Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 25.1 (2017) 53–68 ISSN 1522-7340 (print) ISSN 2052-8388 (online) https://doi.org/10.1558/eph.32240 The (Overwhelming) Improbability of Classical (and Christian) Theism Raphael Lataster1 University of Sydney [email protected] Abstract In the analytic Philosophy of Religion, much ink has been spilt on the existence of some sort of supernatural reality. Such work is usually done by theists; those that find classical theism to be probably true. It is my contention that theism (and especially Christian theism) is unjustly privileged by many in the field (including non-theists), even when su- pernaturalism has been—competently or incompetently—argued for. As such, I present a series of challenges for the theist, finding them to be insuperable at present. The first such challenge concerns the challenge of polytheism. Polytheism is often very casually overlooked on the basis that monotheism is “simpler.” Recognising that such simplicity is not neces- sarily truth-conducive, I argue that polytheism, as a catch-all hypothesis, ought to be preferred. The second challenge proceeds from an assumption not only of supernaturalism, but also of monotheism. There are infinite- ly many monotheistic alternatives to theism, which can be conceived by simply tweaking the typical attributes of God. Again, simplicity is typi- cally appealed to, and again found to be unhelpful. Furthermore, there are the deistic alternatives to consider also, many of which are seemingly more probable than theism. Finally, I consider the pantheistic god mod- els, deciding that pantheisms are generally more robust and make fewer ad hoc assumptions about the world. As an aside, I concisely discuss the difficulties in moving from theism to Christian theism, which includes an argument against miracles, and a brief explanation of the increasing trend of questioning Jesus’ historical existence. Keywords Analytic Philosophy of Religion, classical theism, God’s non-existence, atheism, non-theism, polytheism, alternative monotheisms, deism, pantheism, Jesus’ non-existence 1. This article is based on my doctoral dissertation, and on a paper that was recently pre- sented at the University of Oxford. © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2017, Office 415, The Workstation, 15 Paternoster Row, Sheffield, S1 2BX 54 The (Overwhelming) Improbability of Classical (and Christian) Theism Introduction Many analytic Philosophers of Religion have analysed and scrutinised the common arguments for the existence of at least one god, and found them wanting (Sobel 2004; Oppy 2006; Philipse 2012). I have come to the same conclusion in my doctoral dissertation. There are also good arguments for nat- uralism, which necessitates that we weigh up the evidences for and against, in a thorough and transparent (epistemic) probabilistic analysis.2 While personally attempting such an analysis, it became clear to me that classical theism (to say nothing of Christian theism) is not the only alternative to naturalism. I con- tend that many of these alternatives are so obviously problematic to the case for theism, that any reasonable probabilistic case here would firstly reveal that theism has not been properly argued for as probable, and secondly (more con- tentiously) that theism is outright implausible. In order, we shall briefly con- sider the many challenges to theism’s probability: the inadequacy of the case for theism; the powerful arguments for naturalism; the problem of polytheism; the problem of alternative monotheisms; and the problem of pantheism. Theism Theism, or classical theism, is not simply the belief in some god or gods. It is the belief in God. To theistic philosophers of religion, such as Richard Swinburne and William Lane Craig, God is a specific, person. Richard Swin- burne, a prominent Christian philosopher, treats “God” as a proper name of the person referred to by the following description: a person without a body (i.e., a spirit) who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omnisci- ent, perfectly good, and the creator of all things. This description expresses the traditional concept of God in Western philosophy and theology. Since moral goodness is a great-making property, the greatest conceivable being must be morally perfect, as well as have the other superlative properties listed by Swinburne (Craig 2011). To this clearly monotheistic interpretation (Craig 2008, 155, 300), we can add that God is also revelatory (Craig 2008, 249, 258), transcendent (Craig 2008, 50, 108, 111, 152, 264), immutable (Craig 2008, 152‒154, 254), and his intentions are inscrutable.3 Such theistic philosophers present arguments for the existence of God, which non-theistic—and even some theistic—phi- losophers find unconvincing, for a plethora of reasons. Arguments from con- tingency, for example, tend to simply assume that the world is contingent 2. In probabilistic reasoning, we refer to the inherent plausibility of the theory as the “prior probability,” the likelihood of the evidence on the theory as the “likelihood” (or the “consequent probability”), and the overall result as the “posterior probability” (or simply, the “probability”); see Lataster 2013. 