Governance, Social Development, Conflict and Humanitarian PEAKS Consortium led by Coffey International Development
Final Report ©
Identifying Entry Points For Accountability Interventions In Somalia - Demand Side June 2013 CONTENTS / FINAL REPORT
Contents
Acronyms C1:1
Section 1: 1. Summary Report C2:1 1.1 The Strategic Need for an Accountability Programme for Somalia C2:1 1.2 Appraisal of Evidence and Feasibility for Strengthening Accountability in C2:7 Somalia 1.3 Recommendations and Options for Programming and VFM C2:9
Section 2: 2. Introduction C3:1
Section 3: 3. Methodology C4:1
3.1 Phase 1 – Inception Planning and Desk Based Document Review C4:1
3.2 Phase 2 – Fieldwork, Research, Analysis and Presentation of Findings C4:1 3.3 Phase 3 – Preparation and submission of draft and final reports. C4:2
Section 4: 4. The Policy Context for Accountability Programming C5:1
4.1 Definitions of Accountability and Demand Side Accountability C5:1
4.2 Problems with Traditional Principal-Agent Focussed Models C5:1 4.3 Necessity of Contextual Understanding and Robust Country Analysis C5:1
Section 5: 5. Contextual and Stakeholder Analysis Across the Three Zones of Somalia C6:1
5.1 Context C6:1
5.2 Institutional Mapping and Stakeholder Analysis C6:6
Section 6: 6. The Social Costs of Corruption C7:1 6.1 Introduction C7:1 6.2 Forms of Corruption C7:2 6.3 Causes of Corruption C7:4 6.4 Social Costs of Corruption C7:4 6.5 Key Anti-Corruption Actors C7:5 6.6 The Assumptions Behind Combating Corruption C7:6 6.7 Risk C7:7 6.8 Measurement and Modelling C7:9
Section 7: 7. Exclusion and Accountability C8:1 7.1 Introduction C8:1 7.2 Disempowered Groups C8:2
Section 8: 8. Past and Current Interventions C9: 1
Section 9: 9. Lessons From Intervention C10:1
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9.1 Supporting DSA in FCAS: Review of Evidence C10:1 9.2 Case Studies and Lessons Learnt C10:2 9.3 Recommendations C10:5
Section 10: 10. Conclusions and Recommendations C11:1 10.1 Overview C11:1 10.2 Recommendations C11:3 10.3 Programme Modalities C11:4
Section 11: 11: Annex A: Zonal Report – Somaliland C12:1 11:1 Overview C12:1 11:2 Context C12:1 11.3 Stakeholders and Their Relevance to Accountability C12:7 11.4 Current and Past Initiatives C12:13 11.5 General Comments C12:18 11.6 Recommendations C12:19
Section 12: 12. Annex B: Zonal Report – Puntland (to be inserted) C13:1
Section 13: 13. Annex C: Zonal Report – South Central C14:1 13.1 Overview C14:1 13.2 Context Analysis C14:1 13.3 Mogadishu C14:4 13.4 Kismayo C14:12 13.5 Baidoa C14:16 13.6 Past and Current Initiatives C14:20 13.7 Recommendations C14:22
Section 14: 14. Annex D: Gender and Accountability C15:1 14.1 Aims and Definitions C15:2 14.2 Gender Relations in Somalia: An Overview C15:2 14.3 Disempowered Groups C15:5 14.4 Institutional Framework For Empowerment and Accountability C15:10 14.5 Conclusions and Recommendations C15:10
Section 15: 15. Annex E- Past Interventions Matrix C16:1
Section 16: 16. Annex F – Stakeholder Tables C17:1
Section 17: 17. Annex G – Methodology C18:1 17.1 Phase 1 – Inception Planning and Document Review C18:1 17.2 Phase 2 – Fieldwork, Other Research, Analysis and Presentation of Initial C18:1 Findings 17.3 Phase 3- Preparation and submission of draft and final reports C18:2 C18:4
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE, JUNE 2013 ii CONTENTS / FINAL REPORT
17.4 Questionnaire Templates
Section 18: 18. Annex H – Survey Results C19:1 18.1 Trust C19:1 18:2 Corruption C19:4
Section 19: 19. Annex I List of Interviewees C20:1 19.1 List of persons interviewed C20:1
Section 20: 20. Annex J Bibliography C21:1
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE, JUNE 2013 iii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS / FINAL REPORT
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AIFR Audit Investigative Financial Report
AMISON African Union Mission in Somalia
ASWJ Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama
CBO Community-Based Organization
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
CS Civil Society
CSO Civil Society Organization
DAI Development Alternatives Incorporated
DANIDA Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
DC District Commissioner
DDG Danish Demining Group
DFID Department for International Development (DFID)
DRC Danish Refugee Council
EC European Commission
EDC Education Development Centre
EDF European Development Fund
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FDA Financial Diagnostic Assessment
FGDs Focus Group Discussions
FGM Female genital mutilation
GGACC Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO International Labour Organization
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INGO International Non-Governmental Organization
JJU Jubba Journalists Union
JPLG Joint UN Programme on Local Governance
KDF Kenya Defence Forces
KIIs Key Informant Interviews
MDG Millennium Development Goal
Mof Ministry of Finance
MoH Ministry of Health
MoI Ministry of Interior
NCA National Constituency Assembly
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSA Non-State Actor
NSIA National Somali Intelligence Agency
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PAC Police Advisory Committee
PACT Human Rights, Capacity Building and Research Action
PFM Public Financial Management
PFM Public Financial Management
PLWA People Living with HIV and AIDS
PMFU Public Finance Management Unit
PPP Public Private Partnerships
RDP Reconstruction and Development Plan
RRA Rahanweyn Resistance Army
SBF Somaliland Business Fund
SEMG Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group
SFF Somali Football Federation
SFG Somali Federal Government
SGBV Sexual and other forms of Gender-Based Violence
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C1:2 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS / FINAL REPORT
SNAF Somali National Armed Forces
SNP Somali National Police
SONSAF Somaliland Non State Actors Forum
SORADI Social Research and Development Institute
TFG Transitional Federal Government
TIS Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation
TNG Transitional National Government
TOR Terms Of Reference
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHABITAT United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USIP U.S. Institute of Peace
VFM Value for Money
VOA Voice of America
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
WWW Waamo Women’s Way
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C1:3 SUMMARY REPORT / FINAL REPORT
1 Summary Report
This background paper serves to identify entry points for accountability interventions in Somalia that will inform the design of a DFID Accountability Programme.
1.1 The Strategic Need for an Accountability Programme for Somalia Somalia presents a complex landscape with varied political and security arrangements, social and economic conditions in different regions, and an array of actors exhibiting different interests and influences across the country 1.1.1 The Need for Culturally Sensitive and Tailored Accountability Interventions in Somalia
Factor Considerations for the Somali Accountability context
Political Context The centralised state structures (the SFG) and the processes that led to their formation have been (and continue to be) characterised by low levels of accountability. Political accountability remains considerably influenced by the dynamics of resource extraction and clan domination. Different clan groupings align behind different state formation projects with centrism and federalism finding favour with clans depending on their spatial concentration. Although the ‘hybrid political orders’ of Somaliland and Puntland face clear challenges, they are perceived as more responsive and accountable than state structures in south central (including the SFG) that have been established with a high degree of external influence. Somaliland and Puntland contain clear opportunities for political empowerment and mobilisation efforts. The new constitution, although flawed and ambiguous, provides a useful springboard for debate and dialogue on governance and accountability.
Security and Past and current episodes of violence, the perception of the state formation as a zero-sum Conflict Context game and subsequent low level of trust between groups limits the prospects for an inclusive, sustainable political settlement. Insecurity and fear raises the risk of demanding accountability, leads to lack of trust and diminishes the potential for collective action beyond one’s immediate social group
The Executive, Somalia is characterised by an environment of impunity exacerbated by a weak and Legislature and confused justice system. Judiciary Traditional clan based and Islamic justice systems overlap with the formal justice systems (in including in Somaliland). These multiple, overlapping and often contradictory sources of law make determination of primacy and jurisdiction highly confusing and open to abuse. This in turn limits the degree of protection and accountability provided by the legal system – particularly when vested interests are able to exercise influence over cases. Parliament is viewed positively in terms of its potential as a vehicle of accountability; however this has yet to fully transpire in practice in relation to the SFG. There is a limited awareness of civil rights which limits demand side accountability
Social/Cultural Clan plays both a positive and negative role in relation to accountability. Clan structures can Context provide a vehicle for accountability at the local level. When exposed to external incentives and influences associated with state formation and opportunities for rent seeking, clan accountability tends to weaken and be replaced by a neo-patrimonial dynamic and a fragmentation of politics down clan lines that undermines the
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Factor Considerations for the Somali Accountability context opportunities for collective action. The Somali clan system both divides and unites Somalis into lineage-based groups following the male line. Over 100 sub-clans of varying size and cohesion exist under the five major clan families: Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Darood and Rahanweyne. Governments in all three zones are penetrated by social groups and inundated with pressure and demand from parochial and clan based constituencies who view poor government accountability not as a problem, but as a condition to exploit and perpetuate. Somalia’s youth population are however demanding opportunities for empowerment and realisation beyond traditional norms.
Economic Somalia’s economy is dominated by non-productive wealth accumulation characterised by Context rent-seeking behaviour by elites and ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ – focused on transport infrastructure (ports) and illicit income sources such as Khat, charcoal etc. Accountability around these sectors is negligible and the actors involved have little incentive to change the status quo. In other sectors, such as banking, telecoms and livestock, business have supported state formation and formed bonds of trust in society which may span clan and regional divisions. However, accountability amongst business is generally low due an absence of regulatory capacity, legislation and enforcement. Urbanisation has contributed to changing patterns of social interaction, values and opportunities, creating new social bonds and collective action opportunities.
Marginalised Women/Gender: Groups with a UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index for Somalia is 0.776, placing the country in the fourth lack of ‘voice’ highest position globally. (Gender, Youth, Minority Clans) The adult literacy rate for women is estimated to be 26% (compared to 36% for men and 31% overall). Maternal mortality rates are amongst the highest in the world, at 1,400 per 100,000 live births Early marriages and teenage pregnancies are common; 45% of women now aged 20-24 were married by the age of 18 or younger. Youth Youth face high unemployment levels which stand at 67%, reaching 84% in Somaliland. UNDP’s 2012 Human Development Report for Somalia, which focused on the prospects for youth, Extensive research into the problems facing young men and women in Somalia and concluded that a large number of f actors contributed to youth exclusion and frustration, and constituted some of the main structural drivers of violence. The major structural drivers underlying youth engagement in violent conflict in Somalia are high youth unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities; insufficient, unequal and inappropriate education and skills; poor governance and weak political participation; and a legacy of past violence. Minority Groups Bantu, Sab, and some of the coastal settlers are outside the clan system and hence cannot access any of the advantages of clan membership. Minorities continue to face discrimination in education and services and rarely acquire positions of political influence.
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1.1.2 A Locally Owned and Tailored Zonal Approach to Accountability in Somalia Across the three zones it is recognised that there needs to be a continued focus on political reconciliation in order to build trust and enable an environment in which accountable government can emerge.
Zone Economic and Social Factors that influence Somali Accountability at the Zonal Level
Somaliland Despite low levels of trust, government capacity is increasing. Parliament is viewed as having a key role in developing the legislative framework for accountability. However, MPs are perceived as disconnected from their constituents. At the same time parliamentary accountability is to the clan rather than to all constituents on an equal basis. Local counsellors are perceived as more responsive and accountable, but lacking in capacity and influence. The legitimacy and accountability of traditional authorities involved in government work has declined. Elections are seen as the most effective method for holding leaders to account.
Puntland The constitution created decentralised structures for service delivery but local governance and service delivery outside the urban areas is very much influenced by local customary
practices and clan and kinship structures and relations.
South Central Mogadishu Somalia The perceived domination of regional and district administrative posts such as the Mayor’s office, District Commissioners, port, airport, TV and radio by Hawiye sub-clans, particularly those close to former president Sheikh Sherif has created a sense of exclusion and non- responsive local governance. De facto leadership is often split between the government appointees and clan leaders with higher legitimacy, though formal power-holders may also in some cases be clan leaders. South Central Somalia South central is highly fragmented and the types and underlying factors for conflict are multiple and highly localised. Many areas are subject to overlapping claims for authority as underlying tensions between clans emerge, which AS historically suppressed. In south central, beyond the formal layer of federal government, communities and leaders of different shades have been organising themselves for several years. The legitimacy and functionality of these regional state building efforts differs widely. Deeper assessments may however reveal entry points at the regional level or below for early work on accountability.
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1.1.3 The Key Accountability Actors and Stakeholders to Engage and Mobilise to Drive Accountability in Somalia
Type of Considerations for the Somali Accountability context Accountability Actor/Stakeholder
Civil Society A broad categorisation of Somali civil society can be made as follows: Community Community based organisations, comprising traditional elders (odaydhaqameedyada), based religious elders (Hogaamiyedineedyada) and social and community groups organisation (KooxahaBulshada). Local non-governmental organisations (Hayadahaaandawligaahayneedeegaankagudaha) which tend be more urban, follow ‘modern’ organisation principles such as the presence of Local NGOs an office and formal structure. They include service-delivery and advocacy focused NGOs, training institutes and think tanks. Professional Professional associations (Xirfadelyada) such as teachers, medical personnel, lawyers, associations journalists artists. Media is characterised by censorship (either formal or self-imposed) and capture by business and government interests. This limits its potential role in demand side accountability unless significant reforms and media professionalisation takes place.
Civil Society Civil Society can be further distinguished between modern and traditional sectors. The modern sector incorporating local NGOs, professional associations and networks. The Modern sector traditional sector comprises CBOs, traditional and religious leaders (the latter may be actively involved in CBOs). Traditional sector Modern organisations are most often found in those areas that have had most interaction with the international community, whilst there is a correspondingly higher percentage of traditional CBOs in areas that are less accessible, less developed and have had less contact with international aid. Civil society in the Somali context encompasses a broad range of social groupings that span both the tradition and formal sectors and assume multiple roles as service providers, advocates, and peacemakers, whilst at the same time representing a range of clan and social interests. The legitimacy, downward accountability of local NGOs which receive large amounts of international support has been questioned. By contrast locally based community structures are perceived as closer, more accountable to and representative of their constituencies.
Religious Traditional and religious leaders are heavily involved in political processes and are, broadly Leaders speaking, trusted and well respected. In Mogadishu, key figures in the federal administration are widely believed to be members of religious organisations. Religious networks are an important feature of the Somali landscape, offering a unifying narrative and shared moral framework and identity for Somalis. The high levels of trust towards religious and traditional leaders suggest that this is a group that DFID should seek to work closely with and engage throughout the programme
The Private Somalia has a vibrant private sector that has stepped into key areas of service provision. Sector Although responsive to the needs of the community, private sector organisations have previously been accused of corrupt practices, strong ties to political interests and low levels of accountability (beyond the immediate clan groupings). Whilst businesses are reportedly taxed, corruption has impacted upon the ability of government to leverage a tax base from the private sector. There is an existing lack of downwards and upwards accountability. Government are perceived as having failed to demonstrate evidence that taxes lead to benefits for the
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Type of Considerations for the Somali Accountability context Accountability Actor/Stakeholder private sector and the wider society. Subsequently the private sector has become disengaged from government. In parallel many citizens feel that the private sector is extracting resources for private gain without bringing the societal benefits that are expected of them.
Diaspora Diaspora returnees are increasingly prominent in Somalia, taking up leadership positions in the public and private sector, civil society and Al Shabaab. Individuals from the Diaspora are less accountable than the Somali population since they are able to retreat to their host countries and beyond Somali jurisdiction. However, traditional sources of accountability such as xeer, have a transnational reach. The diaspora have knowledge regarding best practice and existing organisational knowledge could be harnessed by mobilising members of the diaspora around collective action problems. This should include participation in mechanisms that seek to build active engagement of civic actors and decision –makers with government. Any collaboration with members of the diaspora would need to be carefully managed to ensure that they had community support, whilst still maintaining a degree of neutrality for clan preferences and agendas The diaspora bring new ways of thinking and resources. This was noted to include around best practice internationally however, the diaspora where also found to become frustrated when bureaucratic wheels turn slowly and inefficiently. Returnees often have difficulty re- integrating back into their society and are not necessarily welcomed.
International The list of external stakeholders who influence accountability in Somalia is a long one. Community A common theme is that Somalis perceive foreign interventions as self-interested, lacking accountability and often undermining local reconciliation efforts. History shows that all international initiatives in Somalia carry a risk of elite capture and manipulation. This has been true of dialogue workshops, international peace conferences, public financial management schemes and aid planning frameworks. There are limitations in the potential for externally brokered state formation process to create accountable and responsive state structures. On closer inspection internationally-backed peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in Somalia display recurrent problems that tend to undercut accountability: o a strong focus on establishing power-sharing governments at central level in negotiations far removed from traditional decision-making; o the instrumentalisation of Somali civil society groups (and more recently elders); o and the picking and active promotion of ‘winners’ in the midst of negotiations. These limitations emphasis the need for locally driven political settlement, dialogue and accountability initiatives.
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1.1.4 The Social Costs of Corruption and its impact on Good Governance and Accountability
Social Costs of Corruption
Corruption has permeated key sectors of the economy throughout Somalia. The factors causing corruption include the nepotistic job culture, a lack of rule of law, limited transparency over government spending and a lack of oversight and accountability mechanisms. Each of these factors is reinforced by insecurity which helps to spread distrust, fear, and supports a lack of enforcement. The two forms of corruption most commonly articulated during the interviews were nepotism and the pilfering of public funds. Clanisation of politics exacerbates and drives nepotism and corruption. Social costs of corruption include: o The breakdown of the social contract between individuals and the government, including a lack of trust and institutional legitimacy o Permissiveness towards corruption undertaken by family or clan, emboldening inequality o Conflict and insecurity Corruption has resulted in a breakdown of the social contract between individuals and Government, inequality, a trust deficit, and a lack of legitimacy. Each of these has a negative impact on the formation of accountability between government and citizens. Creating a domestic tax system and base is seen as critical for state capacity building, improving conditions of governance, and strengthening the link of accountability between electorates and leadership The need for the programme to support CSOs to report on corrupt practices with the aim of improving citizens ability to hold authorities and individuals to account
1.1.5 The Recurring Constraints and Barriers to Accountability that need to be overcome to Drive Positive Accountability and Transparent Governance
Constraints to Accountability
Among the most significant constraints are: conflict and insecurity; social norms that restrict voice and access for minorities, women and marginalised groups; social fragmentation and a lack of trust; the absence of credible enforcement options; unaccountable international engagement. Insecurity raises the risks of demanding accountability, often to unacceptable levels where accountability champions are silenced, intimidated or killed. Visible insecurity leads to diminished trust and social fragmentation that simultaneously reduces the potential for collective action at the local level, and favours the manipulation of clan affiliation in politics. Patronage politics and rent-seeking is pervasive and presidents, prime ministers, governors, their circle of ministers, and sometimes semi-autonomous figures within the governments are incentivised to use state generated revenues to accrue personal wealth and to feed their clan support base. In the absence of enforcement, and with unaccountable international support continuing to flow, transgressions are unlikely to be punished.
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1.1.6 Enabling Factors and Opportunities for Accountability that need to be Strengthened to Drive Positive Accountability and Transparent Governance
Enabling Factors and Opportunities for Accountability
A number of enabling factors and opportunities have also been identified through this research that may at times counteract the barriers to accountability. They include: A burgeoning youth population which is demanding new opportunities for empowerment and self-realisation beyond the traditional. Continuing urbanisation, a process that creates new social bonds, attitudes and collective action opportunities. Democratisation in Puntland and Somaliland, including contestation and political growth. Indigenous state-building in the south and central regions, whether formalised around federalism or more spontaneous, which serve as a platform for dialogue between and within and between regions on political representation, rights and duties. The ever-increasing demand for education. Islam, which offers a shared moral framework, language and social space around the mosque. The traditional Somalia vernacular and communication style which provides a rich vein of persuasive verbal rhetoric and satire.
1.2 Appraisal of Evidence and Feasibility for Strengthening Accountability in Somalia 1.2.1 Lessons Learned from Donor Governance and Accountability Programming in the Somalia Context
Lessons from Somalia Context
The research team identified 116 externally-supported interventions broadly falling under the rubric of accountability, through interviews and a desk review. It is noticeable that while there are a number of interventions operating in the accountability space, there remains a lack of robust evidence, impact evaluations and evidence- based-research on what works and what does not work in the Somalia context. Although projects use varying terminology with many overlaps, the interventions referred to in this section can roughly be categorised in the following sectors: Community based approaches e.g. DAI Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation, Danish Refugee Council Community Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD) and the Danish De-mining Group Community Safety Programme.) There are very limited opportunities for communities to jointly analyse, plan and take an initiative on development. Where community based approaches do exist they were seen as having high levels of trust and success. Specific examples included community contracting and community budgeting. The former focuses on accountable processes and makes accountability and transparency part of practical daily life Process is key and the selection of projects is based on participatory process involving a wide selection of civil society including clan elders, government, and the private sector. The use of conflict assessment and mapping has supported the understanding of the community dynamics and the local environment in which projects operate. Whilst community based interventions have seen some success and their implementation continues, the majority of the interventions appear to target the zonal level, with a strong focus on capitals and other urban centres. The linkages between community, regional and national initiatives was less apparent and reflects the challenges to taking levels from the community level, where accountability mechanisms have had success,
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upwards. The zonal emphasis further reflects the security context and the limitations to geographical areas of operation for development organisations. Support to civil society and the media e.g. The EU’s Non-State Actor (NSA) Programme has supported the development of three regional NSA platforms Although there have been a number of interventions focused on supporting participation and engagement, through networking, dialogue, and capacity building or support, there remains scope to develop this area by supporting civil society to become unified, strategic, and organised by common problems. There are numerous interventions working with the media highlighting commonalities between development organisations approaches to providing access to accountability resources through information. However, civic education has much less support and would help to build participation and engagement and accountability resources. In Somaliland there was evidence that use of SMS and voice based technology supported donor programming including with relation to elections, job creation, and accountability. Interventions that made use of ICT were limited but it appeared to be a growth area that offers remote access and broader coverage of donors.
1.2.2 Lessons from Accountability Interventions in other Contexts that can Inform Programme Design and Delivery The evidence on the impact of demand side accountability (DSA) initiatives in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) contains many gaps, varies in quality and has lagged behind interventions. There are few studies examining the impact of accountability initiatives, comparing the impact of different mechanisms and drawing conclusions about the factors that influence success. Much of the literature is theoretical and conceptual rather than evidence based. Nevertheless, there is a recurring emphasis on the importance of context and operational modalities in determining outcomes. With this in mind, and given the unique context of Somalia, it is suggested that lessons from within Somalia may prove more illuminating that those from elsewhere. In the absence of substantive material on Somalia, it is recommended that DFID DSA programming be based on action-based research – trialling initiatives on a small scale to determine meaningful impact before expanding initiatives that prove effective and ceasing initiatives without a solid evidence base.
Lessons Learned From Other Countries (Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone)
The lessons learned review looked at 4 case studies of accountability interventions in similar contexts: Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), Afghanistan: Institutional and Technical Support to the High Office of Oversight (HOO) and Anti-Corruption (USAID), Civil Society Programme in Liberia and Sierra Leone (USAID) and the Liberia: The Poverty Reduction Strategy Tracking Network (PRSTN). The key cross-cutting lessons from these case studies are: Build upon peace agreement provisions and do so quickly: Peace agreements often address good governance / demand side accountability. The presence of good governance agendas suggests political will and interest to act. Donors must act quickly to help the parties implement those provisions. Conduct robust contextual / political economy analysis: Power relations and informal institutional processes may limit the impact of interventions. These need to be understood and factored into interventions. Identify and support local accountability mechanisms: Donors should commission a mapping of stakeholder capacities and local accountability mechanisms, such as the shuras in Afghanistan or traditional chiefs in Sierra Leone. Negotiate fully to ensure stakeholder engagement: Programmes must be customised to fit each country’s needs and the interests of all stakeholders. Promoting effective stakeholder engagement requires negotiation between local parties aimed at achieving long-term acceptance of reform initiatives. Build local trust before instituting change: In relation to tackling corruption, experts suggest that in fragile states anti-corruption efforts require caution and need to focus on building social and political trust, integrity and earning basic credibility for government, rather than large initiatives or moral crusades. Iterative programming - trial, evidence and scale up: No matter how comprehensive and well intentioned
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Lessons Learned From Other Countries (Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone) programmes are, there is always a need to adjust, improve and experiment with DSA programmes as they are implemented overtime. Effective engagement with supply side interventions: The evidence emphasises that support to DSA cannot be effective without a corresponding improvement in the delivery of governance and services. DSA interventions must have teeth: Community-level monitoring can be successful, but only when the community can hold government to account. Strengthen partnerships across sectors, and demographic and geographic divides: Accountability thrives where government has the interest and capability to deliver as well as the channels to interact with communities and their representatives.
1.2.3 Promoting an Inclusive Dialogue that considers Women, Youth and Excluded Groups within Accountability Interventions
Supporting an inclusive dialogue for women, youth and marginalised groups that fits within an accepted Somali cultural framework
The assessment found that a future programme will need to approach gender from the perspective of inclusion and exclusion broadly speaking, rather than focusing on women’s needs alone. This is due to: i) the limited capacity to demand accountability in Somalia and the number of particularly disadvantaged groups that need to be engaged and ii) the need for programming to be locally-sensitive, locally initiated, locally designed and fit into culturally appropriate frameworks. Implications for programming: Support individuals, organisations and projects which break the mould but do so from within an accepted cultural framework. This would include professional women’s associations and organisations managed by young people applying innovative solutions to youth problems, such as those using social media to overcome employment constraints. Support individuals, organisations and projects which have the respect and confidence of the people and which do or could act as champions for change. This might include religious leaders campaigning against FGM, women politicians supporting young males to find employment. Collaborate with other stakeholders in developing employment strategies and policies, aiming to maximise short and long-term job creation potential and to encourage entry into self-employment. Ensure that young men and young women are engaged in debates about how to do this. Adopt inclusivity as a condition and a criterion for access to all aid interventions, requiring that a proper balance is maintained between men and women, youth and adult, major and minor clans, able-bodied and disabled. Promote debate about the inclusion of disempowered groups in politics. Avoid marginalising ‘gender’ by confusing it with ‘women’. Gender support should be seen as part of a package of assistance interlinked with other initiatives, to avoid the risk of isolating it and thereby failing to consolidate the potential to make gains across a wide spectrum. It needs to be made clear that all components of the population – young and old, men and women – are included in the notion of gender empowerment.
1.3 Recommendations and Options for Programming and VfM 1.3.1 Recommendation 1: A Potential 5 Strand Programme Based on Key Entry Points for Demand Side Accountability All accountability interventions will need to be locally owned, tailored to the specific zone/region/district and engage with local state/non-state actors. However, the analysis has identified key accountability themes across Somalia that can inform the intervention strands of the programme. Innovative and pilot type interventions could be tested
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across these thematic areas to support individuals, groups and communities across Somalia to demand more accountable governance.
5 Strand Accountability Programme, Types of Intervention and Evidence
Programme Strand Types of Intervention Sources of Evidence/Past Initiatives
Accountability Support for increased quality and quantity of 2013 Somalia Media Support Resources information. Group (SMSG) Without access to the Pilot ICT tools in programming. Experiences of programmes right resources and such as CDRD, the Support research on public policy issues (through capabilities, citizens are UNPOS/UNDP constitution think tanks universities and the media). hard pressed to make project, BBC Media Action, choices, mobilise and Support the development of media/ academic CARE Media project, DAI-TIS act on collective action professionalization and development initiatives. and Shaqadoon. problems. Support civic education programmes.
Participation and Support successful civil society / NSA networking Public planning consultations in Engagement particularly amongst youth and women’s District Development Framework organisations. planning processes in Active participation and Somaliland and Puntland. engagement of people, Support civil society dialogue processes (in civic actors and coordination with the EU), Micro-analysis of the blockages, decision-makers is incentives and change agents Support successful community based critical if government is around specific issues (e.g. development programmes that foster collective to be responsive and customs tariffs at Bosasso port; decision making. accountable military stipend payments), Support interaction between NSAs and state for Draft UNESCO Youth Strategy collective action (e.g. collaborative leadership approaches) UNDP Somalia Human Development Report on youth Approach gender from the perspective of inclusion provides useful entry-points. and exclusion broadly speaking. EU Non-State Actors Programme
Fairer Institutions Support parliamentary support programmes. Parliamentary strategies under development within different Interventions that can Supporting CSOs to report on corrupt practices legislatures as well as the help to develop fairer with the aim of improving citizens’ ability to hold support programmes proposed institutions include authorities and individuals to account. by AWEPA, NDI and UNDP challenging and Technical support to anti-corruption bodies and provide an entry-point for these reforming laws, norms rule of law institutions discussions. and practices that are prejudicial to Engagement with other donor governances Sub-national governance women/marginalised programmes in Somalia on mainstreaming framework groups, restrict accountability into public finance management, UNPOS/UNDP constitution information or inhibit public sector reform and security & justice project, political representation. programming
Enabling Environment Support local dialogues and national debates on Somalia Media Support Group accountability-related issues. under UNESCO auspices Measures often used to create a more enabling Engage members of the religious community in The NGO Consortium for environment for accountability promotion. Somalia. accountability to Support private sector accountability and function are Corporate Social Responsibility actions including
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5 Strand Accountability Programme, Types of Intervention and Evidence
Programme Strand Types of Intervention Sources of Evidence/Past Initiatives transparency initiatives EITI. targeting governments, Support professionalization and regulation of CSOs, the private CSOs and the media. sector and donors
Reflection & Analysis Support for academic and policy-research Lack of evidence for capacity. accountability programmes in Cross-cutting across the Somalia 4 other ‘thematic’ strand Undertake an in-depth studies and research is a 5th track devoted to programme framed around constraints, enabling reflection, analysis and factors and opportunities for accountability action research. programming, testing hypotheses and building evidence for theories of change. Establish an advisory group with significant Somali input to guide DFID’s thinking on accountability
Supporting piloting, impact evaluation and scale up of successful interventions Develop the evidence-base to identify good models for accountability and to inform future interventions
1.3.2 Recommendation 2: Mainstreaming Accountability across Donor Programmes We recommend DFID using mainstreaming, influencing and coordination strategies to promote accountability across donor programmes. Many pre-existing interventions already have implications for accountability, including support for public financial management, civil society development and institutional strengthening.
Mainstreaming Accountability to Ensure Donor Coordination and Cross-sectoral Lesson Learning
Mainstream accountability into current education sector initiatives, e.g. those led by DANIDA, the EU and UNICEF. Build more focused accountability activities into existing governance programmes. Integrate accountability through a cross-sectoral approach. Engage in dialogue with actors working on public sector reform (including public financial management) and security sector reform to mainstream accountability. Mainstream accountability into existing engagement on private sector development.
1.3.3 Recommendation 3: Donor Accountability and Coordination between Governance Programmes DFID should also consider how best to address the often well-founded Somali perceptions of low accountability among international actors intervening in Somalia within its programme. Due attention to these questions in research is one option. A more self-reflective approach would involve establishing an advisory group with significant Somali input to guide DFID’s thinking on accountability and validate emerging findings. Any such a group would need careful planning to avoid perceptions of bias or conflict of interest.
Support Donor Accountability and Coordination with other Governance Programmes
Enhance political dialogue on downward accountability including through a like-minded donor group. Promote enhanced coordination of actors working on accountability-related interventions, particularly “demand
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side” interventions. Influencing and working with others governance programmes: DFID Core State Functions, DFID Stability Programme and Stability Fund, DFID Somaliland Development Fund, USAID TIS etc Within the UN obvious partners or targets for influencing include the new UNSOM mission (e.g. human rights cell), the RC’s Risk Management Office and UNDP.
1.3.4 Options for Programme Modalities and Delivery Mechanisms
Feasible Options for Programming a Somali Demand Side Accountability Intervention
Type of Considerations for the Accountability Programme Modality
Target A focus on long term engagement and building a broad/deep support base amongst the range Groups of potential accountability allies (in country within and outside governments, within Somali civil society and INGOs, in the private sector and among religious leaders) Identifying and mobilising champions of downward accountability (to Somali citizens) as opposed to upward accountability (to external actors) is key Improved harmonisation and coordination amongst donors, INGOs and development partners Programming should be visible in different regions, at different levels, and should strive to build links between the state, non-state actors and citizens.
Intervention Interventions should: Selection identify, track and mitigate risks for programme, partners and beneficiaries
be tailored to the local context and based on conflict/political economy analysis be based on sound evidence/lessons learnt and have a clear theory of change that identifies a known collective action problem tackle known constraints, boost enabling factors or respond to opportunities to increase accountability be locally owned and credible in the eyes of the Somalis and target beneficiaries be locally-sensitive and locally initiated and designed wherever possible
Profiling The programme should carve out a clear and distinct identity using language of “downward accountability”, “accountability for Somali citizens”, and “trust and accountability”.
It would be astute to explore the use of Somali-language and Islamic-derived phrases during the programme design phase as part of an overall communications strategy
Defining and Given the complex and fluid operating context and the limited evidence base for accountability measuring programming locally and internationally, we recommend that DFID avoid committing to too results many specific deliverables in initial business case. It would be more appropriate for the first phase of the new programme to focus on testing different approaches, learning what works and developing an evidence base for theories of change.
Duration In order to allow time for programme design followed by a period of learning and experimentation we recommend a minimum 4 year programme with an initial 6-9 month inception phase.
Funding DFID should consider a number of funding options: This could include opening different modalities “windows” for support under the programme strands; issuing an initial design contract; contracting both design and implementation to a single contractor; using a grants-based
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Feasible Options for Programming a Somali Demand Side Accountability Intervention
Type of Considerations for the Accountability Programme Modality mechanism; or requiring formation of a consortium of agencies with different skill-sets. Alternatively we also recommend combining options. The programme will need to be carefully managed to support an integrated vision for implementation where interventions support the programme level theory of change. The programme will need to support collaboration, coordination, and lesson learning across the different strands of the programme The chosen funding arrangement should be designed with the “do no harm” principle in mind to ensure interventions do not damage already weak civil society networks and accountability relationships DFID should consider managing several smaller, iterative funding arrangements as opposed to one or two larger disbursements to spread financial and reputational risk Given the complexity and sensitivity of Somalia, implementers should demonstrate a proven track record in-country, or the ability to access such knowledge through close partnerships. Implementers should possess key skills in programme strand areas whether they engaged either as a consortium or individually. Among the most critical skills will be those in academic and policy research, civil society capacity building, advocacy support and media development. DFID’s chosen implementation modality should be flexible and able to respond to real-time opportunities as they emerge, for example using rapid response funds or in-country field staff tasked with identifying collective action opportunities and mobilising local support.
Marginalised The programme will need to: Groups Approach gender from the perspective of inclusion and exclusion broadly speaking, rather than (women, focusing on women’s needs alone. minority clans, youth) Support individuals, organisations and projects which break the mould but do so from within an accepted cultural framework ( professional women’s associations, youth-led organisations,
organisations , religious leaders, women politicians) Adopt inclusivity as a condition and a criterion for access to all aid interventions, requiring that a proper balance is maintained between men and women, youth and adult, major and minor clans, able-bodied and disabled. Promote debate about the inclusion of disempowered groups in politics. Make clear that all components of the population – young and old, men and women – are included in the notion of gender empowerment
1.3.5 Value for Money Considerations to Maximise Programme Benefits While Minimising Costs It should be noted that fragile and conflict affected states such as Somalia where the potential benefits (economic, social etc.) of achieving progress towards peace and stabilisations are likely to be significant and where the costs of operating in a complex environment, including reaching hard to access groups, are high, there is often a justification for relatively high levels of investment.
VfM Considerations for a Somali Demand Side Accountability Intervention Programme
VfM Dimension Considerations for the Somali context
All dimensions Fast learning, adjustment and programme adaptation will be required. of VFM First phase of the new programme to focus on testing different approaches, learning what
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VfM Considerations for a Somali Demand Side Accountability Intervention Programme
VfM Dimension Considerations for the Somali context works and developing an evidence base for theories of change. Programme design to include tools such as rapid action research, monitoring processes, real time evaluation, programme learning and adjustment; regular “learn and share” meetings / exchanges between like-minded governance projects, mini-pilots, etc. Thoughtful, but appropriate, M&E design from the start that integrates a focus on the balance between the four “Es”. Baselines should capture few, but important indicators. Include longitudinal tracking surveys on perceptions of accountability, most significant change (to capture unexpected outcomes), and specific behaviour changes (linked to theory of change). Link all technical assistance to effectiveness and return on investment and should be conducted in-country (rather than Nairobi) where security allows. An emphasis on piloting approaches, evidence-generation and scaling up what works.
Economy Managing security will involve higher expenditure. However VfM should play a role in security provision considerations, by ensuring a balance between economy and effectiveness. This include ensuring security provision is as low profile as possible given the context. Costs of expatriate deployment are high due to security provisions. Therefore there should be an emphasis on using reliable national and regional staff and consultants. There are a number of well-established reliable research organisations that can be used as part of establishment and oversight mechanisms. Value for money will feature prominently in the case-by-case assessment of potential delivery partners Reaching poorest and most vulnerable will expensive to achieve, this will need to be justified against the value placed on reaching this specific target group. High risk of aid itself becoming a corrupt “resource rent”. Baselines to support estimates of unit costs per beneficiary and progress targets
Efficiency Make estimates of costs on inputs: outputs for all interventions – and consider alternative options - often the answer will be unknown, but the process of considering choices will itself
improve efficiency. Focus on cross-learning between Somalis – across society – rather than interventions lead by outsiders (expat, diaspora Somali). Option for a piloted, geographic rolling approach which introduces “good governance and accountability” in one context, and then use that example to teach other communities and groups, through personal meetings (i.e. maximise leverage, and reduce costs per person / community reached). Invest in multiple communication channels, but keep them “Somali owned”. The plethora of donor funded activities risks duplication, perverse outcomes – DFID to support and invest in efforts to ensure donor and NGO coordination and cross-learning. Focus should be on supporting, influencing collaborating and coordinating with existing programmes with existing interventions, and scaling up existing successful programmes, collaboration and coordination. A focus on output and milestone based contracts. A carefully designed, responsibly managed (reducing fiduciary risk) and responsive implementation mechanism The appropriateness and quality of interventions,
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VfM Considerations for a Somali Demand Side Accountability Intervention Programme
VfM Dimension Considerations for the Somali context Responsiveness to changing situations on the ground and quick impact opportunities to support accountability
Effectiveness There are risks that by working in complex and insecure situations it will not lead to measurable results. This should not discourage innovation programing that provides access to improved governance mechanism for populations outside of secure geographical areas.
Equity Overt focus on women’s rights, or issues like FGM, may trigger “anti-western” backlash against perceived challenges to social norms. Focus therefore on broad inclusiveness (across clans, gender, age, ability, wealth ranking).
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2 Introduction
DFID intends to roll out a three to four year £12 million Accountability Programme for Somalia. The programme goal is to improve government accountability from the local level by building the capacity of citizens to better understand, articulate and lobby for their needs to be met. It will also provide support to government bodies to respond to this demand. In May 2013, DFID contracted theIDLgroup to identify entry points for accountability interventions in Somalia that will inform the design of the Accountability Programme and supporting business case. The overarching objectives of the consultancy described in the TOR are to: Provide an historical perspective on the effectiveness of “demand side” accountability initiatives in Somalia; conduct forward leaning analysis of potential interventions based on the current political economy; and determine options to support improved state society relations from the “demand side” perspective. Assess and identify ways in which civil society (broadly construed) can be empowered to articulate demand towards overcoming “collective action failures” of entrenched attitudes to corruption. Intervention options under consideration should attempt to innovate and move beyond “principal-agent” type interventions. Provide an emphasis on the issues women currently face or might face in voicing their demands and highlight means of supporting women through “demand side” interventions. Consider the information available and capacity in the three zones of Somalia for measuring the “social damage/cost” (both material and immaterial) of corruption at the individual, group and community level. Consider value for money options for DFID Somalia in investing in potential interventions. This report provides a synthesis of the findings. It is augmented by a number of ‘standalone’ annexes. It is structured as follows: Section 4 - Description of the team composition and methodology used to conduct the study Section 5 - A brief overview of the international policy context for demand side accountability programming Section 6 – An accountability oriented contextual and stakeholder analysis across the three zones Section 7 – An analysis of corruption and its social costs Section 8 – An analysis of gender and accountability Section 9 – A discussion of past and current interventions Section 10 – Lessons from interventions in other contexts Section 11 – Conclusions and recommendations
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3 Methodology
The assessment was undertaken by a team of six international consultants supported by three local research organisations and individuals located in each of the three zones of Somalia. The research was divided into three main phases: Inception planning and desk based document review Fieldwork, research, and initial data findings Preparation and submission of draft and final reports Full information on the methodology, the questionnaire used and team composition is contained in Annex G.
3.1 Phase 1 – Inception Planning and Desk Based Document Review 3.1.1 Document and Literature Review In parallel and subsequent to the inception planning, the team conducted a review of relevant documentation. The purpose was to: assemble information on programing (past and present) in each of the three regions; support the identification of key informants for interview; and explore the country context. The document review provided the foundation for the context analysis and case studies in each of the three zones. 3.1.2 Preparation of Research Instruments An initial key informant interview template was developed prior to the deployment of the team. The question set was discussed with the Somalia Governance and Aid Modalities Expert, Project Director and Team Leader. To ensure that the questions asked were comprehensive, the team elected to use two interview templates contained in Annex G. Questionnaire A was used by the international consultant team - given that the international team would be speaking to interviewees in a more urban setting, the complexity of the questions was enhanced. Questionnaire B was used by the local research teams - these questions were more succinct, but were structured in parallel to the core areas of information required, and included additional ranking questions with a focus on corruption. The number of questions asked in questionnaire A was sometimes limited due to time constraints, but this resulted in a greater depth of response whilst questionnaire B provided answers to each of the questions, increasing the amount of data from beyond the capitals. A set of short questions were developed for the three London interviews. These were based on the questions contained in questionnaire A, but were significantly shorter due to the brief time available.
3.2 Phase 2 – Fieldwork, Research, Analysis and Presentation of Findings 3.2.1 Fieldwork Two parallel streams of fieldwork took place: In the first stream, three international consultants travelled to Hargesia, Somaliland and Garowe, Puntland. The fourth international consultant was unable to travel to Mogadishu due to security concerns. The second stream involved retention of local research teams in: Hargesia – this team travelled to Borama and Shiekh districts to conduct interviews beyond the capital. Kismayo and Baidoa and Mogadishu - due to a breach in contract, an alternative researcher was engaged for this component. Garowe - to supplement the interviews conducted by the international consultant.
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Interviewees were selected purposely and indicatively rather than as statistically relevant samples in order to capture key insights of those with the most information about the programme. Whilst the team made use the pre- specified questions, additional questions were asked if a topic of relevance arose.
3.3 Phase 3 – Preparation and submission of draft and final reports. 3.3.1 Analysis of research results Team members provided a summary report from their respective zone including the main findings from Key Informant Interview (KII) groups; analysis of quantitative data on corruption and trust; and graphs on questions of corruption and trust for each zone. 3.3.2 Preparation and submission of draft and final reports Once the analysis was complete the team prepared reports on their thematic area (for example gender or the social cost of corruption) and/ or zone (Somaliland, South Central or Puntland). These were compiled into a synthesis report with the inclusion of annexes.
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4 The Policy Context for Accountability Programming
4.1 Definitions of Accountability and Demand Side Accountability Definitions of accountability differ, but broadly speaking accountability involves holding individual agencies and organisational actors to account for executing their power according to certain standards, involving a measure of answerability and enforceability. Demand side accountability, also termed social accountability, is where ordinary citizens and/or civil society organisations participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability through civic engagement, forcing political, bureaucratic, business and legal decision-makers to give information on, and justifications for their actions and to adopt standards of good performance.
4.2 Problems with Traditional Principal-Agent Focussed Models The latest academic research on governance and accountability emphasises that internationally promoted best practices are likely to be inappropriate for a context like Somalia. This is because functions like accountability can be fulfilled through varied institutional forms that may not fit with Western notions of ‘best practice’1. The Western-derived public reform and accountability model of ‘supply-side’ versus ‘demand-side’ (principle-agent) is potentially unhelpful. This approach assumes that citizens have an uncomplicated desire and potential ability to hold their rulers and public servants to account for their performance as providers of public goods and that governments wish to provide those goods. It recommends that support be directed towards ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ accountability institutions to counter-balance an overweening supply side. However, non-state actors are often far more complicit in patterns of bad governance than the principle-agent framework would imply, while power-holders are often more constrained than they would wish. In reality, demand and supply-side actors often face prohibitive problems in acting collectively to take ‘even elementary steps’ in the pursuit of the public good. In other words, poor governance and accountability are caused by collective action problems at different levels2. These findings shift thinking towards understanding collective action problems so that accountability programmes can address them.
4.3 Necessity of Contextual Understanding and Robust Country Analysis The research also highlights the limitations of aid driven association models and counsels ‘working with the grain’ based on sound country analysis. It suggests that initiatives which seek to change the behaviour of both suppliers and users of services, of governments and citizens, are more likely to succeed. In fact civil society strengthening and supporting ‘voluntary associations’ can backfire, creating new forms of inequalities, increasing material motivations and corruption amongst leaders. Alternative models seek to address the collective action problems that stakeholders actually face. Successful approaches are initiated locally, aim to solve specific problems and rely on mobilising local resources3. The role of external actors is to contribute to an enabling environment for local problem solving and to help facilitate useful change. As will be shown, these insights are highly appropriate to the unique context of Somalia and underline the importance of this scoping exercise.
1Booth(2012), Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance, Synthesis of the African, Power and Politics Programme 2 Ibid 3“Unlike project inspired initiatives, the more promising initiatives do not require beneficiaries to sign up to principles or organisations of which they have little experience or understanding. On the contrary, there is an enabling institutional environment for local problem-solving initiatives that involve whole populations, use local resource and building on existing formal structures and informal relationships”. See Booth (2012), Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance, Synthesis of the African, Power and Politics Programme p. 78.
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5 Contextual and Stakeholder Analysis Across the Three Zones of Somalia
This section explores the commonalities and regional variations in the Somali political, conflict and security, economic and, social/cultural context, considering their implications for demand side accountability. It provides an overview of the key institutions and stakeholders involved. The analysis is a synthesis of an overall contextual analysis informed by the desk review of literature and the three zonal reports informed by a document review and field research found at Annexes A, B and C. Each sub-section includes a summary box that highlights the key findings and implications for programming.
5.1 Context Significant variation exists across the territory of Somalia. This is true not only in political, but also in economic, security and social terms. Income levels vary widely between relatively wealthy urban areas (Mogadishu and Hargeisa/Somaliland especially) as compared to the rest of the country, with areas in south and central such as Gedo, Hiraan, Bay and Bakol faring badly. 5.1.1 Political Context Somaliland and Puntland Although the state remains under development in all areas, state formation is at its most advanced in terms of reach, capacity and legitimacy in Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland. In Somaliland, at least in major population centres, there is a shared sense of citizenship, and a relationship between state and citizens built around legitimacy, real if limited taxation, and an expectation and demand for service delivery. The international community has played an important broker role and kept the experiment broadly on track up until now. Behind this success are a number of factors including relative homogeneity of clans and lifestyle; strong incentives among the livestock exporters for stability,1 and the cultivation of a Somaliland national identity moulded during the experience of civil war and since in opposition to the chaotic south following colonial era boundaries. The overall political settlement is imperfect however with eastern clans such as the Dulbahante having been co-opted or coerced into the state with only limited success. Tensions also exist inside the polity among sub-clans which vie for prominence such as Sa’ad Muse, HabarJe’lo or HabarAwal. Both Puntland and Somaliland constitute what have been described as ‘hybrid political orders’ where the structures of governance and political authority and lines of accountability involve multiple actors, both formal and traditional, state and non-state, occupying the same political space, constantly negotiating relationships and power. These arrangements are the outcome of drawn-out inter-clan peace-making and what have be described as ‘bottom up’ processes. Although each faces clear challenges - related to the development of formal political institutions including political parties, management of elections, women’s and young people’s, elite competition and sustaining legitimacy of traditional authorities - they are perceived as being more responsive and accountable to their constituencies than those state structures and entities that have been established with a high degree of external influence.2 Somaliland has managed a number of elections with some success; Puntland is due to hold its first multi-party elections in 2013. Both territories are heavily dependent on pastoralism. Although fraught with problems, the northern clan institutions are generally seen as less compromised than in the south. Puntland and Somaliland, though uncertain affairs are genuine openings for debate, contestation and political growth that warrant further investigation. They likely contain opportunities for political empowerment, civic education and mobilisation through a combination of political party, media development and civic education. South Central The south and central regions, often artificially grouped together as ‘South Central’, operate quite differently. No single authority governs here but rather a patchwork of mini-states, occupied territories and ungoverned or lesser-
1 De Waal, A. (2007): Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia. (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/dewaal/) 2 Chatham House (2012), Somalia’s Transition, what role for sub-national entities, Meeting report, Bradbury, M and Healy, S eds (2010). Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking. Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources
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governed spaces exist. Administrations range from single clan-based entities in central regions, to proto-federal states (Jubbaland), Shabaab-administered territory, ‘newly liberated areas’ such as those under Ethiopian or Kenyan military control and areas with some federal government presence. Governance arrangements vary accordingly and the political scene is fluid, with political fragmentation and state formation happening simultaneously. Beneath the formal layer of federal government described below, communities and leaders of different shades have been organising themselves for several years. Some are now embarking on state-building projects. The legitimacy and functionality of these efforts differs widely but careful assessment may reveal entry- points at regional level or below for early work on accountability. Somali Federal Government The formal internationally recognised government, the Somali Federal Government (SFG), was established less than one year ago as a successor to the Transitional Federal Government,3 has been attempting to re-establish administrations or at least appoint governors where that is a viable option (e.g. Gedo and Bay). In the most general sense Somalis interviewed were on the whole are pleased with the symbolic move from transitional to sovereign government. Where they quickly part company however are around the divisions of powers between federal and sub-national entities or, in the case of Somaliland, international recognition that does not take into account the their particular situation and demands. The 2012 transition process bequeathed Somalia with a new set of institutions possessing low levels of input legitimacy. For the most part de facto local authorities have been side-stepped, with implicit questions being raised about their loyalty or legitimacy. The perceived ownership by outlying clans and regions of the current government is low and actually diminishing in the face of unilateral attempts by Mogadishu to extend its power.4 Given these dynamics the relationship between the SFG and the regions is increasingly one of suspicion and competition and the Federal Government is operating amidst a political settlement best described as exclusive. Meanwhile, the most expansive political and military authority in south and central, Al Shabaab lies firmly outside the formal political process despite its significant territorial control and public support base. As interviews carried out for this research demonstrate these dynamics influence views on accountability greatly since it made little sense to many respondents to discuss the accountability of governments which they understand as lacking legitimacy or functional control of territory.
Box 1 Findings: Political Context Although the ‘hybrid political orders’ of Somaliland and Puntland face clear challenges, they are perceived as more responsive and accountable than those state structures in south central (including the SFG) that have been established with a high degree of external influence. Somaliland and Puntland contain clear opportunities for political empowerment and mobilisation efforts. In south central, beyond the formal layer of federal government, communities and leaders of different shades have been organising themselves for several years. The legitimacy and functionality of these regional statebuilding efforts differs widely. Deeper assessments may however reveal entry points at the regional level or below for early work on accountability. The centralised state structures (the SFG) and the processes that led to their formation have been (and continue to be) characterised by low levels of accountability.
5.1.2 Conflict and Security Context Daily life in Somalia, whether at the political or inter-communal level, is coloured by past grievances and stereotypes which grew during the cycles of human rights abuse, exploitation and displacement that occured during the last twenty years. Over 1 million Somalis are thought to have perished since 1988 and most parts of the country have seen conflict-related violence whether in the name of socialism, anti-terrorism, or clan. Despite some optimistic signs of a return to peace and stability large parts of the country remain unstable making security a paramount concern for the population and government authorities. Even in apparently stable areas, conflict and resentment can often be found between sub-clans, clans and regions. Insecurity raises the risks of demanding accountability, often to unacceptable levels where accountability champions are silenced, intimidated or killed. Fear and lack of trust diminishes the potential for collective action beyond one’s immediate social group, and favours the manipulation of clan affiliation in politics.
3 Footnote on TFG 4 Ref....
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The current dynamic of mistrust and contestation between Somalia’s regions and a newly-formed federal government is an illustration of this problem. Neither regions or ‘central’ authorities have sufficient trust in one another to operationalise a federal constitution that on paper at least offers autonomy to regions and a degree of primacy to the centre. The fact is that control of national government is generally seen in zero-sum terms, with those groups identifying themselves as on the periphery eyeing central government with suspicion, assuming that other clans will use it for their interests5. The majority of Somalis have negative attitudes towards a central state, associating the state with domination by specific clans and control of resources. Despite President Hassan Sheikh’s stated wish for unity, a number of regions such as Puntland and the newly declared Jubbaland seem more inclined to manage their own affairs and question the legitimacy of the federal government, thereby posing complicated questions about political representation, respective powers and accountabilities.
Box 2 Findings: Security and Conflict Context Findings: Past and current episodes of violence, the perception of the state formation as a zero-sum game and subsequent low level of trust between groups limits the prospects for an inclusive, sustainable political settlement. Insecurity and fear raises the risk of demanding accountability, leads to lack of trust and diminishes the potential for collective action beyond one’s immediate social group.
5.1.3 Social / Cultural Context The Somali Clan System The Somali clan system both divides and unites Somalis into lineage-based groups following the male line. Over 100 sub-clans of varying size and cohesion exist under the five major clan families: Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Darood and Rahanweyne. Patterns of association, kinship and decision-making between and within the clans are of great social and political significance. The relative size and perceived nobility of one’s clan is an important factor, influencing political representation, access to resources and more. For example the mainly agro-pastoralist Rahanweyn, Digil, Bantu groups and coastal minorities (Saab) enjoy lower social status than the Samaal (noble) lines and so are often relegated or marginalised in decision-making.6 Decision-making in Somalia is itself heavily marked by these structures and traditions. Decisions have traditionally been taken within a council of male elders working within a localised legal framework or Xeer. Deliberations are consensus-based, requiring thorough debate and free expression among participants while at the same time prohibiting formal participation of youth and women.7 In practice “Citizens are primarily accountable to their clan elder not the state, whatever the constitution may say. In the Somali context clan replaces the geographical constituency and government hear their constituents through active mobilisers of the clan. A minister's primary mandate is to win his/her clan to support his government”.8 Clan can play both a positive and negative role in relation to accountability. Clan structures can provide a vehicle for accountability at the local level and - as the clan-based negotiations that led to the establishment of Somaliland and Puntland state in 1993 and 1998 show - can under certain circumstances produce broad and hybrid political settlements with high legitimacy across clans - with clan leaders supposedly held accountable for their actions and decisions in the public sphere by their own kinsmen. However, commentators point to the limitations of this ‘hybridity’ in Somaliland arguing that the government has taken over and increasingly controlled the traditional
5 Within the TNG/TFG government administrations this problem was highly visible, with factions outside governing coalitions being seen as rejectionists and at times acting as spoilers. 6 Marginalisation of smaller clans and minorities is an in-built feature of society linked to the current state of the clan system. In part this has facilitated the rise of Al Shabaab which offered young and marginalised Somalis a sense of purpose and a promise of empowerment. See for example Marchal, R. (2011): The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin in Somalia. (http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/ressource/shabaab.pdf). 7 Xeer contradicts international human rights and Islamic teachings regarding the status of women. (Gundel, J and Omar AA (2006), The Predicament of the 'Oday'. The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia. Available at: http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som/infrastructure-communication-various/Gundel_The%20role%20of%20traditional%20structures.pdfpp43). UNDPshowed that young people in Somalia tend to suffer a form of ‘inter-generational exclusion’ – most face blocked transitions to adulthood to due multiple social, economic and political exclusions. Unemployment rates are around 67% and this is reported as the main source of frustration. The HDR estimates that 73% of the Somali society is under 30 years old and the unemployment rate in Somalia for “people aged 15 to 64 is estimated at 54 percent in Somalia, up from 47 percent in 2002. The unemployment rate for youth aged 14 to 29 is 67 percent—one of the highest rates in the world. Females experienced higher unemployment at 74 percent than males at 61 percent.” (UNDP (2012), Somalia Human Development Report, Empowering Youth for Peace and Securitypp xix, 4). 8 Interviewee, Hargesia, Somaliland
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authorities in hybrid political order and that the traditional authorities (at least those involved with government work) have "lost contact with and legitimacy within their constituencies due to being engaged in tasks beyond their competence and/ or being corrupted by leading politicians". In this "crippled hybrid" arrangement neither state nor traditional institutions function really well and in fact negatively influence each other9. When exposed to external incentives and influences associated with state formation and opportunities for ‘rent seeking’, clan accountability tends to breaks down and weaken, is replace by a neo-patrimonial dynamic, leads to fragmentation in politics down clan lines and undermines the potential for collective action and a sustainable political settlement. It is for these reasons that customary leadership is often more compromised in the south and central regions that have suffered from past conflict, political instrumentalisation of clans from the colonial period right up until the TFG.10 “Clan is number one in our life, so when we are dealing with Westerners we use the word democracy to get acceptance but it isn’t working for us. Elections, political parties are just consumption for outsiders. Inside us we are 100% tribe mentality”.11 The dominance of clan in relation to governance and accountability structures in Somalia poses immense challenges for those looking to promote sustainable civic action whether in the form of political party associations, formal civil society organisation or development initiatives beyond the immediate village or neighbourhood. In each case this requires collection action based on trust that is lacking, and an appetite for action in the service of a notional public good that is considerably more abstract than one’s clan.12 Even more challenging perhaps is the translation of the traditional ‘horizontal’ form of collective accountability within clans, most notably at the level of diya-paying groups, to the modern political arena.13 The modalities of collective decision-making and mutual accountability to other clan members do not translate easily upwards to the national and indeed even district level but easily expose public officials to demands for patronage from clan mobilisers. The research suggests that Somali politicians are inundated with pressure and demands from Somali constituencies. Governments in all three zones appear to be heavily penetrated by societal groups. The simultaneous lack of government accountability and the intense penetration of the Somali state by parochial social actors forms an entrenched system in which powerful social elements demand lack of government accountability by expecting the narrow interests of their lineage or social network to be advanced. On occasion government officials in Somalia may have been responsive and accountable, but to the wrong social groups articulating the wrong demands. When looking ‘downwards’, we find that poor government accountability is seen by important civic constituencies not as a problem to be solved but as a condition to exploit and perpetuate. Partly for this reason attempts to achieve clan balance through appointments to executive bodies, parliaments and senior civil service posts are a constant feature of Somali politics in all regions: clans expect and demand representation according to their perceived size and status in a respective territory. This underscores the close link between representation and accountability in Somalia, a feature derived from the assumption that an office-holder’s primary accountability is to his clan. While the bonds of clan accountability may weigh heavily on public office holders, leaders may also manipulate clan divides in their own interests, shoring up support through divisive (clannist) rhetoric. Many argue that such behaviour would be impossible at the local level where transparency automatically prevails. That it is possible at higher levels indicates how compromised the institution of clan has become in the public arena under the pressure of armed conflict, urbanisation and the corrupting influence of money.“Elect honest leaders and train society to demand rights” (civil society intereviewee) and “The only opportunity to improve trust between leaders and the people are to is to get honest, caring, effective leaders who see that to sacrifice their personal interests to the public interest is worthwhile thing to do.”14
9 Hoehne, M V (2013) Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2013, Vol 7, No. 2 10 Bradbury, M. (2008): Becoming Somaliland. African Issues.Indiana University Press. 11 Interview with religious leader, Hargesia. 12 “A collective action problem exists where a group or category of actors fail to cooperate to achieve an objective they agree on because the first-movers would incur costs or risks and they have no assurance that the other beneficiaries will compensate them, rather than ‘free riding’. The problem is more likely to arise when the group in question is large and the potential benefits are widely shared (‘non-excludable’). Solutions to collective action problems involve enforceable rules (‘institutions’) to restrict free-riding and thereby motivate actors to act in their collective interest” (Booth, D (2012), Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance, Synthesis of the African, Power and Politics Programme, p 11). 13The Diya-paying group is the smallest level of segmentation within sub-clans. These units of several hundred or thousand individuals take collective responsibility for their own security, as well as undertaking an obligation to compensate other groups for any harm committed by their members (Le Sage, A. (2005): Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal & Informal Rule of Law Initiatives. Centre for humanitarian Dialogue. Report for UNDP – Somalia, Rule of Law and Security Programme. Availabe at: http://www.hdcentre.org/files/Somalia%20report.pdf). 14 Interview with elder
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Somali Youth Against this background there are glimmers of hope. Somalia’s growing youth population is demanding new opportunities for empowerment and self-realisation beyond the traditional ones. This sometimes brings conflict with the older generation as young people either become frustrated or simply seek to change norms and practices. However this generation has no historical experience with the state – it may prove easier to shape the political culture of accountability of a young generation than to change the behavior of the older generation.
