Canadian Nuclear Association Association Nuclealre Canadienne

r „ ^ * ISSN 0706-1293

27th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

of the

CANADIAN NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION

Theme: "Meeting Society's Goals"

PROCEEDINGS

June 14-17, 1987 Saint John, New Brunswick Canada

Published by the Canadian Nuclear Association 111 Elizabeth Street Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5G 1P7

June 14-17, 1987

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

Frank MacLoon, NB Power Sponsoring Director Jan Burnham, NB Power Committee Chairman Dan Meneley, UNB CNA Program John Sommerville, NB Power CNS Program Bob Munro, NB Power Hotel Arrangements Diane Waechter, CNA Registrations Jim Weller, CNA CNA/CNS Representation Roger Steed, NB Power Exhibit Coordinator Terry Thompson, NB Power Public Affairs Jeff Jones, NB Power Publications Wendy Anderson-Gillespie, NB Power Spousal Program, Tours Janice Haig, NB Power Graphics and Printing John Paciga, NB Power Secretary Arlie Blizzard, NB Power Treasurer I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SESSION 1 - SETTING THE SCENE

PLANNING ENERGY SUPPLIES FOR PEOPLE O.J.C. Runnalls Chairman, Centre for Nuclear Engineering & Professor of Energy Studies University of Toronto

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S REGULATORY POLICY INITIATIVE AND THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY Antony Campbell Assistant Deputy Minister, Regulatory Affairs Office of Privatization and Regulatory Affairs 22

NUCLEAR REGULATION - IN TUNE WITH THE TIMES Z. Eomaratzki Director General Directorate of Reactor Regulation T.J. Molloy Manager, Components and Quality Assurance Division Atomic Energy Control Board 29

THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY'S RECORD OF SERVICE Dr. Norman Aspin, President Electrical, Electronics Manufacturers Association of Canada J.E. Wilson, Vice President Canadian Nuclear Association 42

NUCLEAR POWER IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: ONE YEAR AFTER CHERNOBYL Jean-Claude Charrault and Derek M. Taylor Commission of the European Communities 47

ROMANIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM: A PROGRESS REPORT Mihai Pop, Director General ISPE, Dr. Eng. John P. Karger, Resident Engineering Manager Mircea Tarta, Deputy Manager ISPE Constantin Ningiuc, Cernavoda Design Manager Institute of Nuclear Power Studies and Design 63 \

SESSION 2 - THE DIALOGUE WITH THE PUBLIC

TECHNOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC Gordon M. MacNabb (Panel Moderator & Panelist) Associate to the Principal, Queen's University; and President & Chief Executive Officer, Precarn Associates Inc 78

PANEL ON PUBLIC INFORMATION IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY Margaret A. Buhlman Vice President, Research Decima Research 86 Rino Castonguay Department des Sciences Cite' des Jeune A.-M. Sormany 87 Linden Maclntyre Journalist Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 90 P. Parker Fredericton High School 94 P.J. Spratt President, P.J. Spratt & Associates Inc 95

SESSION 3 - IAEA: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

THE AGENCY'S ROLE AND NEEDS IN THE PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY L.V. Konstantinov Deputy Director General, Dept. of Nuclear Energy and Safety International Atomic Energy Agency 101

THE OUTLOOK FOR NUCLEAR POWER AFTER CHERNOBYL L.L. Bennett Head, Economic Studies Section, Div. of Nuclear Power International Atomic Energy Agency 113

TRENDS TOWARDS IMPROVED OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS N.L. Char Director, Div. of Nuclear Power G. Samdani Div. of Nuclear Power D. White International Atomic Energy Agency 128 \

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY - THE IAEA SAFETY PROGRAMME Morris Rosen Assistant Deputy Director General Director, Division of Nuclear Safety International Atomic Energy Agency 147

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PLANT OPERATOR FOR IMPROVED SAFETY E.M. Yaremy Division of Nuclear Safety International Atomic Energy Agency 153

SESSION 4 - ECONOMIC GOALS AND OPERATING LESSONS

SLIGHTLY-ENRICHED FUEL FOR CANDU REACTORS P.R. Burroughs and G.H. Archinoff Design and Development Division - Generation Ontario Hydro 172

SUPPLY IN THE URANIUM FUEL CYCLE Jan Murray Secretary-General The Uranium Institute 190

IMPACT OF SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH ON THE U.S. POWER MARKET John R. Siegel Vice President, The Atomic Industrial Forum 203

DEVELOPING NEW PRODUCTS FROM CANADIAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY Dr. S.R. Hatcher, President Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Research Company 221

THE USE OF RADIOISOTOPES IN MEDICINE AND FOOD PROCESSING D.J.R. Evans Vice President, Isotope Division AECL Radiochemical Company 233

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE LESSONS FROM CHERNOBYL E.A. Warman Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation 238

CHERNOBYL SAFETY LESSONS FOR THE CANDU SYSTEM - A DESIGNER'S PERSPECTIVE G.L. Brooks Vice President & Chief Engineer Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 267

.... ,-. I SESSION 5 - PERFORMANCE GOALS

PICKERING NGS UNIT I - READY FOR SERVICE W.G. Morison, W.J. Penn, K.H. Talbot, B.J. Murdoch Ontario Hydro 272

RECENT OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AT GENTILLY 2 Joseph M. McNally Vice-President, Mauricie Region Michel L. Ross Adviser - Special Projects Hydro-Quebec 298 (f rench version) . . . •• 308

EXPERIENCE D1 EXPLOITATION D'UN PARC IMPORTANT DE CENTRALES NUCLE"AIRES L. Bertron Service de la Production Thermique Electricity de France 328

THE CANDU OWNERS GROUP - ORGANIZATION FOR THE FUTURE H.S. Irvine - Ontario Hydro J.E. Stevens - AECL A. Duchesne — Hydro—Quebec A.R. McKenzie - New Brunswick Power B.R. Collingwood - CANDU Owners Group 342

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND LONG TERM GOALS T.J. Sullivan Division Director, Engineering Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 362

RADIATION PROTECTION - THE FUTURE? R. Wilson Director, Health and Safety Division D.A. Lee Manager, Safety Services Department Ontario Hydro 379

LUNCHEON ADDRESSES

Sam G. Horton Chairman, Canadian Nuclear Association 386

R.W. Morrison Uranium and Nuclear Energy Branch Department of Energy, Mines and Resources 389 PLANNING ENERGY SUPPLIES FOR PEOPLE

0.J.C. Runnalls Chairman, Centre for Nuclear Engineering & Professor of Energy Studies University of Toronto Toronto, Ontario

WORLD POPULATION The world population grew relatively slowly during the first 1500 years after 1 A.D. from a starting level of about 300 million people. Then the total began to escalate more rapidly until today the population.stands at an estimated 5 billion as indicated in Figure l.U)UMJ' Fully 75% of that number live in less developed regions. These areas are sometimes referred to as the "South" and consist of Asia, Africa and Latin America as shown in Figure 2.' '

Figure 1 World Population (1) (2) t3)

soo IOOO ISOO 2.OQO 2500

Population projections up to the end of the century indicate that the less developed regions will grow at about .3.to 4 times the rate of more developed regions in the "North" (see Figure 3). Figure 2 Regions of the World (4)

North America Europe Industrialized Countries of the Pacific South Africa

Sou th: Asia Africa Latin America

Figure 3 Estimated World Population Growth

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V WORLD o «E

moat ocvcu»i>«e £«»<•<*« iOS •z

1 1 '960 1985 /99O /9S5 2000 By 2000 about 80% of the world's people will live in the South. As illustrated in Figure 4, the age distribution^in the two parts of the world will be markedly different as well '. The population in the North will be an aging one, whereas an increasing number of young people will be present in the South.

Figure 4 Age-Sex Composition of World Population (2)

MORE DEYELOPELO 1975 aooo

JOO zoo 100 zoo zoo JOO

LESS DEVELOPED 80* REGIONS

300 TOO

Many amongst the 4 billion in less developed regions will be living in squalor and below the poverty level. This is not to say, however, that their expectations for improvement will not be high, particularly in this modern electronic age where the good life being experienced by many in the North is visible for all to see. It will be apparent, therefore, that the problems in plan- ing future energy supplies are immense but must be solved if social chaos is to be avoided.

WORLD ENERGY SUPPLIES During the past 125 years, the sources of world primary,-energy supply have changed dramatically as shown in Figure 5. In 1860, wood was a very important source supplying some 70% of the total required. Now, however, its contribution is just a few percent even though many in the South rely on wood to provide heat for cooking and for warmth. The'use of coal peaked about 1920 and of oil some 60 years later.

During the last 75 years, nuclear power has been the only new source to appear in an amount large enough to show on Figure 5 ,- i.e. greater than 1% of the total. Towards the end of the century and beyond, there may be other sources that contribute significantly such as solar energy and synthetic liquids. For the moment, however, they are not economically competitive. That situation could change in future as conventional hydrocarbons become more expensive, and should technological advances render solar power more attractive.

Figure 5 . World Primary Energy Supply, 1860-2030

10 0-99

10 O-90

O-7O Q Id 0*0 % O-ZO u. 0

Oio 2 0 h iu iaso 1900 I93G 2OOO ZOSOOol

Since 1900, wQ?}d annual energy consumption has increased more than ten-fold (see Figure 6). Since during the same period population has grown 2.5 times, the per capita energy consumption has risen by a factor of 4. In recent years oil and natural gas have played a major role, providing 58% of the total in 1985, for example. However, the contribution of oil appears to have peaked about 1980 with indications that it is now on the decline. Natural gas is expected to follow the same path, but perhaps Figure 6 World Primary Energy Consumption During the Twentieth Century (6) (Exajoules or Gigatonnes Oil Equivalent)

4-00

- 8

1300 19*0 I960 1380 zooo

lagging by several decades.

Meanwhile, energy consumption will continue to grow to more than double or.triple the present level by the year 2060 as shown in Figure 7. The uncertainty alone in energy needs by then will be larger than the total consumption in 1985. One estimate out- lining how.this huge future demand might be met is set out in Figure 8. Clearly, from such a study one could conclude that coal will play the dominant role as an energy source in the 21st century. Serious environmental problems of acid gas and CC>2 emissions will have to be solved, however, before coal can Be burned on the scale envisaged in Figure 8 if a safe environment is to be preserved. Figure 7 World Primary Energy Production, 1960-2060 (4)

ZQOQ 2020 2O4O 20GO

Figure 8 Evolution of World Energy Supplies, 1960-2060

i960 1980 ZOOO Zozo 2O6O Future energy growth rates in the South will be nearly double those in the North as shown in Figure 9 although levels of energy consumption in 2060 will still be seven times lower per capita than in the more developed regions. The dominant sources of Figure 9 Levels of Energy Consumption (4)

HOKTH 4.7/ SOUTH f. 6*9 I 4.19 o QI.' O I I 0(6 I960 II9BQ 2000 2O2O ZO4O 2O6C

energy in the less developed regions in the early decades of the next century will be oil and hydro-electric power simply because 1 nature has provided that_part of the world with a greater endow- ment of those resources (see Figure 10).

External demand from the North for oil supplies will be particularly severe as the South moves to use more and more of its indigenous deposits internally. Thus, pressures will develop in the North to find economic substitutes for ever-more-expensive and diminishing quantities of crude oil. One such alternative is nuclear power.

THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER During the past fifteen years, the world annual consumption of nuclear energy has been growing rapidly, having increased,nearly ten-fold from 1972 to 1986 as illustrated in Figure 11. <»> m Most nuclear power plants are situated in the North as indicated from the graph showing 1986 output of nuclear power (Figure 12). Nonetheless, two developing countries, Taiwan and South Korea, have substantial programs which placed them among the top Figure 10 ._. Energy Production in Less Developed Regions

Oil.

1978 2000 2.020

twelve producers in the world in 1986. It should be noted that data for the USSR for 1986 were not available, but it is believed the Soviet Union would rank between Japan and West Germany in the scale of production shown in Figure 12. When per capita nuclear consumption is plotted as in Figure 13»git is seen that Sweden heads the list of nuclear power users. Only one developing country, Taiwan, falls within the top twelve.

Recent estimates by the Nuclear Energy Agency, NEA, in Paris and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, in Vienna indicate that^substantial growth in the nuclear industry/Vjf1 occur in WOCA* countries during the next forty years (see Figure 14). A wide range of uncertainty exists as evidenced by the large spread between the low and high estimates. In fact, the uncertainty between the two projections is some three times larger

* World Outside Centrally-Planned-Economies Areas Figure 11 .,. ... .g. World Annual Consumption of Nuclear Energy IbOO

IS6S 1915 1935 1995 than the total installed nuclear generating capacity in 1986.

