National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior
Division of Fire and Aviation
The Fire at Sperry Chalet Facilitated Learning Analysis Glacier National Park - 2017 This page intentionally left blank The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
“Those firefighters are heroes, dammit.
Sometimes the fire wins.”
Sperry Chalet Coordinator Belton Inc.
Contents
1. Executive Summary……………………………………………………… 3
2. The Significance of Sperry Chalet……………………………………… 4
3. The 2017 Fire Season…………………………………………………… 8
4. Sprague Fire Timeline……………………..…………………………….. 9
5. Narrative………………………………………………………………….. 11
A. The Sprague Fire and Fire Behavior………………………… 11 B. August 31 – Sperry Chalet Ignites…………………………… 24
6. Conclusion……………………………………………………………… 29
7. Lessons Shared from the Participants…………………………………. 31
8. Observations and Recommendations…………………………….……. 32
9. The Facilitated Learning Analysis Team……………………………….. 40
Appendices A. Schematic of protection plan from Structure Protection Plan (PDF) B. Fire Investigation Report (PDF) C. Fire Progression Map (JPG)
2 The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
1. Executive Summary
On August 10, 2017, a series of dry lightning storms moved across Montana and started several new fires. Among these new fires was the Sprague Fire in Glacier National Park. Over the course of the next few weeks, park management and fire resources would work to suppress the Sprague Fire and protect all threatened structures. Despite extensive protection efforts, on August 31, 2017 the Sperry Dormitory (commonly called the Sperry Chalet), a National Historic Landmark structure, burned when the fire made a hard run up the canyon below the Dormitory. No other structures were lost during this fire, no firefighters were injured or killed protecting the Sperry Chalet, and several other buildings in the Sperry complex were saved.
The National Park Service Division of Fire and Aviation Management was notified of the loss and coordinated with the Purpose: To Acting Associate Director, Visitor and Resource Protection, the Develop and Learn Division Chief for Risk Management, and the Director, The primary goal of this Department of Interior Office of Occupational Safety and Health, review is to understand to determine what type of review to do regarding the loss of the decisions that were Sperry Chalet. Ultimately, it was decided to use the Facilitated made based on the Learning Analysis (FLA) process given the nature of the conditions that existed incident. The FLA meets National Park Service policy and is an and to identify and share appropriate response for this incident. lessons learned both A Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) Team was mobilized on within the National Park September 17, 2017 to conduct a learning analysis that would Service and interagency address several key areas identified by the Branch Chief of fire community. Wildland Fire for the National Park Service. The direction to the FLA Team was to review the lessons to be learned from both the loss of the Dormitory and the success in preventing the other buildings within the Sperry Chalet complex from burning.
This event provides opportunity to learn what was done well and what needs to be corrected or improved. Therefore, the intent of this FLA is to objectively portray the actions taken in protecting the Sperry Chalet complex along with the challenges of protecting the Dormitory and reduce the chances of a similar outcome in the future.
3 The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
2. The Significance of Sperry Chalet
Congress created Glacier National Park in 1910, six years before the National Park Service would be established. The Great Northern Railway, under the supervision of its president Louis Hill, started the system of hotels and chalets to develop a tourist industry to boost the use of the railway.
A number of hotels and chalets were built throughout the park in the 1910s to promote tourism. They were modeled on Swiss architecture to portray Glacier National Park as “America's Switzerland.”
These chalets and hotels, built between 1910 and 1913, included Belton, St. Mary, Going-to-the- Sun, Many Glacier, Two Medicine, Sperry, Granite Park, Cut Bank, and Gunsight Lake. The Great Northern Railway also built the Glacier Park Lodge, adjacent to the park on its east side, as well as the Many Glacier Hotel, located on the east shore of Swiftcurrent Lake. Combined, these buildings represented the largest collection of Swiss Chalet-style buildings in the United States. While these hotels and chalets never made a monetary profit, they attracted thousands of visitors who came via the Great Northern Railroad. Guest on balcony of Sperry Chalet, circa 1940. Louis Hill personally selected the sites for all of Photo by T. J. Hileman. these buildings, choosing each for their dramatic scenic backdrops and views, including remote backcountry
locations accessible only by trail.
The Glacier Park Hotel Company managed these properties until selling them to the National Park Service in 1954.
The Sperry Chalet The Sperry Chalet Complex is located in the Glacier National Park backcountry seven miles by trail from the Going-to-the-Sun Road near Lake McDonald. It resides below the Sperry Glacier in a grand glacial cirque, surrounded by enormous peaks along the Continental Divide.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Built in 1913, the Dining Hall and the Dormitory were the two buildings in the complex contributing to the Great Northern Railway Buildings Architecture in the park’s National Historic Landmark multiple property nomination. In addition to the historic Dormitory and the Dining Hall, the complex also includes several non-historic buildings including toilet/washroom facilities, two bunkhouses for National Park Service maintenance and trail crew staff, and a small water treatment building. (See an aerial image of the Sperry Chalet complex on page 6.)
The Sperry Chalet Dormitory The Dormitory was the largest and most architecturally impressive structure in the Sperry Chalet complex. The approximately 32-by-90-foot two-story building was covered by a large gable roof adorned with two dormers on the east side and three on the west side. Some dormers sheltered small log- framed balconies. One of the gable ends of the Dormitory had the letters “G.N.Ry.” indicating the Great Northern Railway in lighter colored stone.
The Dormitory roofs had log rafters, logged locally, with board sheathing and wood shingles. The heavy random rubble stone masonry of the walls was quarried from the site and laid by Italian masons. The stonework, arched fenestrations with log detailing, gave the building a quality and character of design unique to a backcountry Sperry Chalet and Dining Hall from a distance, circa 1920. structure and provided the stout Photo by T. J. Hileman. construction essential to survive the winds and heavy snows encountered at Sperry.
The Dormitory consisted of 22 guest rooms, reached by a first-floor lobby access and interior staircases. Interior partition walls were tongue and groove boards fastened to the structural log framing. Ceilings were comprised with this same material. Floors were wide boards, painted grey. The rustic log railings of the exterior balconies and deck along the west side of the structure were not original. The original balconies had deteriorated badly and had been replaced.
There was no electricity or running water within the Dormitory building.
5 The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Aerial Image of the Sperry Chalet Complex
Dormitory
Trail to Nelson Lake
Comfort Station
Chlorination Dining Hall Cabin Maintenance Cabin
Trails Cabin
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
The Sperry Chalet Complex Dining Hall Constructed in 1913, the Dining Hall in the Sperry Chalet Complex is a simpler structure. It was built with considerably smaller stones than those used in the Dormitory. While this structure lacks the Dormitory’s exceptionally fine design quality, it nonetheless successfully serves its aesthetic purpose in its simplicity of design. A single story, the gable roof is low and finished with wood shingles. A small deck around the south and west exterior walls overlooks beautiful views toward Lake McDonald. The window and door openings have the gentle segmental arches, which immediately identify the structure as a Great Northern building.
The Sperry Chalet Experience The current 10-year concession contract is held by Belton Chalets, Inc., which is owned by the family who has operated both Sperry and Granite Park chalets for three generations.
Glacier National Park’s 2005 Commercial Services Plan identified the Sperry Chalet visitor experience as necessary and appropriate.
For some visitors, the Sperry Chalet experience was about conquering a challenging hike to then be celebrated and welcomed into this family-style dining hall where complete strangers sit down as guests to enjoy a home-cooked luxurious meal. Afterwards, people part as friends and companions.
Families, disconnected from the chaos of modern influences such as social media (there are no televisions or internet services at Sperry) can relax in the Dining Hall after dinner and engage in long-lost conversations and board games. The view, taken in by sitting in a rocking chair on the porch of the Dormitory, allowed for one to find peace. This has been the essence of the Sperry Chalet experience.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
3. The 2017 Fire Season
Initially, the 2017 fire season in the Northern Rockies appeared as if it was going to be a typical season. The winter, in general, had been wetter than average and most areas had an above- normal snowpack.
Spring brought average rainfall and snowmelt. By the end of June, however, many areas of Montana were receiving record or near-record high temperatures. By mid-July many of the land management units throughout the Northern Rockies were already staffing with “severity resources1.”
By the end of August, major fires were burning in southern and northern California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, British Columbia, and Alberta. Lightning strikes started most of these fires across federal, state and county protected lands.
These fires crossed jurisdictional—and international—boundaries and impacted communities. Thousands of homes were threatened across multiple regions. More thunderstorms were starting new fires every day.
By the time the Sprague Fire started on August 10, the National Preparedness Level was at 5 (the highest, most severe level). There were 80 large fires burning throughout the nation.
Within the Northern Rockies Geographic Area, the regional Preparedness Level was 5 with 17 uncontained large fires burning. On August 10, five new large fires ignited2. With the ongoing and new fire activity, suppression resources were depleted.
