9.345 Price: $13.95

U .. AJIUlOJUfll llt.ll ADUtO&HB Utll AJIUlOJUfll DIYUIOJ!If DIVIIIOJ!If DIVIIIOJ!If

IP'fOIIQU asP&ODUCTIOJ!If IIICTIOJ!If

XVIII AJIUlO&NB coapa lit ALLIIID ~BOJUfll AaJI'I'

AIRBORNE COMMAND

ltl.& PA&ACB~ lt%114 PARACRUTB 55llt PARACRUTB lit AJBBO&HB INFA!ft1&'1' JNrAllfftY JNFAHTaY BIUOADB Stilt PAUCRUTJ: 5t%ad P.utACRUT& 503rd PABACBUT& INFANTRY lll&ll P.utACBVD INI'ANTaY INFANTRY JIQ'AJft'aY

lll&ll PAAAC:BVD AaBORNB JIQ'A!fD1' KNOINRRRI

117&1l P.utACBUTR INI'ANTaY 517th PARACRUTR INFANTRY

AIRBORNE COMMAND

IU~ PAllACBUTII: SUth PABACBUTIE Sllth PARACHUTE sttth PABACBUTR lllth PAilACBUft INFANTRY INI'ANDY INFANTRY INI'ANTa1' INI'AN'I'a1' A HISTORY OF

AIRBORNE COMMAND

AND AIRBORNE CENTER

PUBLISHED BY

THE COMMAND CLUB FOR ITS MEMBERS

Edited By MARSHALL BRUCER, LT. COL., M .C. (ORC) '""' Galveston, Texas .­ A .._

Text from the official History of The Airborne Effort By John Ellis, Col. In£. (ORC). Photographs By S/ Sgt: Polinski, S/Sgt. Witzerman and Lt. Col. Beaty, from the files of Harold Beaty, Lt. Col. C.E. (ORC) A HISTORY OF AIRBORNE COMMAND AND AIRBORNE CENTER $13.95 Number 3 in our reprint series. REPUBLISHED BY THE Antietam National Museum 135 W. Main Street Sharpsburg, Maryland JAMES M. PHILLIPS, Director

Mail All Correspondence To: JIM PHILLIPS P. 0. Box 168 Williamstown, N.J. 08094 I. Sf B. N. 0-932572-04-9 LCC 78-71270 "' - ..... -- f""\-

.. , ~ -. .. - .. - - ... ~ MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM C. LEE "The First Airborne Soldier" BRIG. GENERAL JOSIAH T. DALBEY "He Developed The Idea" A HISTORY OF AIRBORNE COMMAND

CHAPTER I EARLY HISTORY TO ACTIVATION

A. General under cover of darkness for the purpose of The early history of the "Airborne Effort" sabotage and espionage to mass landings in is, in effect, a compilation of facts and data daylight of two or more reinforced divisions relating the concepts, efforts, acomplishments, in the face of determined enemy resistance. and problems of a few individuals who en­ visioned (with the development and expansion B. Background of airpower) the unlimited possibilities for For over a decade there had been sporadic the utilization of air transportation, to experiments in the airborne field. During the project into combat an offensive striking force early 'SO's airplanes were used extensively which might well be capable of determining as carriers of cargo and personnel. The Rus­ the outcome of battles. It is extremely doubt­ sian and British armies had transported ful if these "Airborne Thinkers" initially troops by air and also landed troops by para­ realized the full significance of this newly con­ chute. In 1931 Major General Preston ceived striking force, and certainly not even Brown, Commanding General of the Panama the most optimistic anticipated that ultimate­ Canal Department, moved Battery "B" of ly five airborne divisions, six separate regi­ the flnd Field Artillery from France Field ments, and four separate battalions would be across the Isthmus to Rio Hato, Canal Zone, activated, trained, and committed to combat. a distance of ninety miles by air transport. Nor was it possible to visualize the mass em­ The following year Captain (later Lieutenant ployment of airborne troops eventually ac­ General) George C. Kenney astounded his complished in Normandy, Southern France, colleagues during maneuvers at Fort DuPont, Holland, or the crossing of the Rhine. Delaware, by air-landing an infantry detach­ It is therefore of primary interest to know ment behind enemy lines. just how the "Airborne Effort" developed In 1933 Batteries "A," "B," "C," and from the original concept of a limited number Headquarters, ~nd Field Artillery were trans­ of "Airborne Thinkers" to the sizable air­ ported from Bejuca to Cherrara, Panama, a borne forces employed in World War II, both distance of thirty-five miles. in the European and Pacific Theaters of Operations; to visualize and understand the On 1~ March 1938 strong German forces multitudinous problems confronting those were air-landed at the Aspern Airport, individuals initially charged with the re­ Vienna, during the occupation of Austria. On sponsibility of experimenting with and de­ 7 October 1938 it was imperative for political veloping the project; to know how they solved reasons that occupation troops move into the the problems of personnel, equipment, supply, Silesian town of Freiwaldau. To accomplish air transportation, and training; and to see this movement, Von .Rundstedt utilized 305 how the doctrine of employment gradually Junkers 5~, in which he loaded a complete developed from the initial thought of small infantry regiment, approximately ~,800 men, combat groups landed within enemy territory with acompanymg weapons. The landing

5 was made on a very rough wheat field ncar Freiwaldau, with complete success. EXPLANATIONS OF THE PICTURES From these operations, it was generally The captions were left off all the photographs for two reasons: (I) it costs a lot of moola to cut deduced that small combat groups could be up a printed page with captions, and (2) many landed within enemy territory and were of the faces in the pictures are unrecognizable; and, capable of successfully performing specific since this book is published mainly for grand­ missions such as demolitions, destruction of children, the lack of captions will allow each in­ dividual to substitute imagination for conscience vital communication centers, bridges, other and to describe each portrayed incident as an his­ important structures. In addition, these small torical monument to his own steadfast devotion to units, when operating in conjunction with patriotic duty. Just to keep the record straight, there follows mechanized forces, could reconnoiter in the the official description of each photograph, direct area to obtain vital information, and seize from the files. The pies are numbered from left and hold key positions at a considerable dis­ to right, from top to bottom. From personal ex­ perience the editor suggests that these notes be torn tance from the main units, pending relief by from the book and imagination given full reign .. · .. mechanized forces. * * * * * Despite these conclusions, the matter of or­ Page 1 of Pictures:, ganizing and training such troops in the I. Dedication of Camp Mackall. United States Army did not receive serious 2. Review of 503rd Parachute Infantry by General Lee. consideration until after the Munich Con­ 3. Mascot of the IOlst Airborne Division. ference in 1938. In fact, on 6 May 1939 the 4. Review of 505th Parachute Infantry by Executive in the Office of the· Chief of Infantry General Ridgeway. suggested to G-3 of the War Department 5. South Carolina Maneuvers, Camden-Kershaw. 6. South Carolina Maneuvers, Camden-Kershaw. General Staff that consid~ration be given to 7. Advertisement for Indian Motorcycle Com­ the organization of a srriall detachment of pany. air infantry. It was noted that the infantry 8. 13th Airborne Division Maneuvers. regiment was adaptable to such an experi­ ment without material change in organiza­ after they landed. In the fall of 1939 at a tion, and that a study would determine the three-way conference of the Chiefs of kind of equipment and supply required, suit­ Enginers, Infantry, and Air Corps, the con­ able missions to be performed, degree of con­ tention of the Chief of Infantry obtainecl. trol to be exercised by higher command, and Thus airborne troops came under the control collaboration with the Air Corps in obtaining of this branch of the service. (The matter of the necessary aircraft. control of the project continued as a bone The initiation of the proposed study even­ of contention for some time, as will be dis­ tually led to a discussion as to which branch cussed later in this history.) should control the proposed development. The On 2 January 1940 the Chief of Infantry Chief of Engineers held that inasmuch as these was authorized by the War Department to troops were to be used primarily as saboteurs study the feasibility of air infantry and the and demolition crews, that their training and practicability of the air transport of all types employment should properly be under of ground troops included within the infantry Engineer direction. The Air Corps proposed division. Later in January the Infantry that they should be "Marines of the Air Board at Fort Benning, Georgia was directed Corps," to be designated as "Air Grenadiers." by the Chief of Infantry to conduct a pre­ The Chief of Infantry insisted that airplanes liminary study and to develop and submit a were but a means of transportation and that general plan for the project. On 25 April the primary mission of such airborne troops 1940 the War Department approved the was to fight on the ground as ground soldiers Chief of Infantry's plan to organize a test 6

------~ -

platoon to function under the Infantry Board. In addition, the Material Command of the Page 2 of Pictures: Air Corps was directed to develop a parachute I. C-47 line up at Camp Mackall. 2. CG-4A line-up at Camp Mackall. which would permit safer jumping and land­ 3. Camden-Kershaw landings-considered quite ing from a low altitude. At the end of April good in those days. the Commanding Officer, Flight "B" of the 4. 17th Airborne Division Maneuvers-a snow job. 16th Observation Squadron, Lawson Field, 5. Camp Davis AA Units on Airborne training Georgia, was designated as the first airborne problem. liaison officer for the project, thereby estab­ 6. Daylight Landings at 13th Airborne lishing the first official liaison for joint opera­ Maneuvers. 7. Varieties of Brass watching 17th Airborne tions between the two army branches which Maneuvers. were ultimately to play predominant parts 8. AB-TCC Washington National Airport Air­ in the later developments of the "Airborne borne Show. Effort." While development of the airborne project its relationship to the development of the was in this rather nebulous state, the impor­ "Airborne Effort" in the United States Army. tance of airborne troops, and some indication Not only was attention directed to the ac­ of the part they were to play in the war in complishments of the comparatively small Europe, was vividly brought to general real­ German airborne forces employed, bl,l! the ization with the invasion of the Low Countries relative bearing of their achievements in the by Germany in May 1940. In the attack attainment of the main objective provided a against Holland, Germany was faced with concrete example of the capabilities of air­ successive defense lines which, though not borne troops, when properly employed. The impregnable, ·would effectively retard rapid tactics of employment of these German air­ advance of .the German army and allow the borne troops provided an initial guide, which Dutch sufficient time to destroy the bridges for a time at least, was to influence the de­ over the Maas and Waal rivers. The capture velopment of the doctrine of employment of of these key bridges intact was vital to the airborne troops in the United States Army. success of the German "Blitzkrieg" tactics Following the successful employment of and was accomplished by the use of para­ airborne troops by the Germans as outlined chutists who were dropped in the vicinity of above, by War Department order dated U the bridges, and seized and held them against September 1940 the Commanding General of counterattack. Thus, when the Panzer units, the ~nd Division was directed to conduct such constituting the ground element of the air­ tests as were necessary to develop reference borne-ground team, had pierced the defense data and operational procedure for air­ lines and reached the bridges, further advance transported troops. Because of the impos­ was assured, and with the crossing of these sibility of foreseeing the size or composition two river lines, the fate of Holland was sealed. of a force which might be required to meet a In Belgium similar tactics were used to re­ particular situation arising in the future, the duce Port Eben-Emeal, key fortress of the tests were to be conducted so as to result in King Albert Canal defensive line. Here a the assembly of necessary data permitting the small force of airborne troops, approximately rapid determination of the transport require­ 100, both parachute and glider-borne, landed ments and loadings of any size task force inside the fortress, imprisoned some 1,800 de­ organized. fenders, and neutralized this key installation. An infantry battalion was selected as a The employment of airborne forces in these type unit to study. The tests conducted were two instances is of particular significance m to determine what equipment and personnel 8

