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30Th USENIX Security Symposium August 11–13, 2021 • Virtual Event Sponsored by USENIX, the Advanced Computing Systems Association

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30Th USENIX Security Symposium August 11–13, 2021 • Virtual Event Sponsored by USENIX, the Advanced Computing Systems Association Announcement and Call for Papers www.usenix.org/sec21/cfp 30th USENIX Security Symposium August 11–13, 2021 • Virtual Event Sponsored by USENIX, the Advanced Computing Systems Association Symposium Overview Symposium Organizers The USENIX Security Symposium brings together researchers, practitio- Program Co-Chairs ners, system administrators, system programmers, and others interested Michael Bailey, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign in the latest advances in the security and privacy of computer systems Rachel Greenstadt, New York University and networks. The 30th USENIX Security Symposium will be held as a Program Committee virtual event on August 11–13, 2021. Yousra Aafer, University of Waterloo Important: The USENIX Security Symposium moved to multiple submission Ruba Abu-Salma, University College London and Inria deadlines in 2019 and included changes to the review process and submission Gunes Acar, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven policies. Detailed information is available on the USENIX Security Publication David Adrian, Censys Model Changes web page at www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/ Sadia Afroz, International Computer Science Institute (ICSI), University of publication-model-change. California, Berkeley, and Avast Devdatta Akhawe, Figma All researchers are encouraged to submit papers covering novel and sci- Benjamin Andow, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center entifically significant practical works in computer security. The Symposium Sebastian Angel, University of Pennsylvania will span three days with a technical program including refereed papers, Pauline Anthonysamy, Google invited talks, posters, panel discussions, and Birds-of-a-Feather sessions. Manos Antonakakis, Georgia Institute of Technology Jethro G. Beekman, Fortanix Important Dates Matthew Bernhard, University of Michigan Summer Deadline Battista Biggio, University of Cagliari, Italy • Refereed paper submissions due: Thursday, June 11, 2020, 11:59 pm AoE Thursday, June 18, 2020, 11:59 pm AoE (Extended) Leyla Bilge, NortonLifeLock Research Group Vincent Bindschaedler, University of Florida • Early reject notification: July 24, 2020 Tamara Bonaci, Northeastern University Rebuttal Period: August 31– September 2, 2020 • Joseph C Bonneau, New York University • Notification to authors: September 11, 2020 Sven Bugiel, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security • Final papers due: October 13, 2020 Kevin Butler, University of Florida Fall Deadline Joseph Calandrino, Federal Trade Commission • Refereed paper submissions due: Thursday, October 15, 2020, Aylin Caliskan, George Washington University 11:59 pm AoE Stefano Calzavara, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia • Early reject notification: November 20, 2020 Yinzhi Cao, Johns Hopkins University • Rebuttal Period: January 11–13, 2021 Alvaro A. Cardenas, University of California, Santa Cruz • Notification to authors: January 21, 2021 Nicholas Carlini, Google • Final papers due: February 22, 2021 Lorenzo Cavallaro, King’s College London Rahul Chatterjee, University of Wisconsin—Madison Winter Deadline Qi Alfred Chen, University of California, Irvine • Refereed paper submissions due: Thursday, February 4, 2021, 11:59 pm AoE Marshini Chetty, University of Chicago Sherman S. M. Chow, The Chinese University of Hong Kong • Early reject notification: March 12, 2021 Omar Haider Chowdhury, The University of Iowa Rebuttal Period: April 19–21, 2021 • Mihai Christodorescu, Visa Research • Notification to authors: April 30, 2021 Erinn Clark, Google • Final papers due: June 2, 2021 Shaanan Cohney, Princeton University and University of Melbourne • Invited talk and panel proposals due: Thursday, February 4, 2021 Scott Coull, FireEye Cas Cremers, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Michel Cukier, University of Maryland George Danezis, University College London and Facebook Calibra Anupam Das, North Carolina State University Sanchari Das, Indiana University Bloomington Rev. 1/27/21 Sauvik Das, Georgia Institute of Technology Wenke Lee, Georgia Institute of Technology Nathan Dautenhahn, Rice University Corrado Leita, Lastline Lucas Davi, University of Duisburg-Essen Anja Lejman, Hasso-Plattner-Institute, University of Potsdam Roger Dingledine, The Tor Project Tancrède Lepoint, Google Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, New York University Dave Levin, University of Maryland Adam Doupé, Arizona State University Frank Li, Georgia Institute of Technology Zakir Durumeric, Stanford University Mingyan Liu, University of Michigan Manuel Egele, Boston University Wouter Lueks, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) Serge Egelman, International Computer Science Institute (ICSI), University