1 Severity resources assigned to another park or agency unit in response to high fire danger and the threat of a high amount of wildfire activity. NPS RM-18 Appendix 2 2 According to the National Interagency Coordination Center “Incident Management Situation Report.”
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
4. Sprague Fire Timeline
For the following timeline and narrative, we recommend that you open the Fire Progression Map link. It may be helpful to the reader to have the map to coincide with the descriptions.
Date Event Sprague Fire Size/ Time of Day3 August 10 Sprague Fire started by lightning in the mountainous terrain of the Sprague Creek drainage. This area had not experienced fire since the 1700s. August 11 Initial Attack with 4 rappellers; aviation resources drop 49,000 gallons of water on 10 acres (a.m.) Sprague Fire. 42 guests at Sperry leave. Trail closures and wilderness evacuations initiated. August 12 Wildland fire module (WFM) hikes into fire; aviation resources drop 94,600 gallons 23 acres (unk) of water on Sprague Fire. August 13 Decision to transition to a Type 3 Incident Management Team (IMT3). 60 acres (a.m.) August 14 ICT3 and WFM leader begin organizing the local type 3 organization and take a 98 acres (a.m.) recon flight. August 15 Continued evacuation of wilderness; WFM used as lookouts. 204 acres (a.m.) August 16 Structure protection plans for Mt. Brown Lookout and Sperry Chalet complex 342 acres (p.m.) initiated with firefighters and equipment being flown in; Zone IMT3 takes command of Sprague Fire. August 17 Nine Sperry Chalet staff hike out. 519 acres (p.m.) August 18 Fire prediction models indicating high potential for fire to reach Sperry Chalet within 824 acres (noon) several days; recon flown; high fire activity through the night; NPS trail crew hikes out. August 19 Three USFS firefighters and NPS maintenance employee are flown to Sperry 1,123 acres Chalet to free up the GNP firefighters for park initial attack; pumpkin (a frameless (p.m.) orange portable water tank) requested; sprinklers put on roofs; short-duration crown runs observed until 10 p.m. August 20-23 Sprague Fire increases in activity but does not push toward Sperry Chalet; some 1,502 acres hazard fuel removal at Sperry Chalet; decision to have IMT2 take over the Sprague (p.m.) is finalized on the 22nd; Structure Protection Specialist and Logistics advanced team arrive on 23rd. August 24 Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT2) receives in-briefing; light precipitation 1,503 acres (unk) causes fire behavior to decrease for a few days. August 25 IMT2 takes command of Sprague Fire; division supervisor (DIVS) flies to Sperry 1,503 (unk) Chalet for a thorough briefing.
3 The fire perimeters are from IR flights, GPS'ed by helicopter or by foot, or visual estimates made by field staff when IR or GPS perimeters were unavailable. The FBAN and LTAN from the ICT3 and ICT2 kept a chronology of daily fire growth.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Date Event Sprague Fire Size/ Time of Day4 August 28 Minimal fire growth. 1,575 acres (unk) August 29 Fire mostly backing and begins making runs up Lincoln Ridge after 5:00 p.m. 1,874 acres (unk) August 30 Red Flag Warning posted for dry lightning; IMT2 decides to place DIVS at Sperry 2,095 acres with 3 firefighters and a NPS maintenance employee; bucket work requested to (unk) subdue fire behavior ¼ mile below Sperry in the drainage bottom; operated sprinkler system for 30-40 minutes to test the system and wet down the area. August 31 DIVS calls the Type 2 operations section chief (OSC2) for morning briefing; another 3,276 acres 7:30 a.m. Red Flag Warning posted for the day. 10:00 a.m. Fire activity picks up slightly. 12:30 p.m. Noticeable increase in winds and fire behavior. 2:30 p.m. Winds have increased to approximately 25-30 mph; Sperry Chalet complex blanketed with heavy smoke and receiving significant ember fallout. 3:00 p.m. DIVS requests aviation support. 3:30 p.m. Receiving significant spot fires around the complex; smoke spotted from under the Dining Hall eave; quickly extinguished. 4:30 p.m. Firefighters continue to put out spot fires around the complex. Between 5:50- Smoke spotted coming from below eave of 2nd story dormer of the Sperry 6:00 p.m. Dormitory; attempts are made to extinguish fire by applying water from the exterior. Opened door and made entry into the building; immediately withdrew due to heavy smoke conditions inside the building. 6:15 p.m. Flames coming out dormer window; DIVS notifies OSC2 that Sperry Chalet is a total loss; utilizing bucket drops to reduce fire behavior and shingles from blowing off and starting more spot fires. 8:20 p.m. All helicopters and Air Attack return to home bases by dark. 4,646 acres 3:00 a.m. A majority of the Sperry Dormitory had been consumed by the Sprague Fire.
4 The fire perimeters are from IR flights, GPS'ed by helicopter or by foot, or visual estimates made by field staff when IR or GPS perimeters were unavailable. The FBAN and LTAN from the ICT3 and ICT2 kept a chronology of daily fire growth.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
5. Narrative
This Narrative section presents the factual account of When the Sprague Fire the events, beginning with the detection of the started on August 10, Sprague Fire on August 10 until the Sperry Chalet 15,294 people were on Dormitory burned on August 31 through the next fires throughout the morning. The intent of this narrative timeline is to western United States. capture and share the firefighters’ suppression efforts There were 83 active to protect the Sperry Chalet structures. The lessons fires, with 369 crews, 678 learned highlighted and discussed here are intended engines, and 141 to help the National Park Service and the interagency helicopters assigned to wildland fire community reduce the risk of structural these incidents. loss in wildfires in the future.
During the 2017 fire season Glacier National Park fire On August 31 there were resources successfully caught and suppressed 18 out of 22,655 people on fire the 22 total fires that started in the park keeping them all assignments, 134 active under three acres in size. fires with 564 crews, 1,629 engines, and 180 Of the remaining four fires, the Sprague Fire and Adair helicopters assigned. Peak Fire were inaccessible. Given the remoteness of the Adair Fire, few values at risk, and proximity to old burns it By September 1, there was determined to be very low priority. The Sprague Fire were 129 active fires with was determined to be a higher priority. These two fires, 567 crews, 1,616 fueled by the current dry conditions, grew beyond the engines, and 193 scope of available resources in the park. The other two helicopters assigned. fires started in Canada and burned over the border into the park. A. The Sprague Fire
On August 10, 2017 a large thunderstorm moved through “We just didn’t have the Glacier National Park (GLAC) producing more than 150 resources to manage an down strikes. At approximately 8:36 p.m. that evening, one incident long-term.” of these strikes ignited the Sprague Fire.
The Sprague Fire was small but active when it was called Fire Management in by a park ranger returning from Trout Lake. No flights Officer - Glacier could occur due to thunderstorm activity and then National Park darkness.
● Fire behavior on August 10 – The Sprague Fire, as observed from Apgar Boat Dock and the Huckleberry Fire Lookout, was torching. A short crown run was observed.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
● Fire size on August 10 – Estimated at 50 to 80 acres (this over-calculation will be corrected the next day).
Due to the severity of the fire season and the dry conditions, Glacier National Park fire management had decided in July that they would attempt to suppress all fires.
The months of July and August were abnormally dry and hot in the park. During these two months, the average precipitation for West Glacier is normally close to 3 inches and high temperatures are in the high 70s and low 80s. In 2017, only a third of inch of precipitation was received and high temperatures were in the high 80s. The only precipitation in July was recorded by the West Glacier RAWS on July 15; it recorded 0.01 inch of rain.5
By July 19th, the Intermountain Regional Office had approved Glacier National Park’s severity funding request that would provide additional fire management staffing.
Around 10:00 p.m., key fire management and park leadership – the Fire Management Officer (FMO), duty officer (DO), the type three incident commander (ICT3) for the park, Chief Ranger, and Deputy Superintendent – met to discuss trail closures, evacuation of campgrounds, and suppression strategies. In addition, the FMO conferred with Flathead National Forest FMOs who had called to offer their assistance to assess the fire on the next day.
Wildland Fire Module Assigned to Sprague Fire On August 11, the district fire management officer and assistant district fire management officer from a neighboring U.S. Forest Service (USFS) ranger district arrived at Glacier National Park to help the park assess the fire. A USFS wildland fire module (WFM) had been ordered by Glacier National Park for severity and had arrived on August 8 at a nearby USFS ranger district, where they were going to be hosted. The WFM was assigned to the Sprague Fire. The USFS FMO and AMFO flew a reconnaissance of the Sprague Fire and more accurately estimated it to be 10 acres in size—much smaller than initially thought.
Helicopters were used throughout the day to subdue fire behavior using bucket drops. The plan was to keep this fire small until ground resources were in place to suppress it.
On August 11, the duty officer ordered rappellers for the Sprague Fire. They were inserted to cut a helispot in order to fly in additional firefighters to suppress the Sprague Fire. The rappellers remained on the fire throughout the night.
