A Bunched Logic for Conditional Independence
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Stone-Type Dualities for Separation Logics
Logical Methods in Computer Science Volume 15, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 27:1–27:51 Submitted Oct. 10, 2017 https://lmcs.episciences.org/ Published Mar. 14, 2019 STONE-TYPE DUALITIES FOR SEPARATION LOGICS SIMON DOCHERTY a AND DAVID PYM a;b a University College London, London, UK e-mail address: [email protected] b The Alan Turing Institute, London, UK e-mail address: [email protected] Abstract. Stone-type duality theorems, which relate algebraic and relational/topological models, are important tools in logic because | in addition to elegant abstraction | they strengthen soundness and completeness to a categorical equivalence, yielding a framework through which both algebraic and topological methods can be brought to bear on a logic. We give a systematic treatment of Stone-type duality for the structures that interpret bunched logics, starting with the weakest systems, recovering the familiar BI and Boolean BI (BBI), and extending to both classical and intuitionistic Separation Logic. We demonstrate the uniformity and modularity of this analysis by additionally capturing the bunched logics obtained by extending BI and BBI with modalities and multiplicative connectives corresponding to disjunction, negation and falsum. This includes the logic of separating modalities (LSM), De Morgan BI (DMBI), Classical BI (CBI), and the sub-classical family of logics extending Bi-intuitionistic (B)BI (Bi(B)BI). We additionally obtain as corollaries soundness and completeness theorems for the specific Kripke-style models of these logics as presented in the literature: for DMBI, the sub-classical logics extending BiBI and a new bunched logic, Concurrent Kleene BI (connecting our work to Concurrent Separation Logic), this is the first time soundness and completeness theorems have been proved. -
Cos513 Lecture 2 Conditional Independence and Factorization
COS513 LECTURE 2 CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND FACTORIZATION HAIPENG ZHENG, JIEQI YU Let {X1,X2, ··· ,Xn} be a set of random variables. Now we have a series of questions about them: • What are the conditional probabilities (answered by normalization / marginalization)? • What are the independencies (answered by factorization of the joint distribution)? For now, we assume that all random variables are discrete. Then the joint distribution is a table: (0.1) p(x1, x2, ··· , xn). Therefore, Graphic Model (GM) is a economic representation of joint dis- tribution taking advantage of the local relationships between the random variables. 1. DIRECTED GRAPHICAL MODELS (DGM) A directed GM is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) G(V, E), where •V, the set of vertices, represents the random variables; •E, the edges, denotes the “parent of” relationships. We also define (1.1) Πi = set of parents of Xi. For example, in the graph shown in Figure 1.1, The random variables are X4 X4 X2 X2 X 6 X X1 6 X1 X3 X5 X3 X5 XZY XZY FIGURE 1.1. Example of Graphical Model 1 Y X Y Y X Y XZZ XZZ Y XYY XY XZZ XZZ XZY XZY 2 HAIPENG ZHENG, JIEQI YU {X1,X2 ··· ,X6}, and (1.2) Π6 = {X2,X3}. This DAG represents the following joint distribution: (1.3) p(x1:6) = p(x1)p(x2|x1)p(x3|x1)p(x4|x2)p(x5|x3)p(x6|x2, x5). In general, n Y (1.4) p(x1:n) = p(xi|xπi ) i=1 specifies a particular joint distribution. Note here πi stands for the set of indices of the parents of i. -
Data-Mining Probabilists Or Experimental Determinists?