Box 3 Findings: Social/Cultural Context Clan plays both a positive and negative role in relation to accountability. Clan structures can provide a vehicle for accountability at the local level. When exposed to external incentives and influences associated with state formation and opportunities for rent seeking, clan accountability tends to weaken and be replaced by a neo-patrimonial dynamic and a fragmentation of politics down clan lines that undermines the opportunities for collective action. Governments in all three zones are penetrated by social groups and inundated with pressure and demand from parochial and clan based constituencies who view poor government accountability not as a problem, but as a condition to exploit and perpetuate. Somalia’s youth population are however demanding opportunities for empowerment and realisation beyond traditional norms.
5.1.4 Economic Context Non-productive wealth accumulation and production With a few exceptions Somalia’s economy is dominated by non-productive wealth accumulation and corruption characterised by extractive rent-seeking behaviour by elites who identify the state with resource extraction, as well as by conflict entrepreneurs whether they be termed warlords or gatekeepers. Ports such as Kismayo, Bosasso, Berbera and Mogadishu,airports and checkpoints provided an unregulated income for many years.15 Other important illicit or tax-free income sources include the trade in charcoal, khat, sugar, cigarettes and fisheries.16 Given the nature of these activities and the primary actors involved, accountability around these sectors is negligible and key economic interests that have benefitted from the absence of a state have little incentive to support state-building in the near-term. Further discussion in relation to the impact of spoils politics in relation to accountability can be found below on corruption. Banking, telecoms, water, construction and livestock The picture appears more mixed in areas such as banking, telecoms, water, construction and livestock.17 To some extent business in these sectors have supported state formation or at least financed clan militias in pursuit of local stability. To get business done, they forge bonds of trust in society which may span clan and regional divisions, often using Islamic networks that reach the Gulf states. In seeking political influence however, business networks often diminish the accountability of the top political class to which they provide financial support in a non- transparent manner. Furthermore, accountability among businesses is seen as low since regulatory capacity and legislation is lacking. The oil sector The oil sector was notable by its absence in interviews in Somaliland. As well as offering economic benefits to Somaliland, oil also has the potential to bring increased instability. Potential drivers of instability include environmental and social impacts, in-migration, dispossession through land speculation and an absence of transparency, dialogue and consensus building by the Somaliland Government and the private sector. An
15 Revenue from Mogadishu port customs was estimated at USD 30m in 2010; that from Aden Adde airport USD 1,8m in 2010 (World Bank (2012): Societal Dynamics and Fragility Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370-1164110717447). 16 See UN Report S/2011/433 on the trade in charcoal. A recent World Bank report estimated the potential future revenue from taxing the khat trade as UD 40m (World Bank (2012): Societal Dynamics and Fragility Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370-1164110717447) 17An estimated US$540Mio industry with potential government revenue of US$ 50Mio (World Bank (2012): Societal Dynamics and Fragility Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/3182370-1164110717447).
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accountability programme in Somaliland must undertake pre-emptive action to address potential conflicts around the oil regions in order to build strong state-society and strong industry-society relations. Urbanisation Urbanisation in Somalia is has the potential to create new social bonds and collective action opportunities. Evidence suggests that by reducing dependency on subsistence livelihoods and diversifying income opportunities urbanisation may contribute to changing patterns of social interaction, values and opportunities.18 For example Hoehne notes that clan already intersects with competing trends and identities such as religion, class and urbanism which allow different forms of social integration. Over time city-dwellers gain better access to remittances, basic services and education which may have profound effects on attitudes and social relations. As noted above, whether just to get business done or whether to facilitate access to services best delivered at some scale, Somalis have cooperated successfully around certain forms of trade, production and service delivery such as health, education, water distribution or livestock export.19 The locus for such cooperation is urban areas. All of the above would suggest that Somalia’s towns and municipalities are promising arenas for accountability experiments. Mogadishu and Hargesia in particular have vibrant economic urban centres. Strong sectors include money transfers, the qat trade, small industries such as food and drink processing, textiles, telecoms, small-scale trade of the type found in Bakara Market and larger scale import-export through the port. Both cities have benetifted from a return of members of the diaspora who have supported investment and private sector growth. The Puntland economy has also grown with strong sectors that include the Bosasso sea port, construction, banking, food and drink processing, telecoms (Golis), and livestock trade.
Box 4 Findings: Economic Context Somalia’s economy is dominated by non-productive wealth accumulation characterised by rent-seeking behaviour by elites and ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ – focused on transport infrastructure (ports) and illicit income sources such as Khat, charcoal etc. Accountability around these sectors is negligible and the actors involved have little incentive to change the status quo. In other sectors, such as banking, telecoms and livestock, business have supported state formation and formed bonds of trust in society which may span clan and regional divisions. However, accountability amongst business is generally low due an absence of regulatory capacity, legislation and enforcement. Urbanisation has contributed to changing patterns of social interaction, values and opportunities, creating new social bonds and collective action opportunities.
5.2 Institutional Mapping and Stakeholder Analysis Many labels have been used to describe Somalia, including ‘failed’, ‘conflict-affected’, ‘hybrid’ and most interesting of all, ‘post-transition’. Somalia has also been labelled an ‘accountability free zone’ by those wishing to draw attention to the effects of externally-driven policies in exacerbating war and famine.20 There is much truth in the assertion that key actors, domestic and international have enjoyed impunity for harmful actions over many years. Yet there is another reality which Somalis navigate on a daily basis – the web of accountabilities that constitute contemporary Somali society. Alongside hunger, poverty and conflict exists an array of relationships within and between social groups, the private sector and nascent state authorities. The details of these relationships, of the demands made, the channels for communicating them, are a major focus for this section which provides a typology and description of the key stakeholders and institutions, including civil society, that influence accountability.
18 World Bank 2006 (CEM). 19 World Bank (2013), Drivers of Conflict, Fragility and Resilience, Somalia, Draft Literature Review, World Bank. 20 Maletta, R, Somalia (2008), An Accountability-free Zone, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 40, October
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Box 5: Stakeholder Typology Types of formal political authority, by level: National government (Somali Federal Government) National level government, parliament National level government, executive branch leadership (cabinet level) National level government, line ministries and civil servants National level government, security sector National level government, judiciary Regional states (Puntland, Somaliland, etc.) Regional level government, parliament Regional level government, executive branch leadership (cabinet level) Regional level government, line ministries and civil servants Regional level government, security sector Regional level government, judiciary Local (district, municipal) government, including key officials (e.g. District Commissioners) Types of informal political authority: Clan militia leader Shabaab commander Clan head (sultan, ugaas, etc) Hybrid governance arrangements (coalitions of different actors) Types of civic actor (note: some of these overlap): Clans and sub-clans (represented by clan elders) Business leaders Local relief and development NGOs Local advocacy and rights NGOs Women’s groups Professional groups Religious authorities Youth groups Diaspora Journalists
5.2.1 The Central Government Somalis have yet to coalesce around a common narrative of the state. When interviewed most Somalis express general approval and an aspiration for a central state with benign characteristics. In practice material and political support for such a project varies according to perceptions of who might own and control the outcome. Somalis have identified the state with resource extraction since colonisation, recalling too well that the centralised state model so enthusiastically supported by the international community today was once used by SiadBarre as a conduit for support to his regime and as a vehicle for domestic patronage.21 In Menkaus’s language Somalis are
21 UNHABITAT (2008): Land, property, and housing in Somalia.
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‘risk averse’ towards the state because a state which they may not control would be a threat. If internationally- backed state-building is ever to succeed in Somalia it will have to go hand in hand with reconciliation and with accountability mechanisms that can check state power.22 These perceptions explain the general alignment of clan groupings behind different state formation projects. The more dispersed a clan the more likely it will advocate for a civic rights-based system within a weak central state, while more concentrated clans prefer confederate structures with independent political units based on territoriality or lineage.23 Federalism, arguably a variation on the clan-based territorial model, is strongly favoured by the more spacially integrated Darood and Rahanweyne.24 Centralism finds strong support among most Hawiye clans who dominate Mogadishu, its immediate environs and some central regions. An Islamic Khalifate which would transcend current national boundaries and banish clan affiliation altogether, is favoured by Al Shabaab and allied groups whose domestic support base is strongest amongst the marginalised. Unfortunately Somalis have not agreed on a model for statehood in the last thirty years. The subject is a matter of both violent and non-violent contestation to this day. That said, a sufficient number of Somalis working within mainstream political and civil society circles seem to ‘agree to disagree’ on the subject, using the provisional constitution as a reference point. While the majority population has not been exposed to the debate in any meaningful way, the constitution, flawed and ambiguous as it is, provides a useful springboard for debate on governance and accountability. Federalism and the associated review of the provisional consitution offer a platform for dialogue between and within and between Somalia’s regions on political representation, rights and duties. The Federal Government of Somalia and associated federal institutions including the House of the People, Central Bank, and Supreme Court operate from Mogadishu. Operating under the provisional constitution, the federal state institutions comprise a Presidency, indirectly elected by the legislature, and a Prime Minister selected by the President who in turn nominates a cabinet (council of Ministers). The federal government lacks broad based legitimacy and power across the three regions. Respondents talked of a lack of accountability, limited service delivery capability, and that penetration of government by parochial social actors inhibits the ability of the broader population to demand accountability. Although the central government is facing increasing calls to demonstrate upwards accountability to donors, for example through PFM, downward accountability needs to receive equal attention from donors in order to build bottom up accountability and demand.
Box 6 Findings: Government Somalis have yet to coalesce around a common narrative of the state and have identified the state with resource extraction and clan domination. Different clan groupings align beyond different state formation projects with centrism and federalism finding favour with clans depending on their special concentration. The new constitution, although flawed and ambiguous, provides a useful springboard for debate and dialogue on governance and accountability.
5.2.2 The Executive, Legislature and Judiciary Attempts to cultivate greater accountability in Somalia must be situated alongside a long history of impunity and weak and confused justice system. The Somali legal system is made up of overlapping systems of justice, each with its own strengths and weaknesses and coming to the fore depending on the circumstance and geographical location. These include: the forma judiciary structures in regional administrations and central governments (such as the SFG); the traditional clan based system, (xeer), the growing number of shari’a courts as well as civil society and private sector initiatives and ad hoc mechanism established by Somali militia factions.
22 See Bradbury, M and Healy, S eds (2010). Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking.Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources. 23 Menkhaus, K. (2012): Conflict analysis: Somalia. UNPOS.,UNHABITAT (2008): Land, property, and housing in Somalia. 24 That the new provisional constitution propounds a federal model is substantially due to the efforts of deceased TNG President Abdullahi Yusuf, among other things a member of the Darod clan.
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Informal mechanisms complement existing formal ones with traditional law playing a dominant role in relations within and between groups25 - the latter of which are collectively accountable for the actions of one of its members26. Individuals with a grievance can and do choose which system they wish to adopt, and can switch mid- process. The state system remains heavily biased towards urban areas which limits its geographical outreach and means that there is a divide between rural populations, who may not have alternatives to traditional justice mechanisms and urban populations who can seek redress through statutory law. These multiple, overlapping and often contradictory sources of law have make determination of primacy and jurisdiction highly confusing and open to abuse. This has limited the equality of Somalis before the law and the degree of protection the legal system can offer on a personal basis, particularly when powerful clans, politicians or businessmen exercise direct influence over how cases are decided.27 In Mogagadishu, the courts tend to be seen as partial, slow and corrupt. While they are prepared to use them for essential purposes where no other option exists, e.g. land disputes, only 2 out of 16 Mogadishu-based interviewees felt that the courts were a viable instrument for achieving accountability. This is not surprising: only a small number of lawyers and judges are working and many, particularly the judges who tend to have informal training in Sharia law, lack appropriate training. Other problems raised at a recent national convention on justice sector development included poor infrastructure, executive interference, bribery and intimidation of court officials.28 In Somaliland the judiciary was viewed more positively. A legal aid system is in place which prevents cases being heard unless the participants are adequately represented. However, many people prefer not to take their issues to the courts because of the length of time and the costs involved, and because clan elders can often resolve disputes more effectively in a less confrontational manner. Moreover, confusion over legal systems puts lawyers in a legal vacuum and frustrates the establishment of institutional mandates. Parliament was viewed by many interviewees the key to accountability as it translates social expectations into law and thus sets the standards by which authorities are to be evaluated. “I think people can hold leaders accountable through the parliament who is the representatives of the people and one of the functions of the parliaments is oversight and control of the government. Effectiveness may require time and for people to recognise their powers over their government”.29
Box 7 Findings: The Executive, Legislature and Judiciary Somalia is characterised by an environment of impunity exacerbated by a weak and confused justice system. Traditional clan based and Islamic justice systems overlap with the formal justice systems (in including in Somaliland). These multiple, overlapping and often contradictory sources of law make determination of primacy and jurisdiction highly confusing and open to abuse. This in turn limits the degree of protection and accountability provided by the legal system – particularly when vested interests are able to exercise influence over cases. Parliament is viewed positively in terms of its potential as a vehicle of accountability, however this has yet to fully transpire in practice in relation to the SFG. There is a limited awareness of civil rights which limits demand side accountability.
25 Thorne, Kristina (2005). Rule of Law through imperfect bodies? The informal justice systems of Burundi and Somalia. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Available at: http://www.peace-justice conference.info/download/WS6%20Rule%20of%20Law%20through%20imperfect%20bodies-Thorne.pdf 26 World Bank (2013), Drivers of Conflict, Fragility and Resilience, Somalia, Draft Literature Review, World Bank 27 Le Sage, A (2005), Stateless Justice in Somalia.Formal and informal Rule of Law initiatives. p.7 28‘ At the heart of the debates are widespread concerns expressed by judges, lawyers and civil society leaders that the Somali courts cannot rule fairly and independently, as long as a climate of fear and intimidation hangs above them.’ commented one media article, going on to quote a serving lawyer, AishaKiin who attended the Mogadishu conference, ‘Somalia needs "a judicial system that is independent [from other branches of government] and whose decisions cannot be interfered with,"’. ‘Somali leaders pledge judicial reform following landmark meeting’, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/09/feature-02, April 19, 2013. 29 Interview, former MP and government official, Mogadishu.
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5.2.3 Regional and Local Government Regional government is taken in this section to mean the regional governments in Somaliland and Puntland. It should be noted however that respondents in Somaliland all referred to central government as being that in Hargesia, not Mogadishu. Local government refers to district/municipal government. Each region is discussed briefly in turn below. Across the three zones it was recognised that there needs to be a continued focus on political reconciliation in order to build trust and enable an environment in which accountable government can emerge. Somaliland In May 1991, after the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre, the northern third of Somalia seceded and established a capital in Hargeisa. Somaliland now has a functioning political system and its own currency but is yet to gain international recognition as an independent country30. In 1993, a meeting of Somaliland’s clans at Borama approved a transitional charter31. Another conference in 1997 established a provisional constitution32. Somaliland has enjoyed relative stability for several years and this has permitted formal institutions for representation, governance and service provision to be set up. These are now at varying stages of establishing policies, laws and mechanisms to ensure regulation and oversight. Local councils have been set up in the 6 administrative regions33 as part of moves towards decentralized government. The 2012 municipal elections elicited much interest and turn-outs were large. Not all districts have councils, and even in those which do, the mechanics of government are new. Local councilors often lack experience and knowledge of their roles. However, many people feel that, being closer to the grass-roots than central government, they can be more easily held to account. At the same time accountability is to the clan rather than to all constituents on an equal basis. All our respondents, almost without exception, expressed mistrust of politicians, believing they are interested only in getting elected so as to pursue their personal interests. “People vote for them because of who they are. There is no connection between electors and the elected. The people elected in 2002 never did anything and those elected in 2012 won’t do anything. They don’t even need to make election promises as they aren’t voted on promises but on clan” (Academic interviewee, Hargesia). In spite of the low trust levels there was also a belief by some respondents that government capacity is slowly growing and that this is fundamentally for the improvement of trust between leaders and constituents “You can come and demand your rights but the capacity also needs to be there” (interviewee Hargesia). Parliamentarians have a key role in developing the legislative framework for accountability. The Guurti (upper house) must agree all legislation proposed by the lower house. The Guurti consists of 8234 nominated members, mainly clan elders,35 and at present all men. They are under the tutelage of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), which pays them a stipend. There is notionally decentralised governance in which local district councils deliver, and have autonomy, in regard to key services such as health, education, and water and sanitation. A new national policy on decentralisation is under development. The politics of resource competition between central government ministries and districts is very real and meaningful decentralisation has been a struggle in many areas. Presidential, legislative and municipal elections are conducted by political parties, of which there are seven in the country as a whole and three operating nationally. Parties function largely along clan lines, though clan allegiances may shift from one party to another. Parties adopt candidates, whom the population selects through a free vote. No constituencies have yet been delineated, so elected representatives do not have a specific group of people to whom they are answerable. Members of parliament tend to spend their time in Hargeisa and to have little direct connection with the electorate. As noted above, it is argued that the legitimacy and authority of traditional authorities involved in Government work has declined within their constituencies as the government has taken over and increasingly controlled the traditional authorities. The outcome is a "crippled hybrid" in which neither state nor traditional institutions function well and both negatively influence each other36.
30 BBC (last updated 2013). Somalia profile. BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503 31 Walls, supra note 51, at 382–84 (2009); Time for A.U. Leadership,supra note 51, at 6. 32 Time for A.U. Leadership,supra note 51, at 6. 33 See the Regions & Districts Law (Law No: 23/2002). Available at: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Local_Government_Law/body_local_government_law.htm 34 See Article 60: The Membership of the House of Elders in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND (last updated 2005). Available at: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Constitution/art40somaliland_constitution.htm 35 The Guurti also includes some senior statesmen such as past presidents. 36 Hoehne, M V (2013) Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2013, Vol 7, No. 2 IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:10 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
The results from the interviews in Somaliland showed that elections were seen as the most effective method for holding leaders to account. The institutionalisation of elections has provided a regular and transparent form of transparency, and should be supported in order to further the shift from clan politics and nepotistic practices. Puntland Article 83 of Puntland’s Constitution provides the architecture of the state and the framework for local administration which is established as automous units based on the principles of self-governance. The constitution provides 3 tiers of government and these are the state government, the regional administration, and the district administration. The Puntland government is divided into six regions: Ayn, Bari, Karkaar, Haydaan, Mudug, Nugaal (but also claim Sool and Sanaag) and every region is divided into districts and villages for purposes of accountability. The constitution created decentralised structures for service delivery but local governance and service delivery outside the urban areas is very much influenced by local customary practices and clan and kinship structures and relations. Mogadishu Home to Benadir Region (governorate), a City Council run by a Mayor and 16 subsidiary districts each administered by a District Commissioner. While technically separate, the governorate being mandated to coordinate security together with central government and the City to deliver services, the two administrations were reportedly merged in 2008. The Mayor and DCs are all Presidential appointees, the majority pre-dating the August 2012 transition and so reflecting their allegiance and clan links to former president Sheikh Sherif. Below district level are three lower tiers of administration: Waah, Laan and Tabelle. Interviewees for a governance analysis in Mogadishu report that although legally the chairpersons at each level should be selected by elders, DCs typically appoint candidates. These structures seem to exist in some but not all districts. Even so, de facto leadership is often split between the government appointees and clan leaders with higher legitimacy, though formal power- holders may also in some cases be clan leaders. The perceived domination of regional and district administrative posts such as the Mayor’s office, DCs, port, airport, TV and radio by Hawiye sub-clans, particularly those close to former president Sheikh Sherif was raised by several interviewees. They expressed the view that incoming president Hassan Sheikh has done too little to remedy this situation, perpetuating a sense of exclusive and non-responsive local governance.37
37 Civil societyinterviwee, Mogadishu; Civil society interviewee, Nairobi. IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:11 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
Box 8 Findings: Local Government Somaliland Despite low levels of trust, government capacity is increasing. Parliament is viewed as having a key role in developing the legislative framework for accountability. However, MPs are perceived as disconnected from their constituents. Local counsellors are perceived as more responsive and accountable, but lacking in capacity and influence. The legitimacy and accountability of traditional authorities involved in government work has declined. Elections are seen as the most effective method for holding leaders to account. Puntland There are decentralised structure for service delivery and local governance, however these remain influenced by local customary practices and clan and kinship structures. Mogadishu The perceived domination of regional and district administrative posts such as the Mayor’s office, DCs, port, airport, TV and radio by Hawiye sub-clans, particularly those close to former president Sheikh Sherif was raised by several interviewees. They expressed the view that incoming president Hassan Sheikh has done too little to remedy this situation, perpetuating a sense of exclusive and non- responsive local governance.
5.2.4 Civil Society Various attempts have been made over the last decade to map, define and generate a ‘typology’ of Somali civil society38. Both practitioners and academics have tended to conclude that the common approach to describing civil society through identifying the “array of non-government and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life”39 is unable to do justice to the specificity and complexity of the Somali context. In a situation of ‘hybrid’ governance where formal state structures are weak, contested, un-recognised or non-existent, civil society has taken a wider meaning. It encompasses a broader range of social groupings that assume multiple roles as service providers, advocates and peacemakers whilst at the same time representing a range of clan and social interests. Against this background, the definition of civil society in the Somali context has tended to be expanded to include traditional (clan) leaders and religious elders as well as other groupings (e.g. NGOs) that operate across the spectrum from relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, to development and advocacy , and occupy many of the functions normally attributed to local and even national government.40 To this list could also be added business interests, given the overlap between the social structures and interests underpinning both social and commercial ventures, including service delivery; and media. A broad categorisation of civil society can be made as follows:41 Community based organisations, comprising traditional elders (odaydhaqameedyada), religious elders (Hogaamiyedineedyada) and social and community groups (KooxahaBulshada). They include semi- traditional groups (such as those created for maintaining irrigation and water infrastructure; associations set up by international actors in support of community based reconstruction efforts and may of the local groups set up by women and youth across Somalia. Respondents were asked to provide examples of when citizens had come together to achieve change. Two examples were given: the Somaliland and Puntland peace agreements reached in Borama and Garowe and the formation of the Islamic Courts Union. One respondent noted that although civil society does come together periodically to protest or issue a declaration, it tends to be reactive instead of based on a common understandings on all the key issues.
38 These include theNovib (2002), Mapping Civil Society study and subsequent initiatives by the NGO Saferworld. 39 This is the definition of Civil Society used by the World Bank. 40 Novib (2002), Mapping Civil Society, Novib p. 8. 41 This categorisation follows the typology presented in Novib (2002), Mapping Civil Society, Novib p. 8 that is also reflected in subsequent studies of Somali civil society such as Menhaus et al ‘Civil Society in a Collapsed State’ in Paffenholz, P (2010), Civil Society and Peacebulding: A Critical Assessment, p. 321-347. IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:12 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
Local non-governmental organisations (Hayadahaaandawligaahayneedeegaankagudaha) which tend be more urban, follow ‘modern’ organisation principles such as the presence of an office and formal structure. They include service-delivery and advocacy focused NGOs, training institutes and think tanks. Many rely on international funding. Outside of NGOs managed by women and specifically addressing women's needs, their representation in the NGO sector tends to be more limited. In Somaliland civil society was frequently talked about as being comprised purely by national NGOs highlighting that there is a narrower definition of how civil society is comprised by Somali interviews. “An issue that preoccupies us is the presence of lots of NGOs and few tangible results. We need to have oversight of them as Somalilanders” (Female interviewee, Hargesia). Professional associations (Xirfadelyada) such as teachers, medical personnel, lawyers, journalists, artists. Media is characterised by censorship (either formal or self-imposed) and capture by business and government interests. This limits its potential role in demand side accountability unless significant reforms and media professionalisation takes place. In Somalilandthe media has made inroads in demanding accountability, most notably regarding corruption, but the enabling environment for investigative journalism may be in decline- as evidenced by recent cases of intimidation and harassment. Civil Society can be further distinguished between modern and traditional sectors - the modern sector incorporating local NGOs, professional associations and networks, whilst the traditional sector comprises CBOs, traditional and religious leaders (the latter may be actively involved in CBOs). Modern organisations are most often found in those areas that have had most interaction with the international community, whilst there is a correspondingly higher percentage of traditional CBOs in areas that are less accessible, less developed and have had less contact with international aid.42 Many organisations operate in limited areas of the country, where as some clan elders and umbrella NGOs cover larger parts of Somalia and Somaliland. The evolution of civil society in Somalia, in particular local NGOS, has been shaped by international actors. During the UNOSOM period (1993-1994) a large influx of funding was made available for service delivery and economic recovery, prompting a significant expansion in the number of local NGOs. Many of these had little local legitimacy and were controlled by clan or business interests seeking access to international aid flows. However, the period from 1995 to 2006 was more positive. The early part of this period, at least, was characterised by a decrease in both international funding and attention for Somalia alongside improvements in local governance and security. This environment, together with increased financial support from the business community and diaspora, as well as carefully thought through international support for civil society focused on participation to support a ‘bottom up’ approach, witnessed an “extraordinary blossoming of civil society”43. Organisations began playing central roles in service delivery, health care, human rights advocacy, peacebulding and the provision of local government. However the relations between donors, international NGOs and local civil society remain asymmetrical and strained. 44 The period since 2006 has been characterised, in South Central and Puntland at least, by a more challenging security and governance environment for civil society actors which has constrained activities. A number of NGO networks have emerged since the late 1990s with the support of international NGOS such as Novib and Saferworld. It is hard to make generalisations in relation to the legitimacy, responsiveness and role of civil society in relation to demand side accountability across Somalia, since there are both spatial and temporal variations which will be discussed further in sections the annexes. However, a number of observations can be made. Civil Society has a difficulty in transcending clan or religious divides, although there are exceptions. Somali civil society has a history of, often clan based, advocacy towards political and militia leaders as well as external actors. However, positively, advocacy activities transcending clan interest – such as womens’ rights, human rights and business lobbies - have grown since the mid 1990s. Many of the local NGOS with international ties are involved in communicating information raising awareness and advocacy. The networks, mentioned above, have had an important role to play in amplifying advocacy and public communication and anecdotal evidence suggests communication and outreach to the Somali public by civil
42 Novib (2002),Mapping Civil Society, Novib P.22 43 See Menkhaus et al ‘Civil Society in a Collapsed State’ in Paffenholz, P (2010), Civil Society and Peacebulding: A Critical Assessment, p. 331 44 Ibid. p.333 IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:13 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
society groups has been particularly successful helping to raise awareness of key issues (e.g. women’s rights) amongst the opinion shapers of Somali society. There have also been attempts to organise the business community into more coherent business groups organised along sectoral lines, The UNDP supported efforts to establish a number of groups, such as Somali Telecom Association.45 It is the business community that has been most successful in building social cohesion, forging working partnerships across clan and ideological divides. Civil society groups (in particular local NGOs) are also involved in monitoring human rights and abuses of power (including by local authorities and security forces). However, all Somali organisations playing a monitoring role have been vulnerable to pressure, threats, attacks, especially since 2006. Civil society suffers from divisions and low capacity, a high turnover of personnel and basic management. Competition between local NGOs and even between local NGO networks for profile and funding is common place and there are deep divides between Islamist and non-Islamist NGOS. All these issues, combined with the difficulties of transcending clan divides undermines the potential for civil society as a vehicle for collective action. The legitimacy, responsiveness and ‘downward’ accountability of local NGOs which receive large amounts of international support is questioned. By contrast, locally based community based structures and organisations are perceived as closer to, and more representative of, their communities and to be undertaking activities most relevant and responsive to their needs. Traditional and religious leadershiop and related organisational structures command a high degree of respect and legitimacy within the community. Although many CBOs show features of being clan based, not all believe in clannism or promote the principle.46 External support for civil society needs to be carefully managed. External support for Somali civil society can easily misjudge its target, creating perverse incentives and undermining the explicit goals of civil society strengthening. A number of recurrent errors are identifiable from interviews. First, many external actors will naturally gravitate towards NGOs, assuming that these equate to civil society which in turn equates to accountability.47 This is certainly a mistake for reasons explored above, and one which can unduly empower new arrivals in the face of existing if imperfect accountability structures. A second mistake which is more often made by the UN or major donors is to fall into tokenistic or instrumental treatment of civil society. This can take the form of occasional workshops on supposedly important topics (e.g. gender, or accountability), or worse, descend into the hand-picking of LNGO participants for important conferences.48 This plays all too well into the corrupted NGO ‘industries’ that have developed to attend such events in search of influence, per diems and foreign trips. Arguably the whole purpose of civil society strengthening should be to assist local actors to diagnose and act on problems of collective action. To succeed, external support needs to be well calibrated. One important requirement is currency or topical relevance. Somalis tend to organise well around current events. They are reactive but can be very effective when organising in this way. This suggests that external support for demand side accountability which seeks to boost civil society should be similarly reactive, (e.g. funding research to back an investigation into corruption following news reports). Reactive support needs also to combine with support for longer-term planning and strategising which is often lacking amongst civil society (and indeed government). Where possible support should favour issue-based, rules-based interaction that brings actors together across clan and regional divides.49
45 Menkhaus 46 Novib (2002) p. 35 47 Interview with INGO representative, Nairobi, 25/04/2013. 48 Interview with donor representative, Nairobi, 16/05/2013. 49 Interview with independent analyst, Nairobi, 16/05/2013. IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:14 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
Box 9 Findings: Civil Society Civil society in the Somali context encompasses a broad range of social groupings that span both the tradition and formal sectors and assume multiple roles as service providers, advocates and peacemakers, whilst at the same time representing a range of clan and social interests. Civil society suffers from low capacity and has difficulty in transcending clan or religious divides, which limits the potential to act as a vehicle for collective action though advocacy activities transcending clan interest have grown since the mid- 1990s. The legitimacy, downward accountability of local NGOs which receive large amounts of international support has been questioned. By contrast locally based community structures are perceived as closer, more accountable to and representative of their constituencies. External support for civil society needs to be carefully managed in order not to create perverse incentives. It needs to be well calibrated and responsive to identified problems of collective action and favour issue based interaction.
5.2.5 Religious Leaders The influence of religion and religious groupings has grown markedly in Somalia since the civil war. The traditional sufi-oriented interpretation of Islam remains dominant, but recurrent conflict and external influences, including invasions by a neighbouring ‘Christian’ Ethiopia and finance from Salaafist-oriented madrasas from the Gulf States has bred more conservatism and radicalisation.50 The successful use of Islam as a rallying narrative for the Islamic Courts Union in 2005 and for Al Shabaab from 2008 onwards demonstrate religion’s capacity to mobilise Somalis to collective action under the right circumstances.51 Religious networks are now an important feature of the Somali landscape and are well organised in an attempt to safeguard what they see as the correct values. They offer a unifying narrative and shared moral framework and identity for all Somalis. At the same time, the structure and regular interactions of religious settings are proven to foster trust among adherents to boost business and channel investments across border and across clan lines. Such networks are preferential towards members and sympathisers allowing them greater access to resources and political influence. The Dam Al-Jadid (new blood) grouping, an Al-Islah offshoot is a contemporary example, since critics of the federal government claiming it controls key parts of government, subverting broader accountability.52 Traditional and religious leaders are heavily involved in political processes and are, broadly speaking, trusted and well respected. In Mogadishu, key figures in the federal administration are widely believed to be members of religious organisations. Both groups have high levels of influence although as with elsewhere in Somalia, respondents often caveat statements of approval or trust in religious leaders by remarking that they were not as reliable or unified as they once were. Both groups were felt by some respondents to have been coopted by government and to have subsequently undermined their integrity.
50 Le Sage, A. (2001). Prospects for Al Itihad& Islamist Radicalism in Somalia. Review of African Political Economy, 28, 89, pp. 319- 484.Marchal, R. (2011): The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin in Somalia. Available at: http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/ressource/shabaab.pdf.Hoehne, M.V. (2009): Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How external interference helped to produce militant Islamism. Available at: http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/somalia/ 51 Reports indicate however that Somali political Islam is itself divided, along clan and ideological lines, indicating that this framework also has its limits. Currently, a myriad of faith-based organizations, terror groups and global jihadists compete in Somalia over the dominant interpretation of Islam which further reflects the fragmented condition of Somali society. See Marchal, R. (2011): The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin in Somalia. Bryden, M./Brickhill J. (2010): Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilisation from a Collapsed State. Conflict, Security and Development, 10, 2, pp 239-262. Hoehne, M.V. (2009): Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How external interference helped to produce militant Islamism. Available at: http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/somalia. These authors along with ICG (2006): Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership. Crisis Group Africa Report No 110. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Somaliland%20Time%20for%20African%20Union%20Leadershipand Le Sage (2005, 2001) provide an insightful account of the heterogeneity of religious actors before the external interference of Ethiopian forces, backed by the US and others. Earlier religious political organizations were more fragmented and the imposition of a unified ideological framework by Al Qaida encountered the same challenges as Western statebuilding efforts did: Distrust as foreigners, changing clan and sub- clan alliances, weak infrastructure, lack of security, exposure to external interventions and the risk of being ‘sold’ by petty criminals (Hoehne, M.V. (2009): Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How external interference helped to produce militant Islamism. Available at: http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/somalia/pp: 7). 52 Harakat al-Islah is a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate claiming to Islam with democracy. Its members are prominent in business, humanitarian affairs and education including the Formal Private Education Network in Somalia (FPENS). Critics claim that the Office of the Presidency, Minister of Interior and Ministry of State are firmly undere Dam Al-Jadid control. “Somalia Political Economy Dynamics Affecting Public Financial Management, Transparency and Accountability”, Unpublished, Coffey International, May 2013. IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:15 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
Box 10 Findings: Traditional and Religious Leaders Religious networks are an important feature of the Somali landscape, offering a unifying narrative and shared moral framework and identity for Somalis. The high levels of trust towards religious and traditional leaders suggest that this is a group that DFID should seek to work closely with and engage throughout the programme.
5.2.6 The Private Sector As mentioned previously, the economies in Puntland, Mogadishu and Hargesia are expanding. However, the rate of economic recovery in Somaliland stands in contrast to that of South Central. There are vibrant Somali business communities in Dubai, Kenya and inside Somaliland and vibrant commerce between Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia and with Kenya. Cassanelli53 suggests that economic growthin Somaliland occurred in spite of (or maybe because of?) the fact that the Somaliland state did not have the capacity to intervene very strongly in the private sector. As a result the region succeeded in attracting valuable contributions of money, skills and professional expertise from members of its own diaspora and from a number of NGOs resulting in economic recovery leading political recovery in Somaliland. Somalia’s collapse into a failed economy and heavy dependence on its diaspora for economic survival in the 1990s coincided with revolutionary advances in the telecommunications sector.54 This enabled the rapid growth of the remittance services industry. As reported by Menkhaus55 remittances to Somaliland reach US$500 million per year – four times the value of livestock exports in a normal year.56 Another study calculates that the Somali diaspora community remits some $1.0–1.5 billion each year providing a lifeline for many.57 A lack of service delivery by government, has seen the business community step into areas such as health, education, water and electricity.The business community has supported private schools, both for religious and technical, and helped pay the salaries of security personnel to keep the ports operating.58 In this sense the business community has been responsive to the needs of the community. Yet the business community also stands accused of corrupt practices. Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) reports portray a ‘revolving door’ syndrome of political-business links and rewards and collusion over TFG government contracts. Hawala, telecoms and airline business are said to have financed successive administrations to avoid taxation.
53 Cassanelli Lee (2010). Private sector peacemaking.Business and reconstruction in Somalia.Accord.Issue 21. Available at: http://www.c- r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_12Private%20sector%20peacemaking_2010_ENG.pdf 54 MENKHAUS, KEN (2001). Remittance companies and money transfers in Somalia 55 MENKHAUS, KEN (2001). Remittance companies and money transfers in Somalia 56 Ismail I. Ahmed (2000), “Remittances and Their Economic Impact in Post-War Somaliland,” Disasters 24, 4. 57 Cockayne James with ShetretLiat.(2012) “Capitalizing on Trust Harnessing Somali Remittances for Counterterrorism, Human Rights and State Building.” Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. 58 Cassanelli Lee (2010). Private sector peacemaking.Business and reconstruction in Somalia.Accord.Issue 21. Available at: http://www.c- r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_12Private%20sector%20peacemaking_2010_ENG.pdf IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:16 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
Box 11 The Private Sector, Accountability and Security in Bakhara Market Bakhara Market occupies two square kilometres in the Hawlwadag district of Mogadishu. Formerly a residential neighbourhood, for the last two decades it has been a business hub, both nationally and in the larger region. It hosts financial institutions, telecommunications companies, import/export firms, media companies, manufacturers, public transport terminals, food markets and consumer goods outlets. Bakhara serves towns and cities within Somalia, but extends its reach internationally to Nairobi, Djibouti, Jeddah, Dubai, Cairo, Mumbai, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Islamabad, Beijing, Johannesburg, Addis Ababa, Minneapolis and Toronto, where substantial populations of Somalis live. As a resource-rich district in the midst of conflict, it has been subject to attack, extortion and looting. Between December 2006 and January 2008, local security forces targeted businesses in the district and looted substantial amounts of money. Many traders, labourers and bystanders were killed. Attacks increased in February 2008, with multiple raiding and looting under the pretext of security sweeps. Adding insult to injury, these were the very security forces that were meant to be protecting the market. Unpaid and ill-disciplined soldiers robbed with impunity. To address the deteriorating situation, representatives of the business community came together with other civil society actors, including rights activists and religious leaders, and formed a committee to establish a dialogue with the TFG leadership, the Ethiopian authorities and leaders of the insurgency. These discussions resulted in the market being declared a demilitarised zone. To realise this aim, the market was to have its own private security force governed by a code of conduct agreed by all parties. This was funded through the Peace Fund Initiative, a funding portfolio created by the business community and supported by civil society, religious and traditional leaders. The committee achieved this remarkable tripartite agreement through direct dialogue, subtle negotiation and efforts to convince all sides that it was in their best interest to protect the market. Today, the market area is one of the most peaceful parts of Mogadishu. This initiative has put the accountability of security forces at centre-stage, making them answerable directly to the governing committee and ultimately to the cross-clan business and civic communities from which they were drawn. This community policing initiative is unique in that it was able to forge an agreement that cut across clan and political lines. It was an initiative founded on pragmatism and based upon the realities on the ground, rather some externally designed ‘security sector’ plan. When Somalis want something to work it is because it is in their interest, under their control and ultimately accountable to them.
Whilst businesses are reportedly taxed, corruption has impacted upon the ability of government to leverage a tax base from the private sector.59 Many interviewees said that they were unwilling to pay tax or engage with government as it offers them no benefits. On interviewee lamented the lack of transparency and accountability around this, “Businesses, shops, transport providers, market traders are taxed daily by DC's but see nothing obvious in return. Yet people acquiese feeling that some service is better than none.”60 As noted by Raymond Gilpin at U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) people pay taxes and offer allegiance to a government in return for security and essential public services. When those in government start to use public money for their own personal benefit and services start to collapse, then there is a breakdown of trust. There was no evidence that the business community at large was better able to demand accountability outside of the business in question. Modern Somali businessmen and women are still part of the clan and are expected by their relatives to act in ways that at the very least do not harm the interests of the group. These expectations hinder efforts to transmit professional and associational practices. There is an existing lack of downwards and upwards accountability. Government are perceived as having failed to demonstrate evidence that taxes lead to benefits for the private sector and the wider society. Subsequently the private sector has become disengaged from government. In parallel many citizens feel that the private sector is extracting resources for private gain without bringing the societal benefits that are expected of them.
59 Chêne, Marie (2012) Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Somalia. Transparency International pp 1 60 Civil society interview, Nairobi IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:17 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
Box 12 Findings: The Private Sector Somalia has a vibrant private sector that has stepped into key areas of service provision. Although responsive to the needs of the community, business stand accused of corrupt practices, strong ties to political interests and low levels of accountability (beyond the immediate clan groupings).
5.2.7 Diaspora Spread across Europe, North America and the wider region, the diaspora 61plays an important role in the economy, relief and development efforts, conflict and politics. Contributions are made to humanitarian and developmental schemes in people’s home areas, e.g. paying teachers’ salaries. The diaspora also contribute to local peacemaking initiatives and their inputs are thought to have contributed significantly to the success of Somaliland and Puntland’s inter-clan reconciliation conferences in the 1990s. The enduring strength of clan and associated diya-paying groups are an important basis for remittances. This also obligates members to fundraise in support of clan during times of conflict – analysts point to the significant financial backing that armed groups received from overseas in the early 1990s and in 2007-2008. Diaspora returnees are increasingly prominent in Somalia, taking up leadership positions in the public and private sector, civil society and Al Shabaab. For example the ranks of the new federal government administration are heavily dominated by returnees, probably a calculated move to introduce new skills and break old patronage networks. Yet these individuals face difficult challenges. Many have been outside the country for years and cannot immediately slip back into pre-existing networks to gain knowledge and traction in the society. Returnees also operate within institutions that have few if any arrangements for seeking public input. In some respects individuals from the diaspora who hold dual citizenship are in less accountable to the Somali population than locals since they are able to retreat to their host countries and beyond Somali jurisdiction. However, traditional sources of accountability (such as through xeer) have a transnational reach. The diaspora bring new ways of thinking and resources. This was noted to include around best practice internationally however, the diaspora where also found to become frustrated when bureaucratic wheels turn slowly and inefficiently. Returnees often have difficulty re-integrating back into their society and are not necessarily welcomed. Partially because of this, and partially due to their immediate removal from clan allegiances, the diaspora were viewed by many respondents as being less accountable to the clan and Somali grassroots communities.
Box 13 Findings: Diaspora Individuals from the Diaspora are less accountable than the Somali population since they are able to retreat to their host countries and beyond Somali jurisdiction. However, traditional sources of accountability such as xeer, have a transnational reach. The diaspora have knowledge regarding best practice and existing organisational knowledge could be harnessed by mobilising members of the diaspora around collective action problems. This should include participation in mechanisms that seek to build active engagement of civic actors and decision – makers with government. Any collaboration with members of the diaspora would need to be carefully managed to ensure that they had community support, whilst still maintaining a degree of neutrality for clan preferences and agendas.
5.2.8 International Community The list of external stakeholders who influence accountability in Somalia is a long one. It includes regional states and organisations: IGAD, the AU/AMISOM, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Djibouti and Burundi; western states and organisations notably the US, UK, Italy, France and EU; Turkey; the Gulf states of Qatar and Dubai; the UN Security Council and its agencies; and a range of less influential but well financed OECD countries and INGOs. Interests and means of engagement differ considerably among these actors whose inputs range across the security, political, humanitarian, development and trade spectrum.
61 The term has layers of complexity behind it with varying perceptions of the diaspora partially dependent on how long they have been back. IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:18 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
A common theme is that Somalis perceive foreign interventions as self-interested, lacking accountability and often undermining local reconciliation efforts. There is a mystery behind how money is spent. Donors tell the leadership a sum but how that sum is dispersed is unknown. Since 2000 the Somali government have not been given a breakdown of how much money was spent and how, they were just the recipient. No one knew how the money was spent in Nairobi. The Somali government should demand this information. The government needs to oversee how resources are delivered.”62
Box 14 From committees to accountability: Danish De-mining Group Danish Demining Group (DDG) has been working in the community safety sector since 2007 in Somaliland. An important component of the project was the creation of a community safety committee (CSC) that voiced local safety problems facing different groups in the village and devised a plan that then could be used to mobilize resources and address gaps. DDG facilitated this planning and implementation process in numerous villages, working to establish and strengthen committees and to facilitate planning and analysis. In 2012, DDG revamped its approach based findings from various evaluations which suggested that the CSCs were disrupting local decision-making. In some cases CSCs were becoming more powerful than the village council (VC) as they were trained and resourced whereas the traditional leadership received no such support from the state. In many cases the village council members (always elders) sat on the committees, but sometimes the village members would start to hold the CSCs accountable for safety concerns rather than the traditional and local district level authorities and security sector providers. Fearing that confused lines of accountability were developing DDG moved away from establishing committees in 2012 to the language and practice of ‘planning groups’ These were still responsible for identifying safety gaps at village level and mobilising responses, but they hand over plans to the village council in an elaborate ceremony. It is then up to the VC to bring needs and concerns to the attention of the district authorities and if necessary to seeking funding under the District Development Framework.
Based on a written submission from Danish Demining Group staff, 29/05/2013.
The research in South-Central and Somaliland found that Turkey and Qatar were viewed more favourably. Broadly however, foreign NGOs and the UN are too often seen to be pushing a western agenda. Moreover the international aid industry is seen by many as inherently corrupt. Many foreign-backed peace- and state-building initiatives have often failed to the detriment of accountability. The formation of the new Federal Government and indeed the process leading to the Transitional Federal Government raises important questions around the potential for externally brokered processes to create accountable and responsive state structures. As noted by a number of commentators, the most critically important missing ingredient in internationally/ regionally brokered peace agreements is accountability. It has been integral to the success of local peace processes (such as those that led to the creation of Somaliland) that Somali clans can hold their own kinsmen to account for transgressions, just as they accept responsibility for making restitution in the settlement of disputes. In contrast Somali governments that have been forged at international peace conferences have no clear lines of accountability to anyone. Without the mechanisms of formal or informal public control, neither the donors who funded the peace processes, the mediators who managed them, nor the Somali public on whose behalf they are supposed to 'govern' have been able to hold to account the governments they produced in any meaningful way.63 Furthermore, with continued outside support the TFG did not need to prove itself through the delivery of services and results the Somali community (unlike in Somaliland and Puntland).64
62 UN interviewee, Mogadishu 63 Bradbury, M and Healy, S eds (2010). Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking. Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources 64 Chatham House (2012), Somalia’s Transition, what role for sub-national entities, Meeting report IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:19 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
Box 15 Summary: The International Community and Accountability Initiatives History shows that all international initiatives in Somalia carry a risk of elite capture and manipulation. This has been true of dialogue workshops, international peace conferences, public financial management schemes and aid planning frameworks. A number of past attempts warrant mention as they dynamics around them will likely apply to any future inputs around accountability. The 2007 National Reconciliation Conference: In 2007, following the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union, more than 3,000 people from different regions and clans participated in a TFG-led National Reconciliation Conference convened in Mogadishu from 15 July – 30 August 2007. Although not the first conference of its kind (by one measure it was the 17th), hopes were high that a comprehensive agreement could be reached and a power- sharing government formed. UNDP and the Somali NGO Centre for Research and Dialogue gave the conference their backing. In practice the event proved far less inclusive than was hoped however, as key TFG organisers began to exclude those associated with opposing factions. Serious discussions were held at the event and reparations apparently paid between clan leaders using foreign aid money, though a significant amount of this was also rumoured to have been diverted for personal use. The Joint Needs Assessment process: From 2005 the UN and World Bank led a Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) process gathered information on Somalia’s reconstruction and development needs, culminating in the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). According to interviewees familiar with the JNA, the process was overly controlled by the then TFG planning minister ‘Jirile’. It was eventually dubbed by Somalis the ‘Jirile Needs A Lot’ process in view of his attempts to turn it into a long shopping list. Mogadishu City Charter process: In 2009-10, UNDP began supporting efforts by the Mayor of Mogadishu to develop a City Charter which would set out the mandate, responsibilities of the Benadir administration towards residents. According to interviewees the initiative foundered over questions of participation as it emerged that planning and consultation meetings were captured by the city’s dominant clan. UNDP suspended its support in 2010 due to these problems but hopes to revive discussions at some point in the future. New Deal dialogues: The World Bank and EU are currently spear-heading discussions with the SFG Office of the President on a ‘New Deal’ aid compact for Somalia. The hope is for a broadly-owned comprehensive framework which embodies mutual accountability between donors and the government and draws together security and development strands, so increasing coordination among donors around government priorities. Good practice however is to hold participatory consultations during planning stages and cultivate national not just government ownership of such documents. After several months of dialogue those close to the process are increasingly of the view that the SFG representatives are not prepared for independent inputs from civil society into the process and that consultations will not occur across the regions. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) financing facility: Investigations are currently underway by the SEMG concerning diversion of funds via the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) financing facility. The facility was set up under the TFG to boost donors’ confidence and allow direct payment of government expenditures. It seems that although PWC employees provided receipts and financial reports to the donors as required, these were not always credible. Apparently with the exception of security expenditures PWC were relying on the TFG for expenditure reports without independent monitoring. One unverified estimate of the amounts successfully diverted to senior political figures is USD 18m.
The highly corrupt TFG was a notable failure. Established in 2000 following the Arta peace talks, the TFG failed to win broad-based internal support and quickly became embroiled in a war against the Al Shabaab opposition group. Controlling only small parts of south and central Somalia at the apogee of its power, it left little institutional capacity and lost public trust through divisive politicking, complicity in human rights abuses and misappropriation of funds by some members.65 TNG/TFG institutions lost any trust among Somalis through their leaders’ venal behaviour, but international involvement in their establishment offered poor foundations for accountability. Problems include credible rumours of US and Ethiopian intelligence paying for delegates’ votes at Arta and Djibouti conferences. Outside interference then continued throughout the TFG’s term. For example Ethiopian support for one of the most nefarious senior TFG politicians, parliamentary speaker Sherif Hassan was an open secret despite his widely
65 See e.g. UNSAS, 2011-2015. One unfortunate legacy has been its failure to exert control over Mogadishu. Much of the capital is currently controlled by militias, variously affiliated with former warlords and district commissioners. Some of these were previously armed by AMISOM and like the Somali National Army (SNA) and their loyalty is to their clan commander. IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C6:20 CONTEXTUAL AND STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ACROSS THE THREE ZONES OF SOMALIA/ FINAL REPORT
believed corruption of the parliament. For its part Uganda was heavily implicated in the ousting of popular TFG Prime Minister ‘Farmajo’ in favour of then President Sheikh Sherif. On closer inspection internationally-backed peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in Somalia display recurrent problems that tend to undercut accountability: a strong focus on establishing power-sharing governments at central level in negotiations far removed from traditional decision-making; the instrumentalisation of Somali civil society groups (and more recently elders); and the picking and active promotion of ‘winners’ in the midst of negotiations. Fundamentally, the mistrust in which the international community is held undermines objectives to promote accountability.
Box 16 Findings: International Community Most Somalis mistrust foreign actors who they perceive to be self-interested and lacking accountability and transparency. There are limitations in the potential for externally brokered state formation process to create accountable and responsive state structures.
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6 The Social Costs of Corruption
6.1 Introduction Corruption is operationally defined by The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain1. The costs of corruption can be economic, political, environmental and social. The latter refers to the impact of corruption on trust in the political system, in its institutions and its leadership, on the social fabric of society, on the exploitation of the most vulnerable, and the negative effect on income inequality. As summarised by Transparency International the “effect of corruption on the social fabric of society is the most damaging of all…Frustration and general apathy among a disillusioned public result in a weak civil society. That in turn clears the way for despots as well as democratically elected yet unscrupulous leaders to turn national assets into personal wealth. Demanding and paying bribes become the norm”. Somalia and Somaliland have, and continue to face, major corruption Figure 1: Somalia Corruption Levels in Comparison to other African Countries challenges. They are characterised by a divided political elite and entrenched patronage system within which competition for resource control and power has been normalised. Within each of the three zones where interviews took place as part of the research the following questions were asked regarding corruption. These questions were used as part of an iterative process in which the answers could be further explored and the initial questions expanded upon: Urban Respondents What is corruption, are certain kinds seen as being less damaging than others e.g. misuse of international aid vs. taxes? Do you believe taxation increases government accountability to businesses? Rural Respondents In your view are the following (a-e) examples of corruption? (a) A government official hiring his nephew 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (b) Government allocating jobs by clan quota regardless of merit 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (c) A government official keeping a small amount of project money to use to pay bribes to get an important project done 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (d) a government official keeping project money for personal gain 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (e) International aid workers working on Somalia but living in Nairobi 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes The following sections look at forms of corruption, factors that cause corruption, social cost, anti-corruption actors, the assumptions behind combating corruption, risk and the measurement and modelling of social cost.
1 ICAI (2011), The Department for International Development’s Approach to Anti-Corruption. Report 2. Available at: http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/DFIDs-Approach-to-Anti-Corruption.pdf
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6.2 Forms of Corruption Both petty and grand forms of corruption are prevalent in Somalia, permeating key sectors of the economy such as ports and airports, tax and custom collection, immigration, telecommunication and management of aid resources.2 The Verification of the Audit Investigative Financial Report 2009-10 found that an estimated 25% of customs and the revenue collected would get deposited in the Central Bank.3 During the course of the interviews there was an exploration of the different manifestations of corruption commonly seen to include bribes, collusion, fraud, extortion, nepotism and embezzlement. The two forms of corruption most commonly articulated in interviews were nepotism and pilfering of public funds. These are discussed below. 6.2.1 Nepotism The primary form of corruption referenced in interviews inside Somalia and Somaliland was the allocation of positions of power and authority without merit. This was described i as “widely tolerated”- even encouraged (interviewee in Mogadishu), “not really corruption” (interviewee Puntland), systemic, and part of the social fabric (interviewees from across each of the three zones). The “clanisation of politics” with the objective of consolidating benefits for the clan, was widely believed to exacerbate, and be at the root of, nepotism in both Somali and Somaliland. “In my point of view, if an elected MP hires some of his relatives, it is fine because we elected him or her to do many things for us including employment” (Female interviewee, Borama District, Somaliland). Specific examples of nepotism included the award of the Hargesia Airport Runway Construction project to a relative of the President a local NGO seeking to find jobs for youth receiving requests from business owners for employees from a particular clan or sub-clan, and the use of clan to access job opportunities.
A young woman interviewed by the team had returned to Somaliland over ten years ago. She interviewed for, and was subsequently awarded, a role with an INGO. Days later she had a letter from a Minister (irrelevant to the position applied for) stating the position was not hers and she must decline it. It became apparent the runner up candidate has lobbied his clan to intervene. The woman went to the Minister who had written the letter to argue her case and ask if it was personal. The Minister informed her that his decision was made and could not be revoked. At this point the woman went to her clan leaders and got them to lobby a separate Minister aligned with their clan. After much discussion she was allowed to have the job.
6.2.2 Misuse of Public Funds Interviewees within Somali and Somaliland were more vocal about the misuse of public funds and the unexplained wealth of those in power than nepotism. The lack of visibility on budget spending, revenue from the ports and abuse of state resources (such as relatives using government vehicles), were cited as examples. In contrast to the interviews held in Somalia and Somaliland, Nairobi based interviews also spoke of bribery and embezzlement. Specific cases included: Linkages between Government and clan leaders and the funds gained through piracy- most notably in Puntland;4 Misappropriation of developmental and humanitarian aid. The case presented was the allegation that three contractors were diverting over half of all food aid provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Somalia.5 This links to broader concerns about inadvertent transfer of aid to terrorist groups or individuals thereby putting organisations in breach of national counter-terrorism legislation. A lack of transparency and accountability on revenues6 gained through customs duty on imported and exported goods and via operational handling fees or charges by the port authorities.7
2Chêne, Marie (2012) Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Somalia. Transparency International pp 1 3The Verification of the Audit Investigative Financial Report 2009-10 (TFG Public Financial Management Unit).CONFIDENTIAL Draft Report, Version 1.2, April 2012, pp 12. 4See Harper, Mary (2009), Chasing the Somali piracy money trail. BBC News and Harper, Mary (2012), Getting Somalia Wrong and Beloff, Jonathan R.. 2013. How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development in Puntland, Somalia. Journal of Strategic Security, 6 (1): 47-54. 5 Pantuliano,Sara., Mackintosh,.Kate and Elhawary, Samir., with Metcalfe,.Victoria (2011). Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action Tensions, impact and ways forward. HPG Policy Brief 43 6 Currently, 33% of the income generated by the port of Mogadishu remains unaccounted for and is partly being used for the travel expenses of the current president. See Fartaag ,Abdirazak (2013). Reconstructing Somalia and the Politics of Public Sector Finance.LSE Ideas Africa
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6.2.3 Survey Results The graph below consolidates the responses from interviewees who answered questions the question “in your view are the following (a-e) examples of corruption?” There were a total of 55 respondents of which 20 were from Mogadishu, and 35 were from Somaliland (17 from Borama district and 18 from Sheikh district). Some respondents did not answer each of the questions. A separate column showing the “no replies” has not been included.
The scenarios most dependent on further information were the case of a government official hiring his nephew and international aid workers that live in Nairobi. Of particular note for DFID are the responses on the international aid workers based in Nairobi. 73% of the 56 respondents(across all zones) said that this constituted corruption. This was followed by 19.6% of respondents who felt it depended and 3.6% who said it was not corruption.
“This is wrong. They are creating economic opportunities and resources for one country and destroying another one”. Business interviewee, Borame, Somaliland.
“Nairobi is the centre of corruption. I believe small percentage of the aid allocated for Somaliland reaches here, the rest is corrupted in Nairobi. More people would benefit from the money they spend in Kenya if they would have stayed in the country”. Interviewee, Sheikh, Somaliland.
Where time allowed, the interviewers attempted to probe interviewees to discuss whether the misuse of government generated public funds, or international aid revenues were perceived to be more of less damaging. There was a general consensus that both were equally damaging but a small number of respondents claimed that there was a higher tolerance for misuse of international aid although this was at the same time less vocalised. An INGO in Nairobi commented that whilst the community were quick to fine or fire staff committing corruption, the INGO’s emergency fund for transport is continuously spent on non-transport outgoings of an unconfirmed nature. These findings suggest that perceptions on corruption differ according to the public revenue source. Where corruption impacts the most visible public funds this is seen as more damaging than the less tangible public funds that also exist. The graph below shows the variation in responses between Somaliland and South-Central for each of the responses (yes, no and it depends). It shows that there was very limited disparity in the answers when broken down by region.