Increased Fire Activity at Night Around 11:00 p.m., the rappellers called the duty officer to report increased fire behavior. Due to their concerns of fire overrunning their location, they wanted to hike out. However, because of related safety concerns for hiking out in the dark (including snags, steep terrain, and grizzly bears), the rappellers remained at the fire.
5 https://www.usclimatedata.com/climate/west-glacier/montana/united-states/usmt0352
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
● Fire behavior – Rappellers observed fire activity increasing around 9:30 p.m. and staying active late into the night.
● Fire size on August 11 (a.m.) – 10 acres.
The rappellers hiked out the morning of August 12. A helicopter with a manager flew the helispot and made several attempts to land but due to the slope, the helispot could not be approved for landing.
Sperry Chalet Guests Encouraged to Evacuate It was 11:00 p.m. on August 11 when Sperry Chalet management was contacted by park leadership requesting the Sperry Chalet manager encourage the guests to hike out voluntarily the next day. The trail the Chalet guests had hiked in on had been closed due to the fire so they would have to go out the long way. Thirty nine out of the 42 guests decided to leave the morning of the 12th, hiking the 13 miles out the Gunsight Pass Trail, a long hike that would take them over the Continental Divide. Other concessionaires operating in the park assisted the evacuated guests with transportation and lodging after their unexpected hike out.
Sperry Chalet management worked with the park to get the other three guests back to West Glacier and by 6:00 p.m. the evening of the 12th, only the Sperry Chalet’s staff of nine, the NPS maintenance worker and two NPS trail crew members remained at Sperry. The owner of the Sperry Chalet concession later reflected, “to take that many people and move them out safely was one of Sperry’s golden hours.”
Wildland Fire Module Hikes into Fire On August 12, the USFS FMO, GLAC FMO and WFM leader flew a reconnaissance of the fire. The WFM decided that they felt comfortable and it would be safe to hike into the fire rather than fly. The hike took approximately four hours. The WFM was on the fire around 3:30 p.m. “We knew it would be a pretty long hike, so we were prepared. Once we left the trail we had to bushwhack through a lot of dead and down and thick yew,” noted the WFM leader.
Upon arrival at the fire, the WFM began work cutting down snags to build a safety zone. They were receiving all of their equipment via helicopter sling load using the helispot as a sling site.
The WFM leader walked around the fire perimeter with his GPS unit and captured the fire size at 21 acres.
The WFM believed with cooperative weather there was a chance that they could stop the fire using handline, at least on three sides of the fire. The southern edge of the fire was located on an extremely steep slope and handline would not hold the fire there due to the potential for roll out.
Sprague Fire’s Low Priority Prevents Resources from Being Assigned The WFM leader called the duty officer and fire management officer to provide them an update after hiking into the fire. The recommendation from the WFM leader was to have two Type 1 Interagency Hotshot Crews (IHC) begin constructing handline. Due to the number of snags,
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
steepness of the terrain and the remoteness of this fire, IHCs were the optimum option to construct this fire line. However, there were higher priority fires in the region where structures and lives were being threatened. Based on fire activity regionally and nationally, the DO and FMO determined that obtaining an IHC was very unlikely and the order was not placed. The DO and FMO began to develop other strategic plans for managing the Sprague Fire.
It was made very clear to fire resources by the Glacier National Park (GNP) FMO if there were any concerns regarding safety, they would look at other fire suppression tactics.
The WFM leader still felt comfortable and knew that the module could get some productive suppression work accomplished on the fire. Therefore, they continued to prepare to stay at the sling site.
● Fire behavior on August 12 – Fire was again active at night. Helicopter water buckets were utilized during daylight hours to slow the fire spread to the north, to prevent it from spreading north into Snyder Creek drainage.
● Fire size on August 12 – 23 acres. When the wildland fire Fire Overruns Wildland Fire Module’s Location; Type 3 module made the NPS IC Assigned recommendation of ordering two Type 1 On the night of August 12, the WFM bedded down around crews, there were 75 10:00 p.m. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on August 13, fire resource orders for Type activity picked up and forced the module to move from the 1 or Type 2 IA crews that sling site into their recently snagged safety zone. A thermal were Unable to Fill (UTF), belt caused the fire activity to increase significantly 18 of which were in the throughout the night. Northern Rockies. By approximately 10:00 a.m., the fire had grown by roughly eight acres and had overrun the sling site. It became apparent with their limited available resources the WFM would not be successful using direct tactics to suppress the Sprague Fire.
The WFM called the duty officer to provide an update. The decision was made by the DO and FMO to transfer command from the WFM leader to a NPS type three incident commander from GNP that had recently become available.
The values at risk were quickly identified and prioritized. Public and firefighter safety were the first priority and protecting the Sperry Chalet complex was the second priority. During the remainder of that day’s work shift, the WFM stayed on the fire gathering fire behavior observations.
● Fire behavior on August 13 – Fire was again active at night.
● Fire size on August 13 (a.m.) – 60 acres.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Sperry Chalet Identified as Primary Value at Risk On August 14, the WFM leader hiked out to meet with and brief the duty officer who had transitioned to become the NPS ICT3. The remaining module members began packing up their gear to be slung out via helicopter and hiked out later in the day. It was determined the WFM leader would take over as operations section chief (OPS3) for the Type 3 incident management team (IMT3).
The park’s wilderness manager had been identified as a “group supervisor” responsible for ensuring the safe evacuation of backcountry hikers and trail closures for all trails expected to be impacted by the Sprague Fire.
The IC and the OPS3 took a reconnaissance flight and began developing plans to implement protection tactics on the three priority backcountry values at risk at the time. These values in order of priority were the Sperry Chalet, Mt. Brown Fire Lookout, and Crystal Ford Bridge. While campgrounds were also located in the area, they were very low priority in relation to these three key facilities.
● Fire behavior – Fire growth occurred overnight (on August 13) into the morning of August 14. Roll out, isolated torching and spotting was observed. Scattered precipitation was noted on the weather log from 2:30-3:30 p.m. “There was no question of ● Fire size on August 14 (a.m.) – 98 acres. the importance of that structure to the National Fire Doubling in Size Every Night; Spot Fire Detected Park Service” in Snyder Creek Drainage On August 15, with public safety being identified as the first Glacier National Park suppression priority, the WFM was utilized as lookouts to FMO ensure that no hikers or park employees on the trails would be impacted by the fire. In addition, the park’s wilderness manager facilitated the “sweeping” of trails in order to insure no public were currently hiking any closed areas.
Additional fire growth had been experienced each night due to the thermal belt and consistent diurnal winds. The fire was generally doubling in size each night. Furthermore, a spot fire was identified in the Snyder Creek drainage.
● Fire behavior – The fire grew overnight from the evening of August 14 into the morning of August 15. During the day on August 15, single-tree torching as well as rolling material was causing spotting. Group torching was observed along the fire’s east flank. Thick white smoke was observed as the fire backed down both sides of the ridge between Snyder and Sprague creeks.
● Fire size on August 15 (a.m.) – 204 acres.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Recommended: Click on the map below to view a high quality pdf version of this map in your browser window (15 mb).
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Structure Protection at Mt. Brown Fire Lookout and Sperry Chalet complex On August 16, six park fire employees were flown up to the Mt. Brown Fire Lookout to implement structure protection tactics. The incident management team decided to use protective structure wrap on the Mt. Brown Fire Lookout because there were no water sources for sprinkler systems and no safety zones for firefighters. The lack of safety zones resulted in the lookout being categorized as a “prep and leave” structure, meaning firefighters would do everything they could to prepare the structure for impacts from the fire, then leave well in advance of the fire reaching the lookout.
The same day, four local park firefighters consisting of a crew boss (CRWB), a Type 1 qualified firefighter (FFT1), and two other firefighters (FFT2s) were flown up to Sperry Chalet complex to begin to set up the structure protection equipment and to implement the 2011 structure protection plan. The structure protection equipment included several thousand feet of hose, sprinklers, pumps and nozzles (Appendix A shows the location of the protection methods including the hoselay).
A GNP maintenance employee was also at the Sperry Chalet complex. This employee was identified by the Incident Commander (IC), as being a critical person to have on site to ensure that the facility’s water system was successfully functioning both for potable water for the resources assigned to protect the structures as well as for serving as a back-up water source to run sprinklers. While this employee is not “Red Carded”6 the employee was provided all necessary personal protective equipment (PPE).
Because 2017 had become a very low water year due to “Water was definitely not early snowpack melt and lack of spring and summer unlimited.” precipitation, water sources to operate the sprinkler and hose system was a concern. The CRWB identified several Crew Boss water sources that could supply the system but not enough to run the system continuously. Therefore, trigger points7 were established to determine when the pumps would be turned on.
The identified water sources were: an unnamed lake, referred to locally as Nelson Lake (it should be noted that while locally referenced as a lake this water source is classified as a pond) located approximately 1,500 feet to the southeast of the structures; the potable water system in place for Sperry Chalet complex; and Sprague Creek.