3. Craig links this to God’s being “free” (See Craig 2008, 275‒276; Craig 2010, 158‒161). © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2017 Raphael Lataster 55 and that there exists a necessary god. They also imply that the existence of the world is a surprising fact; one that cries out for an explanation. However, forward thinking philosophers wonder, “Why is there nothing rather than something?” (Bilimoria 2012, 509). Cosmological arguments also assume much about the world that many critics would not yet accept. Philosophical reasons for supposing that the universe began to exist tend to rely on tensed views of time, while philosophers of time (and even philosophers of religion) often favour tenseless models (PhilPapers “All Respondents”). Theists’ scien- tific reasons generally rely on misunderstandings about what the evidence reveals. For example, the Big Bang Theory does not prove that all things came into existence, from nothing, around 14 billion years ago. Rather, it says that around 14 billion years ago, the localised universe as we know it underwent a period of expansion.4 Fine-tuning arguments for theism too quickly dismiss naturalistic possibil- ities involving chance and necessity, while claiming intelligent design, despite a lack of direct evidence (for either possibility). Some philosophers have even argued that natural fine-tuning does more to argue against God’s existence (Sober 2005). Moral arguments simply assume—by ironically appealing to our subjective notions—that objective morals exist, and, more importantly, further assume that they exist because of God. Ontological arguments are logically flawed, and also make assumptions about what a maximal being is, whilst arguments based on personal religious experiences face the problems of credulity and metaphysical excess. Please note that this is not intended as a thorough refutation of such argu- ments, which, as we shall see, is not necessary in arguing for theism’s over- whelming improbability. Also note that recent work has demonstrated that theists likely overestimate the persuasiveness of these arguments (De Cruz 2014; Tobia 2016), and that the influential and respected William Lane Craig effectively admits that his faith trumps reason and evidence (Craig 2008, 47‒48). In any case, let us now turn to the arguments against God’s existence. Naturalism None of the arguments for God’s existence are compelling, largely because the evidence appealed to is at least equally expected on naturalism/s. Further- more, just about all of the arguments can be altered, with related evidence, to form good arguments against theism.5 To make the point about natu- 4. It is also entirely plausible that the universe is eternal, as agreed by several physicists, particularly those who—recognising that the classical laws of physics that predict the singularity actually break down the closer we get to it—doubt the existence of the singu- larity and the big bang as we know it (see Ali and Das 2015). 5. See the comments about the fine-tuning argument above. I argue for this more thor- © Equinox Publishing Ltd. 2017 56 The (Overwhelming) Improbability of Classical (and Christian) Theism ralism’s probabilistic superiority, however, we shall consider only two good arguments against God’s existence. The first: If God exists, gratuitous evils do not. Gratuitous evils exist. Therefore, God does not exist. That an all-good God would allow so much gratuitous evil or suffering has long troubled theists and non-theists alike (Rowe 1979, 337). God has the knowledge that this gratuitous suffering occurs, the will to ameliorate it, and the power to do so as well. It is thus fairly inexplicable why the gratuitous suf- fering continues when God exists, so that this suffering is good evidence that God does not exist. Theodicies can overcome the logical problem of evil, but, being entirely speculative, do not overcome the evidential or probabilistic argument from evil. Appealing to God’s inscrutability is also counter-pro- ductive, as it ends a probabilistic case, and allows anybody to proclaim her or his hypothesis as preferable.6 While this argument certainly does not prove that God does not exist, it provides a probabilistic point against. It is simply that such evidence is more expected on the view that God does not exist. The second: If God exists, God would make God’s existence obvious