Programme.Occasional Paper 1. Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/africaProgramme/pdfs/Abdirazak-Fartaag-LSE-IDEAS- Occasional-Paper-Reconstructing-Somalia-and-the-Politics-of-Public-Sector-Finance.pdf 7 See Bradbury, Mark (2011), Securing the Peace in Somaliland. A Summary and Contextual Analysis.The Rift Valley Institute pp7-8 and the Verification of the Audit Investigative Financial Report 2009-10(TFG Public Financial Management Unit). CONFIDENTIAL Draft Report, Version 1.2, April 2012,pp 14.
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6.3 Causes of Corruption The causes of corruption in Somalia and Somaliland are multiple. Those most identified by interviews were the nepotistic job culture, a lack of rule of law, limited transparency over government spending and a lack of oversight and accountability mechanisms. This is mirrored by the findings of International Crisis Group whose 2011 report lists “a nepotistic jobs culture, poor bookkeeping, weak and unclear internal procedures and regulations and the total absence of reliable records…a culture of profligacy, wanton misuse of state resources and disregard for ethical conduct by those holding public office”.8The absence of functional central governance and a lack of political commitment to drive out corruption further exacerbate the situation. Each of these factors is reinforced by insecurity which helps to spread distrust, fear, and supports a lack of enforcement. A lack of security and its correlation with corruption is most evident in the South-Central territories under Al-Shabaab control. “There is a lack of rule of law so when an official or a Shabaab member visits or phones me to demand money, you feel you have to pay or else” (Interviewee, Mogadishu). A lack of security also prevents functional government control across large areas of the country. The inability of government to reach large segments of the population means that the government is exclusive of the majority. This in turn means that accountability and the concept of the public good mean very little “If corruption is misuse of public funds for private gain then the concept is somewhat difficult as we don't have a clear public-private divide”(Interviewee, Nairobi). This is not to say that there is not moral condemnation of corruption – an entire section of Mogadishu is disparagingly labelled the “National Stolen Money Quarter” since it is believed to have been funded from looted public funds- but that it has become necessary for some to adapt to the existing social realities of the Somali state.
6.4 Social Costs of Corruption The main outcomes of corruption, as seen at the social level, are listed below: 6.4.1 A breakdown in the social contract between individuals and Government Many interviewees said that they were unwilling to pay tax or engage with government as it offers them no benefits. As noted by Raymond Gilpin at U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) people pay taxes and offer allegiance to a government in return for security and essential public services. When those in government start to use public money for their own personal benefit and services start to collapse, then there is a breakdown of trust. Judicial, legislative and executive branches of government also become compromised.9 Interviewees in the cities of Garowe, Nairobi, Hargesia and Mogadishu were asked 'Do you believe taxation increases government accountability to businesses? “The replies were not all aligned but the majority of
8 International Crisis Group (2011). Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support Crisis Group Africa Report N°170, pp 12-13. 9USIP (2010).Governance, corruption, and conflict. Study Guide Series on Peace and Conflict. Available at: http://www.usip.org/files/ETC- D/NPEC/480021.PDF
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respondents in each location did not believe accountability was being increased. Some of the responses are outlined below:
“In Modadishu and Benadir businesses, shops, transport providers, and market traders are taxed daily by DC's but they see nothing obvious in return”. INGO interviewee, Nairobi.
“A big yes! This is also a good practice. However, it is hard to say if it can have immediate impact. This may also promote other accountabilities such as to the general public”. Academic Interviewee, Puntland.
“No it only increases the personal interests”. Youth interview in Puntland.
“Government just has more money and forced us. I get no services. There is a word for money that you are forced into paying. Tax is that”. Woman Interviewee, Somaliland.
Creating a domestic tax system and base is seen as critical for state capacity building, improving conditions of governance, and strengthening the link of accountability between electorates and leadership.10 The findings above demonstrate that Government must accelerate the demonstrable allocation of taxes in order to increase the revenue base and engage with citizens. 6.4.2 Permissiveness and Inequality There is a level of permissiveness towards corruption undertaken by family or clan members. “It is difficult to expose family as the corrupt person represents an entire clan/ family” (Female Interviewee Somaliland). This has emboldened inequality, exploitation of power and the victimisation of individuals and/ or group. 6.4.3 A trust deficit and lack of legitimacy The inability to hold authorities and individuals to account has led to a lack of trust and engagement with government institutions. “People do understand about corruption but there is impunity and people feel helpless demanding accountability” (NGO interviewee Puntland). This is part of a broader concern around institutional, administrative and political weakness. 6.4.4 Conflict and insecurity Unequal access to resources both causes and fuels conflict. Key findings from interviews carried out for a 2011 OECD study on state fragility in Somalia concluded that encouraging or allowing corruption was felt to be a more important 'do no harm' issue than conflict itself. Among survey respondents, 36% cited corruption or issues relating to corruption as the biggest single cause of harm in Somalia, ahead of conflict at 16%.11 As highlighted by an academic interviewee in Hargesia “Anything that leads to unequal opportunities means there is a danger of disrupting stability and security.” An interviewee in Mogadishu mirrored this, stating that combatting corruption will first require inter-group reconciliation because conflict favours corruption “I will take any resources I can to use in my conflict with you” (Mogadishu, Interviewee).
6.5 Key Anti-Corruption Actors 6.5.1 Somaliland: The Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission The Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission (GGACC), was informally established in 2010 under the current Somaliland government. GGACC exists to lead the governance sector and to build strong, capable and effective institutions able to initiate a comprehensive response towards fighting corruption. It is comprised of a five- member committee. Documentation from the GGACC states that: corruption and misuse of national resources is mainstreamed, is in existence at various levels, and that corruption is negatively linked to justice and service delivery. The inadequacy of institutional systems and policy are one obstacle to fighting corruption. Other challenges include a lack of civic education, distrust between government and citizens, a lack of baseline data on perceptions of corruption and a lack of regulation application.
10Herbst, Jeffrey and Mills, Greg (2011).The Fault Lines of Failed States.Foreign Policy. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_fault_lines_of_failed_states 11OECD (2011) Report on International Engagement in Fragile States. Somali Republic, OECD 2011, p.35.
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The political will of the current administration was said to be high. However the bill upholding the powers of the GGACC was only passed on 6 November 2012. Prior to the this, the commission was hindered by a lack of enforcement power, with cases going through the Attorney General. A fact-finding mission by GGACC between February and March 2011 found a lack of policies and procedures within some state institutions, which impedes operations and performance. The correct procedures are not followed when recruiting employees irrespective of the position level, and procurement procedures are not followed. During our interview a specific example was given of the GGACC investigating illegal fishing by Yemen in Somaliland waters. The investigation found that customs and police were colluding and significantly under-reporting the level of fishing. Whilst this resulted in three junior staff at the Ministry of Fisheries losing their jobs, higher-up officials involved were not investigated. There was limited reference to the GGACC by interviewees generally. This might be due to a lack of information on their mandate and activities, or to a lack of effectiveness. Either reason would support calls for external support in building institutional capacity to manage and bring cases to trial that result in prosecution. The collection of baseline data on incidents of corruption would support information gaps on corruption which need to be filled. A current baseline is reportedly being conducted by UNDP that looks at perceptions of corruption. This may produce data that can be built on. 6.5.2 Somalia: TFG Public Financial Management Unit Corruption was described as “rampant”12under the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with finances managed in an “informal, ad hoc way, which encouraged and facilitated mismanagement, misappropriation and embezzlement” and gave individual politicians rather than institutions control over the utilization of public funds.13 In 2010, the TFG established a Public Finance Management Unit (PFMU) in the prime minister’s office. An audit investigative financial report (AIFR) report produced by the PFMU in 2011 detailed major discrepancies between the TFG financial statements in 2009 and 2010 and the actual internal and external revenue received. The World Bank subsequently commissioned a financial diagnostic assessment (FDA) of the AIFR in 2011. The FDA found that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) had shown a lack of cooperation with the provision of financial information and that TFG revenue exceeded official TFG expenditures by $72 million in 2009 and $39 million in 2010.14 The TFG and President Sheikh Sharif publicly challenged the findings but over 120 parliamentarians signed a motion calling for the establishment of an ad-hoc investigatory committee to look into the conduct of several high-ranking officials.15 The mandate of the TFG ended in August 2012 leading to the election of a new Parliament and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. A Public Financial Management (PFM) Self-Assessment Report aims to lay the groundwork for a Government-owned PFM reform action plan that will guide development partner support to PFM over the short- to medium-term.16 The self-assessment found that poor budget execution was the result of numerous factors, such as the inability of the government to plan for cash availability, the inability to execute effective controls that mitigate abuse and corruption and current structures and processes that present loopholes for corruption. The self- assessment goes onto note that President Mohamud and Mohamoud Hassan Suleiman, Finance Minister have prioritised enhancing public financial integrity institutions. This is evidenced by the submission to Parliament for approval of a “mini-budget” for the last quarter of 2012, and its subsequent adoption through the Mini Budget Proclamation Act, 2012 and the Budget for the 2013 financial year that was also passed by Parliament through the Budget Proclamation Act, 2013 and is now in the execution stage. Whilst the above points towards institutional development a proposal by the UK in early 2013 to set up a mechanism (the Joint Financial Management Board17), whereby Britain and other donors would get to scrutinise the books was rejected by Somalia's new government on the grounds that it would infringe national sovereignty18.
12 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI (2012). Somalia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp 12. 13Fartaag ,Abdirazak (2013). Reconstructing Somalia and the Politics of Public Sector Finance.LSE Ideas Africa Programme.Occasional Paper 1. Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/africaProgramme/pdfs/Abdirazak-Fartaag-LSE-IDEAS-Occasional-Paper- Reconstructing-Somalia-and-the-Politics-of-Public-Sector-Finance.pdf 14BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR (2013). 2012 Human Rights Reports: Somalia 15Chêne, Marie (2012) Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Somalia. Transparency International pp 6 16Federal Republic of Somalia (Draft as at 28thFebruary2013), Public Financial Management (PFM) Self-assessment Report and Proposed Public Financial Management Strengthening Initiative (2013-2016). 17 DFID (Updated June 2012). Operational Plan 2011-2015. DFID Somalia
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It is relevant to note that no interviewees in Somalia, Somaliland or Kenya, mentioned any of the anti-corruption or PFM processes being put in place in Somaliland or Somalia. Whilst this may be because they are relatively new it also suggests that there is a lack of political commitment behind these formalised institutions and that the public remain unaware of their mandates. This links back to nepotism, impunity and a patronage system that is deeply rooted within the government. Article 111C of the Federal Republic of Somalia’s Provisional Constitution sets out the development of an independent Anti-Corruption Commission as a priority19. The anti-corruption commissions mandate will be to investigate allegations of corruption that implicate the public sector. Its powers will be: To prevent, investigate and publish corruption allegations; To freeze, seize, confiscate or return any gains from criminal activity; To support the adoption of such laws and other measures necessary to effectively prevent and prosecute criminal offences relating to corruption. Of note is that the constitution stops short of giving the anti-corruption commission the powers to bring cases to trial. This could result in a blockages to prosecution emerging thus diluting the impact of the anti-corruption commissions work.
6.6 The assumptions behind combating corruption Two assumptions viewed as problematic due to real world coordination challenges and collective action problems, (The principal-agent straitjacket), are presented by Booth20. The first is that governments want and need help to deliver development honestly and effectively. The second is that whilst the commitments of governments are open to question, citizens have a definite and uncomplicated interest in holding governments to account for their performance as agents of development. In Somalia and Somaliland these assumptions need to be challenges due to the “claninisation” of politics, nepotism, low levels of trust, a fragmented Government and a limited level of collective action for the common good. Solutions to combat corruption will need to bring the concept of prosecution and accountability for misuse of private and public funds into the public sphere and support capacity building of institutions to identify and prosecute cases of corruption. “There is a complete erosion of the notion of public assets – which predates the collapse of the state. Restoration of civic life will be a very long term project”. Sally Healy, Somalia Expert.
6.7 Risk The risk of reporting on corruption was not widely discussed by interviewees spoken to as part of this research. Where risk was discussed it overwhelmingly related to the media. The media environment in Somalia varies significantly. The Federal Republic of Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, Adopted on August 1st, 2012, provides for freedom of the press (see Article 18 (1-3) Article 18. Freedom of Expression and Opinions21), but journalists face restrictions on their reporting in practice. A media bill approved by the Transitional Federal Assembly in late 2007 was criticized by press freedom groups for imposing vague and severe restrictions, including limits on images and speeches22. There were contrasting perceptions of the media with some respondents stating that the media have a lack of formal training and capacity which makes them weak. There were also allegations that the media are paid to plant quotes in features and that both government and the international community were resistant to engaging with the media due to unprofessionalism and dishonesty in reporting. “Somaliland TV is full of nonsense. Journalists report uncritically and payment of fees is one reason. Too many times you switch on to find some diaspora business
18 Gatehouse, Gabriel (2013). Somalia's fight to harness the power of Mogadishu port. BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- africa-22404123 19The Federal Republic of Somalia (2012). Provisional Constitution. Pp 37. Available at: http://www.somaliweyn.com/pages/news/Aug_12/Somalia_Constitution_English_FOR_WEB.pdf 20Booth, David (2012), Development as a collective action problem: Addressing the real challenges of African governance, Policy Brief 09, African Power and Politics.pp2. 21The Federal Republic of Somalia (2012). Provisional Constitution. Pp 5. Available at: http://www.somaliweyn.com/pages/news/Aug_12/Somalia_Constitution_English_FOR_WEB.pdf 22 As reported by Freedom House (2012). Freedom of the Press, Somalia. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- press/2012/somalia
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person who’s probably paid $500 to lie about all his achievements abroad and his charitable works at home.” NGO Peace Activist, Hargeisa, Somaliland. In contrast, other interviewees saw the media as being relatively free and providing a valuable oversight mechanism and critique of government. Analysis suggests that although discrepancy occurs there is a variety of media outlets to choose from (in Somaliland at least) and that interviewees were able to identify “which ones demand accountability and those that do not” interviewee Somaliland. The media in Somaliland has faced very few violent incidents in contrast to the frequent incidents of harassment, arbitrary arrest, and violence against journalists in the South. However, interviewees in Somaliland reporting two recent incidents that point towards a crackdown on the media and an escalation of violence.In April 2013 the independent daily Habaal, who had recently published articles accusing the Somaliland President of corruption and nepotism, was attacked in Hargesia by gunmen targeting Mohamed Ahmed Jama, the owner and manager of Hubaal Media Network. The attackers were subsequently identified as police officers and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) issued a statement claiming they would be prosecuted23. The second incident was reported by interviewees to involve a police dispersion of protestors at a ’day of the media’ demonstration that called for media freedom. One interviewee summarised the concerns. “People believe they would not have attacked unless the Government (in Somaliland) or MoI is behind it. This is a unique incident but people are concerned about it as what the government will do next. They are building a lack of trust in themselves”.Interviewee, Somaliland. The graph below shows the press freedom score given by Freedom House to Somalia from 2002-201124. Each country is ranked on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the best and 100 being the worst. A combined score of 0- 30=Free, 31-60=Partly Free, 61-100=Not Free. On the second axis two of the World Bank Institutes Worldwide Governance Indicators have been plotted for the same time period. Control of Corruptioncaptures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media25. The measure used for these governance indicators is the percentile rank which ranges from 0(lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries worldwide26. The graph below shows a continuously low level of press freedom and low degree of control of corruption and voice and accountability. This mirrors previous commentary by interviewees regarding public power exercised for private gain, and a lack of freedom of expression and free media.
23 Committee to Protect Journalists (April 30, 2013).Somaliland official says media owner attacked by police. Available at: http://cpj.org/2013/04/somaliland-official-says-police-attacked-a-media-o.php 24 Freedom House (2002-2011). Freedom of the Press. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/somalia 25 See Worldwide Governance Indicators (2012). Frequently Asked Questions. Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm#2 26 See World Bank Institute (2002-2011).Worldwide governance Indicators. Available at:http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp
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6.8 Measurement and modelling The social cost of corruption is enormous27but social costs are also frequently hidden and hard to systematically measure. In order to measure the social costs of corruption a first step would be to measure the level of corruption. This is also problematic. As noted by TI “There is no meaningful way to assess absolute levels of corruption in countries or territories on the basis of hard empirical data”. This is supported by the Stabilisation Unit who state that “Data on the scale of corruption relies largely on measuring the perception or the experience of corruption, which involves difficult methodological challenges with regard to the measurement and the aggregation of data28. During interviews in Kenya, Somalia and Somaliland the interviewers explored the idea of a social cost model that could be used to demonstrate to Somali citizens the social cost of corruption. Only one interviewee (an implementing agency staff member in Nairobi) believed this would assist in presenting the impact of corruption. Other interviewees commented that the costs were widely known but that “corruption is out of discussion”. Interviewee Puntland. This suggests that rather than a social cost model a simple advertising campaign to bring discussion of corruption into the public sphere may be equally as effective. This could make use of Islamic rhetoric around corruption. This was mentioned by some interviewees as playing a strong role in the campaign against corruption. In order to construct a social cost model an indices that looks at incidents of corruption and the social cost across a range of the Somali population including householders, government officials and business owners could provide a baseline estimate. This could then be linked to an educational campaign that seeks to educate the public about the social cost of corruption. Repeat surveys would need to be conducted approximately every 18months after the indices is launched to offer a comparison. On way in which this could be supported is through the use of voice based messaging and SMS technology. This would enable a small range of survey questions on social cost to be asked throughout Somalia and Somaliland including hard to reach and vulnerable groups.
27 PWC (2008).Confronting corruption. The business case for an effective anti-corruption programme. 28Stabilisation Unit (nk).Addressing Corruption in Stabilisation Environments.pp4. Available at: http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/520/SIN%20Addressing%20Corruption%2001082012.pdf
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7 Exclusion and Accountability
7.1 Introduction The exclusion and accountability component of the assessment aimed to answer the question: how empowered1 are the people of Somalia to demand accountability, taking into account the degrees and forms of empowerment enjoyed by different social categories? Whilst the expectation was that that the main social category perceived as vulnerable by respondents would be women, the interview findings revealed three categories of relatively disempowered citizens, namely: women, youth (especially young men), and minority clans.
Gender is defined, within this assessment, as the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men.2 The implication of this definition is that men and women should not be seen as single monolithic categories; instead a proper contextual understanding of gender relations requires the description of “men” and “women” to be further nuanced around other differentiating factors, such as age and class.
Each of these groups face challenges outlined in Box 17 below:
Disempowered Examples of Related Challenges Citizens
Women Standard indicators of women’s condition and status place Somalia near the bottom of global league tables. UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index for Somalia is 0.776, placing the
country in the fourth highest position globally.3 The adult literacy rate for women is estimated to be 26 per cent (compared to 36 per cent for men and 31 per cent overall).4 Maternal mortality rates are amongst the highest in the world, at 1,400 per 100,000 live births.5 Early marriages and teenage pregnancies are common; 45 per of women now aged 20-24 were married by the age of 18 or younger.6
Youth Youth face high unemployment levels which stand at 67 per cent reaching 84 per cent in (especially Somaliland. UNDP’s 2012 Human Development Report for Somalia, which focused on the young men) prospects for youth,7 conducted extensive research into the problems facing young men and women in Somalia and concluded that a large number of factors contributed to youth exclusion and frustration, and constituted some of the main structural drivers of violence. The proportion of people below the age of 30 in Somalia is currently 70 per cent and expected to rise. The major structural drivers underlying youth engagement in violent conflict in Somalia are high youth unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities; insufficient, unequal and inappropriate education and skills; poor governance and weak political participation; and a legacy of past violence. Other factors include forcing youth to join violent groups, often due to a lack of alternatives for survival.8 The UNDP report calculated a “youth frustration index”, the overall frustration index was
1Empowerment (defined as “enhancing the opportunities of those who are socially, politically or economically excluded and transforming the power relations which lead to such exclusion” O’Neill, T., Foresti, M. and Hudson, A. (2007) Evaluation of Citizens’ Voice and Accountability: Review of the Literature and Donor Approaches. London: DFID) is understood in this analysis to be a pre-requisite for accountability. While one level of analysis considers the degree of empowerment of citizens in general, a gender analysis is a tool for assessing the condition of, and outlook for, specific disempowered groups. 2 See Office of the Special Adviser on Gender and Inclusion (OSAGI) http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm (accessed 15 May 2013). 3UNDP (n.d.) Gender in Somalia Brief. 4 Ibid. 5UNDP, Somalia gender equality and women’s empowerment strategy 2011-2015 (2011). 6 Ibid. 7Youth were defined as those between 14 and 29 years. The national youth policy in Somaliland defines youth as persons between the ages of 14 to 35, while in Puntland national youth policy, the age bracket falls between 15 and 30. 8 Ibid.
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3.96 out of 5, with the highest frustration observed in south central Somalia at 4.3, compared to the northern zones at 3.7. Across the regions, south central Somalia scored the highest in all predisposing factors for youth restiveness.9About two-thirds of respondents said they intended to leave the country, mainly to improve their employment or education prospects.
Minority clans Bantu, Sab, and some of the coastal settlers are outside the clan system and hence cannot access any of the advantages of clan membership. These groups fared particularly badly during the war. Often having specialised occupations (for example the Bravanese Gibilcaad were potters, the Sab leatherworkers, the Bantu settled agriculturalists) these groups have always been excluded and isolated. During the war they suffered much greater violence than the rest of the population: for example Bantu villages were ransacked, their grain- stores raided, their women raped and men killed, their livelihoods denied them so that they were obliged to seek work as day labourers on their own farms.10 Minorities continue to face discrimination in education and services and rarely acquire positions of political influence. Al-Shabaab has imposed extremely punitive measures on the Bantu in areas they control, including suppressing the Maimai language and the killing of Christians, who in southern Somalia are mainly Bantu.11
The following sections look at each of the three disempowered groups of focus. The full report is included in Annex D and includes additional information on; the aims and definitions of the assessment as it relates to gender; a historical overview of gender relations in Somalia; additional vulnerable groups including victims of natural disasters, the disabled, war-wounded and People Living with HIV and AIDS (PLWA) and IDPs; and more expanded information on the disempowered groups outlined below.
7.2 Disempowered Groups 7.2.1 Women While the normative legal framework may provide women with certain (limited) rights, the cultural framework colours the institutional response and hence women’s enjoyment of those rights. As Tanja Chopra points out in relation to Somaliland, “all justice institutions are … underpinned by the same social norms and power dynamics.”12 These norms and power dynamics also impact on women’s own self-identified roles and characteristics - especially since the clan system by its nature requires its members (male and female) to manage trade-offs between individual rights and security – thus limiting the demands they are prepared to make of governance institutions. Throughout Somalia, three justice systems operate in parallel: shari’a, secular law (colonial laws of Britain and Italy merged during the previous federation) and customary laws.13 These are practised by religious authorities, lawyers, and elders respectively. Individuals with a grievance can and do choose which system they wish to adopt, and can switch mid-process. Shari’a law does not uphold equality between men and women (for example, a woman’s share of inheritance is half that of a man in the same relationship to the deceased) but its provisions are nonetheless more favourable for women than customary law.14 In particular, the rights which shari’a offers women in relation to marriage settlements, child custody, inheritance and property, exceed those provided by customary law. However, judges themselves are not always aware of the distinctions involved, and in practice tend to be more influenced by
9 Ibid. 10Nur, Ibrahim, Changing gender relations in Lower Shabelle in J. Gardner and J. El-Bushra, eds. Cycles of violence: gender relations and armed conflict. Nairobi, ACORD (2005). 11 Hill, Martin, No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities London, Minority Rights Group International (2010). 12Chopra, Tanja, Operational paper: improving women’s access to justice and security in Somaliland Nairobi, UNDP Somalia, Rule of Law and Security Programme (2011) 3. 13 Somali customary law, known as xeer Soomaali, comprises a set of unwritten conventions and procedures that are passed down orally through generations. These define reciprocal rights and obligations between kin and clans, covering domestic matters, social welfare, political relations, property rights and the management of natural resources. See Abdurahman A. Osman ‘Shuke’, Order out of chaos:.Somali customary law in Puntland and Somaliland (2010) available at http://www.c-r.org/sites/c- r.org/files/Accord%2021_17Order%20out%20of%20chaos_Somali%20customary%20law_2010_ENG.pdf. 14 Customary law sets the value of a woman, as measured by the compensation payment in a murder case, at 50 camels, half that of a man.
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customary law. The latter is dominant and embodies a strong emphasis on community reconciliation rather than individual rights.15 Institutions supporting accountability offer women some opportunities, but at the same time thwart their attempts to make use of these. Such institutions may encourage women’s participation at the level of rhetoric, but in practice there are few incentives for them to make women’s empowerment a reality. Parliament is a critical component of the institutional framework since it is here that legislation is enacted by members who supposedly represent the interests and views of the population. However, representation of women in the three parliaments is very limited, and indeed the propriety of women taking part in political decision-making has been a highly contentious issue for some years. As indicated above, there is a deep-seated unwillingness to accept a role for women in public fora, deriving from their ambiguous position in the clan system. Both men and women buy into the idea that women are unsuitable participants in politics, since they are unfamiliar with power, do not have the skills to represent others, are divided amongst themselves, and have divided clan loyalties that render them unreliable. From the Somaliland women’s organisations’ success in obtaining the approval of religious leaders for their participation in the Congress of Clans in 1997-1998, to the Puntland Administration’s acceptance of 7.5 per cent women’s participation in the Constitutional Conference of 1998, to the acceptance of a proposal for a “women’s clan” to be represented in the Somali National Peace Conference in Djibouti in 2000, women have lobbied for the acceptance, in principle, of their participation in national political fora, and they have achieved a measure of success.16 Yet in practice the implementation of such agreements has always slipped, and women’s political participation continues to be highly contested in all three zones. In all zones, bills sanctioning women’s quotas are presented to parliaments; this was accepted in Somalia but rejected in Somaliland and Puntland. Women currently make up 14 per cent of the new federal parliament in Mogadishu, 3 per cent in Puntland, and occupy one seat out of 82 in Somaliland (none in the upper house).17
Respondents in our interviews did not generally see government as an institution that favours women: as one Somaliland respondent stated, “The political system is dominated by men, debates are held in smoke-filled rooms and there is no place for self-respecting women. Women in parliament are beholden to men, and there are no women in the Guurti.18 It is hard for women to get access unless they have an intermediary.” However, in Puntland many respondent’s view the Ministries of Women’s Affairs, Education and Health to be particularly sensitive to women’s needs.
In both Somaliland and Mogadishu police stations are being recognised for services introduced for women (separate women-only counters at police stations) and secondly for their openness in holding consultations with the public to explain their work. However, UNDP has found that women-only sections can be counter-productive, since their work tends to be seen as marginal to the work of the station overall.19 Others mentioned female lawyers (who tend to work on family cases), legal aid clinics, and rape clinics – significantly, all categories concerned with domestic violence and violence against women. The increase in the numbers of female lawyers and prosecutors, and the formation of professional associations such as the Women Lawyers Association in Somaliland, are positive developments. Professional and educated women often hold positions in such bodies or in NGOs rather than in government posts. Almost without exception, respondents in Somalia and Puntland did not perceive women to have a distinct role in demanding accountability. While some identified the need for attention due to women’s weak political position and low social status, others believed that their situation in respect of accountability was no different from that of men. The probability of a woman achieving her goals is highly dependent on her position within the clan, and also on the degree of power exercised by her clan: indeed, women from powerful clans may become powerful themselves, to the extent of crowding out the voices of women from minority clans, a problem NGOs should consider when engaging women participants in their projects.20 A woman from a powerful clan is likely to seek support through such projects; whilst women from minority clans are more likely to seek redress through the courts.21
15Warsame, Amina,Queens without crowns: Somaliland women’s changing roles and peace building, Life and Peace Institute (2002). 16Ibrahim, Rhoda, Women’s role in the pastoral economy in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds, Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women (London, Pluto Press and CIIR, 2004) Chapter 9. 17UNDP (n.d.) op cit. 18 The Upper House of the Parliament 19UNDP official, pers. comm., (7 May 2013). 20 Interview with Trocaire Country Representative (5 May 2013). 21Interview with UNDP Project Manager (7 May 2013).
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7.2.2 Young Men At the normative level, men experience few constraints in terms of their legal status. However, young men face difficulties accessing institutions as a result of the cultural weight given to older men. The Somaliland and Puntland administrations have recently ratified youth policies, and a similar approach is being adopted in South Central. Nevertheless, cultural norms continue to dominate. Viewed as either victims or perpetrators, young men frequently have their right to participate in the political and economic spheres denied. This has led to frustration and disillusionment on a large scale, pushing many to leave the country or to join armed groups and street gangs. “Youth” is often a relative concept with no fixed boundaries and can be used to sideline or humiliate a competitor of lesser age, perpetuating a culture of gerontocracy. The influence of the clan, in which the role of elders and the traditional leadership is prominent further entrenches exclusion. Youth are traditionally excluded from decision- making within the household, since this is normally reserved for male heads.22 Although young people participate in civil society, those aspiring to political positions face age-related discrimination. For example, the Somaliland Constitution requires candidates running for the House of Representatives to be at least 35 years old, and those contesting for the House of Elders to be at least 45. Recently, the Somaliland parliament adopted a constitutional amendment to reduce the minimum age limit for contesting local council elections from 35 to 25.23 The international community has only recently started recognising the consequences of the war on young men.24 Many young men have no memory of how things were before, having grown up since the worst of the fighting took place, yet they live with the consequences of the war, and of the urbanisation and displacement that accompanied it. Many express fear that violent conflict is about to break out again, and this is an additional reason for their aspirations to leave the country.25 The mental health of young men both inside and outside Somalia causes concern: suicide rates amongst young men in the diaspora is high, and in Somaliland the phenomenon of cilaaj or treatment centres for mental health problems is growing in an unregulated fashion.26 An average of 8 per cent of young people, mainly but not exclusively men, chew Khat27, spending up to US$ 11 per day on the habit. Khat- chewing is a driver of unemployment, and also a consequence of it, significantly contributes to poverty and conflict, and is responsible for numerous psychosocial problems.28 Having few opportunities for education or employment other than as moryaanor clan militia, many young men see little hope for the future. Al-Shabaab has been able to exploit this frustration, and has attempted to address the needs of those who have been marginalised by both political processes and resource conflicts. Already, youth are major actors in the conflict, constituting the bulk of the participants in militias and criminal gangs, including Al- Shabaab, and in piracy. Their marginalisation provides fertile ground for radicalisation. Programmes such as the “Youth at Risk” programme implemented by UNDP, ILO and UNICEF in partnership with local NGOs29 support youth empowerment and engagement. Yet, the UNDP Human Development Report commented that few youth initiatives tackle the key issue of employment creation, and those that do tend to be supply-driven.30 In summary, as with women, the discrimination experienced by young men at the level of cultural norms feeds into institutional practice and procedure and limits the incentives for change. Nevertheless there is some movement, both in terms of policy and in terms of recognition of the problem, and there is potential for dynamic youth-led organisations to be supported.
22UNDP (2012) op.cit. 23 Ibid. 24 Somali women’s organisations have been active in seeking income-generating and other projects for young men throughout the last 20 years, mindful of the threats to peace posed by the lack of employment and education prospects for them. See Ibrahim, Rhoda, Women’s role in the pastoral economy’ in Gardner in Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds, Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women (London, Pluto Press and CIIR 2004). 25RVI, op.cit. 26RVI op.cit. There are fears, as yet unsubstantiated by research, that these treatment centres use repressive methods to treat drug and alcohol addiction. Families in the diaspora are known to send young men there, many unfamiliar with the cultural context and unable to speak Af Somaali. 27 Khat leaves contain stimulant substances which have amphetamine-like properties. 28UNPD (2012) op.cit. 29Guillemois, David, Mohammed, Muktar & Mohammed, Mohammed, Final report Evaluation of the Youth at risk project and some security related components (2012). 30UNDP (2012) op.cit.
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7.2.3 Minority Clans Minority clans primarily include those clans and other groups which fall outside the four main clan families of Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Isaaq. These include settlers of Arab origin in coastal areas, the Bantu agricultural groups of the Shabelle and Juba regions, the “outcaste" sab clan, and various small groups in southern Somalia such as the Tunni and Jiddo pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. However, any group which is in a minority or powerless position in a particular area can been labelled a minority clan, such as the Isaaq, Dolbahante and Warsangeli forcefully relocated into the Lower Shabelle following the 1970’s drought.31 In Somaliland there is one dominant clan (Isaaq) and all others clans are minorities. A number of international conventions, to which Somalia is a signatory, protect minorities. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However in some cases they were signed during the Siad Barre government and are now widely disregarded. In any case these conventions have been breached more often than observed. Organisations of minority groups do exist, but are not strong organisationally and have limited capacity to monitor and report on human rights abuses.32 Respondents to our survey in all locations claimed that apart from civil society the main people speaking up for and providing support to vulnerable people are the clan elders. Businesspeople claimed to practise philanthropy and assist with humanitarian relief supplies to IDPs33, flood victims, and similar groups when emergencies arise. Others who were reported in the survey as providing support to vulnerable groups include civil society organisations (including local and international NGOs (although a strong degree of cynicism was expressed about the capacity of NGOs, often suspected of loyalty to donors rather than the people they are meant to serve) and CBOs), legal aid centres and lawyers’ associations, religious leaders and madrasas, media (for advocacy) and traditional leaders. However, approximately one third of respondents (mostly in Puntland) said they did not know of any such organisations at all, or that those identified were weak and lacked influence. In general, vulnerable people depend largely on their clan for assistance, meaning that those in a relatively weak clan are the most disadvantaged. Moreover, it is perceived that such organisations exist to provide humanitarian support to, and advocacy on behalf of the vulnerable, but do not seek to involve them in discussion or decision-making about the services they receive, nor are the vulnerable themselves effectively organised.
Box 18: Findings: Exclusion and Accountability Three categories of disempowered citizens were identified during the study: women, young men and minority clans: Women, young men and minorities face discrimination at normative, procedural and cultural levels, with the first two levels being highly influenced by cultural norms and expectations. Although equality is enshrined in all three constitutions, there remain gaps in the legal and policy framework. This is most problematic in the case of women, and specifically in women’s exclusion from political decision-making. The best hope for change appears to be at the level of institutions. New initiatives such as police reform, the entry of professional women into the justice system, and the small window of opportunity for women’s participation in politics in Mogadishu, as well as some dynamic youth-led initiatives using social media, suggest that significant cracks in the cultural edifice may be appearing. Demand for change appears to be coming, if anywhere, from youth, from the Diaspora, from the business community, and from decentralised municipalities.
31Cassanelli, Lee, Victims and vulnerable groups in Southern Somalia Ottawa, Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board (1995). 32 Ibid. 33IDP numbers presently hover around the one million mark, almost all of whom require humanitarian assistance and support to return. Many live precariously on the edge of urban settlements without adequate protection from clan or state. Violence including SGBV and exploitation by gangs, security forces and camp ‘gatekeepers’ are commonplace events – redress and accountability is extremely limited. Such conditions bode ill for accountability, for until these sections of the population receive protection, improved livelihoods and options of return, they will have very little voice.
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8 Past and Current Interventions
The research team identified 116 externally-supported interventions broadly falling under the rubric of accountability, through interviews and a desk review. These are summarised in the table in annex E. The table lists a striking number of interventions, suggesting many implementers’ have tried interventions over the years. Below we offer a brief analysis of the interventions according to categories such as coverage, targets, implementers, and timescale. Whilst the table highlights a range of interventions it also has limitations: Firstly, there are significant information gaps among the entries where the research team either lacked time or documentation to obtain the necessary information. Given the scope of this project it was not possible to cross-examine the archives of different organisations or carry out interviews to gather information on historical interventions. Secondly, there is some variation in the table in terms of how an intervention is classified. In most cases the data was provided by donors or INGOs who volunteered information on grants falling under categories such as “civil society” or “non-state actors”; in other cases entries were made based on interviews alone, on website profiles or drawn from literature. This affects the selection in several ways. Mainstream development or humanitarian interventions that have some accountability component will not necessarily register it, either because the terminology is not used or because that element of the work is not prominent. In addition, the heavy reliance on grant management data means that most entries are distinct projects with a discernible start and end date. Such projects may be composed of many individual activities or mini- interventions; they may also form part of a larger programmatic whole. A significant minority of the entries are smaller projects or clusters of activities. Still other entries relate to larger programmes of work that could probably be broken down into many smaller interventions. Thirdly, most of the data only dates back to 2008, which is a realistic limit of most organisations’ institutional memory. Fourthly, we did not examine in detail individual projects for their underlying theories of change, methodologies, instead we categorised according to basic information such as title, location, and description. Deeper examination of each project’s specific methods, results-frameworks, and methodologies would yield interesting insight. With these caveats in mind, it is still possible to provide some commentary and analysis. In terms of funding sources, we clearly see that while a number of European donors, the US and Canada, the World Bank and UN are included in the list, the EU is by far the largest contributor to a wide range of recipients (partially due to the data sources used). There is also a very strong leaning towards INGO implementers. Many have used local implementing partners, namely national NGOs, but this information is not available here. Some larger-scale interventions however have been UN-led or run by consortia of either NGOs or UN agencies, though consortia appear rare. The geographical coverage of the projects is often difficult to determine and many entries register “unknown”. Most projects seem to cover Somaliland, Puntland and South Central (51 entries register “all zones”). A sizeable minority, approximately 31 have only focus on Somaliland, whilst only approximately four to five focus exclusively on Puntland. What is noticeably lacking is the regional and international dimension. Although projects use varying terminology with many overlaps, the interventions referred to in this section can roughly be categorised in the following sectors:
Intervention Type Frequency
Civil Society Strengthening 21
Policy Dialogue / Participation 16
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Governance (supply-side) 7
Anti-Corruption 1
Conflict Resolution / Peacebuilding 7
Child Rights / Child Protection 4
Environmental Protection 1
Parliamentary Support / Elections 4
Media Support 22
Youth Empowerment / Livelihoods 6
Human Rights 6
Gender / Women’s Empowerment 8
Disability 1
Minorities 2
Security (including community security) 5
Education 2
Aid Effectiveness / Transparency 3
Total 116
Community based approaches There are very limited opportunities for communities to jointly analyse, plan and take an initiative on development. Where community based approaches do exist they were seen as having high levels of trust and success. Specific examples included community contracting and community budgeting. The former focuses on accountable processes and makes accountability and transparency part of practical daily life. Participatory budgeting is also an example where communities can hold funding to account and take responsibility for misuse. Both of these models were commented to have fed into stability by reducing corruption and social exclusion practices. DAI’s TIS programme (operational since May 2011) was held in particularly high regard and holds the idea of the promotion of a culture of accountability and governance at the core of the programme. Again, process is key and the selection of projects is based on participatory process involving a wide selection of civil society including clan elders, government, and the private sector. The use of conflict assessment and mapping has supported the understanding of the community dynamics and the local environment in which projects operate.
Box 19: The DAI Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation This U.S. Agency for International Development-funded program strives to increase the visibility of, and confidence in, government by improving government service delivery. We are working with local leaders and groups to create collaborative partnerships between government institutions, the private sector, and civil society, and increase access to information needed to promote peace, recovery, and development for Somalia. Our work with local collaborators is designed to help the Somali people achieve greater stability by encouraging economic growth, strengthening public confidence in government, enhancing cooperation between groups, and improving personal safety. The grants and the work done through them are planned and carried out in the context of Somali culture and values, with Somali ownership of all activities.
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Source: DAI
A further example of a community based approach is the Community Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD)1 Danish Refugee Council-led consortium project. This project uses bottom-up, community led development planning processes to reduce poverty and introduce clear rules of the game, improve access to information and inclusivity in local decision-making. According to CDRD staff the idea that more information about available project resources will drive demand for accountability is a core assumption of the project. The CDRD experience underscores how social fragmentation and inter-clan suspicion create a barrier to collective action, and therefore difficult to overcome. Other community based interventions identified demonstrate the importance of ensuring externally created structures for participation support rather than disrupt or eclipse existing mechanisms for accountability and participation (See box on the Danish Deming group below).
Box 20 From committees to accountability: Danish De-mining Group Danish Demining Group has been working in the community safety sector since 2007 in Somaliland. An important component of the project was the creation of a community safety committee (CSC) that voiced local safety problems facing different groups in the village and devised a plan that then could be used to mobilise resources and address gaps. DDG facilitated this planning and implementation process in numerous villages, working to establish and strengthen committees and to facilitate planning and analysis. In 2012 however, DDG revamped its approach based findings from various evaluations which suggested that the CSCs were disrupting local decision-making. In some cases CSCs were becoming more powerful than the village council (VC) as they were trained and resourced whereas the traditional leadership received no such support from the state. In many cases the village council members (always elders) sat on the committees, but sometimes the village members would start to hold the CSCs accountable for safety concerns rather than the traditional and local district level authorities and security sector providers. Fearing that confused lines of accountability were developing DDG moved away from establishing committees in 2012 to the language and practice of “planning groups”. These were still responsible for identifying safety gaps at village level and mobilising responses, but they hand over plans to the village council in an elaborate ceremony. It is then up to the VC to bring needs and concerns to the attention of the district authorities and if necessary to seeking funding under the District Development Framework.
Based on a written submission by Danish Demining Group, 29 May 2013
Whilst community based interventions have seen some success and their implementation continues, the majority of the interventions appear to target the zonal level, with a strong focus on capitals and other urban centres. The linkages between community, regional and national initiatives was less apparent and reflects the challenges to taking levels from the community level, where accountability mechanisms have had success, upwards. The zonal emphasis further reflects the security context and the limitations to geographical areas of operation for development organisations. Support to civil society and the media Although there have been a number of interventions focused on supporting participation and engagement, through networking, dialogue, and capacity building or support (see box on non-state actor platforms below), there remains scope to develop this area by supporting civil society to become unified, strategic, and organised by common problems. There are numerous interventions working with the media (as seen in the table in annex E) highlighting commonalities between development organisations approaches to providing access to accountability resources through information. However, civic education has much less support and would help to build participation and engagement and accountability resources. In Somaliland there was evidence that use of SMS and voice based technology supported donor programming including with relation to elections, job creation, and accountability.
1Based on an interview with DRC staff, 6 May 2013.
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Interventions that made use of ICT were limited but it appeared to be a growth area that offers remote access and broader coverage of donors.
Box 21: Non-State Actor Platforms The EU’s Non-State Actor (NSA) Programme has supported the development of three regional NSA platforms: SOSCENSA in South and Central Somalia, PUNSAA in Puntland and SONSAF in Somaliland. The origin of the platforms dates back to the early 2000’s and programmes, supported by Interpeace and Saferworld, aimed to “strengthen non-state actors to engage in domestic and international policy dialogue and decision making to bring about a secure and peaceful future for the people”. Key drivers for the emergence of the platforms included a) the recognition of NSAs by the Cotonou agreement, that provided a kind of legal framework for NSA to have a voice in policy dialogue; b) a mapping exercise resulting in the acknowledgement of the existence of a wide fabric of organisations and networks, not only consisting of NGOs but also including many other actors in the different regions of Somalia. In 2008, with the support of Saferworld, assemblies for the constitution of the platforms took place and the three platforms created. Since then the three platforms developed in a different ways, reflecting the opportunities and difficulties emerging in the local context: SOSCENSA has engaged in generating policy positions with its member organisation and feeding these into policy dialogue processes, mainly working in trying to set a relationship with TFG institutions and to influence to constitutional process; SONSAF actively engaged in the preparation of elections and in the democratisation process in Somaliland (including the claim for larger space for the representation of youth and women, and including the participation to the debate on Diaspora role and the role of the civil society in the electoral process); PUNSAA actively engaged in political dialogue in Puntland, mainly focusing on democratisation process and on awareness rising at local level on the key concepts related to the process. The issues articulated by SOSCENSA, SONSAF and PUNSAA reflect the main interest of the represented actors and to their agendas: the construction of an institutional space for dialogue and the construction of conditions for peace, security and governance. However these overarching interests are very general, and are not necessarily leading to the identification and implementation of specific solutions to the key issues in the conflict, such as those related to conflicting interests within the Somali society (including access of different groups to resources; land ownership and management; management of financial resources and of public services, labour related conflicts, ethnic conflicts). Without further effort to clarify differences, interests and the constituencies that are linked to each of participating actors, it would be difficult to deal with these issues within the NSA platforms. It is clear that the different issues considered by NSA are related to local processes and local priorities, they are to be recognised as related to the political and institutional dimension rather than to other local – and grassroots - priorities and needs, such as those more related to the management of resources, to the functioning of public services, to the identification of solutions to structural problems related to the interaction and to the conflicting interests of the different actors within Somali society.
Surprisingly during our consultations with interviewees, most were unable to provide examples of interventions (past or present), had a limited knowledge of key donors and programmes in operation, and were unable to state whether interventions had been successful or unsuccessful. This was true across all three zones and in Nairobi, suggesting foreign-supported accountability interventions have not gained widespread recognition or appeal. Whilst many will not have sought publicity (in part due to security concerns) or targeted specific beneficiaries and institutions and others may not have used the terminology of accountability, it is telling of how little recognition there is in-country for accountability interventions during the field research for this project, particularly in contrast to the number of entries in the table.
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9 Lessons from Interventions in other Contexts
The evidence on the impact of demand side accountability (DSA) initiatives in fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) contains many gaps, varies in quality and has lagged behind interventions. There are few studies examining the impact of accountability initiatives, comparing the impact of different mechanisms and drawing conclusions about the factors that influence success.1 Much of the literature is theoretical and conceptual rather than evidence based. Nevertheless, there is a recurring emphasis on the importance of context and operational modalities in determining outcomes. With this in mind, and given the unique context of Somalia, it is suggested that lessons from within Somalia may prove more illuminating that those from elsewhere. In the absence of substantive material on Somalia, it is recommended that DFID DSA programming be rigorously evidence based – trialling initiatives on a small scale to determine meaningful impact before expanding initiatives that prove effective and ceasing initiatives without a solid evidence base. This chapter summarises the evidence available, highlights lessons learnt from case study material and makes recommendations for DSA programming in Somalia.
9.1 Supporting DSA in FCAS: Review of Evidence The December 2011 U4 Brief on Social Accountability in Institutions of Conflict and Fragility2 points to several “success factors” in building accountable, transparent and responsive states: Stocktaking of accountability initiatives in the Asia and Pacific Region, carried out by the World Bank, showed that initiatives using advocacy and communication strategies led to greater social accountability gains than those that did not. A similar exercise in Anglophone Africa showed that building civil society’s technical expertise in financial management and budget analysis, and approaches to working with the state to overcome mistrust and political resistance were critical factors in the success of independent budget analysis, monitoring and advocacy. The paper highlights the specific challenges of DSA programming in FCAS. In FCAS there is a significant tension between short-term needs and the long-term investment required for accountability and trust to take root. Key challenges remain in building collaborative governance and capabilities from the bottom up, ensuring greater access to information, and enabling citizens to use that information to hold leaders accountable. There are specific challenges around elite capture, violence and coercion: Organisations may be co-opted or viewed as agents of external forces. Risks are exacerbated by limited means for citizen protection and voice, high factionalism and weak security. As social accountability inherently changes the status quo, those seeking change, particularly if they act alone, may do so at great risk. Social accountability initiatives may be further limited where it is difficult to mobilise citizens. In addition to security restrictions, this may be due to a lack of coherent leadership or voice within civil society and limited access to information and means of communication. Understanding and addressing such incentives often presents dilemmas when supporting social accountability in contexts of poverty, conflict and marginalisation.
1 DFID, Research and Evidence Division, A preliminary mapping of the evidence based for Empowerment and Accountability (2010), 11. 2 U4 Brief, Social accountability in situations of conflict and fragility (December 2011).
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Intervention Description Impact and Lessons Learnt
Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA)3 IWA work through local accountability mechanisms, Impact: This approach has reportedly contributed to such as shuras and community development councils to the delivery of critical infrastructure for nearly 60,000 facilitate elections of volunteer community monitors. Afghans and prevented corruption and the misuse of These monitors are trained to access information on resources. reconstruction projects selected by the communities, Lessons Learnt: Non-governmental organisations or survey beneficiaries and assess the reality of projects on community-based groups who served the public good the ground. With an investment of US$ 3,500, before and throughout the war can build and train community monitoring can contribute to reducing networks of change agents, with careful transaction costs and improve delivery of projects with consideration of political economic incentives. considerable budgets. Community monitors followed 184 projects valued at more than US$ 100 million. IWA understands and supports local accountability mechanisms, including shura elections of community monitors, provincial monitoring boards and joint state- society skill building and decision making to help ensure sustainability beyond their intervention.
Afghanistan: Institutional and Technical The project is helping to build a strong and effective Impact: Progress has been made on capacity Support to the High Office of Oversight institution and to build the capacity of civil society to development in both HOO and civil society. (HOO) and Anti-Corruption (USAID)4 educate the public about corruption and citizens’ rights, Lessons Learnt: Without a forum for stakeholder leveraging their outreach to strengthen the impact of the negotiation, spoilers continue to impede progress government’s anti-corruption programme and advocating and portions of society continue to remain unaffected for change. by the programme.
Civil Society Programme in Liberia and USAID sponsored support for West African civil society Impact: The programme has strengthened NGOs in Sierra Leone (USAID) 5 networks strengthens capacity building in civil society monitoring the distribution of HIV/AIDS drugs and organisations for anti-corruption and broadcasting reducing illegal trafficking, resulting in more reliable projects. The project promotes wide usage of the delivery of drugs to hospitals and clinics. In Sierra internet and community radio networks to mobilise for Leone, the National Accountability Group participated
3 U4 Brief, Social accountability in situations of conflict and fragility (December 2011). 4 Specter, B, Negotiating Anti-Corruption Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies: The Case of Afghanistan (2012). 5 Spectpr, B, Fighting Corruption in Countries Rebuilding After Conflict: A Democracy and Governance Program Brief (2009). IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C10:2 LESSONS FROM OTHER CONTEXTS /FINAL REPORT Intervention Description Impact and Lessons Learnt democracy and anti-corruption initiatives. in a policy formulation process that resulted in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. In Liberia, CSOs participated in the development of the Liberian Anticorruption Act. Lessons Learnt: Accountability thrives where government has both the interest and capability to deliver as well as the channels to interact with communities and their representatives. When these conditions are not present, it is necessary to bridge the capital and periphery, the urban and rural divide, to enable intermediaries, including parliamentarians, civil society organisations and sub-national officials, to convey and act on citizens’ concerns.
Liberia: The Poverty Reduction Strategy PRSTN, a coalition of eight Liberian civil society Impact: The researchers and communities found that Tracking Network (PRSTN)6 organisations, is monitoring and engaging authorities in despite the recent passage of the Freedom of the implementation of the national development plan. Information Act, project beneficiaries could not They have used household survey questionnaires, focus access information about development initiatives that group discussions, community scorecards and affect their communities or counties. As a result of interviews to assess the level of participation, access to PRSTN’s work, the government has committed to information, accountability, acceptability and availability integrating citizen feedback in its monitoring and of the Poverty Reduction Strategy projects. evaluation framework. Lessons Learnt: It is often necessary for donors to build the capacity of accountability bodies and to promote linkages across them to forge networks that drive accountability.7
Citizen Mobilisation in Nepal8 An example of the effective use of social accountability Impact: Implementation in most cases has been mechanisms is the Village Development Forum, which weak or non-existent. The citizen’s charter has been conducts monthly meetings focused on governance unenforced. issues in each ward, and has helped inform the public. Lessons Learnt: Effective voice and accountability This forum recently revealed the misappropriation of mechanisms require processes in place: a) to build funds by the Village Development Committee and citizen capability; b) that regularise and
6 U4 Brief, Social accountability in situations of conflict and fragility (December 2011). 7 Specter, B, Negotiating Anti-Corruption Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies: The Case of Afghanistan (2012). 8 C Jha, S Prasai, M Hobley and L Bennet, Citizen Mobilisation in Nepal: Building on Nepal’s Tradition of Social Mobilisation to Make Local Governance More Inclusive and Accountable (2009). IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C10:3 LESSONS FROM OTHER CONTEXTS /FINAL REPORT Intervention Description Impact and Lessons Learnt political parties, and compelled them to assure the public institutionalise mechanisms of accountability; and c) that this would not happen again. Public audits and where poor practice is sanctioned. In the absence of citizens charters, on the other hand, have become political accountability with no elected political distorted in many places. Public audits have been used representation, civil society mechanisms become without proper understanding of the preparation even more important for building the acceptance for required, or the objectives and process necessary for it and implementation of social accountability to enable people to raise issues. mechanisms.
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9.3 Recommendations The recommendations below are based on the evidence review and case study material above: Build upon peace agreement provisions and do so quickly: Peace agreements often address good governance / demand side accountability. The presence of good governance agendas suggests political will and interest to act. Donors must act quickly to help the parties implement those provisions.9 For example, of six countries whose peace agreements included anti-corruption provisions, five experienced improvements in the World Bank’s corruption index during the five years since the agreement signature. In comparison, seven countries that concluded no peace agreements with anti-corruption provisions revealed that only one country experienced significant improvement in the World Bank’s Corruption index.10 Conduct robust contextual / political economy analysis: Power relations and informal institutional processes may limit the impact of interventions. These need to be understood and factored into interventions. Evidence exists of cases where exiting political dynamics affect, and in the worst cases constrain empowerment and accountability initiatives causing them to have no or negative impact, including a sense of disempowerment or tokenistic participation, or new skills and alliances used for corrupt ends or captured by elites. Often negative impacts relate to state behaviour, reprisals, bureaucratic brick walls etc. Identify and support local accountability mechanisms: Donors should commission a mapping of stakeholder capacities and local accountability mechanisms, such as the shuras in Afghanistan or traditional chiefs in Sierra Leone. Knowing who are and how to support social accountability facilitators will depend on the context. In post-war societies, community-based groups who served the public good before and throughout the war may be well placed to build and train networks of change agents, with careful consideration of their incentives11. Negotiate fully to ensure stakeholder engagement: Programmes must be customised to fit each country’s needs and the interests of all stakeholders. Promoting effective stakeholder engagement requires negotiation between local parties aimed at achieving long-term acceptance of reform initiatives. Without a successful negotiation of their interests, some stakeholder groups will be motivated to act as spoilers and erect roadblocks to impede the implementation of the best-intentioned programmes. A successful and continuous negotiation among stakeholders is required throughout implementation12. Build local trust before instituting change: In relation to tackling corruption, experts suggest that in fragile states anti-corruption efforts require caution and need to focus on building social and political trust, integrity and earning basic credibility for government, rather than large initiatives or moral crusades. Early efforts of direct control of corruption should focus on corruption in the delivery of specific public services in cases where there is a good chance of success. Effective and fair delivery of basic services is a key element in building trust. Formal anti-corruption measures tend to require social and institutional foundations and can be destabilising without those foundations. “Direct attacks on corruption may be the last thing a fragile situations needs in the early stages of transition. Such attacks may require credibility, material resources, expertise and institutional strength that a regime and state do not possess. When society is divided, attacks on corruption may only be perceived as more factional or ethnic conflict.”13 Iterative programming - trial, evidence and scale up: No matter how comprehensive and well intentioned programmes are, there is always a need to adjust, improve and experiment with DSA programmes as they are implemented overtime. Given the lack of quality evidence on the impact of DSA in FCAS, the lack of applied experience in Somalia and the critical importance of local political dynamics, we recommend use of an iterative approach based on a solid evidence base. In other words: conducting detailed political analysis / developing a contextual understanding to inform programme design; piloting interventions on a small scale / in a specific geography with a focus on robust impact analysis; conducting
9 Spectpr, B, Negotiating Peace Agreements with Anticorruption Provisions: the Role of international Development Assistance (2010). 10 Spectpr B, Fighting Corruption in Countries Rebuilding After Conflict: A Democracy and Governance Program Brief (2009). 11 U4 Brief, Social accountability in situations of conflict and fragility (December 2011). 12 Specter, B, Negotiating Anti-Corruption Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies: The Case of Afghanistan (2012). 13 Johnson, M, First, do no harm – then build trust: anti-corruption strategies in fragile situations, World Development Report (2011).
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further analysis to determine the causal linkages of successful initiatives before scaling up and transferring to other regions; and ceasing initiatives which fail to demonstrate impact. Effective engagement with supply side interventions: The evidence emphasises that support to DSA cannot be effective without a corresponding improvement in the delivery of governance and services. There is strong evidence that programmes which promote citizen monitoring to reduce corruption are ineffective without simultaneously addressing the incentives of those engaging in corrupt activities either because the monitors themselves will be corrupted or because the bureaucrats will create new methods for obviating the rules (see, for example, Banerjee et al. 2007)14. Effective coordination between the DSA programme and other initiatives must be carefully built into future DFID programming. DSA interventions must have teeth: Community-level monitoring can be successful, but only when the community can hold government to account. Giving community members an opportunity to report poor governance has no effect when officials do not face repercussions (Banerjee et al. 2007, Olken 2007). However, when the community has the power to punish individuals, for example by holding elections that are likely to unseat an individual, then these programmes may succeed (Brollo 2009, Ferraz and Finan 2008). Strengthen partnerships across sectors, and demographic and geographic divides: Accountability thrives where government has both the interest and capability to deliver as well as the channels to interact with communities and their representatives. When these conditions are not present, it is necessary to bridge the capital and periphery, the urban and rural divide, to enable intermediaries, including parliamentarians, civil society organisations and sub-national officials, to convey and act on citizens’ concerns. International partners, can support networks that drive accountability.15
14 Hannah, R, The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy: what has worked, what hasn’t, and what we don’t know (2012). 15 Specter, B, Negotiating Anti-Corruption Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies: The Case of Afghanistan (2012).