AVAILABILITY OF URANIUM Even when considering the low estimate for installed nuclear capacity shown in Figure 14, substantial uranium resources will be required to provide fuel for the plants expected to be in service during the ensuing forty years. Projections of the range of cumulative uranium needed for two different-reactor strategies have been published recently by the NEA/IAEA (see Figure 15). Should fast breeder reactors be introduced in appreciable numbers during the 1990's, uranium requirements will be reduced below the amount needed when water-cooled reactors utilizing the conventional once-through fuel strategy are employed. Because of a slow r

Figure 12 1986 Output of Nuclear Power (8)

Figure 13 1986 Per Capita Consumption of Nuclear Power (8)

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10 Figure 15 Projections of Cumulative Uranium Requirements (10)

(Cutfntt One*

MtQi* Qrewtn CUM

LOW Growrn C»«

2 300 000 te U

Figure 16 Distributions of Uranium Resources Among WOCA Countries (10)

I I S US 80 - S 130 i kg u MM

i 000 Tonnes U 1 001 Tonnes U

a) REASONABLY ASSURED RESOURCES

JC-C

Z X

12 Figure 14 (10)(11) Nuclear Generating Capacity in WOCA Countries

1600

I98S 1995 ZOOS ZQI5 ZQ25

accumulation of plutonium, however, it is not possible to build fast breeders quickly enough to avoid serious pressure on the world's uranium resources by 2025. The dotted line on Figure 15 represents the level of Reasonably Assured Resources available from WOCA countries at recovery prices up to $US130 per kg uranium. These resources are subdivided among the countries noted in Figure 16 . For the sake of comparison, it might be mentioned that the average price of uranium exported from Canada in 1986 was $US 65 per.kg/U, less than the lowest price category shown in Figure 16 . In other words current prices would have to double to bring into production the 2.3 x 10° tonnes shown in this Figure.

11 There are relatively few0exporters of uranium within WOCA as indicated in Figure 17' .

Figure 17 (10) Main Exporters and Importers of Uranium in WOCA in 1980 & 1984

Canada was one of the principal ones, leading the world in output in 1986. Other important exporters were South Africa and Namibia, Niger and Gabon from Central Africa and Australia. The principal importing countries were the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and European members of the OECD. Almost from the beginning of the nuclear power age, uranium producers have been optimistic about the expected growth of the industry. As a consequence, with the exception of the la years, production has always exceeded reactor requirements (see Figure 18). Consequently, stockpiles have been accumulated and these are large enough to provide fuel for existing reactors for perhaps the next 3 or 4 years There has been a dramatic change in the uranium mining industry since 1980 due to a substantial decrease in product price brought about partly by the overhanging inventory in the market. Many high-cost mines in the United States, for example, have been for- ced to close so that there the uranium.mining industry is 3 to 4 times smaller than it was in 1980 (see Figure 19). Mean- while, newly-established output from some of the rich near-surface mines in northern Saskatchewan pushed Canada into the position of world leadership in production beginning in 1984.

13 Figure 18 (1O)(13) WOCA Uranium Production and Requirements, 1964-1986 'l '

1965 I91S

The deterioration of the US industry has led to a number of domestic actions in the. United States which are aimed at restricting the flow of foreign uranium into the country. These actions include legal challenges, political initiatives, and potential Congressional action. The outcome of such moves will probably be made clear during the course of 1987.

URANIUM'S FUTURE ROLE

Utilities in WOCA countries have become convinced during recent years because of an abundant low-cost supply of uranium from suppliers around the world that uranium will continue to be available in large quantities at low prices for many years into the future. The perceived glut of uranium has led to the expenditure of significantly less effort and.funds in exploring for new supp- ies as indicated in Figure 20 . Many do not appreciate

14 Figure 19 (10)(12)(13) Uranium Production in WOCA Countries, 1980-1986

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Figure 20 WOCA Uranium Exploration Expenditures (10)(12)

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/9B0 J982 1994 19*6

X that the time-lag between launching an exploration program and bringing a newly-found deposit into production can be as long or longer than that required to design, build and commission a new power reactor. Even in a politically-stable, geologically- favourable environment such as Canada, for example, some 15 years were required to find and bring into production the Key Lake uranium mine in northern Saskatchewan '.

According to the NEA, reactor-related uranium requirements could exceed the production capability not only from existing and committed facilities but from planned and prospective ones as well during a comparable time period' (see Figure 21). In fact,

Figure 21 WOCA Uranium Production Capability and-., Reactor-Related Requirements, 1985-2025* ' 3oo PRODUCTION CA/>A*iuTy MOM /(Maw Kcso

POSSl flu £ AiiO/T/OWAi. -

5: eC X etoo */ ill Tl \ -^ ii - 0 >4

&3S- 2OOS ZQZ.S- some analysts speaking for the World Energy Conference recently have predicted that the exhaustion of proven uranium reserves could.spread contagiously to the whole world between 2010 and 2015 . Such projections surely run counter to the widely-held belief in the nuclear industry today that the current surfeit of low-priced uranium will persist for the foreseeable future. Canada is indeed fortunate in the uranium bounty which has been bestowed upon the country by nature. The most recent example of that wealth is illustrated by the Cigar Lake deposit in northern Saskatchewan which is shown in cross-section in Figure 22 .

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Figure 22 Cross-section of Cigar Lake Deposit, Northern Saskatchewan (16)

Currently, this is the richest deposit in the world under development and plans are well advanced to meet an initial production date of 1993. Only about 15% of Canada's output is required for the domestic CANDU industry. The balance is available for export to three principal areas in the world, western Europe, industrialized Asia and the United States. Domestic utilities have contracted for assured supplies of Canadian uranium into the long term future. Ontario Hydro, for example, has contracts extending well into the 21st century to provide fuel for a growing number of CANDU reactors.

Ontario Hydro has had very favourable experience with its CANDU complement of some 14,000 megawatts electric which will be in place once the last Darlington reactor is conunissioned in 1992. Capital costs have been at the low end of the,range for plants of 500 MWe or above built in North America (see Figure 23).

17 Figure 23 Inter-Utility Comparison of Nuclear Plants Specific Dry Capital Cost(17)

Q SINGLE UNIT • TWO UNIT PLANT » MULTIPLE UNIT PLANT • ONTARIO HVORO PLANT — ON. TREND LINE

z 1000-

Ontario Hydro is particularly pleased with the economic performance of its nuclear plants and foresees a large and increasing advantage for them against comparable coal-fired stations, particularly those equipped with scrubbers to lower acid gas emissions as indicated in Figure 24. Figure 24 Total Unit Energy Cost for Major Operating Nuclear and Comparable Thermal Stations, 1980-2025<17>

. FORECAST BASIS ESCALATION FORECAST OF SEPTEMUR IMS •0% ANNUAL CAf ACITY FACTOR 13.4* INTEREST RATE -/I f

O in • COMPARABLE WET SCRUBBER COAL STATION .

PICKERING* COMPARABLE WET SCRUMER COAL STATION

18 In 1987, for example, Ontario Hydro will realize savings of some 700 million dollars through the fissioning of uranium rather than the burning of coal to produce an equivalent amount of energy.

FUTURE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES

In spite of obvious cost and environmental advantages, Can£.dian utilities are hesitant to commit further nuclear construction projects until a stronger political and public acceptance base has been built within their jurisdictions. Such developments may be slow to occur but they are inevitable given the dearth of other competitive alternatives. The same reality will emerge in the coming years in all parts of the world with a resulting acceler- ation of the build-up of pressure on available uranium resources.

If one examines the world reserves of non-renewable energy resources as shown in Figure 25, it is seen that the largest one by far is coal'4)(6>. Even with today's relatively modest complement of nuclear reactors, the resource/demand ratio for uranium is dis- turbingly low. Should installed capacity grow in the manner indicated by the NEA in Figure 14, that ratio could be decreased to the range 10-25 by 2025. Long before then, firm steps should be taken to develop the fuel cycles which use uranium more efficient- Figure 25 ,., ... World Reserves of Non-Renewable Energy Resources

SOURCE. Pfioveo WORI-O De^-i^o. Reserves 1965

CRUOB. OIL 97 } QJLSANOS I j 2*8/ AND5HALESJ .SAS 74- ISA- 4-8 * 26 O-34 76

It is already known that with fast breeder reactors and advanced CANDUs utilizing thorium-uranium cycles, overall uranium burnup could be increased by some fifty to sixty-fold above that currently achieved in thermal reactors. Once such efficient uranium use is realized, it is immediately apparent from Figure 25 that the energy to be derived from current reserves of uranium would be equivalent to more than all of that obtainable from coal, crude

V \

oil, oil sands and shales, and natural gas.

Since the lead time required for transformation to a reactor economy with such high utilization of uranium is likely to be at least 20-30 years, it is not too soon to initiate serious planning on a development program aimed at achieving more uranium- efficient use in CANDU reactors. Concurrently, meaningful programs need to be evolved in other parts of the world for the orderly introduction of high conversion fast breeder reactors. Otherwise, nuclear power may not be able to play the important role that it should as a major source of energy for the world in the decades to come.

REFERENCES

1. BRAMWELL, R.D., "Towns and Cities: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow", Gage Educational Publishing Ltd., 1977. 2. BARNEY, CO., "The Global 2000 Report to the President", A Report Prepared by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality and the U.S. Department of State, 1980. 3. United Nations Estimate, 1987 January.

4. FRISCH, J.R., "Energy Abundance: Myth or Reality?", 13th Congress of the World Energy Conference, Conservation Commission Position Paper, Working Group No. 4, Cannes, France, 1986 October.

5. HAFELE, W., "Energy in a Finite World", Bollinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1981, p. 590. 6. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum Company, London, England, 1986 June, and earlier. 7. FRISCH, J.R., "Energy 2000-2020: World Prospects and Regional Stresses", World Energy Conference Conservation Commission, Graham and Trotman Ltd., London, 1983.

8. Nucleonics Week, McGraw-Hill Inc., New York, Vol. 28, 1987 February 5, p. 9. 9. IAEA Newsbriefs, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1987 February 10, p. 2. 10. "Uranium: Resources, Production, and Demand", OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International 7tomic Energy Agency, Paris, 1986.

11. "Summary of Nuclear Power and Fuel Cycle Data in OECD Member Countries", Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris, 1986 April.

20 r

12. WHILLANS, R.T., "Uranium", Canadian Mining Journal, in press, 1987 April. 13. Unpublished Data, Uranium Institute, London, 1987 January.

14. RUNNALLS, O.J.C., "Prospects for the Canadian Uranium Industry", Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy Annual Meeting, Toronto, Ontario, 1987 May 5.

15. RUNNALLS, O.J.C., "Key Lake: A Model of Canadian Development", Proc. Deutsches Atomforum Winter Meeting, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 January 27-28. 16. PEEBLES, G.A. and POTIER, J.M., "Mining the Cigar Lake Uranium Deposit", Uranium Institute Eleventh Annual Symposium, London, 1986 September 2-4. 17. BARTHOLOMEW, R.W., HORTON, E.P., WOODHEAD, L.W., and NICHOLS, M.J., "Economics of CANDU-PHW, 1985", Ontario Hydro Report NGD-10, 1986 August.

21 r { , t

THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT'S REGULATORY POLICY INITIATIVE AND THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

Antony Campbell Assistant Deputy Minister, Regulatory Affairs Office of Privatization and Regulatory Affairs

Regulation is as old as man — according to the Bible that makes it even older iuan woman.

Indeed, by breaching the Garden of Eden's only regulation, man and woman „ were banished to live amidst the hardships of the world. And, I guess, that's what brings us all to Saint John, New Brunswick and this impressive conference.

I appreciate being invited to speak to this session setting the stage for the conference. No discussion of the state of the nuclear industry in any country, let alone Canada, would be complete without at least some reference to the regulatory climate affecting the industry.

In early 1986, the federal government announced a major initiative to improve federal regulatory performance in every area of federal * j regulation. Called the Regulatory Reform Strategy, this initiative has become a significant part of the regulatory climate in Canada.

. . I'd like to do 3 things in the next 20 minutes:

^•^ (1) provide some background and details of the federal Regulatory \ •' Reform Strategy and how it affects the nuclear industry;

(2) comment briefly on some of the characteristics of advanced -• technology regulation as I perceive them; and

(3) suggest a few ways the nuclear industry can help government regulate better or, as we say in Ottawa, regulate smarter.

"Smarter regulation" is the theme of the government's regulatory reform initiative. Like all political slogans, it is positive sounding but meaningless unless you put it in content.

