PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING

Beyond Islamists & Autocrats

THE ALGERIAN CONUNDRUM life is widespread but limited in its capacity to articulate reformist principles, however much individual Algerians Authoritarian State, Democratic Society aspire to a democratic future. For its part, the authori- n John P. Entelis tarian polity maintains its stranglehold on civil society through a military-industrial complex that monopolizes the key coercive, economic, and bureaucratic instru- Observers of the political upheaval sweeping the Arab ments of the state. No amount of externally derived world since 2011 have often asked why remains pressure for democratic reform, whether economic or ostensibly untouched by the so-called Arab Spring. The political, has been able to alter this stalemate in state- question betrays a truncated view of Algerian history, society relations. since the largest country in the arguably ex- This paper, the third in a series exploring prospects perienced the first, if short-lived, “spring” roughly twenty for political reform throughout the region, considers the years before the latest uprisings. Following legislative strengths and limitations of democratic-style reformers in elections in December 1991, the Algeria today. Following an overview of Algeria’s politi- (FIS) emerged in a dominant position, and the Algerian cal landscape, the paper examines the historical roots authorities, fearful of an Islamist takeover, canceled the and current contours of Algerian civil society, where election results and banned the movement. The armed prospects for democratic-style reform remain in force, faction of the FIS responded by launching an insurgency, however limited. The paper concludes with a cautionary and in the ensuing civil war nearly 200,000 Algerians note for U.S. policymakers eager to engage construc- lost their lives. Also lost in the “dark decade” was mo- tively with Algeria. mentum toward political democratization. Today, the prospects for democratic-style reformers in OVERSTATING THE ALGERIAN STATE Algeria are as complex and paradoxical as the coun- The Algerian state has long been considered institution- try’s convoluted history and opaque politics. While civil ally “strong,” if not legitimate, vis-à-vis society, main- society has long possessed a democratic spirit, if not a taining its hegemony by maximizing its economic ad- democratic political culture, rooted in its historic interac- vantages and coercive capabilities to ensure societal tion with French republican principles, this democratic compliance. Yet the maintenance of state control masks orientation is disaggregated and diffuse. Associational a more vulnerable dynamic in which society is forever

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A series that explores how non-Islamist Arab political actors might facilitate progress toward reform and democratic transition. Beyond Islamists & Autocrats

struggling to assert its political primacy in the face of a 1992, the military-security establishment—or le pouvoir, “fierce” state, one willing and able to enforce its author- as it is commonly described—has been the determina- ity through a combination of cooptation and coercion. tive and decisive actor. This became particularly pro- Thus, a putatively strong state, itself internally divided, nounced during the dark decade, 1992–2002, when sits atop a fragile yet highly contentious society forever the military was engaged in a brutal civil war against an on the verge of disrupting the political balancing act so Islamist insurgency that left nearly 200,000 dead and purposively constructed over these many decades. thousands more wounded. Successive national lead- Independent Algeria has long been riddled with con- ers— (January–June 1992), flict, contradiction, and discontinuity within all its relevant (1992–94), Liamine Zeroual (1994–99), and Abdelaziz sociopolitical and socioeconomic parts. Only during its Bouteflika (1999–present)—were all selected by le pou- nearly eight-year war of national liberation (1954–62) voir with the aim of securing state interests as defined by against French colonial occupation (1830–1962) did a narrow band of army elites and their allies in Algeria’s state and society possess a semblance of national coher- military-industrial complex. ence and ideological purpose. Yet even that protracted A triumvirate of state-level interests, as follows, serves struggle could not eliminate the bitter differences among as the coercive, financial, and bureaucratic instrument individuals, parties, and other social movements, as of state control:

each projected an ideologically different post-indepen- 1. the high army command and the security services, dence future. The victory of the National Liberation Front especially the dreaded Départment du Renseigne- 1 (FLN) and its assumption of single-party power provided ment et de la Sécurité (Intelligence and Security no guarantee of stability for state and society. Indeed, Department), or DRS; the war of independence provided the structural context 2. the national oil and gas behemoth, Sonatrach; and that allowed the military wing of the incipient Algerian government to assert its dominance over the country’s 3. the presidential office sitting atop the expansive political destiny. The primacy of the military over the po- patronage network provided by the ruling FLN litical became obvious virtually at independence. Three and its coalition partners. years into his presidency, was over- Yet that state control is itself riddled with internal cleav- thrown in a military coup d’état on June 19, 1965, by ages, factions, and fissures that find resolution through Col. Houari Boumediene, Ben Bella’s defense minister a cyclical process of cooptation and coercion, render- and former head of the revolutionary Algerian Liberation ing state hegemony vulnerable to unpredictable power Army. Whatever pretense of civilian rule at the hands of shifts among the key strategic actors. The current altera- a Marxist-Leninist-type single party was permanently set tion in the balance of power between the presidential aside once the military took over in 1965, a position it clan and its counterpart in the intelligence services is but has yet to relinquish whether operating overtly or behind the latest iteration of this cycle. the scenes. For its part, civil society sees itself manipulated, mar- Until recently, presidential incumbency and execu- ginalized, or otherwise exploited by this military-industri- tive authority have remained prerogatives of high army al complex. Despite the existence of ample hydrocarbon officers and their intelligence counterparts. In both the revenues, a manageable foreign debt, and a massive selection of as Boumediene’s succes- sovereign wealth fund estimated at over $150 billion, sor in 1979 and the forced removal of the former in Algeria has been described as a wealthy state with an

1. The Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) successfully overthrew French colonial rule and assumed power at independence. While its single-party status was overturned with the amended 1989 constitution that recognized a multiparty system, it remains today the dominant political party in parliament, with President serving as party head.

JOHN P. ENTELIS 2 THE ALGERIAN CONUNDRUM Beyond Islamists & Autocrats

impoverished society. One result is a permanent con- tendencies within Algerian political culture: political au- dition of social unrest throughout the country in which thoritarianism (the tendency toward centralized gover- key groups in society—labor unions, students, farmers, nance) and political democracy (the desire for choice industrial workers, opinionmakers, and community ac- and autonomy). tivists—are frequently engaged in wildcat strikes, street From Algeria’s early modern history, the process of demonstrations, violent clashes, and public protests. promoting harmony and political unanimity in its quest While much of this militancy is motivated by a desire to for freedom and autonomy has created a bifurcated po- acquire local public goods and services otherwise being litical culture that can inspire both political authoritarian- denied or ignored by state-level officials, the overall ef- ism and political democracy. The long period of colonial fect is to create at the national level an environment of domination and the need to maintain a sense of identity social turbulence and civil discontent that challenges the at all costs, compounded by the war of independence’s regime’s legitimacy and political efficacy. need to foster cooperation and solidarity in the face of a While wide and pronounced cleavages separate state more powerful enemy, engendered an enduring sense of and society, similar fault lines exist within each of the national identity and political purpose—so essential for broader groupings. At the state level, tensions and divi- the development of civil society and political legitimacy. sions have long characterized inter- and intra-elite be- In addition, it created a tendency to justify political con- havior. Today those tensions revolve around the question trol from above as necessary to combat “enemies” of the of presidential succession, the direction and control of state, whether external or internal in origin. the country’s hydrocarbon resources (including the issue The exposure to the Western world during the colonial of whether or not to explore for and develop shale oil), and post-colonial eras introduced more modern forms and the degree to which socioeconomic opportunities of social activism and political participation. Specifically, and political freedoms should be sacrificed in the name intensive and sustained periods of travel, study, work, of combating terrorism. At the level of the mass public, and personal interaction between Algerian and Euro- fault lines penetrate virtually all aspects of Algerian so- pean societies, along with the creation of an advanced ciety— vs. Arabs, Islamists vs. secularists, urban system of telecommunications and broadcasting, intro- vs. rural, north vs. south, east vs. west, Francophones vs duced Algerians to alternative forms of political expres- Arabophones, and so forth. These cleavages within the sion. These developments challenged the authoritarian state-society divide prevent the state from collapsing yet political order of the state while invigorating preexisting simultaneously create a society forever on the brink of populist and proto-democratic tendencies. revolutionary upheaval. Politicized Algerian civil society owes its origins to the pre-revolutionary period, when it absorbed much THE ROOTS OF ALGERIAN from the French notions of associational life and state- CIVIL SOCIETY society relations. Algerians in , and to a lesser Because of its distinctive and often traumatic expe- extent in colonial Algeria, were allowed to participate riences, Algeria holds a unique place in the political in French professional and trade unions and other mass history of the Arab-Islamic world. The Algerian experi- organizations. Yet this associational experience was not ence has affected several areas of civil society devel- allowed to flower in Algeria after independence, when opment, including the emergence of political pluralism civil society and mass organizations were subordinated and the establishment of proto-democratic institutions to the state-party apparatus and relegated to roles of and practices. No understanding of today’s Algeria can recruitment and propaganda. Under FLN control, po- be had without first appreciating that country’s complex litical activity was moderate and public demonstrations political evolution. This historical complexity informs the kept to a minimum. The persistence of highly centralized coexistence of two powerful yet diametrically opposed control of society was facilitated by a political trade-off