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10 Conclusion and Recommendations
10.1 Overview This study has explored the issue of accountability in Somalia from a broad perspective, recognising that Somalia presents a complex landscape with varied political and security arrangements, social and economic conditions in different regions, and an array of actors exhibiting different interests and influences across the country. This list includes international actors, the diaspora, traditional and religious leaders, neighbouring states, business networks, armed groups and government. Amidst the variation some important commonalities appear. Somalis understand the concept of accountability well. They experience strong horizontal accountabilities on a daily basis through the clan system, particularly in their villages and immediate neighbourhoods. Where government exists and it is possible to influence its composition, they consequently demand adequate representation at all levels. A significant number also form trust networks in businesses and through religious networks, particularly in urban areas. A minority form part of an imperfect but formalised and active civil society. Many would probably be more vocal in demanding positive forms of accountability were it not for some powerful constraints. Recurring constraints Among the most significant constraints are: conflict and insecurity; social norms that restrict voice and access for minorities, women and marginalised groups; social fragmentation and a lack of trust; the absence of credible enforcement options; and unaccountable international engagement. Insecurity raises the risks of demanding accountability, often to unacceptable levels where accountability champions are silenced, intimidated or killed. Visible insecurity leads to diminished trust and social fragmentation that simultaneously reduces the potential for collective action at the local level, and favours the manipulation of clan affiliation in politics. Patronage politics and rent-seeking is pervasive and presidents, prime ministers, governors, their circle of ministers, and sometimes semi-autonomous figures within the governments help themselves to whatever revenues are generated by the state, using it to accrue personal wealth and to feed their clan support base. In the absence of enforcement, and with unaccountable international support continuing to flow, transgressions are unlikely to be punished. Formal governments in Somalia have consequently been impervious to end corruption and improve accountability with public funds. Prominence of parochial social actors Research suggests that Somali politicians are inundated with pressure and demands from Somali constituencies. Governments in all three zones are heavily penetrated by societal groups. And while many elite figures clearly exploit the situation to their advantage, government may in another sense require greater autonomy of decision- making. The simultaneous lack of government accountability and the intense penetration of the Somali state by parochial social actors forms an entrenched system in which powerful social elements demand lack of government accountability by expecting the narrow interests of their lineage or social network to be advanced. On occasion government officials in Somalia may have been responsive and accountable, but to the wrong social groups articulating the wrong demands. When looking “downwards”, we find that poor government accountability is seen by important civic constituencies not as a problem to be solved but as a condition to exploit and to perpetuate in order to sustain parochial interests, including corrupt access to resources. International actors: an impediment to accountability? One can also argue that key international interventions, particularly those focussed on aid and security to the executive branch of government, are skewing the incentives of leaders and those around them. Right now Somalia is experiencing huge demand for upward accountability from donors and external powers, whether in terms of
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establishing PFM mechanisms, attending conferences or planning for the future. In many cases these demands are being subverted anyway – there is huge fraud and diversion of foreign aid albeit with little comeback. But there is a clear tension between pushing our accountability demands (e.g. donor reports, evidence of state-building and action against proscribed groups), and creating space and incentives for downward accountabilities to grow. Implications for accountability programming In Somalia, demand side accountability is not just about amplifying civic voice and leverage with politicians, and eliminating the apparent “disconnect” between the unaccountable state and its citizenry. Nor should it be about privileging the demands of foreign states and taxpayers over those of local constituents. Meaningful accountability in Somalia is about amplifying the voice of the right group of civic groups – the ones calling for accountable use of government revenues and for the responsive delivery of services – not the actors expecting and demanding diversion of government resources for their narrow benefit. So accountability programmes must find ways to make political figures more responsive to constituencies. But they must also help Somali pro-accountability constituencies gain traction against more powerful civic interests for poor governance and to balance these against the demands for upward accountability from foreign governments. When working to improve lines of communication and accountability between state and society, we must pay closer attention to the question “disconnected from whom?” and work to improve connectivity and responsiveness between the state and the civic voices demanding positive (transparent and fair) rather than negative (patron-client) forms of accountability; and to support the empowerment of women and marginalised groups. Enabling factors and opportunities Fortunately, a number of enabling factors and opportunities have also been identified which may at times counteract the constraints. They include: A burgeoning youth population which is demanding new opportunities for empowerment and self- realisation beyond the traditional. Continuing urbanisation, a process that creates new social bonds, attitudes and collective action opportunities. Democratisation in Puntland and Somaliland, including contestation and political growth. Indigenous state-building in the south and central regions, whether formalised around federalism or more spontaneous, which serve as a platform for dialogue between and within and between regions on political representation, rights and duties. The ever-increasing demand for education. Islam, which offers a shared moral framework, language and social space around the mosque. The traditional Somalia vernacular and communication style which provides a rich vein of persuasive verbal rhetoric and satire. Though clearly a difficult operating environment, identifiable opportunities for collective action do arise in the Somali context. One predictable example is from elections. However, momentary trends and events whether a corruption scandal or news of oil exploration is often affected by astute activists with ready support. Five strand programming framework Below we offer some recommendations on how DFID Somalia can proceed to address the constraints, boost the enablers and seize upon opportunities, we propose four strands of work: Improving access to “accountability resources” Supporting participation and engagement Developing fairer institutions Creating an enabling environment These categories are a useful organisational framework in themselves, but they also capture interventions that are particularly relevant for the Somali context while presenting potential new theories of change. In view of the cross- cutting nature of accountability, the recommendations cut across all sectors and levels, from the political sphere to the private sector and from the international down to the local level. We propose specific interventions under each
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category where the research suggests that good models exist once strengthened, or where promising ideas have emerged (See annex on past and present interventions). Many of these can be pursued through “stand-alone” programming, i.e. newly funded initiatives managed by a DFID accountability programme. We also recommend DFID using mainstreaming, influencing and coordination strategies to promote accountability, with many pre-existing interventions having implications for accountability, including support for public financial management, civil society development and institutional strengthening. Crucially, in view of the limited evidence base for accountability efforts worldwide, and bearing in mind the uncertainties of the Somali context, these proposals should be subject to further testing and scrutiny, for example through small-scale pilots or validation focus groups with intended beneficiaries. As will be stressed further below, DFID should adopt an inquisitive and humble approach in this area, recognising that much is still unknown and that most actors engaging in Somalia carry some baggage. We recommend that the new DFID accountability programme establish a fifth track devoted to reflection, analysis and action research.
10.2 Recommendations This section provides recommendations for the accountability programme. We have made more specific recommendations for each of the three zones in the zonal reports within the annexes. Recommendation 1: Improving access to “accountability resources” Promote the use of information and ICT Without access to the right resources and capabilities, citizens are hard pressed to make choices, mobilise and act on collective action problems. These resources could include anything from cash to health, communication technology, information on government performance, self-confidence and organisational skills or just an adequate education and awareness of civic rights and responsibilities. While each of these is probably relevant in Somalia, two in particular stand out: Information and ICT. A key finding was that respondents are hungry for information to assist with accountability demands. This might take the form of publicised government plans, auditing reports, almanacs, company and NGO reports, trade and industry statistics, crime statistics, budgets and more. A much greater quantity and quality of information is needed to enhance public understanding of key issues and to inform assessments of behaviour and delivery by decision- makers. DFID should support research on public policy issues whether through think-tanks, universities or the media. In view of the current capacities in academia and the media and the fragmentation in these sectors, this will need to be a long-term strategic commitment that works under an overall media/academia professionalisation and development strategy. Documents such as the 2013 Somalia Media Support Group (SMSG) strategy co-developed by UNICEF, the US and FCO may provide a good starting point. Uptake of new and old communication technologies is growing rapidly and could assist with compilation and dissemination of such information, through mobile phone surveys, radio phone-ins, SMS public information messaging as well as support improved public debate on accountability-related issues. We recommend DFID support the use or piloting of ICT in its accountability programme, building on the experiences of programmes such as CDRD, the UNPOS/UNDP constitution project, BBC Media Action, DAI-TIS and Shaqadoon. Enhance citizen education Lastly though broad, DFID should investigate options for accountability promotion though education. Despite consistency there is high demand for education across Somalia. If progressive and effective, education at different levels can breed the critical thinking and organisational skills needed to mobilise collectively and demand accountability. It can also offer a shared sense of identity and a concept of citizenship and the public good. Yet if informed by the wrong ideology or badly taught it may also fail in these regards or breed intolerance and so undermine accountability by fuelling the cycle of mistrust and corruption. At a minimum, DFID should engage with others working in the education sector such as DANIDA, the EU and UNICEF to explore options for mainstreaming accountability into sector programmes. It should also consider supporting programmes focused on civic education, since a lack of awareness about civic rights and responsibilities contributes to a lack of information dissemination and a lack of demand from citizens.
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Strand 2: Supporting participation and engagement Mobilise and network civil society and non-state actors Active participation and engagement of people, civic actors and decision-makers is critical if government is to be responsive and accountable. Traditional demand-side programmes might include use of citizen report cards, social audits, participatory budgeting and monitoring, community service management committees, facilitating issue- based coalitions, supporting electoral reform and other democratisation measures. Testing has been carried on some of these approaches, for example through public planning consultations in District Development Framework planning processes in Somaliland and Puntland. Most striking perhaps is the range of possible approaches not yet tested, suggesting that further innovation and testing is needed. In the past some major civil society support programmes have sought to mobilise and network civil society and non-state actors and cultivate regular interactions with decision-makers in order to build healthy state-society relations whilst community based development programmes have sought to foster local participation and collective decision making. To the extent that these innovations are working, DFID should continue its support. There is room for micro-analysis of the blockages, incentives and change agents around specific issues (e.g. customs tariffs at Bosasso port; military stipend payments), and the introduction of new methods to kick-start collective action among state and non-state actors such as collaborative leadership schemes.1 All such efforts should be closely coordinated with the EU, the leading funder of civil society development in Somalia. Support youth groups, women and professional associations There is some indication in the research that groups such as youth, women and professional associations contain greater potential to forge new bonds of trust and mobilise progressive civic coalitions. Current civil society networking initiatives already provide some support to these actors. DFID could investigate how those networks can best stimulate active issue-based coalitions amongst and within these groups and whether additional support would spur faster development of professional associations. Documents like the draft UNESCO Youth Strategy and the UNDP Somalia Human Development Report on youth provide useful entry-points. Finally, as a corrective to the confinements placed on marginalised groups by institutions and social norms, DFID should consider supporting work designed to increase the voice and opportunities for these groups such as research and advocacy. Importantly, the assessment found that a future programme will need to approach gender from the perspective of inclusion and exclusion broadly speaking, rather than focusing on women’s needs alone. There are two main reasons for this. Evidence suggests that the capacity to demand accountability is generally limited in Somalia at present, and that women are just one of several categories who are particularly disadvantaged in this respect. In particular, the lack of attention to the problems faced by young men is damaging, both to the young men themselves and to the wider community. Much as change in gender relations may be seen as necessary, findings from other countries indicate that the nature of the discourse promoted by the international community is often counter productive, and that normative gender frameworks may easily be understood as being either incomprehensible or inappropriate, triggering strong negative reactions. Some respondents suggested that this is the case in Somalia and that incorporating gender into DFID’s interventions implies the need for interventions to be sensitive to the context and locally initiated and carefully tailored wherever possible. Strand 3: Developing fairer institutions Unless institutions offer people opportunities to access resources, voice concerns and obtain redress, accountability remains a fairly abstract concept. Interventions that help develop fairer institutions include challenging and reforming laws, norms and practices that are prejudicial to women and the marginalised, restrict information or inhibit political representation. In Somalia these actions should clearly target both state and non- state institutions. In addition we must recognise the imperative for institutional development as well as reform since government capacities and organisation are often lacking.
1 The term “collaborative leadership” and “transformative leadership” describe leadership styles designed to break down traditional boundaries and solve non-traditional problems, usually through collaboration between state and non-state sectors. The terms are now commonly found in management studies. Why the World Needs Tri-Sector Leaders, Nick Lovegrove and Matthew Thomas, Harvard Business Review Blog, February 13, 2013, http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/02/why_the_world_needs_tri-sector.html. See also UNDP Kenya’s attempts to use training on collaborative leadership to bridge divides among Kenya’s political elite: Collaborative Leadership Training Project, http://www.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/operations/projects/peacebuilding/Collaborative/.
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Coordinate with existing institutional reform programmes to integrate accountability With the possible exception of parliamentary work, it would be unwise for DFID’s new accountability programme to embark on significant institutional reform efforts for no other reason than there are already established governance programmes in Somalia. It is also true however that these programmes do not focus on accountability. A good starting point for DFID would be to engage in dialogue with actors working on public sector reform, principally UN agencies, to ensure that on-going and future PSR programmes take accountability seriously and tackle it systematically as an internal and an external issue. Internal steps could include establishing sound human resources, planning systems, payrolls, clear job descriptions and departmental mandates and budgetary management systems. Externally-focused measures would create systems designed to gauge and respond appropriately to public demand whether through departmental research, policy outreach sessions, grievance redress mechanisms or, reporting capacities. Systems must be complemented by recruitment and training for staff who are outward looking and are incentivised to think and work in this way. As emphasised earlier, these reforms should consider carefully how to create open access networks which provide public officials with sufficient autonomy to operate without undue influence from non-state actors (e.g. clan mobilisers or wealthy business people) and without losing all accessibility. Similar needs exist in Somalia’s nascent security and justice institutions where DFID can again engage in dialogue with the UN but also seek to influence HMG and wider donor support to the sector. Development plans agreed at the London conference are a useful reference point but should not be allowed to detract from sub- national initiatives and on-the-ground opportunities whether in the form of police-community liaison groups or civil society oversight bodies. Promote downward accountability through public expenditure management While Public Financial Management is now being emphasised by international actors with a strong upward accountability demand, DFID should investigate whether public finance bodies at federal and sub-national level can increase their downward accountability through better public expenditure management. In order to succeed any new system would need to be fit for their local context and have institutional champions as well as a programmatic home. They would also need to err on the side of the political rather than the technical – applying lessons, concerning incentives and informal decision-making networks, and seeking to build open access networks, for example through participatory budget monitoring. DFID could begin consultations with current public sector reform implementers to identify tried and tested initiatives, potentially following up with targeted research and piloting. Support Parliamentary as a forum for collective action A third area to invest in is parliamentary support, reflecting the high potential for Somalia’s parliaments as oversight and debate forums which derives from their collective (i.e. cross-clan, cross-factional) nature. Relevant measures at this time could include identification of positive change agents, developing constituency outreach programmes, and boosting skills and systems for research, public hearings, ministerial questioning and the operation of relevant committees such as finance and security committees. Parliamentary strategies under development within different legislatures as well as the support programmes proposed by AWEPA, NDI and UNDP provide an entry-point for these discussions. Strand 4: Creating an enabling environment Engage with religious leaders, private sector actors and CSOs Measures often used to create a more enabling environment for accountability to function are transparency initiatives targeting governments, CSOs, the private sector and donors. In the case of Somalia DFID should certainly consider engaging the private sector and religious actors in accountability promotion. These are two of the country’s most trusted institutions which sometimes guide and sometimes unduly penetrate public sector decision- making. Engaging key members of the religious community in accountability promotion could help to guide the communication of accountability at the grass roots and support and enabling environment for discussion and debate within a locally owned space such as the mosque. The private sector, which is largely unregulated, partly due to effective lobbying, has further potential for Corporate Social Responsibility actions and if combined with other actors, may push public sector accountability in some areas. DFID could use a mainstreaming approach given the existing engagement
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in private sector development in which questions such as taxation, transparency and reporting feed into programmes. CSOs and media organisations also require professionalisation and regulation whether through instruments such as currently proposed NGO and media laws, or through codes of conduct, trainings and sector development strategies. Provided the measures adopted are appropriate and not used for coercive reasons, DFID could support regulation in these areas as a way to set operating and transparency standards and clarify where good and bad practice, including corruption, ends. DFID inputs and decision-making in this area would benefit from engagement with forums such as the Somalia Media Support Group under UNESCO auspices and the NGO Consortium for Somalia. Support trust-building and dialogue Bearing in mind the research findings on social fragmentation, mistrust and conflict and their detrimental effect on collective action and corruption, we recommend DFID support trust-building and dialogue efforts. Somalia requires drawn-out political and social reconciliation efforts at multiple levels before a stable and accountable government can emerge. DFID’s accountability programme cannot deliver on this huge task, though it should bring its influencing capacity to bear on others to this end where possible. Through stand-alone programming however it may be able to support local dialogue (e.g. “community conversations”) or foster national debates on some of the key questions facing Somalia including rights, citizenship, accountability, anti-corruption, or federalism, all of which have a strong bearing on accountability. In part this is a form of civic education, but if delivered in a discursive format suited to the social context in which vigorous debate over practical matters is facilitated it will be better received than top-down or abstract messaging. Correctly moderated and voiced through the right channels and agents (e.g. FM radio, religious leaders and CSO networks) dialogue and debates might support and inform other forms of programming. Strand 5: Reflection and analysis The key challenge for accountability programming in Somalia is to understand how external interventions can help address blockages to progressive collective action. Given the complex picture of accountability, corruption and impunity depicted in this report, where much has been tried but too little is still known,2 we recommend that DFID establish a separate strand of work around reflection and analysis. We recommend a number of complementary approaches. Support academic institutions and think tanks to improve research and teaching capabilities Supporting Somali academic institutions and think-tanks to re-build their own research and teaching capacities to help support the evidence base for aid programmes. It may also provide a normative correction, allowing Somalis to study us and study their own accountability challenges and the influences of outside actors with less bias towards informing donor-funded programmes and more focus on increasing understanding of the issues within Somalia, including in policy circles and among civil society. DFID should consider a range of options to support these capacities including scholarships, university twinning, and support to develop master degree programmes and short courses in social sciences, politics, anthropology and governance-related topics. Support short-term, policy and operational research Support short-term, policy and operational research which universities or think-tanks might produce with the right support. An effective, smart and locally relevant DFID accountability programme will require a range of research inputs, from baseline studies to piloting exercises, public opinion polls tracking the perceived integrity of institutions, focus groups to validate programme designs, stakeholder mappings, political economy analyses of government institutions and business networks. Researching further the constraints, enabling factors and opportunities for accountability programming, to test hypotheses and emerging theories of change and thereby ground future work. If properly linked to other strands of work (e.g. dialogues, media and civil society and parliamentary reform) a research strand could inform real-time programming. The knowledge generated in this way needs appropriate management and information-sharing, perhaps through a data “hub” linked to academic or parliamentary organisations. This would help to plug information gaps such as those identified in this report (see annex on past and present initiatives).
2 See also Chapter 9 of this report on past and present initiatives which show the range of previous accountability-related interventions supported by international actors, often without reference to a clear evidence base.
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DFID should also consider how best to address the often well-founded Somali perceptions of low accountability among international actors intervening in Somalia within its programme. Due attention to these questions in research is one option. A more self-reflective approach would involve establishing an advisory group with significant Somali input to guide DFID’s thinking on accountability and validate emerging findings. Any such a group would need careful planning to avoid perceptions of bias or conflict of interest. Table 1: Overview of recommended programme components by sector
Accountability Participation and Fairer Institutions Enabling Reflection & Resources Engagement Environment Analysis
Stand alone Support for Support Support Support local Support for programming increased quality successful civil parliamentary dialogues and academic and and quantity of society / NSA support national policy- information. networking programmes. debates on research particularly accountability- capacity. Pilot ICT tools in amongst youth related issues. programming. Undertake an and women’s Engage in-depth Support research organisations. members of the studies and on public policy Support civil religious research issues (through society community in programme think tanks dialogue accountability framed around universities and processes (in promotion. constraints, the media). coordination enabling Support Support the with the EU), factors and Corporate development of opportunities Support Social media/ academic for successful Responsibility professionalisatio accountability community actions n and programming, based including EITI. development testing development initiatives. Support hypotheses programmes profesionalisati and building Support civic that foster on and evidence for education collective regulation of theories of programmes. decision CSOs and the change. making. media. Establish an Support advisory group interaction with significant between NSAs Somali input to and state for guide DFID’s collective thinking on action (e.g. accountability. collaborative leadership approaches) Approach gender from the perspective of inclusion and exclusion broadly speaking.
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Accountability Participation and Fairer Institutions Enabling Reflection & Resources Engagement Environment Analysis
Mainstreamed Mainstream Build more Engage in Mainstream programming accountability focused dialogue with accountability into current accountability actors working into existing education sector activities into on public sector engagement on initiatives, e.g. existing reform private sector those led by governance (including public development. DANIDA, the EU programmes. financial and UNICEF. management) Integrate and security accountability sector reform to through a mainstream cross-sectoral accountability. approach.
Influencing Enhance political dialogue on downward accountability including through a like-minded donor and working group. with others Promote enhanced coordination of actors working on accountability-related interventions, particularly “demand side” interventions.
10.3 Programme modalities This section considers a issues around implementation: targets and partners, profiling, defining results, duration and funding modalities. Targets and partners In taking forward its new accountability programme DFID should try to build a broad support base. A range of potential allies are on offer but will require engagement so that a like-minded core group can gradually build for increased leverage. Identifying and mobilising champions of downward accountability (to Somali citizens) as opposed to upward accountability (to external actors) is key. Champions will exist in-country within and outside governments, within Somali civil society and INGOs, in the private sector and among religious leaders. To influence others as well as to implement programming effectively DFID should seek to build an ever broader and deeper support base for its efforts among these groups over time. Within international circles opportunities such as the new donor governance group could develop a shared agenda with like-minded donors. DFID should also play a role in developing coordination and understanding among INGOs. Within the UN obvious partners or targets for influencing include the new UNSOM mission (e.g. human rights cell), the RC’s Risk Management Office and UNDP. Within Somalia and among Somalis an important test will be whether DFID is impartial between regions and social groups and accountable for its own actions. Programming should be visible in different regions, at different levels, and should strive to build links between the state and non-state actors. Guiding questions could assist in the principled selection of partners and interventions, see the box below:
Box 22: Questions to guide principled selection of partners and interventions
Is the intervention tailored sufficiently to the local context, based on a sound conflict/political economy analysis?
Does the intervention tackle known constraints, boost enabling factors, or take opportunities to increase accountability?
Does the intervention respond to a known collective action problem or will it be designed and implemented with a detailed analysis for actors experiencing such a problem?
Does the intervention benefit from lessons learnt in past accountability programming in Somalia?
Are those proposing the intervention credible (i.e. accountable) interveners in the eyes of Somalis?
How will the intervention practice and demonstrate downwards accountability to beneficiaries? What mechanisms are proposed for transparency, two-way communication and grievance redress?
How will the intervention identify, track and mitigate risks both to itself and to partners and beneficiaries?
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Profiling A new accountability programme should carve out a clear and distinct identity. In some respects this is not difficult, for while the language of accountability does appear in donor discourse on Somalia, the language of state-building and anti-corruption is arguably stronger. There are a number of confusions or biased perceptions to avoid. Firstly, too close an association with debates on humanitarian accountability and by extension aid diversion. Secondly, too close an association with flagship donor initiatives for upward accountability on aid flows (PFM etc.) which would weaken the message of an overriding concern with downwards accountability to Somalis, potentially of both international actors and Somali leaders. Lastly, there are suggestions from this research that Somalis occasionally interpret the questioning of international actors on accountability issues as insulting, tokenistic or hypocritical. For all the above reasons the programme should use language of “downward accountability”, “accountability for Somali citizens”, and “trust and accountability”. It would be astute to explore the use of Somali-language and Islamic- derived phrases during the programme design phase as part of an overall communications strategy. Defining and measuring results Given the complex and fluid operating context and the limited evidence base for accountability programming locally and internationally, we recommend that DFID avoid committing to too many specific deliverables in initial business case. It would be more appropriate for the first phase of the new programme to focus on testing different approaches, learning what works and developing an evidence base for theories of change. The proposed research strand can contribute here. Duration In order to allow time for programme design followed by a period of learning and experimentation we recommend a minimum 4 year programme with an initial 6-9 month inception phase. Funding modalities DFID should consider a number of funding options. This could include opening different “windows” for support under the programme strands; issuing an initial design contract; contracting both design and implementation to a single contractor; using a grants-based mechanism; or requiring formation of a consortium of agencies with different skill-sets. Alternatively we also recommend combining options. Whichever approach DFID opts for, four considerations should be paramount. The chosen funding arrangement should be designed with the “do no harm” principle in mind, recognising that large amounts of funding when allocated or spent badly could easily damage already weak civil society networks and accountability relationships. This issue alone should influence DFID to consider managing several smaller, iterative funding arrangements as opposed to one or two larger disbursements. Given the complexity and sensitivity of Somalia, implementers should demonstrate a proven track record in-country, or the ability to access such knowledge through close partnerships. Implementers should possess key skills in programme strand areas whether they engaged either as a consortium or individually. Among the most critical skills will be those in academic and policy research, civil society capacity building, advocacy support and media development. DFID’s chosen implementation modality should be flexible and able to respond to real-time opportunities as they emerge, for example using rapid response funds or in-country field staff tasked with identifying collective action opportunities and mobilising local support. Value for money considerations Somalia presents a unique, challenging context and environment and this has implications for Value for Money (VfM) considerations. VFM is an evaluation criteria endorsed not only by DFID but by the wider donor community. The approach is very clear in that it does not necessarily demand a lower cost (though economies are part of an overall VFM assessment), rather it seeks to ensure that “value” produced is commensurate with money spent. It is not just about economic savings; it is more a framework for considering how money is spent and based on the three “E’s”: economic, efficiency and effectiveness. Increasingly a fourth, “E” equity, is a core dimension of humanitarian and development interventions. It reflects concerns about the distribution of funding benefits and the inequitable division of resources within beneficiary communities. VFM is high when there is an optimum balance between all three elements. It is in the context of effectiveness that the quality of the original programme logical framework and its underlying theory of change are particularly important.
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It should be noted that fragile and conflict affected states such as Somalia where the potential benefits (economic, social etc.) of achieving progress towards peace and stabilisations are likely to be significant and where the costs of operating in a complex environment, including reaching hard to access groups, are high, there is often a justification for relatively high levels of investment. The following table outlines the key VfM considerations for a Somali demand side intervention programme. Table 2: VfM considerations for a Somali demand side intervention programme
VfM Dimension Considerations for the Somali context
All dimensions of Somalia presents a unique, challenging context and environment. Fast learning, VFM adjustment and programme adaptation will be required. Avoid committing to too many specific deliverables in the initial business case. It would be more appropriate for the first phase of the new programme to focus on testing different approaches, learning what works and developing an evidence base for theories of change. The proposed research strand can contribute here. Programme design to include tools such as rapid action research, monitoring processes, real time evaluation, programme learning and adjustment; regular “learn and share” meetings / exchanges between like-minded governance projects, mini-pilots, etc. Thoughtful, but appropriate, M&E design from the start that integrates a focus on the balance between the four “Es”. Baselines should capture few, but important indicators. Include longitudinal tracking surveys on perceptions of accountability, most significant change (to capture unexpected outcomes), and specific behaviour changes (linked to theory of change). Link all technical assistance to effectiveness and return on investment and should be conducted in-country (rather than Nairobi) where security allows.
Economy Managing security will involve higher expenditure. However VfM should play a role in security provision considerations, by ensuring a balance between economy and effectiveness. This include ensuring security provision is as low profile as possible given the context. Costs of expatriate deployment are high due to security provisions. Therefore there should be an emphasis on using reliable national and regional staff and consultants. There are a number of well-established reliable research organisations that can be used as part of establishment and oversight mechanisms. Reaching the needs of the most poor and vulnerable will cost more to achieve, however this is justified by the value placed on reaching this group. High risk of aid itself becoming a corrupt “resource rent”. Baselines to support estimates of unit costs per beneficiary (however defined).
Efficiency Make estimates of costs on inputs: outputs for all interventions – and consider alternative options - often the answer will be unknown, but the process of considering choices will itself
improve efficiency. Focus on cross-learning between Somalis – across society – rather than interventions lead by outsiders (expat, diaspora Somali). One option: a geographic rolling approach. Introduce “good governance and accountability” in one context, and then use that example to teach other communities and groups, through personal meetings (i.e. maximise leverage, and reduce costs per person / community reached). Invest in multiple communication channels, but keep them “Somali owned”. The plethora of donor funded activities risks duplication, perverse outcomes – DFID to support and invest in efforts to ensure donor and NGO coordination and cross-learning. Focus should be on supporting, influencing collaborating and coordinating with existing
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programmes with existing interventions, and scaling up existing successful programmes, collaboration and coordination. A focus on output and milestone based contracts.
Effectiveness There are risks that by working in complex and insecure situations it will not lead to measurable results. This should not discourage innovation programing that provides access to improved governance mechanism for populations outside of secure geographical areas.
Equity Overt focus on women’s rights, or issues like FGM, may trigger “anti-western” backlash against perceived challenges to social norms. Focus therefore on broad inclusiveness (across clans, gender, age, ability, wealth ranking).
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11 Annex A: Zonal Report – Somaliland
11.1 Overview In May 1991, after the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre, the northern third of Somalia seceded and established a capital in Hargeisa. Somaliland now has a functioning political system and its own currency but is yet to gain international recognition as an independent country.1 In 1993, a meeting of Somaliland’s clans at Borama approved a transitional charter.2 Another conference in 1997 established a provisional constitution.3 Somaliland has enjoyed relative stability for several years and this has permitted the establishment of formal institutions for representation, governance and service provision. These are now at varying stages of developing policies, laws and mechanisms to ensure regulation and oversight. Some initiatives have the potential to be models. However, developments in accountability require the following conditions (amongst others), to be in place: Functioning state bureaucratic machinery Increased awareness of civic rights and increased access to information by the public Clearer harmonisation between formal and informal institutions Citizen empowerment and the reduction of structural inequalities Conducting interventions in a transparent and consultative fashion with the local population will enhance the international community’s capacity to support accountability initiatives and their legitimacy. Interviews for this study took place in April and May 2013 in Nairobi and Hargeisa.4 Given the short time available to collect information, all information and suggestions contained here need to be verified and discussed further with appropriate stakeholders. In particular, local and regional perspectives appear significant but were largely lacking from our interviews. A list of persons interviewed is appended.
11.2 Context Political context Somaliland’s political context is one of gradual statebuilding and more recently democratisation against a backdrop of civil war and chaos in the south in the midst of a clan-based, pastoral society. The polity has been through several phases. Clan-based negotiations produced stability following the Somali National Movement (SNM) victory in 1991 when the clans agreed to establish a weak central state and hold it to account, reifying this arrangement in the Gurti. The next phase was state consolidation through introduction of basic taxation and the extension of central government presence at the expense of clan power (under Egal and Riyale). Recently, a democratisation experiment based on one-person one vote has been underway, now extending to district council elections. This appears an impressive achievement but is also fraught with difficulties, conflict and unconstitutional delays by those wielding executive power. The international community has played an important broker role and kept the experiment broadly on track up until now. Behind this success are a number of factors including relative homogeneity of clans and lifestyle; strong incentives among the livestock exporters for stability (see De Waal publication), and the cultivation of a Somaliland national identity molded during the experience of civil war and through opposition to the chaotic south following colonial era boundaries. However, the overall political settlement is imperfect with eastern clans such as the Dulbahante having been co-opted or coerced into the state with only limited success. Tensions also exist inside the polity among sub-clans that vie for prominence such as Sa’ad Muse, Habar Je’lo and Habar Awal.
1 BBC (last updated 2013). Somalia profile. BBC News. Available at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503 2Walls, supra note 51, at 382–84 (2009); Time for A.U. Leadership,supra note 51, at 6. 3Time for A.U. Leadership,supra note 51, at 6. 4 A total of four days were spent in Hargeisa by two members of the consultancy team. In addition, the Hargeisa-based research organisation SORADI carried out additional interviews in Hargeisa, Boroma and Sheikh.
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With Somaliland’s decision not to attend the London conference in May 2013, federation is currently a high profile issue. The general view among respondents was that federation is not an option. Mohamed Omar, foreign minister of Somaliland recently stated that, “the days when Somalia could be governed from the centre are over… anyone who brings them back will not bring peace”.5 However, while some groups are uncompromising, others see some concession to federation as being a realpolitik that Somaliland will eventually have to adopt. A small group welcomes federation because Somaliland’s domination by one clan presents a risk, which can be offset by closer integration with the clan system as a whole. Government Parliamentarians have a key role in developing the legislative framework for accountability. Elected in 2005, the current lower chamber (a directly elected House of Representatives) has 82 seats including one female member. Although only meant to serve a five year term,6 new elections due in 2013 were postponed until 2015 (2016 for the upper chamber), in order to coincide with the presidential election and purportedly to save costs. There are three national political parties represented in the lower house. Parties field candidates, who are elected through a free vote. Clan support for these parties largely determines how people vote, but this is not fixed and clans can change their party allegiance. The Guurti (upper house) must agree all legislation proposed by the lower house. The Guurti consists of 827 nominated members, mainly clan elders,8 all of whom are male. They are under the tutelage of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), which pays them a stipend. There is notionally decentralised governance in which local district councils deliver (and have autonomy of), key services such as health, education, and water and sanitation. A new national policy on decentralisation is under development. The politics of resource competition between central government ministries and districts is very real and meaningful decentralisation has been a struggle in many areas. It is argued that the legitimacy and power of traditional authorities involved in government work has declined within their constituencies as the government has taken over, and increasingly controlled, these authorities. The outcome is a "crippled hybrid"9 in which neither state nor traditional institutions function well and both negatively influence the other. The roles and boundaries between the traditional and state authorities were commented on by interviewees:
“The hybrid form of governance causes confusion. We need clarity to make it work”. Religious leader, Somaliland.
“The government has corrupted traditional and religious leaders. They (traditional and religious leaders), have seen a profit in giving the government support. Now they have lost their effectiveness and integrity and interacting with the government has not made them more accountable to their own people”. Academic interviewee.
The results from the interviews showed that elections were seen as the most effective method for holding leaders to account. Elections were also regularly given as an example of where Somali citizens have come together to achieve change. An interviewee in Hargeisa noted “it is difficult to hold leaders to account in Somaliland but we have elections. Citizens understand that they can replace inefficient or corrupt officials using this method”. The institutionalisation of elections has provided a regular and clear form of transparency, although the process of elections was also seen as being distorted by clan-politics. The most recent municipal elections were in November 2012. Local councils have not yet been established in all districts. The November elections were monitored extensively by local and international civil society (CS) organisations, including social media linked to the Ushahidi platform.10 As noted by Saferworld, the effective use of an Electoral Code of Conduct, ensuring political parties, as well as other actors, operated within the law and a maturing civil society (evidenced by the presence of domestic observers from SONSAF at almost 60 per cent of polling stations), helped to support the electoral process.11 In spite of these measures, there was civic unrest in which three people were killed. The electoral commission also
5The Economist (2013).The centre holds, but only just. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21577437-new- government-mogadishu-has-yet-prove-its-mettle-centre-holds 6Human Rights Watch (2009).Hostages to Peace. Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland 7 See Article 60: The Membership of the House of Elders in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND (last updated 2005). Available at: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Constitution/art40somaliland_constitution.htm 8 The Guurti also includes some senior statesmen such as past presidents. 9Hoehne, M V (2013) Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2013, Vol 7, No. 2 10 Ushahidi is a Kenya-based company specialising in developing free and open source software worldwide for information collection, visualization and interactive mapping (http://www.ushahidi.com accessed 10th May 2013). 11Saferworld (2013). Somalilanders speak. Lessons from the November 2012 local elections. pp ii
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announced a recount of the votes from Hargeisa after violent protests broke out.12 Dr. Steve Kibble, head of the London-based NGO Progressio, led the International Election Observers mission in Somaliland. He commented that the election process is very much clan-driven and that there were concerns regarding the casting of multiple votes due to a lack of effective voter registration.13 Seven political parties (three operating nationally) conduct residential, legislative and municipal elections. Parties function largely along clan lines, though clan allegiances may shift from one party to another. Parties adopt candidates, whom the population selects through a free vote. Elected representatives do not have a specific group of people to whom they are answerable because constituencies are not lineated. Members of parliament tend to spend their time in Hargeisa and have little direct connection with the electorate. The National Development Plan 2012 – 2016 sets out goals for different sectors: its focus is on sustainable development and poverty reduction. Ministries are also in the process of developing policies, systems and procedures, all of which have been virtually non-existent until recently. Under the Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, proposals to coordinate development aid through sectoral working groups are underway. There is wide agreement that this should improve coordination and, in turn, accountability. At present there are multiple coordination and planning channels among the government, donors, INGOs and the UN including many bilateral relationships that inhibit information sharing and public scrutiny. Bureaucratic functions such as management accounting systems and state employee payrolls are still to be put in place. A new Police Act is currently (as of May 2013) going through parliament. The clan system and its links with government
The close linkage between national and local government and the clan system is both “Citizens are primarily an asset and a disadvantage as far as accountability is concerned. The current accountable to their clan arrangements provide an agreed number of parliamentary seats to clans in line with elder not the state, peace agreements brokered after the internal 1996-7 war, referred to as the ‘4.5 whatever the constitution formula’.14 The presence of clan elders in the legislature ensures the representation of may say. In the Somali the electorate that underpins political stability.15 However, this representation may context clan replaces the preclude accountability to the broader population, since the interests of some social geographical constituency categories (essentially women, youth and minority clans) are not represented on a par and government hear their constituents through active with those of adult men. At one level, accountability is about delivering policy outcomes mobilisers of the clan. A as much as about social cohesion, and this may require a shift of mindset amongst both minister's primary mandate suppliers and demanders. Some consider the clans as the bedrock of Somaliland’s is to win his/her clan to democracy, and others as an outmoded institution that impedes democratic support his government”. accountability and cannot deliver the country’s needs. Yet others see them as a positive Interviewee, Hargeisa, force that needs tweaking in order to adapt to current realities. Somaliland. Interviewees perceived the clans to play positive and negative roles concerning accountability. Many of the female respondents commented that the clan provides “cohesion” and “social insurance”. More broadly, many respondents perceive the clan as a primary power structure that can undermine the capacity and accountability of other power structures. An INGO interviewee stated, “Clan is number one in our life, so when we are dealing with Westerners we use the word democracy to get acceptance but it isn’t working for us. Elections, political parties are just consumption for outsiders. Inside us we are 100 per cent tribe mentality”, Religious leader, Hargeisa. The separation of the clan from government is considered “a reality”. Traditional and religious leaders, the elderly and those with a strong reputation or educational attainment were viewed by interviewees as being the most able to present their demands to power holders. The economic context Somaliland has an essentially free market, pastoralist-based economy, in which the main trade is in camels and other livestock exported to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf16and in qat from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia. The authorities
12Verified Voting (2012).Somaliland: After Deadly Protests, Somaliland Electoral Commission Reviews Results 13DeCapua, Joe (2012). Election Observers Readying Report on Somaliland. Voice of America. 14 Available at: http://www.c-r.org/sites/c- r.org/files/Accord%2021_17Order%20out%20of%20chaos_Somali%20customary%20law_2010_ENG.pdf 15 The Presidency is currently held by an Isaaq candidate with popular expectation that other centres of power such as the Chairmanship of the Guurti should go to rivals for fear of a return to overwhelming Isaaq dominance of the state. 16UNPO (2008).Somaliland. Available at: http://www.unpo.org/members/7916
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have dissolved existing monopolies, done away with rigid economic controls, and pursued a deregulated free market economy in which the private business sector has thrived.17 The private sector is the principal provider of a range of services, especially in water, finance, communications and transport. Struggles to control piracy in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and the lack of an institutional framework for management of oil exploration and exploitation compound clan interests in the East of Somaliland. Women have an active economic role and contribute more than 60 per cent of the national income, including through taxes.18 Women’s main economic opportunities tend to be in the informal sector: their businesses range from petty trade to currency speculation and long-distance commerce. Islamic law provides women with inheritance and economic rights, though not on an equal basis with men. However, customary law and practice relating to women’s property, especially with regard to inheritance rights, is less favourable. An economic sector that was notable by its absence in interviews in Somaliland is the oil sector. The Somaliland government has signed exploration agreements with London-listed Company Ophir Energy, Asante Oil, Prime Resources, and Scott Spencer.19 According to Osman Salad Hersi, an associate geology professor at the University of Regina in Canada, “the country, Somalia, including Somaliland, can potentially be the Saudi Arabia of East Africa”.20 As well as offering economic benefits to Somaliland, oil also has the potential to bring increased instability. Potential drivers of instability include environmental and social impacts, in-migration, dispossession through land speculation and an absence of transparency, dialogue and consensus-building by the Somaliland Government and the oil companies. One of the recent production sharing agreements covers an area located in Sool province. “Although DNO [a Norwegian oil and gas company] is a small oil company that is familiar with operating in high risk areas, Block SL18 is not only a high risk area but also lies in a conflict zone” emphasises Mahdi.21 An accountability programme in Somaliland would need to undertake pre-emptive action in order to access potential conflicts around the oil regions in order to attempt to build strong state-society and strong industry-society relations. Accountability could arguably be viewed as a key peacebuilding strategy, and in this light, one that is coming to the fore none too soon. According to the World Bank, the necessity of the establishment of national and local transparent and accountable revenue and expenditure mechanisms is crucial. The regulation of natural resource allocation and the corporate exploitation of natural resources is a constructive way of building both capacities and confidence in shared institutions that generate revenues of public goods provision.22 International aid International donors include EU, DFID, DANIDA, UNHABITAT, UNDP, UNDP, UNIFEM, Sweden, Turkey, China, and the Gulf States. Turkish assistance is on the one hand, well received since its nationals have more opportunity to integrate, while on the other, they are seen by some interviewees as ‘not 100 per cent Muslim’ and having the same hidden agendas as other internationals are perceived as having. The international community in general (particularity the UN agencies), is the object of much antipathy, because of the divergence between announced budgets and actual in-country spend, and a perceived habit of implementing externally designed programmes and remaining distant from the population they are supposed to be serving. There is increasing interest among the intelligentsia in developing a Somaliland approach to the issue of aid effectiveness. Respondents consistently identified the Ministry of National Planning and Development as the strongest Ministry in Somaliland, with an effective, dedicated and driven Minister in place. INGOs now have to submit their annual budget and project proposal to the Ministry of Planning, before reporting on how this money was spent at the end of the year as part of a recent agreement.23 The mechanism will increase visibility of project funding to the
17Mesfin, Berouk (2009)The political development of Somaliland and its conflict with Puntland. Institute for Security Studies 18Nagaad Umbrella (2010) ‘Women’s economic and property rights and the factors that influence small women-owned businesses: research study’. 19 Baldauf, Scott (2012).Drill for oil in Somalia? Why not, says Australian firm. Christian Science Monitor. Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Keep-Calm/2012/0430/Drill-for-oil-in-Somalia-Why-not-says-Australian-firm 20Hacaoglu , Selcan (2013) TONY HAWYARD’S GENEL MAY FIND OIL IN SOMALILAND, MINISTER SAYS. Bloomberg. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-13/tony-hawyard-s-genel-may-find-oil-in-somaliland-minister-says.html. 21 Ali, Mahdi (2013). Oil Geopolitics in the Horn of Africa: Somaliland DNO Oil Deal Adds Fuel to the Conflict in North Somalia. Global Research. Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/oil-geopolitics-in-the-horn-africa-somaliland-dno-oil-deal-adds-fuel-to-the-conflict-in-north- somalia/5332717 22 World Bank (2013), Drivers of Conflict, Fragility and Resilience, Somalia 23 The agreement between the Government of Somaliland as represented by the Ministry of National Planning and Development and development and international non-governmental organisations.
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government and support the upward accountability of INGOs. The Ministry of Planning was widely viewed by respondents as a key mechanism for ensuring the accountability and transparency of the international community. A perceived lack of donor (and previous government) support to eastern regions of Somaliland (with Sanaag and Sool24 specifically mentioned) was also noted in the interviews. For Marleen Renders and Ulf Terlinden,25 the undecided status of the eastern part of the region between Puntland and Somaliland on the one hand, and the status of Somaliland versus Somalia, on the other, heavily affects politics and institution building in Sanaag. A stakeholder mapping survey to identify the international and national agencies operating in the Eastern region would enable an analysis to of the current programmes in the region and support further discussions around the challenges facing agencies in the area including Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Both Sanaag and Sool are considered hotspots for youth disillusionment26 and despair due to a lack of economic and social opportunities. The judicial system Three judicial systems operate in parallel: shari’a, secular law (colonial laws of Britain and Italy merged during the previous federation) and customary laws.27 Religious authorities, lawyers, and elders practice these systems with some judgments overlapping across two or even three of the systems. As noted by Thorne,28 the informal mechanisms complement existing formal ones with traditional law playing a dominant role in relations within and between groups, of which the latter are collectively accountable for the actions of one of its members.29 Individuals with a grievance choose which system they wish to adopt, and can switch mid-process. Whilst a large number of interviewees commented that there is a good fit between the traditional and the formal judiciary, further questions should be asked around case resolution and satisfaction around the outcome. Key questions relate to how these decisions work in practice and whether the outcome provides justice for the clan or individual. Customary law is dominant and embodies a strong emphasis on community reconciliation rather than individual rights. The most contentious legal issues appear to be women’s rights, sexual and domestic violence, and land conflict. The lack of a coherent regulatory framework for land and property rights, and a lack of basic information about land holdings and tenure systems complicate land conflict. For women, decisions about which legal route to pursue in sexual violence cases is highly problematic, as customary law provides community acceptance but may also lead to forced marriage and other abusive situations. Statutory law has the potential to offer greater personal satisfaction to the victim but can be more time consuming and costly. The statutory system is open to corruption through the intimidation or bribing of plaintiffs, and to pressures from the clan to revert the case to the Xeer system. Interviewees suggested that the choice for a woman may depend in part on the degree of power her clan or sub- clan elders wield. Women from minority clans appear to be the ones most likely to seek redress through the courts. Positive developments include the work of the Women Lawyers Association, that was said to be active and effective, and women prosecutors. UNDP is working with Somali authorities to expand access to justice. This includes improving the skills of the legislative and executive to formulate policies and draft laws in line with the government’s reform agenda. UNDP have been engaged in this area since around 2000. Over the past five years, interviewees said that there had been visible improvements. Examples included an assessment of staff capacity in the judiciary system, which revealed a very low percentage of qualified judges and prosecutors. This led to a training programme and financing for law scholarships. Over 60 female lawyers who were graduates of the scholarship programme were providing legal
24Of particular note is the Dhulbahante (a sub-clan of the Darod clan) in Sool who have formed an organisation to resist the authority of the Somaliland Government. 25Marleen and Ulf, Terlinden (2011). Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order:The Case of Somaliland Development and Change 41(4): 723–746 (2010). Pp741. 26 An expanding youth population presents a range of social, economic, political and security challenges as noted by Bradbury, Mark (2011) Securing the peace in Somaliland: a summary and contextual analysis Nairobi, Rift Valley Institute; Ibrahim, Mohamed Hassan (2011) Securing the peace in Somaliland – a barren peace? Excluded youth in Somaliland Nairobi, Rift Valley Institute. 27 Somali customary law, known as xeer, comprises a set of unwritten conventions and procedures that are passed down orally through generations. These define reciprocal rights and obligations between kin and clans, covering domestic matters, social welfare, political relations, property rights and the management of natural resources.See Abdurahman A. Osman ‘Shuke’ (2010). Order out of chaos.Somali customary law in Puntland and Somaliland.Accord 21/17.Available at: http://www.c-r.org/sites/c- r.org/files/Accord%2021_17Order%20out%20of%20chaos_Somali%20customary%20law_2010_ENG.pdf 28Thorne, Kristina (2005). Rule of Law through imperfect bodies? The informal justice systems of Burundi and Somalia. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Available at: http://www.peace-justice conference.info/download/WS6%20Rule%20of%20Law%20through%20imperfect%20bodies- Thorne.pdf 29World Bank (2013), Drivers of Conflict, Fragility and Resilience, Somalia, Draft Literature Review, World Bank
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services in Somaliland as of January 2013.30 The UNDP Evaluation Office found that the creation of mobile courts and legal aid clinics has produced positive results in Somaliland, particularly with regards to improving the outreach of the judicial system to rural areas.31 UNDP are also providing legal aid free-of-charge to the vulnerable and the poor. As reported by Thorne,32 the traditional justice mechanisms in existence are also badly equipped to deal with modern and urban problems. This results from: the impossibility of clan elders knowing the undertakings of all parties in an urban environment; new challenges related to commercial activities that are unfamiliar and do not have a history of precedent; a blurring on the defining lines between clans; and a lack of traditional authority in urban settings due to the higher opportunities for the population to seek out alternative justice mechanisms available to them. The state system remains heavily biased towards urban areas which limits its geographical outreach. This creates a divide between rural populations, who may not have alternatives to traditional justice mechanisms, and urban populations who can seek redress through statutory law. The social and cultural context Clan elders mediate conflict at domestic and local levels, based on their knowledge of precedent and on their commitment to Somali values. Everyone has accountabilities within and to the clan. The clan reciprocates by offering its members physical and economic security (although these benefits are unequally distributed). The clan is also intimately connected with political decision-making and with the business world. Many respondents see this as not only an undeniable reality but also a positive asset, a bulwark against division and insecurity. On the other hand, there are also those who see it as a negative force which constrains objective decision-making and which Somaliland needs to put behind it if it is to progress. Some respondents made the point that the clan acts as insurance to its members who are politicians, with the result that they feel themselves immune to criticism. The fact that sub-clans take responsibility for paying compensation if one of their numbers kills or rapes a member of another detracts from the individual’s sense of accountability for his own actions. Furthermore, many people are reluctant to criticize politicians publicly for fear of upsetting power balances between clans and precipitating conflict. An interviewee in Hargeisa stated, “Electoral processes have led to free political debate on issues in a way that normal social and political processes do not. In everyday life debate can be a bit muted because people do not want to make too many allegations against people from other clans, even though there is free speech in Somaliland). Security and stability comes from the distribution of power e.g. balanced share of key ministries to different clans/sub-clans”. The Joint UN Programme on Local Governance (JPLG), has a well-developed civic education programme run by UNICEF which works at community level to increase awareness of local government planning processes. However, the programme only focuses on a handful of districts. One of the main areas of weakness identified by respondents was around civil and legal education. This has a particularly negative impact on poor and marginalised groups, including women. A lack of awareness about civic rights and responsibilities contributes to both a lack of information dissemination and a lack of demand from citizens. Many respondents stated that people have not yet developed either the knowledge or the habit of demanding accountability from the government owing to years of dictatorship. Enabling citizens to have the knowledge to hold government to account through including an information and education component in governance and accountability programmes would support botton-up accountability. Urbanisation is an increasing trend in Somaliland with approximately 34 per cent of the Somaliland population living in towns. Hargeisa33, a city of over over 750,000 people,34 has drawn populations from the countryside, from South Central Somalia, and from neighbouring countries, attracted by prospects of employment, security and an escape from drought. In 2005, Hargeisa hosted around 72,500 displaced persons, of whom around 60 per cent were
30UNDP (2013) Bringing justice to the most vulnerable. Available at: http://www.so.undp.org/factsheets/Access2JusticeFacts_finaldraft-Z- Video.pdf 31UNDP Evaluation Office (2010).Assessment of Development Results.Evaluation of UNDP Contribution. Somalia. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/countries/somalia/47861786.pdf 32Thorne, Kristina (2005). Rule of Law through imperfect bodies? The informal justice systems of Burundi and Somalia. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Available at: http://www.peace-justice conference.info/download/WS6%20Rule%20of%20Law%20through%20imperfect%20bodies- Thorne.pdf 33Academy for Peace and Development and the Institute for Development and Peace (2010) Local Capacities for Peace Land-Based Conflict Project.Contested Urban Land.Approaching Land Management and Land-based Conflicts in Urban Somaliland. Pp13. Available at: http://inef.uni-due.de/cms/files/final_report-final_2010_04_12.pdf 34UNHABITAT (2013).Hargeisa Urban Water Supply Upgrading Project gets underway. Available at: http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=12179&catid=233&typeid=6
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returnees.35 The concentration of population in urban areas places considerable strain on housing and utilities. Water and other services are inadequate for IDP settlements in Hargeisa. Urbanisation cuts people off from the rural productive base and from traditional social protection mechanisms, while throwing them into dependence on insecure employment opportunities. This is particularly dangerous for unemployed youth, whose livelihoods are highly unstable, and contributes to high rates of criminality.
11.3 Stakeholders and their relevance to accountability Respondents made it clear that in their opinion, the population is largely accustomed to dictatorships and have few expectations of those in authority, and that people lack both the information and the knowledge of civic rights and responsibilities that would be required for them to demand accountability. Where people do hold their leaders to account, according to respondents, they tend to focus on how access to power benefits their particular group, rather than benefits for the community in general.
“The institutionalisation of Central government public institutions is the A key challenge to government ministries is the lack of basic systems for planning, key in supporting monitoring, and regulating both themselves and the private and voluntary sectors. In accountable government. many departments there is still inadequate documentation of plans, budgets, We need better systems achievements and spending for monitoring to happen. Officials tend to retain in place and more civic documentation of their activities for themselves and remove it for their private use when awareness. There needs they leave office. Specific elements in government have introduced innovations. The to be a balance between Hargeisa water authority has set up effective billing and payments systems, collects a five demand and supply”. per cent sales tax, and is putting water user associations in place. Respondents did not Interviewee, Hargeisa. feel government is accountable at present. All our respondents, almost without exception, expressed mistrust of politicians, believing they are interested only in getting elected to pursue their personal interests. While some politicians do respond to people’s needs, they are not felt to be genuine. As one respondent put it, “we are acting in a very nice drama”. There was also perceived to be a lack of accountability within government by interviewees with a lack of transparency and accountability between the central government and parliament. In spite of the low trust levels, there was also a belief by some respondents that government capacity is slowly growing and that this is fundamentally from the improvement of trust between leaders and constituents. An interviewee in Hargeisa noted, “You can come and demand your rights but the capacity also needs to be there”. From the international agency perspective, many respondents reported the experience of dealing with the current government to be frustrating – with much bluster and delayed implementation in many areas. One reason may be an untrained civil service class and politicised senior management tier within ministries, most of whom were brought in following the previous presidential elections as the incumbents were not trusted by the new ruling party. Parliament Parliament is crucial to accountability as it translates social expectations into law and thus sets the standards by which authorities are evaluated. For inteviewees, Parliament provides information from the hearings with the House of Representatives and the House of Elders. The media then disseminate this information thereby providing a degree of publically available information. In the case of Somaliland, parliament reflects a political settlement in which traditional institutions, i.e. clans, are intertwined with modern forms of governance. The contradictions inherent in this arrangement constitute a major challenge for accountability; parliament tends to be accountable to the major clan and sub-clan leaders rather than to the population at large. Moreover, the electoral system cannot yet link MPs to specific defined constituencies, and so there tends to be a strong disconnect between MPs and the electorate. The Guurti (Upper House) can overturn decisions of the House of Representatives.
35FAO and UNICEF (2005).Nutrition survey report: Hargeisa returnees and IDP settlement, Somaliland. Available at: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fsnau.org%2Fd ownloads%2FHargeisa%2520Nutrition%2520Survey%2520- %2520September%25202005.pdf&ei=O3uTUciMLKr34QSDn4HwBg&usg=AFQjCNFHoz8oSVHJminP8yaZNqBXG0U8Qg&sig2=P884sQ1L_d0 qGC03wqGDRA&bvm=bv.46471029,d.bGE
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Power relations between clans and sub-clans are a key factor in the parliamentary process, and minorities feel excluded. Women and under-35s are not well represented in national decision-making as there are few parliamentarians from these groups. The strong influence of clan support for particular candidates, combined with the fact that clans are male led and male dominated means men are put forward as candidates.36 Women have been calling for representation in the electoral process via a quota system, or other positive discrimination mechanisms, since 2005. In 2007, the Amended Presidential and Local Councils Elections Bill was submitted to the House of Representatives. The Bill set in Article 22A a mandatory quota for all local district councils which provided for reserved seats for female candidates. The Bill was rejected by the House of Elders (Guurti) citing constitutional factors.37 The House of Elders later accepted the quota in principle and in 2011 the President of Somaliland released a presidential decree announcing the formation of a National Consultative Committee to advise him on how women can be mainstreamed within the decision-making legislative bodies of the country. In July 2012, the resulting report was submitted to parliament but in September 2012 members of the lower house rejected a provision that would have established a quota for women’s representation in parliament. "We decided to remove the provision providing a quota of local council and parliamentary seats to women and other minority groups from the agenda after lawmakers refused to debate on it," said first Deputy Speaker of Parliament Bashe Mohamed Farah after the vote. Forty-three of the house's 82 members attended the session Saturday (1 September), in which 30 members voted to remove the provision, eight voted to keep it and four abstained.38 Nagaad, an umbrella group for women's organisations in Somaliland, has been involved in lobbying and advocating for the quota. They felt the challenges were primarily traditional and religious in nature, stating, “the decision gets taken back to these people and religion is manipulated to their ends. This is the challenge we face all the time”. The consultant team found Nagaad to be lacking in ability to coordinate and mobilise civil society groups around this issue, with a lack of strategic objectives and new solutions ready to push the agenda forwards in this area. Local government Six administrative regions39 have established local councils as part of moves towards decentralized government. The 2012, municipal elections elicited much interest and with large turnouts. Not all districts have councils though, and even in those that do, the mechanics of government are new. Local councilors often lack experience and knowledge of their roles. However, many people feel that, being closer to the grass-roots than central government, they can be more easily held to account. At the same time, accountability is to the clan rather than to all constituents on an equal basis. An Academic interview in Hargeisa stated, “People vote for them because of who they are. There is no connection between electors and the elected. The people elected in 2002 never did anything and those elected in 2012 won’t do anything. They don’t even need to make election promises as they aren’t voted on promises but on clan”. Traditional and religious leaders The clan system is in many ways hostile to the pursuit of accountability in national governance, since it embodies accountability within a particular power structure rather than to the whole community. Many respondents stated that the clan system is a reality of Somaliland and it will continue to constitute an organizing principle for some time to come. Moreover, the clan principle operates at regional and local level as well as in national politics, linking political dynamics across the whole country, while formal political representation tends to cluster in the capital. Elders have a remit to resolve conflicts and mediate disputes at domestic and community level, receiving a stipend from the Ministry of the Interior. They form part of the judicial system as they mediate in local disputes, operating a restorative rather than retributive system that values compromise and cohesion. This has been critical to Somaliland’s survival in the past, but may not be best suited to the current need for a new political dynamic.
36Bradbury, M. (2008) Becoming Somaliland London/Oxford: Progressio 37Yusuf, Haroon (2012). Chapter 7: The Saga of the Pursuit of Women’s Quota in Somaliland in Reflections and Lessons of Somaliland’s two Decades of sustained peace, State building and Democratization Presentations at the second annual SORADI conference held on 8- 9November 2011. Somaliland Development Series No.2. Available at: http://soradi.org/attachments/article/70/REFLECTIONS%20AND%20LESSONS%20OF%20SOMALILAND%E2%80%99S.pdf 38Dahir, Barkhad (2012). Somaliland lawmakers oppose parliament quota for women and minorities. Available at: http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/09/06/feature-02 39 See the Regions & Districts Law (Law No: 23/2002). Available at: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Local_Government_Law/body_local_government_law.htm
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Elders are generally trusted as they are close to the people and seen as having held the country together in periods of great instability. However, like religious leaders, they are less trusted than in the past, as people perceive them to be tainted by association with politicians. The judiciary The judiciary is a key actor in promoting the rule of law. A legal aid system is in place that prevents cases proceeding unless the participants have adequate representation. However, many people prefer not to take their issues to the courts because of the length of time and the costs involved, and because clan elders can often resolve disputes more effectively in a less confrontational manner. Moreover, confusion over legal systems puts lawyers in a legal vacuum and frustrates the establishment of institutional mandates. The legal profession in Somaliland is relatively young and inexperienced. There is little popular awareness of human and civil rights, but this is growing gradually. The soon-to-be-established bar association, together with the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission (see below), have much potential, and should be closely monitored. Civil society In the Somali context, where formal governmental structures either do not exist or may lack the legitimacy of internationally recognised statehood, civil society takes on a wider meaning encompassing a wide range of social groupings. These groupings have assumed multiple roles as service providers, advocates and peace-makers, while representing a particular range of clan or social interests. They operate across the spectrum from emergency relief, through rehabilitation and reconstruction to development and advocacy, and occupy many of the functions normally attributed to local and even national government.40
“An issue that preoccupies Oxfam Novib presents three categories of civil society actors: CBOs, comprising us is the presence of lots traditional elders committees, religious leaders, social and community groups which tend of NGOs and few tangible to be informal and unstructured; Local non-governmental organisations, which tend to results. We need to have follow 'modern' organisational principles; and Professional associations, such as for 41 oversight of them as teachers, medics, lawyers, and performing artists. The team, alongside local NGOs, Somalilanders”. Female observed each of these groups in Hargeisa. Of note is that interviewees spoke most interviewee, Hargeisa. frequently about civil society as comprised purely by national NGOs, highlighting that there is a narrower definition of how CS is defined. This may be due to: a lack of visibility of other CS actors; a lack of engagement in amplifying the voices of the poor and holding governance actors to account; or that NGOs use the term civil society the most frequently and are subsequently the most self-identified CS group. Civil society advises government on reshaping institutions and on designing new policies and laws. Some, especially outside Hargeisa, have service delivery roles, and others defend the interests of specific social groups such as women, youth and minorities. During interviews in Somaliland, civil society actors expressed that they wanted to have their voices heard more systematically and their participation expanded when key national and international assessments, policies, legislation and strategies are developed. It was stressed that they felt that they had been overlooked as potential leaders in providing accountability (enhancing state transparency and accountability), particularly given their natural 'bridging' role between state and international actors. Interviewees had mixed perceptions of civil society, many deplore their apparent allegiance to donors (who they were seen as being most accountable to), and feel they are driven by a ‘workshop culture’ rather than by the desire to deliver tangible results. A civil society interviewee in Somaliland stated that, “Civil society is a banner of the international community but we don’t see any action”. The women’s movement is particularly weak; women’s umbrella bodies have failed to campaign effectively for women’s rights and have little support amongst professional women. The linkage based political culture is seen as an impediment to the growth of modern civil society institutions. However, there is some evidence that professional organizations and some NGOs cut across clan allegiances, which have the potential for developing in the interests of wider society.42 There is evidence of the amplification of the voice of some groups (such as youth and women), through civil society however the ability of CSOs to sanction offending parties is weak. The recent push back against the media highlights that there may be a declining space in which civil society is able to operate and undertake activities calling for transparency and accountability.
