Scientia Media: the Protestant Reception of a Jesuit Idea

chapter 8 Scientia Media: the Protestant Reception of a Jesuit Idea

Keith D. Stanglin

In the early stages of the controversy between the Dominicans and the Jesuits on the nature of divine grace, the Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535–1600) published his Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione, et reprobatione (hereafter, Concordia) in 1588. Molina’s handling of the harmony between, on the one hand, human freedom and, on the other hand, divine grace, foreknowledge, and predestination, included his positing of the theory of scientia media, or middle knowledge. Briefly, the theory of middle knowledge, as it was commonly received, presup- poses eternal moments and their logical (not chronological) order in the divine knowledge, all of which take place before—or, better, apart from—creation. First, God’s necessary knowledge, or knowledge of simple intelligence, is that by which he knows all possibilities in all possible worlds. He knows possible future contingents, that is, all that could be. Second, God’s free knowledge, or knowledge of vision, is that by which he knows all actualities in the world that he freely chooses to actualize. He knows absolute or actual future contingents, that is, all that will be. There was broad consensus among Molina’s scholas- tic predecessors regarding this two-fold distinction in the divine knowledge.1 Going further, however, and building on similar ideas put forth prior to him, Molina posits a divine knowledge that comes logically or conceptually between these two moments, and is thus “middle.” By middle knowledge, God infallibly knows what free creatures would freely choose if placed in any given set of circumstances, even if those circumstances never actually obtain. He knows conditional, subjunctive, or hypothetical future contingents, that is, all that would be.2 Molina’s aim was to preserve both human freedom (against the

1 ST i q.14 a.9 uses the terms “knowledge of simple intelligence” and “knowledge of vision.” 2 For an analysis of Molina’s views, see William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowl- edge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: 1988), 169–206; Alfred J. Freddo- so, “Introduction,” in Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: 1988), 1–81; and Kirk R. MacGregor, Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge (Grand Rapids: 2015). The debate among philos- ophers and theologians over the legitimacy and coherence of middle knowledge continues,

Dominican notion of physical premotion and predetermination) and a robust account of divine providence. Far from convincing the opposition, Molina’s book was censured by lead- ing Dominicans, who thought its ideas left too much autonomous freedom—a Pelagian sort of freedom—to human creatures standing outside of God’s will. Nevertheless, popular with friends and foes alike, it was published in a second, revised edition in 1595.3 As the de auxiliis debate spread from the Iberian Peninsula as far east as Rome and as far north as Leuven, a little further north and northeast from Leuven the debates were being followed in the Protestant churches and in their emerging universities, in whose ranks tensions were heating up over the same theological questions. Roman Catholic philosophy remained influ- ential among Protestant theologians, whether or not they acknowledged its influence. More specifically, the Roman Catholic debate about divine grace and human freedom between the Dominicans and Jesuits was mirrored by the Protestant debate between the Reformed and Arminian camps, respectively. In the Protestant manifestation of the debate, two figures, Jacob Armini- us (1559–1609) and Conrad Vorstius (1569–1622), quickly and independently picked up the concept of middle knowledge (scientia media) and sought to in- tegrate it into their theology. It is difficult to say who came upon and endorsed the concept first. The remaining task of this essay is to examine the use of middle knowledge by both Arminius and Vorstius and to assess the legacy that they left to the Remonstrants regarding this question.

and the literature on the topic is vast. For example, see Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Ne- cessity (Oxford: 1974); Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: 1974); Robert M. Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 109–117; Robert M. Adams, “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 343–53; William Lane Craig, “Middle Knowledge: A Calvinist-Arminian Rapproche- ment?” in The Grace of God, the Will of Man, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: 1989), 141–64; William Lane Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objec- tion,’ ” Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 337–52; Eef Dekker, Middle Knowledge (Leuven: 2000); William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: 1989); Thomas P. Flint, Divine Provi- dence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: 1998). 3 Luis de Molina, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione, et reprobatione, ad nonnullos primae partis d. Thomae articulos (Lisbon: An- tonius Riberius, 1588); 2nd ed. (Antwerp: Joachim Trognaesius, 1595). English translations of Part IV (1595 ed.) are taken from Freddoso’s translation, hereafter On Divine Foreknowledge.