Extensions of Remarks Hon. Ed 1.Schau

25654 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS September 23, 1983 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS H.R. 3231-WFBT-WFBT TRADE by them. There is no reason that elimina launched cruise missiles in Europe. tion of intra-Cocom licenses could not be During this forum a distinguished part of our harmonization efforts. They are group of European parliamentarians HON. ED 1.SCHAU probably as willing as we are to reduce the 01' CALD'ORKIA paperwork burden placed on government presented their views on the Euro IB THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES and industry. The section of the bill that re missle question. These are Europeans who are deeply concerned about the Thunda11, September 22, 1983 duces controls on West-West trade permits a system of notification to be worked out that planned U.S. deployment in Europe. •Mr. ZSCHAU. Mr. Speaker, one of would allow tracking of shipments for intel I commend to my colleagues the tes the most important sections of the ligence purposes. timony of one of the European leaders Export Administration Act reauthor Q. Doesn't the elimination of export li who attended the forum, Mr. Egon ization is the one that streamlines and censes for these shipments destroy the Bahr, who is chairman of the Arms focuses the control procedures for "paper trail" necessary for effective en forcement and tracking down those who Control and Disarmament Parliamen trade with our NATO allies and Japan. might try to divert technology to commu· tary group of the Social Democratic Although referred to as "West-West nist countries? Party of West Germany. Mr. Bahr has trade," it is restricted to our most A. No it doesn't. A clear paper trail will held a number of government posi trusted allies. still be available for exports to countries tions including Minister of Economic Section 106<b> of H.R. 3231 provides maintaining cooperative export controls Cooperation under Chancellor Helmut for the shipment of goods and technol with the U.S. Section 106<b> of H.R. 3231 Schmidt. ogy to our NATO allies plus Japan says that the Secretary <of Commerce> may without license except in those cases require by regulation a notification by the STATEMENT OF EGoN BAHR ON TIU INF exporter of any exports made under the PuBLIC FoRUK IN TIU U.S. CONGRBSS, Sep of shipments to end users who repre new procedures. The form and detail re tember 15, 1983 sent a risk of diversion. It does not quired in this notification will be left up to The West German Social Democratic permit any of the allies to reexport the Secretary to determine by regulation. Party CSPD> decided to support NATO's sensitive goods or technology without I've met with Justice and Commerce De dual-track decision at a Party Conference in prior U.S. approval. And it specifically partment lawyers to discuss their needs to Berlin, in December 1979. The heart of the permits our Government to require ex establish adequate paper trail and am con dual-track decision is to reduce Soviet SS- porters to give full and complete vinced that the notification of shipment 20's and avoid the start of a new arms race notice of all such shipments so that that the Secretary may require will satisfy which threatens the security of Central will their needs. Europe. This was a few days before NATO our Government know where Q. I've heard that if this section becomes officially adopted the decision at its meeting within NATO sensitive goods and tech law, we will lose our right to control the re in Brussels. It re-affirmed this course of nology are being shipped. This "paper export of sensitive goods and technology policy and its expectatio~ ~bout negotia trail" will allow U.S. law enforcement and will have to depend upon our Cocom tions at the 1982 Party.:~ conference in authorities to prosecute anyone who partners to enforce re-export controls, some Munich and the 1983 Conference in Dort violates U.S. laws concerning such of whom are not as diligent in their enforce mund. This policy remains valid today. shipments. ment and licensing efforts as we are. Is this A large majority of the SPD shared Following is a series of the most true? Helmut Schmidt's view that the SALT proc A. First, we currently do not control re-ex ess, which limits intercontinental arma commonly asked questions about de ports. Our Cocom partners do. Second, any ments must be supplemented by agreements controlling West-West trade and their re-exports of the most sensitive goods from which keep eurostrategic weapons under answers: our Cocom partners to a Communist bloc control. This operating principle also still Q. With all the talk I've heard about tech country must come before Cocom for eval prevails today. nology transfer and the loss of sensitive uation and approval. Using this procedure, We accepted the dual track decision of technology to the U.S.S.R. why should we the United States would have the opportu 1979 as an instrument to carry out this req remove any export licensing requirements? nity to block any sale of which we did not uisite extension of arms limitation and arms A. That's a good question. To begin with, approve. control. this section of the bill only reduces licensing If the goods are not sensitive, yet are still Llk.e Helmut Schmidt, I was in favour of requirements for export to countries that controlled by Cocom and eligible to be ex the dual-track decision from the beginning cooperatively maintain controls over the ported at the individual members' discre because it provided an opportunity to bol same goods and technologies that we do. tion, the United States would know of any ster the acceptance of the SALT n Treaty; These are the NATO countries <except Ice shipment since that country is required to preventing an evasion of the provisions of land) in COCOM plus Japan. Since we've all report such shipments. Since we have the Treaty by shifting the atomic arms race agreed to control export of the same goods agreed with our Cocom partners that such to nuclear medium-range weapons; and in to the same countries, we must ask why we items pose so little threat to our national se ducing the U.S. to sit down at the negotiat should control the shipment of those same curity that they can be exported without ing table. goods to each other. It makes no sense. general Cocom approval, it really doesn't For me, the aim of the negotiations as for In flsca.l year 1982, the Commerce Depart matter who issues the final export license mulated in the Brussels communiqu~ was ment reviewed 21,154 export licenses for the United States or one of our allies.e acceptable. The objective consisted in ensur shipments to our COCOM partners. Of this ing that the Soviet Union would dismantle number, only 23 license applications were the additional eurostrategic nuclear weap denied. That's less than one tenth of one PUBLIC FORUM ON INF ons which had been targeted on Western percent! Clearly such controls of shipments Europe following the introduction of the to our allies are not Justified. HON.EDWARDJ.MARKEY SS-20's. There was no mention in the dual Q. If this section becomes law, we would track decision that a successful outcome of be the only Cocom member that did not re OF llASSACHUSETl'S the negotiations involved the elimination of quire an export license for shipments to IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES the entire medium-range Soviet armament other Cocom countries. Wouldn't this cause Thursday, September 22, 1983 built up since the Sixties. On the contrary, serious problems within Cocom and hurt the Alliance's concern appropriately related our efforts to harmonize licensing and en- • Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, last to the build-up of these arms which had forcement procedures? • week we held an important public become apparent since 1977. A. I do not see how placing additional forum on INF and the upcoming de The SPD has voiced the demand since trust in our allies can be considered harmful ployment of Pershing II and ground- 1979-and still does today-that th,ere must e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor. September 23, 1983 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 25655 be a radical reduction in the number of of strategic arms would have meanwhile maybe plant some fruitful seeds in Soviet SS-20's with the goal of rendering been resolved and that the problems of those who did not have the pleasure. the deployment of American missiles super eurostrategic armaments only represented fiuous. That was our zero option. It did not residual problems capable of resolution The son of an Italian immigrant car call for any zero on the part of the Soviets; within a relatively short period of time. penter who settled in Manhattan and but it did insist upon a removal of the addi Today, the situation reQuires a successful served 40 years in the Carpenters tional Soviet intermediate forces. The negotiation of the Euro-missile issue. The Union, Sal's early influences were to German Federal Government under Helmut increased relevance of this reQuires ample have a profound effect on his entire Schmidt also interpreted the dual-track de time for negotiation, particularly in the ab life. Like his father, Sal joined a trade cision in this way and Quite rightly designat sence of a START agreement. ed the American formulation of the zero The revision of a position held for four union at a young age and he spent option <based on a zero-zero solution for years must not constitute a question of pres nearly his entire working life in the both sides> as an extreme starting position.

Load more