510379438 crs.sagepub.com

Abu Bakarr Bah Northern Illinois University, USA

Abstract Building upon the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville and Michel Foucault, this article develops a concept of power that bridges the structure-agency, control-benefit and macro-micro divides in sociology. Using Sierra Leone as a case study, the article identifies three forms of power that are manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations. It traces political and economic power to the struggles for control over the government and the economic exploitation of the state by the elite. It argues that the forms of political and economic power that emerged in Sierra Leone led to state decay, which created conditions for the civil war. Furthermore, it examines the micro manifestation of power by combatants and ordinary people during the civil war. The article contributes to the theoretical discourse on power in sociology by bringing in an African political experience, which is often missing in sociological theory.

Keywords Africa, civil war, corruption, forms of power, sociological theory, Sierra Leone

Introduction The conundrums of decision making, resource control, and exerting influence over the conduct of individuals have featured prominently in sociological discourses. These are the issues of power the founding fathers of sociology dealt with in their works. Power has been viewed in terms of the configuration of the state and the relations among individuals and groups. In his critique of capital- ism, Karl Marx examined the economic foundation of power. Max Weber discussed power in terms of stratification and domination. In the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, we see a discourse on power that centered on the relation between the state and its citizens. These discourses of power were largely informed by the economic, social, and political realities of Europeans during the 18th and 19th centuries. Most recently, Michel Foucault has addressed the microphysics of power and its implications for everyday life. These rich theoretical discourses of power are insightful for understanding some of the political problems that have been facing the world, such as the civil war in Sierra Leone. This article

Corresponding author: Abu Bakarr Bah, Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA. Email: [email protected] 200 Critical Sociology 37(2) addresses the power-related questions in the civil war: what forms of power developed in Sierra Leone? Who exercised power? What are the effects of power on the country? How did ordinary people experience the effects of power? To answer these questions, I engage in a critical discourse on power that is rooted in the works of Marx, Weber, Tocqueville, and Foucault. Taken together, these theorists provide a rich sociological discourse on power that goes beyond the European realities that they examined. In a similar way, Abner Cohen (1981) used classical sociological theory to study power in Sierra Leone. However, Cohen focused on the culture of the political elite as manifested among the Creoles. While this article also deals with power and infuses classical sociological theory with African political reality, its substance is different from Cohen’s study. Instead of looking at the normative and symbolic aspects of elite power and its cultural reproduction, this article examines the actions of the elite, which led to state decay and created conditions for the civil war, and the way power was manifested by combatants during the war. Though the actions may be conditioned by the elite culture, the focus is on the political and per- sonal motives of the elite and the national implications of their actions. The goal of this article is to provide a multifaceted discourse on power that can shed light on the causes and nature of the war in Sierra Leone. By using the works of the above mentioned theorists to discuss the war, the article expands their discourses of power and brings African political realities into the discourse of sociological theory.

State Decay and the Civil War The notion of state decay is critical for understanding the nature of power and the war in Sierra Leone. There were significant political and economic problems prior to the war that raise serious questions about the efficacy of the state and the legitimacy of the government. Robert Bates (1981: 3) raised the question as to ‘Why should reasonable men adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for the societies they govern?’ African regimes have been typically described as patrimonial, neopatrimonial and sultanist, which invoke Weber’s notion of traditional authority. These categories have been weaved into the concept of personal rule, which depicts the prevalence of patronage politics and its negative political and economic effects. African states weakened by colonialism, international dependency and enclave production not only fail to promote economic and social development, but too often become oppressive and unstable (Bates, 2008; Leonard and Straus, 2003). Robert Rotberg (2004) identified three problematic types of states in the developing world, namely: collapsed, failed, and weak states. Sierra Leone was classified as a failed state. Rotberg’s definition of failure centers on the state’s inability to provide basic security, political freedom, and social services. In his study of constitutionalism and democracy in the former Soviet republics, Stephen Holmes (1999) used the notion of state decay to examine the crumbling of the system of power and the emergence of a modern version of the state of nature. While the concept of failed state depicts the deplorable realities of Sierra Leone during the war, state decay points to the dete- rioration of the state’s capacity to deliver positive political goods during the years leading to the war. State decay was manifested in economic decline, corruption, dilapidation of state institutions and infrastructure, and breakdown of the rule of law. State decay led to severe economic and political problems. In 1990, for example, Sierra Leone ranked last on the Human Development Index with a value of 0.048 (UNDP, 1991). As economic conditions worsened, so did political instability. There were civil unrest, demonstrations, and an underground youth opposition movement against the All People’s Congress (APC) government (Abdullah, 1998). Faced with mounting domestic and international pressures, the government Bah 201 promised political reforms. In the midst of the democratization charade, the civil war erupted in March 1991. The critical questions are: what led to state decay? What are the consequences of state decay? Studies of African states tend to either prioritize the historical and structural causes of state decay or the effects of state decay on ethnicity and violence (Bates, 2008; Leonard and Straus, 2003). This study addresses both sides by tracing state decay to the form of political and economic power that emerged in Sierra Leone and examining how state decay created conditions for the civil war which unleashed a brutal form of power upon the masses.

