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The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office Use Only: Fiscal Year The Commonwealth of Massachusetts OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS/PUBLIC CHARITIES DIVISION ONE ASHBURTON PLACE BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108 (617) 727-2200, ext. 2101 www.mass.gov/ago/charities Form PC Check all items attached Report for the Fiscal Period: 01/01/14 to 12/31/14 (if applicable) X Schedule A-1 Attorney General's Account #: 046444 X Schedule A-2 Schedule RO Federal ID #: 20-8096820 Probate Account X Copy of IRS Return When did the organization first engage in X Audited Financial charitable work in Massachusetts? 01/01/2007 Statements/Review X Filing Fee Has the organization applied for or been granted Amended Articles/ IRS tax exempt status? X Yes No By-Laws If yes, date of application OR date of determination letter: 02/26/2007 IRS Exemption under 501(c): 3 If exempt under 501(c), are contributions to the organization tax deductible as charitable contributions? X Yes No Organization Data Name: THE TOR PROJECT, INC. Mailing Address: 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA ZIP: 02139 Phone Number: (781) 769-7555 Fax Number: Email: Website: WWW.TORPROJECT.ORG In the table below, please enter the appropriate codes from the corresponding tables found in the instructions. Enter up to 2 codes from Table 3 for your organization's main purpose(s) Category Code Category Code County (Table 1) 11 Organization Purpose Code 1 55 Type of Organization (Table 2) 21 Organization Purpose Code 2 Please check box if final return prior to dissolution: Office Use Only: Payment Received Form PC Page 1 of 14 478001 05-01-14 1 THE TOR PROJECT, INC. 20-8096820 All questions must be completed in their entirety whether or not similar questions are answered in an attached federal form. See instructions and definition section for guidance. 1. On what date was the organization created? 12/22/2006 2. Where was the organization created? MASSACHUSETTS 3. What is the form of organization? (check one) Corporation X Testamentary Trust Unincorporated Association Inter Vivos Trust Other (please describe): 4. Was your organization related to any other organization(s) during the reporting year (see definition of "Related Organization")? If yes, please complete the Schedule RO on pages 13 and 14. Yes X No 5. Enter your summary of financial data: Financial Data Amounts A. Contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts received 288,667. B. Gross support and revenue 2,556,397. C. Program services and similar amounts paid out 2,344,084. D. Fundraising expenses 30,954. E. Management and general expenses 143,506. F. Payments to affiliates 0. G. Total expenses 2,518,544. H. Net assets or fund balances at the end of the year 1,476,833. 6. List the total compensation you provided to your five highest paid employees: Hrs/ Salary and Other Name/Title Benefit Plans Week Other Income Compensation ANDREW LEWMAN 1. CLERK, TREAS., EXEC. DIR. 40.00 150,000. 3,000. 18,700. KARSTEN LOESING 2. DEVELOPER 40.00 119,256. 0. 22,615. NICK MATHEWSON 3. CHIEF ARCHITECT 40.00 135,000. 0. 18,675. ROGER DINGLEDINE 4. RESEARCH DIRECTOR 40.00 135,000. 2,700. 5,519. ANDREA SHEPARD 5. DEVELOPER 40.00 125,004. 0. 2,953. 7. Was any compensation provided to any of the individuals listed in question 6 above which was not quantified in your response to 6? If yes, please provide explanation (attach separate sheet). Yes X No Form PC Page 2 of 14 Rev. 02/2010 478002 10-14-14 2 THE TOR PROJECT, INC. 20-8096820 8. List the name, amount of compensation paid, and the nature of services rendered by each of the organization's five highest paid consultants providing professional services (e.g. attorneys, architects, accountants, management companies, investment advisors, professional solicitors, professional fundraising counsel). Name/Title Amount of Compensation Type(s) of Service 1. PEARL CRESCENT, LLC 100,725.DEVELOPER 2. NICOLAS VIGIER 87,495.DEVELOPER 3. GEORG KOPPEN 78,581.DEVELOPER 4. 3BIS 71,279.DEVELOPER 5. GEORGE KADIANAKIS 58,968.DEVELOPER 9. Bank(s) in which the organization's funds are deposited (include bank addresses and phone numbers): Bank Address Phone Number DEDHAM SAVINGS BANK 55 ELM STREET, DEDHAM, MA 02026 781-329-6700 2 MORRISSEY BLVD, DORCHESTER, MA SANTANDER BANK 02125 617-379-4017 200 TECHNOLOGY SQUARE, CAMBRIDGE, CITI BANK MA 02139 617-800-0856 10. What is the organization's accounting method? Cash X Accrual Other (specify): 11. If organization's mailing address is a P.O. Box, list the organization's full street address: Address: City: State: ZIP Code: 12. Contact Person Name: MEREDITH DUNN Street Address: 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA ZIP Code: 02139 Phone Number: 781-769-7555 Form PC Page 3 of 14 Rev. 02/2010 478003 10-14-14 3 THE TOR PROJECT, INC. 20-8096820 13. During the fiscal year reported here, did your organization solicit contributions or have funds solicited on its behalf? X Yes No 14. At any time during the fiscal year following the year reported here, will your organization, or others acting on its behalf, solicit contributions? X Yes No If you answered yes to Question 13 or 14, you must complete Schedule A-1 and/or Schedule A-2 unless you are exempt from the solicitation certificate requirement. 