40OECD (2011) Report on International Engagement in Fragile States. Somali Republic, OECD 41Novib (2002), Mapping Civil Society, Novib 42Novib (2002), Mapping Civil Society, Novib
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The team did not see evidence of civil groups working to support pro-accountability constituencies gain traction. Representativeness cannot be created from the outside. It has to come from within and to be accountable to ordinary Somalis.43 Building an understanding of accountability at the community level would support communities to engage meaningfully with civil society actors and the government at central and local levels. The mixed attitudes towards civil society suggests that the NGO element of civil society does not currently provide responsiveness and accountability to the general public which has resulted in a lack of trust and engagement with the NGO community. The private sector About 70 per cent of the Somali people are pastoralists with livestock production accounting for 60 to 65 per cent of Somaliland’s gross domestic product.44 Remittance/money transfer companies and telecommunications make up the majority of the remaining gross domestic product. Somalia’s collapse into a failed economy and heavy dependence on its diaspora for economic survival in the 1990s coincided with revolutionary advances in the telecommunications sector.45 This enabled the rapid growth of the remittance services industry. As reported by Menkhaus46 one study estimates that remittances to Somaliland reach US$500 million per year, four times the value of livestock exports in a normal year.47 Another study calculates that remittances constitute nearly 40 per cent of the income of urban households in the northern towns of Hargeisa, Burao, and Bosasso.48 The economic recovery in Somaliland stands in contrast to that of South Central. There are vibrant Somali business communities in Dubai, Kenya and inside Somaliland and vibrant commerce between Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia and with Kenya. Cassanelli49 suggests that economic growth occurred in spite of (or maybe because of) the fact that the Somaliland state did not have the capacity to intervene very strongly in the private sector. As a result the region succeeded in attracting valuable contributions of money, skills and professional expertise from members of its own diaspora and from a number of NGOs resulting in economic recovery leading political recovery in Somaliland. Despite the vibrancy of the private sector there were reported concerns by respondents around the motivation of the business community. A case mentioned during interviews was that of three contractors alleged to have diverted over half of all food aid provided by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Somalia.50 There are further concerns around the links between some members of the business community and parties to the conflict.51 This links to broader concerns that aid could be inadvertently transferred to terrorist groups or individuals thereby putting organisations in breach of national counter-terrorism legislation. As government has not yet put oversight mechanisms in place, many services are provided by the private sector (often in an unregulated fashion), and opinion about this sector remains polarized. For some respondents, they are alternative public servants whose philanthropy fills a gap in government service provision. The business community has supported private schools, both religious and technical, and helped pay the salaries of security personnel to keep the ports operating.52 In this sense, the business community has been responsive to the needs of the community. Yet for other respondents, the business community are seen as being primarily accountable to their businesses and as purely profit-seeking with one respondent describing them as “blood-suckers”. There was no evidence that the business community was better able to demand accountability. However, one respondent commented that “businessmen encourage government to have dialogue with opposition during the time of political tension” and one businessman commented that it was easy to talk to MPs due to the collection of taxes. In spite of the latter comment, there was a broad consensus that the payment of taxes had not increased state accountability to the private sector.
43Hoehne, M (2010) in Bradbury, M and Healy, S eds. (2010) Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking.Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources. pp37. 44DAI (2011).Partnership with Somaliland’s Private Sector Aims to Lay Foundation for Growth, Stability. Available at: http://dai.com/news- publications/news/partnership-somaliland%E2%80%99s-private-sector-aims-lay-foundation-growth-stability 45 MENKHAUS, KEN (2001). Remittance companies and money transfers in Somalia 46 MENKHAUS, KEN (2001). Remittance companies and money transfers in Somalia 47Ismail I. Ahmed, “Remittances and Their Economic Impact in Post-War Somaliland,” Disasters 24, 4 (2000). 48 Khalid Medani, “Report on Migration and Remittance Inflows: Northwest and Northeast Somalia.” Nairobi: UNCU and FSAU, 2000. 49Cassanelli Lee (2010). Private sector peacemaking.Business and reconstruction in Somalia.Accord.Issue 21. Available at: http://www.c- r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_12Private%20sector%20peacemaking_2010_ENG.pdf 50 Pantuliano,Sara., Mackintosh,.Kate and Elhawary, Samir., with Metcalfe,.Victoria (2011). Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action Tensions, impact and ways forward. HPG Policy Brief 43 51Carpenter, Samuel (2012).Somali business community.Somalia's private sector can help rather than hinder development. The Guardian. 52 Cassanelli Lee (2010). Private sector peacemaking.Business and reconstruction in Somalia.Accord.Issue 21. Available at: http://www.c- r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_12Private%20sector%20peacemaking_2010_ENG.pdf
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In contrast to the state, some members of the business community are seen as driving the demand for accountability due to their knowledge of best practice (particularly if they are diaspora), desire to see their tax payments utilised effectively, and diminished accountability towards to clan. In spite of the latter, Cassanelli53 claims that modern Somali businessmen and women are still part of the clan and are expected by their relatives to act in ways that, at the very least, do not harm the interests of the group. These expectations hinder efforts to transmit professional and associational practices. The USAID Partnership for Economic Growth program (2011–2013), is currently working with local authorities and private sector groups to improve the enabling environment for investment and generate more productive employment and incomes.54 Another recent initiative is the Somaliland Business Fund (SBF)55 which offers grants to the Somaliland private sector ranging from $5,000 to $150,000 for projects involving business development services and/or fixed assets.56 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are lacking but could provide an opportunity to enhance service delivery whilst utilising the private sector as part of an accountability watchdog. The challenge to this is the lack of private sector trust in the government and the advancement of the private sector in relation to the public sector. Diaspora The Somaliland Academia for Peace and Development has emphasised the positive contribution made by the Diaspora, provided funding and leadership and bringing their skills to Somaliland on their return.57 The term has layers of complexity behind it with varying perceptions of the diaspora partially dependent on how long they have been back in Somaliland for, what activities they are undertaking and why they left. “It is a thorny issue”, commented an interviewee in Hargeisa. The diaspora bring new ways of thinking and resources. Many enter the private and voluntary sectors, building on their wealth and new ideas. However, they are often frustrated when bureaucratic wheels turn slowly and inefficiently. A Diaspora businessman in Hargeisa stated that, “There is something missing in this country is what I can say. People are not familiar with the terms accountability and transparency. In my business my employees are accountable to me as I established and run the business but the private sector is a long way ahead of the public sector here”. Returnees often have difficulty re-integrating back into their society, where they are not necessarily welcomed. They are sometimes seen as impatient and arrogant, as having failed to share the experience of the war, and as retaining allegiance to their host countries. Due to these factors, some of the interviewees perceive them as being less accountable to their clans, the state and their communities. Media There are numerous independently owned newspapers in Somaliland, while radio and television broadcasts are almost completely state controlled.58 A recent study by Chatham House found that radio is the dominant media format, that television is mainly accessed in urban areas, but is beginning to be used for political influence; and that whilst internet is growing in popularity, it still has limited reach.59 As outlined in the section of this report focusing on the social cost of corruption, there are contrasting perceptions of the media in Somaliland. Some respondents felt that the media have a lack of formal training and capacity which makes them weak. There were also allegations that the media are paid to plant quotes and to run particular stories. Both of these inhibit the scope for investigative journalism and have led to some respondents met with as part of this study becoming increasingly resistant to engaging with the media to do its dishonesty and potential for reputational damage.
53 Cassanelli Lee (2010). Private sector peacemaking.Business and reconstruction in Somalia.Accord.Issue 21. Available at: http://www.c- r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2021_12Private%20sector%20peacemaking_2010_ENG.pdf 54DAI (2011).Partnership with Somaliland’s Private Sector Aims to Lay Foundation for Growth, Stability. Available at: http://dai.com/our- work/projects/somalia%E2%80%94partnership-economic-growth-program 55Financed by a World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund with contributions from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the World Bank State and Peace-building Fund (SPF). Landell Mills – a development consulting firm in the UK – has been engaged to manage the Fund. 56Somaliland Business Fund (2012).Somaliland Business Fund-Private Sector Re-Engagement Program Launched. Available at: http://somalilandbusinessfund.com/index.php/news-a-events/17-somaliland-business-fund-private-sector-re-engagement-program-launched 57 Reported in The contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction. Report for the Department for International Development. ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford. 58BBC World Service Trust Research and Learning Group (2011), An Analysis of the Somali Media Environment, BBC World Service Trust 59Chatham House (2013) Somalia's future, Building a Unified Regional state, Chatham House, Africa Meeting Summary
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An NGO Peace Activist in Hargeisa stated that, “Somaliland TV is full of nonsense. ‘Talk to the people’ was a well- Journalists report uncritically and payment of fees is one reason. Too many times liked TV programme bringing ministers to explain their work you switch on to find some diaspora business person who’s probably paid $500 to and answer questions from the lie about all his achievements abroad and his charitable works at home.” public, though it no longer In contrast, other interviewees saw the media as being relatively free and providing runs. “Talk to your people a valuable oversight mechanism and critique of government. Analysis suggests that provides the public with although discrepancy occurs there are both state and private media outlets to opportunities to access their choose from and that interviewees were able to identify “which ones demand leaders- in this sense the media is quite effective”. accountability and those that do not”. Interviewee, Sheikh. Media requires a legal and regulatory framework that promotes a code of conduct, “Horizontal oral accountability ethics and professionalism. Whilst there is legislation that recognizes freedom of 60 is strong. Mechanisms for expression in practice, authorities exercise censorship. Although the media in recourse and compliance are Somaliland has faced very few violent incidents, interviewees in Somaliland already embedded in reported two recent incidents that point towards a crackdown on the media and an Somaliland’s oral and escalation of violence. In April 2013, the independent daily Habaal, who had networked society”. recently published articles accusing the Somaliland President of corruption and Interviewee, Hargeisa. nepotism, was attacked in Hargeisa by gunmen targeting Mohamed Ahmed Jama, the owner and manager of Hubaal Media Network. The attackers were subsequently identified as police officers and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) issued a statement claiming they would be prosecuted.61 The second incident was reported by interviewees to involve a police dispersion of protestors at a ‘day of the media’ demonstration that called for media freedom. One interviewee in Somaliland summarised the concerns, “People believe they would not have attacked unless the Government (in Somaliland) or MoI is behind it. This is a unique incident but people are concerned about it as what the government will do next. They are building a lack of trust in themselves”. Although the media has been able sanction offending parties through publically calling for redress and disseminating information to the public on abuse of power, the mixed messages regarding the media suggest that its role in demanding accountability is not yet being met. The media has made inroads in demanding accountability, most notably regarding corruption, but the enabling environment for investigative journalism may be in decline, as evidenced by recent cases of intimidation and harassment. The media also suffers from a lack of trust, scoring the third lowest aggregated trust score across the three districts in Somaliland. In order to gain strength as a demand side accountability mechanism, the media sector needs to become more accountable, separated from government, and responsible in its reporting. International community The lack of recognition for Somaliland means that the international community does not offer budget support to government. However, it does finance a range of public service projects indirectly through UN and INGO mechanisms. This offers it an exceptional opportunity to influence the conduct of state machineries. However, the mistrust held in the international community threatens this opportunity. This is particularly damaging when the issue is accountability, since the main complaint against international organisations is precisely that they fail to practice accountability themselves. Particular bones of contention are: that only a small proportion of budgets reaches the Somaliland community; that projects are externally designed and are managed from Nairobi (incurring unnecessary costs, described by many respondents as a form of corruption); and that internationals come to Somaliland with preconceived solutions rather than ‘working with the grain’. Further issues include: that policies are introduced but there is no follow-up to ensure implementation (seen as an absence of accountability); that internationals remain in the capital if they come to Somaliland at all (this is generally denoted as corruption); and that there is no transparency about payments to Somali nationals (there are suspicions of corrupt dealings). Often suspicions can result from misunderstandings. For example, rumours of misappropriation of funds abound when projects are designed but not implemented. Greater openness in donor practice by providing budgeting and planning information could mitigate such negative views of international donors.
60Chatham House (2013) Somalia's future, Building a Unified Regional state, Chatham House, Africa Meeting Summary 61 Committee to Protect Journalists (April 30, 2013).Somaliland official says media owner attacked by police. Available at: http://cpj.org/2013/04/somaliland-official-says-police-attacked-a-media-o.php
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The Ministry of Planning has now set up an accountability and transparency mechanism whereby international agencies must declare proposed projects and budgets, and report on the implementation of these.
11.4 Current and past initiatives A predominant finding by the research team in Hargeisa was that when interviewees were asked about external and internal interventions to support governance accountability in Somaliland, no past interventions were mentioned. There were also limits to the number of current interventions listed by interviewees. The interventions most spoken about by interviewees are outlined below. Members of staff from each of these interventions were interviewed by the team. The table at the end of this section summarises the interventions the team was made aware of through desk research and follow-on interviews in Nairobi. Shaqodoon Organisation (“Job seeker” in Somali) Shaqodoon is an off-shoot of the former EDC ‘Somali Youth Livelihood Program' funded by USAID (which ended in 2012) that provided Somali youth with greater opportunities to skill training, access to work, internship and self- employment opportunities. Shaqodoon is an NGO registered in Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug and South Central zone, having offices in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. The organisation has had projects with DRC, UNHCR, the US Embassy, and USAID. Both DRC and UNHCR have used the cell phone and web-based technologies they provide as part of an accountable feedback service. Whilst relocating people from the South to Somaliland, beneficiaries were able to text them with the services they needed. A three-digit number was set up by Shaqodoon that reverses the text charges. In addition to text messaging, Shaqodoon provides voice-based messaging. In practice this means a pre-recorded message is delivered to the phone user. This is highly valuable for accessing illiterate populations and the hard-to-reach. Another example of the service they can provide is the use of the SMS technology during the local elections in Somaliland in November 2012. People could use the service to report violence, which generated over 33,000 texts. Shaqodoon claimed that this was the highest number of complaints received by any organisation. The complaints were then verified through follow-up phone calls. In June 2013, Shaqodoon will host the first job fair in Somaliland. The aim is to bring together 100 employers and start-up financing institutions from a variety of sectors as well as qualified youth. Some of the biggest challenges for youth in Somaliland are a lack of skills suitable for the job market and tribalism when placing applicants in jobs. There has been no engagement with DFID. Comment: Shaqodoon provides a service that would enable remote data gathering, real-time data collection and access to remote and vulnerable populations. In addition they are strongly focused on youth which is a marginalised but growing segment of the population. The use of verbal communication is viewed as highly valuable by the Somaliland population and DFID could utilise the text and voice-based messaging services on offer for a variety of programmes and projects. The role of the private sector merits further research. It offers the potential to provide tax revenue, job creation, economic development and stabilisation. As one of the key tax contributors, the sector also offers opportunity to monitor and demand accountability from government over budget spending. At present tax collection is not believed to have increased accountability. A challenge when working with the business community will be distinguishing between those that are seen as having a strong reputation within the community and those that are viewed as comprised of diaspora who are detached from their communities. Hargeisa Water Authority Each city in Somaliland has its own water agency. The Hargeisa water authority is the public agency responsible in Hargeisa. The Ministry of Mining and Water Resources provides oversight. There is a limited supply as well as limited infrastructure and storage capacity. Piped water only provides water services to a small part of the city. The Director gave the figure of 60 per cent water provision by the water authority with the remainder supplied by private water providers at a significantly higher cost. The areas of the least access are the poorest areas of Hargeisa and those with high numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
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There are currently 25,000 customers, and 33 account readers who visit each customer monthly to take a metre reading. People come to the office to pay and get a receipt. A five per cent sales tax is levied on the water bill.62 The 2004 Water Policy and Water Act, endorsed by the government, declares that government has responsibility for water supply and development, and this has to be paid for (see articles 7.1, 9.1, 64.1 and 69.1).63 Previously, in nomadic areas water was a common resource, supplied originally by burkads (shallow wells). With changes in climate, increasing population and urbanisation, this source became insufficient so people started digging boreholes. The issue of the payment of the service was not said to be a concern, rather it is one of the expectation of access for all. UNHCR are currently supporting the Hargeisa Water Authority through a 16.5 million Euro “Hargeisa Water Supply Upgrading Project”.64 It is viewed as a very collaborative relationship. The project began in December 2012 and has a 42 month time line. The project is currently in the planning and design phase and will focus on expanding the water infrastructure and refurbishing the pipeline. The provision of water will become an increasing point of conflict as urbanisation and changes in climate take place in Somaliland. The project is disseminating information through a package of radio, TV, workshops, and stakeholder dinners with key community leaders. One stakeholder dinner has taken place so far which involved religious scholars, key profile businessmen and clan leaders. Comment: Access to water is not available for significant proportions of the population, resulting in a reliance on private service provision for those who can afford it. The payment for public service delivery has support from customers, suggesting that public service delivery can become sustainable. The agency is already receiving support and appears to be transparent and accountable. It is therefore not suggested DFID looks to partner in this area. Progessio Progressio (an INGO) was central in the formation of civil society (CS) networks, both current and existing, in Somaliland. Progressio interacts with the government through the Ministry of Health (MoH) but do not give budget support. As an organisation, they focus on building the capacity of non-state actors and have a long history of working in Somalia. Progressio places international development workers within local CSOs in order to build technical capacity. One of the areas they have focused on was the accountability and transparency of the electoral system. In 2005, Progressio invited international observers to participate in the elections. The outcome of this was a report indicating what went well and what went wrong, with follow-on recommendations. The idea of voter registration came from one of these recommendations. This idea ultimately failed, but civil registration is now undergoing an assessment. The Minister of Interior has since taken on the responsibility for this but is awaiting funding. An example of successful CS lobbying was given in relation to the election law and the prevention of an extension of the previous administration’s electoral term. With regard to the former, over a period of eight years civil society led advocacy and lobbying efforts to reduce the age at which it is possible to run for office (from 35 to 25). As a result of this, youth have a higher level of representation on local councils. With regard to the latter, the former administration tried to extend their term by ten years in 2008. Lobbying efforts by opposition parties and CS prevented this from proceeding. In contrast, advocacy (by NAGAAD) regarding quotas for women’s political participation failed after being rejected by the house of elders. The difference between successful and unsuccessful CS lobbying relates to a number of factors that include organisational and technical capacity, follow-up on lobbying and advocacy activities (said to be lacking), and the use of a strategy for engagement. Whilst the Progressio representative felt that CS was more accountable than government, questions were raised around the accountability of CS to the general public and beneficiary groups. Comment: DFID could engage with Progressio to capture their experiences of working with CS. This should include a focus on CS accountability towards beneficiaries and the public, methods for strengthening local community demand for
62 Interview with Ibrahim Siyaad Yoonis, Director,ofHargeisa Water Authority. May 2013. 63 These acts refer to ownership, water tariffs, sales tax and control of water resources. See the Republic of Somaliland Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources (2004). Draft Water Act for the Somaliland State. Available at: http://dwateresources-sl.com/wp- content/uploads/2011/11/Somaliland-National-Water-Act.pdf 64UNHABITAT (2013).Hargeisa Urban Water Supply Upgrading Project gets underway. Available at: http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=12179&catid=233&typeid=6
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accountability, and supporting CS to access positive examples of collective action from CS in the region. This is an approach Oxfam GB have extensive experience of working on, including in South Sudan through the “Within and Without the State” programme. The Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission (GGACC)65 GGACC was informally established in 2010 under the current government. GGACC exists to lead the governance sector and to build strong, capable and effective institutions able to initiate a comprehensive response towards fighting corruption.66 It is comprised of a five-member committee. Documentation from the GGACC states that ‘corruption and misuse of national resources is mainstreamed’, is in existence at various levels, and that corruption is negatively linked to justice and service delivery. The inadequacy of institutional systems and policy are one obstacle to fighting corruption. Other challenges include: a lack of civic education; distrust between government and citizens; a lack of baseline data on perceptions of corruption; and a lack of regulation application. The political will of the current administration was said to be high. However, the bill upholding the powers of the GGACC was only passed on 6 November 2012. Prior to the bill being passed, the commission was hindered by a lack of enforcement power, with cases going through the Attorney General. A fact-finding mission by GGACC between February and March 2011 found a lack of policies and procedures within some state institutions, which impedes operations and performance. The correct procedures are not followed when recruiting employees irrespective of the position level, and procurement procedures are not followed. During our interview, a specific example was given of the GGACC investigating illegal fishing by Yemen in Somaliland waters. The investigation found that customs and police were colluding and significantly under-reporting the level of fishing. Whilst this resulted in three junior staff at the Ministry of Fisheries losing their jobs, higher-up officials involved were not investigated. Comment: From the interview with a member of the GGACC, it appeared that there was a lack of political will behind the GGACC as well as corruption within the GGACC itself. The interviewee believed that a change in the makeup of the five-member committee would help to rectify this and enable the GGACC to have a larger impact. Supporting and investigating the suitability of committee members could help to reduce internal manipulation of the GGACC, as would support to the investigation of members running for the committee for any reported corruption. There was limited reference to the GGACC by interviewees generally. This might be due to a lack of information on their mandate and activities, or to a lack of effectiveness. Either reason would support calls for external support in building institutional capacity to manage and bring cases to trial that result in prosecution. The collection of baseline data on incidents of corruption would support information gaps on corruption which need to be filled. A current baseline is reportedly being conducted by UNDP that looks at perceptions of corruption. This may produce data that can be built on. UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG) JPLG is a joint programme of 5 UN partners, UNDP, UNICEF, UN Habitat, ILO and UNCD. JPLG works in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia. In Somaliland, JPLG operates in 7 districts. JPLG assists the development, strengthening and initiation of systems for regional and district councils to be recognised and legitimate, function professionally, perform effectively, and to be responsive, representative, participatory, open and accountable to their citizens and provide services. The three main areas of work are: policy; capacity development and training, with a focus on the district level and on the central level as it relates to oversight for the districts; and the provision of funds for service delivery, with the idea of improving the processes for managing those funds. During interviews with JPLG staff, examples were given of local accountability regarding waste disposal and access to a safe location for children to play in the community.
65 For the Good Governance and Anti-corruption Budget and Implementation Matrix see Ministry of National Planning and Development (2011). National Development Plan (2012-2016) Pp211 66Priority Projects for 2012 Concept Paper, GGACC
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Comment: Other interviewees did not mention JPLG as a model for district and regional governance. In contrast, several interviewees mentioned DAI’s Transition Initiatives for Stabilisation (TIS) programme as an example of best practice in building strong community accountability. The interviewers were not able to substantiate how JPLG’s accountability examples at the community level translate into upward accountability linkages. The Civilian Police Project The Civilian Police project operates in all regions of Somalia. Run by UNDP, it aims towards an efficient, effective, professional civilian police service that meets the requirements for community policing and the needs and expectations of all Somalis. The project particularly supports accountability and oversight mechanisms: it works closely with police authorities in all areas to build internal control mechanisms that respond to cases of human rights abuse by the police and worked with the MOI to convene conferences for a Police Charter and subsequent Police Act. The project partners with the Somali Police Force, Somaliland Police Force and Puntland Police Force. It also partners with international police forces such as the Ugandan police for the provision of high quality training and as an example in establishing accountability mechanisms. To establish special women and children desks at police stations, the project has partnered with UNICEF through a joint Justice for Children project.67 Comment: The project primarily deals with criminal cases, with traditional systems the preferred recourse in other instances. There have reportedly been incidents of the community bringing its members to the police station for separation from the community in cases of disturbance. These cases are not formally recorded by the police. Whilst this suggests an emerging relationship with the police, questions also emerge regarding the individuals the community decides to hand across and whether this is for legitimate purposes as viewed by the legal system. The project is already receiving support, but the emerging lessons around the intersection of the community and police and changing forms of accountability (if at all), would be interesting to monitor over time. Strengthening the participation of Somali Non-State Actors in decision-making on peace, security and development Using EC funding, Saferworld (along with the Academy for Peace and Development in Hargeisa) began to set up non-state actor (NSA) structures in Somaliland in 2004. In March 2006, Saferworld and its partners organised a series of consultations between the EC and the NSA working group in Somaliland, which provided the opportunity for the working group to give inputs into the EC’s assistance strategy to Somalia. The Somaliland working group expressed concerns over the division of EC funding between Southern Somalia and Somaliland. The group called for direct EC partnership with the Somaliland government and questioned the EC’s emphasis on the remittance sector.68 In 2008, the working group was formally established as SONSAF (Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum), a NSA group that aims to strengthen non-state actors in Somaliland to engage in domestic and international policy dialogue and decision-making to bring about a secure and peaceful future for the people of Somaliland. Aid effectiveness is one of SONSAF’s current thematic divisions, the other three are democratisation, environment, and peacebuilding/statebuilding. Comment: The role of the platforms to hold donors to account regarding their aid delivery priorities suggests that NSA platforms could be further supported as part of aid effectiveness monitoring and accountability strategies. Table 3: Intervention Summary
Intervention Timeframe Donor Description
The Good Governance 2012 (bill upholding the Government initiative GGACC exists to lead the governance sector and Anti-Corruption powers of the GGACC) and to build strong, capable and effective Commission (GGACC) to date institutions able to initiate a comprehensive response towards fighting corruption.
67 See UNDP Somalia (date unkown). Civillian Police Available at: http://www.so.undp.org/index.php/1Law-Enforcement.html 68Saferworld (2006).Strengthening dialogue between NSAs, administrations and the EC on the European Union’s new assistance strategy to Somalia. Available at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Somalia%20briefing%20-%20July%2006.pdf
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Intervention Timeframe Donor Description
Shaqodoon Organisation 2012 to date USAID Shaqodoon is an NGO off-shoot of the former EDC ‘Somali Youth Livelihood Program' funded by USAID, that provided Somali youth with greater opportunities for skill training, access to work, internship and self- employment opportunities. It uses innovative cell phone and web-based technologies to effect communication between those offering career opportunities and youth looking for work. Hargeisa Water Supply 2012-2015 UNHCR The project objective is to increase the amount Upgrading Project for the of water to Hargeisa from nearby well fields, Hargeisa Water Authority and to ensure that the supply system is secure and sustainable. The agreement between 2011 to date Ministry of National INGOs have to submit their annual budget and the Government of Planning and project proposals and at the end of the year Somaliland (represented Development report on how this money was actually spent. by the Ministry of National Planning and Development) INGOs Strengthening the capacity 2010-2012 Progressio with EC Progressio is an INGO that focuses on building of non-state actors on civic funding the capacity of non-state actors in Somaliland. dialogue, human rights and active citizenship The Civilian Police project 2009-2015 UNDP UNDP aims towards an efficient, effective, professional civilian police service that meets the requirements for community policing and the needs and expectations of all Somalis. The project particularly supports accountability and oversight mechanisms: it works closely with police authorities in all areas to build internal control mechanisms that respond to cases of human rights abuse by the police. Improved protection of 2009-2012 Stichting Oxfam Aims to strengthen the capacity of Somali human rights in Novib, with EC funds CSOs, to raise public awareness, and to Somalia/land through enhance dialogue with local authorities for the strengthening the role and protection of human rights. capacity of Somali civil society organizations
Joint Programme on Local 2008-2017 UNDP, UNICEF, UN JPLG assists the development, strengthening Governance Habitat, ILO and and initiation of systems for regional and UNCD district councils to be recognised and legitimate, function professionally, perform effectively, and to be responsive, representative, participatory, open and accountable to their citizens and provide services. Enhancing popular 2008-2011 H. Boll Stiftung, Aims to support NSA to contribute to a participation in governance funded by the EC peaceful, more equitable, open and democratic and sustainable society, increase the participation of women, development in Somalia and raise awareness and localized action and Somaliland (focus on towards environmental management, climate
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Intervention Timeframe Donor Description women and youth) change and other global environmental issues. Strengthening the 2004-2013 Saferworld, with EC Aims to strengthen non-state actors in participation of Somali funding Somaliland to engage in domestic and non-state actors in international policy dialogue and decision decision-making on peace, making to bring about a secure and peaceful security and development future for the people of Somaliland. Pillars of peace: beyond 1999 to date Implemented by The Pillars of Peace programme aims to dialogue Interpeace. Funded advance and underpin the consolidation of by the EC, peace throughout the Somali region through Denmark, DfID, consensus-oriented, integrated approaches to Norway, Sweden, statebuilding and peacebuilding. Switzerland and USAID Strengthening Somali civil NK CESVI, funded by the The project aims to contribute to the society capacities to EC achievement of Millennium Development promote environmental Goals 1 and 7 through the empowerment of protection and sustainable non-state actors to play an effective role in development and to shaping sustainable development and to contribute to good local enhance civil society’s role in poverty reduction governance and in environmentally sustainable development and contribute to a good local governance system. Enhancing participation of NK Handicap The project is based on networking among Somalis with disability for International with people with disabilities groups, and advocating human rights and funding from the EC policy changes, at local and national level. democracy in Somaliland and Puntland
11.5 General comments The accountability outlook for Somaliland differs from South Central and Puntland in a number of ways. Firstly, it has been more stable for longer and so state institutions have had time to progress from the embryonic stage to the beginnings of a bureaucratic system. Secondly, the dynamics of the clan system onto which ‘modern’ governance is grafted is relatively one dimensional (there is one dominant clan in Somaliland) so that serious contestations of power are limited to a relatively small area in the east.69 As a result, when seen from the centre in Hargeisa, the overall system is characterised by fluidity and a constantly evolving balance, strong value placed on consensus and consultation, and a certain degree of institutional inertia. However, when in Hargeisa, it is easy to forget that regional differences in the east (and to a lesser extent in the west), of the country have the potential to derail further progress if not addressed. Somaliland’s unwillingness to form part of the Somalia federation is not a minor diplomatic hurdle. It rather reflects a troubled relationship with the international community (and in particular with the former colonial power, Britain), which needs to be carefully negotiated. Unwillingness also stems from unresolved grievances from the civil war and the relationship of Somaliland with other Somali clans. Somalilanders continue to expect solidarity from the UK but are becoming disillusioned, and this is merging with a general mistrust of the international community (distinctions between different donors are not usually made). There is already a high degree of concern over the perceived lack of transparency in external assistance, both in terms of budgeting and in terms of consultation and information-sharing. Donors need to counter this concern by being conspicuously transparent and consultative and by seeking to bring the action as close to the people as possible. This will be particularly true of any initiatives related to accountability, given the risks of being accused of double standards.
69 Although it should be noted that this does not preclude competition within the Isaaq sub-clans which can be intense if non-violent since the late 1990s.
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The team saw evidence that the donor community is already heavily engaging Somaliland CS networks and umbrella organisations. If CS is to grow in an effective and sustainable manner, it will be important to avoid perceived linkages with Western-led agendas and not stifle genuine grassroots activism.
11.6 Recommendations Design a conflict sensitivity approach as a first step. This would involve, amongst other things, conducting a stakeholder mapping exercise of the international and national agencies operating in the eastern region with a particular focus on Sanaag and Sool. This will help to provide evidence on where development aid is flowing and prevent perceptions that development aid is being allocated in a geographically inequitable manner. Make an early assessment of the conflict potential of mineral and oil exploration and exploitation. This should include an assessment of the information most demanded by the public around these areas. Linking CSOs in Somaliland to counterparts in, for example, Ghana and Uganda who have experience of working on these issues can provide valuable lessons. Prior to, and alongside, programme implementation, run a civic education awareness campaign. This should focus on the role and mandate of government institutions, the rights of citizens and ways in which citizens can articulate their demands. Investigate the use of SMS and voiced-based technology. This could be used to collect data from illiterate and geographically hard-to-reach communities and to enable citizens to monitor and report on governance institutions. Further investigate the way in which the business community holds government accountable for the tax revenues it provides. This includes both substantial businesses and small informal sector businesses (a field in which women predominate) which pay a flat rate of tax. Collect baseline data on incidents and types of corruption. There is no evidence that this has been done yet, although a perceptions survey is allegedly underway. Support media training to enable journalists to report fairly and responsibly. Work with an implementing partner in Somaliland to put in place mechanisms for CS to be accountable towards the public and to encourage the public to demand accountability from state and non-state authorities.
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13 Annex C: Zonal Report - South and Central Regions
13.1 Overview Somalia’s south and central regions are controlled by different authorities, including clan-based entities, occupying military forces, Al Shabaab and the internationally-recognised Federal Government of Somalia. Governance, security and opportunities for citizens to voice their demands vary considerably across the territory. The Federal government operates under a provisional federal constitution. Operating out of Mogadishu, the government is seeking to extend its influence and demonstrate its relevance to a population uncertain about its legitimacy. Relations between and within some regions are conflictual, due both to unresolved grievances between clans and to a dynamic of sub-national state formation that the federal government is struggling with. The federal government is also battling politically and militarily with a weakened but formidable opponent, Al Shabaab, which administers two thirds of the territory but is excluded from the current political settlement. Further annexes (E and F) provide stakeholder tables compiled by the research institute (Heritage) in providing an overview of the different actors, their interests, influence and main constituencies. For further levels of accountability to be attained, amongst others the following conditions need to be in place: Improved security for significant sections of the population Substantial reconciliation and trust-building between clans and political leaders Long-term, broad-based dialogue and civic education on issues of federalism and statehood The introduction of ‘smart’ anti-corruption measures by the international community which acknowledge the real political economy of aid, diversion and elite capture of foreign resources Interviews for this study took place in April and May 2013 in Nairobi, Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa. A list of persons interviewed is appended.
13.2 Context analysis The section below first provides an overview of the situation in the south and central regions of Somalia, identfying any political, economic, or socio-cultural factors and processes that have a bearing on accountability. Primary research was also carried out in three distinct locations (Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa ) to elicit information on the specific contexts.. 13.2.1 The south and central regions – an overview Political The region to the south of Puntland State (often labelled misleadingly as ‘South Central’), is politically disparate. Nosingle authority governs here. Rather, there is a patchwork of mini-states, occupied territories and ungoverned or lesser-governed spaces. Administrations range from single clan-based entities in central regions, to proto- federal states (Jubbaland), Shabaab-administered territory, ‘newly liberated areas,’ such as those under Ethiopian or Kenyan military control, and areas with some federal government presence. Governance arrangements vary accordingly and the political scene is fluid, with political fragmentation and state formation happening simultaneously. The last three years has seen the emergence of ‘mini-states’ – small-scale, self-declared polities claiming autonomy or independence. On one count there are 33 such entities - nine in Galmudug, four in Hiran, 12 in the areas south of Hiran, principally around Juba-Gedo-Lower Shabelle, and eight in Shabelle-Benadir.1 Some are entirely ‘virtual,’ either having been declared by diaspora figures or announced as an
1 Another six have at one time or another been declared in Puntland or Somaliland. See A War in Waiting, Somalia’s Disintegration into Mini-States, Somaliareport, 5/4/2012: http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3309/A_War_in_Waiting
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aspiration of local communities.2 Others, such as Galmudug, Jubbaland Himan and Heeb, have emerged through local clan-based negotiations designed to restore stability. In some cases, these states compete for territory and resources.3 Their existence underscores the failure of centrally-led state-building efforts and a determination by local clans or leaders to manage their own affairs. The internal legitimacy of such entities varies, but several of these entities have more functional control of their territory than the federal government. This enables locally-driven state formation with little or no involvement of the centre, as in the case of Jubbaland. At the same time the federal government wishes to establish its own authority on the ground. For some months it has been attempting to re-establish administrations or at least appoint governors (eg Gedo and Bay). For the most part, de facto local authorities have been side-stepped, with implicit questions being raised about their loyalty or legitimacy. Given these dynamics, the relationship between the federal government and the regions is increasingly one of suspicion and competition. The declaration of autonomous entities partly reflects the ambitions of local leaders for control of resources. But it also reflects legitimate differences about statehood and about the roles and functions of different levels of government. It is these political differences that Somalia’s different states, clans and regions must work through if the federal project is to take root. As interviews carried out for this research demonstrated, these dynamics greatly influence views on accountability - it made little sense to many respondents to discuss the accountability of governments that the respondents see as lacking legitimacy or functional control of territory. Conflict and security With some justification, the south and central regions of Somalia have been associated in outsiders’ minds with conflict and armed violence. Yet while the area has seen waves of violence from the time of the civil war and has lacked an effective central government, large-scale destruction has tended to centre on areas in the south. It is these regions – Benadir, the Shabelle river Valley and Lower Jubba Valley - that hold the country’s most valuable economic assets, including roads, ports, airports and agricultural land.4 The nature of armed violence in these areas is instructive and has bearings on questions of accountability. During the 1990s, much of the public infrastructure was destroyed and mass looting took place. Social services collapsed, livelihoods were disrupted and large numbers of people were displaced, some never to return, or in the case of some minority agriculturalists, to return as labourers on their own land. Dispossession, exploitation, clan cleansing and the erosion of any sense of a shared public arena were hallmarks of the civil war period. The period that followed saw the emergence of warlords with a strong interest in blocking state revival. It was only through the leadership of jihadists and business figures in Mogadishuishu that in 2006, through the formation of popular Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the warlords were beaten back. The foreign-backed Ethiopian invasion of 2008 changed the power dynamics again, triggering another costly round of violence and displacement. This eventually propelled the Al Shabaab group to power. With Al Shabaab having retreated to rural locations and the federal government/AMISOM holding most urban areas, the south central region is in an unstable equilibrium. Territory in the south and south west is largely controlled by combinations of KDF/Isiolo/Ras Kamboni brigades (Dhobley, Afmadow, Kismayo, El Wak). To the west, EDF and ASWJ forces control the areas around Dollow, Garbaharey and Luk). Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) 5 clan militias and SNAF control Beletweyne, Guri Ceel, Balanbale, Dhusamareeb, with Ethiopian support. A corridor of territory from Luk to the coast is controlled by SNAF/AMISOM (Mogadishu, Afgoye, Baidoa, Luk, Jowhar, Merka), though it sees periodic guerrilla style attacks by Al Shabaab. Further to the north are the more stable clan-based mini-states of Galmudug and Himan and Heeb. The remaining territory, probably some two thirds of the south and central region, is under the control or heavy influence of Al Shabaab. Under the different security conditions and governance arrangements described above, perceptions of accountability and opportunities for voice can be expected to vary. For example, although not immune to public
2 Examples include Central Regions State launched for North Galgadud region in areas and dominated by the Marehan-Darood; El Bur state (El Bur District and its environs); Mareeg State (announced in Mogadishu with diaspora support, covering El Dher district and its surroundings), and Cowl region as part of Masagaway and El Ad districts. As recently as August 2012 Mataban town saw a political rally in support of the President of Galhiraan state, a formation of a few towns between Hiran and Galgadud. In Pursuit of Peace: Challenges and Opportunities in the Central Regions, Interpeace/CRD, July 2012, p. 11. 3 Conflict between ASWJ, Galmudug and Himan and Heeb are a prime example at regional level. The problem is replicated at lower level however. Galgaduud is currently home to around 17 districts of puzzling complexity and overlap following the politically motivated creation of new clan-based districts by former Presidents Abdullahi Yusuf and Sheikh Sherif. See ‘Building from the Bottom’ Governance and Political Accommodation within Somalia, Conflict Dynamics International, February 2013. 4 Menkaus 2012. 5 Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (The Majority) is a paramilitary group consisting of politically motivated sheikhs from the Sufi brotherhoods opposed to the radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab (Hoehne 2009: 12f).
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demands (there have, for instance, been cases where Al Shabaab governors were replaced following public protests), Al Shabaab understands accountability in a very limited way, with a publicly inaccessible religious council, or Shura, and military commanders making key decisions. Populations living under military occupation will experience different voice and accountability issues, perhaps grappling with small hand-picked administrations dominated by security actors. Others may experience accountability primarily through traditional structures, while residents of Mogadishu are faced with yet another hybrid political order, but one heavily dominated by international decision-makers. There is also the fact of continued inter-clan and political conflict, which a period of lower intensity warfare masks but which undermines trust between different actors. At the national level, key actors continue to seek outright victory rather than accomoration over their political rivals. In some ‘liberated’ areas, security has deteriorated, with a combination of guerrilla attacks, fighting amongst anti-Shabaab factions and the re-emergence of suppressed clan conflict. This reflects that fact that underlying clan conflicts, historical grievances and problems of marginalisation have not been dealt with. The south’s complex social make-up, and the ready availability of rent- seeking opportunities seems to prolong instability again and again. Socio-economic context As indicated above, the south and central regions have a more complex social and economic make-up than northern parts of Somalia. Alongside dominant pastoralists can be found settled farmers, notably the Bantus and Rahanweyn sub-clans whose livelihood style is dominant in the Juba and Shabelle riverine areas but can also be found further to the west and north (eg in Gedo and Bay). 6 Traders, fishing communities, hunters, barbers, and metal and leatherworkers can also be found in the south. Each community tends to retain a distinct culture and organisation. Some groups form part of a caste system based on livelihood and tend to accept adoption by larger clans for protection. 7 In southern regions in particular, areas can be found where different sub-clans, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and minorities co-exist. This has led to recurrent difficulties in negotiating forms of political representation that are acceptable to different groups, a problem which past displacement and mutual distrust exacerbates. This has implications for accountability – those who do not feel properly represented tend to perceive accountability as low.
“The difficult underlying issue is lack of trust amongst conflicted groups/clans. Without comprehensive reconciliation there will always be suspicion. This blocks collective action and the emergence of common agendas around which accountability can develop.” Interview, Mogadish-based civil society peace activist.
At lower levels, representation is often handled through interaction between clan elders. Elders play an important role in the south, mediating conflict and adjudicating according to Xeer, and influencing decisions made in other fora, such as statutory courts. Research suggests, however, that customary leadership is often more compromised in the south and central regions for reasons to do with past conflict and political instrumentalisation of clans from the colonial period right up until the TFG.8 In some respects. the instrumental use of traditional leaders by the UN during the recent National Constituency Assembly (NCA) process can be seen as following in this tradition, producing more conflict and uncertainty around leadership. To a lesser extent, the same is true of religious leaders. While not having been co-opted into political projects in the same way, interviewees noted the fractures that have developed within the religious community, commenting that some leaders have ‘lost their way’.9
6 See IRBC (1995) and Besteman (2007). 7 The term ‘minority’ can be applied to different groups, including in the sense of those from large clans who happen to be minority resident in one geographical area. In addition there is some debate about the status of the Digil-Mirifle groups who form part of the main clan system but have experienced marginalisation. Probably the key groups recognisable at all times as minorities however are as follows. Bantu (a.k.a Jareer): farmers and craftspeople resident in inter-riverine areas; the Midgan (a.k.a Gaboye, Madhiban, Musse Deriyo): hunters and leatherworkers; Tumal (blacksmiths); Yibro (ritual specialists); Benadiri: coastal traders of Arab origin found around Mogadishu, Merka and Brava; Ashraf and Sheikhal: religious minorities including some Christians and Islamic sects. See Hill, M., No Redress: Somalia’s Forgotten Minorities, Minority Rights Group, 2010. Farah (2002), UNHABITAT (2008). 8 See Bradbury, 2008 on the colonial legacy. 9 REF.
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13.3 Mogadishu 13.3.1 Context analysis Political context The political context in Mogadishu has different aspects. The internal aspect concerns local governance, security, legitimacy and accountability downwards to the city’s residents. Another aspect concerns Mogadishu’s relations with other regions and states in Somalia. When thinking about accountability in Mogadishu and surrounding areas it is important to recognise that the local political settlement is one established through force. During the violence of the 1990s, Mogadishu’s cosmopolitan character, in which secular and religious attitudes co-mingled and minorities and sub-clans of all shades occupied property in the capital, vanished. The period of warlordism saw further entrenchment. While the ICU made some attempts to improve administration and provide redress for seizure of property, this was not to last. Instead, local residents were faced with another period of armed violence and occupation, followed by a violent liberation in late 2011.10 Mogadishu’s internal politics reflect this legacy in some important respects. The city’s changed demographics, in which non-Hawiye clans and minorities feel marginalised or have been displaced, is key. One consequence is an enormous backlog of land dispute cases before the courts. But the broader point is that many clans feel excluded from what was once their city. That the city administration is now overly dominated by Hawiye sub-clan appointees, several with dubious backgrounds, does not lead to perceptions of high accountability. When it comes to the new federal government, Mogadishuans tend to express hope, while at the same time recognising accountability to be low. They are conscious of the low input legitimacy of their institutions, both municipal and federal, and are anxious to move ahead both with elections (currently scheduled for 2016) and with standing up government service delivery as quickly as possible. Acceptance of federalism appeared patchy amongst interviewees for this report. When asked what form of government they wanted, Mogadishu respondents were evenly split 4/4 over federalism versus centralism. Five others did not express things in these terms but focussed instead on a desire for responsiveness, transparency and accountability.
There is no accountability in Somalia. But there is now a new government and therefore a new start. Interview, federal government official, Mogadishu.
Security context Security has noticeably improved in Mogadishu from a low-point when TFG/Ethiopian forces battled Al Shabaab and displaced some 700,000 persons. Fighting still occurs but SNAF/AMISOM now control the entire metropolitan area, with Al Shabaab either relegated to outlying areas or working through underground cells in the city. Their tactics have now changed from conventional warfare to assassinations and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Though attacks can be devastating, the movement has arguably lost its grip on the population’s psyche. However, the decline of Al Shabaab has coincided with the re-emergence of clan-based militias. In the absence of effective policing or a functioning judiciary, violent crime plagues many parts of the city. A household survey in 2012 reported that 10% of households had experienced a violent injury in the last 90 days.11 Although some power-holders are implicated in insecurity (for example District Commissioner (DC’s) militias or predatory police), many interview respondents had a sense that security problems divert government attention and resources from service delivery, a key public demand and potential source of accountability. For example, when asked about the risks and challenges faced by those demanding accountability, two respondents said simply, “Fear and insecurity” and “They face the risk of being eliminated.” When asked if they had adequate information to demand accountability, 17 of 22 survey respondents answered negatively. An elder, however, cautioned that information alone is insufficient: “Information cannot be trusted until there is security. I live in Mogadishu and I work in Afgoye. On the way to Afgoye you come across many checkpoints manned by the government's soliders and yet they take money from you because they don't have any salary. In Afgoye a man dressed in uniform shot a government employee dead at a public meeting I attended.”
10 Bryden/Brickhill (2010: 256f), Hoehne (2009). 11 Mogadishu Rising?, Saferworld, 2012.
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Economic context Mogadishu is a vibrant economic centre. Strong sectors include construction, banking, small industries such as food and drink processing, textiles, telecoms, small-scale trade of the type found in Bakara Market and larger scale import-export through the port. Two of Somalia’s largest firms operate out of the city - Hormuud Telecom, the largest telecommunications company in southern and central Somalia, and Jubba Airways. The city is still benefitting from a post-Al Shabaab economic boost that saw investors and diaspora returning to start businesses and reclaim property, as well as a growing influx of foreign aid organisations. Among the beneficiaries is the private security industry which now guards many hotels and businesses. Mogadishu port, through which a range of foodstuffs and consumer goods pass daily, is another major asset. However, there are credible allegations of graft amongst port authority staff and diversion of potential customs revenue in excess of 1 million USD a month.12 Accountability among businesses is seen as low since regulatory capacity and legislation is lacking.
Trust and ownership of small industries in Mogadishu In 2002, Marchal carried out a survey for the EC Somalia delegation of Mogadishu’s economy. He identified 24 small factories operating at a time of high insecurity. The range of items under production was fairly broad and included pasta, mineral water, sweets, plastic, hides and skins, detergents and soap, aluminium, foam, fishing boats, packaging and stone processing. The factories were de facto if not de jure owned by groups of shareholders. Most it appeared were either family members or had some history of common activity. ‘Trust is therefore paramount’ concluded Marchal. Marchal, R., A Survey of Mogadishu’s Economy, European Commission/Somali Unit (Nairobi), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/documents/more_info/mogadishu_economic_survey_en.pdf
Social and cultural context The dominant social issues in Mogadishu today are questions of identity, ownership and territory. Following periods of out- and in-migration linked to the civil war and the influx of humanitarian assistance, populations have shifted over the years. The 1991 civil war was characterised by ‘clan cleansing’, initially between the Darood and Hawiye. That year, most of the Daarood were either killed or expelled from the city, along with many from the Gibil Cad clan and the Reer Xamar. Shortly afterwards, Raxenweyn and Bantu groups began to move to Mogadishu fleeing fighting in the countryside or seeking better livelihoods. With time, some Darood returned, but a larger number of migrants came from the central regions, mostly the Haber Gidir and Abgaal sub-clans.13 These displacements had several consequences for the city’s future politics and demographics. Firstly, a cosmopolitan culture of clan mixing and co- habitation was lost, along with many of the original city’s distinctive colonial and Islamic architectural features.14 Secondly, clan-based neighbourhoods became the norm. Thirdly, although the city remains mixed, Hawiye clans are now found in far larger numbers than ever before and in de facto possession of most private property. In turn, they dominate district-level governance. Fourthly, many of the Rahanweyne and Bantu migrants found homes in camps controlled by individuals from more powerful clan ‘gatekeepers’. The internally displaced population (IDP) is thought to number around half million. Various reports document IDPs’ difficulties in obtaining services and a chronic situation of neglect and exploitation. Human Rights Watch cites rape, beatings, ethnic discrimination, restricted access to food and shelter, restrictions on movement, and reprisals for protesting at mistreatment as common in Mogadishu camps. Militias and state security forces based near camps and camp managers (gatekeepers) are frequently responsible. People from lower-status Rahanweyne and Bantu communities are especially vulnerable. Repeated attempts to seek redress from local and central government have been said to yield empty promise or even arrest and detention. Identifying perpetrators is challenging, but accounts strongly implicate SNAF and militias connected to DCs among others. Interestingly, two DCs were convicted by a military court of looting food aid under the TFG but were later pardoned by the president. Whilst President Hassan Sheikh promised harsh punishments for security personnel committing rape in a bold public move in November
12 One media report claims that a 2010 reshuffle of the port authority’s staff increased recorded revenue from 0.9 m USD a month to 2.5m."Expats Return To Somalia In Hopes Of Aiding Change". Hiiraan.com. Retrieved 25/5/2013. 13 Marchal, R., A Survey of Mogadishu’s Economy, European Commission/Somali Unit (Nairobi), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/documents/more_info/mogadishu_economic_survey_en.pdf 14 Roble, F, Clan Cleansing in Somalia and the Destruction of Mogadishu as Physical Entity and Political, Social, and Cultural Community, April 17,
2013.
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2012, the detention of a female IDP and a journalist who was documenting rape allegations by the SNP and MOI destroyed any credibility for this initiative.15
“Right now people are unable and unwilling to hold leaders accountable. Many people are too scared. A good example is the rape case. That poor woman who reported her rape was treated so badly, she was arrested and imprisoned and then convicted for insulting a government body and making a false claim. Do you think that people are in a position to question and hold a government to account when we are in a country where this happens? People are too scared.”
Interview, IDP camp representative, Mogadishu.
13.3.2 Institutional mapping and stakeholder analysis Regional and district government Mogadishu is home to Benadir Region (governorate), a city council run by a mayor and 16 subsidiary districts, each administered by a district commissioner. While technically separate, the governorate, mandated to coordinate security with central government, and the city council, mandated to deliver services, reportedly merged in 2008. The current mayor is a prominent figure who spent time in local government in the UK.16 The mayor and DCs are all presidential appointees, the majority pre-dating the August 2012 transition and so reflecting their allegiance and clan links to former president Sheikh Sherif. Below district level are three lower tiers of administration: Waah, Laan and Tabelle. Interviewees for a governance analysis in Mogadishu reported that although legally the chairpersons at each level should be selected by elders, the chairpersons are typically appointed by DCs. These structures seem to exist in some but not all districts. Even so, de facto leadership is often split between the government appointees and clan leaders with higher legitimacy, though formal power-holders may also be clan leaders. All survey respondents were asked whether some levels of government are more responsive than others. In Mogadishu one respondent said that the MOI and mayor’s office are more responsive than DCs. Most felt there was no difference in responsiveness. Overall enthusiasm for DCs appears low. Several interviewees pointed to the domination of regional and district administrative posts, such as the mayor’s office, DCs, port, airport, TV and radio, by Hawiye sub-clans, particularly those close to former president Sheikh Sherif. They expressed the view that incoming president Hassan Sheikh has done too little to remedy this situation, perpetuating a sense of exclusive and non-responsive local governance.17 Federal government Mogadishu is also home to the newly recognised Federal Government of Somalia and associated federal institutions, including the House of the People, Central Bank and Supreme Court. Operating under the provisional constitution, the federal state institutions comprise a presidency indirectly elected by the legislature and a prime minister selected by the president. The prime minister nominates a cabinet (the Council of Ministers). Although it may be staffed by people with good intentions, the executive arm of government is seen as unstructured and underperforming.18 Leadership from the prime minister’s office is believed weak, while most ministries are not properly staffed, funded or organised as functioning institutions. Meetings between outsiders and federal officials and advisers tend to be dominated by two key concerns: first and foremost, delivering public services in pursuit of output legitimacy, and second, obtaining the resources and technical assistance from external sources to make this possible and to pay recurrent departmental costs. This puts a heavy onus on the Ministries of Planning and Finance to coordinate discussions and present a credible investment option for foreign backers. Debates on public financial management should be seen in this light and against a history of high corruption in the TFG. Planning and cooperation is still at the most rudimentary level. In addition, a conflict has emerged between the offices of the prime minister and president in which the president still has clear ascendancy.
15 See: Hostages of the Gatekeepers, Abuses against Internally Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia, Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 3-5, researched between July 2011 through November 2012. 16 Allegations of corruption notwitshstanding his listed achievements include starting a garbage collection program, erecting proper streetlights and providing around-the-clock electricity, sacking corrupt public officials, and offering formal police protection, improving traffic safety and fining motorists. See Freeman, Colin (2011-05-15). "How a modest council worker from Camden came to be the Mayor of Mogadishu". Telegraph.co.uk. Retrieved 2011-06-12.
17 Civil society interviwee, Mogadishu; Civil society interviewee, Nairobi.
18 Civil society interviewee, Mogadishu.
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Hassan Sheikh stands accused by critics of running an unaccountable and unconstitutional executive presidency under the influence of the Dam Al Jadid religious network.19 These problems seemed to be reflected in survey responses. When asked what kind of accountability people demand from leaders, the most common response among Mogadishu-based survey respondents was that it is still not possible to demand accountability. Limited access to power-holders was one explanation – several said that access to federal institutions is difficult unless one has connections through business, clan or family. Amongst those who commented on public demand, the most common response was demand for equitable resource sharing and representation. When asked if leaders hear too much or too little from their constituencies, the majority (15 of 22) said ‘not enough’, though some added that leaders probably hear too many demands for patronage from clan and family members.
“There is no way to demand accountability. We need laws in place first. We finally have an official government, but we don't have accountability or even access. If you are related to the leaders or you have connections, then maybe you can demand accountability. The average person with no power or influence will not be able to hold the government accountable, there are no proper channels.” Government interviewee, Mogadishu.
“No, not enough. They only hear from immediate relatives. For example, if I want to contact my MP, I would not have a way of seeing him. If I go to his office or his house, there are guards outside and he will make a decision as to whether or not he will see me.” Academic interviewee, Mogadishu.
Public perceptions of the federal legislature (the House of the People) were just as mixed. As mentioned earlier, reports of intimidation and corruption during the selection of elders for the 2012 National Constituency Assembly (NCA) and the subsequent nomination of MPs have left many skeptical about MPs.20 The MPs that emerged are acknowledged to be a mix – more educated members than ever before, but the majority, lacking the right skills or motivation. The Speaker, Osman Jawari, is seen as a statesmanlike figure who has risen above clan politics and corruption.21 Interestingly, Mogadishu survey respondents who were asked to identify viable mechanisms for holding their leaders to account were most likely to say that ‘parliament’ was the most viable mechanism (6 out of 19 responses). The next most popular responses were: ‘develop legislation and accounting systems’ (3), ‘an independent committee’ (2), ‘media’ (2), ‘educate the public / demand information, public f’r a' (3), and lastly ‘elections’ (1 response). Early attempts to convene committees and produce a legislative agenda were seen by some as having borne fruit.However,others pointed to recent attempts to unseat the prime minister for his role in the Jubbaland process as evidence of the institution’s failure.22 The legislature has somewhere close to its legal maximum of 275 sitting MPs and will serve until 2016 during which time it is expected to lead a constitutional review, establish committees and laws covering issues such as human rights, police oversight, elections and anti-corruption. Only slow progress can be expected on these agendas, but many respondents seemed willing to wait and see.
“Neither this or previous governments are accountable. The public has no way of holding their leaders accountable and the leaders do not want to be held accountable. Each sub-clan has their own MP and MPs have no clue about what is going on with the public they are supposed to be representing. They don’t give the public any of their time or value their opinions. Instead, they are looking out for their own personal interest. They are busy trying to pick fights and getting rid of different Ministers. They pull each other down.” Interview, civil society member, Mogadishu
“I think people can hold leaders accountable through the parliament who are the representatives of the people and one of the functions of the parliaments is oversight and control of the government. Effectiveness may require time and for people to recognise their powers over their government.” Interview, former MP and government official, Mogadishu.
19 The network has its origins within Hrakat al-Islah, a Muslim brotherhood inspired movement. The President, Minister of State and Interior are said by critics to be unduly influenced by it. REF: Coffey report. 20 In addition many elders lost legitimacy (if they ever had it) during the run-up to the NCA as contestation grew over plausible claims of bribery and over a flawed selection processes based on the disliked 4.5 formula. The formula first introduced at ...is due to be phased out along with the introduction of representative parliamentary elections. Careful thought has yet to go into election modalities and associated mechanisms however, such as establishing an election commission or commissions and managing the formation of political parties, a process that Somaliland and Puntland are finding difficult. A number of political parties have been formed in recent years but they had no role in establishing the current parliament. 21 Civil society interviewee, Mogadishu. 22 Ref.