JOHN P. ENTELIS 3 THE ALGERIAN CONUNDRUM Beyond Islamists & Autocrats

whereby the population at large had bargained away ALGERIAN CIVIL SOCIETY TODAY legal political participation and autonomy in return for a guarantee of economic opportunity and standardized No organizations or professional groups have been as welfare provisions. active or as integral to the vitality of civil society and pro- This social contract began to unravel with the dra- motion of democracy as journalists, feminists, Berber- matic fall of oil prices in the late 1980s. The subsequent ists, and human rights activists. Even today, these groups deterioration of socioeconomic conditions ultimately led remain at the forefront of promoting democratic values to the October 1988 protest movement that resulted in and practices. Despite the fractured and fragmented civil the death of hundreds, possibly thousands, of Algerian sphere, the democratic imperative remains the central civilians at the hands of the military. The political cri- concern of these organizations, however much their rep- sis that followed radically altered the balance between resentation now takes the form of individual actions op- state and society, with the latter reasserting its political erating outside formal institutional channels. presence. With the approval of an amended constitu- Established at independence, groups like the Union tion in 1989 that eliminated one-party rule in favor of Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA), the Union a multiparty electoral system, civil society reemerged as Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA), and the “associations of a political character” were legalized Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme and allowed to organize, recruit, propagate, and dem- (Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights, LAD- onstrate. As a result, a large number of independent DH) have given voice to women, workers, and human interest groups evolved into political parties, reflecting rights activists through formal institutional channels orig- the pervasive associational aspect of Algerian political inally under FLN auspices. Today, these and similar as- culture despite efforts at depoliticization and heavy gov- sociations are distancing themselves from state control, ernment supervision. Literally thousands of independent though for the most part they remain supporters of gov- associations, professional groupings, and political par- ernment policies. The UGTA is especially militant when ties appeared in the next two years. It is no exaggera- it feels its workers are being threatened by neoliberal tion to describe this period as the point where Algeria’s policies and other efforts to privatize key strategic sectors democratic political culture found institutional expres- of the economy. The LADDH has never been formally sion in a democratic political system, one in which the legalized: it views itself as an independent human rights full range of ideological tendencies adhered to a con- organization critical of the government for its failure to tested and pluralistic political order, both in principle uphold international human rights standards. and in practice. Still, the state’s efforts to coopt long-established civic That Algeria was able to embark on a democratic associations such as the UNFA, UGTA, and LADDH process in a spontaneous and comprehensive way re- have hindered the ability of autonomous organizations flects the long and tortuous evolution of its nationhood, to develop broad-based populist support. One result is political identity, socialist consciousness, and interna- the individualization of democratic demands, in which tional stature. Without these preconditions, it is unlikely high-profile Algerian activists such as Abdennour Ali that pluralist politics would have developed so quickly or Yahia (human rights), Khalida Toumi (feminism), and as widely. As such, Algeria’s experiment in democracy Kamel Daoud (journalism) assume the voice of reform- went beyond anything undertaken in the region prior ism, if not democracy. The nonformal, highly individual- to the Arab Spring. The success of in such a ized way in which Algeria’s democratic sphere seeks to pluralist milieu speaks primarily to the underlying par- impact public discourse and policy was on display this ticipatory environment and only secondarily to the role past November, when nineteen distinguished intellectu- of religion in politics, the religious state, or the rise of als, political figures, former combatants in the war of Islamic fundamentalism. independence, human rights supporters, and feminist