Bismarck once said there are two things it is better not to see being made — laws and sausages. Maybe that's why so few people understand regulations.

So let's begin with a few definitions.

Regulation is the control of private behaviour by the state through its monopoly over the use of law under threat of sanction.

22 "Thou shalt not eat of the apple" is a prohibitory regulation. So is the regulation that prohibits irradiation of apples.

A positive regulation, on the other hand, is one that forces you to do something. For example, you must pull to the side of the road to let ambulances go by. Or, if you operate a uranium mine, there are a number of specific things which you must do to comply with federal requirements.

Sometimes, if your mine is in Saskatchewan, what you have to do to comply with federal requirements differs from what you have to do in response to provincial requirements — there's no word in the regulatory lexicon for that — except plain dumb regulation.

There are four basic ways that regulations are made affecting the nuclear industry:

1. by statute

2. by "regulation" or subordinate legislation authorized by Parliament or a legislature

3. by formal or informal rulings made by adjudicate bodies or enforcement personnel

How does regulation differ from the other activities of government?

Regulation is one of the 4 major instruments or tools of government. The other big ones are taxation, expenditure and public ownership. Regulation is the cheapest of the 4 for government. What! you may say, surely taxation is the cheapest? No — there are over $30B in tax expenditures.

By contrast, regulation only costs the federal government about $3B per year. But, you may have noticed I said "cheapest for the government. The rea] cost of regulation is what it costs the private sector — consumers, business and industry — i.e., $30-6OB per year depending on the estimating technique.

So much for regulation. What about the term "regulatory reform"? Of course, it means change or improvement to existing regulatory programs or processes — or both.

Regulatory reform is not synonymous with the term "deregulation" — rather, it is a broad term, connoting a range of change, across a spectrum, ranging from the elimination of regulation or a regulatory process (i.e., deregulation) through to increased and intensified regulation. "Regulation", an associated term, means replacing old regulation with newer, more contemporarily appropriate regulation.

In the last ten or fifteen years, regulatory reform has had a special characteristic — the application of economic principles to the traditionally exclusive domaine of the lawyers.

Mixing lawyers and economists together is about as easy as mixing scientists and theologians together.

23 tr

Last week I was at a meeting in which an economist and a lawyer became engaged in a heated exchange - the economist said - "what's black and brown..." the lawyer, not to be outdone, said "an economist is someone who is good with figures..."

These anecdotes underline a key issue about regulation — how to use 19th century instrument of the law to deal with 21st century realities.

This brings me to the government's Regulatory Reform Strategy.

It was developed in response to certain fundamental findings of the Nielsen Task Force:

1) Canadians are too heavily regulated: at the federal level

- 146 regulatory programs - 35,000 employees engaged in regulation - 200 out of 360 statutes are regulatory - 1800 different sets of regulations

(provincial regulatory activity no less intense)

2) This intensity of regulation can have a smothering effect

(1) on personal responsibility (2) on personal freedom of initiative

3) Regulation in Canada can impose enormous costs on our economy — it interferes with development — competitiveness and job creation.

4) The regulatory process had become choked with inefficiency, non-accountability and chronic delays.

5) Ministers and Parliament had lost control of regulation-making — becoming a mere rubber stamp.

6) The public enjoyed little or no access to the regulatory system.

This is just a summary of the key findings — if you want to get a deeper insight, read vol. 20 of the Ministerial Task Force Reports — the one on regulatory programmes.

The government responded to these concerns with a comprehensive eight point strategy. Of these, the key elements affecting the nuclear industry are:

1. a first-ever regulatory policy - smarter regulation

- benefits to exceed costs

2. a code of principles to govern regulatory action

3. appointment of a Minister for regulatory affairs f A. new policies affecting independent regulatory procedures —

; called the Regulatory Process Action Plan.

} The objectives of the Regulatory Process Action Plan ares

(1) streamlined and more efficient management

(2) greater ministerial involvement and accountability

(3) greater public participation To meet these objectives, the Action Plan lays out 5 steps that are now compulsory for all federal regulatory activity:

(1) annual planning and priority-setting

(2) impact assessment - policy review - especially cost/benefit - risk-benefit

(3) legal review

(4) early notice and prepublication

(5) recurrent review.

Each of these steps has potential importance for anyone interested in federal regulatory activity affecting nuclear technology and the related industries.

The Action Plan has been in operation since last September. I am glad to be able to report that it is having a substantial effect in improving overall federal regulatory performance.

So far, I have spoken in pretty general terms about regulation and the process of reform going on in Ottawa.

I would like to turn briefly to a few observations about the special problems facing governments when it comes to regulating matters of high public sensitivity — especially ones that are technical in nature.

Naturally, Governments are particularly vulnerable to pressures for regulation when it comes to matters that affect or apppear to affect the health and safety of citizens.

But they immediately run into a paradox: while the public wants government to regulate, it does not entirely trust politicians with the implementation of the resulting regulatory programmes. That's the main reason regulatory agencies like the AECB were invented.

25 \

Since we are in New Brunswick, let me refer to the tuna incident of 1985. It offers a host of regulatory lessons — but the most instructive are:

(1) a minister's no - in a situation when trying to find a statesmanlike position between honest public fears about a poorly understood technical matter and the realities affecting a community with few economic alternatives-

(2) the incapacity or lack of incentive in the media to inform the public accurately about technical matters — how many people realize even now that the Starkist tuna presented zero risk to health? It was all a matter of smell and taste. Indeed, we have to recognize that the media have incentives to distort and exaggerate the negative or "scary" side of technical stories that capture the public's attention.

(3) combining points (1) and (2) - there is a resulting pressure on politicians to respond, usually with regulatory measures, to negative media-induced images — no matter how false or inaccurate they may be.

It used to be said - you can't fight city hall. Now it should be - you can't fight the 30 second TV clip.

Of course, these lessons are nothing new to the nuclear industry and they are reflected in a study done by the U.S. Center for Media and Public Affairs a few years ago which found that anti-nuclear stories outnumbered pro-nuclear stories 2 to 1 on network TV news from 1970-1983. Among the so-called "experts" the public saw on television during this period, critics outnumbered supporters of nuclear energy 5 to 1.

The article I drew these statistics from contrasted public news about the nuclear industry with the views of a random survey of 580 scientists following the Chernobyl disaster. More than 80% of the scientists expressed confidence in U.S. reactors and a third of them said they would rather live within 5 miles of a nuclear power plant than an airport, coal-fired power plant, chemical plant or oil refinery. The airport was in second place with 22% and the refinery was last with only 8% preferring to live near it.

The rather obvious moral I draw from these thoughts is that the regulation of nuclear safety or uranium mining safety have to be recognized and dealt with as political as well as technical problems.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in the recent Parliamentary report on food irradiation.

If pressures for regulatory action are inevitable in areas of high public sensitivity, does it still make sense to try to neutralize the politics by adopting arms-length regulatory agencies to do the regulating? Some would say that that is the only way to deal with the political dimension and they would point to the virtues of bodies like the Health Protection Branch, the AECB and their equivalents in various countries.

26 Others would say - there's got to be a better way - and point to the faults and shortcomings of those same regulatory agencies. Without pointing a finger at any particular body, here is a list of common problems with regulatory agencies. I'll leave it to you to decide if they apply to the particular agency or agencies you deal with.

1. Regulatory agency procedures nearly always involve chronic delays.

2. The delays get worse the older an agency becomes - reflecting a type of regulatory arteriosclerosis.

3. Agencies tend to become politicized and captured by one or other of the predominant interests affected by their regulatory activity.

4. Agencies tend to be super cautious and, over time, become fixed in their ways and their views and resistant to change.

5. Agencies tend not to be accountable for their bad decisions or their lack of decisions, as the case may be.

Where some or most of the above factors affect an agency, the question has to be asked — isn't there a better or smarter way to regulate?

This brings me to my final point — what can members of the Canadian nuclear community do to help the federal government regulate smarter?

First, they should be familiar with and use the opportunities presented by the federal government's new regulatory policy and process to ensure that regulatory actions are taken only in so far as they are balanced and necessary.

Second, inform ministers and other Members of Parliament. Use early notice and prepublication. When dealing with government you should not be limited to responding to the regulatory agency's requirements but should be proactive and direct information just as much to Parliament, Cabinet and the media.

Third, the nuclear community should take the initiative to find and promote new, better, and faster ways to ensure public protection and confidence. This means promoting and participating in the evaluation or regulatory activities rather than accepting regulatory approaches that may be out of keeping with modern realities and requirements. In this respect, it is important that the nuclear industry be a force for change and enlightenment especially in areas where it is comfortable with the status quo but knows that the public interest would be better served by something new.

Finally, I think you have to play a more active role in better informing and communicating with the public. A better informed public reduces the pressures on democratic institutions to regulate in inappropriate ways.

27 To sura up my main message - let me quote from the needleprint in my hotel room done by Ann Martin in 1868. It says

"How truly blest are they who leisure find To dress the little Garden of the Mind That grateful tillage well rewards our pains Sweet is the Labour, certain are the gains The rising harvest never mocks our toil We are sure of Fruit if we manure the soil.

In short, the surest way for you to bring about smarter regulation and contribute to achieving our society's goals is by manuring the soil of public and political understanding of your vital industries.

Thank you.

28 NUCLEAR REGULATION - IH TONE WITH THE TIMES Z. DOMARATZKI DIRECTOR GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF REACTOR REGULATION AND T.J. MOLLOY MANAGER, COMPONENTS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE DIVISION ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD 270 ALBERT STREET OTTAWA, ONTARIO

1. INTRODUCTION

Among the independent nuclear regulatory agencies In the world the Atomic Energy Control Board stands as one of the senior members. The primary reason why the mandate of this creature of Parliament has not been reshaped and redefined by succeeding governments in the 40 years of its existence can be traced to the nature of the Act which created the Board.

Passed in 1946, the Atomic Energy Control Act declared atomic energy to be a matter of national interest, made provision for the control of its development and use, and enabled Canada to participate effectively in measures of international control. Only once has a government considered it necessary to amend the Act in a way which significantly altered the Board's powers. In 1954 it separated the regulatory and developmental responsibilities for nuclear energy and thus removed from the AECB the administrative control over the recently incorporated Crown corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. The longevity of the AEC Act can be attributed to its style. It is brief, clear, but written In general terms. Nine pages suffice to print the Act in both official languages. In these nine pages the intent of the Act is very clear. The title of the Act, its preamble, several of its sections and the name of the body it created all make clear the objective of Parliament - control of nuclear energy. The way this control should be exercised was left, however, entirely to the Board. The legislation gives the Board extensive discretionary powers which clearly were intended to be used in the interests of health, safety and security of the people of Canada.

In the 1970's consideration was given to significant amendments of the AEC Act. This review culminated on November 24, 1977, when a Bill (C-14) titled the Nuclear Control and Administration Act was tabled before Parliament for first reading. Before It was called for second reading, however, Parliament was prorogued and the Bill died. That the Bill has not been revived has been determined by many factors. One major factor is that legislative reform, while very desirable, is not essential since the Board is able to operate effectively under the existing Act. Furthermore,

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because the powers in the Act are broad and discretionary the AECB has been able, through the years, to adapt to changing technology, industry and society. I | 2. EVOLUTION OF AEC REGULATIONS i To some extent one can trace the evolution of the AECB by perusing the regulations which it has made pursuant to Section 9 of the AEC Act. The first regulations made by the Board were issued in 1947, at a time when nuclear energy was almost exclusively a government activity. The focus of these regulations was on strict security rules, prohibition of unauthorized disclosure of information, and designation of "protected places" where entry was restricted. Only a single brief reference was made to "the protection of persons... against __ injury". The 1950's saw the increased application of radioisotopes in the public domain, the first research reactor in a Canadian university, and the beginning of construction of Canada's first nuclear power plant. These activities led to the making in 1950 of revised regulations with more emphasis on health and safety, including a schedule of the maximum levels of ionizing radiation to which persons could be exposed.

The 1960's opened with the first operation of the 25 MW Nuclear I Power Demonstration reactor on the northern boundary of Algonquin Park in Ontario and closed with construction of the 2000 MW Pickering complex well under way on the eastern outskirts of Metropolitan Toronto. With the exception of uranium mining, activity in the nuclear industry increased dramatically, leading to a new set of regulations, in 1974, which included accelerators, waste management facilities and heavy water production plants under the definition of nuclear facilities. In 1978 uranium mines and mills were added.

While the 1974 Regulations are still in force they have been supplemented in three areas which in 1974 received only limited mention: physical security regulations, regulations for packaging of radioactive materials for transport, and industrial radiography regulations, all promulgated in 1983.

