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Masalah Calon Presiden Populer EXPERIMENTAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY THE EFFECT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF JOKO WIDODO ON THE ELECTABILITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES National Survey 10–20 October 2013 Saiful Mujani R. William Liddle . Funded by: Harian Sinar Harapan Conducted by: Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) The Indonesian Institute (TII) Indikator Politik Indonesia (INDIKATOR) . BACKGROUND • Party/coalition right to nominate presidential candidate: 25% of popular vote or 20% of Parliament seats. • What factors account for strength of partisan support? Many possibilities. • Liddle and Mujani (CPS 2007): Electability of party’s presidential candidate a major factor. …CONTINUED • Current popular hypothesis: Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi), as most popular presidential candidate, will have a powerful influence on votes for his party, PDIP. • How can this hypothesis be tested? • Our approach: experimental opinion survey. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN • A method to establish causal connections. • In normal surveys, cause and effect difficult to separate. • In experimental surveys, cause can be established by giving a “treatment” to the cause and determining the effect. • First example for Indonesia is Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (AJPS 2012). … CONTINUED • Does Jokowi have an influence on a political party’s electability? • Normal surveys can not convincingly determine whether the electability of Jokowi is caused by support for his party or the converse. • With an experimental survey, Jokowi as cause is treated differently in his relationship with political parties. …CONTINUED The Survey Treatment: • Control. If the parliamentary election were held today, which party or party candidate would you choose? • Treatment 1. If ... were held today and PDIP has nominated Jokowi as its presidential candidate, which party ... would you choose? • Treatment 2. If ... were held today and PDIP has not nominated Jokowi ..., which party ... would you choose? …CONTINUED • Sample of 1200 respondents divided into three equal segments. • Each respondent asked only one of above questions, which were assigned randomly. • Was there a significant difference in responses to the control and the two treatment questions? . METHODOLOGY • The survey population is all Indonesian citizens with the right to vote. • Sample: 1200. Margin of error: +/- 2.9%. • Selected respondents interviewed directly by trained interviewer. Each interviewer responsible for 10 respondents in a single village/urban ward. • For quality control, 20% of the respondents were then visited by a supervisor. No significant problems. • Survey dates: 10-20 October 2013. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS: THE JOKOWI EFFECT Control: If the parliamentary election were held today, which party or party candidate would you choose? (%) N=400; MoE= +/-5% PDIP 21.6 GOLKAR 17.5 DEMOKRAT 9.2 GERINDRA 9.1 PPP 4.7 PKB 4.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 Control (continued) HANURA 4.1 NASDEM 3.7 PKS 3.1 PAN 1.2 PBB 0.9 PKPI 0 Don't know yet 20.3 0 5 10 15 20 25 . Treatment 1: If Jokowi has been nominated for the presidency by PDIP… (%) PDIP 37.8 GOLKAR 14.6 GERINDRA 6.6 DEMOKRAT 5.4 PPP 3.6 HANURA 3.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . Treatment 1 (continued) PAN 2.5 PKB 2.5 NASDEM 1.4 PKS 0.6 PBB 0.3 PKPI 0 Don't know yet 21.2 0 5 10 15 20 25 . Treatment 2: If PDIP has not nominated Jokowi as president…(%) PDIP 14.4 GOLKAR 21.8 GERINDRA 11.1 DEMOKRAT 8.2 HANURA 6 PPP 3.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 . Treatment 2 (continued) PKB 5.8 NASDEM 3.9 PKS 2.7 PAN 1.1 PBB 0.3 PKPI 0.7 Don't know yet 20.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 . Comparison of Treatments 21.6 PDIP 37.8 14.4 17.5 GOLKAR 14.6 21.8 Control 9.2 DEMOKRAT 5.4 8.2 Jokowi nominated by PDIP 9.1 GERINDRA 6.6 11.1 Jokowi not nominated by 4.7 PPP 3.6 PDIP 3.5 4.5 PKB 2.5 5.8 0 10 20 30 40 Comparison (continued) 4.1 HANURA 3.5 6 3.7 NASDEM 1.4 3.9 3.1 PKS 0.6 Control 2.7 1.2 PAN 2.5 1.1 PDIP nominates Jokowi 0.9 PBB 0.3 0.3 PDIP does not nominate 0 Jokowi PKPI 0 0.7 20.4 Don't know yet 21.2 20.