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The Eclipse of the Divine Mind Aquinas, Creation, and Eternal Ideas As Anti-Platonic Epistemology

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The Eclipse of the Divine Mind Aquinas, Creation, and Eternal Ideas As Anti-Platonic Epistemology Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 93/1 (2017) 1-27. doi: 10.2143/ETL.93.1.3203589 © 2017 by Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. All rights reserved. The Eclipse of the Divine Mind Aquinas, Creation, and Eternal Ideas as Anti-Platonic Epistemology Paul Jeffry DEHART Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN Science and mathematics Run parallel to reality, they symbolize it, they squint at it, They never touch it: consider what an explosion Would rock the bones of men into little white fragments and unsky the world If any mind for a moment touch truth. Robinson Jeffers, “The Silent Shepherds” I. PLATONiC IdEAS ANd ChRiSTiAN ThEOLOGY A centuries-long theological tradition running back at least to Origen baptized Plato’s “ideas”. The transcendent archetypes were eventually taken to be God’s eternal thoughts of the cosmos, and were invoked to account for human cognition of both God and creation. Augustine, espe- cially influential for the early medieval continuation of this tradition, insisted upon an ontological kinship between the human intellect and that of the creator that enabled the former to grasp truth in its timelessness, a kinship mediated by the eternal rationes in God’s mind1. Beginning around the middle of the thirteenth century this venerable tradition suffered a series of wrenching changes in reaction to Amalric of Bene on one hand, and the Arabic metaphysicians (Avicenna and Averroes) on the other2. Under these new pressures, the issue of the divine ideas had to be thought through anew, from the ground up. The focus shifted from their role in human knowledge to their role in God’s. In particular, any theorization of the ideas now had to allow for their perfect cognitive scope, accounting for divine apprehen- sion of all particularity and distinction; yet it also had to explain how they could be actually one with the divine essence (since what is not God can 1. A useful account of the larger tradition can be found in V. BOLANd, Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis, Leiden, Brill, 1996, pp. 17-192. For medieval theology, the locus classicus in AUGUSTiNE for his doctrine of ideas was De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII. 46. 2. H. MEiNhARdT et al., Idee, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. IV, Basel, Schwabe, 1976, cols. 81-82; M.J.F.M. HOENEN, Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowl- edge in Late Medieval Thought, Leiden, Brill, 1993, pp. 239-240. 2 p.j. deHart only be created) without in any way undermining the metaphysical simplic- ity of God by introducing a kind of composition in God’s being. Different thinkers responded in different ways to this conundrum. Thomas Aquinas did so in a particularly elegant way, but the unavoidable result of his solu- tion was to overthrow the long-standing conviction that fully adequate human knowledge or science can only be accounted for by granting some kind of explicit connection between our minds and the ideas in the crea- tor’s mind. Aquinas’s theory of the ideas thus implied, strikingly, a refusal of epistemic Platonism. In the Platonic theory, ideas are the source and medium of true human knowledge; in the anti-Platonic theory, ideas are not only unknowable as such, but are systematically distanced from any positive role in human cognitive accomplishments. After Aquinas has finished, the luminosity of the ideas is occulted, as it were. Thus Thomas Aquinas offers (in some ways intentionally, in others implicitly and in effect) a uniquely “anti-Platonic” theorization of ideas in their epistemic role. The thesis of this paper is that the real implications of Aquinas’s position (which itself is arguably a necessary response to the stringent conceptual demands of the doctrine of creation from nothing) can only be grasped and appreciated negatively, drawing them out in light of a survey of some later discussions in which theologians and philosophers fall back in various ways into the Platonic gravitational field of classical idea theory. Section II will provide a brief, far from exhaustive account of Aqui- nas on the ideas; it will concentrate on the outlines of his reconciliation of perfect divine knowledge of creation with perfect divine simplicity of being. The remaining sections will examine several later medieval and modern discussion to unfold three consequences of Aquinas’s position, hinting as well at the troubles arising from failing to advert to them. The first such consequence (Section III) was the most quickly grasped, namely the near impossibility of accommodating Aquinas’s idea theory to the ancient tradition that understood the achievements of human understanding as effected by God’s ideas “illuminating” the