Today, most activities in the nuclear field have reached a state of maturity and the regulation of these activities has matured as well. It is the Board's intention that this maturity be reflected in two sets of regulations. The first regulations will address uranium mining. These have been made by the Atomic Energy Control Board and approval by Governor-in-Counci1 is imminent. The second regulations will be general amendments to the current AEC Regulations. These proposed amendments will be substantive and will include, inter alia, changes to reflect developments in administrative law and updated radiation protection standards. The proposed amendments were issued for

30 public comment in April 1986 and it is anticipated that they will be promulgated in 1988. 1 ! 3. TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS I c Although the emphasis of this paper is on the growth of non-technical demands on the AECB, these cannot be divorced from the technical developments in the nuclear field. Therefore, in this section a brief description will be given of the technical demands which have occupied the AECB's technical staff.

From its earliest days, the AECB issued licences, then known as 'orders', for the possession and use of artificially produced radioisotopes. It was not until 1968, however, that the licences were actually prepared in the AECB offices, and until 1975 before * AECB staff began to take over the inspection and enforcement processes. Prior to that, we had depended on Federal and Provincial health inspectors.

In 1969, Eldorado Nuclear Limited began construction of a facility to produce UF,, and the Board decided that it should be licensed, in the manner of a reactor facility. That led to licensing of the remainder of Eldorado's refinery facilities in the late 70's. At about the same time, the AECB was being asked to bring under licensing the uranium mines themselves, because of dissatisfaction with the way safety and environmental hazards were being managed. Another difficult aspect of the nuclear business in the early days was waste management; again the AECB developed and enforced suitable standards.

Although it is not, in general, a radioactive process, the production of heavy water came to the Board's attention as an integral part of the nuclear fuel cycle in Canada and because it represents a very significant public and occupational hazard. The AECB began as early as 1968 to consider a licensing procedure for the plant at Glace Bay, N.S. This procedure was further developed in the early 70's when Ontario Hydro permitted AECL to propose a very large plant on its Bruce site in proximity to a major nuclear generating station.

The growth of nuclear generating stations was touched on in the earlier section of this paper which dealt with the legal history. The rapid growth of the nuclear industry in Canada from the late sixties to the early eighties placed heavy demands on the technical capabilities of the Board and its staff, and these were evident in the interactions with all our licensees. Less evident outside Ottawa, but also of significant impact, are the non-technical demands on the AECB's managerial and administrative staff.

31 4. GOVERNMENT INTERFACE

As a creature of government all the expenses of the AECB have been paid out of moneys appropriated by Parliament. The expenditures by the AECB are not insignificant. For the year ending in March, 1987 the total use of Parliamentary appropriations was more than $22 million. Obviously, we are called upon as a matter of routine to demonstrate that we use these funds in accordance with government policies and in an efficient and effective manner. The Auditor General of Canada, the Comptroller General of Canada, Treasury Board, and Parliamentary committees are the bodies which under normal circumstances ensure that the AECB makes effective use of taxpayers' funds. It is a matter of pride to the Board that oversight bodies have consistently concluded that the AECB manages the Parliamentary appropriations very well.

As part of a government-wide review of management practices in 1983 the AECB was reviewed by the Office of the Comptroller General (Reference 4.1). While there were recommendations for improvement, the survey team acknowledged the positive attitude of AECB management. The following quote reflects the general tone of the report:

"Since the organization is generally well managed, it must be concluded that its management processes have served it well."

Routine annual financial audits of the AECB by the Office of the Auditor General have always found our financial management practices to be sound. In 1985 the AECB was subjected to a comprehensive audit by the same office (Reference 4.2). Whereas people tend to remember the reports of the Auditor General for the skeletons which are revealed when the closet doors are opened, the report on the AECB was very favourable. Statements representative of the general conclusions are:

"We did not find any significant weakness in the administration of this activity. "

"This process is generally well controlled."

"We found that people were being managed in a way that fostered personal commitment."

Finally, in annual appearances before Parliamentary committees we have experienced critical review with positive conclusions.

Further to the routine reviews of the AECB, the election of the current government in 1984 was closely followed by the formation of a Task Force on Program Review under the chairmanship of the Honourable Erik Nielsen. Two different study teams reviewed the AECB.

32 The first study team, dealing with regulatory programs, was led by Antony Campbell and included advisors from the federal government bureaucracy as well as from the private sector and labour. The team looked at the AECB from the viewpoint of the need for its program and of efficiency and effectiveness. On the positive side the study team observed (Reference 4.3) that:

a) the AECB is generally considered to administer well an important regulatory program;

b) the incremental cost of increasingly stringent regulation is insignificant compared to the degree of safety achieved;

c) a task force of AECB, industry and provincial government representatives should be convened to determine the appropriate jurisdiction for low level radioactive wa s t e s .

This last item, in the form of a recommendation, was welcomed by the Board. Problems with disposal of very low level radioactive wastes have for some years been a unique and frustrating problem, not only for the citizens of Port Hope and Scarborough, Ontario, but also for the AECB, which was involved in attempts to remedy the situation.

On the negative side, the task force study team observed that:

a) there had been criticism of the Board's composition of one full-time and four part-time members as having inadequate time and expertise to deal with all the complex issues;

b) The Board had been criticized for not maintaining an arm's-length relationship with industry and for administering the regulations inconsistently

To deal with these criticisms the study team recommended that the structure of the Board be reviewed and the number of members be expanded to include more permanent members representing industry, labour and public interests.

Also on the negative side, the study team was of the view that the AECB's regulatory program represents an undue burden on the uranium mining industry and intrudes more than necessary into provincial jurisdiction.

The second study team took a very broad look at the accountability of regulatory agencies, and at the relationship between those agencies and the government (Reference 4.4). In its overview of the AECB and other agencies it observed special problems of accountability because the objectives of their legislation are so broadly defined. The study team was of the

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view that Parliament should specify more clearly the policy objectives of the AECB. The teatn also agreed with the other study team, on regulatory programs, that the number of full-time members of the Board should be expanded and the representation should be broadened to include industry, labour, and public interest groups. This recommendation for increasing the number of full-time members seems to be a response to criticisms by certain segments of the regulated industry that Board members did not have sufficient time to devote to regulatory issue- so that AECB staff play an unduly influential role. The study team also addressed the question of public hearings by the ^ECB. Its views in this regard were twofold. First, the AECB should be left with the discretion to decide when to hold a public hearing. Second, the government should consider requiring the AECB to hold a public hearing to review the manner in which it would exercise the discretion just mentioned. Action on the study team recommendation that a review be conducted of appropriate jurisdiction for control over low-level radioactive waste has been completed. In fact, discussions with Provincial agencies were under way at the time the recommendation was published. The AECB will shortly publish an amendment to the current AEC Regulations respecting their application, and this should clarify jurisdiction over low-level radioactive waste materials. The question of the composition and operation of the five-member Board is being studied by the Board and its staff, following which recommendations will be made to the designated Minister for the AECB, currently the Minister of Energy Mines and Resources. In defining the scope of the study, the Board expressed the opinion that it should continue to be a technical body which would make technical decisions on health, safety and security matters. Social and economic impacts of nuclear activities would continue to be left to other agencies, e.g. provincial authorities and the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office. Options for public hearings will be one factor which will be part of the study of suitable methods to increase the openness of the AECB practices. A possible increase in the size and nature of the Board will get further examination. With a five-member Board, as currently stipulated under the AEC Act, it has been difficult to have members who specifically represent the constituencies of industry, labour and the public. Because there are only five members, each must have a good grasp of the technical matters on which the Board makes decisions, and persons who possess these qualifications may not be perceived as representative of the public or of labour. Industry representatives who would have the necessary technical background would be perceived as having a conflict of interest. Increasing the size of the Board would be one way to resolve these questions, but such an increase would require a legislative change in the AEC Act.

Another criticism from the study team on regulatory programs was the undue burden of AECE regulation on the uranium mining industry and intrusion into provincial jurisdiction in the area. The first aspect of this criticism arises from specific regulations for uranium mining, which were prepared in consultation with the industry and representatives of labour. The AECB is satisfied that the impact of these regulations is both minor and reasonable. The second issue, overlap with provincial jurisdiction, is an important one and the AECB is trying, within the constraints of its own mandate, to minimize the bureaucratic burden on industry by coordinating its licensing actions with Provincial authorities. The government of Canada also announced in March, 1986, a Regulatory Reform Strategy, including the Citizens' Code of Regulatory Fairness, and in May, 1986, the Regulatory Process Action Plan. The fifteen statements in the Code may not have much effect on the AECB, since AECB practices already conform with each of them. Two of the statements which are of particular relevance are: "the government will encourage and facilitate a full opportunity for consultation and participation by Canadians in the federal regulatory process", and "the government will enhance the predictability of the exercise of discretionary powers by federal regulatory authorities. " On the first point, the AECB currently allows full opportunity for consultation and participation in the regulatory process. This is accomplished in a number of ways. Before any regulations or generic regulatory requirements are adopted it has been for some years the practice of the AECB to publish a consultative document and solicit input from those directly affected, as well as Canadians at large. Consultative Document C-83 "Proposed General Amendments to the Atomic Energy Control Regulations" is the most significant recent example (Reference 4.5).

For all specific licensing decisions of significance the AECB gives advance notice to the public of the date on which a decision is likely to be made, makes available on request the technical information submitted to the AECB in support of a licence and documents its basis for a decision. In addition, the Board has a process for giving interested parties (e.g. licence applicant, special interest group) an opportunity to express their views on matters before the Board (Reference 4.6). However, there is scope for a broader interpretation of the statement. Some may interpret "full opportunity for consultation" on the proposed amendments to our regulations to

35 mean nationwide hearings with full funding for all interested parties. A range of narrower interpretations is also possible. Clearly, some of these would have a major impact on the Board's regulatory process and would reduce the effort available for technical evaluations of individual licence applications.

Enhancing the predictability of the exercise of discretionary powers can be achieved in a variety of ways. Almost inevitably, however, they involve more detailed documentation of regulatory requirements. For some straightforward nuclear applications, e.g. radiography, detailed regulation-making is the preferred route and the one which has been followed by the AECB., The requirements with which a licensee must comply are spelled out by the AECB and there is little doubt as to what a licensee must do to ensure a favourable regulatory decision. This "cookbook" approach, however, is an inappropriate course for power reactor licensing. In the extreme it could engender the type of criticism levelled by some at the USA approach - too much effort spent ensuring that the regulatory requirements are met and not enough effort spent to ensure that reactors are safe. The government's statement on predictability of regulatory decisions is consistent with the requests of some of the key players in the reactor field who would have us document in more detail the regulatory requirements. The AECB is moving cautiously on this, and with some trepidation.

Another entity which would have us make our regulatory criteria much more explicit is the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments. From that body's review of our regulations and those of other agencies it is clear that the law-makers view with disfavour regulations where the criteria for decision-making by regulators are too open to the use of discretion and interpretation. In order to protect applicants and licensees, as well as the people of Canada, from arbitrary decisions by regulators this joint committee wishes to see clear criteria to define how discretionary powers will be used. The objective is very appropriate. The challenge is to accomplish this without making regulations too detailed or prescriptive. Furthermore, the committee has also opposed situations where commonly understood regulatory requirements are not incorporated in regulations. In such an arrangement regulators can withhold from review by parliamentarians requirements which they are imposing on a regulated industry.

For example, one interpretation of the views of the Joint Committee could be that our guide on requirements for containment systems for nuclear power plants should be incorporated into the regulations and be reviewed by the Joint Committee. Statements in the guide such as "The maximum allowable leakage rate from containment shall be the value used in the safety analyses" would then have the force of law. Licensees would be protected from requests by regulators for more stringent requirements and the

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public would be protected from relaxation of standards by regulators.