Gopnik-CH_13.qxd 10/10/2006 1:39 PM Page 208 13 Data-Mining Probabilists or Experimental Determinists? A Dialogue on the Principles Underlying Causal Learning in Children Thomas Richardson, Laura Schulz, & Alison Gopnik This dialogue is a distillation of a real series of conver- Meno: Leaving aside the question of how children sations that took place at that most platonic of acade- learn for a while, can we agree on some basic prin- mies, the Center for Advanced Studies in the ciples for causal inference by anyone—child, Behavioral Sciences, between the first and third adult, or scientist? \edq1\ authors.\edq1\ The second author had determinist leanings to begin with and acted as an intermediary. Laplace: I think so. I think we can both generally agree that, subject to various caveats, two variables will not be dependent in probability unless there is Determinism, Faithfulness, and Causal some kind of causal connection present. Inference Meno: Yes—that’s what I’d call the weak causal Narrator: [Meno and Laplace stand in the corridor Markov condition. I assume that the kinds of of a daycare, observing toddlers at play through a caveats you have in mind are to restrict this princi- window.] ple to situations in which a discussion of cause and effect might be reasonable in the first place? Meno: Do you ever wonder how it is that children manage to learn so many causal relations so suc- Laplace: Absolutely. I don’t want to get involved in cessfully, so quickly? They make it all seem effort- discussions of whether X causes 2X or whether the less. -
Bayesian Networks
Bayesian Networks Read R&N Ch. 14.1-14.2 Next lecture: Read R&N 18.1-18.4 You will be expected to know • Basic concepts and vocabulary of Bayesian networks. – Nodes represent random variables. – Directed arcs represent (informally) direct influences. – Conditional probability tables, P( Xi | Parents(Xi) ). • Given a Bayesian network: – Write down the full joint distribution it represents. • Given a full joint distribution in factored form: – Draw the Bayesian network that represents it. • Given a variable ordering and some background assertions of conditional independence among the variables: – Write down the factored form of the full joint distribution, as simplified by the conditional independence assertions. Computing with Probabilities: Law of Total Probability Law of Total Probability (aka “summing out” or marginalization) P(a) = Σb P(a, b) = Σb P(a | b) P(b) where B is any random variable Why is this useful? given a joint distribution (e.g., P(a,b,c,d)) we can obtain any “marginal” probability (e.g., P(b)) by summing out the other variables, e.g., P(b) = Σa Σc Σd P(a, b, c, d) Less obvious: we can also compute any conditional probability of interest given a joint distribution, e.g., P(c | b) = Σa Σd P(a, c, d | b) = (1 / P(b)) Σa Σd P(a, c, d, b) where (1 / P(b)) is just a normalization constant Thus, the joint distribution contains the information we need to compute any probability of interest. Computing with Probabilities: The Chain Rule or Factoring We can always write P(a, b, c, … z) = P(a | b, c, …. -
(Ω, F,P) Be a Probability Spac
Lecture 9: Independence, conditional independence, conditional distribution Definition 1.7. Let (Ω, F,P ) be a probability space. (i) Let C be a collection of subsets in F. Events in C are said to be independent if and only if for any positive integer n and distinct events A1,...,An in C, P (A1 ∩ A2 ∩···∩ An)= P (A1)P (A2) ··· P (An). (ii) Collections Ci ⊂ F, i ∈ I (an index set that can be uncountable), are said to be independent if and only if events in any collection of the form {Ai ∈ Ci : i ∈ I} are independent. (iii) Random elements Xi, i ∈ I, are said to be independent if and only if σ(Xi), i ∈ I, are independent. A useful result for checking the independence of σ-fields. Lemma 1.3. Let Ci, i ∈ I, be independent collections of events. Suppose that each Ci has the property that if A ∈ Ci and B ∈ Ci, then A∩B ∈ Ci. Then σ(Ci), i ∈ I, are independent. Random variables Xi, i =1, ..., k, are independent according to Definition 1.7 if and only if k F(X1,...,Xk)(x1, ..., xk)= FX1 (x1) ··· FXk (xk), (x1, ..., xk) ∈ R Take Ci = {(a, b] : a ∈ R, b ∈ R}, i =1, ..., k If X and Y are independent random vectors, then so are g(X) and h(Y ) for Borel functions g and h. Two events A and B are independent if and only if P (B|A) = P (B), which means that A provides no information about the probability of the occurrence of B. Proposition 1.11. -
Week 2: Causal Inference
Week 2: Causal Inference Marcelo Coca Perraillon University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus Health Services Research Methods I HSMP 7607 2020 These slides are part of a forthcoming book to be published by Cambridge University Press. For more information, go to perraillon.com/PLH. This material is copyrighted. Please see the entire copyright notice on the book's website. 1 Outline Correlation and causation Potential outcomes and counterfactuals Defining causal effects The fundamental problem of causal inference Solving the fundamental problem of causal inference: a) Randomization b) Statistical adjustment c) Other methods The ignorable treatment assignment assumption Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) Assignment mechanism 2 Big picture We are going to review the basic framework for understanding causal inference This is a fairly new area of research, although some of the statistical methods have been used for over a century The \new" part is the development of a mathematical notation and framework to understand and define causal effects This new framework has many advantages over the traditional way of understanding causality. For me, the biggest advantage is that we can talk about causal effects without having to use a specific statistical model (design versus estimation) In econometrics, the usual way of understanding causal inference is linked to the linear model (OLS, \general" linear model) { the zero conditional mean assumption in Wooldridge: whether the additive error term in the linear model, i , is correlated with the -