-~-- ~ ..------.

and utilized as a combined training hall and Page 3 of Pictures: parachute packing shed. 'l'o assist in getting I. Infantryman (Croft), Loaded. 2. Signalman, burdened. the project under way, a ·warrant officer and 3. Medic, encumbered. four riggers, with twenty-one parachutes, 4. Paratroopers in various stages of deshabille. were made available from Wright Field. The 5. Inspection of harness (pic swiped from film Test Section of the Infantry Board prepared strip). 6. Official method of exhausting men prior to an eight-week training schedule in which were jump. incorporated all phases of parachute train­ 7. Men hurrying to wait in line. ing from the first orientation flight and the packing of parachutes to jumping from air­ were to be transported by air, how they were planes in flight. In addition, a specialized to be loaded, and how many bombardment training program emphasizing the technique and transport airplanes would be required. of the parachutist and including one hour of Similar data was determined for artillery and calisthenics, tumbling, hand-to-hand combat,. other supporting services which would be re­ forced marches, and a daily three-mile run, quired by a task force. was put into effect. This schedule was super­ imposed upon a regular schedule of standard C. The Test Platoon infantry training. With the initiation of this On ~5 June 1940 the War Department training program the project was now directed organization of a test platoon, under definitely on the way. the Commandant of the Infantry School at Eary in July Lieutenant Colonel (later Fort Benning, Georgia, personnel to be Major General) William C. Lee (who, as a secured from the ~9th Infantry Regiment. Major in the Office of the Infantry, had Lieutenant (later Colonel) William T. Ryder, rendered valuable service in fostering the who had previously heard that experiments parachute project), and Infantry Board rep­ in the dropping of personnel and supply by resentatives witnessed demonstrations of the parachute were being conducted at Lawson jump towers at the New York World's Fair. Field, and who had subsequently filed his ap­ Being impressed with these demonstrations plication for parachute duty with the In­ and visualizing the use of such towers as fantry Board, was designated platoon leader. valuable training aids in the early stages of On 11 ,July Lieutenant (later Lieutenant parachute training, Colonel Lee recommended Colonel) James A. Bassett was selected as that the Test Platoon be moved to Hights­ assistant platoon leader. The first task under­ town, New Jersey, for a week's training on taken in the organization of the Test Platoon these towers, which were the property of the was to select from the ~00 enlisted men who euphemistically-named "Safe Parachute Com­ had volunteered for parachute duty, the pany." On ~9 July the Test Platoon was authorized quota of 48. A flight surgeon moved to Hightstown in accordance with was detailed from Maxwell Field, and he, Colonel Lee's recommendation and there re­ with the aid of two assistants, began the ceived one week's training. The -results ob­ process of selection which was based primarily tained were so satisfactory that two of th~se on the highest standards of health and rugged ~50-foot towers were purchased and installed physical characteristics. at Fort Benning, Georgia. Organization having been completed, the One of the major obstacles confronting the Platoon moved into a tent camp located near Test Platoon at this time was the removal or Lawson Field in order to be as near as possible revision of the provisions of paragraph 48, to the airplanes based there. An abandoned Army Regulations 95-15, prescribing 1,500 corrugated iron hangar 'yas made available feet as the minimum altitude from which para- 11 chute jumps would be made except in emergencies. The Platoon complied with this Page - ~ of Pictures: l. C-46 loading on 6th War Loan Drive !:;how. provision on initial training jumps, but felt 2. C-47 finally ready. that this altitude was not practical for mass 3. Stand Up and Hook Up (a publicity shot). jumps under combat conditions. Therefore 4. More inspection prior to jump. 5. "D" Field at jump altitude. recommendations were transmitted to the 6. "A" Field at jump altitude (note Bean fishing Chief of Infantry, through the Infantry off left bank of lake). Board, on 11 July 1940, that the regulation be revised as follows: "No jumps will be later proposal of the War Department G-3 made at altitudes less than 1,500 feet, except suggested that the project be placed under in emergencies and for training and employ­ the direct control of GHQ, with location at ment of parachute troops." either Fort Sam Houston, Texas, or at Mather The recommendation was not favorably Field, California. On 27 August 1940 a con­ considered at that time by the War Depart­ ference was held in the Office of the Deputy ment; however, on 21 August 1940 the Chief Chief of Staff (General Bryden) to reach a of Infantry was directed to train parachutists decision establishing control and location of under the following instructions; "The initial the project. After prolonged discussion, jump for each individual will be made at an General Bryden announced that the project altitude of not less than 1,500 feet; thereafter would continue at Fort Benning under the the altitude to be determined by the officer supervision of the Chief of Infantry. Mean­ conducting training, but at not less than 750 while the Office of Chief of Staff directed that feet without further authority." This revision G HQ give attention to the "organization, provided the authority under ~hich jumps equipment and tactical employment of para­ could be made at altitudes considered practi­ chute and air-transported infantry." cal and commensurate with those made in The first parachute jump from airplanes combat. in flight by personnel of the Test Platoon Now that the project was well under way was made on 16 August 1940, from Douglas­ and held promise of eventually developing built B-18, twin-engine, low-wing, medium into a project of major proportions, the old bomber aircraft. Each parachutist wore the issue of control, which had been temporarily standard Air Corps T-3, free-type, human decided in the fall of 1939 at the three-way escape parachute, and in addition, an emer­ conference of the Chiefs of Infantry, Engi­ gency test type parachute. The initial mass neers, and Air Corps, again came to the jump took place on 29 August 1940 before fore. In June 1940 the G-3 Section of the an imposing assembly of high-ranking officers "\-Var Department had recommended that the and notables who were not only duly impressed project be taken from the Chief of Infantry but enthusiastic in their praise of the accom­ and placed directly under the Chief of Air plishments to date and their faith in the future Corps and Stationed at Fort Bragg, North of the "Airborne Effort." Thereafter, mass Carolina. Geenral Arnold here entered the jumps became a regular training feature. picture in support of this proposal. General McNair, in one of his first official acts at D. Expansion of the Parachute Project GHQ, reiterated the previous contention of On 16 September 1940, less than three the Chief of Infantry, that the primary mis­ months after the organization of the Test sions of parachute troops was ground action Platoon, the War Department authorized the and that air transport was only another means constitution of the 1st Parachute Battalion. of transportation; therefore control properly On 2 October 1940 the first paragraph of this should be vested in the Chief of Infantry. A order was amended to read: "The 501st Para- 12

them heavy weapons and transportation es­ Page 5 of Picturrs: sential to the success of sustained ground This page illustrates 1·arious stages of mental indecision, over Camp Mackall. umber 7 action in overcoming organized resistance. is you going out, isn' t it? "Airborne Thinkers" seized upon this opera­ tion as an illustration of the unlimited capa­ bilities of a balanced airborne force, compris­ chute .Battalion is constituted and will be acti­ ing all the clements of the standard infantry vated at the earliest practicable date at Fort division, and limited only by the cargo-carry­ Bmning, Georgia." The personnel of the ing capacity of the available air transport. Test Platoon were utilized in the organiza­ In Julv 1941 the Air Corps Legan experi­ tion of the battalion. Major (later Major ments ~~ · ith gliders for the transportation of General) 'i\' illiam ,¥. ·Miley was selected men and material, and the following month battalion commander. ~' ar Department G-3 called on the Air Corps ~l ith the activation of the first tactical to develop new cargo aircraft for an airborne parachute unit, increasing interest in .the combat team, to consist of an infantry project became evident; adequate housmg, battalion, and anti-tank company, a field special buildings, jump towers, and a better artillery battery, and a medical detachment. ·umpino· area were provided. In October, •J b . The first air-landing unit of the United high priority having been given to the proJect, States Army was activated on 1 July 1941 at new jump areas were cleared by CCC workers. l<'ort Kobbe, Canal Zone, and was designated - After some delay in obtaining sufficient funds, as the 550th Infantry Airborne Battalion, three new training buildings were constructed with an authorized strength of~~ officers and at Lawson Field. 550 enlisted men. Lieutenant Colonel (later E. Air-landing Troops-Eary Thought Major General) Harris M. Melaskey was and Development. se le~ted as the first commanding officer of the unit. Personnel were all volunteers recruited Probably the greatest single impetus to air­ from units stationed in the Canal Zone. A borne development and expansion was pro­ short time after activation, the 550th was re­ vided bv the German invasion of Crete in May inforced by the attachment of Company "C" 1941. ~Here, for the first time in history, air­ 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion, which borne forces were employed en masse in a had completed its basic training at Fort Ben­ combined effort of major proportions. The ning, Georgia. German Air Forces, obtaining complete aerial A training program was pre1::1 red and put superiority, isolated the island, while glider­ into effect emphasizing the employment of this borne and parachute troops landed and parachute-air-landing team in the assault of stormed kev installations. l\1alame Airdrome key installations particularly air bases. Con­ was captur-ed shortly after the initial landing cept of employm~nt envisioned parachutists and was utilized to land air-transported forces dropping adjacent to the objective, seizing which completed the occupation of the entire and holding, pending the arrival of the air­ island in short order. Prior to this operation landing component, with its heavier weapons little consideration had been given to the use and transportation. Only a limited number of gliders or powered aircraft for the landing of aircraft were available for training pur­ of ground troops, emphasis having been poses, these being B-18's, B-18A's, and placed entirely on the development of para­ C-39's. In the absence of sufficient aircraft, chute forces. Here was a conclusive demon­ in most training exercises it was assumed that stration of the ability of glider-borne troops the force had been dropped or air-landed, fol­ to effect tactical landings, bringing m with lowing which the techniques of assembly 15 peculiar to both parachutists and air-landing troops was emphasized, followed by the assault Page 6 of Pictures: Exits. of the objective and defense against counter­ attack. In August 1941, the reinforced battalion, Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff had been con­ having been ordered to Rio Hato for a month's sidering the organizing, for test purposes, of training, elected to make a tactical exercise a special air-transported unit. On ~7 June of the move. Plans were made and orders 1941 the Secretary of the General Staff sent issued for the air movement, the objective an informal memorandum to the Assistant being the seizure of the auxiliary air field Chief of Staff, G-3, noting that the Chief of near Rio Hato. Coordination with the Air Staff desired action initiated immediately. Corps resulted in 78 airplanes being made The memorandum further advised that the available for the exercise-74 B-18's and 4 initial steps should be the creation of type C-39's. An air movement table was prepared combat teams with such auxiliary troops as and a system for air-ground communication necessary, and with the additional note that provided in the form of visual signals-flares, G-3 should "contact G-4, Air Corps, and go coded panels, smoke, etc.-no radio communi­ to it." cation being available. Parking plans for air­ The new project was assigned to Major craft were drawn up and both Air Corps and (later Brigadier General) Josiah T. Dalbey ground troops were thoroughly briefed. Since of the Operations Branch, G-3, who success­ the route selected was over water, Mae Wests fully "wet-nursed" it until 10 October 1941, were issued to each individual. when the War Department announced the Troops enplaned at Howard Field, Canal activation of the 88th Infantry Airborne Zone, and moving in two'lifts, with the para­ battalion. Lieutenant Colonel (later Major chute elment spearheading the attack echelon, General) Elbridge G. Chapman was selected completed the movement without mishap. By as battalion commander. the time the air-landing element reached the The battalion was strictly an experimental target area (one hour later), the air field agency, under the direction of the Chief of had been secured by the parachutists and was Infantry, with the preliminary mission of held for the landing of the powered aircraft. conducting tests pertaining to airborne The entire operation was termed "a complete troops. With its activation, the Infantry success" by the many high-ranking officers Board was relieved of further responsibility and notables present. in testing, organization, equipment, logistics, This tactical exercise is worthy of note in training, and development of airborne units. that it was the first major airborne training Priority for the test program was established exercise in the United States Army, and be­ as follows: cause it vividly emphasized the requirement (1) Airplane transport, including proper for: :combat loads and merits of airplanes then in (1) Complete staff coordination between service. Air Corps and airborne forces. (~) Armament and special equipment. (~) Air-ground communication. (3) Tables of Organization and Tables (3) The development of aircraft designed of Basic Allowance. to transport ground troops and equipment. In addition, the effectiveness of the parachute (4) Tactical doctrine, including landing air-landing team as an effective striking force formations, liaison with air support units, tac­ was vividly portrayed. tical dispositions of small units for combat 16

