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EMERGING DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES in the LIFE SCIENCES: CHALLENGES and POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS on EXPORT CONTROL Mirko Himmel*

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EMERGING DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES in the LIFE SCIENCES: CHALLENGES and POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS on EXPORT CONTROL Mirko Himmel* EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT PAPERS Promoting the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks No. 64 September 2019 EMERGING DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE LIFE SCIENCES: CHALLENGES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON EXPORT CONTROL mirko himmel* I. INTRODUCTION SUMMARY Advanced biotechnologies such as synthetic biology, This policy paper addresses the challenges of regulating genome editing or nanobiotechnology are frequently emerging dual-use technologies in the life sciences. Export categor ized as ‘emerging technologies’. Emerging control measures can be used as a key governance instrument to prevent the unwanted proliferation of dual- technologies are often described as technologies use technologies. However, emerging technologies present that have disruptive potential but have not yet been certain challenges for conventional export control 1 developed to their fullest potential. These tech­ mechanisms due to the rapid development of various nologies are usually rapidly growing with implications technologies and uncertainties about their potential use. already discernible but their full range of practical uses The paper describes key elements of the European Union is yet to be determined. However, there is no common export control system and provides examples of select agreement on the definition of such technologies. dual-use technologies in the life sciences that challenge Emerging technologies may have great strategic this system. Recommendations are made in order to value and the potential to be adopted for important improve current EU strategic export control. military and non­military industrial purposes.2 In principle, such technologies could be misused by states ABOUT THE AUTHOR or non­state actors, such as terrorist groups, in the Mirko Himmel (Germany) studied biochemistry and development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). completed his PhD in cell biology. He is currently a scientist Therefore, at least some emerging technologies may at the Centre for Science and Peace Research, University of pose a risk to national security and fall within the Hamburg, Germany. His research is focused on preventive scope of international arms control treaties and non­ biological and chemical arms control. The laboratory- proliferation measures. based work of his team is focused on the characterization of The international treaties on biological and chemical microbial infectious mechanisms. He also lectures on weapons are the Geneva Protocol, the Biological and bioethics at the university and provides biosecurity advice. 1 Brockmann, K., Bauer, S. and Boulanin, V., ‘BIO PLUS X: Arms Control and the Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies’, (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2019), p. 2. 2 Brockmann, K., ‘Drafting, implementing and complying with export controls: The challenge presented by emerging technologies’, Strategic Trade Review, vol. 8, no. 6 (2018), pp. 5–28. * The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewer and to the SIPRI Editorial and Publications Department for their invaluable comments. 2 eu non-proliferation and disarmament consortium Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical may also lead to the generation of biological agents, Weapons Convention (CWC).3 The conventions material, knowledge or equipment that can be directly prohibit the development and production of biological misapplied to cause great harm to humans, animals, and chemical weapons, respectively, and require states plants or the environment. In the USA, many research parties to implement measures that prevent the pro­ activities are termed Dual­Use Research of Concern liferation of WMD. Biological and chemical dual­use (DURC), which refers to a rather undefined subset of technologies are covered by international export research with dual­use implications.8 The classification control regimes. The Australia Group (AG) focuses of individual scientific work as DURC requires a on both biological and chemical dual­use items.4 case­by­case risk assessment. This concept is regarded The European Union (EU) is a member of the AG. as somewhat controversial by many arms control and EU member states also participate in the Wassenaar bio security experts and has not been officially adopted Arrangement (WA). 5 The WA lists items that could in the EU.9 contribute to the development of military capabilities, Export control measures can be used as a key including dual­use production technologies. However, governance instrument in order to prevent the there are no exact criteria or defined guidelines unwanted proliferation of emerging dual­use tech­ to clarify how technology assessments should be nologies. However, emerging technologies present performed or export controls be put in place to deal certain challenges for traditional export control with emerging technologies. Furthermore, there is no mech anisms due to the speed of technological single, harmonized international framework available development and uncertainties about potential use. for the regulation of emerging dual­use technologies. Examples of technology sectors that are of interest Generally speaking, biological agents, material, to export control and non­proliferation activities equipment, technologies or software used in the life include additive manufacturing, advanced data sciences may fall into the category ‘dual­use items’ that science, advanced materials, artificial intelligence, can be used for both civilian and military appli cations bio technology, nanotechnology, robotics and sensing as well as in the proliferation of WMD.6 The impli­ technology.10 All these sectors are useful to and can cations of dual use are of particular interest in the life have an impact on the life sciences. Data science, for sciences since ‘almost all biotechnology in service of example, permits better analysis of biological data human health can be subverted for misuse by hostile such as DNA sequences.11 Nanotechnology or additive individuals or nations’.7 Research in the life sciences manu facturing contribute to the development of radically new applications for research results, such as in drug discovery and delivery. The convergence of 3 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, cutting­edge biological research and emerging (bio­) Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature 17 June 1925, entered into force 8 Feb. 1928; technologies presents challenges for non­proliferation Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and measures and arms control.12 A unified classification Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on of dual­use items would require a thorough under­ their Destruction, opened for signature 10 Apr. 1972, entered into force 26 Mar. 1975; and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, standing of their potential misuse, undesirable military Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature 13 Jan. 1993, entered into force 29 Apr. 1997. 8 US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Proposed 4 The Australia Group was inaugurated in 1985. It is an informal Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: group of countries sharing information on export controls and aiming Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information to harmonize measures to prevent the proliferation of biological and (National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 2007). For a full-text chemical weapons of mass destruction. The group has 43 participants, definition of DURC, see National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of including the European Union, see <https://australiagroup.net/>. Science Policy, ‘Dual Use Research of Concern’, [n.d.]. 5 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional 9 US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established in 1996. Dual Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences: Current Issues and Currently, 42 member states participate in the export control regime, Controversies (National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 2017). see <https://www.wassenaar.org/>. 10 Hart, J. and Trapp, R., Science and Technology and their Impacts 6 The term ‘biological agents’ often refers to pathogens or toxins on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: A Synthesis Report on that can cause harm to human, animal or plant health or can degrade Preparing for the Seventh Review Conference and Future Challenges, equipment or damage the environment. Technical report (SIPRI: Stockholm, 2011). 7 US National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of 11 DNA or deoxyribonucleic acid is the molecule that carries the Terrorism (The Fink Report), (National Academies Press: Washington, genetic information in all cellular forms of life and some viruses. DC, 2004), p. vii. 12 Brockmann, Bauer and Boulanin (note 1). emerging dual-use technologies in the life sciences 3 applications or even hostile use by state and non­state new dual­use items and delist others. This legislation actors. At the same time, freedom of research is of is directly applicable in all EU member states and critical importance and essential for scientific progress, may be complemented by additional national export which means that export control measures have to be control provisions. The licencing of exports and the carefully balanced in order to avoid negative impacts dual­use classification
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