A Constructive Approach to the Resource Semantics of Substructural Logics
A Constructive Approach to the Resource Semantics of Substructural Logics Jason Reed and Frank Pfenning Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA Abstract. We propose a constructive approach to the resource seman- tics of substructural logics via proof-preserving translations into a frag- ment of focused first-order intuitionistic logic with a preorder. Using these translations, we can obtain uniform proofs of cut admissibility, identity expansion, and the completeness of focusing for a variety of log- ics. We illustrate our approach on linear, ordered, and bunched logics. Key words: Resource Semantics, Focusing, Substructural Logics, Con- structive Logic 1 Introduction Substructural logics derive their expressive power from subverting our usual intuitions about hypotheses. While assumptions in everyday reasoning are things can reasonably be used many times, used zero times, and used in any order, hypotheses in linear logic [Gir87] must be used exactly once, in affine logic at most once, in relevance logic at least once, in ordered logics [Lam58,Pol01] in a specified order, and in bunched logic [OP99] they must obey a discipline of occurrence and disjointness more complicated still. The common device these logics employ to enforce restrictions on use of hypotheses is a structured context. The collection of active hypotheses is in linear logic a multiset, in ordered logic a list, and in bunched logic a tree. Similar to, for instance, display logic [Bel82] we aim to show how to unify diverse substructural logics by isolating and reasoning about the algebraic properties of their context’s structure. Unlike these other approaches, we so do without introducing a new logic that itself has a sophisticated notion of structured context, but instead by making use of the existing concept of focused proofs [And92] in a more familiar nonsubstructural logic. -
Conditional Independence and Its Representations*
Kybernetika, Vol. 25:2, 33-44, 1989. TECHNICAL REPORT R-114-S CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND ITS REPRESENTATIONS* JUDEA PEARL, DAN GEIGER, THOMAS VERMA This paper summarizes recent investigations into the nature of informational dependencies and their representations. Axiomatic and graphical representations are presented which are both sound and complete for specialized types of independence statements. 1. INTRODUCTION A central requirement for managing reasoning systems is to articulate the condi tions under which one item of information is considered relevant to another, given what we already know, and to encode knowledge in structures that display these conditions vividly as the knowledge undergoes changes. Different formalisms give rise to different definitions of relevance. However, the essence of relevance can be captured by a structure common to all formalisms, which can be represented axio- matically or graphically. A powerful formalism for informational relevance is provided by probability theory, where the notion of relevance is identified with dependence or, more specifically, conditional independence. Definition. If X, Y, and Z are three disjoint subsets of variables in a distribution P, then X and Yare said to be conditionally independent given Z, denotedl(X, Z, Y)P, iff P(x, y j z) = P(x | z) P(y \ z) for all possible assignments X = x, Y = y and Z = z for which P(Z — z) > 0.1(X, Z, Y)P is called a (conditional independence) statement. A conditional independence statement a logically follows from a set E of such statements if a holds in every distribution that obeys I. In such case we also say that or is a valid consequence of I. -
Causality, Conditional Independence, and Graphical Separation in Settable Systems
ARTICLE Communicated by Terrence Sejnowski Causality, Conditional Independence, and Graphical Separation in Settable Systems Karim Chalak Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/neco/article-pdf/24/7/1611/1065694/neco_a_00295.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 [email protected] Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, U.S.A. Halbert White [email protected] Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, U.S.A. We study the connections between causal relations and conditional in- dependence within the settable systems extension of the Pearl causal model (PCM). Our analysis clearly distinguishes between causal notions and probabilistic notions, and it does not formally rely on graphical representations. As a foundation, we provide definitions in terms of suit- able functional dependence for direct causality and for indirect and total causality via and exclusive of a set of variables. Based on these founda- tions, we provide causal and stochastic conditions formally characterizing conditional dependence among random vectors of interest in structural systems by stating and proving the conditional Reichenbach principle of common cause, obtaining the classical Reichenbach principle as a corol- lary. We apply the conditional Reichenbach principle to show that the useful tools of d-separation and D-separation can be employed to estab- lish conditional independence within suitably restricted settable systems analogous to Markovian PCMs. 1 Introduction This article studies the connections between -