6 The Incident Qualification Card, commonly called a “Red Card,” is an accepted interagency certification that a person is qualified to do the required job when arriving on an incident. The National Wildfire Coordinating Group sets minimum training, experience, and physical fitness standards for wildland fire positions.
7 A trigger point is a pre-identified or anticipated event (time, place, or condition) that when it occurs initiates a pre- planned response.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Sprague Creek is located about 3,000 feet away, but because the hose would have to be placed directly in the path of the expected fire movement, it was determined that it was not a viable water source.
A portable water tank and other miscellaneous hose and fittings were ordered to help mitigate these water shortages. With the help of the park maintenance employee and the Sperry concession staff, the fire resources were able to set up the pumps, sprinklers, and hoses, and by the end of the shift on August 16 the initial set up was in place and safety zones and escape routes identified
● Fire behavior – Inversion lifted at 11:30 a.m. No fire observations.
● Fire size on August 16 (p.m.) – 342 acres.
Fire Prediction Models Forecast High Potential for Sprague Fire to Reach Sperry Chalet Complex Because of increasing fire growth and fire behavior, the over-extension of fire staff, and the long-term management Type 3 IMT: needs of this fire, park management decided to transition the Sprague Fire to a zone Type 3 incident management A zone IMT is an team (IMT3) on August 13. With the IMT3 taking command organized and pre- of the fire on August 16, the park was able to staff their identified team. Each initial attack resources. member of this team comes from a different During August 17, additional adjustments to the sprinkler unit within the zone— system to improve performance and water coverage on reducing the impact of and around the structures were made by the firefighters standing-up a Type 3 assigned to Sperry. organization on the host unit. With this zone team The nine concession employees, having completed closing taking command of the the Sperry Chalet facilities for the season, along with two fire, the park was able to trail crew employees, began their 13-mile hike out that more completely staff their morning. initial attack resources. The zone IMT3 was proactive in working with the long-term analyst (LTAN) to interpret fire prediction models. These models were showing a high potential for the fire to reach the Sperry Chalet complex within several days. The Mt. Brown Fire Lookout was also expected to be impacted by the fire.
● Fire behavior – Active fire in the early morning. (At 3:45 a.m., photographs were taken showing crown fire activity in Sprague Creek drainage.
● Fire Size on August 17 (p.m.) – 519 acres.
18 The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Suppression Trigger Point Identified; Fire Remains Active throughout Night On August 18, the resources assigned to the Sperry Chalet complex had the structure protection components in place and thoroughly tested. All personnel assigned to the Sperry Chalet complex felt very comfortable with their safety and their preparedness for the Sprague Fire reaching the complex.
By mid-morning, the Sprague Fire was exhibiting increased activity. All day the fire was “boiling from The Sprague Fire burning on August 18. Arrow indicates the drainage bottom” and flanking up the north side the Sprague Creek Drainage. of Sprague Creek drainage.
After observing this fire activity, the assigned CRWB recognized that when the facilities were impacted by fire, it wouldn’t likely be a flaming front, but would most likely be an ember shower reaching them by spotting.
The column from the Sprague Fire was consistently staying to the north of all the facilities at the Sperry Chalet complex. However, the CRWB established and communicated another trigger point. If the column laid over the facilities and resources began seeing ash or ember fallout, they would start the pumps and prepare to actively protect the View of the Sprague Fire from the porch of the Sperry structures. Chalet Dining Hall on August 18. Photo by the Crew Boss.
By midafternoon, the fire had progressed along the northern side of Sprague Creek drainage directly across from the Sperry Chalet complex. The operations section chief (OPS3) flew a reconnaissance of the drainage and communicated any concerns with the CRWB. At this point, while both the OPS3 and the CRWB felt relatively comfortable, they knew there was potential for the fire column to shift and throw embers toward the structures.
That night, the CRWB slept on the porch of the Dining Hall. The fire remained active throughout the night. “It was a restless night to say the least…just keeping an eye out,” the CRWB said.
● Fire behavior – Fire growth occurred during the day and overnight into the morning of August 19.
● Fire size on August 18 (noon) – 824 acres.
19 The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Safety Officer Trainee Becomes Primary Point of Contact; Sprinklers Installed on Roofs On August 19, a safety officer trainee (SOFR-t) and two other U.S. Forest Service firefighters, along with a maintenance employee, flew up to the Sperry Chalet to replace the GNP firefighters that had been assigned there the previous few days to free up them for park initial attack.
The incoming SOFR-t and the outgoing CRWB spent approximately three hours going over the entire water, sprinkler and hose system, as well as the identified concerns and safety zones to brief the incoming resources.
The SOFR-t became the primary point of contact at Sperry. In order to mitigate the water shortage issue, he ordered a 6,000 gallon “pumpkin” and placed it as the primary water source for all of the structures.
Because the roofs of the structures were identified as a “I wouldn’t have felt key concern, the park maintenance employee gained comfortable getting up approval from his supervisor to get up onto the buildings’ there, especially on a two- roofs to install sprinklers. He was the only person trained story structure.” and qualified in “fall safety protection”. (Firefighters from Glacier National Park, and generally within the National “I think we did everything Park Service, are not trained or qualified to climb up onto we could with the roofs to install sprinklers or wrap structures.) limitations we had.” ● Fire behavior – The fire was 824 acres at noon on Safety Officer Trainee August 19. Helicopter bucket work in Sprague Creek drainage was used to keep fire slopovers in check. Even so, the fire moved rapidly up the north slope of Lincoln Ridge at approximately 6:00 p.m. Also observed: single and multiple tree torching, short-range spotting, and short-duration crown fires. These short-duration crown fires were observed until 10:00 p.m.
● Fire size on August 19 (p.m.) – 1,123 acres.
Improvements Made to Sprinkler System; Protective Wrap Installed; IMT2 Ordered From August 20-23, the Sprague Fire increased in activity but never moved in a direction to threaten the Sperry Chalet complex.
Resources assigned to the chalet continued to test and make adjustments and improvements to the sprinkler system and also placed protective wrap on additional wood components of the structures. Conversations regarding wrapping the dormers of the Sperry Dormitory continued, however, these dormers were deemed inaccessible.
Some of the dead standing trees and fuels on the ground were cut and moved away from the structures. Due to a communication misunderstanding, the firefighters at Sperry were under the belief that specific direction had been given to not cut any green trees.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Helicopters were used for bucket work during August 20-23 to reduce fire behavior in the drainage below Sperry whenever the fire behavior increased. Overall, all the resources were busy making improvements on structure protection throughout the Sperry facilities for several days.
The GLAC FMO worked closely with Northern Rockies GACC, and zone to have the IMT2 move from the Tamarack Fire to the Sprague. This decision was finalized on August 22. Prior to this, the GLAC FMO working with the zone and the IMT2 to have the IMT2, LTAN and SOPL help with the Sprague IMT3. The IMT2 was also able to have Structure Protection Specialist and logistics advanced team sent to the Sprague Fire early; they arrived on 8/23.
Fire Behavior from August 20-23 ● August 20 – Inversion in the morning. Fire grew 50 acres on the North Slope of Lincoln Ridge (lower 1/3, down drainage). Heavy helicopter used to keep fire in check in bottom of Snyder Creek. Fire activity increased at 4:00 p.m. with single-tree torching, fire backed into heavy fuels, and made a small fire run on the north aspect of Lincoln Ridge. Fire grows to 1,183 acres.
● August 21 – Light southwest winds all day. At 4:30 p.m. A field observer (FOBS) described this as the least fire activity to date. The fire was backing in heavy fuels with very little torching. The solar eclipse dropped temperatures from 59 to 52 degrees at 11:30 a.m. Bucket work was used in Snyder Creek most of the day and just beginning to be used in Sprague Creek. No buckets on Lincoln Ridge. Cirrus clouds observed at 2:00 p.m. Fire was flown in the evening and measured at 1,223 acres. Overall, fire growth was minimal.
● August 22 – Inversion in the morning again which started breaking by 11:00 a.m. Single- tree torching and spotting was observed when the temperature reached 70 degrees and relative humidity was 30 percent. There were winds on the upper slopes of Lincoln Ridge (south aspect), though not a lot of fire growth to south. At 9:30 p.m., smoke began moving down Snyder Creek drainage into Lake McDonald; single-tree torching was observed. There was fire growth reported on the toe of the slope between Sprague and Snyder creeks, on the west flank south of Sprague Creek, over Lincoln Ridge, southeast toward Sperry campground, and east up the south side of Snyder Creek drainage.
● August 23 – A strong inversion occurred overnight. Hungry Horse Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS) at 5,500 feet showed relative humidity recovery of 37 percent at 6:00 a.m. It was the fourth day in a row of warm temperatures. It was still hazy at 12:45 p.m. with the smoke starting to rise. At 3:00 p.m., the skies were still hazy but the lookout was requesting another helicopter for buckets in Snyder Creek drainage. Smoke from the nearby Gibraltar Fire had started to spread into Glacier National Park by 6:00 p.m. The skies had become progressively hazier throughout the evening. Infrared mapping mission flown showed the Sprague Fire at 1,364 acres.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Resources Prepare and Plan for Various Potential Fire Scenarios Based on the fire activity observed from August 18 to August 30, the fire resources at the Sperry Chalet complex began to recognize and identify the fire activity they could expect when the fire reached the chalet.
