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Evolutionary Trajectories of Cognitive Abilities and of Their Putative Neuroanatomical and Allometric Correlates: Testing Novel Evolutionary Trajectories of Cognitive Abilities and of their Putative Neuroanatomical and Allometric Correlates: Testing Novel Hypotheses of Cognitive Evolution and Cognitive Integration with Phylogenetic Comparative Methods Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation Authors Barcellos Ferreira Fernandes, Heitor Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction, presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 27/09/2021 20:14:55 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/636930 EVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORIES OF COGNITIVE ABILITIES AND OF THEIR PUTATIVE NEUROANATOMICAL AND ALLOMETRIC CORRELATES: TESTING NOVEL HYPOTHESES OF COGNITIVE EVOLUTION AND COGNITIVE INTEGRATION WITH PHYLOGENETIC COMPARATIVE METHODS by Heitor Barcellos Ferreira Fernandes _____________________________ Copyright ©Heitor Barcellos Ferreira Fernandes 2020 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY In Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2020 2 3 Acknowledgments I thank Mateo Peñaherrera-Aguirre and Michael A. Woodley of Menie for the valuable collaborations and their contributions, both theoretical and methodological, in this work and other, related research, past and ongoing. I also thank W. Jake Jacobs and Horst Dieter Steklis for their insight into the important role of the cerebellum in cognition, the empirical pursuit of which was fundamental to refining conclusions drawn from the analyses forwarded in the present work. Dieter and Netzin Steklis were also fundamental in shaping my always-updating notions of primate psychology and taxonomic diversity. Furthermore, I thank Melinda F. Davis for encouraging me to be methodologically innovative in this work. I must also thank Claudio S. Hutz for encouraging me to be ambitious when aiming for a PhD and in academic decisions. Finally, I thank Aurelio José Figueredo for being more than an advisor all the way: our intense collaboration and intellectual exchanges inspired this work and related professional investments. 4 Table of Contents List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. 7 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. 8 Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 9 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 11 1. The Evolutionary History of G: What Is It, and Are the Most Commonly Studied Neuroanatomical Measures Convergent with It? ...................................................................... 15 2. Do All Species Need General Intelligence? Potential Variations In the Strength of the Manifold .................................................................................................................................... 19 3. Are There Equivalent Variations in the Strength of the Manifold among Brain Regions? Further Tests of the Comparability between G and the Neuroanatomical Volumetric Approach ................................................................................................................................................... 20 4. General Significance ............................................................................................................. 21 Chapter 1. Macroevolutionary Patterns and Processes for General Intelligence (G) and for Commonly Used Neuroanatomical Volume Measures in Primates: Low Convergence Indicates Largely Independent Selection Regimes ...................................................................................... 23 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 23 1.1. Brain Size ....................................................................................................................... 25 1.2. Major Candidate Brain Structures ................................................................................. 26 1.3. Beyond Correlations ...................................................................................................... 30 2. Method .................................................................................................................................. 33 2.1. Measures ........................................................................................................................ 33 2.2. Analyses ......................................................................................................................... 44 3. Results ................................................................................................................................... 53 3.1 Phylogenetic Signal ........................................................................................................ 53 3.2 Evolutionary Rates .......................................................................................................... 55 3.3 Selection Regimes ........................................................................................................... 57 4. Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 59 4.1. Moderate Similarity Between G and Residual Cerebellar, and to a Lesser Extent, Neocortical Volume .............................................................................................................. 62 5 4.2. Putative Alternatives to Volumetric Measures .............................................................. 64 4.3. Limitations and Future Directions ................................................................................. 67 Chapter 2. Examining the Strength of Relations among Cognitive Abilities across the Primate Phylogeny: Clades of High Levels of General Intelligence Also Exhibit a Stronger Manifold ... 76 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 76 1.1. The Evolution of Correlations among Cognitive Capacities ......................................... 77 1.2. Objectives and Hypotheses ............................................................................................ 79 2. Method .................................................................................................................................. 80 2.1. Measures ........................................................................................................................ 80 2.2. Analyses ......................................................................................................................... 81 3. Results ................................................................................................................................... 89 3.1. Average Factor Loadings ............................................................................................... 89 3.2. Variations in Factor Loadings as a Function of G ......................................................... 90 4. Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 93 4.1 Tool Use and Innovation as Drivers of Cognitive Integration ........................................ 95 4.2. The Evolution of Cognitive Integration ......................................................................... 97 4.3. Implications for the Understanding of Specialized Abilities ......................................... 99 4.4. Contrast to the Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns ........................................... 101 4.5. Limitations and Future Directions ............................................................................... 102 Chapter 3. Examining the Magnitude of Correlations among Sizes of Brain Regions across the Primate Phylogeny: Stable Magnitudes across Lineages of Different Brain Sizes .................... 105 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 105 1.1. Concerted or Mosaic Volumetric Evolution of Brain Structures? ............................... 106 1.2. Objectives and Hypotheses .......................................................................................... 109 2. Method ................................................................................................................................ 111 2.1. Measures ...................................................................................................................... 112 2.2. Analyses ....................................................................................................................... 113 3. Results ................................................................................................................................. 116 3.1. Average Factor Loadings and Anatomical Integration Coefficients for Brain Structures ............................................................................................................................................
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