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Security and justice actors Security in Mogadishu is delivered by fragmented and often underpaid agencies, the SNAF and NSIA, which answer to the Ministry of Defence and the SNP under the Ministry of Interior. The SNAF is noted for its militia membership, though command structure and loyalty to the formal organisation is said to have increased.23 Outside of the state, militias number at least 20 and range from private armies for well-connected individuals with links to parliament and former warlords to small forces protecting business interests. Most have strong clan loyalties and many grew from clan-directed action against Al Shabaab under an umbrella of AMISOM support. In some cases, district commissioners command their own militias, as in Wadajir and Hawl-Wadaag districts. Night-time neighbourhood protection groups add to the list of armed actors. The formal security sector faces high absenteeism, in part because soldiers and police officers are reportedly able to earn up to USD 200 a month, double their normal wage, by providing private security. Security personnel also earn revenues from checkpoints, as do militias. Attempts by the president to curtail this practice have only partially succeeded as money is also now demanded ‘virtually’ of some people by phone. The reputation of security actors varies somewhat, from the NSIA (viewed competent) to the police and military which have a demonstrably poor accountability record.24 The city also houses a number of circuit courts, the Supreme Court and the Higher Judicial Council, which together with the Ministry of Justice performs an oversight role. Residents tend to see the courts as partial, slow and corrupt. While they are prepared to use them for essential purposes where no other option exists, such as land disputes, only two out of 16 Mogadishu-based interviewees felt that the courts were a viable instrument for achieving accountability. This is not surprising: only a small number of lawyers and judges are working and many, particularly the judges, who tend to have informal training in Sharia law, lack appropriate training. Other problems raised at a recent national convention on justice sector development included poor infrastructure, executive interference, bribery and intimidation of court officials.25 The dramatic attack by Al Shabaab fighters against the Supreme Court in April 2013 in which some of country’s best-trained legal professionals died was an illustration of the dangers and difficulties faced.26 Potential entry-points for greater accountability exist within newly developed plans for justice sector and police development that actors such as DFID, IDLO and UNDP have worked on with relevant SFG ministries.27 Although officially federal documents, these plans will in practice be primarily implemented in the south and central regions, most likely Mogadishu. Business The business community has stepped in to provide services in areas where government could not, such as health, education, water and electricity. Many of these businesses are said to be financed by the diaspora. Small businesses are reportedly taxed frequently through door-to-door collections by district commissioners’ staff and militias. One interviewee lamented the lack of transparency and accountability around this, “Businesses, shops, transport providers, market traders are taxed daily by DCs but see nothing obvious in return. Yet people acquiesce feeling that some service is better than none” (Civil society interview, Nairobi). Yet the business community also stands accused of corrupt practices. SEMG reports portray a ‘revolving door’ syndrome of political-business links and rewards and collusion over TFG government contracts. Hawala, telecoms and airline business are said to have financed successive administrations in order to avoid taxation. Questions have also been raised about government reliance on business figures to move money in the absence of strict controls.
Look at the area that concerns people most: service delivery. Delivery is privatised and there is no transparency or grievance mechanism if I don't get a good service or if I want to query the price (e.g. 1.8 USD per KW for power in Mogadishu). It is the same for health, education, water, power. And how do these companies get contracts? Maybe they bribe the DC's? We don't know. Interview, civil society member, Mogadishu.
23 Civil society interviewee, Mogadishu. 24 Civil society interview, Mogadishu; civil society interviewee, Nairobi. See also: Hostage to the Gatekeepers... 25 ‘At the heart of the debates are widespread concerns expressed by judges, lawyers and civil society leaders that the Somali courts cannot rule fairly and independently, as long as a climate of fear and intimidation hangs above them.’ commented one media article, going on to quote a serving lawyer, Aisha Kiin who attended the Mogadishu conference, ‘Somalia needs "a judicial system that is independent [from other branches of government] and whose decisions cannot be interfered with,"’. ‘Somali leaders pledge judicial reform following landmark meeting’, http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/09/feature-02, April 19, 2013. 26 Somalia supreme court attack kills at least 20, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/14/somalia-supreme-court-attack-kills
27 See for example, ‘Strategic Action Plan for Policing’, 2013-2017, Somali Police Force and Ministry of Interior and Security.
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Traditional and Religious Leaders The two most important social structures in Mogadishu are Islam and the clan. Religious networks are well organised in an attempt to safeguard what they see as the correct values. The most well-known organisation is the CIS which acts as an umbrella for Islamic organisations and comprises many respected scholars. Key figures in the federal administration are widely believed to be members of religious organisations, though this is not thought to improve accountability. As elsewhere in Somalia though, respondents would often caveat statements of approval or trust in religious leaders by remarking that they were not as reliable or unified as they once were. Clan remains the dominant institution in Mogadishu as across south central, offering a social safety net and at least for some a physical safeguard. Many argue that its interaction with politics has been less healthy however. For example many observers of the current parliament lament the low educational standards and moral fibre of MPs; many interviewees were ready to blame this on corrupted elders.
“Most officials and MPs were elected by corrupt traditional leaders on 4.5 formula rather than on merit. Thus they don’t feel accountable and never reach out to the public/constituencies.” Religious Leader, Mogadishu.
“There's a very weak link between public officials and their constituencies, they were elected by corrupt traditional elders thus they do not feel they are accountable.” Government interviewee, Mogadishu.
“Intermediaries selected MPs. For example, the former speaker of the parliament picked the worse group for the Rahanweyne and ensured that they were not educated and he did this for his own personal gains. The MPs from Somaliland cannot return to Somaliland and therefore cannot communicate with their constituents. Those from Puntland were handpicked by Farole. And the elders that were selected were selected on favouritism and not merit or track record.” UN interviewee, Mogagdishu. Civil society Another actor of some concern to interviewees was organised civil society, operating as NGOs and networks in Mogadishu. Their dominant mode of engagement has been service delivery. Though credible advocacy groups also exist, records show that many NGOs exist only on paper. NGOs are believed to have proliferated in the Benadir region following UNOSOM’s withdrawal in 1994. Oxfam/Novib found 144 organisations operating in Mogadishu and the surrounding regions in 2003. Many, however, were dormant or operating only a few small projects. Most were observed to be clan-based. Many were ‘multi-purpose’ with no fixed mandate. A few more established organisations were networked. The situation has probably not changed a great deal since then, perhaps with the exception of networking initiatives. One interviewee with a long history of involvement in civil society capacity building and networking commented that there are basically three types of NGOs operating in Mogadishu: ‘family’ NGOs that are almost completely lacking in transparency; those that have INGO partners and so display some upward accountability to their donors; and the rare organisations showing some downward accountability to beneficiaries where accountability and funding sources were closely linked.28 Today in Mogadishu NGOs are seen by many federal government officials as competitors for funding and political space. There are well founded mutual allegations of corruption. Mogadishu houses a number of private universities including, Mogadishu University, Benadir University and the Somali Institute of Management and Administration Development (SIMAD). Founded by President Hassan Sheikh, SIMAD focusses on business administration, information technology and accountancy. Mogadishu also houses a number of professional associations such as the Somali Journalists Club, Law Society, Medical Association and artists unions. Religious leaders and traditional structures remain important but are weakened by strong factions.29
Collective Action Respondents were asked to provide examples of when citizens had come together to achieve change. Two examples were given: the Somaliland & Puntland peace agreements reached in Borama and Garowe and the formation of the Islamic Courts Union. One respondent noted that although civil society does come together periodically to protest or issue a declaration, it tends to be reactive instead of based on a common understandings on all the key issues.
28 Interview, Civil Society Respondent, Mogadishu.
29 Mapping Somali Civil Society, Oxfam/Novib, 2003.
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International community International aid agencies can be met with a lukewarm reaction in Mogadishu, unless they bring cash with few conditions. A number of interviewees pointed out that foreign NGOs and the UN are too often seen to be pushing a western agenda. Moreover, the international aid industry is seen by many as inherently corrupt. The most well- known organisations operating at present are OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, UNPOS, and the Red Crescent Societies.30 Turkish and Qatari organisations receive more favourable reviews. Advice offered by survey respondents to the question of how to improve international community transparency and accountability broke down as follows: move to Somalia (4); government must hold them to account (4); be more transparent, publish information (5); listen to communities (1); set up a committee to monitor them (1).
“There is a mystery behind how money is spent. Donors tell the leadership a sum but how that sum is dispersed is unknown. Since 2000 the Somali government have not been given a breakdown of of how much money was spent and how, they were just the recipient. No one knew how the money was spent in Nairobi. There is the development assistance database which is currently managed by UNDP but will be given to the government. The international community can be clear about how money is spent, what is implemented, the Somali government should demand this information. The government needs to oversee how resources are delivered.” UN interviewee, Mogadishu.
13.3.3 Trust, collective action and corruption The following questions were asked regarding trust in Mogadishu: On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: businesses? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: religious leaders? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: national NGOs? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: traditional leaders? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: media? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: government? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: the international community (e.g. UN, INGOs)? Twenty-two people were interviewed in Mogadishu. Due to some respondents declining to answer, or the team not having the time to ask the questions, the number of respondents varies. The graph below shows the answers to each of these questions The score on the primary horizontal axis is taken from the aggregate of all the responses divided by the sum total of the responses.
30 According to an OCHA analysis, the number of key organisations operating in Mogadishu as of February 2012 was as follows: International NGOs – 44; Red Crescent Societies – 9; Local NGOs – 39 (There are about 373 local NGOs registered with the Ministry of interior, although as stated above, only 39 are currently operating); International Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) agencies and local OIC partners – 48.
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The graph shows that religious leaders have the highest levels of trust followed by the media and then the international community. National NGOs and government have the lowest trust levels. The following questions were asked regarding corruption in Mogadishu: In your view are the following (a-e) examples of corruption? (a) A government official hiring his nephew. 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (b) Government allocating jobs by clan quota regardless of merit. 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (c) A government official keeping a small amount of project money to use to pay bribes to get an important project done. 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (d) A government official keeping project money for personal gain. 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (e) International aid workers working on Somalia but living in Nairobi. 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes There were a total of 20 respondents to this question set. Some respondents did not answer questions (a) through to (e). The “no reply” responses have not been included in the graph below.
The graph shows that a government official keeping project money for personal gain is perceived as being the most corrupt. This is followed by the international aid workers working on Somalia but living in Nairobi and a government official keeping a small amount of project money to pay bribes to get an important project done. The scenario most dependent on additional information was a government official hiring his nephew. The scenario with the most “no” responses was the government allocating jobs by clan quota regardless of merit.
Additional information provided during interviews showed that the definition of corruption was constituted as a misappropriation or misuse of public funds for personal gain. One civil society respondent commented that the problem was ‘everywhere’ because of fear, manipulation and lack of enforcement capacity. In his view manipulation by the political class, whereby the government raises funds any way it can to buy loyalty from opposition groups, elders and religious leaders, was a fundamental problem. The view was also offered that misappropriation of foreign aid resources is less of a public concern, but only because people have so little information or hope to influence this problem. Some respondents made the connection between information and corruption. When asked if they had adequate information to demand accountability, two religious leaders separately commented: “You need connections to get information” and “Not at all, even if you know of corruption there's nowhere you can take the complaint”. One response highlighted the element of risk involved by those demanding greater accountability: “They face the risk of being eliminated. They're also constantly marginalized in the government. As a result, people look the other way when it comes to corruption.”Civil society interviewees, Mogadishu.
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13.4 Kismayo 13.4.1 Context analysis Political context Kismayo has been ruled by a series of strongmen and armed clan alliances since the civil war. In December 1993, General Morgan conquered the town and surrounding area using a combined Ogaden and Majerten alliance. Morgan yielded to the Marehan, Ogadeni and Habr Gedir-based Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) in 1999. Following the ICU’s successes in other parts of south and central Somalia, the ICU captured Kismayo, only to lose the city to Ethiopian/TFG forces in 2007. The Ethiopian/TFG forces in turn retreated in the face of an Al Shabaab-led uprising in 2008. Al Shabaab were later ousted by a Kenyan military/Ras Kamboni militia operation which instituted an interim (ie military) administration. Given this history, it is unsurprising that 80% of survey respondents said that people demanding accountability in Kismayo face risks such as death, imprisonment, intimidation, robbery and being ostracised. The respondents felt that most residents simply do not raise demands for fear of the consequences.
Question: How does the public hold it’s leaders accountable here, and how effectively?
“The public holding leaders accountable? That thing does not exist here at all.” Interviewee from a women’s organisation, Kismayo.
“The public almost never holds leaders accountable.” Youth interviewee, Kismayo.
“No one holds or even tries to hold public officials accountable here in our region.” Academic Interviewee, Kismayo.
Since the ousting of Al Shabaab, the politics of the area have been dominated by debate over establishing ‘Jubbaland’, a putative state under the federal umbrella. Planning and consultations for a Jubbaland state began in mid-2012 under IGAD and TFG auspices, with leading Gedo and Juba-based militia figures at the table. A basic framework was agreed at a July 2012 IGAD-sponsored conference whereby Jubbaland would be a federal member state comprised of Gedo, Lower Jubba and Middle Jubba regions, with separation of judicial, legislative and executive powers, unitary security forces, respect for minority rights and a Sharia legal framework. A ‘technical committee’ comprised of representatives from Kenya, Ethiopia, IGAD, AU, UN, regional clans and militias, and with observers from Kenya, Ethiopia, IGAD, the AU and the UN, moved ahead on a selection process for the president, a nomination process for a parliament and a draft constitution. A state constitution, flag and logo were subsequently agreed on and a 500 member convention established to elect a president. As the days following the declaration of Jubbaland on May 15th showed, however, some key issues are unresolved. A rival (Marehan) candidate, Barre Adam Shire Hirale, was also declared president by a separate group of elders. Hirale claims that his rival’s project is a front for Kenyan meddling, but he has a smaller local support base. Puntland and IGAD are backing the former process - Puntland because of their closer affiliation with the Ogaden majority and IGAD because of its long sponsorship dating back nearly two years. The SFG is so far maintaining its public position that only the federal government can lead such a process. Federal Prime Minister Shirdon, probably in contravention of the constitution, has appointed a committee of ministers and representatives to broker an agreement between the competing presidents-elect.31 This confusion underscores the problem of constant jockying for representation and access to resources in local politics, which is driven in part by mistrust among different groups. Consequently, formation of an inclusive administration is believed by most observers to be the key to future stability, as this should quell conflict over control of resources. Perceptions always seem to vary, however, as to whether different groups have been adequately involved in negotiations and whether the resulting representation is genuine. This suggests that an ‘inclusive enough’ settlement is the best possible outcome.32
31 Somalia: Tensions Rise As Two Leaders Claim Jubbaland Presidency, http://allafrica.com/stories/201305170095.html 32 Past dissenters to the current Jubbaland process include the ‘Jubba and Gedo originals’ committee which has claimed inadequate representation for its members. The group is composed of sub-clans and minorities with a long historical presence in the region which pre-dates the arrival of some major clans. IST document.
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Security context The city is reported to be tense if calm at present, with supporters of rival presidential camps standing by. Security in recent months was reported as good, but with some concerns, particularly from weaker clans, over ‘policing’ by Ras Kamboni forces. No formal police are present in the area, leaving militias a free hand. Economic context Kismayo is a commercial centre for produce from across south and central Somalia. Revenue from Kismayo port is the central feature of the city’s economy and that of the wider region. Control of the port provides income from exports such as bananas, livestock, rice, khat, sugar and charcoal. Trading in these commodities is region-wide, notably into Kenya. Huge revenues are at stake. According to the 2012 UN Monitoring Group report, Al Shabaab yielded between 35-50m USD from Kismayo, Merka and Baraawe.33 Each incoming administration has collected customs tax on these items, providing enough income to fund local administrations and troops, most recently including SNA salaries for Lower Jubba and Gedo. Conflict regarding resource sharing among the region’s disparate groups is cyclical. Social and cultural context Kismayo is a cosmopolitan city in which many groups are represented, albeit with different degrees of influence. Clan dynamics are a defining feature of politics and accountability relationships in the area. All the major clan families and significant numbers of minority representatives participate in a vibrant economy and a fluid political scene: Darod (Marehan, Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, Ogaden); Hawiye (Gaaljecel, Ajuuraan, Sheekhal); Baajuun (Bantu); Digil Mirifle (Cawmale, Wardeey, Hubeer, Geledle); and Dir (Biimaal, Madaluug, Ree Aw saciid). Of these, Hawiye and Darood sub-clans have the largest representation. The Ogaden-Marehan-Harti are the major rivals in negotiations and armed conflict in the area, with minorities and small clans forging alliances as necessary, including with Al Shabaab. To the Kismayo residents interviewed for this report, the link between clan, representation and accountability was very clear. 70% of respondents said that leaders are never or almost never held accountable. Most went on to explain that the clan provides leaders with a shield against public demand and individual responsibility.
“If the leader is from a powerful clan, no one but members of his own clan can hold him accountable. This means if a member of the public but from a different clan tries to take a step against the leader, he/she may face a consequence that risks himself or at least he won’t be heard or listened.” Elder, Kismayo.
“Usually, leaders aren't hold accountable for their actions. This is because, the leader always rests under the umbrella of his clan and therefore he cannot be individually judged for his actions. An effective way to hold leaders accountable is separate the leader from intermingling with his own family to seek protection.” Academic interviewee, Kismayo
There was, however, some disagreement on the clan’s implications for accountability. A majority of respondents (60%) deemed the clan as having a negative influence on accountability by shielding leaders from individual responsibility and breeding nepotism. A minority (one individual) rated it as having a positive influence because clan members will hold their representatives accountable. Three respondents said it has both positive and negative implications. In a follow-up question, interviewees were asked what demands are actually made when accountability is demanded. Having acknowledged that voicing demand is not that common, an academic interview stated that “Accountability concerning the provision of public goods and resources. For example, in Kismayo, the biggest source of income of the administration in place is the taxation from the seaport (charcoal export). Usually the relatives of the leader in office earn a lot of money, build beautiful houses, collect the most weapons, etc. Every other member of the society would like to demand accountability over the use of these public resources but this practically never happens because of fear.” When asked whether leaders hear too much or too little from their constituencies, 90% of respondents said ‘not enough’ or ‘they don’t listen except to powerful interests’. All respondents said that elites and members of powerful
33 See ref 6 from IST document.
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(particularly armed) clans can demand more; 80% felt that they themselves lacked adequate information to hold leaders to account and suggested a variety of means to improve access to information including using the media, members of the leader’s clan, business people, opposition groups, and honest people in government.
“Negative influences of clan institutions are extensive and more damaging than positive influences. Clan in Somalia is a cancer and is never useful for any purpose.” Business interviewee, Kismayo.
“The clan system is potentially the only accountability system that Somalia has. Members hold their political representatives accountable by, for example, not contributing to their political campaigns, lobbying for their replacement, shaming them in front of their public, etc.” Media interviewee, Kismayo.
13.4.2 Institutional and stakeholder analysis Regional and district government The city of Kismayo is currently run by an interim administration established after KDF and allied forces pushed Al Shabaab from the area in September 2012. According to an AU brief compiled in 2012, the administration has a 12 member Executive Committee and 25 officers overall.34 Complaints have been heard in the region, particularly from non-Daroods ,that administration appointees from their clan are not their legitimate representatives, with calls for a fresh selection process. The city has traditionally been divided into four degmo, or districts: Calanleey, Faanoole, Farjano, Shaqaalaha but formal governance arrangements do not exist at this level now. The day-to-day governance implications of the recent Jubbaland declaration(s) will become clearer over time, but the constitutional proposals developed in 2012 with IGAD involvement will likely be the key reference point for attempts to build an administration and legislature. Federal institutions (executive and parliament) Except for its SNAF troops, the federal government is not present in Kismayo. Nevertheless, the government continues to try to influence the Jubbaland process, which has led to a conflictual relationship with key figures in Kismayo. The Kismayo problem has consumed President Hassan Sheikh’s time and energy since the government’s inauguration. Observers suggest the stand-off is linked to the centralist ambitions of the president’s advisers, his predominantly Hawiye financial backers and the Dam Al-Jadid network. There is also a well grounded fear that a Ras Kamboni administration brought into being without federal government leadership will not share power and revenue with the centre and may fall into Kenya’s orbit. Attempts by the federal government via the Office of the Presidency and the Prime Minister to influence decision-making in Kismayo have so far been rebuffed. Kismay survey respondents were asked to identify ways in which government could be held to account for its action. The top two answers were ‘parliament/parliamentary committees’ and ‘regional and district committees’ with three responses each. Also included were ‘first establish internal checks and clear standards’ (2); ‘elections’ (2), ‘courts’ (2) and ‘media/public meetings’ (1). Security and justice actors The Ras Kamboni Brigades (RKB), a largely Darood/Ogaden militia force led by Sheikh Ahmed Madobe,35 is the major force in the city and in much of lower Jubba. It is allied with Somali National Army and KDF/AMISOM forces stationed in the area. However, Al Shabaab remains present 50km outside the city and has mounted periodic attacks. There is no formal policing in the city at present, leaving residents reliant on militias and Ras Kamboni in particular. Problems with security or the heavy presence of the above-named security forces may go a long way to explaining residents’ negative perceptions of accountability options. Traditional and religious leaders Jubba’s and Gedo’s traditional leaders from all sub-clans in Kismayo and the wider Jubba and Gedo regions have been heavily involved in political processes. Under the interim administration they have sought influence, not always
34 2 Dir, 2 Digile Mirifle, 2 Hawiye and the remainder Darod, mostly Ogadeni. IST.... 35 Full name Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam. A former ICU member Madobe was governor of Kismayo from 2006 until the EDF invaded in 2006. Later he joined and then left Al Shabaab. Ras Kamboni remains Ogadeni dominated but Madobe succeeded in bring Al Shabaab defectors and some Marehan into the ranks.
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successfully. More recently the Jubbaland conference saw 50-60 leaders from sub-clans in the wider region travel to Kismayo university to select MPs and a President. A long-standing agreement has been that Darood clans would take 47 seats in the legislature (22 Ogaden, 17 Marehan, 8 Harti), with Hawiye sub clans, Digil Mirifle, and Bantus taking 18 seats between them.36 The intended link between accountability and representation (by clan) is obvious. Questionnaire respondents provided little information on the actions of religious leaders in the area. Business Several national firms operate in Kismayo, such as the hawala companies (Dahabshiil, Amal, Mustaqbal, Jubba, Beeso, Taj, Dalsan, Barwaaqo and Kaah Express. There are also three national telecoms providers, Hormuud, NationLink and Telecom Somalia. Waamo Water and Power Company is the only provider of electricity or water. The retail and hospitality sectors are underdeveloped, with many small businesses. The major business in the city is associated with import and export of licit and illicit goods through the port. Those involved wield significant influence. One example is the prominent leader of non-Darood groups in the city, Abdikadir Haji Yusuf (Luga Dhere/Long Legs). Hailing from the Hawiye/Shekhal, he is a wealthy livestock importer and a leading figure in the Jubbaland(1) conference. A second example is the role of the business community in backing the interim administration to block a visit by a federal government team of investigators from entering the city in November 2012 to examine charcoal reserves left by Al Shabaab and determine their fate. Sales of charcoal have since resumed. Civil society CSOs are not well developed in Kismayo and have low influence compared to other non-state actors listed here. Their role in supporting accountability is not huge in terms of traditional demand/supply thinking. The most significant institution is the University of Kismaayo however, which recently hosted the Jubbaland conference. In acting as a facilitator for inter-clan dialogue on state formation, the university could be portrayed as contributing to collective action in the area. Further research into the specifics of this case would be needed however. Other organisations based in the town are the Jubba Journalists Union (JJU) and Waamo Women's Way (WWW). The media sector is not strong, with most residents tuning into national radio stations. However, Kismaayo Radio was recently established. There is also Kismaayo, news online. International community Kenya and IGAD have strong influence in Kismayo, KDF troops having worked closely with Ras Kamboni to oust Al Shabaab and both Kenya and IGAD having supported the Jubbaland process for nearly two years. There was little or no reference to INGO or UN activity in the area among questionnaire respondents. The volatile political and security situation is the obvious explanation. When asked to name external interventions that support improved governance, the responses were limited. Transparency International and Norway (possibly the SFF) were listed, as was the UN Monitoring Group, which was credited with ‘instilling a climate of fear among politicians’. As one elder put it, “Somali leaders do not expect to meet with strong, astonishing internal demands for accountability as the whole community is divided into groups by them. And internationally, no one leader has ever been judged on the basis of their corruption in the country. So, I see that if the International Criminal Court or any other international agency would intervene this would support accountable governance in the country.” When asked to identify opportunities that might exist at this time to promote accountability the top, response was to identify honest leaders. One civil society interviewee said “Elect honest leaders and train society to demand rights”, and an elder responded “The only opportunity to improve trust between leaders and the people are to is to get honest, caring, effective leaders who see that to sacrifice their personal interests to the public interest is worthwhile thing to do.” Other responses where ‘use Islam’ (2); ‘elections’ (2); and ‘create accountability mechanisms and laws’ (1). The top responses to the question of how international actors can be more transparent and accountable were, ‘be more transparent with their donors / government’ (3); ‘government and community must demand transparency / drive out corrupt leaders first’ (3). 13.4.3 Trust, collective action and corruption Survey respondents gave an almost unanimous response that within the clan, in religious settings or in the face of external disaster, Somalis can cooperate. In other settings, particularly in politics, they felt that inter-clan mistrust and rivalry drives competition over resources. One respondent framed this as a collective action problem by explaining
36 IST document.
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that when faced with external calamities such as droughts, Somalis succeed in coming together because the potential benefits of cooperation are assumed to accrue widely, while the burdens of action are more evenly shared.
Q: In what contexts do you see high levels of trust among Somalis working together, and in what settings is trust low? Why does it vary?
“Somalis work together as clan members when fighting but never trust each other for some cooperative projects. This is because of the hatred among them and of clan based affiliation.” Women’s representative, Kismayo.
“People show high level of trust when seeking change and when that same change matures, trust drops down. This is because Somalis have a culture based on desire for change.” Civil society member, Kismayo.
“Trust is high when working together for philanthropy – drought relief, building mosques and quaranic schools, digging wells etc. Trust is very low when sharing resources such as political positions. This is because the first is based on reward seeking and Allah's way, while the latter is motivated by clan rivalry.” Elder, Kismayo
“When a group of people subscribe to a particular ideology (often religious) they tend to be harmonious in their thought and in their actions. We've seen that with the Islamic Courts, Al Shabaab and others.” Media interviewee, Kismayo.
When asked to provide examples of people working successfully together for change, 30% of respondents recalled the 1960s era of the Somali Youth League and north-south unification; 70% pointed to the the ICU, as it was driven by society at large, across clan and against warlords. When questioned about corruption, there was general agreement that corruption is misuse of power or public funds for personal gain (100% of respondents). Most agreed that there are different degrees of corruption, usually saying that taking aid for the poor is the worst kind. Four respondents cited aid workers as the worst offenders. An elder in Kismayo said, “Many people, particularly those working for relief and humanitarian agencies feel that corrupting the aid for the poor is somehow acceptable. There is a widespread feeling among the community that whoever gets that chance never stops doing such corruption.” Respondents were also asked what international actors trying to promote accountability should avoid. ‘Don’t believe leaders / avoid complicity with compromised people’ was the top response (60%), followed closely by ‘take the issue seriously and enact rigorous checks’ (20%).
13.5 Baidoa 13.5.1 Contextual analysis Political context Baidoa town is the regional capital for Bay and the focal point for the Mirifle clan. Although it briefly housed the Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2006 during a period of high instability in the capital, the area has an uncertain relationship with Mogadishu. In the current post-transition, federal context, Digil and Mirifle leaders from Bay and neighbouring Bakool are debating their future status in a unified Somalia and the possible formation of a federal state which could combine Rahanweyne sub-clans into one block. Their decisions and relationship with Mogadishu will be an important test-case for the federal model. The Bay regional administration, which operates out of Baidoa, is largely composed of individuals chosen in 2007. In February 2013, however, former governor Abdifatah Ibrahim Geesey, a close ally of Ethiopia, was replaced by the federal government as part of its strategy to establish interim administrations. This has inevitably changed power dynamics locally as different clans try to interpret Mogadishu’s intentions in the area and form new alliances. One of the findings of a 2012 conflict analysis was that feelings of ownership over local governance have never been high due to the appointment of outsiders. These factors may go some way to explaining survey responses which show perceptions of low government accountability (see below).37
37 Recurrent looting of public assets following changes of leadership was cited as an indicator of low ownership, though it was also recognised that the experience of mass looting during previous phases of conflict has left its mark.USAID-TIS.
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Conflict and security Bay and Bakool witnessed a series of conflicts in which over the past twenty years the Rahanweyne people often fell prey to abusive external forces. These conflicts included attacks by Marehan militias in 1991 and 1992; the ‘Salbalaad’ invasion by Mohamed Farah Aideed’s Hawiye-dominated United Somalia Congress (USC) in 1995; the Ogaden war led by Mohamed Omar Jess (Darood); and the intra-Rahanweyne RRA conflict from 1995-1999.38 The wars have left a bitter legacy that a recent period of Al Shabaab control (January 2009 - February 2012) served to repress rather than solve. The Al Shabaab administration was characterised by repressive governance and economic policies, misuse of force (including executions and harsh punishment) and sexual and gender based violence. Although temporarily redressing the balance between marginalised and dominant groups in some respects, the Al Shabaab administration has left its own conflict legacy. Interviews for a USAID-TIS conflict analysis highlighted the need for extensive trauma healing and counseling. Many inter-communal conflicts also exist, most often over resources. Security analysts warn of the possible revival of inter-clan conflict in the area following the retreat of Al Shabaab and Ethiopian forces.39Despite this, security is tolerably good at present due to the presence of Ethiopian, AMISOM and federal government aligned forces. An area approximately 6km in radius within the town operates as a ‘green zone’ with a night-time curfew. Social and cultural context Underlying many of these issues are long-standing clan divisions. The major clan in the area is the Mirifle, with 32 sub-clans. The major division within the Mirifle is between the '8th' and '9th' groups, with the 8th group dominant. Prominent sub-clans in the 8th group are the Laysan, Hariin and Boqolhore who are dominant in Baidoa town. Prominent 9th groups include the Luway, Huber and Geledle. Yantaar, Eemid, Jirron, Haddame. The Moallimweyne are also present as are some of the Dabarre sub-clan (Digil, i.e. non-Mirifle). Relations among these groups are complex, with some clans in alliance, others in conflict.40 Interviewees nevertheless point to the routine marginalisation of minorities and smaller clans in many decision-making processes and in economic life.
Clan conflicts and alliances in and around Baidoa The Laysan: probably the largest clan in the town and the most influential due to its united leadership. Traditionally agro-pastoralists the Laysan are now highly urbanised and economically successful. They have no organised militias but have produced prominent Mirifle leaders: former TFP Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden (Asharaf clan but adopted as a Laysan) and Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, the most well-known Digil/Mirifle warlord. Local allies: Eimad and Asharaf in Berdale district. The Hariin: the second largest clan and occupying a large area to the north. The Hariin work as pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. The Hariin have manyf militias and are easily mobilised. Traditionally allied with the Elay and Boqolhore against the Laysan, except in regard to Elay-Boqolhore land conflict. Well-known leader: warlord and politician Hassan Shati-Gudud. The Boqolhore are mainly agro-pastoralists. Many are resident in the town but they are not strong politically or economically. They are allied with Hariin and Elay against the Laysan. They traditionally live in the area between Biadoa town and Burhakaba district. The Luway: predominantly pastoralists and agro-pastoralists they dominate the livestock trade and related industries but are not urbanised so not prominent politically in Baidoa. They have organized militia groups which are dormant at this time. Close allies with the Huber and Elay with whom they share grazing land. The Huber: predominantly farmers and agro-pastoralists. They live in surrounding areas and are not politically or militarily active. In the last few years they have been in conflict with the Yantar (pastoralists) over land. In terms of alliances, the Huber are close to Geledle and Luway. The Gelidle, like the Luway, are predominantly pastoralists and secondarily agro-pastoralists. They have some presence in Biadoa town but are not considered politically and economically important. The Geledle are spread
38 The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) was initially formed from clans within the Saab line as a defence against predation from stronger armed clan forces during the civil war period, most notably Aided’s USC. Splits subsequently developed leading to a battle for control of the town in 2005. 39 UN DSS Security Risk Assessment, 2012. 40 The main sub-clan conflicts identified in a 2012 Saferworld conflict analysis report were those between the Leysan and Hareen, Jiroon and Leysan, Sley-Gilidle, Wanjeel-Garwale and Elay-Hadamo.
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throughout three neighboring regions: Bay, Bakol and Middle Juba. Taditionally allied with the Huber.
Economic context Baidoa’s population relies on a combination of rain-fed agriculture, pastoralism, small-scale business and trade. Local businesses include handicraft production and retail. However, the economic position of Baidoa and Bay region is much reduced compared to previous years and unemployment is very high. Many people’s livelihoods have been reduced through successive droughts, crop failure, and depletion of livestock and assets. Estimates of displacement from the area run at around 40,000. Much of this is believed to have occurred during the period of Al Shabaab control when taxes were raised and food prices rose. Access to education and health services is very limited – a small number of clinics, schools and even a university exist but are only affordable for a few. There are also recurrent water shortages. 13.5.2 Institutional mapping and stakeholder analysis Regional and district government The town has two levels of government administration - a governorate at regional level and lower-level district councils. The councils were formed across Bay region through a UNDP/TFG-supported bottom-up process involving peace dialogues and elections in 2007. Councils in each district are supposed to have 21 councilors (27 in Baidoa), a DC, two deputies and secretaries for thematic portfolios. A 2012 UNDP assessment identified capacity gaps around public expenditure management and public works management and a lack of office equipment and administrative assets. The municipality does collect taxes and is able to supply water in the town centre. Otherwise, its revenue goes mostly towards maintaining security. Mechanisms for community participation in development planning are said to exist but they do not function well under present conditions. Federal institutions (executive and parliament) The federal government is represented in Baidoa by federal security forces (SNAF and SNP), by the judiciary, and by the governor. The governor, Adan Abdi Hasowas, was appointed in February 2013 and his influence has yet to be tested. SNAF and SNP personnel make an important security contribution but are strongly backed by Ethiopia for the time-being. Their effectiveness will mainly depend on continued payment and on reinforcement in the event of Ethiopian withdrawal. Members of the federal parliament who hail from Baidoa are said to have visited the area with a view to establishing constituency offices, but these plans have not developed further. Justice and security actors Unlike many parts of south and central Somalia, Baidoa is relatively well served in terms of statutory justice institutions. Two police stations and around 55 officers are said to operate in the town. The police quickly resumed duties within the town centre on Al Shabaab’s exit and are said to patrol day and night and conduct arrests and detentions. Most lack appropriate skills and training, however. Some are new recruits, others have a militia or paramilitary background that may include Ethiopian military training. Payment of salaries is sporadic. According to interviews in late 2012, the main problem the police face is ‘organised crime’, which is taken to include insurgent activity. Actors other than the police dominate security in Baidoa, however. Within the town, Ethiopian Defence Force (EDF) is the principle guarantor of security and indeed of the local administration’s ability to govern. The EDF is backedby pro-federal government military formations and by Djiboutian, Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM troops. Though now uprooted from the city, Al Shabaab forces remain present in outlying districts and mount sporadic attacks against occupying forces.41 They still find support within the town and can contact those living in the area by mobile phone at any time, particularly to issue threats against cooperation with the federal government and its allies. Sporadic outbreaks of fighting between pro-government factions also take place. Ethiopian troops plan to withdraw at some unspecified point, creating uncertainty and prolonging tensions.42 One legacy of their time in Baidoa, however, is the organisation of volunteer neighbourhood watch groups in every district and section of the town.43
41 Interviews carried out in late 2012 by UNDP’s Youth at Risk project show that the area supplied a significant number of ideologically committed Al Shabaab recruits, suggesting a natural support-base. This can partly be attributed to long-standing grievances over marginalisation in the area. 42 A one-day focus group of clan elders convened by Saferworld in late 2012 three months after the Shabaab withdrawl was reported as tense – many residents remain guarded and fearful to speak out on sensitive issues.
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District, regional and appellate courts were also re-established in 2012 and are said to handle 20 to 30 cases a month, mainly involving family issues. The court staff are the pre-2008 incumbents and were re-appointed by the Higher Judicial Council in Mogadishu. They lack a dedicated court building and complain of non-payment of salaries and threats from Islamists to themselves and court users. Under Ethiopian auspices, parallel military courts were established to process Al Shabaab suspects. Sentences range from long-term imprisonment in Baidoa’s prison to execution. A number of suspects are said to have disappeared completely. Traditional and religious leaders Each clan is represented by an elders’ council due to past support from the NGOs Life and Peace Institute and Somali Peace Line, and so cross-clan meetings can be convened. Traditional leaders played an active role in dialogues around formation of district and regional councils in 2007 and are still highly influential. Particularly, outside the town they manage community affairs (including security). Religious leaders previously played a role in conflict resolution and are also said to be well respected. Business The business sector includes numerous small traders selling livestock and agricultural products as well as minorities involved in hunting and handicrafts. The Laysaan clan are most successful in business. Recognisable national firms operate in the town, including all of the Somali Hawala companies (Dahabshiil, Amal, Mustaqbal, Jubba, Beeso, Taj, Dalsan, Barwaaqo, Kaah Express) and two telecom companies (Hormuud and NationLink). Two companies enjoy a monopoly on the supply of water and power, Baidoa Water Supply and Baidoa Electricity. With a few hotels and international agency compounds these firms hire or own small security companies to protect their assets. Civil society A number of local civil society organisations exist in the town, covering issues ranging from health to education, income generation, child protection, legal aid and SGBV. They include some active women’s organisations such as the Bay Women Network and the Bay Youth Foundation. The University of Southern Somalia is the most influential civil society organisation in the area. Village and district-level development committees have been engaged in previous development planning and neighbourhood watch type schemes. Media organisations also operate from the town: Radio Baidoa, the biggest news outlet, and BaidoaNews online. National and international news networks are widely listened too as well, such as VOA, the BBC and Radio Bar- Kulan. International community The UN is the main international actor visible in the area, athough Red Crescent societies also operate from time to time. UNICEF, UNHCR, UNMAS, FAO, WHO, WFP and OCHA are all operating in the area but with a limited footprint. UNDP provides support to the police, courts and district administration at a distance, including for the rehabilitation of a several hundred youth deemed ‘at risk’ of falling into criminal habits. Relatively few INGOs are present due to security concerns.
Box 23: Baidoa survey responses
Baidoa questionnaire respondents were evenly split on how leaders can be held to account in the city. Four of 10 responded ‘They cannot because their leaders were not elected but were selected by someone else.’ Another four suggested the use of public meetings, while one elder suggested the use of chiefs and elders. Eight out of 10 respondents held that the concept of accountability is not well understood. Eight out of 10 respondents also felt that leaders hear too little from their constituencies, a common complaint being that selected officials do not out to seek local views. On the role that the clan pays when it comes to demanding accountability, nine out of 10 interviewees said that clan affiliates have greater voice when dealing with power-holders. Most respondents recognised the clan’s positive contributions through the diya system and through instilling loyalty to one’s community. The same group also tended to cite the negative consequences of encouraging clan favouritism and conflict. Only two respondents said that the clan was wholly negative when it came to accountability.
43 USAID-TIS.
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When asked the best way to hold government to account, four respondents said ‘free and fair elections’; three described some sort of facilitated process which combined elections and traditional methods (presumably as in 2006/7); three respondents from across different sectors, including an IDP and a business person, said that the district council could do it. When asked what risks and challenges people face in demanding accountability, six responded that people are afraid of dismissal or imprisonment by the authorities. However, nine out of 10 also said they did not have enough information to demand accountability, listing a range of communication channels that could be used: media, workshops, seminars, mosques, TV, internet, and posters. The most common advice provided by interviewees to international actors seeking to promote accountability was to avoid any bias towards communities. Outsiders were also advised by the majority of interviewees to ‘let the Somalis take the lead / work closely with government’ as a way of enhancing international actors’ accountability and transparency.
13.5.3 Trust, collective action and corruption Most interviewees in Baidoa felt that trust is high within the clan due to collective decision-making, and within religious settings because people tend to work together. They cited the political arena as being low in trust. Two respondents said that education increases trust among people.
“Within the clan setting, trust is very high among the same clan members. Trust is low in other settings. That's because clans tend to make collective decisions.” Business interviewee, Baidoa.
“Religious settings create an atmosphere of trust among Somalis. It prompts them to work together. Trust becomes low among Somalis in settings where they feel injustice is being done.” Elder, Baidoa.
All ten interviewees cited the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), which brought people of south west Somalia together in defence against General Aideed’s forces in the south in 2005, to be a good example of collective action.44 Corruption Interviewees seemed to have total agreement on the idea that corruption is stealing public property. Several mentions were also made of corruption ‘doing injustice for the whole of Somalia.’
13.6 Past and current initiatives All interviewees in south central Somalia were asked to identify past or current interventions promoting accountability. Almost no positive responses were recorded. The interventions most spoken about by Nairobi-based interviews are profiled below. 13.6.1 The Police Advisory Committee, Mogadishu Civilian oversight of policing is still rudimentary in Somalia, but a locally-grown Mogadishu structure, the Police Advisory Committee (PAC), is seen to be a promising example of a hybrid of ministerial and independent oversight and accountability. Working under the motto ‘No Torture – Justice Prevail,’ the PAC carries out random visits to the central prison, the Criminal Investigation Department, district police stations and IDP camps across the city, monitoring treatment of detainees and hearing complaints. The PAC’s 12 member committee is part Ministry of Interior and part civil society, along with retired judges and police officers. Members are selected on the basis of trust, and with considerations for clan balance and police/civil society representation. Visits take place weekly and monthly reports are sent to the Ministry of Interior, police commissioner and UNDP. According to UNDP, the structure experiences problems related to clan and personality but the overall impression is of modest achievement under very difficult circumstances. The UNDP is now considering how best to support the PAC and similar bodies in other parts of Somalia if opportunities for more strategic police development open up in future. Comment: The case of the PAC shows how hybridity can provide a solution to otherwise intractable problems. Elsewhere in Somalia civilian oversight of policing has not progressed, partly because it is seen as an aggressive action by outsiders. The case also illustrates the importance of trust, between individuals, groups and the state. Finally, it underscores the fact that even under the most difficult circumstances, individuals can sometimes make a difference to accountability.
44 The organisation was headquartered in Baidoa.
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13.6.2 Health sector programming45 DFID Somalia is partnering with SIDA to develop a strategic approach to health sector programming across Somalia, which it hopes will also demonstrate strong accountability. Core strategic plans and a monitoring and evaluation framework have been developed through technical support to zonal and federal ministries of health. NGO and UN implementing partners will work under the auspices of zonal steering groups which have already begun to meet. More challenging issues such as procurement and data management have yet to be addressed, but DFID feels there are early indications that joint planning and accountability may take hold. At the local level, the Irish INGO Trocaire has worked on health issues in Gedo region for more than a decade. The area has a rich mix of clans but also strong local clan governance structures to manage competition. Prior to falling under Al Shabaab control, Gedo had a district authority, health board, women's and youth groups and elders councils, all active and functioning. According to Trocaire, there was a lot of debate in the area on important accountability issues, ranging from health provision to taxation and militias, though major clans largely excluded minorities from the discussion. In 2008, Al Shabaab replaced these structures with their own structure, which was appointed by the senior command, not locally accountable and which explicitly rejected clan thinking. Local elders became fearful, religious leaders split, women's groups were prevented from meeting, and youth activism was disrupted. Al Shabaab brought security but also fear and uncertainty and so accountability decreased. Trocaire’s engagement survived the Al Shabaab period, though fear and uncertainty in the area mean it is not yet possible to re-instate some accountability mechanisms such as community health forums. The organisation currently works in five districts servicing three hospitals and two health centres. It provides funding and technical support to the local health facilities under the auspices of health boards with which it develops agreements. The individual medical facilities report to the boards and the boards inspect medical facilities for staff attendance, patients’ complaints, use of supplies, etc. The boards are an important structure for accountability. They typically comprise 12 members drawn from elders, religious leaders, businesses and women (two to four women where possible). Minorities do not often achieve formal representation. In Trocaire’s view, effective accountability depends on many factors. Representation of interest groups is one consideration. The attitude and legitimacy of local government is another (for example, the administrations in Luk and Belet Hawo are permissive now, not so elsewhere). The presence of international actors is also a factor – more actors breeds greater confusion and lowers accountability, including through incentivising an extractive approach by some community leaders. In the health sector alone there are: the new federal government plan; the DFID-SIDA joint health and nutrition programme funded by the UN; GAVI (Global Alliance for Vaccines) funded by the WHO, which proposes a different community governance structure; and UNICEF's Integrated Management of Childhood Illness programme.. Information availability is also seen as critical. In Gedo, Trocaire use quarterly meetings that review against targets. Data (such as the number of items consumed) matters a great deal as it feeds debate within the board. Information flows to the wider community are generally poor though, as neither board members or local government tend to see this as their role. The role of clans has been instructive. During the period of Shabaab occupation, accountability was lower in the absence of clan mechanisms. Otherwise, it is clear that clans make constant demands for jobs and contracts, demands that are balanced in part through the health board structure. It is only in recent years, however, after more than a decade of engagement, that local people are willing to accept arguments about rational use of scarce resources or the need for technical skills in senior positions. Meanwhile, although the health boards are once again functional, individuals do not seem to approach them. Individual complaints or queries may sometimes come through NGOs but otherwise local residents either use their clan representatives or vote with their feet. Comment: The health sector case demonstrates the important accountability potential which structures such as boards, steering groups and transparent strategies have. It also shows the challenges at the local level where insecurity, fear, lack of coordination and trust can undermine accountability. There are it seems no short-cuts. Long- term commitment, a principled approach and a readiness to face reversals and fight small battles for fair representation and accountability are required as progress can only be incremental.
45 Based on interviews with DFID Somalia and with Trocaire Somalia, 10/5/2013.
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13.7 Recommendations Continue existing support for civil society initiatives, with renewed emphasis on stimulating issue-based coalitions that can act collectively to improve accountability where possible bridging state and non-state divides. Provide support to the media, academic institutions, government departments and independent think-tanks to improve the quantity and quality of public information (for example on laws, regulations, government plans, revenues) Support media development initiatives, working in coordination with other actors, to ensure that journalists have the skills, protection and regulation to provide better information for public debate and to challenge corruption and impunity. Conduct targeted analysis, particularly of the public sector, to identify change champions and to better understand decision-making and incentives. Where there is sufficient access and state legitimacy, support government institutions across all sectors to establish systems and policies that boost downward accountability, such as research, public consultation and complaints redress mechanisms. Cultivate a more permissive environment for civic action. At the local level, support trust-building, reconciliation and dialogue among conflicted groups. At the zonal and local level, support civic education, public education and public debates on accountability-related topics such as state-hood, governance, corruption, accountability and transparency. Support development initiatives for the federal parliament, both those which would assist MPs in playing an executive oversight role (for example hearings and committtees) as well as the development of key oversight legislation and related public outreach efforts to broaden public ownership. Investigate the use of SMS and voiced-based technology both as a tool to support public debate and as a possible complaints / oversight mechanism through which the public can monitor and report. Begin to engage the private sector, particularly diaspora investors, in a debate about corporate social responsibility, taxation and transparency. Investigate the viability of a corruption monitoring tools such as public opinion surveys. Begin dialogue with Somali civil society actors / non-state actors ranging from religious leaders to the private sector on how best to stimulate in-country debate on accountability, anti-corruption and transparency issues, with a view to identifying partners, entry-points and reference points for future programmes and campaigns. Begin dialogue with the range of international actors engaging in south and central Somalia to build a ‘coalition of the transparent’, for example organisations and states that are prepared to speak up in favour of downward accountability and take steps to increasing their own transparency and accountability.
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14 Annex D: Gender, Excluded Groups and Accountability Interventions
14.1 Aims and Definitions This paper attempts to answer the question: how empowered are the people of Somalia to demand accountability, taking into account the different degrees and forms of empowerment enjoyed by different social categories? Empowerment (defined as ‘enhancing the opportunities of those who are socially, politically or economically excluded and transforming the power relations which lead to such exclusion’1) is understood in this analysis to be a pre-requisite for accountability. While one level of analysis considers the degree of empowerment of citizens in general, a gender analysis is a tool for assessing the condition of, and outlook for, specific disempowered groups. We define gender as ‘the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men’.2 The implication of this definition is that men and women should not be seen as single monolithic categories; instead a proper contextual understanding of gender relations requires the description of ‘men’ and ‘women’ to be further nuanced around other differentiating factors, such as age and class. The key reference on gender and accountability is UNIFEM’s 2009 study, which envisages accountability as a key strategy for women’s empowerment. This study concludes that gender-sensitive accountability systems require ‘not just women’s participation but also institutional reform to make gender equality one of the standards against which the performance of decision-makers is assessed’.3Changes may be necessary at three levels for institutions to be accountable to women: normative (laws), procedural (incentives, work practices, performance assessment measures, improving access) and cultural. These should be seen as ‘mission critical’, i.e. essential to the functioning of any institution.4 This approach – seeing accountability as a vehicle for women’s empowerment rather than women’s empowerment as a pre-requisite for accountability – is echoed by other work on gender in the context of the broader statebuilding framework. In these accounts, statebuilding initiatives to date have failed to ‘build a state that works for women’ and strengthen women’s citizenship in post-conflict settings,5 essentially because they have failed to take into consideration the way in which societal norms and informal power dynamics influence political settlements to block women’s rights and political participation.6 Peace settlements, new constitutions, participation in politics and parliaments, economic participation, and delivery of quality services are all potential routes to enhancing women’s empowerment in post-conflict societies. Instead, there is evidence of a ‘post-war backlash’ against women, an under-reported phenomenon whereby new (or previously unnoticed) forms of violence against women emerge after war.7 Donors have not managed to translate rhetoric into real changes in power dynamics: international actors have not done enough to support women to challenge male-dominated culture, have not applied transformative gender analysis in a systematic way, have not sought out local women’s organisations to find out how to challenge male power, and have not raised capacity within their own organisations.8 This approach to gender analysis, however, of focusing exclusively on women’s empowerment issues, is at odds with the broader view of gender as a relational concept, as in the above definition. Moreover it does not capture the outlooks of Somali respondents – men and women - to our survey, for whom women’s empowerment was a significant, but not exclusive, concern. Following our research findings, we would identify three categories of
1 O’Neill, T., Foresti, M. and Hudson, A. (2007) Evaluation of Citizens’ Voice and Accountability: Review of the Literature and Donor Approaches. London:DFID. 2Office of the Special Adviser on Gender and Inclusion (OSAGI) http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm accessed 15th May 2013. 3 UNIFEM (2009) Who answers to women? Gender and accountabilityProgress of the world’s women 2008/9 p.3. 4Ibid p. 7. 5Castillejo, Clare. (2011) Building a state that works for women: Integrating gender into post-conflict state building, Madrid, FRIDE, Working Paper no. 107. 6Smits, Rosan. and Schoofs, Steven. (2010) Aiming High, Reaching Low Four Fundamentals for Gender-Responsive State-building, The Hague, Clingendael Institute. CRU Policy Brief No. 13 7 Pankhurst, Donna (2007) Gender issues in post-war contexts: a review of analysis and experience, and implications for policies 8O'Connell, Helen. (2011) ‘What are the opportunities to promote gender equity and equality in conflict-affected and fragile states? Insights from a review of evidence’ in Gender and Development 19:3, pp.455-466, London, Routledge
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relatively disempowered citizens, namely: women, young men, and minority clans and internally displaced persons. The remaining sections of this paper address these categories. We will attempt to sketch an outline of the normative, procedural and cultural challenges to their empowerment and hence to their capacity to hold state and other authorities to account.
14.2 Gender relations in Somalia: an overview Pre-war, Somalia was a predominantly nomadic society, in which transhumance practised by adult men accompanying large animals (mainly camels) to pasture was the economic mainstay, complemented by women’s roles in the management of small stock and in trade.9 The type of trade which women engaged in included both local petty trade in animal by-products such as milk and ghee, of which they were the exclusive practitioners, and more substantial, long-distance trade.10 Women occupied tightly restricted areas of decision-making, but had substantial economic autonomy and were acknowledged as contributors to the economy. In the agricultural and agro-pastoral societies around the Shabelle and Juba rivers in southern Somalia, and in the Yemeni-influenced urban centres along the coast, the division of labour varied from the nomadic pattern. In Brava, for example, whose main livelihoods were fishing, handicrafts (leatherwork and weaving) and commerce, women lived secluded lives and were veiled.11 In agricultural communities like the Bantu, both men and women engaged in agricultural work. The latter communities were generally not incorporated directly into the clan system, although various forms of accretion took place. For those that were, clan identity took different forms for men and for women. Men had a relatively uncomplicated relationship with the clan of their father, and most particularly the lineage or diya-paying group. This grouping constituted the main form of collective action, whereby members guaranteed each other’s security by contributing to a fund underwriting compensation for abuses committed by any of their number.12 Because marriage outside the father’s clan was preferred, women’s closest relationships (with her parents, children, children’s spouses and grandchildren) tended to be with members of clans other than their own.13 This positioning of women ‘at the centre of multiple and potentially conflicting loyalties’14 provided the cement that kept the eternally-fissive clans and sub-clans together, lent women a particular role in cementing relations between clans, and formed the basis for the high regard in which women were generally held. At the same it guaranteed women’s exclusion from clan decision-making fora, on the grounds that their loyalties were divided and could not be counted upon.15 Although clan continues to be the basis for Somali society generally, the war has brought a number of important shifts of emphasis to the patterns described above. During the worst of the fighting, when people were displaced to their clan territories for safety, many families had to split since husband and wife belonged to different clans, and women had to make difficult decisions about where they and their accompanying children (also most likely from different clans) would be least at risk. For many families this split eventually became permanent. Clan members concentrated in their home territories, and women’s role in maintaining the cohesion of the system was reduced.16 Exogamous marriage (i.e. marriage outside the clan) provides a degree of protection to a woman against an abusive partner, since her immediate male relatives are her main protectors: if she marries one such relative, there may be no-one to protect her if the marriage turns sour. During the war exogamous marriages became less
9 Ibrahim, Rhoda (2004) ‘Women’s role in the pastoral economy’ in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR. 10Women were empowered to undertake long distance trading trips as a result of the security they enjoyed through their position in the clan structure. Warsame, Amina (2004) ‘Crisis or opportunity? Somali women traders and the war’ in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR. 11 Sayid, Amina (2004) ‘Amina’s story’ in in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR 12 In the agricultural communities of southern Somalia, work parties, rotational savings associations and other forms of mutual assistance were practised. See Declich, Francesca (1993) ‘Mutual assistance groups: feminine and masculine agricultural work along the Juba river’ Paper presented to the Conference of the European Association of Somali Studies, September 1993. 13 Gardner, Judith, with Amina Warsame (2004) ‘Women, clan identity and peacebuilding’ in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR 14Ibid p. 161. 15 Ibid. 16 Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR, passim.
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common for reasons of clan enmity, thus exposing women to greater risks of abusive marriages.17 This appears to be now reversing, at least in Somaliland, and cross-clan mixing may now be on the increase again.18 Warfare in Somali society was traditionally subject to prescribed rules of engagement, with women and children being protected from harm. In the inter-clan warfare in southern Somalia of 1991-2 these rules appear to have been abandoned. ‘Rape camps’ in Mogadishu targeted women from minority groups. Many women who fled the country to Kenyan refugee camps encountered yet more sexual violence there too. In the words of one escapee, ‘We ran away from the lion, but we found only a hyena’.19 UNHCR’s programme of support to Somali refugees in Kenya became one of the first to acknowledge and address the issue of sexual violence in warfare; half of the women raped in the camps had previously been raped in Somalia.20 In nomadic communities21 there has been a noticeable change in the division of labour, with women often becoming the main family breadwinner.22 Women’s economic activities are mainly in the small-scale informal sector, but some have become major players in sectors previously reserved for men, such as qat wholesaling23 or currency speculation.24 Many men have been economically disempowered by the war, having lost access to the resources which previously served as the basis for their power (such as animals and jobs). Being economically dependent on a woman was previously viewed as something shameful for a man.25 The lack of economic opportunity has particularly affected young men, many of whom spent the war as moryaan or armed fighters attached to various rebel groups and living lawless lives fuelled by drugs and alcohol.26 Change in economic roles, however, have not led to changes in power relations or in the ideal characteristics expected of men and women at different life stages. Although women may in some cases have acquired greater decision-making power within the household as a result of their economic contribution, there has been little change in understandings of women’s roles at the community level,27 where (male) clan elders retain decision-making power, excluding both women and youth.28 For example women have been highly influential in promoting peace negotiations at various stages of the war, providing all possible support and encouragement to their men-folk to continue negotiations to the very end, and yet have no voting rights when peace agreements are tabled.29 The overarching framework within which gender relations are played out is the power relationship between clans. These relationships too have changed as a result of the war. For example, in the Shabelle region, where local pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities live side by side with northern nomadic clans resettled during the 1973 drought, Bantu agriculturalists, and urban dwellers, power balances between these groups changed more than once during the 1990s30 and resulted in some groups – notably the Tunni, Bantu and Gibilcaad – becoming virtually destitute. Livelihood options for both men and women in these groups were reduced, and women became particularly vulnerable to sexual violence.31
17 Ahmed, Sadia (2004) ‘Traditions of marriage and the household’ in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR 18 Sadia Ahmed, pers. comm. 4th May 2013. 19 African Rights (1993) The nightmare continues: abuses against Somali refugees in Kenya London, African Rights. 20Musse, Fowzia (2004) War crimes against women and girls in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR 21Including communities which were originally nomadic but which have become settled as a result of urbanisation. 22 As Nur (op.cit) notes, change has been less dramatic in agricultural communities, where women were already economically active, and in urban communities where women’s education and employment was already accepted. In some urban communities however where women had previously lived sheltered lives, the war obliged many women to become economically independent when they had had no such experience previously at all. 23 Fouzia Musse, pers. comm. 2nd May 2013. 24 Nur, Ibrahim (2005) ‘Changing gender relations in Lower Shabelle’ in J. Gardner and J. El-Bushra, eds. Cycles of violence: gender relations and armed conflict. Nairobi: ACORD: Gardner, Judith, and El-Bushra, Judy (2004) ‘Introduction’ in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR. 25 Gardner, Judith, and El-Bushra, Judy (2004) ‘Introduction’ in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR: Nur, Ibrahim (2005) ‘Changing gender relations in Lower Shabelle’ in J. Gardner and J. El-Bushra, eds. Cycles of violence: gender relations and armed conflict. Nairobi: ACORD. 26Rift Valley Institute (forthcoming) ‘A War on Men? The enduring consequences of conflict on Somali men’ Report of a research workshop held in Nairobi, 29th-30th April 2013. 27Nur, op.cit. 28 Various respondents to our survey confirmed that ‘youth’ are generally understood in the Somali context to comprise those under 35. 29Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women London, Pluto Press and CIIR. 30Cassanelli, Lee (1995) Victims and vulnerable groups in Southern Somalia Ottawa, Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board 31Nur (2005), op.cit.