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activists issued a public letter to President Bouteflika. Even more problematic is the broader social con- Written on the sixty-first anniversary of the start of Al- text within which democratic reformers operate. One geria’s war of national liberation, the letter demanded large-scale survey of Arab public opinion, including government accountability, political transparency, judi- Algerian opinion, found that “while few people reject cial integrity, and overall state responsiveness to public democracy generally, a large proportion opposes it in needs and demands.2 their country.”3 Throughout the region, citizens tend Despite the individualization of democratic expres- to prioritize safety, economic well-being, and cultural sion in the country, one should not automatically as- authenticity over initiatives aimed at implanting demo- sume that all “secularists” are “democrats,” either in cratic procedures like free and fair multiparty elections. belief or in practice. For example, among the nineteen But in Algeria especially, where elections in the early signatories to the Bouteflika letter are such high-profile 1990s resulted in widespread violence, attitudes about historic personalities, political figures, and public intel- democracy are strongly correlated with the perceived lectuals as Zohra Drif-Bitat, Louisa Hanoune, and Ra- effects of elections on the stability of the country, and chid Boudjedra, who are intensely secular if not vehe- even Algeria’s reformists demonstrate ambivalence to- mently anti-Islamist but barely qualify as “democratic” ward democracy. These attitudinal conditions speak to in any universal sense. Yet it is testimony to the fractured the challenges of building broad support for democracy character of Algerian civil society that even such prob- against a backdrop of economic strife, corruption, and lematic figures are given the democratic label. general instability.4

THE LIMITS OF REFORM Institutional obstacles Broadly speaking, reform prospects in Algeria face While an elite-level struggle takes place among aged two principal hurdles, the first attitudinal and the sec- power brokers in the army (Gaid Salah, b. 1940), in- ond institutional. telligence services (Mohamed “Toufik” Mediene, b. 1939), and presidency (Bouteflika, b. 1937), the mass Attitudinal obstacles public seethes with discontent as the chasm separat- Whatever else Algerian “democrats” may aspire to, rela- ing state and society deepens and widens. The uncer- tively few would identify with the full meaning of liberal tainty of presidential succession is playing out against a democracy, one that not only includes the usual proce- backdrop of chronic social unrest, civil turmoil, terrorist dural practices of contestation and participation but also threats, decaying social services, pervasive corruption, provides legal guarantees of freedom of expression, as- ethnic violence, and reduced oil and gas revenues. Au- sociation, press, and belief as well as legal protection tonomous institutional life is frozen. Opposition parties for minorities. Moreover, while a number of individuals are powerless, the legislature impotent, the judiciary may hold progressive if not liberal democratic ideals, feeble, and the bureaucracy incompetent and corrupt. collective bodies like the UGTA share the regime’s so- The electorate is deeply alienated and dismissive of the cialist and state-centered orientation, one whose com- formal political process, believing that the real deci- mitment to pluralistic politics is tepid at best. sionmaking takes place behind closed doors.

2. The letter appeared in the Algerian daily El Watan on November 7, 2015. 3. Lindsay J. Benstead, “Why Do Some Arab Citizens See Democracy as Unsuitable for Their Country?” Democratization, September 3, 2014, p. 8. Synopsis available at http://bakerinstitute.org/research/why-do-some-arab-citizens-see-democracy- unsuitable-their-country/. 4. Ibid., pp. 5, 20.