.• -.te:- ., ••. -.te:- ., .·.. . .r ~ ...... ·-...... - - :.. .. -- --.. ..; .. - ...: .. . .:- - --- . ·- -" ... • • -.· - • ••. -. -· -. .:\ ' . . ..-·. --...... ~' . -... - ... - : .... : ...... -- quarters and headquarters company. The ad­ Page 7 of Pictures: ministrative personnel in headquarters com­ I. First stick to jump the Hart Chute. 2. Artillery "Control Patton" test jump. pany were so organized as to provide for 3, 4. First mass jump with Hart chute. separate administration, and supply detach­ 5, 6, 7. First " Double Door" C-46 mass jump. ments for lettered companies when a single company was to be used on a separate combat cooperation with parachute units, and defense mission. Also, the administrative and supply of landing fields and the advance thereon. organizat-ion of the battalion was such that (5) Training program for the Airborne the battalion was reasonably self-sustaining Battalion, for preparing a standard infantry when acting on separate and independent mis­ battalion for airborne missions, and special sions. The lettered companies were so or­ training for attached units of other arms and ganized that each squad and platoon was a services. complete combat unit within itself, capable (6) Training literature. of limited independent action. With the initiation of the expansion pro­ F. The Pamchnte Group. gram, the Provisional Parachute Group found With expansion of the parachute arm m its functioning handicapped by shortage of immediate prospect, the requirement became specialized personnel. Already understrength, evident for proper headquarters to plan and the 501st Parachute Battalion was further execute the expansion and to coordinate train­ depleted when it provided a cadre for the 502d ing activities. To provide the required con­ Parachute Battalion, which was activated on trolling agency, the Provisional Parachute 1 July 1941. Group Headquarters was activated on 10 The activation of the 3d Battalion, 503d March 1941, with permanent station at Fort Parachute Infantry, was in the immediate Benning, Georgia, and placed under the con­ offing. Unpredictable problems occasioned trol of the Chief of Infantry. Lieutenant by school washouts, some cases of inferior bat­ Colonel William G. Lee was assigned to the talion personnel, and transfers further com­ command of the Group. It was stated ( un­ plicated the situation. In addition, the entire officially) at the time of the organization, that problem of personnel procurement was "up the Group would be called upon at a later in the air," pending a decision of w~ether date to submit recommendations for the or not the National Guard would return to permanent organization of Group Head­ State service, and the authorization of an in­ quarters and Headquarters Detachment. Im­ crease in the Army by Congress. Until those mediate and constant attention was directed questions were decided, personnel for the toward: activation of units in accordance with 1942 (1) The provision of training cadres for Troop Basis were not available. By 1 July additional parachute battalions as the need 1941 the Replacement Training Centers had should arise. run dry and no men could be procured there­ (2) Study of permanent Tables of Organ­ from. When the Office of the Chief of In­ ization and Basic Allowances. fantry asked for a clear-cut picture of the (3) Development of tactical doctrine for personnel situation, Colonel Lee commented, the proper employment of parachute troops. "I can well understand why you are confused To attain maxm1um jumping-fighting as to our enlisted personnel. "VVith the general strength in the lettered companies and at the intermixture right now, damned if we don't same time to make them light, mobile, easy have trouble understanding it ourselves." A to transport and supply, all administrative partial solution was effected by making avail­ personnel were placed in battalion head- able Regular Army personnel of the 8th and 19 9th Infantry Divisions; nevertheless, the 502d Parachute Battalion was activate at re­ Page 8 of Pictures: Every Man a Superman! duced strength. To alleviate this personnel shortage, Colonel Lee and two of his staff officers visited train all new men. The effect of this increase the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Bragg, to was to constitute an organization and to per­ secure 172 jumpers to fill the 502d Parachute form a function which had been in operation, Battalion. Major General (later General) unofficially, with instructors furnished from Jacob L. Devers, the Division Commander, the .?Olst Parachute Battalion. With the offered full cooperation, and his Chief of Staff establishment of The Parachute School, the accompanied Colonel Lee to each of his regi­ 501st Parachute Battalion was brought up to mental commanders. In addressing them, full strength in officers and enlisted men, and Colonel Lee stated that misfits, slow-wits, all were qualified parachutists. The 502d stupid and physically awkward men, chronic Parachute Battalion was also at full strength. drunkards, habitual AWOL's, and offenders Colonel Lee was enthusiastic in his report to of military discipline would be promptly re­ the Chief of Infantry: "Please permit me to turned to their units. Neither Colonel Lee say that your Personnel Section has certainly nor his officers talked to the men directly, the played ball with us ...." proposition being presented by the divisional During July 1941 acquisition was made of company commanders. Volunteers then re­ a tract of land in Alabama to adequat~fy pro­ ported to the visiting parachute officers at vide training areas for the rapidly expanding various recreation halls made available for program. Two hundred and thirty-five thou­ consultation and examination. The results sand dollars were made available for training obtained exceeded the most optimistic expecta­ facilities, and by 14 July the local Quarter­ tions, approximately 1,000 men having master had initiated preliminary surveys for volunteered for the quota of 172 vacancies, target ranges, jump grounds, auxiliary land­ including 400 non-commissioned officers who ing fields, roads, and ferries. Reporting to were willing "to take a bust" to volunteer for the Chief of Infantry on 14 July Colonel Lee parachute duty. was optimistic about the future of the entire Results from the 8th Infantry Division at project. Only one minor detail worried him: Fort Jackson, South Carolina were not as "I pulled my remaining hair out the other satisfactory. Officers assigned for recruiting day when three parachutes failed to open, but purposes with this division had not perfected the reserve parachutes functioned and the the system used so successfully by Colonel Lee boys came through smiling." and his officers at Fort Bragg, and it became On 2 September 1941 the addition of 971 necessary to canvass the division several times, enlisted men for the Parachute Group was Colonel I.ee concluded, "The cow at that place approved, thus clearing up a number of prob­ has been milked dry ... , the 9th Division at lems in personnel shortages. The activation Fort Bragg is a fertile pasture.... " of the 504th Parachute Battalion was stepped By 14 July 1941 the personnel picture had up to 5 October. By that date there were brightened. The requested increase in al­ three battalions at full strength, less basics, lotment of grades and ratings for the Infantry and one battalion at full strength, including Service Command (Parachutists' Course) and basics. Loss replacements and some over­ the establishment of a course for parachutists strength were also made available to alleviate as a part of the Infantry School was approved further shortages. 10 July 1941, thus constituting a permanent The training of the early groups at Fort force (The Parachute School) to properly Benning was that of the regular infantry or- 20