What is Power? Power has often been viewed in terms of the struggle to exercise control and gain benefits in situations that are mediated by structure and agency. Dennis Wrong (1995: 21) sees power as ‘the capacity to produce intended and foreseen effects on others.’ Power takes multiple forms, such as force, manipulation, persuasion, and authority. Working largely within a macro framework of state formation, Gianfranco Poggi (2001: 14) views power as the ability to ‘lay routine, enforceable boundaries upon the activities of other human subjects … in so far as that ability rests on the former subjects’ control over resources.’ He identified three main forms of social power: political, ideological/normative, and economic.1 C. Wright Mills (1956) understands power as control over political, economic, and military institutions, which allows the power elite to make public decisions and differentiate themselves from the masses. In contrast, Richard Emerson (1962) focuses on the relation of dependency among actors in micro settings. Individuals gain benefits and exercise control by manipulating the dependency relation. Power, especially at the micro level, tends to gravitate toward equilibrium. Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984) sees power as social and cultural capital, which actors use to navigate economic and social spaces. While his notions of symbolic power and habitus are sensitive to structure, Bourdieu pays significant attention to agency. Patricia Collins (1990) also tried to transcend the structure-agency dichotomy in her discourse on power. Her notion of matrix of domination points to ways in which structure, agency, and emotions inform the way African American women experience and resist race, gender, and class oppressions. Instead of reducing power to zero-sum choices: structure or agency, exercising control or gaining benefits, and macro or micro level analysis, I take a multifaceted approach to power that pulls all of these dimensions together. Marx provides a concept of power that does not only deal with structure and the pursuit of wealth, but also recognizes agency and social control in human relations. Marx’s concept of power is rooted in his notion of species being, which sees human beings as creative. Creativity is mani- fested in the labor process through which we objectify ourselves. However, this creative power is constantly subverted by oppressive modes of production. In the process, human beings become exploiters or victims of exploitation; and very often both (Marx, 1964a). Powerlessness, which the majority of people experience, is a direct result of property relations. Property relations, especially under capitalism, lead to exploitation of the masses and deprive them of the material means to realize their full potential as human beings. This exploitation is inherently tied to the ‘restless never-ending process of profit-making’ and ‘boundless greed after riches’ (Marx, 1978: 334). Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1978) further argue that exploitation is fermented through ideology. By controlling the means of mental production, the ruling class masks its interest as the general good of the masses and controls the state. This exploitative power relation intensifies the class struggle between the haves and have-nots. Weber’s concept of power revolves around two critical issues: access to resources and control over action. As he points out in his study of stratification, power emerges out of the differential 202 Critical Sociology 37(2) access to economic and social resources. Though power is visible in class and status situations, Weber’s main focus is on the state and politics, which embody the most profound exercise of power. The exercise of power in the modern state is most vivid in plebiscitary democracy and the bureaucratic apparatus. Power is ‘the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action’ (Weber, 1946: 180). It is predicated on the system of legitimacy, which facilitates compliance. He identified three bases of legitimacy (legal authority, charismatic authority, and traditional authority), which underscore the importance of structure, culture, and agency in Weber’s discourse on power. Tocqueville’s concept of power centers on the relation of control between the state and its citi- zens. This relation is not only rooted in the political structure, but also influenced by agency. Two principles inform his notion of power: equality and liberty. Power is essentially the ability of the state to encroach on the liberties of its people. Conversely, powerlessness is the inability of citizens to resist (De Tocqueville, 1899). Tocqueville is concerned with two forms of power: state power and people power. State power is exercised by those in control of the state. In contrast, people power lies in civil society. While being critical of state power, he is at ease with people power. For Tocqueville, state power has a perpetual tendency toward despotism which must be averted. The way to ensure liberty is to boost the people’s ability to resist the powers of the state by promoting a culture of grassroots civic participation. Under ideal conditions, the state must be counterbal- anced by an equally strong civil society. Michel Foucault (1977, 1980) presents a microscopic notion of power that revolves around agency and formal mechanisms of control. His primary focus is on the way individuals experience power in heterogeneous and localized social settings. Power is exercised by using exceptional discipline or technologies of domination which produce docile bodies. He sees the exercise of power in the form of a net-like organization that cannot be monopolized. Rather, each individual has the potential to intermittently exercise power and be subjected to power, albeit unevenly. As Foucault (1980: 98) states, power ‘is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth.’ Foucault asserts the omnipresent nature of power, but does not see power as omnipotent. Power is constantly resisted through a variety of means and at multiple social locations. This unsettled nature of power raises an intriguing question about the ability of those that are perceived to be powerless to adjust, evade, and resist power. The foregoing discourse shows that power entails both the exercise of control and struggle to gain benefits in situations that are mediated by structure and agency. Depending on the social setting, the emphasis can be on control, benefits, structure, or agency. However, power cannot be reduced to just one of these dimensions without undermining its meaning. As such, I view power in a broader sense that encompasses all four dimensions. Such a broad view of power is critical for understanding the factors that led to the war in Sierra Leone and the ways individuals experienced it. Weber’s notion of power as the ability to impose one’s will upon others is a critical beginning. Following Marx, Tocqueville and Foucault, however, it must be hastily added that such action is geared toward exerting political, social and psychological control and securing economic and social benefits. Furthermore, the outcome of such action is mediated by structural conditions and the abilities that actors bring to bear on the situation. Thus, power is the struggle to exercise control and gain economic and social benefits in situations that are mediated by structure and agency. Such struggles are manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations that reflect the multi- faceted nature of power. Power is inherently tied to political struggles. As Weber and Tocqueville point out, power is embedded in the state. The state exerts political power over its citizens through its control of the Bah 203 means of violence and economic resources and claim to legitimacy. Of critical importance are the political process for gaining control of the state, basis of legitimacy, and bureaucratic apparatus for effective control of day-to-day affairs. Marx saw the state as an extension of class relations, which empower the elite and promote conflicts. At the center of the conflicts are the elite who are con- stantly vying for power. Power is also manifested in economic relations. While Marx’s work is a critique of capitalist societies, he sheds light on the economic foundation of power, exploitative tendencies in human relations, and the social boundary between the victim and victimizer which are so pervasive in countries such as Sierra Leone. Though Sierra Leone is on the periphery of the world capitalist system, its economic relations raise questions about the same moral imperatives of fairness, equity, and honest work that Marx underscores in his discourse on power in capitalist societies. In both Marx and Weber, economic power is geared toward the accumulation of wealth and stratification of individuals into a class and status system that privilege the elite at the expense of the masses. Power is also visible in everyday life situations where individuals experience and exercise power in micro settings. Such experiences may be the result of structural arrangements or the direct actions of other individuals. There are three critical attributes of the micro manifestation of power. First, power emerges in the everyday world that is taken for granted. Second, power directly affects the human consciousness. Third, power is exercised on a temporal and situational basis. As Foucault points out, power is part of everyday experiences affecting not only the body, but also the sense of self. Though the manifestation of power in the everyday world is often unproblematic, its cumulative impact on the perception of power relations is significant. Micro manifestations of power are insightful for understanding the build up of political and social grievances and the difficulties of postwar reconciliation.

