THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WAR OF 1812 Lisa R. Morales, B.A., B.M., M.Ed Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS May 2009 APPROVED: Randolph B. Campbell, Major Professor Denis Paz, Committee Member G. L. Seligmann, Committee Member Ronald Marcello, Committee Member Michael McPherson, Committee Member Richard McCaslin, Chair, Department of History Michael Monticino, Interim Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse School of Graduate Studies Morales, Lisa R., The Financial History of the War of 1812. Doctor of Philosophy (History), May 2009, 218 pp., 1 table, references, 207 titles. The War of 1812 brought daunting financial challenges to the national government of the United States. At the onset of war, policymakers were still in the process of sifting through a developing body of American economic thought while contemplating the practicalities of banking and public finance. The young nation’s wartime experience encompassed the travails of incompetent and cautious leadership, the incautious optimism that stemmed from several previous years of economic growth, the inadequacies of the banking system, and, ultimately, the temporary deterioration of the financial position of the United States. While not equivalent to great tragedy, the war did force Americans to attend to the financial infrastructure of the country and reevaluate what kinds of institutions were truly necessary. This study of the financing of the War of 1812 provides a greater understanding of how the early American economy functioned and the sources of its economic progress during that era. Financial studies have typically not been a primary focus of historians, and certainly with regard to the War of 1812, it is easy to understand a preoccupation with political and military affairs. To a large degree, however, economic realities and financial infrastructure determine a nation’s capacity for growth and change as well as national strength. The War of 1812 offers a prism through which to view the tensions of economic and financial policymaking during an emergency situation and reveals an important turning point in the development of distinctly American financial ideas and institutions. Copyright 2009 by Lisa R. Morales ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to gratefully acknowledge the patient and insightful guidance of Dr. Randolph B. Campbell, University of North Texas Regents Professor of History, whose suggestions made possible the completion of this project. His enthusiasm for, and knowledge of, the subject matter provoked much thought and stimulating discussion. Many thanks also to the illustrious members of the committee who reviewed the end result. Your contributions were invaluable. Lastly, recognition must be extended to Patrick J. Morales. His encouragement facilitated the writing of this behind-the-scenes account of financial policymaking during the War of 1812. Again, many thanks to all. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………………..iii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………..…….…………………..………..1 2. THE BEGINNING OF AN AMERICAN ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY……………………………………………………………11 3. ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN COLONIAL AND EARLY NATIONAL AMERICA .….....................................................................30 4. THE NEW SCIENCE OF AMERICAN FINANCE..……………………….…………..50 5. THE COMPLEXITY OF MADISONIAN FINANCE... ………………….…………….75 6. A STRANGE REVOLUTION OF SENTIMENT…...…………………….………….....99 7. WAR CANNOT BE CARRIED ON WITHOUT MONEY.…………….……………..126 8. THE CHALLENGE OF 1813…….……………………………………………….……150 9. PURSUING A PHANTOM…………………………………………………………… 174 10. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………................193 BIBLIOGRAPHY...…………………………………………………………………………….204 iv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The War of 1812 brought daunting financial challenges to the national government of the United States. When the war came, policymakers were still in the process of sifting through a developing body of American economic thought while contemplating the practicalities of banking and public finance. The young nation’s wartime experience encompassed the travails of incompetent and cautious leadership, the incautious optimism that stemmed from several previous years of economic growth, the inadequacies of the banking system, and, ultimately, the temporary deterioration of the financial position of the United States. While not equivalent to great tragedy, the war did force Americans to attend to the financial infrastructure of the country and reevaluate what kinds of institutions were truly necessary.1 Increasingly scarce resources in the midst of a series of American defeats during the war years created policymaking tension between the executive and legislative branches of government regarding financial matters.2 As the war progressed, the executive branch, through the treasury department, advocated a more centralized approach to monetary policy and a revised taxation system to raise revenue. These ideas contrasted with an influential body of economic thought from the Jeffersonian tradition that emphasized the fear of concentrated power and the danger of paper money. A comparison of congressional debates prior to and after the war 1 Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 12th Congress, 1st Session, December 11, 447. Accessed from the Library of Congress, American Memory website, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsplink.html, July 2008. Joseph Desha, Republican of Kentucky, expressed the views of many pro-war congressmen when he stated that war should be waged “independent of expense” because the country was too prosperous to fail financially. John C. Calhoun, Republican of South Carolina, conveyed the same sentiment. The optimism expressed as the war began gave way to a new awareness of financial needs, and by February 1814, Congress was actively contemplating proposals for operational financial institutions such as a national bank. 2 The Gallatin and Madison Papers, as well as the Annals of Congress each offer details of the constant tension between the executive and legislative branches of government. Financial policy could not be effectively made within this environment of ideological distrust. Additionally, Gallatin was preoccupied with military defeat rather than financial policy. 1 reflects the practical education that members received during this period on issues related to financial policy. Before the War of 1812, principled men conveyed the depth of their sentiment opposing a centralized banking entity, but in the war’s aftermath, financial weakness revealed the country’s need for sound economic policies and structures.3 To appreciate fully the responses of the executive branch and Congress to the war, it is crucial to trace the development of American economic thought during the colonial and early national eras. The first three chapters of this study provide the reader with broad historical context, enabling an in-depth awareness of longstanding ideas reiterated by executive and congressional leadership during the war years. Chapter 2 offers a brief exploration of pivotal European intellectual influences and thematic American concerns related to money from the colonial era, as well as an introduction to Jeffersonian economics, which will equip the reader with a sense of the continuity of American financial debates through the colonial and early national periods. American financial debates often resulted from colonial Americans’ ambivalence related to the achievement of rapid economic growth and its burdens. Chapter 3 addresses the transformational course of American economic development through commercial activity and maturing trade relationships, both of which brought a degree of prosperity that gave colonists a sense of long-term economic security. Expanding trade and productive capacity, the luxury of consumption, and the need for money and banking institutions motivated public discussions about the morality of financial operations. From the late seventeenth century through the War of 1812, Americans continually evaluated economic ideas and observed the practical realities of finance, synthesizing a distinctly American point of view. 3 Murray N. Rothbard, A History of Money and Banking in the United States (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2002), 72-83. Rothbard examines the financial mess left by the banking system after the War of 1812. Stating that the War of 1812 “had momentous consequences for the monetary system”, he identifies the issues that national leadership had failed to address. 2 While colonial Americans, including Thomas Jefferson, may have debated financial necessities according to regional concerns, Alexander Hamilton decisively answered the question of what national financial policies and mechanisms were “necessary and proper” under the Constitution of 1787. Chapter 4 discusses Hamilton’s vision for the future of the United States that would culminate in a burgeoning American empire, competitive with the nations of Europe. He foresaw an active, involved government ensuring the health of the American business and the growth of the economy. To that end, Hamilton wanted businessmen, merchants, and people of wealth, in general, to be personally connected to the fortunes of the United States. Believing that public debt would provide a strong focus for the fledgling nation, the first secretary of treasury understood the importance of binding various interests to the success of the country. In particular, he knew that those accustomed to power and wealth would require a stake in America’s future or