combat firing with the assumption that the Page 9 of Pictures: troops had been dropped, combat missions Various maneuver landings; except number 4- which is the Test Section, hard at work! with troops jumping and proceeding on tacti- al missions with resupply accomplished by parachute. ganization, with stress being placed on calis­ The second phase, or battalion training, in­ thenics, long marches, daily three-mile runs, cluded field exercises in which the battalion and other exercises tending to develop the operated on independent missions; Two train­ physical stamina which the contemplated em­ ing periods of .seventy-two hours each, of ployment of the parachutist envisioned. Also, sustained combat, attack and defense; and perfection was demanded in map reading, use one battalion exercise, prepared by the Pro­ of the compass, scouting and patrolling, and visional Parachute Group Headquarters and proficiency in all parachute weapons. It was serving as a test of tactical proficiency. In repeatedly emphasized to the parachutist that all instances the techniques of assembly, move­ the method by which he entered combat would, ment without transportation, communication of necessity, impose upon him greater prob­ with only signal equipment dropped by para­ lems than those of the regular infantry chute, aerial resupply, and all other matters soldier; therefore he must excel in every re­ peculiar to parachute operations were em­ spect. In addition, an intensive technical phasized. This phase was completed in two training course with the parachute was re­ weeks. quired. This course was divided into two While this training program was initiated phases: by the Provisional Group Headquarters, it (1) Parachute maintenance, which m­ was extremely difficult to maintain. ·Parachute cluded folding, packing, inspection and re­ troops were the "Infant Prodigy of the pair; and Army," and as such, created intense interest (~) Jump training, which included proper in all quarters. Frequent calls for "demonstra­ exit from the airplane, manipulations of the tions" were received. Officials of higher head­ parachute in the air and on the ground, quarters wished to observe and to display the proper landings for water, forests, etc. "Parachute Infantry," Army commanders re­ Under the Provisional Parachute Group, quested the participation of parachute troops this training was designated as individual in maneuvers. Thus in November 1941, we training of the parachutist. find Colonel Lee deeply concerned over fre­ The early training of the units of the quent interferences with training. He com­ Provisional Parachute Group was divided plained to the Chief of Infantry that the into two phases: (1) Squad, platoon, and Group had not been able to maintain an. company training; and (~) battalion train­ orderly and progressive training program. ing. The objective outlined was for the com­ With the 50~d concentrating its efforts almost pletion of these two phases within sixteen entirely in preparing for participation in weeks after the parachutist had completed maneuvers, its other essential training had individual training. The first phase, fourteen been spotty. The planning, preparation, and weeks, incl~ded basic subjects, technical wea­ coordination of outside exercises and activities pons training, markmanship qualifications, detracted from the efficiency of the small communication specialist training, jumping Group headquarters in the conduct of normal with combat equipment, squad, platoon and training routine, and purely spectacular company exercises (day and night) follow­ jumps of the units gave the wrong impression ing parachute drops in which technique of to the Army and public. assembly, communication, etc., were stressed, Ten days before P earl Harbor Colonel Lee, 23 hospitalized by an accident, renewed his drive for thoroughness in the essentials of training. Page 10 of Pictures: 1. The C-47 Mock-up training area. In a letter which was read to all battalion and 2. Loading the C-54. company commanders he stressed combat 3. CG-4A Bone yard. training as the primary objective of the 4. Loading the CG-4A. 5-8. Glider take-offs. group, insisting that all obstacles to intensive combat training be eliminated, stating blunt­ lv: "A unit which cannot fight is useless." Meanwhile, liaison was maintained with private parachute manufacturers, the Army G. Equipment. Air Corps, and other interested agencies. From the beginning parachute units at Captain (later Colonel) W. P. Yarborough, Fort Benning were handicapped by shortages Test Officer for the Group, and his associates of equipment, particularly parachutes, com­ rendered valuable service in this respect, fre­ munication equipment, and ammunition. In quently visiting Wright Field, Irving Air May 1941 Colonel Lee wrote to Major Gaither Chute Company, the Maintenance and Ma­ who in those days fostered the project in the terial Commands of the Air Corps, Marine Office of the Chief of Infantry: "Our com­ Corps installations at Lakehurst, New Jersey, munication equipment is zero. God knows we and other centers interested in parachute de­ have got to have something with which to fight velopment. From these and many other or else we will have to use megaphones for sources they obtained the latest items of equip­ communication." Major Gaither, although ment to .conduct tests, and voiced the opinion not directly responsible for equipment, pulled of the Provisional Parachute Group on modi­ many Washington strings to hurry along the fications and development in parachutes, procurement. Major Ingomar Oseth also weapons, airplanes, gas masks; in fact, every­ pulled strings within the Office of the Chief thing down to water bags. of Infantry for the equipment needs of the Throughout 1941 the parachute shortage parachute battalion. He was handicapped, continually plagued progress because, as as were all elements of the Army that early in aptly stated by one of the early parachute the game, by a lack of material with which officers, "A parachutist without a parachute to work. "Gaither showed me your letter .. . is like a cavalryman without a horse, only in which you very kindly said you didn't blame more so." Manufacturers were unable to 'Ingomar,' but suggested that I stir it up." step up production to meet the requirements Major Oseth wrote to Colonel L~e: "I have occasioned by the expansion of the parachute been stirring the matter up since the para­ program. The Irving Air Chute Company chute project was first placed in your lap, but contracted to produce ~00 ·parachutes by 8 I am confronted by the inexorable fact that it September 1941, and 100 per week there­ does little good to stir an empty pot. When after, while Switlick Parachute Company there is something to put into the pot, the stir­ promised 3,750 packs, T-5, by July 1941. ring will produce results, but at present the By 15 October 1941 neither company had de­ principal items of signal equipment asked for livered nor was ready to make delivery of are non-existent." any parachutes. Despite this discouraging response Colonel In mid-September the Group had a slim Lee continued to press his needs for essential total of ~08 parachutes, with new men com­ equipment, providing the Office of Chief of ing in fast. The Air Corps obligingly di­ Infantry with precise information on the verted some of its own parachute appropria­ nature and seriousness of the shortages; tion to the Group for the purpose of badly­ ultimately the equipment was forthcoming. needed 'chutes, and some of the deficit was 24

to the Office of Chief of Infantry and then to Page 11 of Pictures: The Adjutant General before they could be Some gliders landed without mishap. Pies num­ ber 3. 4, and 5 were taken at Camden-Kershaw. effected. Corps Area and War Department Number 8 was taken on Christiansen's Pike agencies repeatedly by-passed the Group with (the only improved road in the county built information and orders for the battalions. by an architect; note the soft shoulders). Even funds, requested by the Group, were in some instances allocated directly to the made up by open-market purchase; meanwhile battalions. · Without court-martial jurisdic­ pressure from many sources was brought to tion, the Group was again by-passed as each bear on the contracting manufacturers to fill battalion was placed under the 4th Division their commitments more promptly. for such jurisdiction. H . C01nmand E chelon, for Parachute F aced with t hese difficulties, Colonel L ee T1·oo ps-The Pamchute R egiment. continued to agitate for a t actical head­ At the time the first parachute battalion quarters from the Fort Benning end, while was activated in 1940, the idea was p revalent efforts to attain this objective were exerted in in the General Staff that parachute troops the Office of Chief of I nfantry and the War would seldom, if ever, be employed in units Department. With the formation of tank larger than a battalion; therefore they were groups t o exercise tactical supervision over organized as separate GHQ battalions without separate tank battalions, it seemed logical to provisions for any higher headquarters. The conclude that a similar tactical control should mass employment of German parachute troops be established for the parachute battalions. in Crete and later in Greece led Colonel Lee With this long-sought objective apparently to state, "After these successful operations, within immediate grasp, one thing caused I think it would indeed be dull of us to say Colonel Lee to temper his recommendation: that parachute troops will seldom be employed The fear that the change would remove the in units larger than a battalion." Colonel L ee Group from the control of General Hodges, felt throughout the life of Provisional Para­ Chief of Infantry, who by his efforts in foster­ chute Group that it was inadequate to exer­ ing the project from the beginning, had cise the necessary tactical control which the earned the sincere appreciation of all in­ situation demanded. For example, in the terested in the parachute program. Thus, he early life of the Group, the Table of Organiza­ cautioned General Hodges: "I believe that tion provided only two staff officers and a your office can feel out the General Staff in small detachment of ten enlisted men. The advance on this matter, and, if your office can duties of S-1 and S-4 were combined in one get informal assurance that no step will be officer, and the S-~ was also the S-3. This taken at this time to remove the Group from organization was adequate for the experi­ your control, I go on record as heartily recom­ mental stage, but obviously could not exercise mending the action prepared by your Train­ supervision and tactical control over the ex­ ing Section." panded parachute organization as it existed The issue of a tactical Group Headquarters in the fall of 1941. was adroitly side-stepped. While General The lack of a larger group headquarters Hodges was considering the paper for the also created many administrative bottlenecks. establishment of a tactical group, Major War Department orders asigned officers to the Gaither suggested to Major Dalbey battalions rather than to the Group; thus, that an order be issued assigning the when it became necessary or desirable to trans­ four parachute battalions to ·the Provisional fer officers from one battalion to another Parachute Group; thus in effect, accom­ within the Group, requests had to be referred- plishing the desired result without pre- 27 senting the issue squarely. Major Dalbey Page 12 of Pictures: • agreed to the suggestion, pointing out that Illustrating various forms of Parachute Malfunc­ inasmuch as both the Group and the battalions tion. The pigeon became a malfunction during were GHQ troops, it would be necessary for the 13th AB Division maneuvers. He was GHQ to issue the order. Therefore, the mat­ supposed to have delivered a message to Troop Carrier that rations were to be delivered to a ter was discussed with Colonel (later General) stranded parachute unit. With typical Air­ Mark W. Clark in order to accomplish the borne efficiency the parachutists went straight result without further question or debate, and to the heart of the matter, and ate the pigeon instead. by 1 July 1941, GHQ was ready to issue the desired order, giving Colonel Lee all the maneuver experiment consisting of intel­ prerogatives of a regimental commander. ligence, operations, communication, supply, Late in 1941, the War Department was and staff sections. considering the idea of placing all parachute Over in GHQ, thought was developing and airborne troops under the Air Support along the same lines. General Clark, writing Command of the Army Air Corps. Colonel personally to Colonel Lee, stated: "I for one Lee, in a letter addressed to Colonel Miley, feel that these units should be expanded commenting upon this plan, stated that he materially, for they are mighty handy to felt there should be a special headquarters have around when a difficult job is to be under GHQ or the Chief of Staff, charged done." General Clark further stated that with organization, development and training he had passed upon a paper (recommending in of all parachute troops, airborne troops, and substance what G-3 War Department had participating Air Corps troops. He further originally drawn up). expressed the opinion that this headquarters The Chief of Infantry, in commenting on should be commanded by a Major General, the expansion, advocated the use of the term "preferably an outstanding Air Corps of­ "regiment" rather than "group," pointing ficer," and that the headquarters not be sub­ out that this term was more familiar to the ject to any chief of branch. average infantryman, and that a regimental In reply to this proposal, Colonel Miley organization insured that with each three advocated, "A parachute force similar to the battalions, a new regiment would be added. Armored Force." His plan envisioned a Then too, it seemed that there was something number of parachute divisions, to consist of a little foreign to Infantry and akin to Air three parachute regiments and one group of Corps in the word "group." air transport. A senior Air Corps officer' on On 30 January 1942, the War Depart­ the staff would coordinate and advise on avia­ ment directed that four parachute regiments tion matters. To assign parachutists to the be constituted. The existing battalions were Air Corps would be a "step backward," be­ expanded immediately into two regiments, cause there might be no tactical headquarters, both of which were initially understrength. and they would be overshadowed by other The 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment was interests. formed from the 503d and 504th Parachute With the outbreak of the war, there was Battalions, and received priority on person­ renewed interest in airborne activities, both nel and equipment during its formation. The in the War Department and in GHQ. Four 50fld had an initial strength of less than 900 days after Pearl Harbor, G-3 War Depart­ men and did not reach its authorized strength ment initiated a paper on the subject of a until enough men had completed basic para­ command echelon for parachute units. The chute training to provide fillers. It was paper compressed in two pages the tactical planned to activate the other two regiments lessons of European operations and our own by May 1942. 28 --- .. - + -- -