Manifestations of Power and the Civil War In Sierra Leone, power is manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations. It is derived from the political and economic structures and abilities of strategically situated individu- als to manipulate the social and political environment to their advantage. Too often, power is used to accumulate wealth and violate the right of citizens and exercised in ways that are destructive to national development. Naturally, the conditions of state decay that characterized Sierra Leone raise questions about the link between the political and economic manifestations of power and the civil war.

Struggle for Political Power and the Emergence of Dictatorship The civil war has its roots in the struggle for political power which undermined democracy in Sierra Leone. Politics has been plagued by ethnic favoritism, corruption, and political patronage. Though these problems can be attributed to the legacies of colonialism, it is equally true that the elite exploited the problems to promote their narrow political ambitions. The cumulative effects of these problems are the erosion of the rule of law, disintegration of the electoral system, and emer- gence of military and one-party dictatorships which created the conditions for war. Since Sierra Leone gained independence from British rule in 1961, its politics has been con- trolled by the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the APC which are dominated by the three biggest ethnic groups (i.e. Mende, Temne, and Limba). The SLPP was formed in 1951 by members of the ruling families from various ethnic groups in the hinterland to counter the political dominance of the Creoles. Internal power struggle within the SLPP led to the formation of the APC in 1960. 204 Critical Sociology 37(2)

Gradually, the SLPP was reduced to a Mende-dominated party, while the Temnes and Limbas dominated the APC. After bitter struggles between the APC and SLPP, president and his ruling APC exploited the political instability to introduce one-party rule. The SLPP was revived in the early 1990s during the campaign to restore democracy. It regained power after the 1996 elections, but lost to the APC led by Ernest Koroma during the 2007 elections. The contest between the SLPP and APC has been effectively reduced to an ethnic power struggle between the Mendes who are the majority in the south and east and the Temnes and Limbas who dominate the north (Kandeh, 1992). Smaller ethnic groups, such as Kissi, Creole, Fula, Loko, and Soso, have been marginalized and people of non-black African descent denied full citizenship. Ethnic politics has been manifested in nearly all elections, especially during the 1967 and 2007 elections. It has created political instability and contributed to the entrenchment of patronage politics and the emergence of one-party and military dictatorships. Patronage has been a key feature of political power in Sierra Leone. Though politics cannot be devoid of the problems associated with resource distribution, the manner in which resources are distributed affects the way power is perceived. Political patronage centers on the president and a tiny clique of confidants, mostly from the president’s ethnic group or region. Stevens transformed the state into an APC political apparatus, which he tightly controlled. President Joseph Saidu Momoh’s government was run by the ‘Ekutay’ group (Kpundeh, 1994). They used state resources to maintain their stay in office. Practically, the ruling elite saw the state as a means of gaining wealth and distributing personal favors (Reno, 1995). Political patronage undermines transparency in government and blurs the critical boundary between public and private action. This culture of political patronage makes state officials comfortable in treating state resources as their private property and perpetuates corruption and nepotism. By the time the war broke out, the system of political patronage had rendered state institutions dysfunctional. The state as a whole was in decay. One-party rule, adopted by the APC government in 1978, had significant implications for the power struggle. It was introduced on the pretext of promoting national unity and economic devel- opment. However, the practice of one-party rule proved to be disastrous. The APC’s grip on power foreclosed any meaningful political opposition to government action and made it easy for politi- cians to engage in corruption. Instead of reducing ethnic and regional animosity, one-party rule intensified it. From its inception, one-party rule was viewed as a calculated move by the ruling APC to eliminate the SLPP and marginalize southerners. One-party rule also perpetuated a politi- cal culture that revolved around patronage. The APC was tightly controlled by Stevens and his handpicked successor, Momoh. Under one-party rule, the APC mismanaged the economy and stifled political dissent. One-party rule undermined the efficiency and legitimacy of the government. Viewed from the lens of Tocqueville’s discourse on power, one-party rule was a gross empower- ment of the state at the expense of the people. The struggle for political power has also been exacerbated by the intervention of the military in politics. Military intervention first began with the 21 March 1967 coup, led by Brigadier David Lansana, which triggered a series of counter coups by officers belonging to different ethnic groups. The coup was to preempt the handover of power from the SLPP to APC following the bitterly con- tested March 1967 elections. Two days later, Lansana was overthrown by a group of officers who formed the National Reformation Council (NRC) headed by Andrew Juxon-Smith. On 18 April 1968, the NRC was overthrown by non-commissioned officers, known as the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) headed by John Amadu Bangura. The ACRM immediately restored civilian rule by installing the APC leader, Stevens, as prime minister (Fisher, 1969). The APC kept the military out of power for more than two decades by co-opting senior officers, arresting officers suspected of political ambitions, executing accused coup plotters, and building a loyal Bah 205 paramilitary force. In 1992, however, the military overthrew the APC and formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led by Captain Valentine Strasser. It reluctantly handed power to a civilian government following the 1996 multiparty elections. A year later, in collaboration with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), it overthrew the elected SLPP government of president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. The international community refused to recognize the junta. In 1998, the AFRC was deposed by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) backed by Civil Defense Forces (CDF), commonly known as Kamajors, and mercenar- ies supporting the exiled government of Kabbah. Military involvement in politics unwisely inter- rupted the democratic process and intensified dictatorship. Despite its messianic claims, the military has proved incapable of ending ethnicity, patronage, and corruption in politics. Military govern- ments were equally corrupt, brutal, and plagued by ethnic animosities. This is most evident in the series of coups that took place in the late 1960s and the failures of the NPRC and AFRC. As Strasser himself acknowledged to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), ‘The army should be in the barracks and stay out of politics’ (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Three: 259). The RUF rebellion could be seen as an anticipated outcome of the state decay that resulted from the form of political power manifested in Sierra Leone. By taking up arms against the APC govern- ment, Foday Sankoh and other disgruntled Sierra Leoneans sought to reclaim their political rights and end the economic exploitation of the state. They promised the masses freedom and prosperity. As Mohamed Augustine Brima confessed, the RUF:

tried to persuade us to join them. The most important thing why they were able to convince us was that after we have joined them we will get free education, electricity supply, good roads and water supply. During that time it happened that I have just completed my fifth form [education] and my parents were poor and they were unable to support me further. (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 458).

The initial outbreak of the civil war could be seen as a genuine struggle to end economic exploi- tation and dictatorship. However, as Marx (1964b) points out, revolutionary struggles often get brutal and further oppress the poor. The rebellion quickly turned into a brutal and exploitative war camouflaged as a political struggle for democracy and economic progress. The lack of political vision and honesty in the civil war is most evident in the atrocities committed against civilians and the greed for power and wealth which fueled the war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The RUF boycotted the 1996 elections and vigorously exploited diamond resources, while the government refused to recognize their legitimate grievances and continued to prosecute the war.

Economic Exploitation and State Decay Prior to the civil war, the political elite exploited the state by embezzling government funds. These activities effectively ruined the state and led to economic hardship. While economic power is often derived from market relations, in Sierra Leone economic power has been rooted in access to the state. The fusion of economic and political power is most evident in the shady relation between the political and business elite in the mining industry, which led to the emergence of the shadow state characterized by rampant corruption (Reno, 1995). By the time the war broke out, corruption had become a primary means of accumulating wealth for the elite and a necessary means of sur- vival for the masses. The endemic corruption has been attributed to socio-cultural and systemic factors which tolerate wrongdoing. Bankole Thompson and Gary Potter (1997: 141) argue that corruption is predisposed by a ‘clash between modern culture and traditional culture’ which ‘blurs 206 Critical Sociology 37(2) the distinction between the official roles of public officers and their personal interest’. They attribute corruption to ineffective judicial and law enforcement practices. Other factors which account for corruption include low salaries, poor professional ethos, ill-defined official duties, lack of transparency and accountability in the political system, and inadequate political leadership (Kpundeh, 1999). Since corruption is rampant in Sierra Leone, it is important to take note of the various kinds of corruption and their relative effects on state decay. Stephen Riley (1993) identified four forms of government corruption in Africa, namely: incidental, systematic, systemic, and personal. While all of these contribute to state decay and violate the law, systemic and personal corruption are the clearest manifestations of the kind of economic power that led to state decay and the war. These are not the kinds of corruption that are necessitated by low salaries and the daily struggle to provide food, clothing and shelter. Rather, they are driven by greed for wealth and by the culture of political patronage. They often involve embezzlement of huge sums of state funds by the elite. Though the vast majority of corruption cases have not been properly documented or proven in court, it is common knowledge that politicians, top civil servants and wealthy business people frequently embezzle huge sums of government funds (Thompson and Potter, 1997). Common sense alone calls into question the high standard of living maintained by senior government officials and the luxury goods they consume, which far exceed the reach of their salaries. This common knowledge has been buttressed by several high profile embezzlement scandals during the 1980s, such as ‘vouchergate’, ‘squandergate’ and ‘milliongate’ (Kpundeh, 1999). Several government investigations shed light on the economic exploitation of the state by individuals who are well- positioned within the political system and bureaucratic apparatus. Some of these investigations include the Foster Commission established by Stevens, the Tucker Commission set up by Momoh, the Beccles-Davies, Marcus-Jones and Nylander commissions of inquiry formed by Strasser, and the audit conducted by the presidential transition team of Koroma. While government investi- gations tend to be marred by political witch-hunt, populist rhetoric and superficiality, these inves- tigations shed light on the economic exploitation of the state. In particular, the reports of the Beccles-Davies and the Marcus-Jones commissions have emerged as a reputable documentation of high-level corruption. The Beccles-Davies Commission found presidents Stevens and Momoh and several top govern- ment officials guilty of embezzlement. Stevens was prime minister from April 1968 to April 1971 and continued in office as president until November 1985. Momoh succeeded Stevens and served as president until April 1992. The commission found that their personal emoluments could not have been enough to secure the assets that they accumulated. Stevens’s official earnings during his entire tenure in office amounted to 271,975 leones, yet he owned numerous properties worth millions of leones.2 His Kabassa Lodge alone was estimated to have cost 3.3 million leones at the time of completion in the early 1980s. Momoh owned numerous properties worth millions of leones, 23 vehicles, bank accounts with millions of leones, foreign bank accounts, and other invest- ments worth millions of leones which far exceeded his official salary. Similarly, several ministers, the head of the armed forces, and inspector general of police were found guilty of accumulating assets that far exceeded their official earnings. The commission ordered the confiscation of their properties and imposed fines on them (Sierra Leone Government, 1993a). The Marcus-Jones Commission also found several government officials and businesspersons guilty of corruption and embezzlement. They were ordered to refund several millions of leones and some of their properties were confiscated (Sierra Leone Government, 1993b). Despite the bitter lessons of the war, corruption has persisted. According to a World Bank survey (1996–2006), Sierra Leone ranks among the most corrupt countries and is one of those Bah 207 doing the least to control corruption. In 1996, its percentile ranking for control of corruption was around 1 percent. Between 1998 and 2002, its ranking fluctuated between 17 and 27 percent. Since 2002, its ranking has dropped to around 6 percent in 2006 (Kaufmann et al., 2007). The Anti-Corruption Commission (2001, 2002, 2003) has exposed several cases of corruption under the SLPP government. In its 2001 report, the commission documented 58 cases of misappropriation of government funds or property and 13 cases of donor funds in various ministries. In 2002, it investigated 79 cases, some of which involved the State House, National Development Bank, and the military. Most of the cases involved the customs and excise department; 43 cases were either in court or with the office of the Attorney General. In 2003, the commission had 37 cases involving misappropriation of government funds or property and 18 cases involving donor funds across various departments such as education, income tax, and energy. Though the number of cases went down, corruption did not necessarily decline. As the commission acknowledged in its 2003 report, it does not have enough resources to deal fully with the huge caseloads. The commission itself is not free of corruption. One of the cases it investigated involved the commission itself. Several businessmen have been implicated or found guilty of corruption and embezzlement of government funds. Jamil Mohamed, who was a close associate of Stevens, fled Sierra Leone in the midst of strong allegations of fraudulent activities and inappropriate meddling in government affairs (Reno, 1995). The Tucker Commission discovered a scheme involving officials at the Ministry of Education and business people who fraudulently received government grants on the pretext that they were proprietors of independent schools (Kpundeh, 1995). The Marcus-Jones Commission found Mahmoud Kadi, a prominent businessman, guilty of embezzling government funds through fraudulent contract activities (Sierra Leone Government, 1993b). The cumulative effect of corruption which characterizes economic power in Sierra Leone is state decay. Corruption destroyed the formal economy, ruined national institutions, undermined the rule of law, and drained the state of vital resources. To be sure, corruption and state decay feed off one another. While corruption contributes to state decay, the crumbling of state institutions provides a favorable environment for corruption. However, one needs to focus on the effects of corruption on state decay in order to better understand the political and social grievances that led to the civil war. By the time the war broke out, Sierra Leone was one of the poorest countries in the world with high mortality rates, widespread unemployment, low literacy rate, and poor infra- structure. Under such conditions, the state did not only lose the ability to provide positive political outcomes. It also lost legitimacy and became more oppressive.

