A Neo-Hintikkan Theory of Attitude Ascriptions
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Ambassador does not realize that Sir Percy is the KRITERION Scarlet Pimpernel. And this response is essen- Nr. 19 (2005), pp. 1-11 tially right. But, of course, this is not the end of the story. After all, we need an account of the A Neo-Hintikkan Theory of meanings or contents of attitude ascriptions which explains why the two ascriptions to the French Attitude Ascriptions Ambassador differ in truth value.1 Peter Alward What is odd is that, despite the obvious expla- University of Lethbridge, nation of failure of substitutivity phenomena, the Alberta (Canada) standard approach to the, strictly speaking, se- mantic issue is to take the problem to be one of They seek him here, they seek him there, fineness of grain: the (conventional) referent of Those “Frenchies” seek him everywhere. a name is just too coarse-grained to serve as its Is he in Heaven? Is he is Hell? meaning or content when it occurs in a belief con- That damned, elusive Pimpernel. text. Instead, the meaning should be taken to be something more fine-grained, such as a Fregean —Sir Percy Blakeney sense, or a structured intension, or even a repre- sentation (see, e.g., [2, 3, 14, 13]). The trouble Abstract with this strategy is that no matter what type In the paper, I develop what I call the of entity is chosen to serve as the meaning of “Neo-Hintikkan theory” of belief sentences. names, when they occur in attitude ascriptions, What is characteristic of this approach is it is always possible to find examples of substitu- that the meaning of an ascription is analyzed tivity failure of names which have the same “fine- in terms of the believer’s “epistemic alter- grained” meaning.2 natives”: the set of worlds compatible with how the believer takes the world to be. The There is, however, another approach to the se- Neo-Hintikkan approach proceeds by assum- mantic issue which is more congruent with the ing that (1) individuals in believers’ alter- natural explanation of the phenomenon mentioned natives can share spatio-temporal parts with above. What I have in mind is the “Believed- actual individuals, and (2) ascribers can re- World” approach developed and defended by Hin- fer to individuals in believer’s alternatives tikka.3 What is characteristic of this approach in virtue of their perceptual or causal inter- is that the meaning of an ascription is analyzed action with the spatio-temporal parts these “believed individuals” share with actual in- in terms of the believer’s “alternatives”: a set of dividuals. The guiding idea underlying this worlds which are compatible with how the believer view is that the source of substitutivity fail- takes the world to be. What I hope to do in this ure in certain central cases is that believers paper is develop this idea in a certain direction. have put the spatio-temporal parts of the ob- In particular, my goal is to present a semantic jects they have encountered together in the theory which captures the idea that substitutiv- wrong way. ity phenomena stem from the fact that believers There is a sense in which failure of substitu- have put the temporal parts of things they have tivity phenomena are unsurprising. Consider the encountered together in the wrong way. following fictional example: ‘The French Ambas- 1Or, perhaps, a theory which explains away the intu- sador believes that Sir Percy Blakeney is a fop- ition that such pairs of ascriptions do so differ. For present pish dandy’ is true while ‘The French Ambas- purposes, I am simply going to assume that our intuitions sador believes that the Scarlet Pimpernel is a here are correct. That is, I am simply going to ignore that foppish dandy’ is false, despite the fact that ‘Sir Direct Reference theory of attitude ascriptions defended by Percy Blakeney’ and ‘the Scarlet Pimpernel’ core- such folk as Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames. 2For a worked out version of this argument, see my [1]. fer. A natural response would be to point out that 3See, e.g., [6]. [8, 15], have also defended versions of this this phenomenon arises simply because the French theory. KRITERION, Nr. 19 (2005), pp. 1-11 §1) According to Hintikka, associated with a be- Eliot’5 falls within the extension in w of ‘x wrote liever are a set of possible worlds compatible with eight novels’. what s/he believes. Hintikka calls these the “al- Failures of substitutivity of coreferential refer- ternatives” to the actual world for the believer in ring expressions are explained on Hintikka’s view question. Each of these worlds is what is described as follows. Suppose ‘Fred believes that George by a “complete novel”, a maximally consistent set Eliot wrote eight novels’ is true and ‘Fred believes of sentences of a language ([5, p. 143], and [7, that Mary Ann Evans wrote eight novels’ is false, p. 127]). Hintikka’s view, in a nutshell, is that despite the fact that ‘George Eliot’ and ‘Mary Ann an ascription is true just in case the complement Evans’ corefer. This is because, although the func- sentence is true in all of the believer’s alternatives. tions which serve as the meanings of these two We can, however, be a little more precise than this. names in ascriptions to Fred have the same value Let ‘Aa,t’ abbreviate ‘the alternatives of believer in the actual world, they differ in value in at least a at time t’ and ‘Bela,p,t’ abbreviate ‘a believes at one of Fred’s alternatives. And, in at least one time t that p’. This allows the account of belief of these “non-coreferential worlds”, the referent of ascriptions to be represented as follows: ‘Mary Ann Evans’ does not fall within the exten- sion in that world of ‘x wrote eight novels’. I endorse the basic Hintikkan framework.6 ‘Bela,p,t’ is true iff There is a difficulty with Hintikka’s theory, how- ‘p’ is true in every member of Aa,t. ever. And this concerns his account of exactly which function serves as the meaning of a singu- Consider, for example, the ascription ‘Fred be- lar referring expression in an ascription comple- lieves that George Eliot wrote eight novels’. This ment on any given occasion of use. According to ascription is true, on Hintikka’s view, just in Hintikka, the meaning of a name in a belief con- case the complement sentence ‘George Eliot wrote text function corresponds to one of the believer’s eight novels’ is true in all of Fred’s alternatives. “methods of recognizing individuals” [6, p.160].7 The meanings or contents of expressions occur- This is reminiscent of the sort of descriptivism ring in ascription complements are, on this view, that has fallen into disfavour since the publica- functions from worlds to appropriate extensions tion of Naming and Necessity [9] and one might, at those worlds. So, for example, the meaning of therefore, worry that Hintikka’s view runs afoul of a name is a function from worlds to individuals, similar difficulties. After all, it is far from obvi- and the meaning of a n-place predicate is a func- ous that a believer’s methods of recognition would tion from worlds to sets of n-tuples. These func- pick out a unique individual in all her/his alterna- tions yield an interpretation of the complement of tives.8 Another worry, however, concerns how the an ascription relative to any given member, w, of 5 the believer’s set of alternatives. That is, relative Or, more precisely, the value of the function which serves as the meaning of ‘George Eliot’ in ascriptions to to w, there will have to be an assignment of in- Fred for argument w. dividuals in w to any referring expressions in the 6It is worth noting that I do not endorse Hintikka’s ac- complement sentence and an assignment of a set of count of quantifying in, which invokes the notion of “indi- viduating functions”. n-tuples of individuals in w to each n-place predi- 7 4 Strictly speaking, only “individuating functions”— cate in the complement. Given an interpretation, those function which pick out the same individual in all truth-in-w can be defined in terms of satisfaction of a believer’s alternatives—correspond to methods of rec- in the usual way. For example, ‘George Eliot wrote ognizing individuals, according to Hintikka. Presumably, eight novels’ is true in one of Fred’s alternatives, non-individuating functions correspond to those methods believers use to pick out individuals, but which do not suf- w, just in case in w the referent in w of ‘George fice for recognizing them. 8One might also worry that since we identify people by 4An account of such interpretations will, of course, have appeal to their contingent properties, Kripke’s modal argu- to be made more complicated in order to accommodate ments also come into play here. In [1], I argue that there ascription complements which express modal propositions are difficulties in the application of these sorts of arguments and the like. to belief contexts. 2 Alward, P.: A Neo-Hintikkan Theory of Attitude Ascriptions ascriber, by means of his/her use of a name, man- For simplicity, I will treat these entities as ordered ages to pick out one of the believer’s methods of sequences of n-adic relations and individuals. So, recognition and which method of recognition s/he for example, the proposition that Joe is short can manages to pick out. And Hintikka offers us no be taken to be the ordered sequence <being short; answer here.