Margins of Psychology of Margins Central European University European Central
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Central European University Philosophy Department Margins of Psychology by George Tudorie In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in Philosophy Supervisor: Professor Hanoch Ben-Yami CEU eTD Collection Budapest 2013 Academic honesty statement I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institution, and no materials previously written and/or published by another person unless otherwise noted. Signature CEU eTD Collection Abstract This thesis presents a case for skepticism about the idea that explanation in psychology must proceed uniformly throughout the discipline by adopting a strict version of natural scientific explanation. This idea is not itself a piece of psychology, but a philosophical commitment derivative from the historical struggle of psychology to establish its scientific credentials. Here it is argued that these credentials are not threatened by accepting diverse patterns of explanation for dissimilar explananda. A specific version of this argument is developed in this thesis; its backbone is a distinction between the kinds of individuals that constitute the object of psychological explanation. Individuals are arranged from the equator of typical, socially competent, accultured persons, to various poles or ‗margins‘. This arrangement reflects the degree of opacity of various persons, as seen from the interpretive standpoint of (their own) common culture. Two such poles are explored here: young children, and psychotic individuals. Given this topology, the thesis argues that the explanatory and interpretive practices and concepts which psychology inherits from common use in paradigmatic cases cannot be extended to ‗marginal‘ situations. Moreover, the lessons learned in ‗marginal‘ or exceptional cases are not, by default, lessons about central or regular subjects. This is in part a view about common psychological concepts. Essential psychological notions – belief, intention, motive, etc. – are meaningful or applicable within the scope of culturally established practices. They are not terms of art, claims of regimentation notwithstanding. This does not exclude the possibility of their being adequate material for scientific explanation. But their explanatory force is dependent on shareable practices, and where the cultural support falters, so does the CEU eTD Collection applicability of the relevant concepts. This does not mean that the inherent ambiguity of ‗marginal‘ cases excludes explanation; but it does exclude its being dissipated as a problem of difficult translation. Where there is serious doubt that something counts as belief or intention, this cannot be settled by definitional fiat. Abstract The thesis proceeds as follows. The first chapter presents evidence for the persistence through theoretical changes of the idea that psychology progresses as a natural science grounded in a unified explanatory pattern (Mill, James, Watson, Köhler, Marr). In the most telling cases, this idea takes the form that the adequacy of natural scientific explanation in exceptional cases (e.g. psychopathology) confirms that already familiar explanations of typical cases must be conceived of as natural scientific in the same sense. The chapter then focuses on two traditions which resist this view: the defense of the autonomy of the Geisteswissenschaften, areas of psychology here included (Dilthey, Collingwood); and Wittgenstein‘s views about the applicability of (regular) psychological concepts in exceptional scenarios. The eventual target of invoking these sources of resistance is the popularity in recent developmental and clinical cognitive psychology of theories that assimilate the explanatory order of the ‗margins‘ to that of the paradigm. The second chapter develops this idea in the developmental case (Tomasello‘s shared intentionality model of early communication and cooperation), while the third focuses on psychosis (Frith‘s theory of schizophrenia). CEU eTD Collection Everything is on a reduced scale here in the Polar regions; we can't afford to be extravagant. Amundsen CEU eTD Collection Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1. Fragments of a conceptual landscape .................................................................................. 20 1.1 Preamble: a note on the cognitive revolution .............................................................................. 20 1.2 Pluralism in psychology as antidote for grand theories ............................................................... 25 1.3 The argument from the margins as argument against ‗more-of-the-same‘ explanation .............. 27 1.4 A story of progress ...................................................................................................................... 33 1.5 Progress: Mill .............................................................................................................................. 36 1.6 Progress: James ........................................................................................................................... 39 1.7 Progress: Watson ......................................................................................................................... 51 1.8 Progress, further examples: Köhler, Marr, Morton, and Carey ................................................... 58 1.9 Interlude....................................................................................................................................... 65 1.10 Resistance: Dilthey .................................................................................................................... 69 1.11 Resistance: Collingwood ........................................................................................................... 78 1.12 Resistance: Wittgenstein, introductory remarks ........................................................................ 92 1.13 Resistance: Wittgenstein, anthropological difference ............................................................... 99 1.14 Parenthesis: anthropological vs. psychological difference; Snell, Onians and Jaynes ............ 109 1.15 Resistance: Wittgenstein, psychological difference ................................................................ 117 1.16 Resistance: a note on McDowell ............................................................................................. 130 1.17 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................ 132 Chapter 2. Development ...................................................................................................................... 134 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 134 2.2 Tomasello on shared intentionality: overview .......................................................................... 137 2.3 Influences: Searle ...................................................................................................................... 144 2.4 Influences: Bratman .................................................................................................................. 158 2.5 Tomasello‘s proposal ................................................................................................................ 167 2.6 Concluding remarks .................................................................................................................. 183 Chapter 3. Psychosis ............................................................................................................................ 187 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 187 CEU eTD Collection 3.2 Freud and Schreber .................................................................................................................... 193 3.3 Rokeach and Leon Gabor .......................................................................................................... 204 3.4 Counterpoint: Richard Bentall ................................................................................................... 213 3.5 Frith: context and a riddle about psychological explanation ..................................................... 218 3.6 Frith: the model ......................................................................................................................... 232 3.7 Frith: aftermath and conclusion ................................................................................................. 241 Table of Contents Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 248 References ........................................................................................................................................... 253 CEU eTD Collection List of Illustrations Figure 1. Pinson - model of fetus, late 18th century................................................................................ 1 Figure 2 - Fetuses in utero, 12th century ............................................................................................. 134 Figure 3. Pirna and Schloss Sonnenstein, by Bernardo Bellotto (Canaletto) .....................................