Another part of the government's regulatory reform strategy, the Regulatory Process Action Plan, again does not require any significant changes to AECB practices. The Action Plan does, however, put greater emphasis on the analysis of the impact of any proposed regulations and on public consultation. Neither point presents any fundamental problem but it is quite clear that the whole process of regulation making will be more closely orchestrated to ensure that the process is not only fair but also seen to be fair. While we have only limited experience with the current process we have made an estimate of the time required to issue our proposed general amendments to the AEC Regulations. Although the process for promulgating the previously mentioned General Amendments is far from complete, it appears that the Action Plan will add about a year to the process, when compared with the process followed for the last extensive amendments to the Regulations, in 1974. As noted above, none of the individual changes involve, in themselves, any significant resource requirements. The cumulative effect, however, will represent an appreciable effort in tasks which are not directly related to technical evaluation, inspection, and enforcement of the safety of nuclear activities. These developments occur at a time when downsizing of the AECB (along with the rest of the public service) is in effect. At the AECB our approved staff complement will shrink from 285 in 1986 to 263 in 1991, a reduction of 8% over the five years. In addition, the AECB is currently involved in another new non-technical endeavour - a review of the feasibility of cost recovery. At the request of Treasury Board, we are investigating the feasibility, mechanisms, timing, and impacts of fees for applicants and licensees to reduce or eliminate parliamentary appropriations. On completion of the study we expect a decision by the government on the question of cost recovery by the AECB. Such a practice, incidentally, would not be inconsistent with that of nuclear regulatory agencies in other countries, or even some other regulatory bodies in Canada. 5. WORKER INTERFACE

Until the eighties there was very little formal contact between the AECB and organized labour. There was apparent acceptance that any discussions relating to the health and safety of workers would involve onlj the workers themselves and their employers. Changes to that arrangement first appeared in the mining industry. Following the Ham Commission report of 1976 on the health and safety of workers in mines the AECB took a more direct role in safety assessment and inspection of uranium mines. The workers and their representatives, for their part, began to insist on an input into the regulatory process and regulatory decisions.

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This soon led to tripartite discussions between mine management, workers' representatives, and AECB staff to discuss working conditions in mines and methods for reducing the health risks for miners. A logical outcome of these types of discussions was the detailed uranium mining regulations which are now awaiting government approval. Included in these regulations are requirements dealing with workers' rights in mines; e.g. the right to have a representative accompany AECB staff on inspections of mines, the right to receive copies of AECB inspection reports, and the right to receive results of all measurements of environmental conditions. Organized labour, led by the CLC, has also proclaimed its wish to be involved in the regulatory process for all nuclear activities. For several years now there have been bilateral discussions between worker representatives and AECB staff. One visible outcome has been a proposed regulatory policy statement (Reference 5.1) which describes the opportunities for workers to have an input into the licensing process. Organized labour has also commented extensively on our proposed general amendments to the AEC Regulations (C-83).

Organized labour seemed to be pursuing three major objectives in commenting on C-83. The first was to convince the Board that the proposed dose limits (which are generally consistent with ICRP recommendations) should be substantially reduced. The second was to enshrine in C-83 all the rights of workers and their representatives which are explicit in the proposed uranium mining regulations. The third objective was to obtain speedy approval of C-83, while setting up a tripartite process for subsequent amendments, a process which would involve industry, organized labour and the AECB.

The AECB views as very desirable a closer relationship with worker representatives in matters which affect the health and safety of workers. Informed input by workers will undoubtedly enable the AECB to regulate smarter. There is also no doubt that this involvement with organized labour will continue to require an investment of staff time. With careful direction, this investment could pay back in improved regulatory effectiveness. 6. PUBLIC INTERFACE

One of the features of our time is the increasing desire for some members of the general public, either directly or through special interest groups, to learn about and become involved in decisions which affect them or the country in general. The day has passed when the public seemed content to leave complex decisions on health and safety to government or its technocrats. This realization did not come quickly or easily to the AECB. Nevertheless, in the late 1970's the Board recognized the public's wish for information and concluded that it should make a more of its processes known to them.

38 In 1980 the AECB instituted a policy on public access to licensing information. Under this policy the AECB stated its intent to serve notice about and make available for examination by the public:

a) all current licences and approvals, including the supporting documentation;

b) information on any action to revoke or suspend a licence ;

c) reports from licensees which are required by the Regulations or as a licence condition; and

d) applications for a licence.

Somewhat surprisingly, neither this initiative by the Board nor the Access to Information Act which followed three years later resulted in any rush for information held by the AECB. Our public documents room, where licensing information is openly available, is not heavily used by the public, nor even by the critics who complained so loudly about the AECB's secrecy.

A second initiative by the Board in its desire for a more open operation was its decision to solicit public comments on any proposed regulatory requirements. The contrast with past practices is striking. In 1977 the AECB published a licensing document on the use of two shutdown systems in reactors (Reference 6.1). This document was drafted by AECB staff, received comments from power reactor licensees and the Board's Reactor Safety Advisory Committee and was then endorsed by the Board. The sequel to this document (Reference 6.2) was distributed widely for public comment in 1980 before being issued for trial use.

In keeping with the times and in compliance with the government's regulatory reform strategy the AECB is investigating options to increase further the visibility and openness of the Board. Public hearings and Board meetings open to the public are two of the options being considered. These are initiatives for which the AECB may be obliged to seek additional funding. Regardless of what actions are taken it is inevitable that an increasingly critical public attitude will place a heavier strain on AECB re sources .

7. INDUSTRY INTERFACE

The dealings between the AECB and the nuclear industry were from the outset at a purely technical level and largely remain so to this day. We have attempted to maintain the most efficient and effective methods for communicating at the engineering and scientific level. Not surprisingly, however, as the industry and the AECB grew the communications between the regulator and the industry became more formal. Of much more significance has been the AECB's requirement for a licensee, particularly in the reactor industry, to document much more completely than in the past the basis for his conclusion that his proposed activities are safe. Whereas in the past the AECB may have been satisfied with a highly condensed summary of a safety analysis it now insists on a much more thorough report to permit an in-depth review of selected aspects of the safety of nuclear facilities. The insistence on a well-documented safety case for major nuclear facilities arises for a number of reasons. The increased size and complexity of plants is one reason. Also, experience has shown that in some cases, assurances of safety by a licensee were not soundly based.

In today's world we believe that the relationship that has developed between the industry and the AECB is an appropriate one. There is ample evidence that Canadians and their elected representatives wish to be assured that nuclear safety matters are investigated thoroughly and any activities are conducted with a high level of safety. In this regard we can reiterate the statement of the Nielsen Task Force Study Team when it noted that "The incremental cost of increasingly stringent regulations is insignificant compared to the degree of safety achieved".

8. CLOSING STATEMENTS

The AECB has always been a technical body which reaches technical conclusions and decisions on health, safety and security matters. The Board has re-affirmed the view that it should retain that mode of operation. Inevitably, there are a variety of non-technical demands being placed on the AECB by government, the industry, organized labour, and the general public. The AECB must respond to the expectations of these various constituencies in the face of equally strong demands for reduction in government expenditures. Notwithstanding these various demands, the AECB cannot compromise on the technical matters of health, safety, and security. There is ample evidence that Canadians support this position.

40 4.1 Atomic Energy Control Board - IMPAC Survey Report Office of Comptroller General, November 1983 4.2 Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons, Fiscal Year Ended 31 March 1985 4.3 Management of Government - Regulatory Programs A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program Review, May 1985

4.4 Management of Government - Regulatory Agencies A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program Review, November 1985

4.5 Consultative Document C-83 Proposed General Amendments to the AEC Regulations Atomic Energy Control Board, April 1986 4.6 Regulatory Document R-76 AECB Policy and Procedures on Representations and Appearances Atomic Energy Control Board, May 1983 5.1 Consultative Document C-96 Input to the AECB Licensing Process from Unions and Worker Representatives Atomic Energy Control Board, October 1986 6.1 Regulatory Document R-10 The Use of Two Shutdown Systems in Reactors Atomic Energy Control Board, January 1977 6.2 Consultative Document C8/Rev 1 Requirements for Shutdown Systems for CANDU Nuclear Power Plants Atomic Energy Control Board, May 1982

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THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY'S RECORD OF SERVICE

Dr. Norman Aspin, President Electrical, Electronics Manufacturers Association of Canada and J. E. (Ian) Wilson, Vice-President Canadian Nuclear Association

This year marks the 25th anniversary of nuclear electricity in Canada. In June 1962, the Nuclear Power Demonstration unit at Rolphton, which is still in operation today, was being run up to its full output of 20 MW.

The decision to construct NPD was taken in June 1955. A few years ago, when we were complying with the requests that we provide all available information on nuclear power to the Ontario Select Committee on Hydro Affairs, I found a document still marked "Confidential" in Ontario Hydro's public library. It is dated June 1955 and it is the text for a series of lectures delivered to Ontario Hydro staff by Dr. W. P. Dobson entitled "Nuclear Energy - The Contemporary Scene".

The first paragraph reads as follows:

These Lectures have been prepared at the request of Dr. Hearn, with the intention of supplying the Ontario Hydro staff with a brief statement to the present situation regarding the application of nuclear energy to the production of electrical power. The flood of literature on this subject is almost appalling, and it was Dr. Hearn's idea that a few high spots might be presented and that this would spare you the time-consuaiing effort of searching a large number of publications in which there is a tremendous amount of repetition, much conflicting opinion, and some unrealiable information.

Plus ga change - plus c'est le meme, or as they say in New Brunswick, "same difference".

On page 4 Dr. Dobson tells us that -

In September 1953 the first Canadian conference on nuclear energy and its applications to power production was held at Chalk River. This was a secret conference attended by engineers from power companies, manufacturers, universities, etc. The proceedings were published in two-parts — one classified and one unclassified — and these are valuable contributions to Canadian scientific literature.

On the cost of nuclear power Dr. Dobson says -

The best estimate that can be made at present gives the cost of electricity generated in the early stations at 7 miles per kWh. No accuracy is claimed for this estimate but it is certain that the cost will decrease as knowledge of nuclear power stations increases. Eventually, the cost of nuclear power should be no more than that from conventional sources.

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t* So much for the assertion of critics.that the industry was forecasting that £ nuclear power would be too cheap to meter.

| With general inflation, 7 mills in 1955 has become 3.2 cents in 1986. NPD is still producing power for around 5 cents/kWh while the average from all Ontario Hydro's nuclear stations was 3 cents/kWh in 1986. And this compares with coal at almost 5 cents/kWh. Despite Dr. Dobson's disclaimers, early estimates proved remarkably accurate.

In fact, in terms of price, nuclear power in Canada has consistently exceeded the expectations at the time of initiation of the program. Ontario Hydro's program has saved $7 billion in foreign exchange to purchase U.S. coal and the accumulated economic benefit of nuclear over coal will exceed $20 billion by the end of the century.

- ^, More electricity was generated from nuclear power in 1986 than was consumed in the world in 1956. Although Canada as a whole falls just short of its proportionate contribution to this achievement, the provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick have contributed more than their share. For instance in 1955, Ontario's electricity demand stood at 24 Twh's and by 1962 it had risen to 37 TWh's. Last year the output from Ontario's nuclear stations was more than 58 TWh's.

It is estimated that this will rise to 62TWh's in 1987, meeting more than 50% of the province's total electricity demand. Again this exceeded 1955 expectations.

Why then does the general public, including some reporters who regularly cover the nuclear industry, have the impression that nuclear power is too expensive and that it hasn't lived up to expectations?

• For instance, a recent article on food irradiation in the Toronto Star 1 stated "Food irradiation has the entire nuclear industry jumping with joy. After so much bad news about the dangers and high cost of nuclear energy and the insoluble problems of nuclear waste, they think they've found a much needed success story".

There is only so much you can do in a letter to the editor to rebut such statements. But there is a clear indication that the industry must do a better job of providing the kind of information on which people will base their support or opposition to nuclear power.

The CNA submission to the Centennial Awards Jury, for selection of the CANDU steam supply system as one of the ten most outstanding Canadian Engineering achievements of the past 100 years, concluded as follow:

By all measures such as originality, ingenuity, creativity and the sheer size of the undertaking, the CNA considers the development of the CANDU Nuclear Steam Supply System to rank high among the most unique engineering projects successfully undertaken in Canada's history.

T) Well, as we now know, the Jury of our engineering peers agreed and CANDU was selected. We had a great success story to tell and it was unthinkable to us that the result would have been otherwise. But what if the public at large had been the Jury?

Consider that many people may believe one or more the following:

1. Nuclear power is too expensive.

2. An accident such as Chernobyl is likely to happen in Canada.

3. There is no solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal.

4. Plutonium is the most dangerously toxic substance known to man.

5. Sell a nuclear reactor and you've sold a nuclear bomb.

6. You can't buy insurance against a nuclear accident.

7. The industry is still secretive and evasive.

8. Hydraulic, solar and wind can meet all our future energy needs, with less risk and at less cost. All that's needed is a "level playing field". Too much is spent on nuclear R & D.

9. The whole nuclear industry is driven by the profit motive and vested interest.

10. There is no safe level of radiation and any minute increase in exposure is life threatening.

Therefore, when people hear nuclear industry representatives talk about clean, safe, economical nuclear power they only have to believe one of the above, or to have concern about one of the adjectives to turn-off from both the message or the messenger.

We in the industry are confident that reasonable people, if they have the opportunity to study the facts, will support and embrace the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. This is sometimes regarded by observers as arrogance, and, if we are honest with ourselves, even our best friends might on occasion be inclined to agree.

