Airborne Command
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Beaty, from the files of Harold Beaty, Lt. Col. C.E. (ORC) A HISTORY OF AIRBORNE COMMAND AND AIRBORNE CENTER $13.95 Number 3 in our reprint series. REPUBLISHED BY THE Antietam National Museum 135 W. Main Street Sharpsburg, Maryland JAMES M. PHILLIPS, Director Mail All Correspondence To: JIM PHILLIPS P. 0. Box 168 Williamstown, N.J. 08094 I. Sf B. N. 0-932572-04-9 LCC 78-71270 "' - ..... -- f""\- .. , ~ -. .. - .. - - ... ~ MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM C. LEE "The First Airborne Soldier" BRIG. GENERAL JOSIAH T. DALBEY "He Developed The Idea" A HISTORY OF AIRBORNE COMMAND CHAPTER I EARLY HISTORY TO ACTIVATION A. General under cover of darkness for the purpose of The early history of the "Airborne Effort" sabotage and espionage to mass landings in is, in effect, a compilation of facts and data daylight of two or more reinforced divisions relating the concepts, efforts, acomplishments, in the face of determined enemy resistance. and problems of a few individuals who en visioned (with the development and expansion B. Background of airpower) the unlimited possibilities for For over a decade there had been sporadic the utilization of air transportation, to experiments in the airborne field. During the project into combat an offensive striking force early 'SO's airplanes were used extensively which might well be capable of determining as carriers of cargo and personnel. The Rus the outcome of battles. It is extremely doubt sian and British armies had transported ful if these "Airborne Thinkers" initially troops by air and also landed troops by para realized the full significance of this newly con chute. In 1931 Major General Preston ceived striking force, and certainly not even Brown, Commanding General of the Panama the most optimistic anticipated that ultimate Canal Department, moved Battery "B" of ly five airborne divisions, six separate regi the flnd Field Artillery from France Field ments, and four separate battalions would be across the Isthmus to Rio Hato, Canal Zone, activated, trained, and committed to combat. a distance of ninety miles by air transport. Nor was it possible to visualize the mass em The following year Captain (later Lieutenant ployment of airborne troops eventually ac General) George C. Kenney astounded his complished in Normandy, Southern France, colleagues during maneuvers at Fort DuPont, Holland, or the crossing of the Rhine. Delaware, by air-landing an infantry detach It is therefore of primary interest to know ment behind enemy lines. just how the "Airborne Effort" developed In 1933 Batteries "A," "B," "C," and from the original concept of a limited number Headquarters, ~nd Field Artillery were trans of "Airborne Thinkers" to the sizable air ported from Bejuca to Cherrara, Panama, a borne forces employed in World War II, both distance of thirty-five miles. in the European and Pacific Theaters of Operations; to visualize and understand the On 1~ March 1938 strong German forces multitudinous problems confronting those were air-landed at the Aspern Airport, individuals initially charged with the re Vienna, during the occupation of Austria. On sponsibility of experimenting with and de 7 October 1938 it was imperative for political veloping the project; to know how they solved reasons that occupation troops move into the the problems of personnel, equipment, supply, Silesian town of Freiwaldau. To accomplish air transportation, and training; and to see this movement, Von .Rundstedt utilized 305 how the doctrine of employment gradually Junkers 5~, in which he loaded a complete developed from the initial thought of small infantry regiment, approximately ~,800 men, combat groups landed within enemy territory with acompanymg weapons. The landing 5 was made on a very rough wheat field ncar Freiwaldau, with complete success. EXPLANATIONS OF THE PICTURES From these operations, it was generally The captions were left off all the photographs for two reasons: (I) it costs a lot of moola to cut deduced that small combat groups could be up a printed page with captions, and (2) many landed within enemy territory and were of the faces in the pictures are unrecognizable; and, capable of successfully performing specific since this book is published mainly for grand missions such as demolitions, destruction of children, the lack of captions will allow each in dividual to substitute imagination for conscience vital communication centers, bridges, other and to