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davies, stephen. Philosophical Perspectives on Art. definition is irreducibly evaluative thus springs from Oxford University Press, 2007, 279 pp., $75.00 a more fundamental disagreement between function- cloth. alists and proceduralists. This argument does not seem compelling to me. Philosophical Perspectives on Art is a collection of It might be the case that the definition of art is irre- sixteen papers published by Davies over the last quar- ducibly evaluative, and yet works with no merit are ter century. The book is divided thematically into artworks. For example, it might be the case that to two sections, dealing with the nature of art and mat- be an artwork is to be an object that it is appropri- ters of interpretation and appreciation, respectively. ate to evaluate in the light of certain standards, an Davies’s Definitions of Art was the first book in an- object that will be good or bad insofar as it meets or alytic aesthetics that I ever read, and I have been falls short of such standards. In “Essential Distinc- attending to his work closely ever since. Readers of tions for Art Theorists,” Davies considers a version this journal will be sure to add this new collection to of this reply, offered by Nick Zangwill, but suggests their list of essential reading. that such an approach cannot deal adequately with The volume deals with a diverse range of topics: the case of completely worthless art. Davies argues art’s definition, critical responses to Dissanayake and that anti-descriptivists about art’s definition simply Danto, the art status of architecture, intentionalism, cannot account for artworks whose lack of merit does interpretation, the status of aesthetic principles, and not spring from accidental damage or a failure of an and aesthetic expressiveness. In each case, artist to realize her ambition to make good art, but is Davies raises intriguing and subtle issues that deserve just bad through and through. detailed consideration. I can only offer a preliminary I cannot see how this can be right. The concept or discussion of a few of them here. essence of art might be irreducibly normative with- In “Functional and Procedural Definitions of out this requiring that every artwork possess at least Art,” Davies argues for the incompatibility of those some degree of merit. As long as the relevant defi- two dominant approaches to the definition of art. He nition irreducibly includes mention of standards that specifies a range of key dividing lines between the it is appropriate to hold artworks to, it will be es- contrasting positions: the significance of hard cases, sentially evaluative in . This just does not the status of descriptive versus evaluative definitions, seem to entail that any artwork must to some extent and the relative importance of accounting for art’s meet those standards. This point is not local to the place in our lives. On the second issue, Davies ar- case of aesthetics. For example, Timothy Williamson gues that it ought to be common ground between the thinks of belief as essentially a state that has knowl- approaches that works should be evaluated as art by edge as its standard of appropriateness: “Knowledge examining the extent to which they serve the point sets the standard of appropriateness for belief. That of art. The basic disagreement between the positions does not imply that all cases of knowing are paradig- concerns rather the status of works that do not meet matic cases of believing. ...Nevertheless, as a crude minimum standards of artistic merit, despite their generalization, the further one is from knowing p, according with a set of wholly descriptive, broadly the less appropriate it is to believe that p. Know- procedural conditions that artworks typically meet. ing is in that sense the best kind of believing. Mere If these conditions hold, D