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14.3 Disempowered groups 14.3.1 Women To what extent do women have the capacities and the opportunities to access their rights? Essentially, they face discrimination at all three levels: normative, procedural and cultural. While the normative legal framework may provide women with certain (limited) rights, the cultural framework colours the institutional response and hence women’s enjoyment of those rights. As Tanja Chopra points out in relation to Somaliland, ‘all justice institutions are underpinned by the same social norms and power dynamics’.32 These norms and power dynamics also impact on women’s own self-identified roles and characteristics - especially since the clan system by its nature requires its members (male and female) to manage trade-offs between individual rights and security – thus limiting the demands they are prepared to make of governance institutions. Standard indicators of women’s condition and status place Somalia near the bottom of global league tables. UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index for Somalia is 0.776, placing the country in the fourth highest position globally.33 The adult literacy rate for women is estimated to be 26% (compared to 36% for men and 31% overall).34 Maternal mortality rates are amongst the highest in the world, at 1,400 per 100,000 live births.35 Early marriages and teenage pregnancies are common; 45% of women now aged 20-24 were married by the age of 18 or younger.36 Somali women are beset by violence in many forms. Women and girls continue to be targeted for rape, abduction and sexual slavery as well as clan-related revenge killings.37 Levels of sexual violence against women are high, and reportedly increasing: for example UN partners registered 237 cases of rape in September 2012 in Mogadishu alone.38 Women and girls have been stoned to death for alleged adultery; and Al-Shabaab persistently uses cruel, inhuman and degrading forms of punishment to exert control over the populations where they are in control. Within this difficult regime, Somali women find it hard to speak out for fear of backlash. Women and children living in internally displaced persons settlements in Bossaso, Galkayo, Hargeisa and along the Afgoye corridor continue to report a large number of rapes. Evidence shows that even in some parts of Somalia where there is relative peace, high levels of sexual and gender-based violence tend to persist, creating long-term threats to security and to women’s health.39 Female genital mutilation (FGM) remains widespread in its severest form (infibulation) with a prevalence of 98%40 among Somali women and girls (although activists in Somaliland believe the tide may be turning there41). The normative framework In terms of the normative framework, the constitutions of all three Somali administrations provide for equality between men and women both in general and in relation to specific functions such as political participation and ownership of property. However these also specify that Islamic shari’a law overrides constitutional equality clauses.42 Somalia has not signed the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), nor has it drawn up a National Action Plan for UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820, leaving little room for individuals or groups to challenge discriminatory practice. Throughout Somalia, three justice systems operate in parallel: shari’a, secular law (colonial laws of Britain and Italy merged during the previous federation) and customary laws.43 These are practised by religious authorities, lawyers, and elders respectively. Individuals with a grievance can and do choose which system they wish to adopt, and can switch mid-process. Shari’a law does not uphold equality between men and women (for example, a woman’s share
32Chopra, Tanja (2011) Operational paper: improving women’s access to justice and security in Somaliland Nairobi, UNDP Somalia, Rule of Law and Security Programme p. 3. 33UNDP (n.d.) Gender in Somalia Brief. 34 Ibid. 35 UNDP (2011) Somalia gender equality and women’s empowerment strategy 2011-2015 36 Ibid. 37 Reported in Gender Profile of the Conflict in Somalia, UNIFEM 38 Sexual violence against men is beginning to be acknowledged. See RVI op.cit. 39 UNDP Somalia (n.d.) Strengthening Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Somalia, 2012 - 2015 40 Ibid. 41Interview with Chairperson of NAFIS FGM network, Hargeisa, 5th May 2013. 42UNDP (n.d.)op cit. 43 Somali customary law, known as xeer Soomaali, comprises a set of unwritten conventions and procedures that are passed down orally through generations. These define reciprocal rights and obligations between kin and clans, covering domestic matters, social welfare, political relations, property rights and the management of natural resources. See Abdurahman A. Osman ‘Shuke’ (2010). Order out of chaos. Somali customary law in Puntland and Somaliland. Accord 21/17.Available at: http://www.c-r.org/sites/c- r.org/files/Accord%2021_17Order%20out%20of%20chaos_Somali%20customary%20law_2010_ENG.pdf
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of inheritance is half that of a man in the same relationship to the deceased) but its provisions are nonetheless more favourable for women than customary law.44 In particular, the rights which shari’a offers women in relation to marriage settlements, child custody, inheritance and property, exceed those provided by customary law. However, judges themselves are not always aware of the distinctions involved, and in practice tend to be more influenced by customary law. The latter is dominant and embodies a strong emphasis on community reconciliation rather than individual rights.45 Land conflict, which is a highly contentious legal issue for women, is complicated by the lack of a coherent regulatory framework for land and property rights and a lack of basic information about land holdings and tenure systems. Land-grabbing by male family members of a deceased man is a particularly noted problem facing widows.46 Another problematic legal issue for women is which route to go down in sexual violence cases, as customary law provides community acceptance but may also lead to forced marriage and other abusive situations, while statutory law offers the prospect of greater personal satisfaction but has practical barriers of time and cost. Islam permits a substantial degree of economic autonomy for women; Somali customary law is more restrictive in terms of women’s property and inheritance rights.47 Al-Shabaab has been known to defend the rights of individual women in inheritance, even though at the level of the community their prohibitions against women’s liberty have been repressive.48 However, women’s ability to profit from their economic autonomy is constrained not only by the limited property rights they accede to under customary law and the desire of many men to block such rights for their women-folk, but also by their relatively low social status, specifically their low levels of education, access to capital, and political power. Thus gender bias in the society at large is perpetuated in the market place.49 Despite this autonomy, the economic outlook for women is depressing. Female unemployment stands at 74%, compared to 61% for men.50 A 2010 survey of 90 businesswomen in 4 regions of Somaliland found that ‘While constitutional law and shari'a provide women with the right to own and dispose of property independently, women often are obstructed from practicing such rights because of various legal, cultural and societal barriers’.51 It further found that women contribute more than 70% to their families’ income and more that 60 % of the national income – through taxes and other contributions. Average earnings for women in the informal sector are about $3 per day and for most this is their only income (15% reported receiving other support from their families). Advantages of the informal sector for women are that little start-up capital is needed, and that the women can operate more or less as independent business managers, giving them a sense of pride. The survey found that market women pay tax of $0.3 per day, as well as rent, but do not feel they receive adequate services in return as their premises are dirty and insecure. Access to credit is seen as the main impediment to business expansion. Although the majority of women-operated businesses are in the informal sector, small numbers of women – typically those from the diaspora who have amassed savings for investment52 - can be found in medium-sized businesses. Some have entered businesses traditionally operated by men, such as currency speculation or qat wholesaling.53 The procedural framework Institutions supporting accountability likewise offer women some opportunities, but at the same time thwart their attempts to make use of these. Such institutions may encourage women’s participation at the level of rhetoric, but in practice there are few incentives for them to make women’s empowerment a reality. Parliament is a critical component of the institutional framework since it is here that legislation is enacted by members who supposedly represent the interests and views of the population. However, representation of women in the three parliaments is very limited, and indeed the propriety of women taking part in political decision-making
44 Customary law sets the value of a woman, as measured by the compensation payment in a murder case, at 50 camels, half that of a man. 45Warsame, Amina (2002) Queens without crowns: Somaliland women’s changing roles and peace building Uppsala, Sweden, Life and Peace Institute. 46 UN Habitat Land, property and housing in Somalia 47Nagaad Umbrella (2010) Women’s economic and property rights and the factors that influence small women-owned businesses: research study: Warsame (2002) op.cit. 48Interview with gender activist, 2nd May 2013. 49Nagaad umbrella (2010) op.cit. 50 UNDP (2012) Somalia Human Development Report 2012: empowering youth for peace and development 51Nagaad Umbrella (2010) op.cit. 52 Hiraan Online April 23rd 2013, available at http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2013/Apr/29006/somalia_women_from_somali_diaspora_return_home_to_start_enterprises.aspx, accessed 19th May 2013. 53Nur (2005) op.cit.
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has been a highly contentious issue for some years. As indicated above, there is a deep-seated unwillingness to accept a role for women in public fora, deriving from their ambiguous position in the clan system. Both men and women buy into the idea that women are unsuitable participants in politics, since they are unfamiliar with power, do not have the skills to represent others, are divided amongst themselves, and have divided clan loyalties that render them unreliable. From the Somaliland women’s organisations’ success in obtaining the approval of religious leaders for their participation in the Congress of Clans in 1997-8, to the Puntland Administration’s acceptance of 7.5% women’s participation in the Constitutional Conference of 1998, to the acceptance of a proposal for a ‘women’s clan’ to be represented in the Somali National Peace Conference in Djibouti in 2000, women have lobbied for the acceptance, in principle, of their participation in national political fora, and they have achieved a measure of success.54 Yet in practice the implementation of such agreements has always slipped, and women’s political participation continues to be highly contested in all three zones. In all zones, bills sanctioning women’s quotas were presented to parliaments; this was accepted in Somalia but rejected in Somaliland and Puntland. Women currently make up 14% of the new federal parliament in Mogadishu, 3% in Puntland, and occupy one seat out of 82 in Somaliland (none in the upper house).55 Respondents in our interviews did not generally see government as an institution that favours women: as one Somaliland respondent put it, ‘The political system is dominated by men, debates are held in smoke-filled rooms and there's no place for self-respecting women. Women in parliament are beholden to men, and there are no women in the Guurti.56 It's hard for women to get access unless they have an intermediary.’57 However, in Puntland the Ministries of Women’s Affairs, Education and Health were seen by many respondents to be particularly sensitive to women’s needs. Police stations were mentioned in both Somaliland and Mogadishu, both for the service they are beginning to provide for women (separate women-only sections of police stations) and for their openness in holding meetings with the public to explain their work. However, UNDP has found that women-only sections can be counter- productive, since their work tends to be seen as marginal to the work of the station overall.58 Others mentioned female lawyers (who tend to work on family cases), legal aid clinics, and rape clinics – significantly, all categories concerned with domestic violence and violence against women. The growth of numbers of female lawyers and prosecutors, and the formation of professional associations such as the Women Lawyers Association in Somaliland, were seen as positive developments. Professional and educated women seem to be more often found in such bodies or in NGOs rather than in government. Civil society and traditional clan leaders were also mentioned by a minority of respondents as being responsive to women’s needs. However a strong degree of cynicism was expressed about the capacity of NGOs, who were often suspected of loyalty to donors rather than the people they are meant to serve, and for some respondents are guilty of taking funds under false pretences while not delivering any services. Almost without exception, respondents in Somalia and Puntland did not believe that women have a distinct role in demanding accountability. While some identified women as needing particular attention deriving from their weak political position and low social status, others believed that their situation in respect of accountability was no different from that of men. For some, women have not yet acquired the necessary skills and so would not be able to practise such a role, even if it were appropriate. As one respondent put it, ‘We need more female lawyers and judges. Then they will have a distinct role from men in demanding accountability.59 On the other hand, in Mogadishu the range of opinions was reversed: more than two-thirds of respondents believed that women do have a role – that they have proved themselves to have considerable power to mobilise opinion and participate in the political arena. Although there are a number of active women’s organisations in all parts of Somalia, there is little evidence so far of the emergence of a women’s movement as such. Many respondents complained that divisions among women prevent this, and point to the organisational weaknesses of some women’s organisations. The Somaliland women’s umbrella, for example, was criticised for having waged an inept campaign over parliamentary quotas, and having
54Gardner and El-Bushra (2004) op.cit.Chapter 9. 55UNDP (n.d.)op cit. 56 The Guurti is the Somaliland upper house, made up of nominated clan elders. 57Interview with civil society activist, 2nd May 2013. 58UNDP official, pers. comm., 7th May 2013. 59Interview with male clan leader, Sheikh, 11th May 2013.
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failed to influence key movers and shakers. Few respondents, whether women or men, had much faith in women’s organisations, which they saw as being largely sustained by the international community while not having significant practical competences to offer. Respondents commented that women-led organisations such as the Somaliland Women Lawyers Association offer the same services as men, and do not appear to offer significantly higher quality support to vulnerable women. However opinion was divided on this issue, with other respondents claiming that women active in, for example, local councils are more efficient, practical, and hard-working, and less politically ambitious, than men. The cultural framework Looking at women’s empowerment from the point of view of the cultural framework, the picture is dominated by the functioning of the clan system, which lies at the base of most institutions. As respondents emphasised time and again, the clan system has both advantages and disadvantages for women, and in any case is the current reality, like it or not. ‘It's the only security we have - clan has become the substitute for the state’60 as one respondent put it. A woman’s chances of achieving her goals is highly dependent on her position within the clan, and also on the degree of power wielded by her clan: indeed, women from powerful clans may become powerful themselves, to the extent of crowding out the voices of women from minority clans, a problem which needs to be borne in mind by NGOs insisting on the participation of women in their projects.61 A woman who belongs to a powerful clan is likely to seek support through that mechanism; if she is from a minority clan she is more likely to seek redress through the courts.62 - ‘if a clan isn't powerful, neither men nor women can access rights easily.’63 If a woman is married within the clan, she is more likely to be protected from other clans, but also less likely to find a champion within her immediate circle.64 Thus formal state accountability mechanisms tend in the present circumstances to act as an alternative safety-net for when clan fails to meet women’s needs. 14.3.2 Young men At the normative level, men experience few constraints in terms of their legal status. However, access to institutions is often blocked for them as a result of the cultural weight given to older men. The Somaliland and Puntland administrations have recently ratified youth policies, and a similar approach is being adopted in South Central. However, cultural norms continue to dominate reality. Viewed as either victims or perpetrators, young men are frequently denied rights to participate in the political and economic life of the country, and experience frustration and disillusionment on a large scale, pushing them to leave the country or to join armed groups and street gangs. ‘Youth’ is often a relative concept with no fixed boundaries that is used to sideline or humiliate a competitor of lesser age, perpetuating a culture of gerontocracy. The influence of the clan, in which the role of elders and the traditional leadership is prominent, further entrenches exclusion. Youth are traditionally excluded from decision- making within the household, since this is normally reserved for male heads.65 UNDP’s 2012 Human Development Report for Somalia, which focused on the prospects for youth,66 conducted extensive research into the problems facing young men and women in Somalia and concluded that a large number of factors contributed to youth exclusion and frustration, and constituted some of the main structural drivers of violence. The proportion of people below the age of 30 in Somalia is currently 70% and is expected to rise. The major structural drivers underlying youth engagement in violent conflict in Somalia are high youth unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities; insufficient, unequal and inappropriate education and skills; poor governance and weak political participation; and a legacy of past violence. Other factors comprise forcing youth to join violent groups, often due to a lack of alternatives for survival.67 Overall youth unemployment stands at 67%, reaching 84% in Somaliland. However the problem is underemployment as much as the absence of jobs, since large numbers of young people end up in the low-paying informal sector, as unpaid family workers or self-employed. About 70 percent of youth surveyed, in both paid and unpaid work were seeking different jobs.
60Interview with civil society activist, 2nd May 2013. 61 Interview with Trocaire Country Representative, 5th May 2013. 62Interview with UNDP project manager, 7th May 2013. 63Interview with media consultant, 5th May 2013. 64 Ahmed, Sadia (2004) op,cit. 65UNDP (2012) op.cit. 66Youth were defined as those falling between 14 and 29 years. The national youth policy in Somaliland defines youth as persons between the ages of 14 to 35, while in the Puntland national youth policy, the age bracket falls between 15 and 30. 67 Ibid.
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Although young people participate in civil society, those aspiring to political positions face age-related discrimination. For example, the Somaliland Constitution requires candidates running for the House of Representatives to beat at least 35 years old, and those contesting for the House of Elders to be at least 45. Recently, the Somaliland parliament adopted a constitutional amendment to reduce the minimum age limit for contesting local council elections from 35 to 25.68 The report calculated a ‘youth frustration index’, which worked out overall at 3.96 out of 5, with the highest frustration being observed in south central Somalia at 4.3, compared to the northern zones at 3.7. Across the regions, south central Somalia scored the highest in all predisposing factors for youth restiveness.69 About two- thirds of respondents said they intended to leave the country, mainly to improve their employment or education prospects. Key indicators such as literacy and employment rates are higher for men than women, and there is no doubt that women face more serious levels of discrimination and abuse than men. Nevertheless the consequences of the war for young men have only recently begun to be acknowledged by the international community.70 Many young men have no knowledge of how things were before, having grown up since the worst of the fighting took place, yet they live with the consequences of the war, and of the urbanisation and displacement that accompanied it. Many express fear that violent conflict is about to break out again, and this is an additional reason for their aspirations to leave the country.71 The mental health of young men both inside and outside Somalia causes concern: suicide rates amongst young men in the Diaspora are said to be high, and in Somaliland the phenomenon of cilaaj or treatment centres for mental health problems is growing in an unregulated fashion.72 An average of 8% of young people, mainly but not exclusively men, chew qat, spending up to US$11 per day on the habit. Qat-chewing is a driver of unemployment, and also a consequence of it, contributes significantly to poverty and conflict, and is responsible for numerous psychosocial problems.73 Having few opportunities for education or employment other than as moryaanor clan militia, many young men see little hope for the future. Al-Shabaab has been able to exploit this frustration, and has attempted to address the needs of those who have been marginalized by both political processes and resource conflicts. Already, youth are major actors in the conflict, constituting the bulk of the participants in militias and criminal gangs, including Al- Shabaab, and in piracy. Their marginalisation provides fertile ground for radicalisation. Programmes such as the ‘Youth at risk’ programme implemented by UNDP, ILO and UNICEF with local NGOs74 support youth empowerment and engagement. The project attempted to involve young people in community security management, and provided training and loans for income generation. An end-of-project evaluation however was able to draw few substantive lessons, owing to a lack of reliable management information.75 The UNDP Human Development Report further commented that few initiatives with youth focus on the key issue of employment creation, and those that do tend to be supply-driven, i.e. to focus on vocational training and enhancement of the capacity of young people to access employment, and to be poorly documented or researched.76 However, our survey did encounter a small number of dynamic and innovative initiatives. For example, Shaqadoon, a Somali NGO which grew out of a USAID employment project, uses social media to link job seekers with employers in all three zones. In Somaliland it recently attained 50% of its target of 100 jobs found within 3 months, which it considered a success.77 A review of potential entry-points for enhancing employment opportunities for both male and female youth would seem to be a timely intervention. In summary, as with women, the discrimination experienced by young men at the level of cultural norms feeds into institutional practice and procedure and limits the incentives for change. Nevertheless there is some movement,
68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Somali women’s organisations have been active in seeking income-generation and other projects for young men throughout the last 20 years, mindful of the threats to peace posed by the lack of employment and education prospects for them. See Gardner and El-Bushra (2004) op.cit. 71RVI, op.cit. 72RVI op.cit. There are fears, as yet unsubstantiated by research, that these treatment centres use repressive methods to treat drug and alcohol addiction. Families in the diaspora are known to send young men there, many unfamiliar with the cultural context and unable to speak Af Somaali. 73UNPD (2012) op.cit. 74Guillemois, David, Mohammed, Muktar & Mohammed, Mohammed, 2012.Final report Evaluation of the “ Youth at risk project ” and some security related components 75 Gillemois et al, op.cit. 76UNDP (2012) op.cit. 77Interview with Shaqadoon staff member, Hargeisa, 7th May 2013.
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both in terms of policy and in terms of recognition of the problem, and there is potential for dynamic youth-led organisations to be supported. 14.3.3 Minority clans and IDPs Minority clans include primarily those clans and other groups which fall outside the four main clan families of Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Isaaq. These include settlers of Arab origin in coastal areas, the Bantu agricultural groups of the Shabelle and Juba regions, the ‘outcaste’ sab clan, and various small groups in southern Somalia such as the Tunni and Jiddo pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. A number of international conventions, to which Somalia is a signatory protect minorities. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However in some cases they were signed during the Siad Barre government and are now widely disregarded. In any case they have generally been more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Bantu, Sab, and some of the coastal settlers are outside the clan system and hence cannot access any of the advantages of clan membership. These groups fared particularly badly during the war. Often having specialised occupations (for example the Bravanese Gibilcaad were potters, the Sab leatherworkers, the Bantu settled agriculturalists) these groups have always been excluded and isolated. During the war they suffered much greater violence than the rest of the population: for example Bantu villages were ransacked, their grain-stores raided, their women raped and men killed, their livelihoods denied them so that they were obliged to seek work as day labourers on their own farms.78 Minorities continue to face discrimination in education and services and rarely acquire positions of political influence. Al-Shabaab has imposed extremely punitive measures on the Bantu in areas they control, including suppressing the Maimai language and the killing of Christians, who in southern Somalia are mainly Bantu.79 Organisations of minority groups do exist, but are not strong organisationally and have limited capacity to monitor and report on human rights abuses.80 Organisations catering for ‘vulnerable groups’ (see 15.3.4 below) generally do not include minority clans among their clients. In addition, the term can be applied to any group which is in a minority or powerless position in a particular area, such as the Isaaq, Dolbahante and Warsangeli who were forcibly moved into the Lower Shabelle following the 1970’s drought.81 In Somaliland there is one dominant clan (Isaaq) and all others are regarded as minorities. During the Siad Barre regime many Somalis moved around the country, often for work or to seek commercial opportunities, and sometimes being forced to move from the arid north to southern agricultural schemes, with the result that they lived far from their original clan territory. During the war, the threat of violence led many to return to their clan territories, where they expected to find safety. However, they did not always do so, as conflicts often continued at the sub-clan level within the territories. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a process of re-mixing is now going on; for example, there has recently been a rush of businesspeople to Mogadishu, taking advantage of a depressed economy coupled with an improving security situation.82 At the same time, populations with Somaliland connections have sought safety there from the continuing insecurity in the south. There are now few locations where someone is not in a minority. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) tend to be people having lower clan protection, since they are not in their clan territory. The likelihood is that they are also poor, and that coming from rural areas they find adaptation to urban settings where they are seeking protection. Such populations are generally poorly served by urban services such as water or education. They are also largely excluded from access to employment, which is often linked to clan connections, a factor which falls particularly heavily on IDP youth.83 IDP camps are generally insecure - composed of temporary housing and far from services such as water supplies or markets – and residents are particularly vulnerable to thievery and criminal violence. IDP camps tend to be particularly dangerous places for women and children, being the site of many forms of abuse ranging from domestic violence to rape to trafficking to child labour.84
78Nur, (2005) op.cit. 79 Hill, Martin (2010) No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minoritiesLondon, Minority Rights Group International 80 Ibid. 81Cassanelli (1995) op.cit. 82Interview with gender activist, 2nd May 2013. 83Guillemois, David, Mohammed, Muktar & Mohammed, Mohammed, 2012.Final report Evaluation of the “ Youth at risk project ” and some security related components 84 Saferworld conflict analyses of Bosasso, Burco and Laas Caanood, 2010.
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14.3.4 Others Vulnerable groups include victims of natural disasters, the disabled, war-wounded and People Living with HIV and AIDS (PLWA). There is generally no legal framework for addressing disability in government, and very little support provided for the vulnerable. There are a small number of Somali CSOs representing them and providing services, and these are supported by some specialist international organisations such as Handicap International.85 The Danish Refugee Council runs a cash transfer scheme for vulnerable community members, managed through local committees who make decisions on criteria for eligibility.86 Respondents to our survey in all locations claimed that apart from civil society the main people speaking up for and providing support to vulnerable people are the clan elders. Businesspeople claimed to practise philanthropy and assist with humanitarian relief supplies to IDPs, flood victims, and similar groups when emergencies arise. Others who were reported in the survey as providing support to vulnerable groups include civil society organisations (including local and international NGOs and CBOs), legal aid centres and lawyers’ associations, religious leaders and madrasas, media (for advocacy) and traditional leaders. However, around a third of respondents (more in Puntland) said they did not know of any such organisations at all, or that those that were known were weak and lacked influence. In general, vulnerable people depend largely on their clan for assistance, meaning that those whose clan is relatively weak are at a disadvantage. Moreover, such organisations as do exist provide humanitarian support to, and advocacy on behalf of, the vulnerable, but do not seek to involve them in discussion or decision-making about the services they receive, nor are the vulnerable themselves effectively organised.
14.4 Institutional framework for empowerment and accountability In summary, women, young men and minorities face discrimination at normative, procedural and cultural levels, with the first two levels being highly influenced by cultural norms and expectations. Although equality is enshrined in all three constitutions, there remain gaps in the legal and policy framework. This is most problematic in the case of women, and specifically in women’s exclusion from political decision-making. Change is most advanced in Mogadishu and this suggests the possibility of similar movement elsewhere. However, what holds back women, young men and minorities is not so much the constitutional framework as the conduct of institutions. There are few incentives for individuals in government to respond to the specific needs of these groups, nor are there any sanctions for failing to do so. This will continue as long as clans are able to mobilise block votes for their chosen political parties, as long as civil society organisations representing these groups remain weak, and as long as politics continues to revolve around the capital cities of Somalia’s zones and sub-regions with little attention being paid to rural or remote constituencies. At the same time, the best hope for change appears to be found at the level of institutions. New initiatives such as police reform, the entry of professional women into the justice system, and the small window of opportunity for women’s participation in politics in Mogadishu, as well as some dynamic youth-led initiatives using social media, suggest that significant cracks in the cultural edifice may be appearing. Demand for change appears to be coming, if anywhere, from youth, from the Diaspora, from the business community, and from decentralised municipalities. Established women’s organisations have had mixed success, with many respondents – men and women – being dismissive of their capacity to drive change. The ‘women’s agenda’ is widely perceived to be an imported and donor-backed initiative,87 and formalising women’s rights can lead to a backlash to the extent that it exposes males who either abuse or ignore their responsibilities towards women.88
14.5 Conclusions and recommendations Specific recommendations drawn from this review include the following:
85 Handicap International works in Somaliland – see http://www.handicap-international.org.uk/where_we_work/africa/somaliland, accessed 19th May 2013. 86Interview with civil society activist, 5th May 2013. 87 Although, as Amina Warsame points out, traditional songs demonstrate how women have been unhappy with their lot for generations (Warsame 2002 op. cit.). 88 Interview with Tanya Chopra, 1st May 2013.
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Seek out individuals, organisations and projects to support which break the mold but do so from within an accepted cultural framework. This would include professional women’s associations and organisations managed by young people applying innovative solutions to youth problems, such as those using social media to overcome employment constraints. Seek out individuals, organisations and projects to support which have the respect and confidence of the people and which do or could act as champions for change. This might include religious leaders campaigning against FGM, women politicians supporting young males to find employment, for example. Collaborate with other stakeholders in developing employment strategies and policies, aiming to maximise short and long-term job creation potential and to encourage entry into self-employment. Ensure that young men and young women are engaged in debates about how to do this. Adopt inclusivity as a condition and a criterion for access to all aid interventions, requiring that a proper balance is maintained between men and women, youth and adult, major and minor clans, able-bodied and disabled. Promote debate about the inclusion of disempowered groups in politics. Look for ‘quick wins’ in improving the living conditions of the poorest and most vulnerable women. This might include promote women’s security (through for example, increasing numbers of women police officers, setting up street lighting) in key locations such as IDP camps, and intensifying the access to credit of poor women keen to start up in business. Research the incidence and impact of mental ill-health on the population as a whole but particularly on young people; investigate the ‘cilaaj’ institutions and assess their effectiveness. Take a long-term view of the change that is required, and the intensity of the accompaniment it will need. Accompaniment needs to be sympathetic but challenging. Appointing gender focal points and organising occasional workshops will not be sufficient. If the international community is serious about gender and inclusion, it needs to show that it is there for the long haul. Avoid marginalising ‘gender’ by confusing it with ‘women’. Gender support should be seen as part of a package of assistance interlinked with other initiatives, to avoid the risk of isolating it and thereby failing to consolidate the potential to make gains across a wide spectrum. It needs to be made clear that all components of the population – young and old, men and women – are included in the notion of gender empowerment. In more general terms, this brief review highlights the need to approach gender from the perspective of inclusion and exclusion broadly speaking, rather than focusing on women’s needs alone. There are two main reasons for this. On the one hand, the evidence available to the team suggests that the capacity to demand accountability is generally limited in Somalia at present, and that women are just one of several categories who are particularly disadvantaged in this respect. In particular, the lack of attention to the problems faced by young men is damaging, both to the young men themselves and to the wider community. On the other hand, much as change in gender relations may be seen as necessary, findings from other countries indicate that the nature of the discourse promoted by the international community is often counterproductive, and that normative gender frameworks may easily be understood as being either incomprehensible or inappropriate, triggering strong negative reactions.89 Some respondents suggested that this is the case in Somalia. It was suggested for example that for the UN to introduce gender policies and run a few training workshops, and then expect nationals to continue with implementation without follow-up, is irresponsible and an absence of accountability. Moreover, at a recent conference on the impact of war on Somali men, the point was made that the international community’s insistence on women’s empowerment as a major plank of policy is widely taken to imply that Somali men are more than usually negligent in offering protection to women, and Somali society in general more than usually unable to operate equitably, a criticism that many Somalis find offensive.90 Numerous respondents in our interviews, both men and women, voiced similar opinions. Whatever side one takes in this contentious debate, it is clear that this is an area where the international community will not succeed if it appears to be imposing a moral framework developed elsewhere. Given the insistence of the international community on
89 El-Bushra, Judy (2012) Gender in peacebuilding: taking stock London, International Alert, http://www.international- alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/201210GenderPeacebuilding-EN.pdf, accessed 16th May 2013. 90 Rift Valley Institute, op. cit.
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statebuilding as an ‘indigenous process’,91 this would be unfortunate indeed. We would agree with David Booth that ‘(…) institutional blockages [to development progress] can be overcome, and external actors may be able to make a positive contribution. But this requires skilled labour, and exceptional local knowledge and learning capabilities. It may well require more ‘arm’s length’ development cooperation, delivered by organisations that can work in ways that are far more embedded and adaptive’.92 This does not mean abandoning the attempt to incorporate gender into the international community’s interventions, but rather implies the need for interventions to be locally-sensitive and locally initiated and designed wherever possible.
91OECD (2011)Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD Publishing. 92Booth, David (2012) Development as a collective action problem: addressing the real challenges of African governance Africa Power and Politics Policy Brief no. 09, London, Overseas Development Institute.
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15 Annex E: Past and Current Interventions Matrix
The table summarises past and current interventions identified through desk review and field visits. Desk sources include: the EU-DFID civil society strategy paper for Somalia; a list of media related actions provided in a document compiled by UNESCO for the international media working group; and a document listing interventions the EU has funded in recent years under funding lines for civil society and human rights.
Intervention Type Frequency
Civil Society Strengthening 21
Policy Dialogue / Participation 16
Governance (supply-Side) 7
Anti-Corruption 1
Conflict Resolution / Peacebuilding 7
Child Rights / Child Protection 4
Environmental Protection 1
Parliamentary Support / Elections 4
Media Support 22
Youth Empowerment / Livelihoods 6
Human Rights 6
Gender / Women’s Empowerment 8
Disability 1
Minorities 2
Democratisation 0
Security (Including Community Security) 5
Education 2
Aid Effectiveness / Transparency 3
Community-based Development 1
Service Delivery 1
Resource Management 1
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Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
New Deal Policy World Bank lead 2013 World Federal Not known Preparatory talks led by the Initial promise waning as Dialogue / with G7+ Bank World Bank on parallel SFG Presidency tries to Participation support, Sahan, dialogue and aid planning run a non-inclusive Interpeace and process in line with the process. Office of the OECD-backed New Deal President model.
Establishment of Governance Interpeace 2013 EU Mogadishu €575,767 To improve the quality of a Policy Unit for (supply-side) life for the people of the Office of the Somalia. The Policy Unit President of will facilitate a coherent, Somalia well-coordinated, high quality public policy
formulation which supports the development of the security/stability, good governance, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia.
Bridging facility Parliamentary AWEPA 2013 EU Mogadishu €568,148 To contribute towards the for support for Support / democratic development of inauguration Elections a modern State which and capacity embodies the principles of building of New good governance, effective Federal Houses representation, respect for of Parliament human rights, accountability and
transparency by supporting the capacity and development of Somali Legislative institutions.
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Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Hargeisa Water Service Hargeisa Water 2012 - UNHCR Somaliland Not known Increase the amount of The payment for public Supply Delivery Authority/UNHC 2015 water to Hargeisa from service delivery has Upgrading R nearby well fields, and to support from customers, Project ensure that the supply suggesting that public system is secure and service delivery can sustainable. become sustainable. The agency is already receiving support and appears transparent and accountable.
Promoting Youth Interpeace 2012 – EU Somaliland €228,763 To empower Somaliland Relatively small project Youth Empowerment Europe 2015 youth to engage more requiring further
Empowerment / Livelihoods effectively in and contribute coordination. and and Policy positively to peace and Participation in Dialogue / state building processes. Democratic Participation
Governance
Conflict Resource Life and Peace 2012 - EU Central €410,000 Different perspectives on Solid bottom-up transformation Management Institute (LPI) 2015 Somalia resource management in peacebuilding work and inter-clan Hiraan, Middle-Shabelle which includes joint resource and Galgadud regions have partnership with Islamic management in been clarified and relief organisations central Somalia discussed through a process of engagement of
the clans and local authorities, which has led to the development of locally- owned agreements for the management of water resources
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Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Somali Human Human Rights East and Horn 2012 - EU All zones €300,000 To contribute to protection Rights of Africa Human 2015 and promotion of rights of
Defenders Rights the Somali HRDs and to Protection Defenders achieving a safe working Programme Project environment. (EHAHRDP)
Overcoming Gender / Minority Rights 2012 - EU All €357,972 To contribute to improved multiple Women’s Group 2015 gender equality, reduced discrimination Empowerment violence against women against Somali and increased access to minority women justice (with a particular focus on women in minority
communities).
Promoting and Civil Society Danish 2012 - EU All zones €600,000 To improve pre-conditions Enhancing Strengthening Demining Group 2014 for sustainable peace by
Active Civil and Security enhancing civil society
Society and Policy capacity for engaging with Engagement Dialogue / local authorities and (PEACE) Participation empowering local communities to identify and
address their safety concerns and needs.
Media Media Support Relief 2012 - EU Puntland €338,248 To improve the right to Education for International UK 2014 freedom of opinion and
Development, expression in Puntland thus
Inclusion, and enhancing respect for Awareness human rights and advocacy (MEDIA) for the benefit of the community at large.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:4 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
To strengthen Child Rights / CESVI 2012 - EU Somaliland €461,250 To strengthen the capacity the capacity of Child 2014 of Somalilander Civil
Somaliland Civil Protection and Society on how to plan and Society to plan Civil Society develop integrated and develop Strengthening approaches for vulnerable integrated children. approaches for vulnerable children
Promotion of Gender / VSF 2012 - EU Unknown €494,127 To contribute towards the gender equality Women’s 2014 promotion of gender and women's Empowerment equality and women empowerment in empowerment in Somalia Somalia for an inclusive, transparent and accountable society.
The promotion Gender / ILO 2012 - EU Unknown €593,825 Enhancing women’s of gender Women’s 2014 economic participation and equality and Empowerment empowerment and an women’s enabling environment for economic women entrepreneurship. empowerment
Justice and Gender / Danish Refugee 2012 - EU Somaliland €539,630 To promote gender equality economic Women’s Council 2014 and women’s empowerment Empowerment empowerment in for gender- Somaliland for an inclusive, based violence transparent and survivors in accountable society Hargeisa
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:5 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Strengthening Policy Saferworld 2012 - EU All zones €2,150,000 Somali citizens and non- Well regarded and with the participation Dialogue / 2014 state actors in the three broad reach, now facing of Somali Non- Participation Somali regions are challenges with long- State Actors in and Civil engaged in policy dialogues term sustainability of its decision-making Society with government and model on peace, Strengthening international actors and security and and Conflict well-informed on issues of development Resolution / peacebuilding and (phase 2): Peacebuilding statebuilding, aid Towards effectiveness and service sustainability delivery, leading to changes in policy and
behaviour by targeted decision-makers
Prevention of Child Rights / ILO 2012 - EU South €300,000 To contribute to the child recruitment Child 2014 Central effective prevention of child
& reintegration Protection recruitment and of children reintegration of children associated with associated with armed armed forces forces and armed groups and groups in (CAAFAG) in south central south central Somalia Somalia
Promoting Gender / ADESO 2012 - EU Puntland €537,739 Creation of a more enabling Women Political Women’s 2014 environment where gender
Participation for Empowerment sensitive conflict resolution peace and and peace building security in mechanisms are Puntland implemented. (PROWOPP)
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:6 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Somali Security Danish 2012 – EU, All Not known Promoting public Promising initial attempt Community Demining Group on- DFID, participation in security at coordination among Safety going Sweden sector through peace and security Framework Norway, establishment and support actors. Netherla for district safety nds, committees – aims to link previous with other initiatives, ly UNDP including UNDP support for capacity building in Ministries of Interior and Security, CDRD and TIS.
Shaqodoon Youth Shaqodoon 2012 - USAID Somaliland Not known Shaqodoon is an NGO off- Use of innovative text Organisation Empowerment Organisation on- shoot of the former EDC and voice based / Livelihoods going USAID Somali Youth messaging services Programme . It provided which enable remote youth with opportunities for data gathering, real-time skills training, access to data collection and work, internship and self- access to remote and employment. It uses cell vulnerable populations. phone and web-based In addition they are technologies to enable strongly focused on communication between youth. youths and employers.
Radio Life Link Media Support Free Press 2012- Netherla All €265,000 Building capacity of Somali Somalia Unlimited (FPU) 2013 nds radio stations and
– formerly Press improving access to
Now information by the Somali public. Provision of
broadcasting/journalism training courses to selected
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:7 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons radio stations. Production of high-quality news and information programmes to radio listeners
Promoting Gender / PROGRESSIO 2012 - EU Somaliland €225,009 To advocate for the representation Women’s 2013 adoption of a women’s of women in Empowerment quota in political decision making governance in Somaliland.
Support to Media Support Free Press 2012- UK South- £114,200 Improving access to independent Unlimited 2013 Central and GBP information to support free, radio stations in Puntland transparent, accountable
South Central and inclusive political
Somalia systems; strengthen security and justice; and
prevent and minimise conflict. Provision of financial support for 3 South-Central radio stations and media management training for 10 radio stations.
People to Media Support Internews 2012- USAID/ South Not known Training and mentoring for People Radio 2013 Internew Central journalists and media
Somalia managers; journalist
training for 3 community
stations; CSO training on Media Literacy; safety and security training for both journalists and radio staff.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:8 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Secretariat Aid Intermedia NCG 2012 - EU All €41,570 To provide complementary Support Effectiveness / 2013 and responsive secretariat
Services Transparency services in support of the SDG group on aid-
effectiveness and donor coordination matters, the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) Programming exercise and coordination process.
Beyond Child Rights / UNICEF 2012 - EU Unknown €243,125 To build the foundations for Emergency: Child 2013 a sustainable and effective
Building A Child Protection government-led child Protection protection system in System In Somaliland and Puntland, Somalia capable of addressing both prevention and response to violence, exploitation and abuse of children through a system of laws, policies, regulations and services.
The Good Governance Government of 2012 Govern Somaliland Not known GGACC exists to lead the Suggestions of a lack of Governance and (supply-side) Somaliland on- ment governance sector and to political will behind the Anti-Corruption and Anti- going initiative build strong, capable and GGACC as well as Commission Corruption effective institutions able to corruption within the (GGACC) initiate a comprehensive GGACC itself. response towards fighting
corruption.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:9 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Strengthening Aid BBC Media 2012 EU All Not known Building capacities of media in Effectiveness / Action (BBCMA) media organisations to promotion of Transparency facilitate a dialogue human rights between Somali media gender equity organisations, with an aim and peace in to assist them in elucidating Somalia an overall media strategy.
Media Support Media Support UNPOS 2012 UNPOS Puntland Not known Building capacities of media organisations; training Workshop for Journalists on Freedom of Expression; support to the process of drafting a regulative framework; development of media legislation for Puntland; and developin a capacity building strategy for the Ministry of Information and media practitioners.
Transition Civil Society DAI 2011 - USAID All Not known Increase the visibility of, Initiatives for Strengthening 2016 and confidence in, Stabilisation and government by improving (TIS) Governance service delivery. Working and Policy with local leaders to create Dialogue / partnership between Participation government, the private sector, and civil society, and increase access to information.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:10 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Action against Conflict DRC 2011 - EU Puntland Not known Address the high level of Conflict and for Resolution / 2014 localised conflict and the Somaliland Tolerance (ACT) Peacebuilding poor protection of human rights in the fragile situations in Somalia. Its specific objectives were that Somali-based capacities and practices for protection of human rights and conflict resolution were to be strengthened in the targeted four districts.
Support to Minorities Terresolidalionlu 2011 - EU Unknown €361,125 Enhance the role of the of Vulnerable s 2014 the umbrella association
Groups in and of its members as
Somalia agents of change and advocates of their own
communities’ needs.
Institutionalising Civil Society Heinrich Boll 2011 - EU Somaliland €225,000 To contribute to the Democracy in Strengthening Stiftung EV 2014 advancement of
Somaliland: Somaliland’s
Strengthening democratisation process in Civil Society for order to sustain the Effective prevailing peace and foster Democratic the rule of law culture, Participation through advocacy and effective lobbying by a
strong and mobilised civil society and an informed public.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:11 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Setting News Media Support Press Now 2011 - EU All €300,000 Building capacities of Standards in (renamed Free 2013 Somali radio stations by Somalia Press Unlimited) training and mentoring journalists and managers. Long-term practical journalism training for Somali radio station journalists; 2-month training courses in all aspects of radio journalism; short-term media management training for radio station owners and directors.
Enhancing Disability and HANDICAP 2011 - EU Somaliland €211,125 Promotion and protection of Participation of Policy INTERNATION 2013 rights of people with Puntland Somalis with Dialogue / AL disability to prevent Disability for Participation discrimination, abuse and
Human Rights exploitation and the and Democracy enhancement of their civic in Somaliland participation and and Puntland representation in democratic reforms in Somaliland and Puntland.
Action against Conflict Danish Refugee 2011 - EU Puntland, €600,000 Somali based capacities Conflict and for Resolution / council 2013 Somaliland and practices for protection
Tolerance (ACT) Peacebuilding of human rights and conflict in Puntland resolution have been strengthened in the
Bossaso and Galkayo districts of Puntland.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:12 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Setting News Media Support STITCHING 2011 - EU All €300,000 To improve the capacity of Standards in PRESS NOW 2013 the Somali media outlets
Somalia and increase access to
information in South and
Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland.
Strengthening Human Rights FONDATION 2011 - EU All €300,000 Civil authorities, local the civil society CARITAS 2013 organisations and to promote LUXEMBOURG educational institutions are human rights strengthened in promoting and to provide the human rights of women legal services and providing legal for victims assistance to victimised women.
The agreement Aid N/A 2011- Ministry Somaliland Not known INGOs have to submit their between the Effectiveness / on- of annual budget and project Government of Transparency going National proposals and at the end of Somaliland Plannin the year report on how this (represented by g and money was actually spent. the Ministry of Develop
National ment Planning and Development) INGOs
Documentation Human Rights UNPOS Human 2011 – EU All Not known Designed to service any of human rights Rights Unit and presen future national human violations East and Horn t rights commission of Africa Human Rights Defender
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:13 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Civil Society Civil Society Saferworld 2011 - EU, All €274,015 Strengthening the role of promotion of Strengthening 2012 DFID civil society in promoting human rights and Policy human rights and Dialogue / democratic reform, in Participation supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating political participation and representation.
Strengthening Media Support IMS/ Radio Ergo 2011 - IPDC - All $20,900 + Equipment and technical Humanitarian ongoin UNESC 30,000 facilities for training in new
Information flow g O and traditional media. To through media set up a radio station as a and among first step intervention Somali targeting Somali displaced displaced people. Also, to provide communities training and mentoring for journalists to foster positive
UN media coverage.
Institutionalising Civil Society H. Boll Stiftung 2010 - EU Somaliland €225,000 To bring together civil Democracy in Strengthening 2013 and society actors in the pursuit Somaliland: and Policy Diaspora of common agendas for Strengthening Dialogue / human rights and Civil Society for Participation democratic reform. To Effective contribute to advancement Democratic of the democratisation Participation process in order to sustain peace and foster the rule of law through advocacy.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:14 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Somali Governance UNDP 2010 - EU All zones €13,000,00 The project aims at Seen as a failing project Institutional (supply-side) 2013 0 developing key federal, due variously to lack of Development Somaliland and Puntland a systematic or locally-
Project (SIDP) government and public specific approach to institutions so that they can capacity building, poor
administer and manage relationship with core government functions governments, bad more effectively which, in management and lack of turn, will lead to more attention to effective and efficient accountability service delivery.
Strengthening Civil Society CATHOLIC 2010 - EU Somaliland €455,098 To strengthen the capacity the capacity of Strengthening INSTITUTE OF 2013 of CSOs in Somaliland on
CSOs on civic and Policy INTERNATION civic dialogue, human rights dialogue, human Dialogue / AL RELATIONS and active citizenship to rights and active Participation (PROGRESSIO) promote democracy and citizenship in good governance in
Somaliland Somaliland (NW Somalia).
Strengthening Media Support BBC Media 2010 - EU All Not known Training and mentoring for radio stations in Action (BBCMA) 2012 journalists and media Somalia to managers to enhance the WST promote human capacity of local journalists rights, peace and radio producers to and governance produce conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting media outputs that address gender equity and human rights for dissemination through local media and the BBC Somali Service.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:15 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Protection of the Child Rights / CESVI 2010 - EU Somaliland €663,614 Awareness improvement of rights of children Child 2012 the local society and Puntland affected by the Protection Government, the treatment armed conflict in of the children's trauma Somaliland and through a psychosocial and Puntland mental health approach and an intensive programme of formal and informal education programme to fill the huge educational gap and help the social reintegration.
Non state actors Policy Progressio 2010- EU Somaliland Not known Strengthening the capacity civic dialogue Dialogue / 2012 of non-state actors on civic Participation dialogue, human rights and active citizenship
Establishment of Media Support UNESCO 2010 – IPDC - Somaliland $35,000 The aim is to provide Hargeisa 2011 UNESC independent information
Campus CMC O and knowledge-sharing through radio for the
university and surrounding communities. It also improves the quality of training at the Hargeisa School of journalism through the integration of the campus radio.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:16 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Strengthening Media Support UNESCO 2010 – IPDC - Puntland $35,000 To enhance and diversify East African 2011 UNESC radio programming and
University O prompte democratisation Journalism processes. The project also
Training through produced a cadre of well- Community trained journalists and Radio and ICTs provided an alternative for public information and
development support programming in areas of concern to students and the community around the East Africa University.
Media law Media Support Free Press 2010 - Canada Somaliland $50,000 Promote inclusive process Two new draft laws reform, Unlimited 2011 to draft new media laws in were prepared under the
Somaliland Somaliland. Support the auspices of a
Somaliland parliament to parliamentary sub-
bring together government committee. They have and journalists to draft yet to be placed on the media-related laws, agenda of parliament for specifically: Law on Media discussion and a vote. and Access to Information;
and Law on Broadcasting.
The Civilian Security UNDP 2009 - Not All $11,085,43 Support accountability and Shows the difficulties of Police project 2015 known 2 USD so oversight mechanisms. accountability work far Work closely with police to when dealing with state build internal control security organisations mechanisms that respond to human rights abuse by the police.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:17 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Strengthening Youth DEUTSCHES 2009 - EU Somaliland €600,000 Capacities and the Role of Empowerment ROTES KREUZ 2013 competences of SRCS as
Somalia Red / Livelihoods EV Non State Actor to support, Crescent and Civil integrate and train the
Society SRCS Society youth in all regions of as Non-State Strengthening Somaliland, are improved Actor to better integrate the Youth into the Society of Somaliland
Improved Human Rights Oxfam Novib 2009 - EU All €345,578 To strengthen the capacity protection of / Civil Society 2012 of Somali CSOs, to raise human rights in Strengthening public awareness and to Somalia/land enhance dialogue with the through local authorities for the strengthening protection of human rights the Role and
Capacity of Somali civil society organisation
Enhancing the Civil Society H. Boll Stiftung / 2009 - EU Mogadishu, €210,000 To enable non-state actors Not well known Role of Civics Strengthening National Civic 2011 South- in Somalia to contribute to and Intellectuals and Conflict Forum – Central and a peaceful, more equitable, in Peace- Resolution / Somalia (NCF) the open, and democratic Building and Peacebuilding diaspora society. To aid civics and Reconciliation in intellectuals participation in Somalia peace-building and post- conflict reconstruction.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:18 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Media Media Support Relief 2009- EU All 370,831 Education experiences for Independence International 2011 immersion in journalism and education in (RI) skills, media production
Somalia (MIES) skills, and media literacy
and philosophy. The
learning will increase the functionality, participation, and peace of the civil society in Somalia fostered by an independent Puntland-based Somali media that maintains public acceptance and a demonstrated commitment to independent media standards.
Joint Governance UNDP, UNICEF, 2008- Not All Not known JPLG assists the Perceived more as a Programme on (supply-side) UN Habitat, ILO 2017 known development, strengthening supply-side initiative. Local and UNCDF and initiation of systems for Demonstrates the low Governance regional and district starting point for local councils to be recognised governance work in and legitimate, function terms of council professionally, perform administrative capacity effectively, and to be but also civic awareness responsive, representative, and trust. participatory, open and accountable to their citizens and provide services.
Community Community- Danish 2008 - World All $27,915,09 To contribute to stabilising Large consortium Driven Recovery based Demining Group 2015 Bank, 6 the fragile parts of Somalia approach which is due
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:19 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons and Development / Danish DFID, by enhancing community for evaluation in 2013 – Development Refugee Council DRC, safety and improving the a promising initiative (CDRD) and UNICEF quality of lives and though not coordinated Develop EC, livelihood of conflict well with others to date. Informed and Dutch effected populations. The Accountable DANIDA DIALOGUE has two aims: Local SIDA, improving dialogue among Governance Somalia communities, and between through User Stability communities and district Empowerment Fund, authorities; and supporting (DIALOGUE) Finish communities to prevent and programme resolve local conflicts.
Strengthening Policy Saferworld 2008- EU, Not known €2,459,237 Aims to strengthen non- the participation Dialogue / 2012 DFID state actors to engage in of Somali non- Participation & domestic and international state actors in Civil Society policy dialogue and decision-making Strengthening decision making on peace, Conflict security and Resolution / development Peacebuilding
Enhancing Policy H. Boll Stiftung 2008- EU Somaliland €450,000 Aims to support NSA to participation in Dialogue / 2011 contribute to a peaceful, governance and Participation & equitable, open and development in Civil Society democratic society, Somalia and Strengthening increase the participation of Somaliland and Youth women, and raise (focus on Empowerment awareness and localised women and / Livelihoods action towards youth) and Women’s environmental Empowerment management.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:20 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Promoting Policy Saferworld 2008 - EU, All €432,904 Increased space and Somali NSA Dialogue / 2011 DFID mechanisms for democratic inclusion in Participation policy-making in place. policy making and Civil Relevant Somali and Society international policies and Strengthening strategies are more responsive to the needs of Somali people based on the input of NSAs (as indicated by changes in policy positions of Somali authorities and international community).
Security of Security Security force 2008 - Not Mogadishu Not known To address the deteriorating Bakhara Market ongoin known security of the successful in Mogadishu g market, representatives of the business community came together with other civil society actors and formed a committee to establish a dialogue with the TFG leadership, the Ethiopian authorities and leaders of the insurgency. These discussions resulted in the market being declared a demilitarised zone. To realise this aim, the market was to have its own private security force governed by a code of conduct agreed by all parties.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:21 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
The Gender / SWA-IIDE 2007 - Not All Not known IIDA is a large women’s Establishment of Women’s ongoin known organisation which that was the Somali Empowerment g created in Mogadishu in Women Agenda 1991, bringing together (SWA) individuals and women’s groups from all over Somalia. The Somali Women Agenda (SWA) was created as a national women’s movement including Somali women and the Diaspora, mainly focusing on women participation to decision- making process. The platform was officially launched in 2007 with the participation of 22 organisations.
Support to Civil Society Saferworld 2006 - EU Not known €315,000 Somali Non- Strengthening 2008 State Actor Structures
District-based Conflict UNDP / UNOPS 2006 - Not South Not known Parallel processes holding Seen as having made a Peacebuilding Resolution / / CRD / TFG 2008 known Central reconciliation talks to solid contribution in Project Peacebuilding Steering Group support inclusive district some areas, particularly administrations in parts of Bay, under TFG South Central, notably Bay direction; are now calls and Gedo. to repeat the exercise
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:22 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Democratisation Civil Society National 2005 - USAID, Puntland Not known Programme s include Strengthening Democratic presen Norwegi and legislative and executive and Education Institute (NDI) t an Federal strengthening, civil society and Ministry capacity building, civic Governance of education on the (supply-side) Foreign constitutional and political and Affairs processes, and public Democratisatio (MFA), opinion research to n DFID aggregate Somali views on constitutional and political processes.
Effective Civil Society Saferworld 2005 - EU Not known € 1,080,000 dialogue Strengthening 2008 between NSAs, and Policy administrations Dialogue / and the Participation international and Aid community Effectiveness / Transparency
Support to the Parliamentary AWEPA 2004 - EU Somaliland €1,260,000 Offers training, workshops, legislative sector Support / 2012 seminars and study visits in Somalia Elections for parliamentarians and parliamentary staff with the objective to create an environment that fosters knowledge sharing of the democratic process.
Somalia and Security Somalia and 2002 - Not All, but Not known United Nations panel of 2012 report received a Eritrea Eritrea ongoin known strong S/C experts monitoring strong negative reaction Monitoring Monitoring compliance with the from senior TFG;
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:23 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons Group Reports Group (UN) g focus embargoes on the delivery coverage of of weapons and military humanitarian aid equipment to Somalia and diversion contested, but Eritrea. widely seen as uncovering high
corruption
Civil Society Civil Society CARE 2000 - USAID Somaliland Not known Goal of strong civil society Expansion Strengthening 2003 Puntland organisations that Programme contribute to good (CSEP) in governance and peace northern building with cooperative, Somalia. productive linkages with civil authorities.
Pillars of peace: Conflict Interpeace 1999 - EC,Den All Not known Aims to advance and beyond dialogue Resolution / ongoin mark underpin the consolidation Peacebuilding g DfID, of peace throughout the Norway, Somali region through Sweden consensus-oriented, Switzerl integrated approaches to and and statebuilding and USAID peacebuilding.
The War-Torn Policy Interpeace 1994 - UNRISD Somaliland Not known Assist the international Seminal programme of Societies Dialogue / 1998 community and national work based on Puntland Project Participation and local actors to better participatory action understand and respond to research which ran the challenge of rebuilding during Somaliland and war-torn societies. It Puntland’s formative encouraged society to years. Points to the collectively analyse the importance of complex interactions
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:24 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons between peace-keeping, participatory approaches relief, rehabilitation and development activities, and between local, national and external actors.
Promoting Policy MercyCorps Not USAID Somaliland Not known To work with local Peace and Dialogue / known communities and traditional Puntlland Reconciliation Participation structures of governance to programme and Conflict reduce violent conflict and Resolution / ease social tensions Peacebuilding through using grassroots, ‘bottom up’ approaches to build capacities of local communities to engage in dialogue with each other and officials.
Strengthening Civil Society CESVI Not EU Somaliland €565.236,0 The project aims are to Somali civil Strengthening known 6 contribute to the society achievement of the capacities to Millennium Development promote Goals 1 and 7 through the environmental empowerment of Non State protection and Actors to play an effective sustainable role in shaping sustainable development development and to and to enhance civil society’s role contribute to in poverty reduction and in good local environmentally sustainable governance development and contribute system to good local governance.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:25 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Empowering the Gender / COSPE Not EU Not known Somali Women’s known Women’s Empowerment Agenda; Empowering Somalia
Strengthening Education Foundation Not EU Not known Non State Caritas known Actors in the Luxembourg sector of Non- Formal Education and Vocational Skills
Support to youth Civil Society Terre Solidali Not EU Somaliland Not known and gender Strengthening ONLUS known umbrella and Youth associations in Empowerment Somaliland / Livelihoods and Gender / Women’s Empowerment
Democratic Parliamentary International Ongoi USAID, Somaliland Not known Support marginalised Transitions in Support / Republican ng DFID groups, campaign and Somaliland Elections Institute (IRI) internal party strengthening assistance to Somaliland’s three political parties, and parliamentary staff and development training for both houses.
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:26 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Engaging Non- Civil Society ADRA-Somalia Not EU Somaliland €100,000 The overarching objective is State Actors in Strengthening known poverty reduction in the the Promotion of Environmental context of sustainable Alternative Protection development, including Energy Activities prevention of loss of in Somaliland biodiversity; resource based conflicts and improvement of economic development of Somali people through provision of sustainable energy services.
Empowerment Civil Society Oxfam GB Not EU All Not known Well regarded but of Somali Non- Strengthening known lacking follow-up State Actors
Strengthening Human Rights Foundation Not EU Not known Not known the civil society Caritas known to promote Luxembourg human rights and to provide legal services for victims
Strengthening Youth Deutsches Not EU Somaliland Not known the Role of Empowerment Rotes Kreutz known Somalia Red / Livelihoods Crescent to better integrate the Youth
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:27 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Somalia Parliamentary Interpeace Not EU Somaliland Not known Shows the importance Democratisation Support / known of external oversight and Process II - Elections technical assistance to Somaliland Local election processes Election Component
Somalia Parliamentary Interpeace Not EU Somaliland Not known Shows the importance Democratisation Support / known of external oversight and Process – Phase Elections technical assistance to III –Additional election processes Support to the Somaliland Presidential Elections Component
Enhancing the Youth Interpeace Not EU Not known Not known Testing A/V with good role of youth Empowerment known initial results and rural / Livelihoods communities in and Policy peacebuilding Dialogue / through film- Participation discussions on and Media peace, security Support and democracy
Capacity Human Rights Caritas Not Not Somaliland Not known building for known known Somaliland Human Rights Commission
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C16:28 ANNEX E: PAST INTERVENTION MATRIX / FINAL REPORT
Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Advocacy on Minorities Minority Rights Not Not All Not known Documenting violations and minority rights International known known detail barriers faced by minorities
Civil Society Civil Society Terre Solidaires Not EU South Not known Capacity building of local Capacity Strengthening known Central civil society so are able to Building and Policy (Galgadud) demand on behalf of Dialogue / community to district Participation governance and so can be responsive service providers themselves.
The Governance World Bank / Not Not All Not known Shared strategy for Mixed reviews. Positive Reconstruction (supply-side) UNDP known known deepening peace and aspects include and reducing poverty in a post- participation of govt, IC Development conflict setting. Three-zonal and civil society in Plan plan developed through in- developing country consultations comprehensive and spanning issues of transparent plans, but infrastructure, socio- majority view is overly economic development, ambitious, bureaucratic governance and and having fallen under reconciliation. the control of TFG planning minister
Civic Education Education Diakonia SIDA Puntland Civic education
Media Support Media Support UNPOS AMISO All Monitoring of media Some useful outputs for M content; outreach and UN system but
public messaging campaign essentially a top-down emphasising Somali stabilisation initiative ownership and involvement; mapping and
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Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons analysis of Somali media; provision of monthly updates, with specific focus on the AMISOM/UNSOA are of operations.