War and Everyday Experiences of Power and Powerlessness The civil war lasted from March 1991 to January 2002. It was started by the RUF and combatants belonging to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), collectively referred to as ‘rebels’. The RUF, led by Foday Sankoh, was formed by Sierra Leoneans trained in Libya and supported by Charles Taylor (Abdullah, 1998; Gberie, 2005).3 Its declared goal was to overthrow the APC government and implement a revolutionary change to promote economic development. After the military overthrew the APC government, the RUF continued to fight the NPRC military govern- ment and the elected SLPP government that succeeded it. Initially, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (AFRSL), supported by Nigerian and Guinean troops, mercenaries, and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) fought the rebels on behalf of the govern- ment.4 The government also allied itself with the CDF created by local communities to defend themselves against the rebels and renegade soldiers of the AFRSL. As the war evolved, a signifi- cant fraction of the AFRSL connived with the RUF and formed the AFRC/RUF alliance that 208 Critical Sociology 37(2) overthrew the SLPP government of Kabbah. The exiled government of Kabbah, supported by ECOMOG, CDF and mercenaries, fought the RUF and the AFRC. Shortly after the signing of the July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established to implement the agreement. UNAMSIL deployed around 17,500 military personnel to accomplish its mandate. It encountered difficulties with the RUF and AFRC, while generally sup- porting the government of Kabbah. The civil war represents the cumulative effects of the destructive political and economic power manifested in Sierra Leone and a brutal exercise of power by combatants over civilians. As the state lost control over law and order, combatants gained more power to control the lives of ordinary people and inflict punishment. There are victims and perpetrators in the war. The victims are civilians whose liberties and dignity were violated. The TRC (2004, Appendix 1: 9–22) has documented 40,242 counts of violations committed against 14,995 people during the war. The violations include forced displacement, abduction, arbitrary detention, killing, destruction of property, torture, rape, sexual slavery, amputation, cannibalism, and drugging. At the height of the war in 1999, nearly half a million Sierra Leoneans were refugees (UNHCR, 2003, Statistical Annex I: Table A.6). The perpetrators of these gruesome acts are combatants belonging to various armed factions. According to the TRC (2004, Appendix 1: 23), 59.2 percent of the documented violations are attributed to the RUF, 9.8 percent to the AFRC, 6.7 percent to the Sierra Leone army (i.e. AFRSL), 5.9 percent to the CDF, and 0.7 percent to ECOMOG. One of the dilemmas of the war is delineating between victim and victimizer. Too often, this distinction is blurred. There are people who became victims and perpetrators during the course of the war. These are individuals, especially orphans, abducted by combatants and eventually con- scripted into their ranks. As Ansu Koroma recalled:

All of us were lined up again and asked whether we were interested in joining the ‘movement’. Anyone who was not interested in the movement was asked to indicate so by putting up his/her right hand. Two people put up their hands. Their throats were cut off. Our leader took the remainder of us to the training base. (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 1010).