The firefighters were able to run through several potential scenarios and plan for how to tactically implement structure protection based on these scenarios.
The most likely scenario was that fire would run up a timber stringer located on the south side of the complex and throw embers and smoke over the facilities. The primary concern in all the scenarios was the impact of spot fires and embers originating from below the facilities.
Type 2 IMT Receives In-Briefing; Division Supervisor Visits Sperry Chalet complex On August 24, a Type 2 incident management team (IMT2) that had been ordered a few days earlier was receiving their in-briefing. They made plans to complete a transition and take command of the Sprague Fire on August 25.
On August 25, the Division Supervisor (DIVS) from the IMT2 flew up to Sperry. The resources on site gave the DIVS a thorough briefing and spent a few hours going over all the facilities, concerns, safety zones, and plans for suppression implementation.
The DIVS felt they had a solid plan and was comfortable with what was in place at the Sperry Chalet complex. After his assessment and briefing, the DIVS flew back to the helibase. The Sperry Chalet complex was only a portion of the geographic division assigned to him. The DIVS remained working on the rest of his division, regularly checking in with the resources at Sperry.
Fire Moves Closer to Established Trigger Point The Sprague Fire received some light precipitation on Based on the gradually August 24, causing fire behavior to decrease for the next increasing fire behavior few days. By August 27 however, the fire had moved and movement, the closer to one of the established trigger points. The SOFR-t firefighters at Sperry knew at Sperry ordered a helicopter to work that portion of the it was a matter of time fire to keep it away from the base of the timber stringer, before the fire reached located on the south side of the chalet, which begins ¼ them. With the growing mile down below the Chalet on a natural bench. anticipation of the fire ● August 24 – Rain began at 7:00 a.m. that continued they ran the pumps every sporadically throughout the morning. 1/10th inch of day and thoroughly tested rain is recorded which limited fire growth. Cloud the entire system. cover was more than 80 percent. Smoke began drifting down-drainage at 10:30 a.m., creating They talked every hazards on the Going-to-the-Sun Road. morning that “this could be the day.” ● August 25 – Mostly clear in the morning with high cirrus clouds. Helicopter bucket work on lower Snyder Creek drainage.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
● August 26 – The Sprague Fire is estimated at 1,537 acres.
● August 27 – Fire activity had picked up with torching and short-range spotting. Some multiple-tree torching occurred along the north side of Lincoln Ridge and the original unnamed ridge between Sprague and Snyder drainages. Bucket drops were utilized on the very west portion of Snyder. One short-range spot fire was noted ahead of the main fire on Lincoln Ridge.
● August 28 – The fire was backing down toward Snyder Creek and expected to cross it. Fire crossed under the mostly-rock avalanche chute that had previously been preventing fire spread on the south side of Snyder Creek. Bucket drops occurred on the lower Snyder Creek area. The fire was estimated at 1,575 acres.
● August 29 – The fire continued backing on the fire’s flank from the lower Snyder Creek drainage to Lincoln Ridge. Beginning at approximately 5:00 p.m. the fire made a run up Mt. Edwards on the south side of upper Snyder Creek. Short crown runs occurred into the “black” (already burned areas) on Lincoln Ridge. The fire is estimated to be 1,874 acres.
Red Flag Warning Posted; Division Supervisor Flies to Sperry Chalet Complex The predicted weather on August 30 included a Red Flag Warning for the area. The SOFR-t assigned at Sperry Chalet complex had timed out and needed to be demobed from the incident. His replacement would be the division supervisor (DIVS) for Division W (which included the Sperry Chalet complex). The SOFR-t flew down to the helibase that morning and met with the DIVS for approximately one hour to provide a briefing on the Sperry Chalet facilities and the plan for their protection. The DIVS then flew up to the Sperry Chalet complex with the intent of staying there.
By early afternoon, the DIVS had arrived at Sperry. He met with the other resources on-site and became oriented to any new changes that had been made to the sprinkler and hose system. These resources had been on-site at Sperry for an extended period of time and were intimately familiar with the protection plan and efforts.
From one of the lookout points at the Dining Hall, the DIVS could see the fire about a ¼ mile down the hill in the drainage bottom. He ordered a helicopter for bucket work to subdue the fire behavior with the hopes of keeping the fire out of the timber stringer they had previously identified as an area of concern. In addition, they ran the sprinklers for 30-40 minutes to further test the water system and wet the area down.
There wasn’t significant fire behavior on August 30 that was of major concern for the DIVS.
● Fire behavior on August 30 – Red Flag Warning for dry lightning. No thunderstorm downdrafts were predicted to affect the fire area today. Fire crossed the avalanche chute and Snyder Creek. Short crown runs occurred into the “black” on Lincoln Ridge. The fire continued to back on the flank from the lower Snyder Creek Drainage to Lincoln Ridge.
● The Sprague Fire was mapped at 2,095 acres.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
B. August 31 – Sperry Chalet Ignites
Of the hundreds of fires ignited by embers at the Sperry Chalet complex on the afternoon of August 31, two were structure fires—the Sperry Chalet Dormitory and the Dining Hall. The Dining Hall structure fire was extinguished while the Sperry Chalet Dormitory, despite aggressive fire protection and suppression efforts, was not and consequently it was lost in the fire. Both of these historic structures share similar stories.
In addition to sharing an open view to the Sprague Creek drainage below, the Sperry Chalet Dormitory and Dining Hall share similar characteristics in age, building materials, and combustibility. The masonry stone exterior walls supported roof structures woven of large timbers with thick lumber roofs and tongue and groove floors. Wood-paneled walls completed the interior finishes.
(See Appendix B for the complete Fire Investigation Report.)
On August 31, the DIVS at the Sperry Chalet complex made his morning phone call to operations to receive a briefing and voice any concerns. At that time, the primary concerns were: 1) the predicted Red Flag Warning for the day (i.e., breezy west-southwest winds and low relative humidity); 2) the two stringers of timber located on the north and south sides of the facilities; and 3) fire coming from directly below the facilities sending embers across the structures.
With the predicted weather, the DIVS was expecting the Sperry Chalet complex to be impacted by fire that day. The previous few days a heavy inversion had set in the drainage below. The morning of August 31, the air was quite a bit clearer, but the winds were calm. Nothing appeared to be much different from the previous days.
By 10:00 a.m., fire activity had started to pick up slightly. One of the Type 2 firefighters (FFT2) at Sperry Chalet went to Nelson Lake to start the pump and test the system.
After running the sprinklers for approximately 30-40 minutes, they shut them down and allowed the portable tank and pumpkin to refill. By 12:30 p.m., there was a noticeable increase in fire behavior and winds. One FFT2 went back to Nelson Lake to start the pump and get the system running, then returned to assist the others with structure protection.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Chalet Area Receives Ember Showers; Spot Fires Occurring Around the Facilities By 2:30 p.m., the wind had increased to approximately 25-30 mph. The Sperry Chalet complex was blanketed with heavy smoke and was receiving significant ember fallout which ignited many spot fires.
Firefighters worked to extinguish spot fires throughout the complex. One firefighter, stationed on the west side of the chalet, continued to spray water on the walls and eaves of the Dormitory. This firefighter also reported extinguishing spot fires between the Sperry Chalet’s deck and the canyon’s edge.
Each of the five individuals (four firefighters and one maintenance employee) at Sperry were assigned a general geographic area to patrol and work within over the course of their shift.
When a spot fire below the Dining Hall was located, the resources made note of the spot, but stayed focused on actively protecting the structures.
At 3:00 p.m., the DIVS ordered a helicopter to help look for spot fires and for bucket drops to moderate fire behavior in the Sprague Creek drainage below the facilities. By 3:30 p.m., the resources at Sperry were receiving multiple spot fires around the complex. The conditions became extremely smoky. Having just completed a reconnaissance flight of the fire, operations orders “a bucket ship ASAP to Sperry Chalet” and, shortly after this, orders additional buckets.
The Type 1 firefighter (FFT1) was patrolling the dining and cabin area. One of the FFT2s was patrolling the maintenance cabin and the restrooms. Another FFT2 and the maintenance employee were patrolling and actively using hoses to spray the side of the dormitory that was exposed to the fire.