We are very good at explaining ourselves in a series of lectures. But bow many people have the time or inclination to listen even if they had the opportunity.

Perhaps the point with which we in the industry have most difficulty in putting our case is the last point made above - there is no safe level of radiation. Volumes have been written to try to deal with this issue.

44 It is equally true to say "there is no safe level ox air pollution". And the public is very concerned about air pollution. But they don't want or need volumes of qualifications or explanations to accept some level of air pollution.

On Cable TV broadcast news in Ontario we can read the pollution index for various cities. The list always ends with the statement "over 32 is considered dangerous". While the reading is below 10, and less than Hamilton, people in Toronto feel reasonably assured. Above 20, they become increasingly uncomfortable. But how many people know the health risks and consequences of a sustained air pollution index of 32? I'm sure it would be a great relief to many people to have the dangers of radiation related to such a familiar scale. Or would it only cause them to question the adequacy of the pollution index? The airlines would no doubt prefer it if we were to stop scaring their passengers by equating the dangers of nuclear power to the number of flights between Saint John and Vancouver, Look what we have done to the Tobacco industry!

A number of short answers to the list of concerns above are listed in a fact sheet inserted into the CNA 1987 Yearbook. But I would like to deal briefly here with two issues not discussed in the fact sheet.

The reason people can't insure their houses against damage from a nuclear plant accident is that they are already insured under the Nuclear Liability Act. But if you think that satisfies everyone, wait until you hear Energy Probe attacking the Act in the Supreme Court of Ontario later this year.

On the question of the ability of solar energy to meet society's needs, there is a quote from the second last page of Dr. Dobson's 1955 lecture notes:

The Study of solar energy in its practical applications has received a great deal of attention recently, but little progress has been made. However, the interest attached to it is made evident by conferences of scientists and engineers; and international conference will be held in Arizona next December at which it is expected that practically all knowledge on the subject will be presented.

Perhaps this goes to demonstrate that as long as we have schools of engineering we will always have people working to invent a better windmill, etc. But whereas solar power has contributed very little to the world's energy needs since that statement was written, nuclear power has been developed at a remarkable pace.

By 1990, nuclear electric capacity will surpass the world's total hydro-electric capacity. Energy is now being produced from uranium at a rate equivalent to more than six million barrels of oil per day, about one-third of total OPEC production. The energy in Canada's annual uranium production (11,720 tonnes in 1976), used only once through in a CANDU, contains more than twice the energy available from Canada's annual oil production. And as a country we are a net exporter of oil.

v" All of this was happening while the world was experiencing the two oil price crises of the 1970's. i „! There were lessons to be learned from these crises. Energy f self-sufficiency became a primary focus of national energy policies. But i we have also learned that self-sufficiency, in isolation, will not insulate industrial countries from the economic impacts of another oil-price driven world economic recession.

Nuclear power has helped Canada to "live better electrically". And it can help achieve society's goal of sustained economic prosperity.

An essential part of tomorrow's record of service will be how well we provided the public with the information it wants and needs to share this industry's vision of the future.

46 r r NUCLEAR POWER IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY : ONE YEAR AFTER CHERNOBYL Jean-Claude Charrault and Derek M. Taylor Commission of the European Communities Brussels, Belgium

THE SITUATION IN APRIL 1986 In April 1986, the European Community had 114 nuclear power reactors in commercial operation with a total electricity generating capacity of around 75 GWe net. This represented about one-fifth of the Community's installed capacity and generated close to one third of the electricity produced and consumed in the Community during that month. In the 15 years since the early 1970s, nuclear had increased its share of total primary energy demand in the Community from 2% to 13%.

The reason for this sustained increase in nuclear power growth was that several of the Member States had anticipated the likely benefits of nuclear rower - especially in the wake of the first oil shock in 1973. Among these benefits particular importance was placed on the security of supply aspects of nuclear power, with uranium producers being geographically diverse and distinct from the Community's traditional oil suppliers, and its economic advantages over other fuels in electricity generation. There were, however, major differences between the committments to nuclear power in the Member States (Table 1), Both France and Belgium were generating over 60% of their electricity from nuclear plants while five other Member States had no nuclear programmes at all (see Table 1). These differences more or less reflected the public's views of nuclear power. The most recent Eurobarometer opinion poll covering nuclear power had been undertaken in October 1984. It was unlikely that the opinions on nuclear had significantly changed in the eighteen months to April 1986. In general, public opinion in the Community's larger nuclear States was in favour of the technology while in smaller, non-nuclear States public opinion was against it. Community-wide, there were more people in favour of nuclear power than against it. In 1985, the Commission had proposed that one of the Energy Objectives for the European Community be that by 1995 no more than 10% of the Community's electricity would be generated by hydrocarbons and that approximately 40% would be generated by nuclear energy. As of April 19B6 no decision had yet been taken by the Council of Energy Ministers of the Community. Though not part of the Energy Objectives, the Commission had further proposed that nuclear's share of electricity production should rise to about 50% by around the turn of the century.

47 \

table 1 Nuclear Power Plants in EC-12

Country April '1986 April 1987 Under Construction Number GUe Number Sue Number GUe

Belgium 7 5.5 7 5.5 - . France 40 35.3 AS 45.1 13 16.3 Germany 16 16.1 17 17.4 7 (1 ) 5.6 Italy 3 1.3 3 1.3 A 3.9 Netherlands 2 0.5 2 0.5 - - Spain a 5.5 8 5.5 7 (2) 6.5 U.K. 38(3) 10.6 38 10.6 4 2.4

TOTAL 114 74.8 123 .85.9 35 34.7

(1) Includes one reactor which is operating but not in full commercial service and two reactors whose construction is completed. (2) Includes two reactors the construction of which has been "deferred" and three reactors on which construction has been halted temporarily. • (3) Includes five advanced gas cooled reactors (AGRs) which are feeding electricity into the grid but which are not yet fully commissionec1

The events at the Chernobyl nuclear power station on 26 April 1986 changed many things. Europe, which had watched more with fascination than aue the events - or non-events - at Three Mile Island, came under the radioactive clpud of . Chernobyl.

Figure 1 shews estimates of the areas of land covered by the main body of the plume at various times during the release. The figures are based on trajectories calculated by the UK Meteorological Office (1) assuming that the release of material to the atmosphere started on 26 April and continued until 5 May. By Monday 28 April the radioactive plume had reached the coast of Sweden where 14 times normal levels of radiation were reported. By the Wednesday the wind direction at the accident site had changed causing a plume of material to move to the south and east while, at the same time, the high pressure area to the west was causing the contaminated air mass to spread over other parts of Europe. By Saturday 3 May the area of contaminated air extended from north-western Europe to south-eastern Europe, with only Spain and Portugal of the Community's twelve Member States unaffected, where it had rained during the time of plume passage, radioactive material was washed out from the cloud and deposited on the ground giving rise to levels of radiation that were high relative to neighbouring areas where it did not rain. This was particularly the case in parts of Italy, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany and the British Isles.

Figure 2 shows the levels of surface contamination in the Community's Member States by iodine-131 as reported to the Commission by the national authorities following the accident. The distribution of ceasium 134/137 was very similar with the small differences between the two distributions being 48 r

Saturday 25 April 1986

Wednesday 30 April Friday 2 Moy 1986

Saturday 3 May 1986

Figure 1 Areas covered by the main body of the cloud on various days during the release <1Q Average 10 10" 10

Peak 10 10 10 103 (Both values rounded to the nearest order of magnitude)

Figure 2 lodine-131 deposition , Bq m~2

50 due to the different behaviour of the tuo radionuclides. It should be noted that while this figure is thought to be a fair representation of the general situation in each country or region, there are areas within each region that could have higher or lower deposition depending on local factors.

The main response of the various authorities in the Member States was to offsr advice on what not to eat and drink. The most important nuclirie as far as health consequences to the population were concerned was correctly identified in the early stages of the incident as iodine-131. The group in the population which was most at risk was identified as young children drinking fresh milk from animals grazing contaminated pastures. Other foods, such as leafy green vegetables and fruit, uere identified as possible sources of exposure. The countermeasures therefore included, for example, changing grazing animals' diet from pastures to uncontaminated stored feed, instructing people to wash fruit and vegetables before eating them, advising people against drinking undiluted rainwater and, in those countries where the levels were particularly high, the withdrawal of fresh milk and vegetables from public consumption. Unfortunately, different Member States adopted different radiological criteria. This resulted in different allowed levels of contamination for foodstuffs and drinking water. In some instances these differences were as much as one order of magnitude. There were many reports of cows being allowed to graze in one field while in an adjacent field - across a national or regional border - they had to be kept indoors. Overall, there was a marked lack of co-ordination between the different organisations in their reaction to the crisis. There was a lack of homogeneity in the data collected and how this information was reported to the public. This added a great deal of confusion to basic fear, which itself had already been fuelled by speculation resulting from lack of factual knowledge. Following the accident, there was a large and rapid growth in anti-nuclear feeling throughout the Community. Public opinion which had recently been rather in favour of nuclear power swung very much against it. It is not suprising that the subject suddenly became a major political issue in many Member States with calls, usually from those in opposition to Governments, to stop the progress of nuclear power or even to close down existing stations. As a result, there was a very strong polarisation of views between the Governments of Member States as to the future role of nuclear power in the Community. This was reflected in the new Energy Objectives adopted by the Council of Energy Ministers in September 1986. While setting an objective of less than 15% of electricity to be generated by hydrocarbons in. 1995 and recognising the substantial role played by nuclear in the Community's energy supply, the Council did not formally retain the specific target, as 51 proposed by the Commission, of 40% nuclear electricity generation for 1995. t f • DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY J. In the year after the accident a great deal has been f said and written about the future of nuclear power in the [ Community. Not all of this has been as negative as the previous section may imply. Very strong support for nuclear power came immediately after the Chernobyl accident from the Tokyo Summit in May 1986. At the end of June the European Council - the Heads of State and Government of the Member States - meeting in The Hague recognised that nuclear energy constitutes an important source of energy for many countries. The Council of Energy Ministers meeting in September, while not adopting the specific 40% nuclear target for 1995, did underline the necessity of continuing and stepping up measures to reduce the share of hydrocarbons in the production of ""* electricity, taking account of the substantial role of nuclear power. On a world scale, the special session of the General Conference of the IAEA in September 1986 - attended at ministerial level by many of the 9A countries represented - adopted by concensus a resolution on the safety of nuclear power which starts by stating that nuclear power will continue to be an important source of energy for social and economic development. The .Commissions' representative to that Conference expressed a double conviction: the need to maintain optimal conditions of nuclear safety and the need to maintain . the nuclear option. He concluded that the European Community i would be exposed to economic and political risks of extreme gravity if nuclear energy was put into question. The debates are still continuing in many fora. However, general agreement has already been reached in several areas. The first is that, because of the major differences in technology between the Chernobyl reactor and the nuclear reactors in operation in Western Europe, the Community has very little to learn in terms of the technical aspects of nuclear safety from the accident. Secondly, human error played a very major part in the Chernobyl accident. The operating procedures, operator training and the engineered "defence in depth" of Western reactors would have combined to help prevent the Chernobyl disaster. However, in spite of the highly developed "safety culture" already practiced within the the European Community, Chernobyl has taught us several things. The first among these concerns the international repercussions that result from any nuclear accident involving the release of large quantities of radiation. Radionucleides do not respect international boundries. Therefore, preventing nuclear accidents and reacting to any that might occur are tasks that need to involve a high degree of international co-operation - especially in the areas of nuclear safety, radiation protection and information.

On a world scale the ideal forum for this cooperation is the IAEA and all the Community's Member States, together with the Commission, are giving full support to that

52 Agency in its post-Chernobyl programme. However, it soon became very obvious that the Community - the world's largest producer of nuclear electricity - has a very important lead role to play. In June 1986 a document was adopted by the Commission which outlined the basis for common action by the Community and set out the action areas. This "framework communication" has guided much of the post-Chernobyl work of the Commission (2). This communication was followed in August 1986 by the publication of a document which discussed the development of Community measures for the application of that part of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the Euratom Treaty) dealing with health and safety (3). Among topics covered in this document were the basic standards for the health of workers and the general public and the radioactive content of foodstuffs. The publication also contained the Commission's initial proposal for a system of rapid information between Member States that would operate automatically in the event of unusually high levels of radioactivity or a nuclear accident. Recent developments on this proposal are described later in this paper. The next document to be published by the Commission (in November 1986) was a descriptive paper on the Chernobyl accident and its impact on the Community (4). In addition to a description of the events leading up to and immediately following the accident, the paper describes the levels of fallout within the Community, the problems with food contamination and some of the actions taken in response to the accident in the USSR, the Community and through the IAEA. Finally, the document poses - and attempts to reply to - a series of questions including:

"Could such an accident happen in the Community?" "Is there scope for improving current levels of assurance of safety of nuclear installations?" and "what are 1-ikely to be the long term effects on the health of Community citizens?". Concerning the possibility of such an accident happening in the Community, the report concludes that "insofar as there are no nuclear power plants in the Community displaying the unfavourable stability characteristics of the RBMK reactor and insofar as criteria for segregation of safety functions and safety circuits are entirely different in the Community, such an accident cannot be considered as a precursor or as a warning of specific relevance to the Community". However, the accident did re-emphasise some of the lessons of the TMI accident, i.e. the importance of the human factor and man-machine interface, the value of properly conceived and built containment and the need to consider a very wide range of conceivable events when evaluating design safety and possible accident consequences.

