PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING Beyond Islamists & Autocrats THE ALGERIAN CONUNDRUM life is widespread but limited in its capacity to articulate reformist principles, however much individual Algerians Authoritarian State, Democratic Society aspire to a democratic future. For its part, the authori- n John P. Entelis tarian polity maintains its stranglehold on civil society through a military-industrial complex that monopolizes the key coercive, economic, and bureaucratic instru- Observers of the political upheaval sweeping the Arab ments of the state. No amount of externally derived world since 2011 have often asked why Algeria remains pressure for democratic reform, whether economic or ostensibly untouched by the so-called Arab Spring. The political, has been able to alter this stalemate in state- question betrays a truncated view of Algerian history, society relations. since the largest country in the Arab world arguably ex- This paper, the third in a series exploring prospects perienced the first, if short-lived, “spring” roughly twenty for political reform throughout the region, considers the years before the latest uprisings. Following legislative strengths and limitations of democratic-style reformers in elections in December 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front Algeria today. Following an overview of Algeria’s politi- (FIS) emerged in a dominant position, and the Algerian cal landscape, the paper examines the historical roots authorities, fearful of an Islamist takeover, canceled the and current contours of Algerian civil society, where election results and banned the movement. The armed prospects for democratic-style reform remain in force, faction of the FIS responded by launching an insurgency, however limited. The paper concludes with a cautionary and in the ensuing civil war nearly 200,000 Algerians note for U.S. policymakers eager to engage construc- lost their lives. Also lost in the “dark decade” was mo- tively with Algeria. mentum toward political democratization. Today, the prospects for democratic-style reformers in OVERSTATING THE ALGERIAN STATE Algeria are as complex and paradoxical as the coun- The Algerian state has long been considered institution- try’s convoluted history and opaque politics. While civil ally “strong,” if not legitimate, vis-à-vis society, main- society has long possessed a democratic spirit, if not a taining its hegemony by maximizing its economic ad- democratic political culture, rooted in its historic interac- vantages and coercive capabilities to ensure societal tion with French republican principles, this democratic compliance. Yet the maintenance of state control masks orientation is disaggregated and diffuse. Associational a more vulnerable dynamic in which society is forever ©2016 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A series that explores how non-Islamist Arab political actors might facilitate progress toward reform and democratic transition. Beyond Islamists & Autocrats struggling to assert its political primacy in the face of a 1992, the military-security establishment—or le pouvoir, “fierce” state, one willing and able to enforce its author- as it is commonly described—has been the determina- ity through a combination of cooptation and coercion. tive and decisive actor. This became particularly pro- Thus, a putatively strong state, itself internally divided, nounced during the dark decade, 1992–2002, when sits atop a fragile yet highly contentious society forever the military was engaged in a brutal civil war against an on the verge of disrupting the political balancing act so Islamist insurgency that left nearly 200,000 dead and purposively constructed over these many decades. thousands more wounded. Successive national lead- Independent Algeria has long been riddled with con- ers—Mohamed Boudiaf (January–June 1992), Ali Kafi flict, contradiction, and discontinuity within all its relevant (1992–94), Liamine Zeroual (1994–99), and Abdelaziz sociopolitical and socioeconomic parts. Only during its Bouteflika (1999–present)—were all selected by le pou- nearly eight-year war of national liberation (1954–62) voir with the aim of securing state interests as defined by against French colonial occupation (1830–1962) did a narrow band of army elites and their allies in Algeria’s state and society possess a semblance of national coher- military-industrial complex. ence and ideological purpose. Yet even that protracted A triumvirate of state-level interests, as follows, serves struggle could not eliminate the bitter differences among as the coercive, financial, and bureaucratic instrument individuals, parties, and other social movements, as of state control: each projected an ideologically different post-indepen- 1. the high army command and the security services, dence future. The victory of the National Liberation Front especially the dreaded Départment du Renseigne- 1 (FLN) and its assumption of single-party power provided ment et de la Sécurité (Intelligence and Security no guarantee of stability for state and society. Indeed, Department), or DRS; the war of independence provided the structural context 2. the national oil and gas behemoth, Sonatrach; and that allowed the military wing of the incipient Algerian government to assert its dominance over the country’s 3. the presidential office sitting atop the expansive political destiny. The primacy of the military over the po- patronage network provided by the ruling FLN litical became obvious virtually at independence. Three and its coalition partners. years into his presidency, Ahmed Ben Bella was over- Yet that state control is itself riddled with internal cleav- thrown in a military coup d’état on June 19, 1965, by ages, factions, and fissures that find resolution through Col. Houari Boumediene, Ben Bella’s defense minister a cyclical process of cooptation and coercion, render- and former head of the revolutionary Algerian Liberation ing state hegemony vulnerable to unpredictable power Army. Whatever pretense of civilian rule at the hands of shifts among the key strategic actors. The current altera- a Marxist-Leninist-type single party was permanently set tion in the balance of power between the presidential aside once the military took over in 1965, a position it clan and its counterpart in the intelligence services is but has yet to relinquish whether operating overtly or behind the latest iteration of this cycle. the scenes. For its part, civil society sees itself manipulated, mar- Until recently, presidential incumbency and execu- ginalized, or otherwise exploited by this military-industri- tive authority have remained prerogatives of high army al complex. Despite the existence of ample hydrocarbon officers and their intelligence counterparts. In both the revenues, a manageable foreign debt, and a massive selection of Chadli Bendjedid as Boumediene’s succes- sovereign wealth fund estimated at over $150 billion, sor in 1979 and the forced removal of the former in Algeria has been described as a wealthy state with an 1. The Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) successfully overthrew French colonial rule and assumed power at independence. While its single-party status was overturned with the amended 1989 constitution that recognized a multiparty system, it remains today the dominant political party in parliament, with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika serving as party head. JOHN P. ENTELIS 2 THE ALGERIAN CONUNDRUM Beyond Islamists & Autocrats impoverished society. One result is a permanent con- tendencies within Algerian political culture: political au- dition of social unrest throughout the country in which thoritarianism (the tendency toward centralized gover- key groups in society—labor unions, students, farmers, nance) and political democracy (the desire for choice industrial workers, opinionmakers, and community ac- and autonomy). tivists—are frequently engaged in wildcat strikes, street From Algeria’s early modern history, the process of demonstrations, violent clashes, and public protests. promoting harmony and political unanimity in its quest While much of this militancy is motivated by a desire to for freedom and autonomy has created a bifurcated po- acquire local public goods and services otherwise being litical culture that can inspire both political authoritarian- denied or ignored by state-level officials, the overall ef- ism and political democracy. The long period of colonial fect is to create at the national level an environment of domination and the need to maintain a sense of identity social turbulence and civil discontent that challenges the at all costs, compounded by the war of independence’s regime’s legitimacy and political efficacy. need to foster cooperation and solidarity in the face of a While wide and pronounced cleavages separate state more powerful enemy, engendered an enduring sense of and society, similar fault lines exist within each of the national identity and political purpose—so essential for broader groupings. At the state level, tensions and divi- the development of civil society and political legitimacy. sions have long characterized inter- and intra-elite be- In addition, it created a tendency to justify political con- havior. Today those tensions revolve around the question trol from above as necessary to combat “enemies” of the of presidential succession, the direction and control of state, whether external or internal in origin. the country’s hydrocarbon resources (including the issue The exposure to the Western world during the colonial