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Disconnected and Discounted? Religious Actors and Civil Society in Post-2001 Afghanistan

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Disconnected and Discounted? Religious Actors and Civil Society in Post-2001 Afghanistan Disconnected and Discounted? Religious Actors and Civil Society in Post-2001 Afghanistan Kaja Borchgrevink and Kristian Berg Harpviken (PRIO) Kanishka Nawabi, Idrees Zaman and Mirwais Wardak (CPAU) Arne Strand and Astri Suhrke (CMI) Religion is an influential force in Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), in society and politics. While many Afghanistan – both in people’s the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and formal and informal institutions daily lives and in politics. In the the Cooperation for Peace and Unity declined during the war, local religious international debate on peacebuilding (CPAU) undertook a new research civil society institutions remained and development in post-Taliban project, whose main findings are significant. Afghanistan, however, religion is hardly presented in this policy brief.1 The ever mentioned, and religious actors project draws on case studies from The understanding of civil society in the and institutions are rarely included in Kunduz city (Kunduz) and Sayedabad international aid community that has policies or programmes. Given that (Wardak where 40 religious leaders defined peacebuilding and development strengthening Afghan civil society is and a range of key informants were policy in Afghanistan since 2001 is rather considered essential by both national interviewed, as well as a national-level narrow. Donors have mainly supported and international development actors, study based on interviews with officials formally established organizations why do they pay so little attention to from the Afghan government, national associated with secular development religious actors and institutions? How and international development actors, programmes. Focusing on the service- is religious civil society viewed by the and religious leaders, complemented by delivery role of civil society, donors main development actors – the Afghan a review of relevant existing literature. view such organizations as effective government, other international implementers of reconstruction and governments, and national and Afghan Civil Society development projects. More traditional international civil society? How does Formal, modern civil society organi- civil society actors and institutions, religious civil society perceive current zations are a recent phenomenon. however – religious ones included – do peace and development processes? In Afghanistan, traditional forms of not commonly perform these sorts of And, more generally, what role and association – such as the local councils functions. function does religious civil society play (shura/jirga) – and religious institutions in Afghanistan? – such as the mosque, the religious Although the Islamic faith is shared seminaries (madrasas) and religious by virtually all Afghans, there are With these questions as a starting point, leaders (mullahs and ulema) – have also religious differences within the researchers from the International historically played an important role country. 1The present policy brief is an output of a research project that forms part of a larger research initiative on Afghanistan by the CMI and PRIO. The project is funded by the Royal Norwegian Min- istry of Foreign Affairs, and complementary funds have been granted by the Ford Foundation. The main research has been conducted by Kaja Borchgrevink (PRIO) and Kanishka Nawabi, Mirwais Wardak and Idrees Zaman (all CPAU). Advice, training and support have been provided by Kristian Berg Harpviken (PRIO) and Arne Strand and Astri Suhrke (both CMI). Policy Brief PRIO • CPAU • CMI Religious civil society is not important and influential institution and international development actors, homogenous, but comprises reform- for religious leaders as opinion- the relationship is presented as being friendly, pro-government moderates makers. More generally, religious solely one-way. along with Islamists, conservative- leaders serve as the conveyors of civil minded traditionalists and radical society ‘voices’, and they often have Lack of Genuine Dialogue fundamentalists that oppose the considerable influence as critics of While their involvement is limited, the government. The public debate gives political processes. government and other development voice to many competing groups actors – such as the United Nations who all speak the language of religion. Mediation and Conflict Resolution – have tried to use the voice of the Furthermore, religious networks and Afghan religious leaders have played clergy to legitimize their own policies institutions often span state boundaries a role in conflict resolution not only and programmes, and to gain access including movement of people, finances because of their knowledge of religious to project beneficiaries. Little effort, and ideas. law and their general religious authority, however, has been made to create but also because, as religious leaders, they space for an autonomous role on the Civil Society Functions have a degree of autonomy in relation to part of religious actors or to establish Religious civil society has a number community and tribal structures. a genuine dialogue. Religious leaders of functions. Religious actors and express frustration about a situation in institutions stand out from other types Intermediation which their advice is only sought when of civil society actors by providing The relatively independent position of the government needs it to support its moral authority and linking the believer ulema and local mullahs enables them to own policies. to the sacred. In addition to these act as interlocutors between their own functions, which are fundamentally communities and external agents, such Tension and Collaboration religious, religious actors in Afghanistan as the Afghan state, international agencies The values and agendas of modern perform a number of other ‘civil society and NGOs. civil society and traditional religious functions’: 2 civil society in Afghanistan are often in Resource Distribution and Social Security conflict. Despite these differences, actors Socialization and Social Cohesion Afghanistan’s religious institution – the within modern Afghan civil society are As authoritative guardians of religious mosque and the religious school – perform somewhat more active than the Afghan norms and practices, Afghanistan’s social security functions through charity government and Western donors when religious leaders and institutions have and redistribution of resources within the it comes to involving religious leaders in considerable potential to strengthen community. dialogue and project activities. internal bonds between members in a community, as well as to act as a The clergy’s role in defining, maintaining Interest in Collaboration bridge between different groups. Their and preserving what are considered Among the religious leaders position, however, can also be used to appropriate moral values, however, interviewed in Sayedabad and Kunduz, divide groups. Just as religious actors gives religious leaders considerable the overall majority expressed can potentially foster conflict, they can influence. The roles and functions of positive views about the government’s also be important promoters of peace, religious leaders and institutions can development agenda. Although reconciliation and collaboration across be utilized for different agendas; they cautiously sceptical of the government, conflict lines. may support the government, for many believe that, as religious leaders, example, or they may oppose it; they they could positively contribute to this Public Communication and Advocacy may promote peace and cooperation, agenda by generating support among Religious leaders serve as local or they may advocate hostility and the people, as well as through more information brokers, and also voice conflict. It is partly this ambiguity that direct participation in development their opinions on public matters. In makes religious civil society critical in projects. Afghanistan, the mosque is used not peace and reconciliation processes. • Most religious leaders, however, only for religious services but also to have not been invited to take part share information of public relevance Giving Voice or Using Voice? in such activities. and to spread political messages. To the extent that religious civil society • Many religious leaders – even The Friday prayer, in particular, is an is acknowledged by other national among the traditionalists – are 2 The analysis presented here draws on the framework developed in Thania Paffenholz & Christoph Spurk’s ‘Civil Society, Civic Engagement and Peacebuilding’, Social Development Paper No. 36 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006). Policy Brief PRIO • CPAU • CMI positive to foreign development youth in foreign madrasas has alarmed Why the Lack of Engagement? assistance, as long as this does not the government, leading to new Even though many national and conflict with Afghan traditions and initiatives to counter this development. international aid actors acknowledge Islam. The Ministry of Education has recently the central role – even the potential for • The majority of the religious initiated a madrasa programme in constructive involvement – of religious leaders (and virtually all those which regular subjects are grafted on civil society, there is considerable interviewed in Wardak) were to the traditional curricula. Religious reluctance to engage. Why? highly critical of the foreign education is a contested issue, where • Lack of familiarity, not knowing military presence. There was a some (particularly in the government)
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