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Deep-seated inter- and intra-elite struggles that date an ongoing Islamist insurgency, declining hydrocarbon back decades have never been resolved through trans- revenues, violence between Arabs and Berbers in the parent or accountable public institutions. As a result, Al- Mzab region, and recurring socioeconomic grievances gerian decisionmaking in the twenty-first century is little expressed through often violent mass protests across a different than it was in the twentieth: a cabal of shadowy wide swath of localities and regions. figures within the state’s military-industrial complex, op- Key questions remain. Given the current political, se- erating at times cooperatively and at other times conflic- curity, and socioeconomic crises facing the country, does tually, serves as the final arbiter of national policymak- the regime still have the capacity to co-opt opposition ing and selections to high office. While the process is and buy social peace in the manner and style once con- purposely opaque, the decisionmaking instruments are sidered “routine” for regime elites? Additionally, is the not; they range from political assassinations (Boudiaf, Ali pressure for fundamental institutional reform from high- Tounsi) to corruption charges (Chakib Khelil), arrests and profile individuals and civil society movements sufficiently imprisonments (Abdelkader Ait-Ouarab, aka General comprehensive and sustained to transition Algeria from Hassan; Hocine Benhadid), forced retirements (Amara its current “competitive authoritarian” mode of gover- Benyounès, Abdelkader “Fawzi” Lounis), dismissals for nance to a genuine democracy? Finally, does the demili- insubordination (Ali Bendaoud), ambassadorial reas- tarization of the Algerian polity serve as a fundamental signments, and “car accidents.” precondition for the advent of law-bound government, The Bouteflika counteroffensive has aimed directly at or is civilian rule as devoid of democratic propensities the security and intelligence services formerly led by Me- as its military counterpart? A glance at one measure of diene, the world’s longest incumbent head of a country’s law-bound government, Bouteflika’s one-sided electoral intelligence services until his forced retirement in Septem- victories—73.79% in 1999, 85% in 2004, 90.24% in ber 2015. Without explanation or justification, the heads 2009, 81.53% in 2014—suggests “competitive authori- of the internal security department within the DRS, the tarianism” in Algeria remains alive and well. Such “victo- presidential guard, and the republican guard were all ries” also reaffirm the skepticism found in the attitudinal summarily dismissed. More significant was the dissolution surveys cited above regarding the general distrust shared of the Groupe d’Intervention Spéciale, the special forces by masses and elites toward elections as an instrument counterterrorism unit within the DRS charged with combat- of democratic legitimacy. ing Islamist militancy. Spreading special forces functions The general conclusion regarding the status of demo- across different army, navy, and national guard units is cratic reformers in Algeria is that while democratic ideals clearly intended to undermine the independent coercive and liberal attitudes pervade civil society, however am- capacity of the DRS. A case could be made that with the biguous their articulation, they remain highly disaggre- disastrous failure of the GIS to prevent the terrorist attack gated, particularly among public intellectuals and other at the In Amenas gas facilities in 2013, sufficient reason opinionmakers. These ideological cleavages reflect the existed to disband the DRS unit. Still, the timing two years broader fault lines that have characterized state-society later raises suspicion that political calculations were as im- relations in Algeria since the war of independence. In the portant as security considerations in explaining the presi- absence of a broad consensus on the interpretation of dential actions. The culmination of this sustained execu- “democracy” and “liberalism,” it will be very difficult to tive offensive, Toufik’s removal, was accomplished in the construct a meaningful platform for democratic reform opaque and conspiratorial style so long associated with that can attract both the mass public and autonomous decisionmaking at the highest level of Algerian politics. associations. For its part, the Algerian state remains im- The behind-the-scenes struggle for political domi- penetrable to societal demands for democratic reform. nance atop of the military-industrial pyramid comes at Any reform must be conceived, constructed, and com- a particularly difficult time for the country as it confronts manded by the regime itself.

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U.S. POLICY CHOICES of power. Algerian democratic reformers, whether indi- vidually or collectively, have had little influence on alter- Beyond the hydrocarbon trade and counterterrorism ef- ing this state-society dynamic, and many view the U.S. forts, the United States shares little with Algeria. Given role in critical if not hostile terms. Indeed, many Alge- the anti-market culture that dictates Algeria’s domes- rian “liberals” denounce America’s democratic preten- tic economic policy, American business presence in the sions, arguing that Washington’s democracy-promotion country is minimal. Corruption and extensive bureau- agenda is little more than a cover for more hegemonic cratic hurdles also limit U.S. private-sector involvement ambitions in the region. in the economy. Given these structural limitations, U.S. policy should Since 9/11, U.S.-Algeria relations have centered on avoid public promotion of democratization, human global counterterrorism; arms transfers, intelligence rights, and political pluralism, since Algerians believe sharing, and coordinated military exercises are now reg- they are already “democratic,” “promote human rights,” ular features of this exchange. However, while these se- and “advance political pluralism,” however compro- curity arrangements may have prevented a bad security mised or incomplete each of these areas may be in prac- environment from becoming worse, they may also have tice. As noted earlier, Algerians are extremely protective diminished any hesitation by Algeria’s leaders about lim- of their national sovereignty and distrustful of those who iting political freedom in order to maintain a monopoly seek to interfere in their domestic affairs.

John P. Entelis is professor of political science and associate director of the Middle East Studies pro- gram at Fordham University. The recipient of several Fulbright awards, Professor Entelis is the au- thor or coauthor of numerous scholarly publications on the comparative and international politics of the Middle East and North Africa, including Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized; State and Society in Algeria; and Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa. In addition, he has written numerous book chapters, articles, and book reviews for leading scholarly journals, and his analysis has appeared in the New York Times and Le Monde Diplomatique, among other publications. The former editor-in-chief of the Journal of North African Studies, Dr. Entelis cur- rently serves on its international advisory board. He is past president of the American Institute for Maghrib Studies, the premier scholarly professional association engaged in North African studies.

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