CHAPTER fl ACTIVATION AND MISSION

responsible for the training of these unib: Page 13 of Pictures: Illustrating various forms of Glider Malfunction. that this advanced and combined training The cow in number 5 and Wallace-Troth in could be best accomplished by a unified com­ number 7 are plainly puzzled. The cow mand under which all parachute regiments didn't give milk for three days following the crash. Neither did Wall ace or Troth come could be grouped until such training was com­ to think of it. . . . ' pleted, at which time they could be released to commanders in the theaters of operation. A. Reqni1·ement for Unified Command. Under such an arrangement, regiments could be progressively released upon completion of Early in 194fl, it became evident that the training and new regiments formed to replace "Airborne Effort" had progressed to that them, assuring uniform methods, proper stage which required unity of command to equipment, and the achievement of a high provide uniform organization, equipment, standard of training. In the absence of such training, and effective liaison with the Air a training headquarters and the probable dis­ Corps. persal of these units to various parts of th.e Up to this point, the several airborne com­ United States, it was feared that not only ponents had progressed satisfactorily under would the training task be more difficult, b~t the rather loose control of the Chief of In­ the lack of suitable means to insure fantry and now provided a nucleus on which uniformity, coupled with the non-availability a real airborne force could be built. How­ of transport planes might lead to the collapse ever, it had become apparent to those in­ of training control. dividuals closely associated with the develop­ ments that continued expansion (four ad­ Experience during the past year's opera­ ditional parachute regiments were scheduled tions had emphasized the vital part that the for activation by 1 July 194fl), with its ac­ Air Corps would play in basic, unit, and com­ companying problems, required the direction bined training stages. It was known tht.t at and supervision obtainable only by a com­ the beginning of 1943, transports would be mand echelon provided for that purpose. coming off production lines in quantities Under the existing arrangement, parachute adequate for a major airborne operation, and units, upon completion of unit training at that the Air Corps was engaged in training Fort Benning under the Provisional Para­ a suitable force, pilots and staffs, for such au chute Group, passed to control of GHQ for operation. It had become evident that lack advanced training and preparation for com­ of effective coordination between the Air bat. At that stage, such units were only Corps and airborne troops was primarily due partially trained and equipped. Further to the absence of accurate, long-range in­ tactical training, in the form of battalio.n and formation of airborne transport requirements. regimental day and night jumps, loading and Obviously without such advance information, unloading of supplies and air transport, com­ the Air Corps would not properly train crews bat team exercises with air-landing units­ and perfect training to meet the requirements field artillery, infantry, and antitank-and of airborne troops. advanced training with air combat team, was As a solution to all of these problems, required. Colonel Gaither, in a memorandum to the It was the consensus of opinion of those Chief of Infantry, suggested the creation of 31 an "Air Infantry Training Command," pointing out the pressing need for such a Page 11,. of Pictures: 1. The Lockheed Airtrooper, smallest plane command to direct and coordinate all airborne tested by the E & M Section, and activities and concluding that without such 2. The C-97-largest plane tested! control, the airborne program might well bog 3 & 5. First mass test jump from the CG-4A glider. down deeply, both from lack of air transporta­ 4. Unloading the truck, 2% ton, 6x4, com­ tion and from lack of organization in advance plete with spare tire and wench (in back planning to carry it beyond the basic air seat), from the C-82. 6. Snatch Pickup. a development of ITCC. training for small parachute units which was More useful on War Bond Rallies than then being acomplished under the Chief of in combat. Infantry. 7. ·wall ace-Roberts about to establish an airfield. The reorganization of the War Depart­ 8. The CG-lOA, developed through the in­ ment and the Army, effected 9 March 194fl, sistance of ABC. paved the way for the constitution of such a command as had been" proposed by Colonel airborne forces for offensive action, this head­ Gaither. The creation of the Army Ground quarters proposes to form an Airborne Forces and the merging into one command Command. of the various Army agencies under which the several parachute and air-landing units "fl. The several components of an airborne were operating, simplified procedure and task force have progressed separately to a established unity of command. The establish­ point where their training and their common ment of the Army Air Forces, and the dele­ need for· air transport requires direction, gation to that headquarters of all functions, supervision and coordination obtainable only duties and powers, formerly exercised by the by a command echelon provided for that GHQ Air Force (Air Force Combat Com­ purpose. mand) and the Chief of the Air Corps, pro­ "3. The Airborne Command will operate vided one air force command to which air­ directly under this headquarters to: organize borne units, through Army Ground Forces, and train especially organized airborne could effect the coordination required to ground units such as parachute, air-landing provide the long-range planning which had infantry and artillery; continue airborne been so obviously lacking and which was es­ training of such other ground force units sential to controlled, progressive airborne as may be designated; control the allocation for training of such Air Corps transport air­ training. plane or glider units as may be made available B. Activation. by the Army Air Forces; coordinate training With the wheels now set in motion for a with Army Air Forces combat units; de­ suitable headquarters to control the training termine operating procedures for airborne of airborne troops and to provide effective operations and supply of large forces; and liaison with the Army Air Forces, Army cooperate with the Navy to determine operat­ Ground l<'orces now evidenced interest in the ing procedure for joint airborne-seaborne formation of a higher headquarters for all operations. airborne troops. In a memorandum to the "4. It is proposed to· move immediately the Chief of Staff, United States Army, on the Headquarters, Provisional Parachute Group subject of the Airborne Command, General from Fort Benning, Georgia, to Fort Bragg, MeNair (Commanding General, Army North Carolina, and redesignate that Group Ground Forces) stated: as the Airborne Command. "1. In order to provide properly trained "5. '"rhis information is f-urnished in view 32

designated to provide suitable officer para­ Page 15 of Pictures: chute volunteers to be given parachute train­ Illustrating all of the gliders developed and used in Airborne operations. ing at the School. The Airborne Command, as such, was activated ~1 March 194~ at Fort Benning, of the fact that such a command was not in­ Georgia, under the command of Colonel W. C. cluded in the original organization chart of Lee, and included the following units: the Army Ground Forces." Headquarters and Headquarters Com­ The Commanding Officer was empowered pany, Airborne Command. to activate airborne units under authority 50lst Parachute Infantry, less one from Army Ground Forces. Unit and air­ battalion (inactive). borne training and all organization were to 50~nd Parachute Infantry. be under the· direction of Army Ground 503rd Parachute Infantry (less 3rd Forces. Liaison with the Army Air Forces, Battalion, inactive, then at Fort Bragg, North formulation and development of tactical train­ Carolina) . ing doctrine, and development and standard­ 88th Infantry Airborne Battalion. ization of material and equipment were among Under the memorandum from the Com­ the primary functions of the Airborne manding General, Army Ground Forces, to Command. the Commanding Officer, Airborne Command, The Infantry School was to continue para­ it was agreed that the Airborne Command chute jump training with graduates being as­ should be transferred from Fort Benning, signed to the Airborne Command. The Re­ Georgia, to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on placement and School Command was or about 1 May 194~.

35 CHAPTER 3 EXPANSION AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Gener·al. Page 16 of P ·ictures: From the date of activation (~3 March Test - and - Development - and - Equipment - 194~) to the date of reorganization (~8 Feb­ and - Material - and - finally - The Airborne ruary 1944), the Airborne Command, in com­ Board had more fun than a Hutchinson bag full Gf unessential paratroopers. pliance with Army Ground Forces directive, 1. Casualty Loading, developed by ABC, later devoted the major portion of its time and taken over by ITCC. effort to the activation, training, equipping, 2. The AA Mount T-91 modified with old Kochevar contemplating more modifications. and preparation of units for combat. 3. A good idea before and ... During this period, the search for better 4. After! methods, perfected organization, and im­ 5. The "Control Patton." 6. Triple tow of puddle jumpers. proved equipment, was continuous. With the 7. The war ended just in time! expansion of the airborne effort from infantry 8. Whatever happened to them? alone to all elements of a division, other arms and services were developed and trained for of the Army Air Forces, and the activation airborne operations. In the attainment of of the I Troop Carrier Command, glider this objective, the assistance and cooperation training centers were established at Laurin­ of the various service schools were timely and burg-Maxton, North Carolina; Sedalia, Mis­ helpful; especially was this true with the souri; and Alliance, Nebraska, with the Field Artillery School, the Infantry School, greatest activity centered at Laurinburg­ and the Antiaircraft School of the Coast Maxton. Through coordination with Army Artillery. Air Forces, airborne units were later stationed Constant search was maintained for effec­ at each of these bases and there received ad­ tive lightweight weapons and vehicles to in­ vanced glider training. crease the fire power and mobility of airborne units. The requirement was not limited to The Parachute School at Fort Benning, air-transportability alone, for ammunition, Georgia, previously operating under the In­ in quantity, had to be moved with the piece. fantry School, was activated under the Air­ In most instances, after landing, both guns borne Command, and its facilities expanded and ammunition had to be man-handled into to meet the ever-increasing demand for para­ position. chute personnel. The problem of supply by air was recog­ The requirement for the establishment of nized as a challenge to the success of airborne a training camp for the exclusive usage of operations, and as such, the Airborne Com­ airborne troops resulted in the selection of mand devoted much time and thought to de­ Camp Mackall, North Carolina, as the loca­ velop methods and techniques to provide the tion, and construction was rushed through to proper solution. The development of a work­ completion in early 1943. able communication plan for large-scale air­ It is impossible in one chapter to fully borne operations, the perfection of organiza­ cover all important events occurring during tion, procurement of equipment, and training this period; therefore, this chapter is de­ of signal personnel were matters of primary voted primarily to outlining major events concern and major importance. in the development and expansion of the Air­ With the expansion of the glider program borne Command. Subsequent chapters will 36

the former administration building, was made Page 17 of Pictures: available for Airborne Command Head­ I. The Hart chute, claimed to be the best ever. quarters. Arrangements were completed to 2. The Triangular chute, claimed to be the use airplanes based at Pope Field for orienta­ best ever. tion flights and jump training. Suitable jump 3. The British foot bag, claimed to be the best ever. fields being nonexistent, two fields sufficient 4. The Elastic Line chute, claimed to be the for immediate training requirements were best ever. 5. The Derry chute, claimed to be the best selected and cleared. ever. With the Command Headquarters now es­ 6. Water Jump tests with new life vest, claimed to be the best ever. tablished at Fort Bragg, Colonel Lee set 7. TBM-3 jump tests-no claims. about the expansion of his staff by the ad­ 8. Pilot chute tests, claimed to be the best dition of key officers and enlisted personnel ever. 9. The German parachute, claimed to be the selected from the 88th Infantry Airborne best ever. Battalion. Colonel Chapman was selected as I 0, I I. Jump from Cub planes-all claims out­ rageous. Executive Officer, Lt. Colonel (later Brigadier General) Charles L. Keerans, S-4, and Cap­ tain (later Colonel) Hugh P. Harris, Assist­ be devoted in detail to activities such as train­ ant S-3. ing, test and development, personnel, etc. One of the first missions undertaken by B. Acti·vities F1·om 23 March 1942 to 15 the headquarters was the preparation and August 1942. publication of the "Instructional Pamphlet