Embers were igniting spot fires on all sides of the “The smoke was thick. It structures within the Sperry complex. Firefighters was hard to pick out extinguished numerous spot fires, keeping their focus on specific targets. Once in a all the structures, with particular attention on the Dining while the smoke would Hall and the Dormitory. clear and I could make a With the winds continuing to increase, embers were good drop.” funneled upward toward the eaves of the Dining Hall and Dormitory. Helicopter Pilot
Ember Ignites a Portion of Dining Hall Roof—It Is Quickly Extinguished By 3:30 p.m. The DIVS was approximately 100 yards up the hill from the Dining Hall when he noticed smoke coming from its corner. He radioed the FFT1 who was patrolling that area.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Within one minute, the FFT1 arrived at the Dining Hall and radioed the DIVS to “bring a pulaski” (fire tool). The wind had blown an ember up under the building’s eaves and ignited a small portion of the roof. Using the pulaski, they reached up and quickly opened the soffit, revealing active flames within the concealed spaces under the eave. A “rat’s nest size pile” of debris fell from the soffit when it was opened. The fire was quickly extinguished.
By 4:30 p.m., the resources had caught and extinguished multiple spot fires throughout the Sperry Chalet complex. No fire was detected burning on any of the other structures. Three helicopters were working the drainage and areas around Sperry in an attempt to reduce fire behavior. At this same time, fire activity increased around the majority of the perimeter of the Sprague Fire.
At approximately 5:30 p.m., all of the resources regrouped near the Dormitory. They quickly discussed the status of their situation. The DIVS asked if everyone still felt comfortable and safe being in that location. The surrounding fire behavior seemed to have slowed down. “It felt like we may have been successful and the worst was over,” said one of the firefighters.
Everyone dispersed and continued to patrol the entire area of the facilities. One Type 2 firefighter remained to spray water on, and around, the Dormitory as well as up toward the second-story dormers.
Sperry Chalet Dormitory on Fire; Thick Smoke Prevents Access to Inside Just before 6:00 p.m., the FFT2 spraying water on the Dormitory radios the DIVS to report that there was smoke coming from under an eave on the second-story in an area framed with large timbers and “We never felt like we intricate wooden dormers. needed more people, or didn’t have enough The FFT2 continued to spray water up toward the dormer people to deal with what as everyone else made their way to the chalet. The DIVS we had.” could see smoke coming out of the chimney as he and the maintenance employee arrived at the building. They Firefighter looked toward the dormer and made the decision to see if 8 they could access it from the inside of the building. They removed the shutter from the door beneath the dormer that was smoking and opened the door. “Terrible brown smoke” filled the building from floor to ceiling. “It was so thick you could barely see your hand in front of you,” explained the DIVS.
Nonetheless, the DIVS, maintenance employee, and FFT2 with a hose took a couple of steps inside. Immediately they realized they could not safely proceed any farther. Knowing there wasn’t anything more they could do, two of the firefighters went back to check on the other structures and catch more spot fires.
8 Wildland firefighters do not wear the required Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for structure fires, nor are they trained to engage a fire which is burning inside a structure. However, many wildland firefighters within the NPS are trained in structural fire. Training in both areas is required to function in each arena.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Next, the DIVS, with help from the maintenance employee, made access through the alternate door only to find the same conditions—smoke from floor to ceiling. Once again, they had to turn back. Within approximately five minutes, flames could be seen coming from the window of the dormer.
Fueled by the heavy timbers, wooden walls and ceilings, the fire grew rapidly with flames reaching the underside of the dormer and extending to the roof shingles within minutes.
Over the next hour, the fire continued to grow in size and intensity, consuming the majority of combustible materials in the building’s south half.
The Sperry Dormitory was equipped with a fire-resistant “It was a gut punch. For wall designed to withstand fire for one hour. This wall the past two hours we separated the north and south areas of the building. It was had worked hard and felt installed in the mid-1990’s to enhance the fire safety for like we were going to be Sperry Chalet guests. As the fire continued to burn, this successful.” wall eventually failed and flames also engulfed the Dormitory’s north half. Firefighter Sperry Dormitory is a Total Loss
Once the fire spread to the north half it was apparent the Sperry Dormitory structure was fully involved. The DIVS called OSC2 to notify him that the Sperry Dormitory was a total loss.
The DIVS called the helicopters and had them start making bucket drops on the Sperry Dormitory. This wasn’t an attempt to put the structure fire out but intended to prevent burning material from the Dormitory from blowing off and igniting more spot fires around the Sperry’s remaining structures.
Resources Protect Other Structures; Extinguish More Spot Fires By 8:20 p.m., the sun had gone down and all aviation resources had to return to the helibase. Fire activity had calmed slightly and the winds were decreasing. Around the Sperry Chalet complex, there were still several spot fires with an occasional single and group tree torching.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
The firefighters continued working to protect the other structures and catch spot fires. At midnight, they all regrouped. The DIVS made the decision that they needed to rotate to get some rest. The DIVS and the two FFT2s bedded down for a short rest while the FFT1 and the maintenance worker continued to patrol and protect the structures. At 3:00 a.m., the DIVS and two FFT2s relieved them.
By 3:00 a.m., the majority of the Sperry Dormitory had been consumed.
● August 31 fire behavior forecast for upper Sprague Creek/Sperry Chalet: “Fuels are mostly Spruce/Fir open canopy. Isolated stands that are downwind from current fire edge may burn and spotting may occur between groups of trees.”
● August 31 fire behavior observed –The Sprague Fire made a significant run up to the Mt. Brown Lookout starting around 2:00 p.m. The fire made it to the rim of Snyder Basin adjacent to the Avalanche Lake drainage as well as to the saddle between Mt. Brown Fire Lookout and the Mt. Brown summit. In short, most of the upper Snyder Basin burned during this burn period. In upper Sprague Creek, aggressive torching and spotting occurred. The fire moved through the open canopy spruce fir and sparse fuels and spread beyond the Sperry Chalet complex; sparse vegetation areas shown as being a non-burnable fuel model were burning.
● An infrared flight just after 9:00 p.m. on August 31 mapped the Sprague Fire at 4,646 acres.
The total number of fires that ignited within the Sperry Chalet complex during the afternoon of August 31 is not known. The firefighters who were there that day spoke of many. As one of the firefighters observed: “It was the [his] most intense direct firefighting experience.”
In the subsequent days, structure protection continued at Sperry as the Sprague Fire continued to grow and threaten the other structures in the complex. The morning of September 1 crews were flown in to clear trees and vegetation that could still be a threat to the remaining structures at Sperry.
From the ashes of Sperry have come many thoughts and ideas for what the future of the Sperry Dormitory might be. Stabilization efforts have been implemented to support the historic stone walls through the winter. As the manager of Sperry Chalet remarked “Sperry’s story isn’t over yet…It’s a start of a new chapter for her.”
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
6. Conclusion
The burning of the historic Sperry Dormitory triggers a sense of regret and loss, leading to speculation about what more could have been done, should have been done. The firefighters, the ICs and park leadership were well aware of the historical significance of the chalet, the visitor experience it provided, and the profound uniqueness of the buildings. They, like many others who appreciated the uniqueness of the Sperry Chalet dormitory, will continue to re-examine the actions taken and on what more could have been done.
Hindsight usually provides clarity to a situation and the “what ifs” become apparent. The structural protection at Sperry Chalet was reasonable from a wildland fire management perspective. It provided both defensible space and the ability to defend the structures from flames and embers; however the difficult situation firefighters faced on August 31 was inherent in the design and location of the Dormitory and Dining Hall. These historic structures, even ones with stone walls, were not built to reduce the structure’s ignition potential from wildfire embers. In fact, they are “highly ignitable9”. Furthermore, Sperry was located to provide the guests with a view of the valley below. The unintended consequence of the Sperry Chalet’s location is that it placed the Dining Hall and Dormitory in direct alignment with embers from the Sprague wildfire.
Retardant drops had been considered to assist in the protection of the Sperry Chalet complex. However, several factors made the use and availability of retardant and the application unrealistic and extremely dangerous. The terrain alone would make effective retardant drops extremely difficult and dangerous to the pilots. The smoke that blanketed Sperry causing very low visibility coupled with 20-30 miles per hour winds, made retardant drops unrealistic and unsafe.
Sperry Chalet was defensible, but at least one ember found a small gap in the eaves. When a structure is susceptible to ignition, there will always be some probability that prevention and
9 Jack Cohen, a preeminent researcher on wildfire and home ignitions, considers both the wildland fuels and the home (structure) as fuel when looking at home loss due to wildfire. Cohen observes, “For highly ignitable homes, effective wildland fire actions must not only prevent fires from burning to home sites, but also eliminate firebrands that would ignite the home and adjacent flammable materials. To eliminate firebrands, wildland fuel reductions would have to prevent firebrand production from wildland fires for a distance of several kilometers away from homes….home ignitions depend on home ignitability, and fire losses depend on home ignitions. Thus, the W-UI fire loss problem can be defined as a home ignitability issue largely independent of wildland fuel management issues.”