15. If you are claiming an exemption from the solicitation certificate requirement, please indicate by checking the box to the right to identify which exemption applies to your organization. a religious organization an organization which: (a) does not raise more than $5,000 during a calendar year OR does not receive contributions from more than ten persons during a calendar year; AND (b) carries out all of its activities, including fundraising, through unpaid volunteers. (The conditions at both (a) and (b) must be met for your organization to qualify for this exemption.) 16. Attach a list of names, addresses (street and/or mailing), and telephone numbers of other offices/chapters/branches/affiliates. 17. Attach a list of names, titles, and addresses (street and/or mailing) of officers, directors, trustees, and the principal salaried executives of organization. STATEMENT 1 18. Attach a list of names, titles, and addresses (street and/or mailing) of any individual(s) authorized to sign checks, and any individual(s) responsible for: custody of funds; distribution of funds; fundraising; and custody of financial records. STATEMENT 2 19. Has this organization or any of its officers, directors, employees or fundraisers solicited funds in any Yes X No other state? If you attach list of states where solicitation was conducted, including registered agency, dates of registration, registration numbers, any other names under which the organization was/is registered, and the dates and type (mail, telephone, door to door, special events, etc.) of the solicitation conducted. Form PC Page 4 of 14 Rev. 02/2010 478004 05-01-14 4 THE TOR PROJECT, INC. 20-8096820 }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}}}}}}} ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ FORM PC OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, TRUSTEES AND EXECUTIVES STATEMENT 1 }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} NAME AND ADDRESS TITLE }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}} ANDREW LEWMAN TREAS/CLERK/EXEC DIR 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 NICK MATHEWSON V.P./CHIEF ARCHITECT 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 ROGER DINGLEDINE PRES/RESEARCH DIRECTOR 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 IAN GOLDBERG CHAIRMAN/DIRECTOR 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 WENDY SELTZER DIRECTOR 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 MEREDITH DUNN DIRECTOR 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 CASPAR BOWDEN DIRECTOR 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 ROB THOMAS DIRECTOR 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 5 STATEMENT(S) 1 THE TOR PROJECT, INC. 20-8096820 }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}}}}}}} ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ FORM PC PAGE 4, LINE 18 STATEMENT 2 }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} NAME AND ADDRESS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} ANDREW LEWMAN RESPONSIBLE FOR CUSTODY OF FUNDS 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 ANDREW LEWMAN RESPONSIBLE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 ANDREW LEWMAN RESPONSIBLE FOR FUNDRAISING 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 KAREN REILLY RESPONSIBLE FOR FUNDRAISING 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 MELISSA GILROY CUSTODY OF FINANCIAL RECORDS 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 ANDREW LEWMAN CUSTODY OF FINANCIAL RECORDS 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 ANDREW LEWMAN AUTHORIZED TO SIGN CHECKS 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 ROGER DINGLEDINE AUTHORIZED TO SIGN CHECKS 7 TEMPLE STREET, SUITE A CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139 6 STATEMENT(S) 2 THE TOR PROJECT, INC. 20-8096820 20. Has this organization or any of its officers, directors, or employees: If yes, please attach an explanation. (a) Been enjoined or otherwise prohibited by a government agency/court from operating or soliciting contributions? Yes X No (b) Ever been refused registration or had its registration or tax exemption denied, suspended, modified or revoked by a governmental agency? Yes X No (c) Been the subject of a proceeding regarding any solicitation or registration? Yes X No (d) Entered into a voluntary agreement of compliance or consent judgment with any government agency or in a case before a court or administrative agency? Yes X No 21. Have any restrictions been removed during the year from donor-restricted funds? Yes X No If yes, please attach an explanation. 22. Have donor-restricted funds been loaned to unrestricted funds? Yes X No If yes, please attach an explanation. 23. This question involves "Termination of Employment or Changes of Control Compensatory Arrangements" with certain "Related Parties" (see instructions and definition sections). Report only if payments made or promised to any individual are in excess of four months salary or $100,000, whichever dollar amount is less.
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