Once conscripted, they become perpetrators. Ansu Koroma stayed in the RUF and eventually became a military police commander. As Master Rokono also told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 113):

Before the war broke out in our part of the country, I was in class one in a school in Mattru. We were on holidays in a village around Mattru when the rebels attacked us. The rebels killed some people and they abducted us. They asked us to join them and, wherever they went, they took us along with them … They trained us and gave us guns; they punished me a lot. We would attack places, kill people and take some of the people away. We also took creatures away during such attacks.

The brutality of the war instilled widespread fear among civilians. As Aminata Sampa Bangura recounted, ‘I had never seen a rebel before and they captured me. I was so frightened that I urinated on my pants. The[y] captured me together with 14 others’ (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 7). Combatants employed brutal tactics that were aimed at causing fear and displacing people. The RUF was particularly notorious for these brutal tactics. Power was manifested in the ability to inflict punishment and violate norms of human decency with impunity. As Father Mario recalled, ‘The rebels enjoyed punishing us. They enjoyed it when you scream and cry. That was a sad Bah 209 surprise to me’ (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 519). Such power was often exercised during chance encounters between civilians and combatants. Power and powerlessness are simultaneously manifested in the everyday atrocities that marred the war. Victims helplessly watched as their loved ones were killed and their own bodies mutilated by combatants. While hiding in a hole, Pa Santigie Kamara watched rebels kill his five children, three wives, and brother (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Fatmata Kamara painfully told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part One: 95): ‘The rebels ... beheaded my sister and took us to Seven Up garage. They killed two of my friends. At that time I was a virgin, I have done nothing wrong, they have killed my sister, my mother and father.’ Fatmata stated further, ‘After amputating my friend’s hand, he called one of his boys and he raped me, they said they were still not satisfied, they tied us and chopped off our feet.’ Salifu Kanu also recalled how the Kamajors amputated his fingers and the arm of an elderly woman. (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Too often, the powerless victims were at the mercy of the combatants. James Morseray confessed to burying a pregnant woman alive (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Master Patrick Bangura told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 749):

I was with my boss Morris Kallon. We came across an old man with his three children and they ordered me to cut off the old man’s hand and I did; as I had been drugged. Later they gave another command to cut off the woman’s leg as they were said to be collaborating with the Kamajors.

Civilians often found themselves powerless when attacked by armed combatants. Their only recourse was to abandon their homes and run into the bush or relatively safer towns. Those that were caught had no option but to obey the commands of their captors. Captives were often scared to escape because they had been seen with their captors, forcefully tattooed, or intimidated by the brutal killing of others who tried to escape. As Foucault (1977: 200) rightly notes, ‘Visibility is a trap.’ Fatmata Jalloh was abducted in Kabala in 1998 at the age of 13 and taken to Freetown. She told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 481), ‘Initially when we arrived, I had wanted to run away. But I was afraid because some civilians had seen me with these people. Because of that I could not run away.’ Mustapha Musa, an abductee who became a rebel, testified, ‘If an escapee was caught his or her forehead was branded with the RUF symbol. Red-hot iron was used … If the red hot iron was not available, they use new razors … That was [why] I decided to stay’ (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 1014). Despite the apparent dichotomy between power and powerless, there are many instances where power is resisted by the powerless and the powerful become powerless. As Foucault points out, power is not omnipotent. Victims managed to overcome the fear that was instilled in them and confront their victimizers. Sahr Meh-Meh Nicol endured a lot of abuse from rebels, but eventually found the courage to fight for his life. Rebels burnt his house, which they occupied for days, and abducted him. He ran from the rebels, but was caught by another group of rebels who tried to amputate his hands. After the rebels refused his plea for mercy, he decided to put up a fight. He escaped with a wound (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part One). Ibrahim fought off six rebels who attacked him and his friends. He told the rebels that he would die bravely, rather than comply with their orders. After the rebels shot one of his friends, he snatched the gun and knocked four of the rebels to the ground. He fled just before another group of rebels approached him (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part One). Lady Dikpama and her father confronted a group of rebels who wanted to kill her husband and abduct her daughter. She demanded to know why her husband and daughter were arrested and tried to reason with the rebels. She bravely confronted the rebels, even after they 210 Critical Sociology 37(2) killed her husband (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Hawa Sheriff and her daughter were shot during the rebel attack on Koidu. She used a razor blade to operate on her own foot and her daugh- ter’s head to remove the bullets (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Despite their powers, combatants too faced situations of powerlessness. Their own colleagues and enemy forces abused them. In some cases, they suffered emotional breakdown. Master Bowanag, an RUF child soldier, recalled his painful treatment by the RUF and the Kamajors. He was arrested by the Kamajors after escaping from the RUF (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Mohamed Augustine Brima was an administrator within the RUF security department. He pain- fully watched the RUF execute his own brother, who was a member of the Kamajors (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Abdulai Sesay, a powerful RUF combatant, suffered emotional breakdown during a mission. He told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 553): ‘As we went ahead I remembered about my late mother and I was distressed. I was crying as I advanced. I told my boys not to call me Col. any longer.’ Another RUF combatant, James Morseray, told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 277):

The day I entered DDR [program] I was so happy. I compared the two lives I had lived and I observed that being a rebel was not a good one. The Indians [i.e. UN peacekeepers] usually left us to walk around. I saw my uncle and I cried. I was so surprised to see him. I thought he was dead. I asked for my mother and he told me that my father and mother were dead. I asked him about my family members. Since we separated, I don’t know where they had been.