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
protection efforts will not be successful. What we do know “If the crews weren’t there is that the structural protection plan the park had written on August 31 all the and the incident management teams implemented enabled structures would have the firefighters at Sperry Chalet Complex that day to safely been lost potentially defend the structures. except the newest The story of the events of August 31 should also illuminate building” the many successes. The firefighters successfully protected all buildings from direct flame impingement. They Division Supervisor successfully ensured none of the roofs caught fire from embers; they limited the spot fires within the chalet complex. None of the firefighters were injured or felt unsafe while protecting the structures. They prevented embers from getting established on the porches, at the base of the buildings, on the sides of the buildings, and under the eaves in all the places they could do so safely and effectively. Their efforts are acknowledged; they safely engaged the fire within the scope of their duties.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
7. Lessons Shared from the Participants
These are the lessons the FLA participants wanted to share in their own words:
Risk Management Lessons • The risk to Sperry Chalet was underestimated. In the backcountry, where There was so much lead time that confidence was it is not viable to have high in regards to being able to defend it. (Both structural firefighters and Resource Advisors (READs)) their equipment, these • Be bigger-picture in determining helicopter dip wildland firefighters did sites. (READ) their best to defend the structures. • Be willing to do fuels reduction work that is needed when there is a fire. (NPS Maintenance employee)
• Find multiple ways to protect structures. (NPS Maintenance employee)
• Put fire crew through fall restraint training. (CRWB)
• Structure protection requires different tactics because of the differences in structures and locations. (OPSC)
• Fire management practices that fit the fire ecology in Glacier has been immensely successful and resulted in far more manageable fire behavior than if there hadn’t been a history of managing fires. (CRWB)
Communications Lessons • Get more messaging out about the teamwork that took place on the decision making that occurred. (internal to NPS) (CRWB)
• Better messaging to the public about the successful suppression activity that was accomplished within the park – having caught 18 out of 22 fires under three acres for example. (CRWB)
• Hoselay and sprinkler system worked well and personnel communicated well. (DIVS)
• Open communications to all levels of park staff in employee meetings, all employee emails and face to face time was important. (NPS Leadership)
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
8. FLA Team Observations and Recommendations
This chapter is divided into two sections:
A. Section A highlights actions directly related to the events surrounding the loss of Sperry Dormitory and makes recommendations based off the lessons learned related to the loss of the Dormitory and successes in the protection of the remaining structures. These recommendations, if implemented, could result in a different outcome when working to protect historic structures in the National Park Service and other agencies.
B. Section B focuses on the observations and recommendations that would likely have not have prevented the dormitory from burning down. Section B addresses recommendations on any planning, operational or managerial issues which can be addressed to reduce the chance of a similar incident in the future that, if implemented, could result in a different outcome when working to protect historic structures. Section A
Observation One: Messaging Firefighters are commonly portrayed as heroes, here to protect life and property. This has contributed to a cultural expectation that there will be no acceptable losses. This is not a safe or realistic expectation.
Considerations • The FLA team commends the park on quick notification to the public on the loss of the Sperry Chalet Dormitory via social media. However prior to the event there was a lot of emphasis on the park social media page, and in public meetings, about how well protected the structures were; there was no mention of the fact that despite taking solid measures to protect the values at risk there are no guarantees firefighters will be able to successfully protect every structure.
• The messaging issued prior to the burning of the dormitory appears to have given an indication to the public there were fail-safe protections in place and the entire Sperry Chalet Complex would be saved no matter what during the fire event.
Recommendations • Through messaging and communication plans, park staff and the public should be informed that despite the best efforts of firefighters, not all values at risk can be saved.
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• Messaging about wildfires within national parks should provide information to the public about Firewise practices and International Code Council (ICC) standards10.
• The need to change messaging as recommended here is not specific to the NPS, the fire community as a whole would greatly benefit from the recommended changes being put forth to the public in regards to structure protection from wildfires.
Observation Two: Training Wildland firefighters are not equipped or routinely trained in fall protection to provide the necessary safety margin for climbing structures to wrap them in shelter wrap. This also prevents them from being able to safely install sprinkler systems on a roof if necessary.
Considerations • The National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) S-215 Fire Operations in the Wildland/Urban Interface training is the only wildland fire course required that relates to structure protection and is often taken by lower level firefighters. The training does not include training on “collapse zones,” the area that could kill a firefighter if a building collapsed and potentially an area where hose systems are deployed by wildland firefighters.
• Many of the hoses and gated wyes put in place at Sperry Chalet complex as part of the structure protection system were located within the collapse zone.
• More parks are experiencing larger wildfires and more historic structures are at risk. While the full protection of these structures from wildfires cannot be guaranteed measures can be taken to insure that all tools are safely and effectively used.
Recommendations • Target specific NPS wildland firefighters to receive training in fall protection to supplement S-215 training. Focus for this training could be for parks with remote, high-risk historic structures.
• NPS should consider enhanced training for wildland firefighters, especially wildland fire modules, assigned to protect structures from wildfires. Enhanced training should include, but not be limited to: effective structure wrapping, implementing water systems, and collapse zones.
10 The NPS has adopted the International Code Council’s (ICC’s) International Urban-Wildland Interface Code (2006). Contained in the ICC’s code (sections 603 and 604) are descriptions of defensible space and maintenance requirements for urban wildland interface areas. Maintenance of the defensible space includes modifying or removing nonfire-resistant vegetation and keeping needles, leaves, and other dead vegetative material regularly removed from around structures and roofs. The code stipulates that the minimum requirement for defensible space around structures is 30 feet. Tree crowns should be pruned and maintained to a minimum of 10 feet horizontal clearance from structures and overhead electrical facilities. Tree limbs should be pruned to maintain a 6-foot clearance above the ground. High fire-hazard areas, flammable construction materials, topography, and fuels may require up to, and possibly more than, 100 feet of additional clearance space. The need for additional clearance should be determined by the park structural fire coordinator, fuels manager, FMO, chief ranger, or park superintendent.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
• NPS should consider recommending to the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) the development of more advanced wildland urban interface structure protection training for all wildland firefighters. Section B
Observation Three: Hazard fuels reduction and International Code Council standards Resources on the ground at the Sperry Chalet complex were under the belief that “no green trees” could be cut. While this did not contribute to the loss of the Sperry Dormitory, it did complicate the ability of the resources on the ground to meet their desired end state in terms of protection efforts. Further reduction of fuels adjacent to the structures would have created a more manageable situation and safer situation for the firefighters.
Considerations • The communication for acceptable fuels work was never clearly documented or defined, resulting in different interpretations and outcomes.
• Leadership believed clear direction was given allowing for the necessary removal of trees; resources on the ground believed they were not permitted to cut trees and clear the area of the complex. There was misunderstanding in communication and leader intent from the highest level at the park, through the teams, down to the resources on the ground at the complex.
• The Division Supervisor on the ground at the chalet had to “pull the safety card” to get permission to drop some trees that hindered the approach and take off for the helicopter. The trees were felled after the maintenance staff member at Sperry contacted the wilderness manager and obtained permission.
Recommendations • NPS Leadership should reiterate to parks the requirement to meet the International Code Council (ICC Code) standards for all structures and complexes within parks, especially where highly valued historic structures are at risk in remote areas or designated wilderness (see RM-18 Chapter 7).
• NPS Wildland Fire should consider using the Sperry Chalet FLA lessons learned as a case study during the annual new superintendent academy and include a section in the M581 and M582 courses on the balance of managing for “desired landscapes” and what is needed to meet the ICC Code.
• Written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) that identify acceptable mitigation actions in the event of a wildfire (these may be captured as constraints in WFDSS), should be identified by parks and approved by leadership prior to fire events.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
• In each SFMP or FMP, it should be clearly identified which park division(s) are responsible for maintenance of the fuels around infrastructure to meet NPS required ICC standards. Observation Four: Communication challenges hinder mitigation actions The communication challenges made it difficult for the IMT2 team to achieve their desired end state for fuel reductions; and an understanding of that end state by the Resource Advisors (READ’s).
Considerations • No READs were at Sperry Chalet complex until after the fire had consumed the dormitory. All consulting for desired work was done via radio or cell phone with fire resources on the ground. This contributed to the communication difficulties over what fuels reduction was permissible.
• READs were primarily from within the park staff and met the technical specialist (THSP) qualification to be in the role of a READ. All the READS assigned to the fire were qualified REAFs (Resource Advisor Fireline-qualified).
• READs were present at all morning briefings, which the FLA team commends. Their position was reflected on the daily incident action plan. The READs recorded good documentation on the daily events, actions and communications they had during the Sprague fire. These are all commendable and successful actions.
Recommendations • REAFs should be present and on location when there are protection efforts being implemented for historic structures. These REAFs should be familiar with the park operations and have an understanding of acceptable actions.
Observation Five: Park leadership with the incident management teams a success Park leadership was highly accessible and engaged with the Type Two Team. The Type Two Team appreciated this level of leadership engagement; it helped them to effectively manage the fire.
This is an excellent example of leadership during a fire that should be carried over as a lesson learned to all parks when working with any level of incident management team.