On 9 April 194~ the headquarters was for Airborne Operations," based primarily on moved from Fort Benning to Fort Bragg, the findings of the 88th Infantry Airborne North Carolina. Prior to the movement, Battalion, and providing the information Colonels Lee, Chapman, and Miley had visited necessary in the planning and execution of Fort Bragg to survey facilities available for the movement of an airborne force; the train­ the Airborne Command Headquarters and the ing- of units in the technique of loading and 503d Parachute Infantry. For many years, unloading of airborne personnel and equip­ Fort Bragg had been known in Army circles ment, employing all available tvpes of air as the largest field artillery installation in the transports and gliders. This pamphlet, pre­ United States Army; consequently, the pared under the direction of the S-3, Lt. authorities there were inclined to view with Colonel (later Major General) James M. skepticism the encroachment of any other Gavin, provided the data used in the air­ arm of the service. The advance party, landing training of the Second Infantry Di­ therefore, was not received with open arms, vision later in 194~, and was the forerunner and initially the outlook was anything else but bright. Despite this chilly reception, of many such pamphlets prepared and pub­ suitable barracks, motor shops and sheds for lished bv the Airborne Command in the Form the use of the regiment as parachute pack­ of "Training Bulletins," for the guidance of ing, maintenance, rigging and drying build­ airborne troops in the loading and unloading ings, were secured. Modifications necessary techniques of infantry, artillery, antiaircraft, to adequately provide space and facilities to engineer, signal corps, quartermaster, ord­ meet the requirements of the 503d were ac­ nance and medical units. Additional training complished at an expense of $~7,000. A por­ aids in the form of training films and film tion of the old 9th Division area, including strips were prepared and made available not 39 only to airborne units but also to all units undergoing air-landing training. Page .1 8 of Pictures: 1. Assorted Brass at 11th Division Maneuvers, This project was initiated in early May observing consumption of taxes. 194~, and by ~0 September 194~ instruc­ 2. HQ-1944. They never did get that light tional pamphlets, training films and film strips bulb over the door! 3. Maj. Gen. McAuliffe, the 5th and last CG. were available for troop instruction. 4. Friday Afternoon Tea Jump. In earlv June, the Airborne Command and 5. Maj. Beaty Receiving the Hart "Supreme :;acrifice" Award upon completion of his the 503d ~Parachute Infantry were inspected I OOth jump. The official citation read: "To at Fort Bragg by Secretary of War Stimson, the Superest of the Dooperest for having Chief of Staff General Marshall, Prime Min­ proved conclusively that the most necessary piece of equipment of the parachutist in ister Winston Churchill, and other dignitaries flight is Parachute, complete with Harness." and officers of high rank. Shortly following Behind Mr. Hart is the famous German this inspection, the Second Battalion, 503d Parachutist, Col. General Chester von und Parachute Infantry; left the United States De-Gravvstein. 6. Illustrating the Approved School Solution. for further training in England, thus being 7. The Hollywood Tour-78 men in one B-17! the first airborne unit to move overseas. 8. Snow Jump in Milwaukee. Activation of new units and the expansion of others now followed in rapid order. The the two divisions under Second Army not-only 504th Parachute Infantry was activated effec­ for administration but also for ground train­ tiYe 1 May 194~; The Parachute School was ing. However, General MeNair ruled against activated under the Airborne Command, 15 this division of training responsibility, and May 194~; the 3d Battalion, 503d Parachute the Airborne Command was given the full Infantry, 8 June 194~; Battery A, ~15th responsibility of the training of the two newly Field Artillery Battalion, 15 June 194~; activated divisions. 700th Coast Artillery Battery, Separate General (later Lieutenant General) (AW), ~7 July 194~; 505th Parachute In­ Mathew B. Ridgway was assigned to com­ fantrv 6 Julv 194~; 506th and 507th Para- ~ ' ~ mand the 8~d Airborne Division, and on 15 chute Infantry H.egiments, ~0 July 194~. August 194~ General I .. ee relinquished com­ General Lee had been ordered to England to mand of the Airborne Command which he observe and study British airborne organiza­ had been instrumental in developing from the tion and technique, and to make recommenda­ initial stage of a "Test Platoon" in 1940, to tions concerning the organization and employ­ a command with corps responsibilities in 194~, ment of airborne troops in operations then to assume command of the lOlst Airborne under consideration by the combined Chiefs Division. General Chapman assumed com­ of Staff. Upon his return to the United mand of the Airborne Command on 16 August States, he recommended the activation of an 194~. airborne division in the United States Army. On 30 July 194~ Army Ground Forces C. Acti.vities Fmnz 16 Angust 191/E to 15 ordered the activation of two airborne divi­ November 191,3. sions-the S~d and lOlst-effective 15 With two airborne divisions activated and August 194~ at Camp Caliborne, Louisiana, the activation of additional divisions, separate activation to be accomplished by the Third regiments, and battalions contemplated in the Army with the divisions assigned to Second immediate future, expansion of the Airborne Army for administration and to the Airborne Command Headquarters was necessary to Command for training. properly plan, coordinate and supervise the I nitially, consideration was given to placing many airborne activities then engaged in. On 40