Contextualizing State Power: Middleman Minorities, Traditional Rulers, and International Actors Up to this point, I have viewed the manifestation of power in Sierra Leone largely as a struggle for political power and economic exploitation of the state by the political elite and the RUF. While the manifestations of power in political, economic, and everyday life situations illustrate the nature of state power, it is also important to note three critical layers of power that interact with the state. These are the middleman minority ethnic groups, institution of traditional rule (i.e. chieftaincy), and international institutions. Though fundamentally different, these three layers of power provide complementary environments for contextualizing the sources and manifestation of political and economic power in Sierra Leone. The nature of economic power in Sierra Leone raises intriguing questions about the influence and status of middleman minority ethnic groups, most notably Creole, Lebanese and Fula.5 These three groups have successfully positioned themselves as middleman minorities and acquired significant economic power (Bonacich, 1973). During the colonial and immediate postcolonial period, Creoles were the most dominant black Africans in the civil service and formal economy. However, their position has drastically declined in both of these sectors as other ethnic groups have settled in Freetown. The Lebanese have been heavily involved in the import-export business and procurement of government contracts, which made them well-connected with the political elite. Fulas dominate the informal economy, especially cattle and retail trade, but until recently main- tained minimal economic relations with the government. They have now entered the import-export business and filled the vacuum left by Lebanese businessmen who fled the country during the war (Jalloh, 1999). All three groups became important economic brokers by acting as middleman minorities between ordinary Sierra Leoneans and state-controlled resources on the one hand and the import-export world economy on the other hand. Bah 211

These three ethnic groups are politically marginalized partly due to their relatively small numbers and late settlement in the country. Creoles lost their dominant positions in politics and the civil service as the SLPP and APC gained power. Until recently, Fulas mostly kept aloof from politics. Fulas consist of indigenous Sierra Leonean Fulas and Fula immigrants from Guinea and other West African countries. However, the generous citizenship laws toward people of black African descent, especially at the time of independence in 1961, have made it easy for these two groups of Fula to integrate. Their growing numbers, coupled with their wealth and investment in western education, has enabled Fulas to increase their political participation. In contrast, the Lebanese are politically excluded because the laws deny citizenship (jus sanguinis or jus soli) to people who are not of ‘Negro African descent’. Such people can only become citizens by natu- ralization, which disqualifies them from holding government offices (Sierra Leone, 1973). The Lebanese, who have lived in Sierra Leone since the colonial era, fall into this politically excluded non-black African category. The only exceptions are Molatos, who have mixed black African and non-black ancestry. The denial of full citizenship to non-black Africans was conditioned by the racialized British colonial rule which denied black Africans citizenship and placed them at the bottom of the political, economic and social hierarchy. This ugly legacy of racial gradation has metamorphosed into a postcolonial racial inequality that blemishes democracy. As Tocqueville rightly argues, democracy must be based on the principles of equality and liberty. Sierra Leone recently amended its citizenship laws to recognize dual citizenship. However, the amendment retained the ‘Negro African descent’ criterion for citizenship based on birth or descent (Sierra Leone, 2006). The economic and political statuses of these three ethnic groups not only demonstrate how minorities carve out a niche for themselves in the ethnic power struggle but also how they infil- trate the state and counterbalance the powers of the dominant ethnic groups. As Foucault points out, power cannot be monopolized. Though Creoles lost their political power, they have held significant offices in military governments and Freetown city government. Furthermore, they have adjusted to the ethnic proliferation in Freetown and contours of ethnic politics. In recent years, Fulas too have managed to hold significant government offices and actively participate in national politics. They not only use their economic resources to promote their political inter- ests, but also amicably live among other ethnic groups in virtually all parts of the country and work with the political elite with dexterity. While the Lebanese have not made direct gains in politics, they have used their wealth to exert influence over the political elite and maintain a cozy relation with them as evident in the extensive ties between Jamil Mohamed and the APC regime. A significant development for Sierra Leonean Lebanese is the appointment of John Saad, who is a Molato, as minister of housing and infrastructural development in the current APC government. The second layer is the institution of traditional rule which predates the modern state in Sierra Leone. Though the specific form of traditional rule varies from one ethnic group to another, they share the key features of what Weber termed traditional authority. Prior to colonial rule, tradi- tional rule was the core political, military, and cultural institution among the various ethnic groups that lived in present-day Sierra Leone (Fyfe, 1962). Chiefs (i.e. traditional rulers) were co-opted into the British colonial administration through the indirect rule system (Mamdani, 1996). Gradually, traditional rule was relegated to a form of local government that on the one hand became an instrument of pacification and exploitation and on the other hand a vehicle for resis- tance against colonialism. After independence, traditional rule survived as a form of local govern- ment, a custodian of culture, and molder of ethnic identity. 212 Critical Sociology 37(2)