^ On the question of improving the current levels of assurance of safety of nuclear installations, the report identified four broad categories of actions by which this could be done.-The first of these was exchanging information and making comparisons between countries concerning safety philosophies and approaches and the safety criteria and guidlines for the design and licencing of nuclear installations. The second was periodical safety reviews of reactors using the most up-to-date methodologies, especially Probabilistic Safety Assessment. Thirdly, because of the influence of the human factor on safety, the expert teams of scientists and engineers, together with the laboratories and facilities for safety research, are the foundations upon which continuing safe performance is built. These assets must be preserved and, where necessary, upgraded. Finally, the designs of plant operational procedures and of plant safety systems should be such that interference with the normal operating modes are extremely difficult to achieve.

Much of the data used to reply to the third question - "what are likely to be the long term effects on the health of the Community citizens?" - were drawn from a report prepared for the Commission by the National Radiation Protection Board (NRPB) in the United Kingdom (1). This report was itself published in March 1987 and received much publicity, probably because it included preliminary estimates as to the number of fatalities that could result in the Community from the release of radioactivity from Chernobyl.

The report was prepared using the environmental measurements made during the month after the accident and on calculations made using mathematical models of radionuclide transfer through the environment. Three pathways were considered: - external radiation from the cloud and deposited material, - internal radiation from inhalation of airborne material during the passage of the cloud, - internal radiation from ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs. The latter pathway is considered to be the most important. Estimates were made of average doses to individuals in EC countries, of doses to individuals in theoretical critical groups and of collective doses to the population of each country for the first year after Chernobyl and over a fifty year period. Estimates were also made for thyroid doses for the same groupings. The differences between the countries is illustrated in Figure 3 and in Figure A. Based on the estimated doses and "risk factors" for cancers as a result of irradiation, estimates have been made of the numbers of non-fatal and fatal thyroid cancers and total number of fatal cancers which could be statistically expected in the Community following the Chernobyl accident.

54 •- • -.>«

A Belgium D Germany FR G Italy J Portugal B Denmark E Greece H Luxembourg K Spain C France F Ireland I Netherlands L UK

AVERAGE ADULT — CRITICAL INDIVIDUAL. A

A Infant 300 o Child v AHi.U o/x

X 200 1000- I A !

to A

100 X A A A A B D H J K A B C D E F G II I J K L A rx~

Figure 3 Individual effective dose in first year

Au 1

>uSv 10 - 50 80 - 300 300 - 1000

Figure U Average adult effective dose to 50 y within the EC

I •

To see these estimates in context, it is necessary ' to compare them with the number of cancers that would occur ; in the population if Chernobyl had not happened. The number of thyroid cancers exp'ected in EC countries over the next fifty years is of the order of three hundred thousand, while the ' accident itself is expected to give rise to a further two > i thousand. Of these two thousand, approximately 5% are expected ' to be fatal, without the Chernobyl release, during the next fifty years about thirty million people in the Community are expected to die of cancer. The number of additional fatalities from cancers of all types due to Chernobyl, which are expected to occur over roughly the same period, has been estimated at around one thousand. It will therefore not be possible to detect the health impact on the Community of the Chernobyl accident. Using the same risk factors it is possible to calculate the number of fatalities that might be expected in """ the Community over the same fifty year period as a result of irradiation by natural sources - cosmic rays, terrestrial radiation and irradiation from naturally-occurring materials in the diet. This results in an estimate of eight thousand fatal cancers per year, or nearly half a million over a fifty year period. This is nearly five hundred times greater than the excess cancer fatal ities predicted due to Chernobyl. It should be noted that the authors of the report stress that during the coming months and years, improved x - assessments will be made of the radiological impact of the I Chernobyl accident and that their results should be regarded as preliminary. Another major report, which was adopted by the i^ Commission, concerns the "Technological problems of nuclear ^ safety" (5). There have been some who would propose to meet * such problems by a Community system of binding safety : criteria. However, the Commission prefers to follow the course I; of harmonization placing emphasis on the principal objective -• of a resolution of the Council in 1975 which was to provide "an equivalent and satisfactory degree of protection of the population and of the environment against the risks of radiation resulting from nuclear activities". The report critically reviews what has been achieved, on the Community level, in the field of harmonization of codes and standards in nuclear safety in i recent years. In view of the experience accumulated in the course of implementation of the Council resolution and the lessons learned from accidents such as Three Mile Island, the actions recommended in the Communication go beyond a continuation of the harmonization process. There are four major aspects of the strategy put forward by the Commission. These are: - continuing and bringing to an interim conclusion the harmonization process initiated in response to the 1975 resolution, by publishing the criteria and guidelines that are

57 \

most important for the safety of light water reactors, together with statements of convergence/divergence; - promoting co-operation in the field of reactor safety reviews at Community level, in order to ensure the mutual transparency of the methodologies, plans, scope, input data and results of such reviews; - undertaking an examination of the situation with regard to the human resources and main installations dedicated to nuclear plant safety in order to ensure that economic pressures and some decline in the pace of development of nuclear power do not jeopardize the assets on which are based the considerable achievements in the Community in the nuclear safety field;

- supporting the IAEA, which has an essential role to play on the broadest international level in the process aimed , at ensuring that stringent safety standards are applied in the different regions of the world. The proposals in the report represent a comprehensive approach concerning the promotion of further * common options for safety and for assuring an equal level of protection for the population of the Community as a whole which is more adapted to the post-Chernobyl situation. They do not, however, require new legally binding regulations and could probably be carried out through the existing collaborative arrangements. In one area the Commission has had to move rather slower than hoped. Within days of the Chernobyl accident the Council agreed values for the maximum permissable levels of radioactivity in foodstuffs into the Community. These values were designated as "temporary" until detailed recommendations ' could be made and agreed by the Council. In December 1986 the Commission adopted a draft proposal concerning the limits on the radioactive contamination of agricultural products and drinking water following a nuclear accident (6). However, at that time no agreement had been reached as to the precise limits that should be proposed for the permanent system of controls. An international scientific seminar on the subject of radioactive contamination of agricultural products was held in Luxembourg in April 1987. Following this seminar the the Commission has adopted its proposals concerning the maximum permissable levels. These proposals will now be submitted to the Council for decision. Meanwhile, the temporary measures have been extended until the end of October 19B7.

Following the consultations required by the Euratom Treaty, the Commission has very recently adopted and submitted to the Council a formal proposal for a Community system of rapid exchange of information. Concerning the information which is to be reported, the Commission proposal follows I closely that of the Vienna (IAEA) Convention on "early r notification" but adds two items to the list. The first of | these concerns the reporting of measures introduced for ij agricultural products and drinking water. This would allow the j'j Commission to fulfill its dutie58s _of maintainin g a unified _ 'j f market and protecting the health of the population. The second concerns reporting the measures taken or planned by which the public are advised how best to protect themselves. For examples, if the public are advised not to eat certain foodstuffs this would be reported and would help to avoid a repetition of the confusion over these matters which followed the Chernobyl accident.

Therefore, the essential difference between the Vienna Convention and a Community system is the "two way" nature of the latter. It is not only the country in which an accident occurs that reports, but also any country which detects the radiation. Under this system, each reporting country would also be informed of the actions taken by others. Unnecessary duplication would not arise because, by supplying the information specified by the Community system, the Member State would at the same time be fulfilling the requirements of the Vienna Convention.

Concerning the Vienna convention on "early notification" and that on "mutual assistance" (together adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA in September 1986), the Commission considers that it is advisable for the Community to accede to both these conventions. A proposal to this effect is presently before the Council.

APRIL 1987

In the past twelve months, nine new reactors have entered commercial operation to boost the Community's nuclear capacity to over 86 GWe, close to a 15% increase.

Eight of the new stations were in France, a country which now generates around 701 of its electricity by nuclear power. France is the European country which has developed nuclear energy to the greatest extent accounting for over half of the nuclear capacity installed in the Community. In April 1987, not only had it 48 plants in commercial operation and a further 13 under construction but it had a programme covering all aspects of the fuel cycle and, together with other European countries, the first commercial scale fast breeder reactor (Super Phenix). Nuclear energy therefore occupies not only a central role in French energy planning but also in the French economy. Now that the restructuring of the French electricity industry away from coal and oil has been achieved, the ordering rate for new nuclear plant has slowed down. However, there is no evidence that Chernobyl will bring about any significant changes to French nuclear energy policy.

Belgium is second in the "nuclear league" only two or three percentage points behind France in terms of nuclear share of electricity production. It now has seven plants in operation and there are preliminary plans to construct an eighth before the end of the century. The Belgian Government has announced that it will not take a decision on this plant before a parliamentary debate has been held on Chernobyl. This is scheduled to take place in the Autumn.

59 Germany produces nearly 30% of its electricity by nuclear power. Immediately after Chernobyl the main political opposition parties called for the phasing out of nuclear energy. However, the ruling coalition, while putting increased emphasis on nuclear safety, confirmed its support for the nuclear option and was returned to power following the elections in January 1987. The current reactor programme should be completed on schedule. Spain is also dependent on its nuclear stations for about 30% of its electricity. In 1982 the Socialist Government imposed a moratorium on some nuclear projects. This was a result of their views on the evolution of electricity demand and because of financial constraints. A review of this sitiuation is expected in 1988. Chernobyl does not appear to have given rise to any significant developments vis-S-vis the rSle of nuclear energy in Spain. Around 20X of the United Kingdom's electricity is from nuclear energy. In recent years the main issue in energy planning has been the Central Electricity Generating Board's application to construct a PUR at Sizewell. Following the longest public inquiry in British history, the Inspector recommended that permission be given to build the reactor. In March 1987 the Secretary of State for Energy announced the Government's agreement to the construction, making it clear that in arriving at this decision the lessons of Chernobyl and the low fossil fuel prices had been taken into account. At the time th« political opposition parties indicated that they would reverse the decision if they came to power.

The two nuclear stations in the Netherlands produce 6X of that country's electricity. Chernobyl happened only days before the relaunch of the country's nuclear programme was to be debated in the parliament. As the country was also preparing for an election, the Government decided to postpone its decision on nuclear power. The situation is likely to be reviewed next year. Less than AX of Italy's electricity comes from its three nuclear plants. The National Energy Conference which took place in February 1987 saw the need for Italy to maintain the nuclear option. However, the situation remains far from clear and subject to developments on the political level in coming months. There are five countries without nuclear energy programmes in the European Community: Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. Collectively they account for about 6% of the Community's total electricity production. None of these countries had any firm plans to introduce a nuclear programme even before Chernobyl. It is not likely that any of them will hsve nuclear energy production this century. Within the Community as a whole, a further .".3 nuclear power stations are at various stages of construction, ranging from clearing the site prior to construction proper to being loaded with fuel - or even already achieving full power. It is likely that the large majority of these stations will be

60 put into commercial service within the next five or six years. This add another thirty or so giggawatts electrical capacity to the grids. While it is apparent that nuclear power will continue to play a major rol3 in providing the Community's energy in the future, it is still too early to make predictions concerning its continuing growth in the longer term. It is noticeable that none of our Member States with nuclear programmes has indicated any intention of renouncing the nuclear option. There are some preliminary indications that public opinion may be slowly returning to its support - at least in some countries. It is possible that pointers to Europe's nuclear future could be the UK Government's approval for Sizewell B and the Community's first commercial-size fast reactor, Super Phenix, reaching 100% power.