landing training to all airborne units. Also Page 19 of Pictures: in November, the cargo glider, CG-4, was Illustrating time consumption at ABC. W e became the fir st wearers of the Glider Wings checked out of the experimental stage at by undergoing rigorous and rugged glider in­ ·wright Field, Ohio, and in limited quantity, struction. ( Prigge flunked the first class so was made available for the training of these f!Ot into two pictures.) We demonstrated that anybody could be a paratrooper, and dropped two divisions. Knuckle Knob Rockefeller to prove it. We In addition to its other responsibilities, the played baseball and repeatedly demonst:ate,d Airborne Command had been directed by that Smith's (ORC) team could beat Qumto f. Army Grou.nd Forces to train the Second In­ (RA). The last photo illustrates Final Maneuvers at ABC-and a good one it was! fantry Division for movement by air trans­ port. This mi ssion was carried out in Texas in September and October 194~, with Fort ~0 August 194~ authorization for such ex­ Sam Houston as the base of operations. In­ pansion was provided by Army Ground structional teams were organized and dis­ Forces directive, creating a general staff. patched to San Antonio; mockups of the C-47 Organizational plans for the 8~nd and and C-46 transports were constructed; the 101st Airborne Divisions called for the as­ division was streamlined by the deletion of signment of the 50~nd Parachute Infantry non-airtransportable equipment and non­ to the lOlst Airborne Division and the 504th essential personnel; combat teams were or: Parachute Infantry to the 8~nd Airborne Di­ ganized; and the necessary coordination ef­ vision, assignment to be accomplished when fected with the Army Air Forces. The train­ the divisions were moved from Camp Caliborne ing of the division in the loading and to l<"'ort Bragg, in October 194~. Personnel lashing of its equipment was only the initial for other parachute elements (artillery, stage in this training program. Staff func­ engineer, medical, etc.) were to be recruited tioning in the planning and preparation for within the divisions, received individual para­ an air movement was outlined and emphasized; chute training at the Parachute School, then details including movement to marshalling rejoin the divisions at Fort Bragg to complete areas adjacent to airdromes; control of traf­ individual, unit, and combined training. fic at the airdrome; methods of enplaneing; In October 194~ the 8~nd and 101st Air­ liaison with troop carrier elements ; organiza­ borne Divisions moved to Fort Bragg where tion for control after landing, and all other they were joined by the 50~nd and 504th essentials were fully covered. Parachute Infantry Regiments, and im­ As a second phase in the training program, mediately engaged in an intensive training a flying CPX was prepared and conducted. program. The month of October also The third and final phase consisted of the air witnessed the departure of the first parachute movement of the division, by combat teams unit to the Pacific Theater of Operation, this (because of limited aircraft available), to unit being the 503d Parachute Infantry­ Brackettville and Del Rio, Texas. later to win fame at Lae, Salamaua and Coincidental with the training of the Sec­ Corregidor. ond Division, an airborne team was conduct­ In November 194~ the Army Air Forces ing tests in determining procedures of air glider base at Laurinburg-Maxton, North supply at the Desert Training Center in Cali­ Carolina, was completed and made available fornia. As a result of the findings of this for the glider training of airborne units by team, on 15 NovembeT 194~, a draft copy the I Troop Carrier Command. of the Field Manual FM 31-40, "Supply of A glider school was constituted at Laurin­ Ground Units by Air," was submitted to burg-Maxton with the mission of giving air- Army Ground Forces by Headquarters Air- 43 borne Command. It was realized that this and Army Air Forces station troops-a total draft did not provide the "last word" in aerial of approximately 32,000 troops. The site supply procedure, but it did make available consisted of approximately 18,000 acres; in written form valuable data not heretofore 2,000 acres for cantonment areas, 5,000 acres available, and after much discussion and very for small arms ranges, 1,000 acres for the little change, was published in May 1943. airfield, and 10,000 acres for the maneuver On 9 November 1942 construction began area. on the new airborne training center. Pre­ On 27 November 1942 orders were received liminary suneys had been in progress for directing "the activation of the 11th Airborne some time and a general location known as the Division at the new camp at Hoffman, North "Sandhills Recreation Area," near Hoffman, Carolina, followed on 31 December by orders North Carolina, and approximately forty for the activation of the 17th Airborne Di­ miles from the Fort Bragg military reserva­ VISIOn. 'iVith this added incentive, construc­ tion, had tentatively been agreed upon prior tion of the new camp was pushed with the to final authorization by the 'iV ar Depart­ greatest vigor. On 25 February 1943 the ment. Consisting of 97,000 acres, 65,000 of 11th Airborn Division was activated at the which were government-owned at the time, new camp, and on 4 Aprill943 Headquarters this area was deemed ideally located for an Airborne Command was officially opened at airborne training installation. Although Camp Mackall, North Carolina, which was clos·e to existing airfields, the entire area was the name given to the new camp in honor remarkably clear of air traffic. Numerous of Private John T. Mackall, the first air­ large and reasonably level areas were available borne soldier to give his life in the invasion and suitable for parach~te drop zones and of North Africa. glider landing areas; the sandy loam soil as­ While construction of Camp Mackall was sured quick drainage; the terrain was well in progress, training activities at Fort Bragg adapted for ground training and maneuvers; and Laurinburg-Maxton were under full records showed the area free of flood dangers headway, with both the 82nd and 101st Air­ and health surveys indicated generally favor­ borne Divisions rapidly completing training able conditions; railroad transportation was required prior to their release to theater of assured by the nearby Seaboard Railroad operation commanders. Parachute operations lines. With proper pumping and filtering centered in the Bragg Area with Pope Field equipment, an ample water supply was avail­ as the air operations base, while glider train­ able, and nearby power companies could ing was centered at Laurinburg-:-Maxton furnish all necessary electrical power without Ar.my Air Base, with units of both the di­ the need of camp power installation. The area visions being moved successively to this base was in the heart of the North-South Carolina to undergo advanced airborne training. Maneuver Area, which minimized the difficul­ The outstanding highlight of this period ties entailed in staging division or other large­ was the visitation to the Command on 22-24 scale maneuvers, and the location of air bases March 1943 of a party of distinguished · at Pope Field, Laurinburg-Maxton, Florence notables including Anthony Eden, Foreign and Lumberton assured adequate departure Minister of Great Britain, Sir J olm Dill, bases for large-scale airborne maneuvers. Chief of Staff General Marshall, and many Approved plans called for a camp to ac­ others. To provide a realistic demonstration commodate Headquarters Airborne Com­ of the capabilities of airborne troops, both mand, two airborne divisions, five parachute the 82nd and 1 01st Airborne Divisions were regiments, the necessary station complement, employed in a simulated attack of the Fcrt 44 Forces, which agency recognized the training followed in the planning and execution of air­ value of such procedure to elements of the borne missions in combined operations. Troop Carrier Command. The recommendations of this board were In preparation for such a maneuver for the published as War Department Training 101st Airborne Division, which was nearing Circular No. ll3, "Employment of Airborne completion of its training, the Airborne Com­ and Troop Carrier Forces." Throughout the mand organized its first maneuver directorate remainder of W oriel War II, adherence to the and completed all necessary preparations for general principles outlined therein prevailed, the staging and direction of a full-scale and the basic principles outlined therein were maneuver to be held in the vicinity of Camden, determined to be basically sound and not re­ South Carolina, on fl4.cfl8 May 1943. Fol­ quiring major change. lowing this maneuver, the 101st Airborne During the months of August and Septem­ Division, reinforced by the 506th Parachute ber 1943 the expansion program of the Air­ Infantry, participated in the Tennessee borne Command was practically completed. Maneuver under Second Army. During the The 464th and 466th Parachute Field progress of these maneuvers and prior to its Artillery Battalions were activated on 1 departure overseas, the division engaged in August 1943; and 13th Airborne Division was an airborne CPX, prepared and directed by activated at Fort Bragg, 13 August 1943, Headquarters Airborne Command. with Brigadier General (later Major In July 1943 the Second Airborne Infantry General) George \tV. Griner, commanding; Brigade was activated at Camp Mackall, with the 597th Airborne Engineer Company was Brigadier General George P. Howell as Com­ activated 1 August 1943; and 541st Para­ manding General. After completion of or­ chute Infantry, 1~ August 1943. To super­ ganization and training, the Brigade was vise the training of the several separate field ordered overseas in December 1943. Colonel artillery units then existing, the 407th Field (later Brigadier General) Ridgely Gaither Artillery Group was activated at Camp Mac­ succeeded General Howell as Commandant of kall, 5 August 1943. On 1 September, the the Parachute School. 54~d Parachute Infantry was activated at Fort Benning, Georgia. On 10 July 1943 the Command, as well as During late September and early October all airborne units, was electrified by the news 1943 General Chapman having been ordered that the 8fld Airborne Division had spear­ to the European Theater as an observer, headed the allied invasion of Sicily. Despite Major General Swing assumed command dur­ the fact that later detailed reports revealed ing his absence. On 15 November 1943, that planning and execution of this mission shortly after his return, General Chapman left much to be desired, the effect on morale was assigned to command the 13th Airborne and the stimulus to training were immediate. Division. On 16 November Brigadier General Many principles of employment, long ad­ Leo Donovan assumed command of the Air­ vocated by airborne commanders and gen­ borne Command. erally recognized as essential to the success of airb01;ne operations, were violated in the D. Activities from 16 November 1943 to planning and execution of this mission. As ~8 February 194 . ~- a result, by '¥ar Department directive, a The outstanding events in the history of the board was constituted, comprising representa­ Airborne Command during this period were tives of the War Department, Army Air combined airborne-troop carrier maneuvers Forces, and Airborne Command, with the staged in December 1943 and January 1944, mission of recommending procedure to be under the direction of combined airborne- 46 troop earner maneuver headquarters con­ policy and providing the instrumentability stituted for that purpose. under which such training and maneuver could Combined maneuvers under such a director­ be accomplished. ate had long been the objective of the Air­ Combined airborne-troop carrier head­ borne Command, not only as a training quarters was established 1~ November 1943 exercise of inestimable value and a test of at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, with readiness for combat for Loth airborne and Brigadier General Frederick W. Evans, Di­ troop carrier forces employed but also as the rector of 1\Ianeuver, and Brigadier General most suitable means of effecting the coordina­ Leo Donovan, Co-Director, and plans were tion required between the two agencies in the developed for the combined maneuver to be planning and execution of a major airborne staged from 6 to 10 December 1943. (For operation. the January maneuver, this order was re­ Troop Carrier recognized the value of such versed.) procedure, however, participation in com­ The 11th Airborne Division, reinforced by bined training and maneuver had been ham­ the 50lst Parachute Infantry, constituted the pered by overseas shipment of troop carrier airborne force (attacking force). One com­ units on short notice and without suitable bat team from the 17th Airborne Division, replacements, resulting in the frequent dis­ reinforced by one battalion of the 54lst Para­ ruption of carefully planned training activi­ chute Infantry, composed the defending force. ties of both airborne and troop carrier units. The scope of the maneuver called for an Then too, in all prior combined maneuvers, operational period of five days, the use of troop carrier units and staffs had been made four departure air bases, flying of a circuitous available on such short notice, and in such route of approximately ~00 miles with at least limited number, that in many instances the one-half of the landings and assembly of air­ normal functions of troop carrier staffs had, borne units to be made at night; reinforce­ of necessity, been performed by airborne ment, resupply, evacuation, and other sup­ staffs. Such procedure was definitely unsatis­ port to be effected by air only. factory, unrealistic, and not conducive to the During the exercise, the 53rd Troop Car­ attainment of success in combat airborne rier Wing utilized ~00 C-47 transport air­ operations. craft and ~34 CG-4A gliders (most of which The Airborne Command had repeatedly were flown in double tow); landing 10,~8~ brought this matter to the attention of the men, either by parachute drop, glider, or air­ Army Ground Forces, insisting that remedial landing. One thousand, five hundred four action be taken to correct this situation. tons of equipment and supplies, including ~95 The solution was provided on ~ November ~.::'1-ton trucks, 48:1/b -ton trailers, and 3~6 tons 19-13 on which date Loth Army Ground Forces of supplies, were flown in and landed. and Army Air Forces issued directives cover­ Total casualties for the maneuver, includ­ ing ''.T oint Training of Airbome and ,-rroop ing air and ground operations, were two Carrier LTnits," setting forth the training fatalities and 48 minor injuries.

47 CHAPTER 4 THE AIRBORNE CENTER

A. General. 103rd Divisions completed the course of in­ The Airborne Command was reorganized struction and the instructional teams were and redesignated as the Airborne Center by prepared to move to the next two divisions War Department order, effective 1 March when orders were received from Army Ground 1944. Forces cancelling the remainder of the train­ In effect, the mission of the Airborne ing program, because of the "stepped-up" Center was essentially the same as its predeces­ movement of these divisions to theaters of sor, the Airborne Command. However, the operation. sizable reduction of the troop list, occasioned B. Trainimg Detachnunts, Schools, and by the completion of training and departure Demonstrations. of the 11th and 17th Airborne Divisions and In December 1944, in compliance with various other small combat units, and the Army Ground Forces directive, participation shifting of major administration functions in joint airborne-troop carrier training of to other headquarters, materially alleviated troop carrier combat crew replacements was the responsibilities of the headquarters and initiated. decreased the demands made on it by sub­ At that time the I Troop Carrier Com­ ordinate units making possible a reduction of mand, Army Air l<'orces, operated four re­ personnel and reorganization of staff. placement training unit bases, located at In lieu of a general ~taff section, four Bergstrom Field, Austin, Texas; George operating sections were created, these being : Field, Lawrenceville, Illinois; Sedalia Army Adjutant General Section; Organization, Air Field, Warrensburg, Missouri; and Doctrine and Training Section; Supply Sec­ Maulden Army Air Field, Maulden, Mis­ tion and Equipment and Material Section. souri. Each of these bases was engaged in With the departure of airbome units to the training of approximately eighty-five re­ overseas theaters and the reorganization and placement crews per month. reassignment of others as outlined above, the To orient, indoctrinate, and instruct these training of airborne units, heretofor~ the combat crew replacements on pertinent air­ major function of the headquarters, was prac­ uome subjects, an airborne instructional team tically completed. Only three airborne units was placed on detached serYice at each replace­ remained--the 13th Airborne Division, the ment training unit base. 541st Parachute Infantry, and the 464th Ground school training comprised a com­ Parachute Field Artillery Battalion. Airborne prehensive course in the organization of air­ training of these units was completed under home troops, the procedures that airborne the Airborne Center in late 1944 and early troops were taught, and the knowledge and 1945 and all three units proceeded to the requirements expected of troop carrier crews theaters of operations. in order to obtain maximum effectiveness in To complete the air-transport training of airborne-troop carrier operations. these divisions within the time limit imposed Flying training included actual flying by the Army Ground Forces schedule, fiye problems, involving the dropping of free instructional teams were organized to do the bundles and bundles from pararacks, con­ job. Plans called for the use of sixty CG-4A cluding with the planning and execution of mockups for each diYision. The 84th and a demonstration parachute drop involving 48 the employment of actual troops and equip­ demonstrations has continued regularly since ment~ consisting of one p'arachute infantry that date. platoon, one parachute field artillery gun sec­ Another activity engaged in by the Air­ tion, and one parachute engineer squad. In borne Center, which also can be termed as co­ the absence of combined airborne-troop car­ operation with the Army Air :Forces, is the rier training (not possible because all major conduct of the "airborne training in safe load­ airborne units were in theaters of operations) ing for Army Air Forces glider pilots." The this procedure provided the means whereby value of such. training was recognized by the these replacements were prepared for opera­ airborne headquarters in the early stages of tions with airborne trops, and proved to be joint airborne-troop carrier training. How­ of such value that at the request of I Troop ever, the opportunity to engage in such a · Carrier Command, it was continued and re­ training program for glider pilots was uot Jnained in effect as of 1 September 1945. present until early June 1944 at which time In September 1943, at the request of Head­ Headquarters I Troop Carrier Commaud, quarters Army Air Forces, arrangements Stout Field, Indianapolis, Indiana, directed were completed by the Airborne Center to that sixteen hours of loading, lashing, and provide a short course of instruction on air­ balance, be incorporated into the glider pilot borne tactics and techniques for Army Air training course. Troop carrier officials at Forces staff classes, after their completion of Laurinburg-Maxton having no instructors the course of instruction at the Command qualified to prepare and conduct such train­ and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, ing, called upon Airborne Center for assist­ Kansas and as a part of their general orienta­ ance which was gladly provided. By 1 Sep­ tion on the functions of the various Army tember 194.5 sixteen such classes had been Ground Forces commands. Four such classes instructed under the supervision of the Air­ received instruction under Airborne Com­ borne Center, and the continuance of this mand between 11 September 1943 and 24 type of instruction was contemplated as long November 1943. On 24 December 1943, as desired by the Army Air Forces. Headquarters Army Air Forces, stating that C. ThmteTs of Opemtions Detachments. this course of instruction had proven to be of such interest and value, requested that ar­ Being charged with the responsibility of rangements be made to provide similar in­ developing and recommending the organiza­ stmction to each Air Forces class completing tion and doctrine, tactics and techniques of airborne troops, Headquarters Airborne the course at the Command and General Staff Center, early in l 944, felt a crying need for School. Subsequently ten classes received a constant and continuous contact with airborne three-day course of instruction under the troops in both theaters of operations. It was direction of the Airborne Center.