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 . The Jokowi Effect on PDIP PDIP Std. Treatment n Votes Error Control 400 21.6% 2.1% PDIP nominates Jokowi 400 37.8% 2.4% PDIP does not nominate Jokowi 400 14.4% 1.8% F=32.269, p-value=0.000 The nomination of Jokowi has a very significant effect on PDIP’s electability. THE ELECTABILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES Open Question: If the presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote? (%) Jokowi 18.0 Prabowo 6.9 Bakrie 5.7 Wiranto 4.2 SBY 2.7 Megawati 2.3 Kalla 1.4 Other names 5.6 Don't know yet 53.2 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 . Semi-Open, 27 Names: If the presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote? (%) Jokowi 35.9 Bakrie 11.4 Prabowo 11.4 Wiranto 7.8 Megawati 5.9 Jusuf Kalla 3.9 Mahfud MD 1.6 Rhoma Irama 1.2 Dahlan Iskan 1.0 Other names 3.2 Don't know yet 16.6 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 Other names each. below 1% Closed, 4 Names: If the presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote? (%) Jokowi 47.4 Prabowo 15.8 Bakrie 12.6 Dahlan Iskan 3.7 Don't know yet 20.5 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 . Closed, 3 Names: Prabowo vs Bakrie vs Megawati or Jokowi (%) 20.2 Don't know yet 29.4 49.1 Megawati/Jokowi 17.7 If opposing Jokowi 13.2 If opposing Megawati Bakrie 23.8 17.5 Prabowo 29.1 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 . FINDINGS • If only three candidates in first round, as in 2009, and they are Bakrie, Megawati, and Prabowo, Prabowo would probably get the most votes and win in the second round against Bakrie. • Megawati’s support has declined significantly since last year in several surveys (SMRC or LSI for example) as Jokowi has become an increasingly popular candidate. • If Prabowo and Bakrie compete with Jokowi, Jokowi has by far the strongest support (49.1%), perhaps enough to win in one round. WHAT EXPLAINS JOKOWI’S CURRENT ELECTORAL STRENGTH? 1) Most liked figure 2) Most exposed in mass media 3) Possesses most desirable leadership qualities to voters . Recognize and Like the Following Figures (%) Jokowi 93 Prabowo 77 Jusuf Kalla 73 Dahlan Iskan 72 Wiranto 71 Megawati 70 Bakrie 64 0 20 40 60 80 100 . TV Exposure: In the last month, which of the following have you seen on TV? (%) JOKO WIDODO 71.8 ABURIZAL BAKRIE 58.0 WIRANTO 47.7 PRABOWO SUBIANTO 47.3 MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI 43.1 JUSUF KALLA 29.9 DAHLAN ISKAN 17.3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Radio Exposure: In the last month, which of the following names have you heard about on the radio? (%) JOKO WIDODO 5.0 ABURIZAL BAKRIE 3.7 MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI 2.3 WIRANTO 2.2 PRABOWO SUBIANTO 1.8 JUSUF KALLA 1.5 DAHLAN ISKAN 1.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Newspaper Exposure: In the last month, which of these names have you seen in the newspaper? (%) JOKO WIDODO 10.2 ABURIZAL BAKRIE 6.8 PRABOWO SUBIANTO 6.1 WIRANTO 4.3 MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI 4.0 DAHLAN ISKAN 2.2 JUSUF KALLA 2.2 0 20 40 60 80 100 Social Media Exposure: In the last month, which of the following names have you seen or read about on the internet/twitter/sms/facebook, and so on? (%) JOKO WIDODO 4.6 PRABOWO SUBIANTO 2.6 ABURIZAL BAKRIE 2.3 WIRANTO 1.7 MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI 1.4 DAHLAN ISKAN 1.0 JUSUF KALLA 0.9 0 20 40 60 80 100 Presidential Criteria: Which do you think are most important? (%) Honest/trustworthy 51 Cares about people 24 Capable of leading 12 Firm 7 Authoritative 3 Intelligent 1 Don't know/NA 2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 . CONCLUSIONS • Most desirable qualities for Indonesian presidential candidates today are honesty or trustworthiness and caring for the people. • Less important: leadership capability, firmness, intelligence. • Jokowi’s current popularity likely a product of the fit between voters’ preferred qualities and their assessment of his self-presentation and actions. .
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