Recommendation • Park leadership needs to remain accessible to incident management teams as was done on the Sprague Fire.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Observation Six: Structure protection plan for Sperry Chalet complex did not include the use of sprinklers The structure protection plan for Sperry Chalet complex did not include the use of sprinklers on the roofs. Fire staff at GNP believed the recently installed class B fire retardant wood shake shingles, coupled with the expectation water could be applied to all areas of the roofs with hoses, was adequate. Furthermore, the fire crew at Glacier does not currently have fall protection training so they were unable to safely install sprinklers on roofs of structures.
Considerations • Sprinklers were eventually installed well in advance of the burning of the Sperry Dormitory and it is the belief of the FLA team these sprinklers helped significantly to protect the remaining structures. Sprinklers were also installed on the dormitory and were running prior to the ember shower, which did help prevent fires from igniting on the roof.
• Once in place the sprinklers provided better coverage and protection allowing the crews to accomplish more and mitigated the loss of any other structures in the complex. The structure protection plan was written in 2011 and did not account for the use of sprinklers. When the crews at Sperry actually implemented the plan they had difficulty getting good water coverage to all the buildings with only hoses. While the plan was an excellent starting point, it had not been tested. Because of the need to protect the Sperry Chalet complex, it was found not enough hose pressure could be generated to reach the roofs of several structures, including the dormitory.
• The plan clearly does state it is designed to be a starting point for developing structure protection efforts. As the plan gets updated it should incorporate the lessons learned from this event and include the use of sprinklers and an update to the water supply system.
• Fire retardant shingles do offer a level of fire protection but they are not a guarantee against fire.
• When the structure protection plan was developed, there was an assessment of the risk associated with being on the roof of the Dormitory and it was believed at the time, through conversations with the individual who developed the plans, it was not worth the risk. There is a trade-off in risk associated with the plan. Due to the height of the building and pitch of the roof the installation of sprinklers was considered dangerous, and even the person who did eventually install the sprinklers was nervous about working on the roof.
• The structure protection plan did not account for the potential for fallout of embers should one building ignite within the complex of multiple structures. This fallout made the protection of the other structures challenging for the firefighters after the Dormitory ignited.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Recommendations • Structure protection plans should consider the use of sprinklers and balance the use of sprinklers with risk of accessing roofs.
• Structure protection plans should consider potential ember fallout in areas of multiple structures and identify suitable mitigations.
• NPS should assess the feasibility of installing external quick connect sprinklers on structures for swift installation and to reduce the risk to firefighters.
Observation Seven: Propane tanks created an unknown hazard to personnel The Sperry Structure Protection Plan states that propane tanks should be moved to a downwind area that is free of heavy fuels. Though some propane tanks had been moved out to a safe open rock area, there were approximately 12 tanks still locked under the Dining Hall.
Considerations • The Dining Hall where the tanks were stored was wrapped to provide protection. An unwrapped
portion of the dining hall ignited. Crews were able Firefighters wrapping the to safely and quickly extinguish the fire at the Dormitory. Dining Hall.
• Had crews not been able to suppress the fire in the Dining Hall then a major life safety hazard existed. Consider if the Dining Hall had become fully involved and the propane tank BLEVEs (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions); this could have been a significant threat to firefighter safety.
• Fire shelter material had been used to wrap the area under the Dining Hall where some of the tanks were stored. This wrap covered any signs that indicated there were tanks stored below so the Division Supervisor, who arrived on scene after it was wrapped, was unaware of the presence of these tanks.
• Full propane tanks for the concession were flown to Sperry along with structure protection equipment for the firefighters. This was done because this is routine, with the tanks being cached as a part of closing procedures.
Recommendation • All propane tanks should be moved to safe locations. Structure protection plans should be reviewed and updated as needed to make sure safe propane storage areas are identified and clearly marked.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Observation Eight: The Dormitory could not be wrapped safely or effectively During the incident, there was much discussion about the shelter wrapping on the Sperry Dormitory. During the interviews, the FLA team consistently heard that firefighter safety was the first priority and the dormitory could not be safely or effectively wrapped. All parties involved believed the highest level of work was done that could be accomplished safely and effectively within the Sperry Chalet complex in terms of wrapping structures.
Considerations • The dormitory is two stories high and has many irregular shapes. Wrapping some of those areas could create additional pockets where embers could become trapped and negate the effort of wrapping.
• The areas wrapped on the dormitory were effective, no embers entered under the decking and the sprinklers installed on the roof kept it from igniting. The dormitory was built at the top of a chimney canyon, which is one of the most dangerous locations from downhill fires. The structure had many areas where embers could enter. The dry conditions of the structure left it vulnerable to those embers and once it ignited, it rapidly became fully involved.
• The park communicated via social media the structures were well protected and showed how the lookout had been entirely wrapped. The lookout is square in shape and does not have the complications of shape present on the Dormitory.
Recommendations • Communicate what can be achieved safely and effectively with regards to using shelter wrap and communicate this appropriately to the public.
• Structure protection means that firefighters take appropriate measures, such as safely wrapping the areas where it will be effective, and realize that sometimes it means accepting unavoidable vulnerability, especially when highly flammable structures are situated in dangerous topographic settings.
Observation Nine: Crews entered the burning structure Crews entered the burning structure despite not having the right equipment or training. After removing the barricades over the doors, the crews stepped inside the Chalet. Encountering heavy smoke, they retreated, moved to the second door and again attempted entry. They were unable to progress more than the distance of the staircase before realizing they could not see or breathe.
Considerations • Firefighters at Sperry had been engaged for several days prior to August 31. They had invested time and energy into ensuring there was solid protection in place for all structures within the complex and drilled extensively in regards to protecting the
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Dormitory. All of the resources were well informed of the significance of this structure and were committed to save a structure they had worked so hard to protect.
• Crews entered the structure by removing the barricade over the door. They then entered with a hose but realizing they couldn’t see through the heavy smoke and darkness they exited. They then tried a second door to see if they could enter the structure.
• None of the resources at Sperry Chalet complex were trained or equipped to enter a burning building.
Recommendation • NPS Fire Leadership should emphasize to NPS wildland firefighters under no circumstance should one enter a burning building without proper structure fire training and PPE.
Observation Ten: Fire staff felt a deep sense of loss Firefighters felt despair at the loss of the Dormitory. One firefighter remarked during his interview “it was a gut punch. For the past two hours we had worked hard and felt like we were going to be successful.”
Considerations • When the firefighters who were assigned at Sperry on August 31 came off the fireline, only one of them was debriefed, in an After Action Review lasting approximately 3 hours. The other four firefighters were not debriefed.
• Social media posts show some of the public placed blame on the park for the actions implemented in terms of suppression and for the loss of the Dormitory.
• Mentally and emotionally, there can be significant impacts for firefighters when they experience a loss during their operational period. The long-term benefits of treating mental and emotional wellness of employees, particularly in the event of loss, will result in a healthier workforce.
Recommendation • Recommend that the NPS commits to developing and making mandatory Critical Incident Stress Management programs to assist firefighters and park staff in the aftermath of a tragedy or loss, beyond the standard capabilities of the Employee Assistance Program.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
9. The Facilitated Learning Analysis Team
The National Park Service assembled the following interagency team for this Facilitated Learning Analysis:
Miranda Stuart
Team Lead; National Park Service Fire Management Specialist; Fire and Aviation Management
William Knudsen
Operations Deputy Team Lead; US Forest Service Supervisory Forestry Technician; Assistant Superintendent Lewis and Clark Hotshots
Stephen Pisani
Cultural Resource SME; National Park Service Historical Architect; Washington Support Office
Nate Benson
Fire Behavior SME; National Park Service National Wildland Fire Science and Ecology Lead; Fire and Aviation Management
Jimmy Stewart
Structural Fire Investigation SME; National Park Service Regional Structural Fire Manager; Southeast Region
Kathy Komatz
Writer/Editor; National Park Service Structural Fire Training Specialist; Fire and Aviation Management
Special thanks to the staff at the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center for support and input on the product development and to all of the personnel that contributed interviews, photographs and other content for this document.
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
“Sperry’s
story isn’t
over yet…
It’s a start
of a new
chapter for
her.”
Sperry Chalet Manager
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The Fire at Sperry Chalet: A Facilitated Learning Analysis
Appendix A Schematic of water, hose and sprinkler layout from Structure Protection Plan.
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National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior
Branch of Wildland Fire Division of Fire and Aviation
Appendix B: The Fire at Sperry Chalet Fire Investigation Report April 2018
The linked appendix is intended to function as a stand-alone product and investigates the factors and actions in regards to the protection of structures and the loss of the dormitory at Sperry Complex in Glacier National Park. https://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument/sperry-chalet-structure-loss-2017
Location Sperry Chalet Glacier National Park West Glacier, Montana 59936
Fire investigator Jimmy G. Stewart, CFI Regional Structural Fire Manager Southeast Region National Park Service National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior
Branch of Wildland Fire National Park Service Division of Fire and Aviation 3833 South Development Ave. Boise, ID 83705
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