fully~ reali7.ed that airborne organization , In May 1944, in compliance with the re­ equipment, and material were not perfect, quest of Headquarters Army Air Forces having been hastily consummated and pro­ School of Applied Tactics, Orlando, Florida, curer] to meet emergency requirements, and arrangements were completed for a tactical being recognized at the time as only the most demonstration, staged monthly for the suitable expedient readily available. orientation and edification of graduates of Headquarters First Allied Airborne Army, senior officers attending the Army Air Forces on 29 August 1944, initiated a request, Tactical Center. The first demonstration was through channels, for four officers and twenty staged 15 .June 1944 and at the request of the enlisted men from Airborne Center to be Army Air Forces, participation in such placed on temporary duty with that head- 49 quarters for a period of approximately ninety public with an opportunity to view, at first days. This request having received the ap­ hand and on a miniature scale, the work of proved of the VV ar Department and the neces­ airborne troops, Troop Carrier Command, sary orders issued by Army Ground Forces, and Army Air Forces, in simulated combat this detachment was prepared and shipped by operations, as practiced in the European and air, arriving in the theater on !'l8 September Pacific '!~heaters of operation. 1944. Evidence of its attainments are best In each city visited, weather permitting, evaluated by the remarks of the Deputy Chief an "Airborne Attack" was launched in the of Staff, First Allied Ai1:borne Army, in a logical sequence used so successfully in com­ letter addressed to the Commanding General, bat operations; .First, a parachute echelon Army Ground Forces: "This detachment, dropped and seized a landing area; second, since its arrival, has been and is conducting reinforcements consisting of glider-borne a series of tactical evaluation tests relating troops with artillery, antitank guns, and to the development of airborne equipment, transportation, were flown in and landed; procedure and technique. This work has been third, resupply was landed by both parachute most beneficial and it is essential that it be and glider; and fourth, wounded were continued." evacuated by gliders snatched by troop car­ rier planes in flight. D. WaT Bond Demonstration Teams. These demonstrations were witnessed by In Aprill945, at the request of the United thousands in each city visited and to use the States Treasury Department and in com­ phraseology of most newspaper accounts, "the pliance with Army Ground Force orders, three Airborne Attack demonstration with its War Bond Airborne Demonstration teams thundering planes and whistling gliders at­ (each team consisting of" four officers and !'l8 tracted probably the largest crowd ever enlisted men) were organized and prepared gathered in this city." Prior to and follow­ to be staged in 54 of the largest cities in the ing demonstrations the public was invited to United States. inspect airborne equipment such as transport The demonstrations, sponsored jointly by planes and gliders. During the "Airborne the 'Var and Treasury Departments as a Attack," by the use of public address sys­ feature of the Sixth and Seventh War Loan tems, narrators informed the spectators as to Drive, were staged to provide the American the tactics and techniques employed.

50 WHERE AIRBORNE UNITS FOUGHT

UNIT DATE oF AcTION PLACE oF AcTION TYPE oF AcTION

509th Parcht. In£. Bn. 8 Nov. 42 *Oran, North Africa First American use of air­ borne troops.

15 Nov. 42 *Youks Les Bains, Tunisia Contact French troops and proceed to Gafsa, Tunisia for attack; at Gafsa en­ countered Italian troops.

Nov. 42 *F~id Pass, Tunisia Demolition action and in­ fantry contact with Italian troops.

(Radioman, Pathfinders) Sept. 43 *Island of Ischia off the Captured garrison and coast of Naples, Italy Radar units.

14 Sept. 43 *Avellino, Italy Attacked 25 miles behind enemy line.

22 Jan.- Anzio, Italy Sent to hold beachhead. 1 April 44

Dec.-J an. 45 "Belgian Bulge"

82d Airborne Division 9-10 July 43 ·*Gela, Trapani, Palarimo First large scale airbornt~ operation-night operation.

14 Sept. 43 *Salerno, Italy Reinforcements to hold beachhead.

5-6 June 44 *Normandy, France Disrupt Nazi Communica­ tions and supply.

82d Airborne 17 Sept. 44 *N ijmegen, Holland Seize and hold highway bridges across Mass River at Grave and Waal River at Nijmegen.

20 Dec. 44- Stavelot, Trois- "Belgian Bulge." 17 Feb. 45 Pants, Hablemont Seigfried Defenses, Undenbreth, to the Roer

April-May 45 Elbe River Assault across Elbe River­ Bleckede Area Contacted Russians at Gra­ bow.

504th Prcht. In£. Regt. 14 Sept. 43 *Altavilla, Italy Reinforce Salerno Beach­ head.

Oct.-Dec. 43 Venafro, Italy Ground fighting.

22 Jan. 44- Anzio, Italy Sent to hold beachhead. 1 April 44

505th Prcht. In£. Regt. 15 Sept. 43 Sai'erno to Naples, Italy Beachhead landing - weeks of fighting. • Denotes airborne assaults. 51 WHERE AIRBORNE UNITS FOUGHT

UNIT DATE OF AcTIOK PLACE oF AcTION TYPE oF AcTION

(Two battalions) Oct. 43 Yilla Litorno to Volturno Ground action with British Ri,·er, Italy X Corps.

First Airborne Task Force: 15 Aug. 44 *Southern France Spearhead invasion. 517th Prcht. Inf. Regt. 460th Prcht. F.A. Bn. 163rd Prcht. F.A. Bn. 509th Prcht. Inf. Bn. 551 st Prcht. In f. Bn. 550th Glider Inf. Bn. 596th A/ B Engr. Bn.

101st Airborne Division 5-6 June 44 ;+Normandy, France Seize Causeways, disrupt Nazi communications and supply.

17 Sept. 44 *Eindho,·en, Holland Seize the four highway and railway bridges over the As River and Williams Vaart Canal at Vechel, seize bridge at St. Oedenrode seize Eindhoven and bridges.

19 Dec.- Bastop;ne, Belgium "Belgian Bulge." 15 Jan. 45

Apr. 45 Germany-Berchtesgaden Ground fighting.

11th Airborne Division Jan. 45 Lcyte. P. I. Boat landing- an artillery battalion dropped by para­ chute.

1 Feb. 45 ~ asugbu, Luzon Amphibious operation with the glider elements of the division.

3 Feb. 45 *Tagaytay, Luzon Im·asion of South Luzon.

:23 Feb .. 45 *Los Banos Camp, Luzon Raided prison camp, liberat­ ing 2,146 American civilians.

~Iar. 4.5 Cavite, Manila, Ground fighting. Batangas, Luzon

11th Airborne Division 2.5 June 'M *Luzon Parachutists, gliders (used for first time in Pacific Theater).

Aug. 45 Honshu, Japan First troops to arrive at Honshu-air-landed.

17th Airborne Division .Jan.-Feb. 45 Flamierge, Flamizoule, "Belgian Bulge." Clervaux, Belgium

24 :Mar. 45 *Across the Rhine at Start of rush to Berlin. Wesel

• Denotes airborne assaults. 52 WHERE AIRBORNE UNITS FOUGHT

UNIT DATE OF AcTION PLACE oF AcTION TYPE oF AcTION

.5 03d Prcht. Inf. Regt. 5 Sept. 43 *Lae, Salamaua, To cut off route of escape of New Guinea 20,000 Japanese fleeing from Salamaua and Lae.

3 July 44 *N oemfoer Island To capture main airdrome.

16 F eb. 45 *Corregidor, P. I. Destroy enemy guns from the rear.

April 45 N egros Island, P. I. 67 days of continuous • fighting.

13th Airborne Division April 45 Marshalling areas, Reserve troops France • Denotes airborne assaults.

53 Price: $13.95

l:lad A.I&BOILNB Jtllt A.IIUIOaJq lltll A.JRBORNB 17th A.IRBORNB Uth A.IRBOa:NS DIVISION DIYJIION DIVIIION DJVUJON DIVIIION

BNGINIID UPaODUC'riON IIIC'riON A.I&BORNB DAINING DB'I'ACBMBN'I'

XVIII A.I&BORNB C08PI lit ALLDD .U.BORNB AUIY

AIRBORNE COMMAND

Zad A.I&BORNa IUild PARA.CRU'EE 5Sllt PARACRUU lit AiaBORNB BIUGA.DB INI'A.N'l'aY JNPANDY .BRIGA.DB Stilt PARACBUTJ: 512ad PARACBUTB 503rd PARACBUTB SIIUl PARACIIUD ltltll PARACBVft INI'ANTRY INFANTRY INFANTRY INI'ANTR'I' UfrANTRY

Slltll PARACBUftl AIBBORNB DfPAKD'I' BNGINBBRS

lt7tll PARACBUTB INFANTR'I' 51'7th PARACBUTB INFANTRY

AIRBORNE COMMAND

515th PARACBUTB 5Uth PARACBUTB 51lth PARACHUTE 5ttill PARACBU'I'B ltiUl PARACBUft INFANTRY INI'ANTR'I' INFANTRY INI'AN'I'RY JHrANTR'I'