The Hardness of Conditional Independence Testing and the Generalised Covariance Measure
The Hardness of Conditional Independence Testing and the Generalised Covariance Measure Rajen D. Shah∗ Jonas Peters† University of Cambridge, UK University of Copenhagen, Denmark [email protected] [email protected] March 24, 2021 Abstract It is a common saying that testing for conditional independence, i.e., testing whether whether two random vectors X and Y are independent, given Z, is a hard statistical problem if Z is a continuous random variable (or vector). In this paper, we prove that conditional independence is indeed a particularly difficult hypothesis to test for. Valid statistical tests are required to have a size that is smaller than a predefined significance level, and different tests usually have power against a different class of alternatives. We prove that a valid test for conditional independence does not have power against any alternative. Given the non-existence of a uniformly valid conditional independence test, we argue that tests must be designed so their suitability for a particular problem may be judged easily. To address this need, we propose in the case where X and Y are univariate to nonlinearly regress X on Z, and Y on Z and then compute a test statistic based on the sample covariance between the residuals, which we call the generalised covariance measure (GCM). We prove that validity of this form of test relies almost entirely on the weak requirement that the regression procedures are able to estimate the conditional means X given Z, and Y given Z, at a slow rate. We extend the methodology to handle settings where X and Y may be multivariate or even high-dimensional. -
STAT 535 Lecture 2 Independence and Conditional Independence C
STAT 535 Lecture 2 Independence and conditional independence c Marina Meil˘a [email protected] 1 Conditional probability, total probability, Bayes’ rule Definition of conditional distribution of A given B. PAB(a, b) PA|B(a|b) = PB(b) whenever PB(b) = 0 (and PA|B(a|b) undefined otherwise). Total probability formula. When A, B are events, and B¯ is the complement of B P (A) = P (A, B)+ P (A, B¯) = P (A|B)P (B)+ P (A|B¯)P (B¯) When A, B are random variables, the above gives the marginal distribution of A. PA(a) = X PAB(a, b) = X PA|B(a|b)PB(b) b∈Ω(B) b∈Ω(B) Bayes’ rule PAPB|A PA|B = PB The chain rule Any multivariate distribution over n variables X1,X2,...Xn can be decomposed as: PX1,X2,...Xn = PX1 PX2|X1 PX3|X1X2 PX4|X1X2X3 ...PXn|X1...Xn−1 1 2 Probabilistic independence A ⊥ B ⇐⇒ PAB = PA.PB We read A ⊥ B as “A independent of B”. An equivalent definition of independence is: A ⊥ B ⇐⇒ PA|B = PA The above notation are shorthand for for all a ∈ Ω(A), b ∈ Ω(B), PA|B(a|b) = PA(a) whenever PB =0 PAB(a, b) = PA(a) whenever PB =0 PB(b) PAB(a, b) = PA(a)PB(b) Intuitively, probabilistic independence means that knowing B does not bring any additional information about A (i.e. doesn’t change what we already be- lieve about A). Indeed, the mutual information1 of two independent variables is zero. -
CLASSICAL BI: ITS SEMANTICS and PROOF THEORY 1. Introduction
Logical Methods in Computer Science Vol. 6 (3:3) 2010, pp. 1–42 Submitted Aug. 1, 2009 www.lmcs-online.org Published Jul. 20, 2010 CLASSICAL BI: ITS SEMANTICS AND PROOF THEORY a b JAMES BROTHERSTON AND CRISTIANO CALCAGNO Dept. of Computing, Imperial College London, UK e-mail address: [email protected], [email protected] Abstract. We present Classical BI (CBI), a new addition to the family of bunched logics which originates in O’Hearn and Pym’s logic of bunched implications BI. CBI differs from existing bunched logics in that its multiplicative connectives behave classically rather than intuitionistically (including in particular a multiplicative version of classical negation). At the semantic level, CBI-formulas have the normal bunched logic reading as declarative statements about resources, but its resource models necessarily feature more structure than those for other bunched logics; principally, they satisfy the requirement that every resource has a unique dual. At the proof-theoretic level, a very natural formalism for CBI is provided by a display calculus `ala Belnap, which can be seen as a generalisation of the bunched sequent calculus for BI. In this paper we formulate the aforementioned model theory and proof theory for CBI, and prove some fundamental results about the logic, most notably completeness of the proof theory with respect to the semantics. 1. Introduction Substructural logics, whose best-known varieties include linear logic, relevant logic and the Lambek calculus, are characterised by their restriction of the use of the so-called struc- tural proof principles of classical logic [44]. These may be roughly characterised as those principles that are insensitive to the syntactic form of formulas, chiefly weakening (which permits the introduction of redundant premises into an argument) and contraction (which allows premises to be arbitrarily duplicated).