of Mateo Maffei, Technische Universität Wien California, Berkeley, and AppCensus, Inc. Stefan Mangard, Graz University of Technology Pardis Emami-Naeini, University of Washington Ivan Martinovic, University of Oxford William Enck, North Carolina State University Michelle Mazurek, University of Maryland Roya Ensafi, University of Michigan Stephen McCamant, University of Minnesota Sascha Fahl, Leibniz University Hannover Jon McCune, Google Giulia Fanti, Carnegie Mellon University Patrick McDaniel, The Pennsylvania State University Kassem Fawaz, University of Wisconsin—Madison Susan E. McGregor, Columbia University Ariel J. Feldman, Google Andrew Miller, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign Wu-chang Feng, Portland State University Esfandiar Mohammadi, University of Lübeck Earlence Fernandes, University of Wisconsin—Madison Fabian Monrose, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill David Fifield, Unaffiliated Veelasha Moonsamy, Radboud University Simone Fischer-Hubner, Karlstad University Tyler Moore, The University of Tulsa Christopher Wardlaw Fletcher, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign Takao Murakami, AIST Michael Franz, University of California, Irvine Adwait Nadkarni, College of William & Mary Matt Fredrikson, Carnegie Mellon University Nick Nikiforakis, Stony Brook University David Freeman, Facebook Inc. Rishab Nithyanand, The University of Iowa Patrick Gage Kelley, Google Guevara Noubir, Northeastern University Siddarth Garg, New York University Cristina Onete, University of Limoges/XLIM/CNRS 7252 Christina Garman, Purdue University Yossi Oren, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Carrie Gates, Bank of America Rebekah Overdorf, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) Daniel Genkin, University of Michigan Chris Palmer, Google Irene Giacomelli, Protocol Labs Nicholas Papernot, University of Toronto and Vector Institute Ian Goldberg, University of Waterloo Aleatha Parker-Wood, Unaffiliated Neil Gong, Duke University Mathias Payer, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) Daniel Gruss, Graz University of Technology Paul Pearce, Georgia Institute of Technology and International Computer Guofei Gu, Texas A&M University Science Institute (ICSI) J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan Giancarlo Pellegrino, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Mike Hamburg, Rambus Roberto Perdisci, University of Georgia Hamza Harkous, Google Radia Perlman, Dell Technologies Wajih Ul Hassan, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign Zachary Peterson, California Polytechnic State University Xiali (Sharon) Hei, University of Louisiana at Lafayette Jason Polakis, University of Illinois at Chicago Nadia Heninger, University of California, San Diego Christina Pöpper, New York University Abu Dhabi Ryan Henry, University of Calgary Sara Rampazzi, University of Michigan and University of Florida Alejandro Hevia, University of Chile Aanjhan Ranghanathan, Northeastern University Matthew Hicks, Virginia Tech Bradley Reaves, North Carolina State University Thorsten Holz, Ruhr-Universität Bochum Elissa M. Redmiles, Microsoft Research Nicholas Hopper, University of Minnesota Konrad Rieck, Technische Universität Braunschweig Amir Houmansadr, University of Massachusetts Amherst Thomas Ristenpart, Cornell Tech Danny Yuxing Huang, New York University William Robertson, Northeastern University Sotiris Ioannidis, Technical University of Crete Stefanie Roos, Delft University of Technology Cynthia Irvine, Naval Postgraduate School Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Technische Universität Darmstadt Suman Jana, Columbia University Merve Sahin, SAP Security Research Rob Jansen, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory Brendan Saltaformaggio, Georgia Institute of Technology Somesh Jha, University of Wisconsin—Madison Nolen Scaife, University of Colorado Boulder Anthony D Joseph, University of California, Berkeley Bruce Schneier, Harvard Kennedy School Chris Kanich, University of Illinois at Chicago Kent Seamons, Brigham Young University Apu Kapadia, Indiana University Bloomington Vyas Sekar, Carnegie Mellon University Vasileios Kemerlis, Brown University Wendy Seltzer, W3C and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Yongdae Kim, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) Fatemeh Shirazi, Web3 Foundation Sam King, University of California, Davis Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer SIT Engin Kirda, Northeastern University Angelos Stavrou, Virginia Tech Tadayoshi Kohno, University of Washington Deian Stefan, University of California, San Diego Katharina Krombholz, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Ben Stock, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Christopher Kruegel, University of California, Santa Barbara Gianluca Stringhini, Boston University Negar Kyavash, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) Cynthia Sturton, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Andrea Lanzi, University of Milan Nick Sullivan, Cloudflare Mathias
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