REFERENCES 1) MORREY.M., BROUN,J..WILLIAMS,J.A..CRICK,M.J.,SIMMONDS,J.R. and HILL.M.D., "A preliminary assessment of the radiological impact of the Chernobyl reactor accident on the population of the European Community" Report of work under CEC contract 86 398. Published by the Commission of the European Communities, 1 987. 2) COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES "Outline communication from the Commission to the Council on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident" C0M(86) 327 final, 1986. 3) COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES "The development of Community measures for the application of Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty 'Health and Safety'" C0M(86) 434 final, 1986. 4) COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES "The Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and its consequences in the framework of the European Community" C0MC86) 607 final, 1986 . 5) COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES "Technological problems of nuclear safety" C0M(87) 96 final, I9e7. 6) COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES "Proposal for a system for establishing limits for the radioactive contamination of drinking water and agricultural products in the case of a nuclear accident" C0MC87) 28 final, 1987.

^ ') TABLE

DERIVED REFERENCE LEVELS(1) AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONTROL OF FOODSTUFFS FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT (Bq/kg)

(2) Isotopes of iodine and strontium Notably I-I31, Sr-90

Milk products Other major foodstuffs Drinking water 500 3 000 400

(2) Alpha emitting isotopes of plutonium and transplutonium elements Notably Pu-239, Am-241

Milk products Other major foodstuffs Drinking water 20 80 10

All other nuclides of half-life greater than 10 days(2)(3) Notably Cs-134, Cs-137

Milk products Other major foodstuffs Drinking water 4 000 5 000 800

NOTES

(1) These derived reference Levels are intended for general application; they are based on the Lower RL discussed in the text, namely, a committed effective equivalent of 5 mSv in a year and a committed dose equivalent to the thyroid of 50 mSv in a year. Values based on the higher RL would be 10 times greater.

(2) Within each group of nuclides the values relate to the total activity of all the nuclides in the group. Each group can then be treated as completely independent of the other groups.

(3) Milk products include fresh milk and re-constituted milk drinks or foods prepared from dried milk preparations. Cheese should be considered as one of the "other major foodstuffs".

(4) For minor foodstuffs, e.g. those with an annual consumption of less than about 10 kg., values of 10 times those for major foodstuffs will be appropriate. It is not to be expected that restrictions will be needed on items such as spices and condiments.

(5) Carbon 14 and tritium are not included in this group because of their low contribution to the doses for any forseeable accident.

I r r*• t

ROMANIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM: A PROGRESS REPORT

Mihai Pop, Director General ISPE, Dr. Eng. John P. Karger, Resident Engineering Manager Mircea Tarta, Deputy Manager ISPE Constantin Ningiuc^ Cernavoda Design Manager Institute for Nuclear Power Studies and Design

1. Introduction

I should like to present a snap shot of the nuclear power program in Romania today. To do this meaningfully, I shall briefly review the past Romanian nuclear development history, shall describe the present situation giving the progress on Cernavoda, our principal nuclear power complex under construction and shall indicate the direction of our future plans.

Historically nuclear development in Romania has the following benchmarks:

1956 Installation of a research nuclear reactor in the Institute for Atomic Physics type VVR-S 2 MWT enriched uranium H20 moderated and evolved, is completed.

1960-1970 Feasibility studies to define optimum scenario for nuclear power development in Romania by the Institute for Power Studies and Design (ISPE) in cooperation with other j&\ Institutes and Industrial units are carried out.

^ Type of Studies: - Status of Nuclear Power development in the world and prospects - Optimum nuclear unit power for national power grid - Fuel resources and fuel cycle implications - Siting requirements for nuclear power plants and Romanian possible sites - Local manufacturing capability and compatibility between reactor types and Romanian industrial investment - Selection of optimum type of reactor for Romania based on the above restrictions.

These studies resulted in the conclusion that for Romanian conditions power reactors fuelled with natural uranium are the most attractive. On the basis of technical maturity, operating performance and economies, the CANDU type reactor is recommended.

1968-1975 The first contacts with AECL (Canada) and the Canadian Industry are made. Preliminary technical and commercial negotiations are held.

63 1976 A joint Canadian-Romanian feasibility study for a nuclear power project with CANDU PHWR-600 MW(e).

1977-1978 Technical and commercial discussions are held. These are completed with the AECL-Romenergo agreements for Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant Unit No. 1 Nuclear Steam supply signed in December 1978.

These are the:

- Engineering Services Agreement, - Licensing Agreement, - Procurement Services Agreement.

1979 (April) In April of 1979, the Disbursement Procedures Agreement is in place (Export Development Corporation loan).

1979 (April) Work at the Cernavoda site starts in April.

1979 (May) Romenergo-AECL agreements become effective in May.

1981 (Feb.) The Ansaldo Impianti (Italy) and General Electric (USA) agreements are completed for the Balance of Plant for the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2.

1981 (Dec.) Cernavoda Unit 2 agreement becomes effective.

1982 A decision is taken to increase Romanian industry participation starting with Unit 1.

1983-1984 The major order negotiations for long delivery time components are completed in Canada.

1985 to Negotiations for all items to be purchased from Canada for present Units 1 and 2 are completed. (May '87)

1987 (May) Preliminary discussion between the Romanian Organizations and the AECL and the Organization of CANDU Industries (O.C.I.) to extend cooperation for future nuclear power units in the National Power Program,

Our first slide shows the Romanian Nuclear Power Program which is based on the CANDU PHWR 700 MW(e) unit.

The first site is Cernavoda with 5 units of 700 MWe. The next three or four nuclear generating stations having typically two or three units of 700 MW(e) will follow. Today the sites are approved for two of them.

64 I 3. The Cernavoda Project

f 3.1 The Participants / The Cernavoda Project, the design, construction and commissioning of a five CANDU PHWR unit station, each with a gross electrical output of 700 MW(e) is a very complex undertaking that requires cooperation among many professional disciplines and industrial trades. The station, although a CANDU design, is being executed by the Romanian organizations, under their responsibility and the technical assistance of AECL. Some of the main Romanian organizations involved in the project are shown on the next slide. The Ministry of Electrical Energy (MEE) is responsible for the overall project management at the government level. The Cernavoda Power Enterprise (INC) represents the utility and is responsible for the implementation of the project.

There are other ministries and organizations as follow:

State Committee for Nuclear Energy (CSEN)with ISCAN-ACN, - the regulatory body for the control of all nuclear activities, including auditing of quality assurance programs; ISPE - the Institute for Power Studies and Designs- is the general designer of the plant and design authority for the conventional part (BOP); IRNE - the Institute for Nuclear Power Reactors- is the design n j authority for the nuclear part of the plant (NSP); ' Romenergo - Foreign Trade Company responsible for all contacts outside Romania;

There are also three major external participants for the first two units of (^ the Cernavoda Project: 1 • AECL (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited) responsible for the CANDU Nuclear Steam Plant technology, engineering and quality assurance, and purchasing agent for RE in Canada; Ansaldo Impianti - responsible for design of conventional plant equipment; General Electric - responsible for the supply of the turbine generators.

4. Romanian Industrial Participation

4.1 General

Starting in 1982 a policy of development of national capability in nuclear technology was decided. The objective is to provide progressively most of the equipment, materials and skills necessary to support the nuclear power program in Romania. The so called industrial integration decree states that the value of Romanian supplied components to total components value shall be 40% for Unit 1 NSP 60% for Unit 2 and over 80% for the subsequent units.

65 4.2 Technology Transfer

The Romanian Industry required for the power industry is well developed and well equipped in must areas, partly as a result of Romania's petroleum industry background and partly because of modern planning. The technology transfer that was required was very specific knowhow related to CANDU components to allow the Romanian Industry to bridge the experience gap. For these components, agreements were made whereby the future Romanian supplier participated in a training program on the premises of the Canadian manufacturer during the fabrication of the first unit component. This occurred for example in the case of such major components as the Calandria and the steam generators. In other cases, the Romanian industry additionally supplied parts to the Canadian manufacturer for the first unit. An example of this type of arrangement is the procurement of the closure plugs, small but complex and important mechanisms.

4.3 Quality Assurance

One of the aspects with which Romanian Industry was less familiar were the CSA-Z- 299 and the ASME quality assurance programs. Under technical assistance quality assurance training programs were conducted both for the project quality assurance personnel as well as the site contractors and the involved industries. The results to date of these programs are summarized on the next slide.

Industry was also required to formulate and practice quality assurance programs. The number of Romanian Organizations with quality assurance programs is shown on the next slide.

5. Construction Progress

Construction to date is principally civil construction which for Unit 1 is 90% complete, and mechanical major component installation which in Unit 1 is about 60% complete. Fuel channel installation is scheduled to begin this year and the reactor building piping installation has commenced as well as some of the electrical installation. The balance of plant installation is progressing well with the major components of the turbo generator and the condenser in place. The subsequent units are each progressively a month behind until the fifth unit where the civil work has only commenced several months ago. The following slides show some of the construction milestones.

6. Conclusions

The first conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that Romania is strongly committed to a nuclear power program consisting of a number of units. They are all based on the Canadian nuclear reactor developed by AECL-CANDU 600.

66 Choosing this type of reactor, Romania considered internal technical and economical aspects as well as the international reputation of AECL achievements in the nuclear field.

The design, construction, licensing and operation for the first time in Romania of nuclear power plants raise important problems that will have to be solved by our specialists.

In solving them we consider there exist ever growing possibilities of cooperation with the AECL specialists and the Canadian industry at large, so that the commissioning of unit 1-NPP Cernavoda and the remaining nuclear program should be completed as expeditiously and efficiently as possible.

This achievement will stand as an example of the good relations between our two countries.

67 Slide 1 ROMANIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM (CANDU PHW 700 MW UNITS }

No NAME POWER START CONSTRUCTION (MWe)

1. .;;cERNAvodA',:;;^r 5 «700 1979-1984

2. (site preliminary Iderif iflfed 2 x700 1988

: : 3. •••': ^FUTURE 7^ B •'^.• /ijil ; 1988 site preliminary identified] 3 »700

A. i FUTURE - C •: 2 x?00 T B A > • . -i

5. n^^UTURE-b :'-; '•! 2 x700 T B A

T B A — To be assigned Slide 2

MINISTRIES FOR STATE COMMITTEE MINISTRY OF JCOUIPMENTJ MIUG, FOR NUCLEAR ELECTRICAL POWER CSEN ENERGY MEE MIET, OTHERS 1 -RE6ULA1

ROMANIAN MANUFACTURERS I INC ROMENERGO CANADA EXECUTIVE FOREIGN AECL • o- ENTERPRISE PURCHASES OCI ITALY Al ISPE GE ARCHITECT I USA ENGINEER OTHERS

IACN ANM IAMSAT IRNE ICSITEEJ |cCSfT-Fv| [OTHERS

FOREIGN SITE CONTRACTORS SUBCONTRACTORS DESIGN SUPPLIERS \ ,

SLIDE 3

ORGANIZATION

MINISTRY OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY (KEE)

CERNAVODA PROJECT (INC)

ICEMENERG

SPE

ICEMENERG - QA ORGANIZATION ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE CLIENT

ISPE - GENERAL DESIGNER AND BOP DESIGN AUTHORITY

70 Slide U IMG B-Case Study Present Status Manufacturing Some Main Mechanical Components Technical ( %0f Completion as of 28th of May 1987 Transfer

Training in Unit. 1 2 3 4 5 Canada

1)Calandria Cdn Cdn 10% 0 0 80 man « months

2) Steam Generators Cdn Cdn 5% 0 0 100 man » months

3) Pressurizer 100% 10% 0 0 0

M Degasser 100% 10% 0 0 0

5) Reactivity Mech Deck 100% 95% 0 0 0

6) End fittings 20% 0 0 0 0

•71 Primary Heat Cdn Cdn 5% 0 0 30 man x months Transport Pump

8) Heat Exchangers Cdn Cdn 1% 0 0 30 man x months

Note: 1) All Cases With Numbers Indicates 100% Roumanian Manufacturing Responsability 2) + 22 Other Components see slide 5 Slide 5 - Page 1

LIST OF STATUS FOR OTHER COMPONENTS MANUFACTURED BY I M Q B

item Component Unir 1 Unit ]I

<•• •*> i w !pc.)

1 2 3 U

1 Equipment Airlock 70 -

2 Personnel Airlock 70 —

3 F/T CJCV Seal Door 65 -

i, Transf. Channel Tube, Transition Piece, Containment Pass 80

c Specs! Sliding Door. Vapojr Recovery Re cm "ICO

72 t Sl.de 5- Page 2

LIST OF STATUS FOR OTHER COMPONENTS MANUFACTURED BY I MGB

Iran Component Unit. 1 Unit 11 no (pc) (pc)

1 : 3

; 6 " S*ee. F,.:ed Shielding Doers 100 ICO

-7 Concrete Filled Shielding Door 100 100