Though the local government powers of the institution of traditional rule are subject to the control of the national government, the institution retains its position as the foundation of ethnic cultural identity and the most important source of legitimacy among the rural masses. This cultural role and deep-rooted legitimacy make traditional rule an important factor in the discourse of power in Sierra Leone. Politicians quickly realized that chiefs are vital political assets that could serve as liaisons between them and the rural masses and give the government a cover of legitimacy. This led to a complex dependency relation between politicians and chiefs. Politicians depended on chiefs for political support, while chiefs depended on politicians for economic favors. As Reno (1995) points out, in the diamond rich Kono district, for example, Siaka Stevens exploited the institution of traditional rule for both political and economic gains. Chiefs soon became an integral part of the system of political patronage, albeit as junior partners. Chiefs often find themselves in awkward situations of giving cover of legitimacy to regimes that are corrupt and oppressive against their people. As Marx feared, they inadvertently provide politi- cians with the means to exert mental control over the masses. In fairness, many chiefs resist. However, like the colonial regime, successive postcolonial governments find ways to co-opt chiefs by giving them money and other favors and manipulating ethnic sentiments. When soft tactics fail, they interfere in the process of selecting chiefs and impose their preferred candidates on the people (Fanthorpe, 2005). Despite the pacification of chiefs, they remain critical liaisons between the political elite in charge of the state and the rural masses. Chiefs seize opportunities to switch allegiances during elections, extract resources from politicians, and even expose the government’s lack of legitimacy by withdrawing support, albeit temporarily. During the civil war, chiefs, especially in the South, played a critical role in lending legitimacy to the SLPP government and resisting the rebels and renegade soldiers. The Kamajors, built around the institution of traditional rule, became a critical military force that defended the rural masses and a vital political and cultural movement that filled the vacuum left by the exiled government. As the country is rebuilding, chiefs are reverting to their prewar role as cultural power brokers that are vulnerable to manipulation by politicians. The other important factor in the discourse of state power in Sierra Leone is the role of interna- tional institutions and western governments. Like most African countries, Sierra Leone has been dependent on western governments and financial institutions for economic assistance (Delacroix and Ragin, 1981; Fearon, 1988). Since the end of colonial rule, the state has been receiving various forms of economic assistance which reinforce its dependency. This financial support has huge implications for state power. In many ways, international economic assistance has empowered the government by providing it with vital resources. Too often, the resources are misused through political patronage and corruption. The end of the Cold War and the rise of neoliberal economic policies during the 1980s led to a serious rethinking of western support to developing countries. In response to domestic and interna- tional pressures, western governments and financial institutions introduced stringent rules for countries seeking financial assistance. They demanded democratic reforms and austerity measures (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Wiseman, 1996). The policies of the international financial insti- tutions and western governments led to severe economic crisis in Sierra Leone which effectively undermined the power of the state. The government lost vital resources that partially sustained the system of political patronage and corruption. At the same time, the worsening economic conditions led to popular demands for multiparty democracy. As the international community pressured the government, so did the citizens feel empowered to demand accountability from the political elite. These political and economic developments opened a window for political reforms, which could Bah 213 have shifted power from the one-party state to the people. Unfortunately, the exercise was manipu- lated by the political elite, who were determined to stay in power at all costs.

Conclusion The article engages in a simultaneous analysis of the causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone and a discourse on power with the aim of bringing African political reality into sociological theory. The war raises questions about the political, economic, and social conditions in Sierra Leone. The central question in this article deals with the link between political and economic power and the civil war. To understand this connection, the article examines the struggles for political power and the eco- nomic exploitation of the state. It points to the ways in which ethnic politics and corruption led to forms of political and economic power that undermined the efficacy of the state and the legitimacy of the government. The critical lesson for Sierra Leone is to understand the inherent risks of instabil- ity associated with dictatorship, which breeds corruption and ethnic political animosity. By deviat- ing from democracy, Sierra Leone fell into the thorny path of dictatorship. While democracy may not necessarily guarantee a smooth road to peace and prosperity, dictatorships are prone to abuse power and create conditions of state decay. As I argue, the war is born out of the conditions of state decay that characterized the country. The challenges are how to consolidate the democratic process that came out of the war, deal with corruption, and address the economic problems of the country. The article identifies three major ways in which power is manifested in Sierra Leone. Power is manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations. While these categories do not nec- essarily exhaust the variety of ways in which power is manifested, they transcend the common dichotomies in the discourses of power and provide useful ways of looking at power in African countries. Power is a multifaceted social reality, which has been difficult to conceptualize. This article engages in a discourse on power not necessarily to refute other ways of conceptualizing power. Rather, it bridges the three most common divides in the studies of power: structure-agency, control-benefits, and macro-micro level analysis. As I argue, power is derived from social struc- tures and exercised by actors in ways that are geared toward exerting control and gaining economic and social benefits. By examining the causes of the civil war and the lived experiences of ordinary people during the war, the article makes a connection between the macro discourse of power at the level of the state and the micro manifestations of power in the daily lives of people. Too often, sociological theory has been driven by western political, economic, and social experiences. This article deliberately invokes the works of the founding fathers of sociology in order to connect African political realities with some of the core works in sociological theory. By so doing, the article demonstrates the relevance of sociological theory for contemporary African societies and how African political realities enrich sociological theory. For example, the article underscores the issue of corruption, which is often missing in western discourse on power. Furthermore, it shows a brutal manifestation of power during the civil war that is unimaginable in western democracies. As sociology moves forward, it must not only conduct research across different parts of the world, but it must also reflexively broaden the experiences that shape the discourses in sociological theory.

Acknowledgements I thank Northern Illinois University for supporting this study through its summer research and artistry grants, the West African Research Association for its generous support, and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article. 214 Critical Sociology 37(2)

Notes 1 Poggi also took note of military power. 2 The leone (Le) was introduced in 1964 and pegged to the British pound at a rate of Le2 = £1 (in December 1967, Le1 = US$1.20). In November 1978, the Leone was pegged to the SDR of the International Monetary Fund. Its value has sharply declined. For example, Le1 = US$0.81 (1982), Le1 = US$ 0.21 (1985), Le499 = US$1 (1992), Le2092 = US$1 (2000), and Le2908 = US$1 (September 2005). See Riddell (1985) and IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook volumes: 43(2) (February 1990), 51(2) (February 1998), and 58(12) (December 2005). 3 Charles Taylor was the leader of the NPFL rebel movement and the president of Liberia from 1997 to 2003. He is currently standing trial for war crimes at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (The Hague). 4 ULIMO was a rebel movement in Liberia fighting against the NPFL. 5 Officially, Sierra Leone has 16 indigenous ethnic groups. The Lebanese are included in this count.

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