describe each portrayed incident as an his important structures. In addition, these small torical monument to his own steadfast devotion to units, when operating in conjunction with patriotic duty. Just to keep the record straight, there follows mechanized forces, could reconnoiter in the the official description of each photograph, direct area to obtain vital information, and seize from the files. The pies are numbered from left and hold key positions at a considerable dis to right, from top to bottom. From personal ex perience the editor suggests that these notes be torn tance from the main units, pending relief by from the book and imagination given full reign .. · .. mechanized forces. * * * * * Despite these conclusions, the matter of or Page 1 of Pictures:, ganizing and training such troops in the I. Dedication of Camp Mackall. United States Army did not receive serious 2. Review of 503rd Parachute Infantry by General Lee. consideration until after the Munich Con 3. Mascot of the IOlst Airborne Division. ference in 1938. In fact, on 6 May 1939 the 4. Review of 505th Parachute Infantry by Executive in the Office of the· Chief of Infantry General Ridgeway. suggested to G-3 of the War Department 5. South Carolina Maneuvers, Camden-Kershaw. 6. South Carolina Maneuvers, Camden-Kershaw. General Staff that consid~ration be given to 7. Advertisement for Indian Motorcycle Com the organization of a srriall detachment of pany. air infantry. It was noted that the infantry 8. 13th Airborne Division Maneuvers. regiment was adaptable to such an experi ment without material change in organiza after they landed. In the fall of 1939 at a tion, and that a study would determine the three-way conference of the Chiefs of kind of equipment and supply required, suit Enginers, Infantry, and Air Corps, the con able missions to be performed, degree of con tention of the Chief of Infantry obtainecl. trol to be exercised by higher command, and Thus airborne troops came under the control collaboration with the Air Corps in obtaining of this branch of the service. (The matter of the necessary aircraft. control of the project continued as a bone The initiation of the proposed study even of contention for some time, as will be dis tually led to a discussion as to which branch cussed later in this history.) should control the proposed development. The On 2 January 1940 the Chief of Infantry Chief of Engineers held that inasmuch as these was authorized by the War Department to troops were to be used primarily as saboteurs study the feasibility of air infantry and the and demolition crews, that their training and practicability of the air transport of all types employment should properly be under of ground troops included within the infantry Engineer direction. The Air Corps proposed division. Later in January the Infantry that they should be "Marines of the Air Board at Fort Benning, Georgia was directed Corps," to be designated as "Air Grenadiers." by the Chief of Infantry to conduct a pre The Chief of Infantry insisted that airplanes liminary study and to develop and submit a were but a means of transportation and that general plan for the project. On 25 April the primary mission of such airborne troops 1940 the War Department approved the was to fight on the ground as ground soldiers Chief of Infantry's plan to organize a test 6 - -----~ - platoon to function under the Infantry Board. In addition, the Material Command of the Page 2 of Pictures: Air Corps was directed to develop a parachute I. C-47 line up at Camp Mackall. 2. CG-4A line-up at Camp Mackall. which would permit safer jumping and land 3. Camden-Kershaw landings-considered quite ing from a low altitude. At the end of April good in those days. the Commanding Officer, Flight "B" of the 4. 17th Airborne Division Maneuvers-a snow job. 16th Observation Squadron, Lawson Field, 5. Camp Davis AA Units on Airborne training Georgia, was designated as the first airborne problem. liaison officer for the project, thereby estab 6. Daylight Landings at 13th Airborne lishing the first official liaison for joint opera Maneuvers. 7. Varieties of Brass watching 17th Airborne tions between the two army branches which Maneuvers. were ultimately to play predominant parts 8. AB-TCC Washington National Airport Air in the later developments of the "Airborne borne Show. Effort." While development of the airborne project its relationship to the development of the was in this rather nebulous state, the impor "Airborne Effort" in the United States Army.