Media Support Media Support UNPOS AMISOM All $153,300 Equipment and technical facilities for training in new
and traditional media for specialised reporting; new media products developed and disseminated including mobile/cellular platforms
Media Support Media Support UNPOS AMISOM All $175,000 Capacity building of CSOs and the media to help media
understand the information needs of audiences. Conduct an annual public survey and assess the effectiveness of the information operation and the understanding by Somalis of the mission's mandate and expectations.
Media Support Media Support UNPOS AMISOM All $126,350 Training for journalists and media managers. Bi-annual
workshops for staff, contractors, partners and local media in media skills culturally and politically sensitive reporting.
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Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons
Media Support Media Support Radio Mogadishu US and South Central Not known Equipment and technical Italy facilities for training in new
and traditional media for specialised reporting; providing Radio Mogadishu with machines to read pre- 1991 sound archival material.
Media Education Media Support Relief Not EU Not known Not known Improve access to freedom of for Development, International (RI) known opinion and expression in the
Inclusion, and Puntland State, thus
Awareness enhancing respect for human (MEDIA) rights and encouraging transparency. By empowering
Somali journalists with skills and techniques, the standards of journalism will be raised to provide independent and objective reporting and promote the media as a tool for peacebuilding.
Conflict-sensitive Media Support IMS/ Radio Ergo Not UNESCO Not known Not known Training of field reporters that journalism training known constitute the Radio Ergo workshop for network in Somalia and in Somali journalists the Dadaab Refugee Camp in Northern Kenya on humanitarian reporting, safety of journalists conflict- sensitive reporting. This was carried out as part of the
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Intervention Category Implementers Time Donors Regions Funds Description Perceptions / Frame Emerging Lessons strategy to build the capacity of Somali journalists inside the country to not only provide much needed information to the Dadaab camp refuges but will also develop skills and build capacities of the refugees involved with transmission or production of the programmes.
Media Support Media Support AU/UN Not UNSOA All Not known Studies on existing media Information known laws and policies in Somalia;
Support Team establishing a press council/ (IST) media complaints body/ Independent regulator in
Somalia; building capacities of media organisations; and monitoring of media content
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16 Annex F: Stakeholder Tables
16.1 Table 4: Mogadishu Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) International Traditional (e.g. OECD Stable and High EU, USA, tax Very accessible to Development People are sceptical Actors donors DAC Group) democratic payers: their Ministers, tax about them Somalia transparency and constituencies; payers USA and UK: accountability inaccessible to Counter- public terrorism EU: Counter immigration Influence with Somali key stakeholders Non- E.g. Turkey, Stable Modest Their governments: Very accessible to Their governments Very positive traditional Qatar Somalia; stable and strong their donors counter weight Somalia; equal governments; against influence with inaccessible to Western Western public countries; governments influence among key Somali stakeholders UN Agencies Mainly Stable and High Donors (EU, USA) Accessible to UNSC; donors Low; they’re viewed UNDP, democratic donors; as advancing UNPOS, Somalia; inaccessible to western agendas OCHA, continued public UNICEF, business UNHCR
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) AMISOM Stable Relatively high AU; EU; UN; USA; Inaccessible to AU, UNSC; donors Very good Somalia at Somali public: public. The only peace with Peaceful Somalia relationship they itself and its have with public is neighbours; the ‘AMISOM influence on hospital’ domestic politics; continued business INGOs: E.g. Oxfam, Fighting Modest Donors and public: Accessible to Their board Low: they’re seen Save the poverty and fighting poverty and donors but not to as advancing children, diseases; diseases the public western agenda TIKA developing human capacity; infrastructure Diaspora Stable High Public Accessible Nobody Mixed Somalia International Prosperous Low Public (potential Accessible Their board Low Private Somalia consumers) Sector Regional Stable High Their governments Inaccessible to Nobody (AU at Very low states (e.g. Somalia public; accessible times) IGAD (Frontline to donors members) states aspire to weak and divided Somalia) International Eventful Low Public Accessible to the Their companies Mixed Media Somalia elite only
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Formal state Executive Presidency Extending Limited Public; donors; Accessible to the No body; Low: Presidency is (Central – E.G. branch government AMISOM elite only; elites Parliament: seen as over FGS and / or authority and access presidency parliament has legal reaching his powers state level eg legitimacy; through oversight role over and trumping the Puntland / stable established the govt. Prime Minister, Somaliland) Somalia; networks of Donors wield the side-lining some Strong friends, clan ‘power of the purse’ (Daarood) clans government members and and marginalising Better group groups outside his relations with membership Dam-Jadid group the PM, cabinet and Parliament Executive Prime Extending Limited Public; donors; Accessible only to Parliament: they Low: Prime Minister Branch Minister’s government AMISOM elites can fire him through is seen as weak Office authority and vote of no- and kowtowing to legitimacy; confidence. Donors president’s better relations can cut funding too expansive powers with President and Parliament Line More influence Very limited President, Prime Accessible to the President, Prime Very low: cabinet is ministries and resources Minister and elite only: Elites Minister Parliament seen as collectively and civil Parliament; donors can access and donors incompetent servants ministers through networks and through expensive hotels that average people can’t come to Parliament Government Limited Public; government; Accessible to elite Nobody; speaker Extremely low: MPs oversight; donors (members only. MPs don’t are seen as legislative of their respective have formal professional black- power; better clans) relations with their extorting
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) relations with clan concessions from the President, constituencies Cabinet. Prime Minister and Cabinet Speaker of Parliament Significant Public; Access to public is Supreme court; Relatively high: he’s Parliament leadership; parliamentary limited due to donors seen as a strong leadership security statesman among legislative the 3 top leaders agenda; good relations with president, PM and MPs Formal Police : Secure Limited - . Public; government; Accessible to Government; Extremely low: Due Security 7,000-strong Mogadishu Approx. 90% donors: secure public: People can interior ministry. to poor training, lack funded by EU and environs; based in Somalia – They meet them at Donors of regular salary, via UNDP obtain Mogadishu. demand consistent police stations, the police are seen payment Comprised of salary, better pay investigation as marauding militia mostly few sub- and equipment centres, etc. clans as a result of ex chiefs. These clans are: Sa’ad/Habar- Gidir/Hawiye. Rahanweyne/Di gil and Mirifle. Abgal/Hawiye Military: To defeat al- Limited: Approx. Government and They’re Government, Extremely low – 18,000 strong Shabaab and 80% based in donors: They inaccessible to defence ministry The military has a funded by secure Mogadishu. demand consistent people because and donors reputation for being U.S. (60%) Somalia; Comprised of salary, better their camps are abusive, engaged in and Italy obtain mostly 3 clans: training and outside of the city rape and looting. (40%). payment Abgal/Hawiye. equipment limits and they’re They’re comprised Rahanweyne/Di regularly patrolling of clan militia gil and Mirifle. the city Marehan/Daaroo
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) d. They were initially made up of various militias loyal to warlords in Mogadishu but that has since changed. National To defeat al- Modest – The Government and Inaccessible to Government, Relatively high as Intelligence Shabaab and NISA chief briefs donors: They public – the nature interior ministry and they’re viewed as and Security glean the President demand legal of their work is Western agencies more competent Agency actionable every morning framework to work secretive than the police and (NISA) intelligence and the agency with as NISA is military Most is well currently not professional connected to enshrined in the of the 3 western laws of the land agencies. agencies Funded entirely by UK, U.S., France and others Formal Functioning Limited Public; government; Accessible to Government and Very low because Judiciary judicial sector donors: They public through donors corruption is in Somalia. demand respect courts, legal rampant in the Independent from the executive clinics and judicial sector judicial sector branch which they conferences perceive as encroaching upon them Regional Governor Functioning Considerable Public; government; Inaccessible to Fed Government; Mixed because the Government and stable donors: service public due to interior minister governor is viewed Benadir: delivery across 16 security, but donors – At times, much more advancing districts. More governor regularly the governor is positively than his
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) group or influence on donors attends public influenced by predecessors but personal and executive functions and powerful interest he stands accused interests in branch in securing sometime groups including of widespread contracts, etc more powers organises them to clan and business corruption enhance his image Sub Regional Municipal See above Government government (e.g. Mayor) District 16 DCs. 8 are Stable district; Depends, but District residents; Inaccessible to Federal Low because Commission Abgal. 2 are service generally low government: public due to government; service is not ers Murusade. 3 delivery; effective security but elites mayor/governor adequately are Habar- resource administration have almost delivered Gidir. 1 is extraction unhindered Duduble. 2 access are minorities. Non-formal / non- Traditional A peaceful Depending on Members of the Accessible to clan Members of clan Mixed but generally state structures leaders Somalia region, but clan: united clan members good including civil (sultan, dominated by generally voice; stronger clan society ugaas etc) / his clan respected but at expense of clan not feared others; domination
structures Religious A peaceful High because Public: observant Very accessible to Religious scholars High authorities Somalia and people trust their society; Sharia- public through an observant moral authority compliant political mosques and society dispensation; other venues advancement of a particular religious agenda Private Approx. 50% Continued High because Elites and their Accessible Their “owners” Very low militias of SFG business they protect just organisations/comp soldiers are about everybody anies engaged in
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) private protection Total estimated strength could be as high as 15,000 ASWJ forces About 150 A stake in Low (since after Sufi sect; Ethiopia Inaccessible Ethiopia – the Very low soldiers now national transition, their (which created and country that created part of Somali politics; defeat formal role armed them) them. They’re trying National of al-Shabaab shrank to find a role for Army considerably themselves Shabaab Somalia Low Jihadist community Extremely Senior Shabaab Extremely low turned into a inaccessible commanders because people are Jihad tired of their endless battlefield Jihad Business Money Peaceful and High because Public: They’d like Accessible Their shareholders High transfer prosperous they can easily prosperous Somalia companies Somalia – buy political and but they demand to monopoly on other support not pay taxes its sector Education Literate and High – they’ve Probably their Accessible Their donors and Relatively high sector educated been educating donors who are religious scholars Somalia; youth for 2 mostly Arab domination of decades of war countries Arabic culture; lack of national education policy Telecoms Prosperous High – they’ve Public; government; Accessible Shareholders Modest companies (3 Somalia; resources to other business providers) market influence groups monopoly; policymakers
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) political influence; lack of government taxes Health N/A companies Electricity Peaceful and Low/unknown Public; companies Accessible Their shareholders Low companies (4 prosperous prefer not to pay providers) Somalia – taxes monopoly on its sector Water Continued Low/ unknown Public; companies Inaccessible Shareholders Low companies (2 business; lack prefer not to pay providers) of national taxes water company Local relief Sector based and (eg. Health) development Women’s Peaceful Modest Women; public Very accessible Their board Modest NGOs/ groups Somalia umbrella groups – Youth Groups Peaceful Modest Youth; public: Very accessible Their board Limited (with Somalia prosperous Somalia international links - operational) Local Stable, Considerable Public; Accessible Their boards Modest advocacy peaceful and policymakers; and rights democratic media: Vibrant, NGOs Somalia tolerant and democratic society Community No significant N/A based group to organisation speak of
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Professional Have not groups/ seen them in networks Mogadishu Journalists/ Eventful but High Public; Accessible Their owners Low (due to Media stable Somalia policymakers; rampant corruption) donors
16.2 Table 5: Kismayo Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) International Traditional Not present Actors Donors (e.g. OECD DAC Group) Non- Not present traditional donors UN Agencies Mainly Stable and High Donors (EU, USA) Accessible to UNSC; donors Low; they’re viewed (non- UNPOS, democratic donors; as advancing stationary OCHA, Somalia; inaccessible to western agendas presence) UNICEF continued public business AMISOM 4,000 strong Creating a Very high Raskamboni Militia; Inaccessible to AMISOM, to an Seen positively in (KDF) ‘strategic AMISOM; IGAD, public; Accessible extent. IGAD, AU Kismaayo, space’ (client Ethiopia. Their to elites, clan and UNSC, and to negatively in other regional state) demands include: elders, donors parts of Somalia in Jubbaland influence over businesspeople who see them as
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) region; Jubbaland regions, who use the strengthening influencing concessions in Kismaayo port polarised polities national Somalia’s EEZ politics via (Exclusive Jubbaland; Economic Zone) protecting its tourism sites and Lamu port project near Raskamboni Continued ‘business’ INGOs Some visits, minimal presence Diaspora Number is Stable and Relatively low Local communities. Accessible No body Mixed: at times very small prosperous They’re the force positive b/c they Somalia; behind an support economy; Jubbaland autonomous state negative b/c they administration dominate politics functioning International Negligible Prosperous Low Public (potential Accessible Their board Low private presence Somalia: consumers) sector functioning Kismaayo port; autonomous Jubbaland to make deals with Regional Ethiopia and Autonomous High Their Governments: Inaccessible to AU, UNSC, Donors. Very low b/c they’re states (e.g. Kenya are Jubbaland They demand public; accessible seen as weakening IGAD relevant here region they weakened central to donors central state in members) can deal with state in Somalia Somalia directly. But
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) IGAD member states are rivals on Somalia. Djibouti wants a strong central state; Ethiopia and Kenya want weaker one International Only Kenyan Eventful Low Public Accessible to the Their companies Mixed media media has Somalia (Non- elite only been Kenyan media allowed so has been far dissuaded from visiting Kismaayo b/c KDF doesn’t want them to report critically) Formal state Administratio Jubbaland Full control of Modest and Daarood clan, KDF, Accessible to the KDF, Ethiopia High locally; low (Central e.g. FGS n State/Ras the 3 regions challenged by Ethiopia, Ras elites only nationwide. and / or state Kamboni in Jubbaland rival Kamboni. They level Militia (Lower Jubba, administrations demand Middle Jubba autonomous and Gedo). Jubbaland Getting rid of rivals. Strengthening ties to KDF and their govt. Weakening the SFG in Mogadishu.
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Domination of Daarood clan over others; control of Port of Kismaayo. Controlling Shabaab Jubbaland Disrupting Ras Limited Marehan clan; SFG Inaccessible to Nobody Low locally, high Administratio Kamboni in Mogadishu. public nationally n (2) efforts; Col. Barre recapturing Hiiraale Kismaayo. Control of port (resources) Formal Police: (no Security police) Military Defeat al- Limited Government and Inaccessible Government, Low (SNAF): Shabaab and donors: defence ministry 2,000 strong secure and donors under the Somalia; tutelage of obtain regular the SFG in salaries; Keep Mogadishu Kismaayo under SFG; Counterweight to Ras Kamboni militia; Mostly from Daarood clans Informal Ras Autonomous High because Ahmed Madoobe, Inaccessible Ahmed Madoobe Viewed positively security Kamboni Jubbaland they’re led by KDF, Daarood clan: locally; negatively militia admin; Ahmed They demand self- nationally (approx. challenge to Madoobe, new ruling Jubbaland
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) 3,000 SFG troops; President of strong) – work with Jubbaland supported by KDF; control admin KDF Shabaab Formal Don’t exist Judiciary Regional Governor Don’t exist Government Sub Regional Municipal Don’t exist Government government (e.g. Mayor) District Don’t exist Admin Non formal / non Traditional Specific to Depending on Members of the Accessible to clan Members of clan Mixed but generally state structures leaders clan. Majority region, but clan: united clan members good (including Civil (sultan, position: generally voice; stronger clan Society) ugaas etc) / autonomous respected but at expense of clan Jubbaland not feared others; domination
structures state; united Daarood clan against others Religious A peaceful High because Public: observant Very accessible to Religious scholars High authorities Somalia and people trust their society; Sharia- public through an observant moral authority compliant political mosques and society dispensation; other venues advancement of religious agenda Private Protecting Moderate Influence only in Owners and clients: Public may Owners and clients Modest security VIPs, hotels, security and relation to their performance of access them on (often the same) companies big continuation of duties security duties the street, companies business otherwise clients and owners in private meetings
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Shabaab No presence Somalia as a Low Jihadist community Extremely Senior Shabaab Extremely low inside city - Jihad inaccessible commanders because people are 50KM battlefield tired of their endless outside Recapture of Jihad Kismaayo, once most important city Business Money Peaceful and High because Public: They’d like Accessible Their shareholders High transfer prosperous they can easily prosperous Somalia companies Somalia – buy up political but they demand to (About 12 monopoly in its and other not pay taxes operators) sector - Lack support of local and national regulations Education Literate and High – they’ve Probably their Accessible Their donors and Relatively high sector educated been educating donors who are religious scholars (University of Somalia; youth for 2 mostly Arab Kismaayo domination of decades of war countries and 3 high Arabic culture; schools) lack of national education policy Telecoms Prosperous High – they’ve Public; government; Accessible Shareholders Modest companies Somalia; resources to other business (Hormuud, monopoly; influence groups NationLink political policymakers and influence; lack Telecom) of taxes Water and Continued Low – unknown Public Inaccessible Shareholders Low Power business; lack companies of national (Waamo) water company
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Local relief Sector and based (eg. development Health) NGOs/ Women’s Peaceful Modest Women; public Very accessible Their board Modest umbrella groups Somalia and groups – (Waamo stable (with Women's Kismaayo international Way links - (WWW)) operational) Youth Peaceful Modest Youth; public: Very accessible Their board Limited Groups Somalia and prosperous Somalia stable Kismaayo Advocacy Stable, Considerable Public; Accessible Their boards Modest and rights peaceful and policymakers; NGOs/ democratic media: Vibrant, umbrella Somalia tolerant and group democratic society Local No N/A Community significant based org group to speak of Professional Jubba See below groups/ Journalists networks Union (JJU) Journalists/ E.g. Eventful but High Public; Accessible Their owners Mixed. National Media Kismayo stable Somalia policymakers; radio is widely Radio donors listened to; Kismayo radio very new and not so reliable
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16.3 Table 6: Baidoa Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) International Traditional Not present Actors Donors (e.g. OECD DAC) Non- Not present traditional donors UN Agencies Mainly Stable and High Donors (EU, USA) Accessible to UNSC; donors Low; they’re viewed (mostly non- UNDP, democratic donors; as advancing stationary UNPOS, Somalia; inaccessible to western agendas presence) OCHA, continued public UNICEF, business UNHCR AMISOM Keeping AS at Very high Public; Somali Inaccessible AU, IGAD, UNSC, Mixed: AMISOM is and EDF bay. Stable government; local Ethiopia liked; EDF not so (Ethiopian Baidoa. For admin; much Defence EDF: influence Forces) in domestic Somali politics. EDF forces have intervened without the approval of the AU or UNSC INGOs Some visits, minimal presence Diaspora Number is Stable and Relatively low Local communities. Accessible No body Mixed: at times negligible prosperous They’re the force positive b/c they Somalia; behind an support economy; Effective local autonomous state negative b/c they administration dominate politics
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) International Negligible private presence sector Regional Ethiopia is Ethiopia wants High Their governments: Inaccessible to AU, UNSC, Donors. Very low b/c they’re states (e.g. most an They demand public; accessible seen as weakening IGAD relevant here autonomous weakened central to donors central state in members) state state in Somalia Somalia (SouthWest or Bay and Bakool). This is to weaken central government and strengthen local authorities International Media Eventful Low Public Accessible to the Their companies Mixed media access is Somalia elite only limited Formal state Federal Not present Consolidate Low None Inaccessible (not No one Mixed (central – e.g. government but Governor influence; present) FGS and / or administratio is an counter state level) n appointee Ethiopia Formal Police: Stable and Modest SFG, local admin, Accessible SFG, local admin, Modest Security several peaceful traditional elders, donors hundred in Baidoa; donors region keeping AS at bay; payment Military: To defeat al- Modest Government and Inaccessible Government, Low 1,000 strong Shabaab and donors: defence ministry under the secure Bay and donors tutelage of region; obtain the SFG in regular
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Mogadishu salaries; Keep AS at bay Formal Functioning Modest SFG and local Accessible SFG and local Low b/c of poor Judiciary justice admin admin capacity institutions; protection; payment Regional Governor Bay region Full control of Modest SFG, Ethiopia, Digil Accessible to the SFG, Ethiopia, Modest government administratio Bay region. and Mirifle clans; elites only traditional elders n Stability. Speaker of Peace. Parliament Working with SFG. Keeping Shabaab at bay Sub-regional District Baidoa As above As above As above As above As above As above government administratio district ns admin (closely aligned with regional admin) Non formal / non Traditional Strong local Depending on Members of the Accessible to clan Members of clan Mixed but generally state structures leaders admin; welfare region, but clan: united clan members good (including Civil (sultan, of Digil and generally voice; stronger clan Society) ugaas etc) / Mirifle clans in respected but at expense of clan the region and not feared others; domination
structures in the nation; obtaining resource access and political representation
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Religious A peaceful High because Public: observant Very accessible to Religious scholars High authorities Somalia and people trust their society; Sharia- public through an observant moral authority compliant political mosques and society dispensation; other venues advancement of a particular religious agenda Private Protecting Moderate Influence only in Owners and clients: Public may Owners and clients Modest security VIPs, hotels, security and relation to their performance of access them on (often the same) companies big continuation of duties security duties the street, companies business otherwise clients and owners in private meetings Shabaab No presence Somalia Low Jihadist community Extremely Senior Shabaab Extremely low inside city turned into a inaccessible commanders because people are Jihad tired of their endless battlefield. Jihad Recapture of Baidoa, once most important city Business Money Peaceful and High because Public: They’d like Accessible Their shareholders High transfer prosperous they can easily prosperous Somalia companies Somalia – buy up political but they demand to (8 monopoly on and other not pay taxes companies its sector support operate in - Lack of local Baidoa) and national regulations Education Literate and High – they’ve Probably their Accessible Their donors and Relatively high sector educated been educating donors who are religious scholars (University of Somalia, Bay youth for 2 mostly Arab South region and decades of war countries Digil and
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) Somalia and Mirifle 3 High members; Schools) domination of Arabic culture; lack of national education policy Telecoms Prosperous High – they’ve Public; government; Accessible Shareholders Modest companies Somalia; resources to other business (Hormud and market influence groups NationLink) monopoly; policymakers political influence; lack of government taxes Power Peaceful and Low/unknown Public – regular Accessible Shareholders Low companies prosperous affordable supply (Baidoa Somalia – Electricity) monopoly in the sector Water Continued Low – unknown Public – quality, Accessible Shareholders Low companies business; lack affordable water (Baidoa of national and regular supply Water water Supply) company Local relief Sector and based (eg. development Health) NGOs/ Women’s Peaceful Modest Women; public Very accessible Their board Modest umbrella groups Somalia and groups – stable Baidoa (with (Bay Women international Network) links - Youth Peaceful Modest Youth; public: Very accessible Their board Limited
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Stakeholder Interests Influence (how Main Accessibility Who are they Popular powerful and constituencies (when/where/ answerable to perceptions of this influential they and key demands how are they (who effectively stakeholder are) interacting with can sanction them constituents) for wrong doing/ poor performance) operational) Groups Somalia and prosperous Somalia (Bay Youth stable Baidoa Foundation) Local Stable, Considerable Public; Accessible Their boards Modest advocacy peaceful and policymakers; and rights democratic media: Vibrant, NGOs/ Somalia; tolerant and umbrella better access democratic society group for local communities to national resources and power Local No N/A Community significant based group to organisation speak of s Professional N/A groups/ networks Journalists/ E.g. Radio Eventful but High Public; Accessible Their owners Low (due to Media Badioa stable Somalia policymakers; rampant corruption) donors
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17 Annex G: Methodology
The assessment was undertaken by a team of six international consultants supported by three local research organisations and individuals located in each of the three zones of Somalia. The research was divided into three main phases: Inception planning and desk based document review Fieldwork, research, and initial data findings Preparation and submission of draft and final reports
17.1 Phase 1- Inception planning and document review Document and literature review In parallel and subsequent to the inception planning, the team conducted a review of relevant documentation. The purpose was to: assemble information on programing (past and present) in each of the three regions; support the identification of key informants for interview; and explore the country context. The document review provided the foundation for the context analysis and case studies in each of the three zones. Preparation of research instruments An initial key informant interview template was developed prior to the deployment of the team. The question set was discussed with the Somalia Governance and Aid Modalities Expert, Project Director and Team Leader. To ensure that the questions asked were comprehensive, the team elected to use two interview templates contained in Annex G. Questionnaire A was used by the international consultant team - given that the international team would be speaking to interviewees in a more urban setting, the complexity of the questions was enhanced. Questionnaire B was used by the local research teams - these questions were more succinct, but were structured in parallel to the core areas of information required, and included additional ranking questions with a focus on corruption. The number of questions asked in questionnaire A was sometimes limited due to time constraints, but this resulted in a greater depth of response whilst questionnaire B provided answers to each of the questions, increasing the amount of data from beyond the capitals. A set of short questions were developed for the three London interviews. These were based on the questions contained in questionnaire A, but were significantly shorter due to the brief time available.
17.2 Phase 2 – Fieldwork, other research, analysis and presentation of initial findings Fieldwork Two parallel streams of fieldwork took place: In the first stream, three international consultants travelled to Hargesia, Somaliland and Garowe, Puntland. The fourth international consultant was unable to travel to Mogadishu due to security concerns. The second stream involved retention of local research teams in: Hargesia – this team travelled to Borama and Shiekh districts to conduct interviews beyond the capital. Kismayo and Baidoa and Mogadishu - due to a breach in contract, an alternative researcher was engaged for this component. Garowe - to supplement the interviews conducted by the international consultant.
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The table below details the interviews conducted and questionnaires used.
Location Interviews Questionnaire Interviews Questionnaire Interviews Questionnaire A B A
Hargesia 29
Borama 18
Shiekh 18
Garowe 23
Mogadishu 22
Kismayo 10
Baidoa 10 2
Nairobi 18
London 3
Total: 153 interviews Data collection instruments The team used key informant interviews (KII) in each of the three zones and Nairobi. KIIs included: Traditional leaders Religious leaders Women NGOs/ CBOs Youth Minority groups The private sector INGOs Donors Local/ regional Government UN organisations Members of the Diaspora community Civil society The media DFID advisers Interviews in Nairobi were primarily with INGOs and donors. Interviews by the local research teams provided access to the harder to reach KII including traditional and religious leaders. Interviewees were selected purposely and indicatively rather than as statistically relevant samples. This was done in order to capture key insights of those with the most information about the programme. Whilst the team made use the pre-specified questions, additional questions were refined through an iterative process during the interview if a topic of relevance arose.
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Analysis of research results Team members provided a summary report from their respective zone including the main findings from KII groups; analysis of quantitative data on corruption and trust; and graphs on questions of corruption and trust for each zone.
17.3 Phase 3- Preparation and submission of draft and final reports. Preparation and submission of draft and final reports Once the analysis was complete, the team prepared reports on their thematic area (for example gender or the social cost of corruption) and/ or zone (Somaliland, South Central or Puntland). These were compiled into a synthesis report with the inclusion of annexes. Team Composition The assessment team was composed of Somali and international experts on Somalia, and experts with prior expertise in voice and accountability of governance institutions in Africa and fragile and conflicted affected states. Local researchers enhanced access to KII groups and provided reach beyond the capitals of Hargesia, Mogadishu and Puntland. In Hargesia a half day training was provided to the local research organisation on: the objectives of the assessment, the purpose of each of the questions included in the questionnaires, translation of accountability, governance and corruption to ensure the meaning was not distorted; and methods of interview selection. The researchers in Puntland and South Central were briefed in person and via skype respectively. Research Limitations There were some unavoidable limitations to the study. The security situation prevented travel to Mogadishu - This was overcome by identification of a replacement team in South Central but it prevented delivery of a face-to-face research briefing. Withdrawal of local research organisation, Hanvard - The replacement team undertook this work but this led to an additional challenge of training around the questionnaire resulting in the interviewers in Baidoa and Kismayo using questionnaire A rather than questionnaire B. Whilst this did not adversely impact the research, it meant no ranking questions on corruption were obtained from these areas. Limited access beyond the regional capitals - Beyond South-Central the international team accessed Hargesia and Garowe but access was limited to the capitals due to security constraints. This resulted in an urban bias in the information captured. The use of local researchers who went beyond the capitals helped to circumvent the issue. Limited time available - The number of KII conducted reflects the time available for the assessment. For example 3.5 days were spent by two international members of the team and 4 days were spent by a third team member in Garowe. Despite this relationships were found in the data and the team met all pre- identified interviewees deemed necessary. Lack of in-depth triangulation - The nature of the assessment and questionnaires designed for the KII did not allow for in-depth triangulation. The information was self-reported making verification difficult with potential biases in: the cultural understanding between the interviewee and interviewees; selective reporting e.g. on previous interventions or examples of demand side accountability; and exaggeration of events or the role of organisations or actors.
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17.4 Questionnaire Templates Questionnaire A Questionnaire A was used by the international consultant team on the basis that they would be speaking to interviewees in a more urban setting where the complexity of the questions could be enhanced.
Date of Interview
Names, Job titles and organisation name (if relevant) of those in attendance
Gender of participant
Age of participant
Location (city/district)
Have you written up your notes onto this form, spell checked and tidied the notes? Y/N
Can you give me an overview of what you are currently working on (if a donor/ NGO and so on)
Context/institutional mapping
How is accountability understood in the Somali context? Does this differ by region?
How does the public hold its leaders accountable? Is this effective?
What kind of accountability do people demand from their leaders?
Do Somali public officials hear too much from their constituencies, or not enough?
Are certain people or groups better able to demand more from power-holders? Why?
What functions do the institutions of clan play with regard to accountability? Can you describe positive and negative influences of clan on accountability e.g. in the diya system, influence on state decision-making, elections in Somaliland
Access to information
Are you able to access adequate information to be able to hold leaders to account?
Which sources can best make that information available?
Perceptions of trust, accountability and collective action
In what contexts do you see high levels of trust among Somalis working together, and in what settings is trust low? Why does it vary?
Can you give an example where Somali citizens have come together to achieve change (e.g. from government, power holders etc). Prompt- was this cross-clan? This could be at the community or national level.
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: businesses?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: religious leaders?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: national NGOs?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: traditional leaders?
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On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: media?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: government (in Somaliland this will be Somaliland government not Mogadishu)?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: the international community (e.g. un, INGOs)?
Are there any levels of government that are more accountable to you than others? Why?
What is the best way to hold government to account? (Ask for both local and central levels)
Are members of the diaspora (returnees) more or less accountable to the public in business and politics?
Gender and inclusion
Which authorities listen and respond best to women's concerns? (for example, security, access to economic resources, redress for abuses such as sexual or domestic violence)
Do women have a distinct role from men in demanding accountability? Why / why not?
Which actors support vulnerable/marginal groups to access services and get support from decision-makers. Are there examples of successful championing?
Corruption: costs and strategies
What is corruption, are certain kinds seen as being less damaging than others e.g. misuse of international aid vs. taxes?
Do you believe taxation increases government accountability to businesses?
Information
How do you provide information about your work to people in your area?
Risks and challenges
What risks and challenges do people face when demanding greater accountability and transparency? How do they manage those risks?
When trying to promote accountability what should international actors avoid?
Interventions and opportunities
Which external interventions do you know of that support accountable governance? How successful are they? Please explain
What opportunities exist right now to improve trust between leaders and people?
How can the international community/ donors be more accountable and transparent for their own actions?
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17.4.1 Questionnaire B Questionnaire B was developed for use by the locally based research teams. The questions were more succinct, but parallel to the core areas of information required by the team, and included an additional series of ranking questions with a focus on corruption.
Date of Interview
Names, Job titles and organisation name (if relevant) of those in attendance
Gender of participants
Age of participants
Location (city/district/ village)
Have you written up your notes onto this form, spell checked and tidied the notes? Y/N
Can you give me an overview of what you are currently working on (if a donor/ NGO and so on)
Context/institutional mapping
How do people hold their leaders accountable, and how effectively?
What kind of accountability do people demand from their leaders?
Do Somali public officials hear too much from their constituencies, or not enough?
Access to information
Are you able to access adequate information to be able to hold leaders to account?
Which sources can best make that information available?
Perceptions of trust, accountability and collective action
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: businesses?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: religious leaders?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: national NGOs?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: traditional leaders?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: media?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: government (in Somaliland this will be Somaliland government not Mogadishu)?
On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: the international community (e.g. un, INGOs)?
Are there any levels of government that are more accountable to you than others? Why?
What is the best way to hold government to account for its actions? (Ask for both local and central levels)
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Gender and inclusion
Do women have a distinct role from men in demanding accountability?
Which actors support vulnerable/marginal groups to access services and get support from decision-makers.
Corruption: costs and strategies
In your view are the following (a-e) examples of corruption? (a) A government official hiring his nephew 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes
(b) Government allocating jobs by clan quota regardless of merit 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes
(c) A government official keeping a small amount of project money to use to pay bribes to get an important project done 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes
(d) a government official keeping project money for personal gain 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes
(e) International aid workers working on Somalia but living in Nairobi 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes
Interventions and opportunities
How can the international community/ donors be more accountable and transparent for their own actions?
What sort of governance / Government (with a careful definition of both) would you like to have at central/ local level?
17.4.2 Additional Iterative Questions Where time allowed, the questions in questionnaires A and B were expanded upon or, further questions were developed. Some of these questions included: How important is the reputation of authority structures or decision makers? Which types of media do you trust the most?
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Which government department/ministry do you find most accountable? What makes this particular institution to be more accountable than others? Do the diaspora bring back the necessary skills required for better governance? What role do institutions like universities play in promoting accountability? Which categories of men (based on criteria such as age, economic level, or occupation for example) are most likely to be listened to and supported? What do factors like age, or economic status make for men? Are there factors that impact men's access- who have the most and least access and why? Where do women turn to if they notice lack of accountability in local level projects? Do they realise, do they intervene, where do they report to? Are there any examples of women who broke the ‘sound barrier’ and became actively involved in decision- making processes?
17.5 List of Team Members
Name Position
Simon Rynn Team Leader International Senior Consultant
Judy El Bushra Gender Expert International Senior Consultant
Nuur Mohamud Sheekh Somali Expert International Senior Consultant
Joanna Buckley Survey and Economic Appraisal Expert International Consultant
Ken Menkhaus Expert - Somalia Governance and Aid International Principal Modalities Consultant
Sarah Bayne UK-based Project Director - theIDLgroup Internal Senior Consultant
Katie James UK-based Coordinator theIDLgroup
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18 Annex H: Survey Results- Trust and Corruption
18.1 Trust The following questions were asked regarding trust in Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B: On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: businesses? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: religious leaders? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: national NGOs? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: traditional leaders? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: media? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: government? On a scale of 1 to 10, how much do you trust the following: the international community (e.g. UN, INGOs)? In Somaliland, the international team interviewed 24 people in Hargeisa with additional 5 interviewed by SORADI. A further 18 were interviewed in Borama district and 18 in Sheikh district. Due to some respondents declining to answer, or the team not having the time to ask the trust questions, the number of respondents varies. The number of respondents is subsequently included on the secondary diagonal axis. The figure below shows the answers to each of the questions broken down by districts in Somaliland. The score on the primary horizontal axis is taken from the aggregate of all the responses divided by the sum total of the responses. Figure 2: Trust Scores across Actors in Somaliland
The figure above shows that the highest levels of trust were in Sheikh district, exhibiting slightly higher trust scores across all but one category (traditional leaders). This was followed by Borama and then Hargeisa. The highest overall trust score was given to traditional leaders by Borama district respondents. Across all districts, however, religious leaders had the highest trust score, followed by traditional leaders. The international community had the lowest trust score across all districts followed by the business community (which had the lowest of all the trust scores in Hargeisa). 22 people were interviewed in Mogadishu. Due to some respondents declining to answer, or the team not having the time to ask the trust questions, the number of respondents varies. The number of respondents is subsequently included on the secondary axis.
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The figure below shows the answers to each of the trust questions. The score on the primary horizontal axis is taken from the aggregate of all the responses divided by the sum total of the responses. Figure 3: Trust Scores across Actors in Mogadishu
The figure above shows that religious leaders have the highest levels of trust followed by the media and then the international community. National NGOs had the lowest trust levels followed by the Government. The high levels of trust in religious leaders correspond with the findings in Somaliland. In contrast to Somaliland, the international community scored the third highest, whereas in Somaliland it had the lowest levels of trust out of the seven actors addressed in the questions. In Kismayo 10 interviews took place, with a further 12 in Baidoa. Most interviewees in Baidoa felt that trust is high within the clan due to collective decision-making and within religious settings because people tend to work together. They cited the political arena as being low in trust. Two respondents said that education increases trust among people.
“Within the clan setting, trust is very high among the same clan members. Trust is low in other settings. That's because clans tend to make collective decisions.” Business interviewee, Baidoa.
“Religious settings create an atmosphere of trust among Somalis. It prompts them to work together. Trust becomes low among Somalis in settings where they feel injustice is being done.” Elder, Baidoa.
All ten interviewees cited the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), which brought people of south west Somalia together in defense against General Aideed’s forces in the south in 2005 to be a good example of collective action.1
1The organisation was headquartered in Baidoa.
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Figure 4: Trust Scores across Actors in Baidoa and Kismayo
Baidoa has slightly higher trust scores than Kismayo, scoring slightly lower only for traditional leaders. The highest levels of trust, as with Somaliland and Hargeisa, were with religious leaders. This was followed by the business community. The media had the lowest trust score, followed by the international community. The levels of trust in the business community contrast to the low levels of trust found in Somaliland. One reason for the higher levels of trust may be that these two districts have seen greater service provision by the business community in lieu of government during the period of conflict. Finally, in Puntland there were 23 responses to the questions on trust asked in Questionnaire B. The results are shown in the figure below. It was particularly notable that although all 23 respondents responded to the question on business, religious leaders, national NGOs and traditional leaders, only 12 responded to the question on government. This suggests discomfort around discussions of government, and this may result from the limited space in which it is possible to critique government without encountering risks. The highest level of trust was with the media. This was followed by traditional leaders. The lowest level of trust was with government. This was followed by national NGOs. The low levels of trust in government, and unwillingness to participate in this question, suggest a lack of accountability and faith in the effectiveness of government. The high levels of trust in the media may reflect the media’s ability to disseminate information that would otherwise remain in the hands of government. They may also point to a well-trained media that is able to accurately report and convey information demanded by citizens in Puntland. This score contrasts with the trust in the media in Hargeisa- an area in which views towards the media were deeply mixed due to concerns around neutrality and professionalism.
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Figure 5: Trust Scores across Actors in Puntland
18.2 Corruption The following questions were asked regarding corruption in Questionnaire B: In your view are the following (a-e) examples of corruption? (a) A government official hiring his nephew 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (b) Government allocating jobs by clan quota regardless of merit 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (c) A government official keeping a small amount of project money to use to pay bribes to get an important project done 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (d) a government official keeping project money for personal gain 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes (e) International aid workers working on Somalia but living in Nairobi 1. No 2. It depends on the circumstance 3. Yes In Somaliland there were a total of 35 respondents of which 17 were from Borama district and 18 were from Sheikh district. Some respondents did not answer questions (a) through to (e). The “no reply” responses have not been included. Figure 6: Perception of Corruption in Somaliland
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The figure above shows that a government official keeping project money for personal gain was perceived as being the most corrupt of the 5 scenarios given. This was followed by the allocation of jobs based on clan quotas regardless of merit and a government official keeping a small amount of project money to use to pay bribes to get an important project done. The scenario most dependent on additional information was a government official hiring his nephew. The information required was whether he/ she has the right qualifications for the job. Whilst international aid workers living in Nairobi but working on Somalia was not rated as the most corrupt scenario, the results show high levels of dissatisfaction with the operationalisation of programmes and the geographical distance of international staff from the projects and programmes they are implementing.
“I don’t think we can hold them accountable. The projects are designed and budgeted outside Somaliland. No one can hold them accountable. They have the money, and whoever has the money has the power”. Interviewee, Sheikh district.
“We need to hold them accountable by ensuring effective implementation of their projects. Strong national NGOs could help this”. Interviewee, Sheikh district.
The same questions were asked regarding corruption in Mogadishu: There were a total of 20 respondents to this question set. Some respondents did not answer questions (a) through to (e). The “no reply” responses have not been included. Figure 7: Perception of Corruption in Mogadishu
The figure above shows that, as in Somaliland, a government official keeping project money for personal gain was perceived as being the most corrupt of the 5 scenarios given. This was followed by the international aid workers working on Somalia but living in Nairobi and a government official keeping a small amount of project money to use to pay bribes to get an important project done. Internationals living in Nairobi were perceived as the second most corrupt. In Somaliland it was rated as the fourth of the five situations listed. This highlights that the perceptions of the international community is more precarious in Somaliland. This may be due to a lack of historical presence and continued lack of donors operating from Hargeisa. The scenario most dependent on additional information was a government official hiring his nephew. The scenario with the most “no” responses was the Government allocating jobs by clan quota regardless of merit.
Additional information provided during interviews showed that the definition of corruption was constituted as a misappropriation or misuse of public funds for personal gain. One civil society respondent commented that the problem was ‘everywhere’ because of fear, manipulation and lack of enforcement capacity. In his view manipulation by the political class was a fundamental problem whereby the government raises funds any way it can so as to buy loyalty from opposition groups, elders and religious leaders. The view was also offered that misappropriation of foreign aid resources is less of a public concern, but only because people have so little information or hope to influence this problem.
Some respondents made the connection between information and corruption (knowledge is power). When asked if they had adequate information to demand accountability, two religious leaders separately commented: “You need connections to get information” and “Not at all, even if you know of corruption there's nowhere you can take the
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complaint”.1
One response highlighted the element of risk involved to those demanding greater accountability “They face the risk of being eliminated. They're also constantly marginalised in the government. As a result, people look the other way when it comes to corruption.”, civil society interviewees, Mogadishu.
In Baidoa Questionnaire B was used for two interviews only. These responses are shown in the figure below.2 Figure 8: Perception of Corruption in Baidoa
In Puntland Questionnaire A was used so the above question set was not applicable. Questionnaire A’s questions on corruption found that the definition of corruption offered by survey respondents focused on misappropriation or misuse of public funds for personal gain. There is general understanding of the vice but most respondents feel that there is very little they can do to arrest the situation. The more educated respondents are of the view that creation of an anti-corruption commission and the implementation of the constitution are key to addressing corruption. There is also a general feeling that institutions of law and order are not up to the task and this encourages impunity.
2 These two interviews were conducted by the local research team engaged through Hanvard. However, due to a lack of delivery, the remaining 10 interviews were conducted by an alternative provider at which time they choose to use Questionnaire A rather than B.
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19 Annex I: List of Interviewees
19.1 List of persons interviewed 19.1.1 Hargeisa Name Role Company
Khader Aden Hussein General Manager Ambassador Hotel, Hargeisa
Mohamed Fowsi Abdi Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Director of Good Governance Mohamed Commission
Quman Akli lawyer
Lead Researcher, Mohamed Farah Academy for Peace and Development Democratisation Programme
Ibrahim Siyaad Yoonis Director Hargeisa Water Authority
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Adam Haji Ali Director University of Hargeisa, and former Chair of SONSAF
Team Leader, Access to Abdikarim Sheik Mohamed UNDP Justice
Salma Sheikh Somaliland National TV
JPLG local governance Alexandra Windisch UNDP project
JPLG local governance Samira Hassan UNDP project
former adviser to Ministry of Hassan Dimbil Interior
Su’ad Ibrahim Country Representative Progressio
Nafisa Yusuf Mohamed Executive Director NAGAAD Network
Sheikh Almis Yahye
Ibrahim
Anna Rader Communications Officer UN HABITAT
Head of Office, Programme Soren Rasmussen UNDP Coordinator
Shukri H. Bandare Chairperson Candlelight
Aamina Milgo Chairperson NAFIS FGM Network
Dr Adan Abokor Representative Rift Valley Institute
Phillip Cooper Programme Manager JPLG, UNDP
Peter Cross Civilian Police Project UNDP
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Name Role Company Manager
Communications and Mustafa Othman Shaqadoon Technology Manager
Mohamed Ahmed Executive Director SONSAF Mahamoud NAGAAD Haroon Yusuf Programme Co-ordinator
Observatory of Conflict and Violence Abdilahi Odowa Director Prevention
Dr Mohamed Osman Fadal Director SORADI
Somaliland National Youth Organization Saed M Ahmed Executive Director (SONYO)
19.1.2 Sheikh District
Name Role Company
Aadan Hussein Egal Businessman And Religious Leader
Muuse Mohamed H Muse Sales Manager Telesom
Baashe Mohamud Muuse Local Council Engineer Sheikh District
Abdiraxman Ismaciil Candlelight for Health and Education
Ahmed Abdi Shire Project Manager Health Poverty Action Nutrition
Muxyadin Ismail Hersi Tawfiiq Environment Protection and Nursery Organization
Adam Muuse Ali Principal Sheikh School
Ayaanle Maxamuud Chairperson And Qualified Sheikh Hospital Axmed Nurse
Nuux Haji Abdi Came Veterinarian IGAD Sheikh Technical Vet School
Sheikh Hamse Hassan Principal Islamic school Jama
Amina Abdi Administrator District Court
Khadija Hussein Hassan Mp Local Council
Qadan Yusuf Hersi Procurement Officer Local Council
19.1.3 Boroma District
Name Role Company
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Name Role Company
Abdikadir Adam Nour Manager Telesom Borama
Abdirahman Adan Nur Businessman
Yusuf Amir Businessman
Mohammed Mumin Adan Member Local Council (Ka'ab)
Fuad Mohammeded Omar Graduate And Member Of Local Ngos
Eng, Abshir Magan Khaire Lecturer Amoud University
Mohammed Abdi Osman Assistant Dean Of Amoud Univeristy Agriculture
Mohammed Ali Osman Businessman And Lecturer Amoud University
Shiekh Mukhtar Religious Leader And Mohammed Omar Teacher
Awil Abdirahman Traditional Leader
Chief Muse Osman Traditional Leader Dhagawayne
Fahmi Abdi Bidar Traditional Leader
Suldan Ibrahim Da'ar Yusuf Traditional Leader
Anisa Adan Mohamoud Member Women Organisations And Primary School Head Teacher
Fadhiya Adan jama Finance Officer AYODO (Africa Youth Development Organisation)
Fadhiya Hussien Qalib Civil Service Employee And Member Of Women Organisations
Safia Abdi Nour Chairperson Of Women's Kulmiye Party Wing Of Kulmiye Party, Member Of Women’s Organization And Local Government Staff
19.1.4 Nairobi
Name Role Company
Raqiya Omaar lawyer/human rights activist Somaliland
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Name Role Company
Fowzia Musse Independent consultant
Judith Gardner Independent consultant
John Rutaro Fundraising Officer Progressio
Abdi Aden Ali Somaliland Advisor Saferworld
Ulf Terlinden Somalia Country Director Interpeace
Laro Gonzalez Governance Coordinator IRC
Mohamed Abdirizak National Democratic Institute
Abduba Mollu Ido Somalia Programme DANIDA Manager
Paul Simkin Country Director Conflict Dynamics International
Angi Yoder-Maina Independent Consultant
Mark Bradbury Rift Valley Institute
Tanja Chopra World Bank
John Rutaro Progressio
Fouzia Musse
Ivanoe Fugali Danish Refugee Council
Jessica Price SIDP Project Officer UNDP
Hibak Kalfan Country Director InterNews
Eva Landeborn
Anna Schmidt Somali Governance Advisor EU
Vishalini Lawrence Chief of Party TIS DAI Programme
Rosemary Heenan Somalia Country Director Trocaire
Nikolai Hutchinson PACT
Ibrahim Abdihamid Ministry of Health World Health Organization
Marleen Renders Somalia Programme Director Life and Peace Institute
Esther Waters-Crane UNICEF
Katrin Seidel Heinrich Boll Foundation
Francesca Pavarini EC
Matt Bryden Director Sahan Research
Osman Moallim
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19.1.5 Puntland
Name Role Company
Jeylani Farah Coordinator Diakonia
Ahmed Ali Shire UNDP
Abdirizak Said Nur Democratization Officer PUNSAA
Yusuf H Nur Director Puntland Legal Aid Centre
Ahmed Said Nur Project Advisor DAI TIS
Suleiman Haji Abdulle
Ali Farah Programme Director PDRC
Burhan Ahmed Dahir Secretary General Puntland Media Association
Hagi Omer Farah Businessman
Fatuma Mohamud Businesswoman Mohamed
Farhiya Shire Ato Chair and member of local All Somali Female Representative council
FEYSAL Mohamed Matan Project Officer Somali Family Services
Hawa farah Goh Member Women’s Group
Abdullahi Abdurahman Director Humanatarian and disaster mangement
Hassan Aden Mohamed Independent Researcher
Mohamed Dahir Mohamed Traditional Elder
Musa Duale Governance Project Officer UNDP
Osman Moallim Executive Director Somali Youth Development Network
Mohamud Hamid Vice Chancellor Puntland State University Mohamud
Liban Aden Jama Religious Leader
Suleiman Haji Abdulle Assistant Manager Danish Demining Group (DDG)
Mohamed Musse Said Veterinarian
Malyun Emin Member Women’s Group
Mohamed Ali Jama Coordinator Youth Programme
Ahmed Naji Programme Manager VSF
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C20:5 ANNEX I: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES / FINAL REPORT
19.1.6 Mogadishu
Name Role Company
Moe Hussein Policy Advisor UNDP
Hassan Abshirow General Secretary Civil Service Commission
Fatima Aden Somali Peace Line
Haboon Cabdala Shariff Head of Section National Civil Service Commission
Abdullahi Osman Director Hormuud Telecom Foundation
Abukar Dahir Osman Ministry of Interior & National Security
Garaad Salaad Dir. of Communications PM office
Shukri Ahmed Admin and Finance Officer Coalition of Grassroots Women Organisations (COGWO)
Abdirashid Ainansh Vice-President Somali Chamber of Commerce
Amina Hagi General director Save Somali Women and Children
Abdi Aynte Director Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS)
Haawo Siidow Abdi Trainer South Central Somalia Religious Leaders' Network
Hassan Issac Hassan Chairman Somali Youth Today and Tomorrow
Layla Mohamud Abdulle Human Rights and Somali Women Journalist Association Communications Officer
Sheikh Ali Wajiis Religious and community leader
Hassan Ahmed Sadik Executive Director Somalia South Central Non State Actors (SOSCENSA)
Ahmed Mohamud Jeele Supervisor of NGO and 'Bishaa Caas' NGO influential elder from a minority clan
Hussein Mohamed Farah Camp leader Siligo Americo IDP camp
Saida Osman Gedi Chairwoman Sareedo Relief Foundation
Hassan Maalin MP Member of Parliament
Wants to remain MP and former Minister MP and former Minister anonymous
Abullahi Shirwa Director Somali PeaceLine
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C20:6 ANNEX I: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES / FINAL REPORT
19.1.7 Kismayo
Name Role Company
Sultan Rashid Dhurre Clan Elder Omar
Abdirahman Abdirizak Field Officer SGJ (Solidarity Group of Jubbaland) a regional NGO Roble
Mumino Suldaan Farah Youth Activist
Abdirizak Ismail Mohamed Head of the Department of Kismayo University Business Administration
Abdi Jama Mohamed Businessman – export/import
Adam Ali Mohamed
Ali Adam Ibrahim University Student
Ismail Abdirashid Haji Elm Secondary school teacher
Asha Mohamed Hassa Member WomenKind Women's NGO
Farah Sheikh Salad Journalist
19.1.8 Baidoa
Name Role Company
Kerow Abdi Nur Agriculturist
Eden Mad Isack Businessman
Malak Alio Keero Ali Clan Chief
Abdulkadir Sheik Ali D.C Baidoa Local Authority
Alinur Abdi Idow Local NGO Supervisor
Nur Isaq Boorow Youth
Abdi Adan Sheik Youth – football player
Halima Ali Mohamed Member of IDP
Fowzi Abdinur Mohamed Intellectual Speaker of the south west intelectual council
Abdifatah ahmed Member Youth Club
19.1.9 UK
Name Role Company
Farah Abdulsamed Managing Director Haan Consultants Company (Nairobi)
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Name Role Company
Mohamed Abshir 'Waldo' Director Sandi Consulting (Nairobi)
Markus Hoehne Max Planck Institute for social anthropology Sally Healy Independent Consultant –
Somalia Expert
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20 Annex J: Bibliography
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Beloff, Jonathan R, How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development in Puntland, Somalia. Journal of Strategic Security, 6 (1) 2013
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Bradbury, M (2008) Becoming Somaliland. African Issues. Indiana University Press.
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Brickhill, J (2010) ‘Security and Stabilization in Somalia’ in Bradbury, M and Healy, S eds. (2010) Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking. Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources
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Cassanelli Lee ‘Private sector Peacemaking’, in Bradbury, M and Healy, S eds. (2010) Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking. Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources
IDENTIFYING ENTRY POINTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA – DEMAND SIDE – JUNE 2013 C21:1 ANNEX J: BIBLIOGRAPHY / FINAL REPORT
Cassanelli, Lee (1995) ‘Victims and vulnerable groups in Southern Somalia’, Ottawa, Canada, Immigration and Refugee Board
Castillejo, Clare. (2011) Building a state that works for women: Integrating gender into post-conflict state building, Madrid, FRIDE, Working Paper no. 107.
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Chatham House (2013) ‘Somalia's future, Building a Unified Regional State’, Africa Meeting Summary, 18 April, Chatham House
Chêne, Marie (2012) Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Somalia. Transparency International
Chopra, Tanja (2011) ‘Operational paper: improving women’s access to justice and security’ in Somaliland Nairobi, UNDP Somalia, Rule of Law and Security Programme p. 3.
Clarke, W./Herbst, J (eds.) (1997) Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Boulder, Westview. Cockayne James with Shetret Liat.(2012) ‘Capitalizing on Trust Harnessing Somali Remittances for Counterterrorism, Human Rights and State Building’, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.
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DAI (2011) ‘Partnership with Somaliland’s Private Sector Aims to Lay Foundation for Growth’, Stability. Available at: http://dai.com/news-publications/news/partnership-somaliland%E2%80%99s-private-sector-aims-lay- foundation-growth-stability
De Waal, A. (2007) ‘Class and Power in a Stateless Somalia’. (http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/dewaal/).
DeCapua, Joe (2012) Election Observers Readying Report on Somaliland, Voice of America.
Declich, Francesca (1993) ‘Mutual assistance groups: feminine and masculine agricultural work along the Juba river’ Paper presented to the Conference of the European Association of Somali Studies, September 1993.
DFID (Updated June 2012) ‘Operational Plan 2011-2015’, DFID Somalia
DFID Reserach and Evidence Division (2010) ‘A preliminary mapping of the evidence based for Empowerment and Accountability’ p.11 DFID (2010) ‘Evaluations of Voice and Accountability Instruments’, Helpdesk Research Report, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
Fartaag , Abdirazak (2013) ‘Reconstructing Somalia and the Politics of Public Sector Finance’, LSE Ideas Africa Programme, Occasional Paper 1, Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/africaProgramme/pdfs/Abdirazak-Fartaag-LSE-IDEAS-Occasional- Paper-Reconstructing-Somalia-and-the-Politics-of-Public-Sector-Finance.pdf
Fartaag , Abdirazak (2013) ‘Reconstructing Somalia and the Politics of Public Sector Finance’, LSE Ideas Africa Programme. Occasional Paper 1. Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/africaProgramme/pdfs/Abdirazak-Fartaag-LSE-IDEAS-Occasional- Paper-Reconstructing-Somalia-and-the-Politics-of-Public-Sector-Finance.pdf
Federal Republic of Somalia (Draft as at 28th February 2013), Public Financial Management (PFM) Self- assessment Report and Proposed Public Financial Management Strengthening Initiative (2013-2016).
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Financial Diagnostic Assessment (not for citation) Verification of the Audit Investigative Financial Report (2009-10)
Freedom House (2012) Freedom of the Press, Somalia, Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- press/2012/somalia
Gatehouse, Gabriel (2013) Somalia's fight to harness the power of Mogadishu port, BBC. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22404123
Guillemois, David, Mohammed, Muktar & Mohammed, Mohammed (2012) Final report Evaluation of the “Youth at risk project” and some security related components
Gundel, J and Omar AA (2006), The Predicament of the 'Oday', The role of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in Somalia, Available at: http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som/infrastructure-communication- various/Gundel_The%20role%20of%20traditional%20structures.pdf
Gundel, J, Political Economy Diagnostic of PFM Institutions in the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, 2010 (draft) - not for citation
Gundel, J (2009) Clans in Somalia: Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop, Vienna, 15th May 2009 (Revised Edition), Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation (Accord), available at: http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1261130976_accord-report-clans-in-somalia-revised-edition-20091215.pdf
Hammond, L. (2010) Obliged to Give: Remittances and the Maintenance of Transnational Networks Between Somalis at Home and Abroad. Bildhaan, An International Journal of Somali Studies, 10. Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol10/iss1/11
Hanna, R, Bishop, S, Nadel, S, Scheffler, G, Durlacher, K, (2011) The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What Has Worked, What Hasn’t, and What We Don’t Know-a Systematic Review, Technical Report. London, EPPI Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London.
Harper, Mary (2012) Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State, London, Zed Books LTD
Herbst, Jeffrey and Mills, Greg (2011) The Fault Lines of Failed States: Can social science determine what makes one state fail and another succeed? Foreign Policy, Electronic Edition, Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_fault_lines_of_failed_states
Hill, Martin (2010) No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, London, Minority Rights Group International
Hoehne, M V (2013) ‘Limits of hybrid political orders: the case of Somaliland’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2013, Vol 7, No. 2
Hoehne, M (2010a) ‘Political Representation in Somalia: Citizenship, Clanism and Territoriality’ in Bradbury, M and Healy, S eds. (2010) Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking, Accord, Issue 21, Conciliation Resources
Hoehne, M.V. (2010b) Diasporic engagement in the educational sector in post-conflict Somaliland: A contribution to peacebuilding? Diaspeace, Working Paper No, available at: https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/bitstream/handle/123456789/36879/DIASPEACE_WP5.pdf?sequence=1
Hoehne, M.V. (2010c) People and Politics along and across the Somaliland-Puntland Border in Dereje Feyissa and Markus V. Hoehne (eds.) ‘Borders and borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa’, London: James Currey, pp. 97-121.
Hoehne, M.V. (2007) ‘Puntland and Somaliland Clashing in Northern Somalia: Who Cuts the Gordian Knot?’ Social Science Research Council, available at: http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/Hoehne/
Hoehne, M.V. (2009) ‘Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How external interference helped to produce militant Islamism’, Social Science Research Council, available at: http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/somalia/
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Human Rights Watch (2013) Hostages of the Gatekeepers: Abuses against Internally Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0313_ForUpload.pdf
Human Rights Watch (2009) ‘Hostages to Peace, Threats to Human Rights and Democracy in Somaliland’, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somaliland0709web.pdf
Human Rights Watch (1995) ‘Somalia Faces The Future: Human Rights In A Fragmented Society’, Human Rights Watch Reports, 7, 2, available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/somalia/#P454_114635
Ibrahim, Rhoda (2004) ‘Women’s role in the pastoral economy’ in Gardner, Judith and El-Bushra, Judy eds (2004) ‘Somalia – the untold story: the war through the eyes of women’, London, Pluto Press and CIIR.
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Interpeace (2011) Pillars of Peace - Democracy in Somaliland Challenges and Opportunities, available at: http://www.interpeace.org/index.php/publications/doc_download/220-pillars-of-peace-somali-programme-english
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Roble, F (2013) ‘Clan Cleansing in Somalia and the Destruction of Mogadishu as Physical Entity and Political, Social, and Cultural Community’, April 17.
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