human intellect. The second anti-Platonic epistemic consequence of Aquinas’s ideas (Sections IV and V) results from his insistence that the ideas are in no sense bearers of dis- tinct acts of existence proper to them, but rather are identical with the one act of divine existence itself. The third consequence (Section VI), contrary to a hallowed tradition going back to the Fathers (and often revived since) that closely associates ideas and the eternal Word, was that idea theory in fact needs to be disentangled in principle from theories of the eternal generation of the Son as Word. II. ThOmAS AQUiNAS ANd ThE RECONfiGURATiON Of IdEA ThEORY For Aquinas, all creaturely reality, distributed in its varied kinds, con- sists in nothing but deficient reflections or repetitions of, “participations in”, the utterly unique but infinitely rich and absolutely perfect act of THe Eclipse of tHe DiviNe MiNd 3 divine existence itself, God’s act of being God3. Not just individual crea- tures in themselves, but also their relations and differentiations, all are part of the distributed balance and order which God bestows on the universe; hence even their collective unity of distinction and interconnection itself is a participation of the divine unity of perfection. The result is that the world and all in it, in their diminished and diversified ways, infinitesimally rep- licate the content, so to speak, of God’s own identity or essence; they are, individually and collectively, acts of being-like-but-therefore-not God’s act of being God. Nothing real about them results from anything extraneous to the creator (say from subordinate makers or intransigent matter). And hence God can know all that they are simply by knowing himself, his own essence. This addresses initially the issue of God’s omniscience. But for any thinker of this period knowledge involves the presence, in some man- ner, of a resemblance or likeness of the known in the mind of the knower. This is true both for sensible knowing as well as for that higher form of knowledge shared by God, angels and humans, which is called under- standing or intellection. How, then, can the divine intellect know all these creatures and not be diversified in some way by the multiplicity of their ideas existing in it? Aquinas begins to answer this question by specifying two different modes in which the likeness of a thing can be in the intellect that understands it. The first points to that aspect shared by all kinds of knowledge, one which was stressed by Aristotle, namely that knowing occurs as the knower actu- ally takes on a formal similarity to the known. The second points to some- thing unique to intellection, which might be called the self-transparency of intellect and of the intelligible. According to the first mode, the form of the thing understood, i.e. its identifying and actualizing principle, comes to be shared with the intellect that knows it. Intellection, that is, primarily presup- poses not two things, say subject and object, but one thing: the unified actuality in which both the understanding and the understood merge or coin- cide in an identity of form. Aquinas means this quite literally. The intellect is not simply activated by contact with intelligible form (often called a species); rather, that form or species becomes the form itself that actual- izes the intellect. As he puts it, the intellect in the act of understanding something “actually exists through the species [of the thing understood] as 3. The fundamental treatments of divine knowledge, ideas, and providence upon which the discussion in this section is largely based can be found in ThOmAS AQUiNAS, Summa Contra Gentiles [henceforth SCG], Book I, chapters 47-54 and 66, and Summa Theologica [henceforth ST], Part I, questions 14, 15, and 22. BOLANd, Ideas in God (n. 1), provides a thorough overview of Aquinas’s various discussions of these topics. The reading of Aqui- nas laid out in the following paragraphs is not a straightforward summary but is very much a synthetic interpretation. It is not uncontentious, but I have argued for it in detail else- where. See P. DEHART, What Is Not, Was Not, and Will Never Be: Creaturely Possibility, Divine Ideas and the Creator’s Will in Thomas Aquinas, in Nova et Vetera 13 (2015) 1009-1058. 4 p.j. deHart through its own form”. When this happens, the intellectual knower is said to be actually understanding4. To the degree that intellect is not understanding, but has to be brought into union with the understood thing, it is passive, i.e. it is in a state of potentially understanding until unity with the species occurs. However, properly speaking intellection in itself is not a mere passive capacity but a kind of activity that Aquinas calls immanent action or operation, i.e. the intellect, actualized by its formal identity with the understood thing, exer- cises itself in accord with this actualization, not by effecting change out- side the knower but by augmenting or perfecting the knower from within.
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